ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: SHEATHING the SWORD
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ABSTRACT Title of dissertation: SHEATHING THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES: ASSESSING AL QAEDA AND DEVISING A U.S. RESPONSE Kevin McGrath, Doctor of Philosophy, 2007 Dissertation directed by: Professor Miranda Schreurs Department of Government and Politics Al Qaeda killed over 3,000 US citizens on September 11, 2001, and terrorism leapt to the fore of US strategic and political priorities. Yet, after nearly six year of concerted effort by the United States, the dominant power in the international system, Al Qaeda survives and is still acknowledged as a potent threat. This begs the question not just of why, but of what the United States can do to redress the situation. This dissertation seeks answers by examining the four key aspects of Al Qaeda that enable it function as a successful terrorist entity – strategy, organization, financing, and politics. These factors area analyzed relative to the dynamics of the phenomenon of terrorism in the US-Al Qaeda struggle. For each variable, Al Qaeda’s perspective and efforts, as well as the perspective and efforts of the United States, are scrutinized. This dissertation assesses Al Qaeda is primarily a political threat, not a military one. Terrorists subvert legitimate political processes to achieve political ends. Al Qaeda challenges not only specific US political decisions, but also the very nature of the US political system, a classical liberal democracy, and the nature of the US-created post World War II international order. The character of the US political response is critical. As such, this dissertation concludes that US efforts to combat such a threat cannot be limited solely to a hard power approach. Such a component must be present in US strategy, for it alone directly degrades Al Qaeda’s capacity for violence, the source of its power. The US approach must, however, include a greater emphasis on the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s political dimension. The political aspect both drives the conflict and frames its execution, thus shaping the possible outcomes in both the near and far term. Fortunately, as the leader of the international system, the United States is in a position to politically undercut Al Qaeda. The United States can do so by adhering to globally revered traditional US political values and foreign policy emphases – the rule of law, a participatory political system emphasizing the importance of international institutions, and democratic values, such as human rights – in not just the execution, but also the formulation of US policy. The potential impact is significant. Internally, manipulating the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s political dimension in accordance with traditional US values can weaken Al Qaeda’s internal cohesion. Externally, the United States can narrow Al Qaeda’s room for maneuver by depriving it of political support, thus strategically degrading Al Qaeda’s operational capability. In the process, the United States will also stunt the terrorism process’s subversive effects on the United States’ political character. In short, addressing the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s political dimension in a manner consistent with traditional US political values ensures US political integrity while also yielding national advantage. SHEATHING THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES: ASSESSING AL QAEDA AND DEVISING A U.S. RESPONSE by Kevin McGrath Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2007 Advisory Committee: Professor Miranda Schreurs, Chair Professor George Quester Professor Jillian Schwedler Professor John Steinbruner Professor Nancy Gallagher ©Copyright by Kevin McGrath 2007 ii DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to all those, both military and civilian, who choose to commit to and give of themselves to the fight against Al Qaeda. iii Acknowledgements This dissertation is the result of a collaborative effort of supporting people, without whom nothing of any real value would have been accomplished. I would particularly like to thank my committee chair, whose comments honed spirited blathering into an argument, and my dissertation committee, without whose indulgences this project would never have materialized. Admiral Stansfield Turner was also a formative academic influence whose coursework formed the basis of this project. I would also like to especially note the help of Eden “Terrorism Consiglierie” Terrenzini for her printing and editing prowess, and Keith “My dissertation will be on the Cubs” Williams, my friend who pitched in when I was in crisis mode to help bring this project to fruition. Of particular note, I would like to thank some elite officers with whom I have deployed and/or had the privilege or supporting from the rear – Paul, Ollie, Kevin, Lantz, Travis, H, S, KB, and Sean. I have learned a tremendous amount, both personal and professional, from these colleagues, friends, and mentors. Their influence is present throughout this work, and I owe them a tremendous debt, both professional and personal. Last, but not least, I would like to thank my immediate chain of command at work – Phil, Dee, and Jim – whose graciousness enabled this project, and without whose support it never would have happened. I would also like to thank a multitude of people who kept me sane – “the Heathers,” the Wildcat, the JMU crew, the Mangos, Seth, Mandy “Her Environmental Highness” McNally, and those from work who have transitioned from colleague to friend. I have pretty much blown all of you off through the spring, summer, and fall of 2007. I appreciate your indulgence. The bubble boy is being released back into the wild. The first beer is on me. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables v Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Research Question / Hypothesis 2 Background 3 Justification for Study / Objectives 6 Literature Overview 7 Scope 11 Methodology 13 Structure of Study 16 Chapter 2: Analytic Framework 19 Introduction 19 Root Premise 19 Process of Systematic Scrutiny 20 Who are the participants? 20 What are the actors’ interests? 27 How are the actors now working to secure their interests? 31 What are the strengths and weaknesses of these efforts? 36 Resulting State of Play 44 Conclusion 45 Chapter 3: Historical and Political Background 48 Introduction 48 Formation of Al Qaeda – International Context 49 Formation of Al Qaeda – Role of Afghanistan 49 Formation of Al Qaeda – Organizational Precursors 51 Formation of Al Qaeda – Role of Usama bin Laden 53 Formation of Al Qaeda – Ending of Afghan Jihad 54 Formation of Al Qaeda – The Organization Coalesces 56 Al Qaeda – Displacing to and Congealing in Sudan 58 Al Qaeda – Returning to Afghanistan 60 Preparing to Turn the Corner to Terrorism 61 Turning the Corner – Al Qaeda Turns Terrorist 63 Conclusion 64 Chapter 4: Al Qaeda Strategy 66 Introduction 66 Al Qaeda’s Political Goals 66 Al Qaeda’s Intermediary Objectives 70 Trends in Al Qaeda Thinking 71 Al Qaeda’s Employment of Terrorism 74 v Al Qaeda’s Strategy Prior to 9/11 76 Al Qaeda’s Strategy Post 9/11 77 Conclusion 83 Chapter 5: US Strategy 85 Introduction 85 Post 9/11 US Strategy to Combat Al Qaeda 86 Part I 86 Part II 89 Current International Relations and US Foreign Policy 93 Contemporary International Realities 94 Afghanistan 94 Iraq 97 Iran and the Greater Middle East 98 Contemporary US Foreign Policy 101 Emerging US Strategy to Combat Al Qaeda 106 US War in Iraq 106 Lebanon and Jihadists 113 Syria and Sunni Jihadists 115 Conclusion 116 Chapter 6: Al Qaeda As An Organization 118 Introduction 118 Al Qaeda – Pre 9/11 Structure and Operations 119 Structure 119 Operations 120 Al Qaeda – Post 9/11 Structure and Operations 121 Mass 121 Structure 122 Operations 129 The Rise of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia 132 Pre Death of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi 133 Post Death of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi 136 Conclusion 143 Chapter 7: Countering Al Qaeda As An Organization 146 Introduction 146 Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Gravity 147 Afghanistan 148 Pakistan 149 Iraq Center of Gravity 159 Diffuse Global Presence Center of Gravity 162 Countering Network 163 Renditions – A Unilateral Approach 166 Conclusion 171 vi Chapter 8: Al Qaeda Financing 174 Introduction 174 Usama Bin Laden’s Finances 175 Al Qaeda Finance Pre 9/11 – Generating Income 176 Al Qaeda Finance Pre 9/11 – Handling & Moving Money 179 Al Qaeda Finance Pre 9/11 – Spending Income 185 Al Qaeda Finance Post 9/11 – Generating Income 187 Al Qaeda Finance Post 9/11 – Handling & Moving Money 193 Al Qaeda Finance Post 9/11 – Spending Income 194 Existing US Procedures to Combat Al Qaeda Finance 196 Stage I 196 Stage II 201 Weaknesses in US Procedures 202 Conclusion 203 Chapter 9: US-Al Qaeda Struggle Politics 206 Introduction 206 Looking At Al Qaeda 206 US-Al Qaeda Struggle 208 Muslim Publics and US Political Values 208 US Public Standing 211 Policies Versus Values 212 Perceptions of the United States by Muslim Publics 215 Perceptions of Al Qaeda by Muslim Publics 216 Possibilities for the Future 216 Implications for the US-Al Qaeda Struggle 217 Conclusion 221 Chapter 10: Conclusion 224 Introduction 224 US-Al Qaeda Struggle Synopsis 226 Way Ahead 234 Proposed US Political Focus 235 Proposed US Objective 235 Proposed US Security Policy Issue Prism 236 Proposed US Policy Approach to Al Qaeda 237 Conclusion 243 1 Introduction “When people are entering upon a war they do things the wrong way round. Action comes first, and it is only when they have already suffered that they begin to think. Thucydides (as quoted in Berner 2005, prologue) “If you wish to conduct offensive war you must know the men employed by the enemy. Are they wise or stupid, clever or clumsy? Having assessed their qualities, you prepare appropriate measures.” Sun Tzu (Tzu and Griffith 1963, 148) After more than five years of concerted effort by the United States, the most powerful state in the international system, to politically and organizationally neuter Al Qaeda, a numerically small, resource-poor, transnational terrorist group hunted by every state, Al Qaeda is not only not defeated, it remains a potent threat.