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FOKUS | 2/2014 Transatlantic Relations: Permanent Alliance or Perpetual Crisis? Stanley R. Sloan The on-going discussion in the European to a shared transatlantic belief that the we look at our security problems from the Union, NATO and in Western capitals about combination of weakness in worn-torn vantage of these unique national perspec- how to understand, and what to do about, Europe and the apparent expansionist tives.” Today, it seems that: “Plus ça change, Russian aggression against Ukraine has intentions of the Soviet Union necessita- plus c’est la même chose!” revealed some clear fault lines. Some of ted steps to keep Moscow from spreading those fault lines run through the Atlan- control further West in Europe. Burdensharing Issue Born tic, but even more dramatic ones have emerged between those NATO and EU The Treaty recorded an impressive agenda In the late 1940s, the United Kingdom, members who live in Russia’s immediate of values and interests shared by the France and other European countries wan- neighborhood and those who do not. signatories. They pledged in the treaty’s ted a substantial American contribution preamble “to safeguard the freedom, to defense arrangements on the ground This analysisi provides some historical per- common heritage and civilisation of their in Europe. On the other hand, the United spectives on the transatlantic relationship peoples, founded on the principles of States, and particularly the US Congress, as background for what may become a democracy, individual liberty and the wanted to place limits on that contribu- very difficult Euro-Atlantic debate on how rule of law.” The Article 5 commitment to tion. In addition, some Americans, inclu- to deal with Vladimir Putin’s Russia in the collective defense was particularly impres- ding leading members of the US Congress, wake of his recent actions in Ukraine. The sive, in spite of language letting members wanted to bring the military capabilities analysis starts from the premise that the choose exactly what they would do in the of Germany and Spain into play as soon as transatlantic alliance was born in crisis, and case of an attack on another member. But possible. This American desire met with that the history of transatlantic relations the outward expressions of consensus on strong European opposition. since 1949 can be seen, in part, as driven general values, interests and commitments by perceived crises and the responses of partially concealed the fact that some very While the United States was most con- the transatlantic allies to those crises.ii different agendas and priorities motivated cerned about countering Soviet power, It proceeds from the premise that it is a the original members. France was focused on constraining mistake to look at transatlantic relations as Germany’s military potential. US Secretary simply an interaction between the United This should not come as a surprise. The of State Dean Acheson, to win the advice States on one side and “Europe” on the policies and perspectives of the original and consent of the United States Senate other. Europe has never been so coherent members, those who have joined since, to the North Atlantic Treaty, reassured to be able to describe it as one entity, and those, like Austria, who are members the Senate Foreign Relations Committee particularly when it comes to defense and of the Atlantic community through their that the treaty would not force the United security interests of European states. European Union membership, are products States to deploy large numbers of troops of a variety of factors. As I observed wri- to Europe. One key to avoiding such Origins ting about US relations with West Germany deployments would be the rearmament of in 1984iv, “We differ about how to deal with West Germany. Over the past 65 years, the crises in the Soviet Union not because one of us is transatlantic relations almost always right and the other is wrong. We disagree However, at the same time, French Foreign had something to do with how the allies because we see the problem from our own Minister Robert Schuman reassured French should deal with the Soviet Union or, since geographical locations; our perceptions parliamentarians prior to the National the end of the Cold War, with Russia. But are based on unique historical experiences; Assembly’s vote on the treaty, saying, “Ger- they also frequently were very much about our ideological frameworks have been many has no army and should not have how to deal with each other.iii shaped by different factors; our economic one. It has no arms and will not have any... interests have their own separate founda- It is therefore unthinkable, for France and The negotiations leading to agreement on tions; and we have substantially different her allies, that Germany could be allowed the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty responded military capabilities and world roles. Thus, to adhere to the Atlantic pact as a nation 1 FOKUS | 2/2014 capable of defending itself or of aiding in concept of the deal it had struck with the Defiant de Gaulle the defense of other nations.”v Europeans in 1949. Thus, the burden- sharing issue was born. It was to become In the years ahead, one issue after another The British, meanwhile, were hoping to mi- the “perpetual crisis” for this seemingly posed challenges, and stimulated new nimize their commitments on the ground permanent alliance. crises. The most serious internal crisis in in Europe so that they could concentrate the alliance came in 1966, when French on maintaining the Commonwealth. A In the same period, the Eisenhower President Charles de Gaulle declared that solid American commitment to European administration told the NATO allies that he was pulling France out of NATO’s Inte- defense would support that objective. the United States was adopting a policy grated Command Structure. As Secretary of massive retaliation against the Soviet of State Dean Rusk prepared to go to Paris The outcome reflected in the treaty repre- Union should it attack Europe. The theory to discuss the situation with President de sented compromises between all of these was simple: in attacking Western Europe, Gaulle, President Lyndon Baines Johnson approaches. Specifically, the treaty’s the Soviet Union would risk American raised a burden-sharing question of his Article 3 said that “In order more effectively strategic nuclear attacks on its cities and own, directing a reluctant Rusk to ask to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the forces. The administration viewed this as a de Gaulle: „Does your order include the Parties, separately and jointly, by means way of deterring the Soviet Union without bodies of American soldiers in France‘s of continuous and effective self-help and permanently deploying large numbers of cemeteries?“vi mutual aid, will maintain and develop their US forces on the continent, thus limiting individual and collective capacity to resist the burden on the US treasury. De Gaulle’s decision reflected his belief armed attack.” that Europe, and France in particular, Suez Crisis and the Three Wise Men needed sufficient freedom from American The treaty therefore underlined the com- dominance in NATO to be able to make mitment to the “mutual aid” desired by the Against the backdrop of these difficult be- autonomous decisions about defense, Europeans and the “effective self-help” on ginnings, the residual colonial instincts of including decisions about the use of the which the American commitment to the the UK and France led to a major transat- French strategic nuclear force de frappe. alliance was based. lantic rift in 1956 when the two European But President Johnson’s reaction sug- powers attempted to seize control of the gested some of the emotions stirred by In spite of the impressive accomplishment Suez Canal. The United States opposed de Gaulle’s dramatic assertion of indepen- represented by the Treaty of Washington, it the move in the United Nations, and its dence could raise further problems for did not take long for transatlantic troubles two allies were forced to back down, transatlantic relations down the road. to break out into the open. NATO’s first seriously burdening US bilateral ties to the Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight UK and France and threatening political Nuclear Issues David Eisenhower, was elected President consensus in the transatlantic alliance in 1952 at the head of a Republican Party more generally. The role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s de- determined to get America’s financial fense plans remained a contentious issue house in order. Ironically, just prior to the British/French throughout the Cold War. move against Egypt, the NATO allies had The fiscally-conservative Eisenhower admi- recognized that political and economic In response to European desires to have nistration quickly became frustrated with divisions among them threatened alliance a larger role in NATO nuclear deployment the minimal progress toward estab lishing a credibility, and had appointed a senior decisions, the Eisenhower and Kennedy European Defense Community. In Decem- “Three Wise Men” committee (the foreign administrations developed the idea of a ber 1953, Secretary of State John Foster ministers of Canada, Italy and Norway) to NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), Dulles traveled to Paris to warn the North find ways to improve non-military cooper- in which NATO allies would participate Atlantic Council that the United States ation in the alliance. in the deployment of US Polaris nuclear would be forced to undertake an “agoni- missile systems. But agreement was never zing re-appraisal” of the US commitment Their recommendation for enhanced con- reached on the terms and conditions for if the Europeans did not do better. The sultations on a wide range of issues has implementation. plan for a European Defense Community been echoed in alliance documents ever nonetheless failed in the French National since but perhaps never fully implemen- At the same time, the growing Soviet Assembly the next year.

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