Chapter 4 • Copyright Notice, Deposit, and Registration
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
The Music Modernization Act of 2018 and Its Burgeoning Impact Jeffrey G
The Music Modernization Act of 2018 and its Burgeoning Impact Jeffrey G. Knowles, Partner, Coblentz Patch Duffy & Bass LLP Lisa M. Schreihart, Attorney Abstract The Music Modernization Act of 2018 (“MMA”), enacted October 11, 2018, is the most significant reform of music copyright law in decades. As the first major legislation since the Copyright Act of 1976 to affect music royalties, the MMA has made major strides in improving compensation and to level the playing field for all music creators, including songwriters, legacy artists, and music producers. The MMA modernizes the musical works licensing scheme for today’s digital music environment, provides federal copyright protection for pre-1972 sound recordings, and ensures that music producers can get a piece of the royalty pie. The MMA may also have some shortcomings that allow room for legislative growth in the modern music era. This paper describes the key parts of the MMA and eXamines the benefits and criticisms of the Act that have surfaced in the Act’s first year as law. An Overview of the Music Modernization Act The Music Modernization Act (MMA), proposed as H.R. 1551 by Representatives Orrin G. Hatch and Bob Goodlatte, combined the Music Modernization Act of 2018 (S. 2334), the Classics Protection and Access Act (S. 2393), and the Allocation for Music Producers Act (S. 2625). The MMA, an amended version of S. 2823, passed unanimously both in the House as H.R. 5447 on April 25, 2018 and in the Senate on September 18, 2018. The MMA was enacted October 11, 2018. The MMA is intended to: 1) increase compensation to songwriters and streamline licensing of their music; 2) enable artists who recorded music before 1972 to be paid royalties when their music is played on digital services; and 3) enable music producers (e.g., record producers, sound engineers, and other studio professionals) to receive royalties for their creative contributions to recorded music. -
Circular 1 Copyright Basics
CIRCULAR 1 Copyright Basics Copyright is a form of protection Copyright is a form of protection provided by the laws of the provided by U.S. law to authors of United States to the authors of “original works of authorship” that are fixed in a tangible form of expression. An original “original works of authorship” from work of authorship is a work that is independently created by the time the works are created in a a human author and possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. A work is “fixed” when it is captured (either fixed form. This circular provides an by or under the authority of an author) in a sufficiently overview of basic facts about copyright permanent medium such that the work can be perceived, and copyright registration with the reproduced, or communicated for more than a short time. Copyright protection in the United States exists automatically U.S. Copyright Office. It covers from the moment the original work of authorship is fixed.1 • Works eligible for protection • Rights of copyright owners What Works Are Protected? • Who can claim copyright • Duration of copyright Examples of copyrightable works include • Literary works • Musical works, including any accompanying words • Dramatic works, including any accompanying music • Pantomimes and choreographic works • Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works • Motion pictures and other audiovisual works • Sound recordings, which are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds • Architectural works These categories should be viewed broadly for the purpose of registering your work. For example, computer programs and certain “compilations” can be registered as “literary works”; maps and technical drawings can be registered as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” w copyright.gov note: Before 1978, federal copyright was generally secured by publishing a work with an appro- priate copyright notice. -
The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred V. Ashcroft
The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred v. Ashcroft By Pamela Samuelson* I. Introduction The past decade has witnessed an extraordinary blossoming of scholarship on the constitutional law of intellectual property,1 much of which focuses on copyright law.2 Had the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Eldred’s challenge to the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act,3 this body of scholarship would have undoubtedly proliferated with alacrity. Many scholars would have been eager to offer interpretations of implications of an Eldred-favorable decision for other intellectual property disputes.4 Given the Ashcroft-favorable outcome, some may expect the Eldred decision to “deconstitutionalize” intellectual property law and reduce to a trickle further scholarly * Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Information Management, University of California at Berkeley. Research support for this article was provided by NSF Grant No. SES 9979852. I wish to thank Eddan Katz for his exceptional research assistance with this article. 1 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 99 (2000); Paul J. Heald and Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1119 (2000); Robert Patrick Merges and Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 J. Legis. 45 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 529 (2000); Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection Of The Intellectual Property And Commerce Clauses Of The Constitution: Beyond A Critique Of Shakespeare Co. v. -
Section 1201 Rulemaking: Seventh Triennial Proceeding to Determine
united states copyright office section 1201 rulemaking: Seventh Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention recommendation of the acting register of copyrights october 2018 Section 1201 Rulemaking: Seventh Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention Recommendation of the Acting Register of Copyrights TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1 II. LEGAL BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................... 9 A. Section 1201(a)(1) ............................................................................................................. 9 B. Relationship to Other Provisions of Section 1201 and Other Laws ........................ 11 C. Rulemaking Standards ................................................................................................. 12 D. Streamlined Renewal Process ...................................................................................... 17 III. HISTORY OF SEVENTH TRIENNIAL PROCEEDING ................................................ 20 IV. RENEWAL RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................... 22 V. DISCUSSION OF NEW PROPOSED CLASSES ............................................................. 31 A. Proposed Class 1: Audiovisual Works—Criticism and Comment ......................... 31 B. Proposed Class 2: Audiovisual -
Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement
J.H. REICHMAN* Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement I. Preliminary Considerations The absorption of classical intellectual property law into international economic law will gradually establish universal minimum standards' governing the relations between innovators and second comers in an integrated world market.2 This author's previous articles focused on the broader legal and economic implications of this trend.3 The object here is to convey a more detailed and comprehensive *B.A., Chicago, 1958; J.D., Yale, 1979. Professor of law, Vanderbilt Law School, Nashville, Tennessee. The author wishes to thank Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Paul Edward Geller, Paul Goldstein, Robert E. Hudec, and David Nimmer for helpful comments and critical suggestions, John Henderson and Jon Mellis for their research assistance, and Dean John J. Costonis for the grants that supported this project. 1. For a perceptive analysis of the conditions favoring the growth of universal legal standards generally, see Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 543-50 (1993) (stressing "central role" of multilateral forums "in the creation and shaping of contemporary international law" and the ability of these forums to "move the solutions substantially towards acquiring the status of international law"). 2. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Componentof the GATT 's Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospectsfor Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 173-78, 254-66 (1993) [hereinafter Reichman, TRIPS Component]. For background to these negotiations, see also J.H. -
ELDRED V. ASHCROFT: the CONSTITUTIONALITY of the COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT by Michaeljones
COPYRIGHT ELDRED V. ASHCROFT: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT By MichaelJones On January 15, 2003, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA"), which extended the term of copyright protection by twenty years.2 The decision has been ap- plauded by copyright protectionists who regard the extension as an effec- tive incentive to creators. In their view, it is a perfectly rational piece of legislation that reflects Congress's judgment as to the proper copyright term, balances the interests of copyright holders and users, and brings the3 United States into line with the European Union's copyright regime. However, the CTEA has been deplored by champions of a robust public domain, who see the extension as a giveaway to powerful conglomerates, which runs contrary to the public interest.4 Such activists see the CTEA as, in the words of Justice Stevens, a "gratuitous transfer of wealth" that will impoverish the public domain. 5 Consequently, Eldred, for those in agree- ment with Justice Stevens, is nothing less than the "Dred Scott case for 6 culture." The Court in Eldred rejected the petitioners' claims that (1) the CTEA did not pass constitutional muster under the Copyright Clause's "limited © 2004 Berkeley Technology Law Journal & Berkeley Center for Law and Technology. 1. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301-304 (2002). The Act's four provisions consider term extensions, transfer rights, a new in- fringement exception, and the division of fees, respectively; this Note deals only with the first provision, that of term extensions. -
Copyright Law Revision
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW JULY 1961 Printed for the use of the House-- Committee on the Judiciary U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 676682 WASHINGTON : 1961 For sale by the Superlntendent of Documents, U.S. Qo7cmment Prlntlug O5ce Wn~bington25, D.O. - Prlco 45 cent8 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL THE LIBRAR~AWOF CORORESB, Washington, l).C. July 7, 1961. Hon. SAMRAYE~N, Igpealcw of the House of Representatices, Washington. D.C. SIB: As authorized by Congress, the Copyright Office of the =brary of Con- gress has in the past few years made a number of studies preparatory to a general revision of the copyright law, title 17 of the United States Code. That program bas now been completed. Thirty-four studies and a subject index have been published in a series of 12 committee prints issued by the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The studies have been widely circulated and interested persons were inrited to submit their comments and views. On the basis of the studies and the comments and views received. the Copy- right Ofece has prepared a report on the important issues to be considered and tentative recommendations for their solution in a general revision of the law. I am pleased to submit the report of the Register of Copyrights on general re vision of the copyright law to you find to the Vice President for consideration by the Congress. Very truly yours, L. QUINCYMUMFOBD, Librarian of Congress. -
The Role of the Register of Copyrights in the Registration Process: a Critical Appraisal of Certain Exclusionary Regulations *
[Vol.116 COMMENT THE ROLE OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS IN THE REGISTRATION PROCESS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF CERTAIN EXCLUSIONARY REGULATIONS * Under the Copyright Act,' the only action required in order to obtain a valid statutory copyright in a published work is publication with the prescribed notice.' In order to perfect the rights accruing under his copyright, however, the claimant must also "promptly" de- posit two copies of the best edition of the copyrighted work, together with a claim of copyright, in the Copyright Office. 3 Fulfillment of this requirement of registration and deposit is a condition precedent to any action for copyright infringement, but the copyright itself ordi- narily remains valid pending fulfillment.4 Thus, although most claimants register their works as a matter of course, registration may be deferred, without loss of any rights, until the eve of suit. Unfortunately for some copyright claimants, however, the re- quirement of registration cannot be satisfied by the claimant's acts alone: recent cases also require that the Register of Copyrights actually issue a certificate of registration before infringement proceedings can be brought.5 To the extent that the Register has any discretion to * This Comment has been entered in the 1968 Nathan Burkan Memorial Compe- tition. ' 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1964). 2 Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939) ; United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1943). 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964), provides: Any person entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this title; and such notice shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the United States by authority of the copyright proprietor, except in the case of books seeking ad interim protection under section 22 of this title. -
Supreme Court of the United States
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2002 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus ELDRED ET AL. v. ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 01–618. Argued October 9, 2002—Decided January 15, 2003 The Copyright and Patent Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: “Congress shall have Power . [t]o promote the Progress of Science . by securing [to Authors] for limited Times . the exclusive Right to their . Writings.” In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copy- rights by 20 years: Under the 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act), copy- right protection generally lasted from a work’s creation until 50 years after the author’s death; under the CTEA, most copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author’s death, 17 U. S. C. §302(a). As in the case of prior copyright extensions, principally in 1831, 1909, and 1976, Congress provided for application of the en- larged terms to existing and future copyrights alike. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain, brought this suit seeking a de- termination that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” prescription and the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee. -
Circular 2 Copyright Registration
CIRCULAR 2 Copyright Registration This circular provides guidelines for An application for copyright registration contains three submitting a complete, accurate essential elements: a completed application form, a nonre- fundable filing fee, and a nonreturnable deposit—that is, a copyright claim. It covers copy or copies of the work being registered and “deposited” • Completing online and paper with the Copyright Office. The Office will not review your claim until it has received these three elements in compliance applications with its regulations and policies. • Submitting a filing fee This circular provides guidelines to help you make sure 1 • Preparing a deposit copy you submit a complete, accurate copyright claim. Detailed registration requirements can be found in the Compendium • Communicating with the Office of U.S. Copyright Office Practices. • Determining when your registration takes effect Copyright Application A copyright application establishes the basic facts of a claim: the title of the work, the author of the work, the name and address of the claimant or owner of the copyright, the year of creation, whether the work is published, whether the work has been previously registered, and whether the work includes preexisting material. Once submitted to the Office, the application becomes part of the public record and can be viewed by the public upon request. In completing an application, it is important to give clear and accurate information. Establishing a full, accurate record serves the public interest, provides potential licensees with accurate information, and decreases the cost of copyright litigation. Online Application The Copyright Office strongly encourages you to apply online to register an individual literary work, visual arts work, motion picture, musical work, sound recording, other per- forming arts work, or single serial issue. -
You(Tube), Me, and Content ID: Paving the Way for Compulsory Synchronization Licensing on User-Generated Content Platforms Nicholas Thomas Delisa
Brooklyn Law Review Volume 81 | Issue 3 Article 8 2016 You(Tube), Me, and Content ID: Paving the Way for Compulsory Synchronization Licensing on User-Generated Content Platforms Nicholas Thomas DeLisa Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons Recommended Citation Nicholas T. DeLisa, You(Tube), Me, and Content ID: Paving the Way for Compulsory Synchronization Licensing on User-Generated Content Platforms, 81 Brook. L. Rev. (2016). Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol81/iss3/8 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks. You(Tube), Me, and Content ID PAVING THE WAY FOR COMPULSORY SYNCHRONIZATION LICENSING ON USER- GENERATED CONTENT PLATFORMS INTRODUCTION Ever wonder about how the law regulates your cousin’s wedding video posted on her YouTube account? Most consumers do not ponder questions such as “Who owns the content in my video?” or “What is a fair use?” or “Did I obtain the proper permission to use Bruno Mars’s latest single as the backing track to my video?” These are important questions of law that are answered each day on YouTube1 by a system called Content ID.2 Content ID identifies uses of audio and visual works uploaded to YouTube3 and allows rights holders to collect advertising revenue on that content through the YouTube Partner Program.4 It is easy to see why Content ID was implemented—300 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube per minute.5 Over six billion hours of video are watched each month on YouTube (almost an hour for every person on earth),6 and it is unquestionably the most popular streaming video site on the Internet.7 Because of the staggering amount of content 1 See A Guide to YouTube Removals,ELECTRONIC fRONTIER fOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/intellectual-property/guide-to-youtube-removals [http://perma.cc/ BF4Y-PW6E] (last visited June 6, 2016). -
A Case for a Longer Term of Copyright in Canada - Implications of Eldred V
COMMENTAIRE A CASE FOR A LONGER TERM OF COPYRIGHT IN CANADA - IMPLICATIONS OF ELDRED V. ASHCROFT par Kamil Gérard AHMED* En 1993, une directive de l'Union européenne a obligé les États membres à prolonger dans leur droit interne la durée minimale du droit d'auteur de vingt ans, la portant ainsi à soixante-dix ans après le décès de l'auteur, et exclut cette prolongation ne s=appliquant pas aux États non membres qui n=offrent pas la même durée de protection. Cette directive a été le fer de lance de changements législatifs à l'échelle internationale. En 1998, le Congrès américain a adopté le Copyright Term Extension Act, qui prolonge de vingt ans la durée de la protection des droits d'auteur existants et futurs. En 2003, l'arrêt de la Cour suprême des États-Unis Eldred c. Ashcroft, a confirmé la légalité du Copyright Term Extension Act. La protection couvrant la vie de l'auteur et les soixante-dix années suivant son décès dans l'Union européenne et aux États-Unis a eu des répercussions au Canada, où le régime de protection dans la Loi sur le droit d'auteur couvre à ce jour la durée de vie de l=auteur plus cinquante ans. Le présent exposé soutient la position que le Parlement canadien ne doit pas ignorer les développements à l'égard du droit d'auteur dans l'Union européenne et aux États-Unis et qu'il devrait modifier la Loi sur le droit d'auteur du Canada afin de prolonger la durée du droit d'auteur à soixante-dix ans après le décès de celui-ci.