DRAFT Storming the Reality Studio: Leveraging Public Information in the War on Terror Brendan Matthew-Gordon Kelly Prepared for the 47th Annual International Studies Association Convention March 22-25, 2006 San Diego, CA Abstract This paper ar gues that the war on terror is understood on both sides as an idea war, an event that signifies the triumph of Constructivist theories over strictly Realist interpretations of international politics. It further argues that this is a watershed event, in which information operations have finally taken a primary role in military strategy. Finally, it argues that this is most visible in cyberspace. On February 17th, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld spoke before the Council on Foreign Relations to argue that America was losing the information war in its struggle against radical Islam: Rumsfeld also said al-Qaida and other Islamic extremist groups have poisoned the Muslim public's view of the United States through deft use of the Internet and other modern communications methods that the American government has failed to master. "Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today's media age, but for the most part we - our country, our government - has not adapted," he said. 1 This argument is problematic for several reasons. First, it fails to consider the possibility that the Muslim world’s “poisoned” view of the United States has nothing to do with Al-Qaeda or other extremist organizations.2 But even if we accept Rumsfeld’s argument at face value, these statements are still problematic. The fact is that America, the home of Hollywood and Madison Avenue, has dominated the art of political spin for decades. The relationship between the military and the entertainment industry has grown so symbiotic that one scholar has labeled it the “military-industrial-media-entertainment” network.3 1 “Rumsfeld Says Extremists Winning Media War.” USA Today (February 17, 2006) 2 A legitimate argument asserts that America’s current troubles are larger than a simple image problem. In this worldview, America’s terrorist woes are the result of longstanding foreign policies, and cannot be dispelled with any amount of PR. This position is best summarized by Osama Siblani, publisher of the Arab American News: "The United States lost the public relations war in the Muslim world a long time ago. They could have the prophet Muhammad doing public relations and it wouldn't help." Without actually disputing this argument, it should be noted that this argument is not sufficiently nuanced. For example, it does not explain why its propaganda strategy, which had worked so long for America, is failing now. Nor does it consider that radical Islam is directed against many countries other than the U.S. Finally, it does not consider the way in which non-state actors and foreign governments manipulate information for their own advantage. 3 Der Derian, James. Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network. (Westview Press, Boulder CO, 2001) In response to September 11th, the US government harnessed the power of this relationship to launch a coordinated public relations campaign spanning print, broadcast, and Internet media.4 This public relations campaign complements a broad counterterrorism strategy utilizing all tools available to government, incorporating public diplomacy, strategic deception, and psychological operations. It was–and is– nothing less than a full-fledged attempt to disrupt terrorism by any means necessary. In light of these facts, it is simply incomprehensible to insinuate that the US has “not adapted” to the media age. What Rumsfeld means is that the openness of Western media has allowed other voices to emerge that challenge the American position. What Rumsfeld is arguing, in effect, is that the US military policy of “full-spectrum dominance” must be pursued in the information sphere as well. America must be prepared to fight dirty, even if it means propagating misinformation and declaring preemptive strikes on any information sources not sympathetic to the American perspective. This attitude is in strong contradiction to the ideals of Western democracy, which prizes freedom of expression. It is in this way—clinging to outdated notions of free speech—that Americans and their government “have not adapted” to fighting wars in the media age. The Internet earns a special place in this debate. As a global, two-way information system, the Internet has always had the potential to unite geographically-dispersed networks. Recently, this potential has been exploited by jihadists, and it has become 4 “The Art of Networking and Public Diplomacy.” Charlotte Beers, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. April 11, 2002. a truism that the Internet is a haven for terrorism.5 Presumably this is a problem because the Internet serves as a virtual “command and control center” allowing for direct communication between Islamists cells. Recently, however, the propaganda value of the Internet has also been acknowledged, noting that it gives Islamists a direct window to global audiences and potential converts. The terrorist threat has been invoked as a justification for sweeping surveillance powers in the electronic sphere.6 It is ironic that the Internet, an American- dominated and “inherently democratic” institution, should cause such problems for American intelligence. For a decade, cyberenthusiasts have proclaimed the Internet as a panacea for authoritarianism and censorship, due to its distributed architecture. Analysts have been predicting for years that the Net will bring down authoritarian rule in places such as China, Cuba, and the Middle East to usher in American-style democracy. And yet, now it is America that faces a global threat from the open information infrastructure. However, rather than prove the cyberlibertarian thesis, the Americans may yet turn the power of the Net against their extremist enemies--just as China has made impressive steps in curbing the Net. However, unlike the Chinese, who have adopted a defensive information posture by firewalling off their country, the US is practicing an offensive information strategy in which it actively reaches out to identify, degrade, and (occasionally) silence opposing viewpoints. 5 Coll, Stephen and Susan B. Glasser. “Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations.” Washington Post (August 7, 2005): A01 6 Risen, James. State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration. (Free Press, New York, 2006) This paper argues that the war on terror is understood on both sides as an idea war, and that both sides have launched coordinated media attacks to influence public opinion. It further argues that this is a watershed event, in which information operations have finally taken a primary role in military strategy. Finally, it argues that this is most visible in cyberspace. Understanding the War on Terror as Information War The Global War on Terror (GWOT) has changed the face of the map, bringing NATO to Afghanistan, and coalition forces to the streets of Baghdad. But the war on terror cannot be understood by looking at a map, as it is not limited to military actions. The war on terror is primarily a war of ideas; a battle of differing shapes of the future. Public officials have long acknowledged that the global war on terror is primarily a war of ideas.7 In this conflict, the greatest battleground is not Afghanistan or Iraq, but the public ideosphere. The great prize in the ideational war is the idea of legitimacy, as insurgents and state security forces alike attempt to mold the ideosphere in their favor, striving to convince skeptical publics that they are the rightful spokespersons. Information warfare is not a new concept, and nothing is fundamentally different in its application today. What is different is the proportion of resources and attention dedicated to information operations. In past military conflicts, information operations were regarded as secondary to actual “kinetic” combat, and intended to bestow an advantage on one’s conventional military forces. But in modern information warfare, the battle of ideas has supplanted and replaced the actual 7 “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.” February 2003. conflict. The pseudo-military discipline of “perception management” strives to alter an adversary’s worldview and obviate the need for combat. This is a shadowy discipline, marrying fields of public diplomacy, psyops, and strategic deception. Most importantly, perception management is targeted against friend and foe alike, and must be cultivated in times of peace, giving rise to oxymoronic statements like “peace-time military operations.”8 It is a situation in which the presentation is the real battle, and the actual combat between armed adversaries is secondary. The situation has come to vindicate the arguments of postmodern philosopher Jean Baudrillard, who argued over fifteen years ago that representation (the “hyperreal”) was replacing the real in international politics.9 In military jargon, “information operations” is an umbrella term that refers to attacks against military command and control centers on one hand, and psychological operations against hostile populations. Traditionally, it has been possible to separate these two functions. But the GWOT is exceptional for two important reasons: first, the idea war is largely preemptive, without clear distinctions between active combatants, potential recruits, and sympathetic audiences. Secondly, modern global communications are so