World Bank Document

8 COVY RESTRICTED AF85 Vol. 3

Public Disclosure Authorized This report was prepared for use within the Bank and its affiliated organizations. They do not accept responsibility for its accuracy or completeness. The report may not be published nor may it be quoted as representing their views.

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPIMENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION Public Disclosure Authorized

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

THE CONGO'S ECONOMY: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS

(in three volumes)

VOLUME III

Public Disclosure Authorized TRANSPORT

November 19, 1968 Public Disclosure Authorized

Africa Department CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS AND UNITS

From November 6, 1961 to November 9, 1963

Unit - Congolese franc (CF) US$ 1 CF 64

From November 9, 1963 to June 23, 1967

Unit - Congolese franc (CF) US$ 1 = CF 180 (selling rate) US$ 1 = CF 150 (buying rate)

After June 23, 1967

Unit - Zaire (Z) equals 1, 000 CF US$ 1 ZO. 5

ACRONYMS

CFL: Societe Congolaise des Chemins de Fer des Grands Lacs CFMK: Chemin de Fer Matadi-Kinshasa KDL-BCK: Chemin de Fer Katanga-Dilolo- Leopoldville Chemin de Fer Bas Congo-Katanga OTRACO: Office d'Exploitation des Transports au Congo VICICONGO: Chemin de Fer Vicinaux du Congo THE CONGO'S ECONOMY: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS

VOLUME III - TRANSPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...... i-iii

I. BASIC FEATURES ...... 1

II. CURRENT SITUATION ......

General ...... 4 Traffic ...... *...... 5

III. TRANSPORT POLICY AND COORDINATION ...... 7

General ...... 7 Voia Nationale ...... - 8 Investment Priorities ...... 8 Unw-onomic LTnes ...... 9 Tariffs ...... 9

IV. WA*TERWAYS ... . 1.

A. River Network ...... 1.l B. Serv4.Geq deas Vonis Nav_gabh1- . 12 Bief Maritime ...... 12 *Ri af Mnvpn, Bi!MoP t4;;:.1_X:;;;:;;:v@:7 13 Bief Superieur ...... 13 .S+sMfin iri^^ +* -*oi1 Equipment ...... 13 Inve stmen+ ...... 1..14 C. River Transport ...... 14 D-. D~~.eYrRACO------1-- TGO...... 1 Organization and Management ...... 15 Taf'fic ...... X *.- IR Equipment ...... 20 Finnnal 1itation...... 20 Investment ...... 21

V~~~~- .... p......

a. ~neneaaJ...... *..*...0. 2 B.C. B.Natsadi ...... **...... 25.234 D. Kinshasa...... 25 E. BoFirani ...... ,.26 F. Aketi ...... 28 U. LAer ur -L,...... Page No.

VI. RAILWAYS ...... 30

A. General ...... 30 B. OTRACO ...... 32 General ...... 32 Equipment ...... 32 Traffic ...... 32 Performance ...... 3...... Financial Situation ...... 33 Investment ...... 34 Conclusions ...... 35 C. Compagnte du Chemin de Fer ...... 35 Katanga-Dilolo-Leopoldville (KDL-BCK) ...... 35 Organization, Management and Manpower .. 35 Equipment ...... 36 Traffic ...... 36 Performance ...... * ...... 37 Financial Situation ...... 37 Investments *...... 38 New Railway Line Port Francqui-Kinshasa ... 39 Conclusions ...... hi41

D. Societe Congolaise des Chemins de Fer des Grands Lacs (CFL) ...... 41 Organization and Manpower ...... 41 Equipment ...... 42 Traffic ...... 43 Performance ...... 44 Financial Situation ...... 44 Investment ...... 44 Conclusions ...... 45 E. Societe des Chemins de Fer Vicinaux du Congo (Vicicongo) ...... 45 Organization, Management and Manpower ...... 45 Equipment ...... 46 Traffic ...... 46 Financial Situation ...... 48 Investment ...... 48 Conclusions ...... 49

VII. ROADS AND ROAD TRANSPORT ...... O, 50

A. The Road Network ...... 50 B. Administration and Finance ...... 50 C. Road Maintenance ...... 51 Dl. Road Transport ...... 52 E. Conclusions ...... 53

STA1ISTICAL ANNEX MAP

VOLUME I - MAIN REPORT VOLUME II - AGRICULTURE This volume was prepared by Messrs. J. Brechot, R.Y. Scheiner, A. van Dijck and V. Wouters. MHE CON0'°n V -ya MTTT TJm..... AVTD PROCT°

V olume III. _.IA UA SZ P O A , -T .2T ------A

oU-mary anu CofnQ.LUb.LU

1. The Congo is a large country where the major centers of population, production and trade are widely scattered, consequently, the lines of communications are long. For this reason, the Congo needs an efficient and extensive transport system as an important means of integrating the country politically, administratively and economically.

2. The Congo river and a number of inland lakes have been very valuable natural assets in this respect. They have provided a vast network of navigable waterways, about 15,000 km long, which are mostly navigable the year round. The waterways are the main arteries of the transport network, which also comprises about 5,000 km of railways and about 140,000 km of roads and tracks. This network is highly integrated. The railways serve either as a bypass for river sections which are not navigable or as an extension of the waterways into the hinterland. As to the roads, they serve largely as a feeder network to the railways and waterways. Consequently, each transport mode or section of the network depends very much on another.

3. This network had been well equipped and was able to handle efficiently the traffic being offered before independence. Since then the efficiency of the transport system has badly deteriorated for a variety of reasons. Transport organizations have been seriously weakened by the massive and sudden departure of qualified expatriates and by the general decline in labor morale and discipline. The infrastructure and equipment have suffered considerable damage during rebellions and disorders and they have deteriorated because there has been very little investment in replacement, while repairs and maintenance has been neglected.

4. Broadly speaking, efficiency has declined to the point where the transport system is barely able to handle 70 per cent of the traffic in 1958. Transport is generally slow and subject to long and frequent delays. Some valuable cargoes have been lost or have declined in market value because the necessary transport means were not available at the appropriate time to move commodities to markets or to processing centers. Furthermore, the inefficiency of the national system has made the Congo, and Katanga province in particular, more dependent on the transport systems of neighboring countries. Last but not least, transport costs are mostly about 40- 50 per cent higher than before independence, which is a serious burden on the country's foreign and domestic trade. There is serious concern that the transport system may be unable to meet the expected in-rease in traffic and, thereby, seriously delay the recovery of the economy now under way.

5. The situation is not the same for each of the three principal transport modes. While the railways should be able to meet the expected increase in traffic, the situation of road and river transport is critical. This does not mean that the railways face no problems. The operating efficiency of all four networks is low, the utilization of equipment inefficient and all are overstaffed. These deficiencies are less severe on the KDL-BCK railway serving Katanga than on the other three networks. The KDL-BCK network handles currently more traffic, in terms of ton-k'm, tnan before independence. The deficiencies are somewhat greater on the OTRACO network which comprises the mainline from Matadi to Kinshasa and a branch line serving Mayumbe. The other two networks namely, the CFL serving the eastern part of the country and the Vicicongo serving the north-eastern part, face major problems since they have been seriously affected by the disturbances in these areas. But, since traffic has declined considerably, they have some time to rehabilitate their plant and services.

6. Navigation on the rivers and access to some ports has become much more difficult as a result of poor dredging, the swift propagation of river vegetation (water-hyacinth) and by inadequate navigational aides. At the same time, the efficiency of river transport services has seriously deteriorated. OTRACO, which accounts for 95 per cent of all waterborne transport in the country, is barely able to handle about 50 per cent of the pre- independence traffic in ton-km. The most obvious reasons for this decline in efficiency are: lack of experienced and qualified staff, critical short- ages of imported spare parts, poor labor morale and discipline.

7. As to road transport, the situation is equally critical. The national highway organization has been seriously weakened and has virtually ceased to function in many areas of the country. Maintenance and repairs have been badly neglected, many road sections are full of potholes and the surfaces have either worn off completely or are very thin. In addition many ferries and bridges are out of service. As a result, many areas are difficult to reach or are accessible only at high cost. Many trucking enterprises have lost a large part of their fleet during the rebellions and most of the remaining vehicles are in poor operating conditions.

8. The Government has already taken some measures which should facilitate the rehabilitation of the transport system. Early in 1968, it approved an increase in tariffs which should enable some transport enterprises to earn a surplus during the current year, while others should be able to gradually reduce their losses. Special financial assistance has also been provided to enterprises which have greatly suffered from civil disorders. Thanks to the improving financial situation and the liberali- zation of imports most transport organizations should be able to obtain essential imported spare parts and to realize reasonable programs of maintenance and repairs.

9. At the suggestion of the mission, the Government is soliciting financial assistance from the UNDP and the Bank Group for two programs of technical assistance, one for the highways and another for river transport. The principal purposes of the assistance for the highways are to improve the highway organization, possibly by establishing an autonomous highway authoritv. and to provide managerial and operational support for the implementation of effective programs of road maintenance and rehabilitation. The nrineipal obieetive of the technical assistance for river transnort is to prepare and assist in the implementation of effective programs for improving the performance of OTRACO's river transport services and the maintenance of navigation by the Service des Voies Navigables. Both programs are designed - i.L. - to pave the way for well considered measures to rehabilitate the transport system. TUe Government has stated i'ts willingness to give these progrms the necessary support to ensure their success.

10. Until recently, the principal announced objective of overall transport policy was to enhance the role of the Voie Nationale, in particular by the construction of a new railway link as a bypass for the Kasai river. Tnis policy tended to detract attention from the more urgent task of rehabilitating the existing system. It was also hardly realizable in view of the critical situation of road and river transport and the limited resources available to the Government. The Government has now agreed to postpone for the time being major investments in additional new facilities in the transport sector and instead to concentrate on the rehabilitation of the existing system.

11. In the past, transport policy has been formulated and implemented on an ad hoc basis as problems arose, with little or no coordination. This has created some problems which, though manageable for the time being, will have to receive proper attention as soon as the rehabilitation of the transport system has been effectively carried out. In this respect, measures will have to be taken to strengthen the staff of the Ministry of Transport, and Communications.

12. In sum, the prospects for the rehabilitation of the transport sector are favorable. The Governmment is now attaching high priority to this objective and important measures have already been taken or are being considered to this end. Rehabilitation is bound to be a difficult and time- consuming process and improvements in performance are likely to be realized gradually. For this reason, the transport system may have some difficulty in handling the expected increase in traffic requirements during the next year or two. Thereafter, the measures and programs now being initiated should lead to an improvement in the performance of the transport system.

I. BASIC FEATURES

1. The Congo is the second largest country in Africa, about one- fourth the size of the United States, but with a population of less than 17 million living in widely scattered settlements. The lines of communi- cation between major centers of production and commerce are generally fairly long. A considerable volume of the country's agricultural commodities and mineral products has to be transported 1,500 - 2,500 km to reach either Kinshasa, the capital, or the maritime ports of Matadi and Boma. For these reasons, the Congo needs an extensive and efficient transport system as a vital means to integrate the country politically, administratively and economically.

2. The Congo is fortunate in that the Congo and Kasai rivers and several lakes provide a vast system of natural waterways of about 15,000 km, which are mostly navigable year-round. This network serves a large part of the country and has made it possible to develop several widely dispersed areas simultaneously. Properly organized and operated water transport can provide comparatively low cost transport for a large part of the country's products.

3. The overland transport network comprises about 5,000 km of railways and about 140,000 km of roads and tracks. This infrastructure including the waterways, is characterized by a high degree of integration and interdependence. and little duplication. The waterways are the principal artery of this system. The railways have been built either as a by- pass for river sections which are not naviffable or as an extension of the waterways into the hinterland. Thus, the Congo has no unified railway network, but separate railways in different narts of the countrv. The roads are largely tributary of river ports and railway stations. Only where no navinable rivers and railroads exist; mainly in the area east of Kisangani does the road system have a trunk route function.

4. The high degree of integration means that each section is largely dependent on the nerformance of another; difficulties on one section affect traffic elsewhere in the system. In general, there is little competition between different modes of transnort; excent in a few areas where road transport offers an alternative to rail or river transport.

5. The country is largely landlocked; it has a coastline of only 30 km and it srole direct aeeess to the oeean is vla the estuary of the Congo river, which forms the boundary with Angola. / Navigation on the estuary AwndsanAon in+tegratePd nnvIvatinnAl fsaeilities instalLed and maintained by each country on its own territory.

6. For the eastern regions of the country, use of the Atlantic gateay-involves a Yery long oerland hal. To s>ho.ten enty-adA exi4+ routes to the sea for these regions, the Congo's transport system has been

1/ Treaty of MaCT 25, 1891 between the Independent State of Congo and Po fJug,' I. BASIC FEATURES

1/ Treaty of MaCT 25, 1891 between the Independent State of Congo and Po fJug,' increasing mineral production from Katanga, which the national route was unable to hanule. FrUrthermore, competJtion r^rom neighboring lines berve as an incentive for the domestic transport enterprises to improve efficiency, so as to remain coapetitive.

10. Tne organization of the transport sectors reflects both historical and geographical factors. All rail and river transport is being handled by four companies. Each company serves a particular region of the country and operates more than one mode of transport. In other words, the organization of the system has a regional rather than a functional basis. hnese companies operate along commercial lines and are expected to cover their costs and to make a profit. They have been established by private interests, sometimes with some Government participation, but at present they have been reconstituted, either as autonomous public entities, or as mixed corporations in which the Government has a major share.

11. The main activities of the four major companies are as follows:

- OTRACO, operates most of the waterways in the country, the railway line Matadi-Kinshasa and the Mayumbe branch line, and some road transport services.

- BCK-KDL, operates the railway network serving Katanga and the port of Aketi.

- CFL, operates on integrated network of railways and river and lake routes serving the eastern part of the country.

- Vicicongo, operates a railway network and road transport serving the north-eastern part of the country. -'4-

II. CURRENT SITUATION

General

12. When the Congo became independent in 1960, it possessed an extensive network of waterways, railways and roads, with fairly modern equipment. This infrastructure was the result of considerable investments made in the transport sector over many years, especially during the decade pre- ceding independence. These facilities were adequate to handle efficiently all the traffic then offering.

13. Basically, this infrastructure and equipment is still in place, although it is in poor operating condition. Its overall operating efficiency and traffic handling capacity have seriously declined. Furthermore, the efficiency of the transport organizations has declined for a variety of reasons. In broad terms, the situation of river transport and of the roads is more critical than that of the railways.

14. The reason that transport has not yet become a general bottleneck in the economy is that production and transport demand have declined and that the Congo has been able to rely on the transport systems of neighboring countries. Yet there are serious problems to be resolved and there are already bottlenecks to be considered in certain areas. Valuable cargoes have already been lost or seriously damaged because no transport facilities were available to move the goods in time. In some areas also, the poor condition of the roads is a handicap for the revival of agricultural production. Usually, transport is slow and subject to frequent and long delays, and the cost of transport per ton-km has risen since 1960, in some areas probably by more than 40 per cent. In a country like Congo, where the average haul is long, the effect of such an increase on the competitive position of some commodities can be serious.

15. The revival and expansion of production presently underway and the resulting increase in traffic demand will put a heavy strain on the transport system. There is concern that a lack of adequate transport will weaken incentives and delay the recovery of the economv, especially of agricultural production.

16. Measures must be taken promptly, therefore, to rehabilitate existing asRets and to imnrove the orcanization and onerating effieienev of the transport sector. This can probably be achieved, as explained in more detail belnvo without extensive new investmentœ in the immediate future, but rather by increasing and accelerating maintenance and repairs andi by improving manag'ement wnd o perationi. The Government in aWAre of the problems in the transport sector and has already taken some measures to remedy the sitm%titon_ It is also go1ititing assuitanne frvomi t1'he TTNnP and from the Bank group to implement urgent programs for the rehabilitation of river t+r Qot And+ +the roadsQ, aR eeornmendiedA bhy the missiant,(Cnarawrrpha 84 and 2o6). -5-

Traffic

17. Important changes have taken place in traffic flows. Since 1960 nassenger travel has increased while freight traffic has declined. As shown in Table 4, passenger travel by ship and rail, expressed in terms of passenger-km. increased by about 40 per cent between 1959 and 1966. During the same period, freight traffic by rail and river fell from 4.2 billion ton-km to 3 billion ton-kmi a decline of 30 Der cent.

18. The increase in nassenger traffic is to be explained by the flight of people to safer areas in the wake of the disturbances and return journeys hone, grnater freedom to travel and a decline of fares in real terms.

19. The Aetline in freight traffic is mainly attributable to the fall in agricultural production, mainly in areas affected by rebellion. To a lesser ext+ent 4t is alan duiie to the fAll in the volimne of iwmorts and to the fact that the national route via Port Francqui was unable to handle a greater volue of the traffic for Ktanga

20. In terAms of ton-k, river 4Pv- ht tr-af fic jamntne in IOAA to less than 50 per cent of the traffic in 1959. Despite this reduction the capacity+. ,.. A''TPACO,.ahlnh is t-he ora,,nizti^r. are_ponib4le for, nnotli.allu all river transport in the Congo, was strained to the limit. This situation hih light4_h4- the ,.4ri-. A+ aw4-.o+4o%in ^41 AIIAPAI ,o4wtag.+1.-anano%w+ uaght4 fgb

t e 21~L.L.f ,Oreralfl, ra'i..AC - at,ev. ..t, a..^ht5.. aa.a 1963, s ar - d re-..

cover in 1964 and is expected to reach in the near future about the same Level as in=`1959. T'he situai.0-. G4 each the o two. sy+ eknow marked differences, however. The two smaller lines, the CFL serving the 4 easte, part o. the Congo und Vicico.go a.., ,, +he nor+h=eastr. part, have been seriously affected by rebellion and the volume of freight they handled is stil aVl inIa c-mpariso.n with that- befor independen^e. Traf on Matadi-Kinshasa line is also smaller in 1959, reflecting the decline in exDorts and imports via the national route. In eontrast- the KnL net-work serving Katanga handles currently more traffic than before independence. This increase is mrinlv attributable to recent ehAnges in the A 4v ectn4 4 Of Katanga's trade (see para. 23 below), longer hauls and an increase in the tolme of Ka+tw-.a a e orts.

22. No stvaistics are available on road +trasport. or o.n the *.ehic^lea park, but all evidence indicates that freight haulage by truck has declined in all areas Of the C=Ih -y, exce+ 4n the onc Of Y.on-' Ce . n-* of the reasons is that many trucking firms have lost most of their equipment during the disturbances, vh41le t he re-inoing equipment 84 in poor operating condition. It also appears likely that the fall in agricultural prodvct,^ u in p0s-lAdpnec yer reaau__.. eA__ I- -man_v r_ roa*_ kJ.L IJLLUL l,LIuz 4.11 yu-0 P.1 U%LUWL%;c y V L u uc u cll U=W U ±UL L1JSU L.xa.urV.

23. ~ TheI1' ch"gco -hich.IaI take plae i te directilor.L- o-P tra`i can be illustrated by the shifts in the country's foreign trade routes

(Ta.bl L).* 1u com.-ined vo±Ued VIox 4.FLO sUU exports declined irom auUtu 2.5 million tons in 1959 to about 2.0 million tons in 1967. The loss is concentrated on the national route to Matadl-Boma. in contrast, tLraffic -6- through Lobito has increased, mainly on account of higher imports of fuel .dA eona ; the iatter tn r^miaee 1over inmnrta from the Wankin mnies In Rhodesia. The volume of exports through Sakania, near the Katanga border with Zembia, has risen slghtly, mainly nn aer'nrnit of eopp smhin4.wtu to Beira, while the import volume has declined due to smaller coal shipments e_ -lr4"4 Tvn <2avn +ha MAA^ad_Rrn^1t. MA Orni-mina -nv- Oa+.l Pe%v- h^.i#. from Wn TIn --im the Mata- .B~ e~1 ~nspresaan+lr wv.u),- 50 per cent; the Lobito route for about one-third and the route via Sakania for less th-n 20 per cent Of the combined volume of exorts ad imorts. - 7 -

III. TRANSPORT POLICY AND COORDINATION

General

224. The announced long-term oblective of transport policy is to enhance the role of the national route. Otherwise, policy is being made and imnlemented on an ad hoe basis as problems arise and there is no concerted effort at coordination. This is a serious weakness and, in srder to aeeelerate the rehabilitation of the transport sector and to promote its sound development, it is necessary for the Government to announee realistin poliev obiectives nromptlv and to prenare consistent guidelines for the development of the transport sector in the immediate futuire And in the long run. The eountrv in nresentlv ill-equipnped to undertake this task as the Ministry of Transport and Communications, which in practicwlly solely reoniiblP for all general problemA i4n tihe trafnsport sector, does not have sufficient competent staff.

25. The problems of overall transport policy and coordination are manageable, havever. The mi4n reason 4i that++thes taark are made ea ir4 for the Government by the high degree of integration of the infrastructure and by the coneentra+ion of rail and river n 8a a i-"r- prises, operating as autonomous entities along commercial lines. In this co%nr.ecion4 an t f Jr4+be t o 4-1.tha t a+ un+ry i roanaAd44en free, the number of trucking enterprises and private operators is still inadequate.

26. Unlike in some other countries, transport policy and coordination in the Congo do notJ ha,veV to solve aecute prob.lt.mA 14t Ai4--ap - com`4Apetition or discrimination between different modes of transport or amongst operators. 4 Tn , wbatever co-mpetl -ion exi-.sts can-be regardeA as a ealt.h4-y i- .114 general0.. L WlLA.6i V~LLJUJJ %JJ.L J.0lD .L.I. 4' L .CAde &A C&~.%.LlIAi LA.J centive for the transport enterprises to reduce costs and to improve the La1.AC.-liy o-Ltheir se-Lvices. The si.tuatU1-ion requires neverthleLess c'Lose supervision by the authorities to avoid that the transport enterprises take *.=Ad adAantage ora th4ei -nopo4l4s4t To4-rma -nA 4- o,a - ment continues to exercise close supervision and control over tariffs.

27. Coordination is to some extent carried out within each large eneprise, since they are involvel in more `han one mode of tr------t. Moreover, these enterprises maintain the necessary contact with each other tlo coord' nate opperatiLons w-ALIere t0heir net- orks Cuonn"WCL. A.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ' r_ . Aue coce UULWI.4J.U u 1. I epurIe.Ji.LUU J.La lfwsew - Ut..UL- prises also means that the Government can supervise a large segment of the transport sector by superrvising th'uu nWUterprises.*The task of the Govern- ment is also made easier by the regional character and autonomous status of the major transport organizations, which have considerable flexiDility to deal with current problems and to adjust their operations to local requirements. Tneir fairly large size has also enabled them to withstand the recent disruptive events more easily than small operators. Finally, their commercial character governs their financial perrormance. Tnis and the Government's tariff policies have made it possible to limit their losses. - 8 -

29. The main problems which have arisen in the fields of overall transport nnlieiv A nd enordinstion relate to! the "Voie nFLtionan&" inv.et- ment priorities, uneconomic lines, and tariffs. Each of these is briefly rviewed belov. woi4 orN As4 halo 1-

30. The prncepcl ,bhative ofathe-Goriirnent 4. t nhace the w^lo of the "Voie nationale" and to make the country less dependent on the trans- 4 pot+ sys4f..a OP ei.borlr.gnlnn4 i.4 a ha Q w 48 toa nniin+a Congleae products, especially the mining production of Katanga, and also part of the

Z^ ubi_an pro ducti Jon v X thOMa .n-t.ionl ' routfe. T4z o..o i-A8- ta.-U able in the near future mainly because the present capacity of river trans- po-.t -iJa the fRais- is- limite A and can be Increcase A _'y rA ^-wihu jJ.L LI VA. U~1LLf o b.& . J.LoALJ. &A 'A.0.U AJ5.L ~ n~. W"1.1J eSn.L Un%A4.L.LJ .UUJ& disrupting river transport elsewhere. Even if capacity of the national route were not a "iUtJIng f actor , some con-mod"iUi.J hrtALa Lbe AJ, ported via more economical routes, in order to safeguard their competitive position on fore'lu marLets. TLu-e economidc iLmpacto of tihe Gmvernmentsa policy in this respect has not yet been analyzed and such an appraisal shLould bDe un%derJt'a'ken as patOL o01 'ane r.I.1O0.1 t 0-.J A. 0 -- A realistic objectives and guidelines for the rehabilitation and development of the transport sector.

IlnveY tment rrio0rit.ies

3n-e GoUerflmCU has bLeen considering th1-e construction o' tbis new railway link, as a by-pass for the Kasai river. Construction of this new 'ine woulda make it possible vt establsh udrct: railwar services Uetween the main production centers in the eastern part of the country, mainly Katanga, and the maritime ports of Matadi and Bona. -hnis route would make it physically possible to evacuate all of Katanga's copper production and at least part of the Zambian production, via the na-ionaL route. The economic justification of this project remains to be proven.

32. Until recently, the emphasis on this project has detracted attention from the urgent need to rehabilitate the existing system in order to provide adequate transport for the economic recovery of the country. It has also introduced great uncertainty in the preparation of investment plans of major transport enterprises. The reason is that, construction of the new railway would greatly reduce river transport and thus raises doubts about the profitability of investments for the rehabilitation and development of water transport facilities. The mission discussed this question with the Government, which now has agreed to postpone the 2onstruction of the new railway link and to give first priority to the rehabilitation of the existing system. Key transport organizations should now be informed of this decision in order to provide them with a firm basis for planning their investments. Uneconomic Lines

33. The importance of the Mayumbe railway and the railway from Kisangani to Kindu has declined and road transport may ofier a more economical alternative. The question has therefore, arisen whether operation of these two lines should be continued (see paras. 117 and 163). Conse- quently, studies ought to be undertaken without delay to determine whether their proposed rehabilitation is economically justified.

Tariffs

34. The Government has practiced a flexible tariff policy; tarifrs of rail, river and road transport have been adjusted five times since independence. The principal objective of the last tariff adjustment which has been effective as of January 11, 1968 is to permit each transport enterprise to balance its operating budget in the near future, including normal maintenance and renewals. As a result, the prospects are that some enterprises may already earn a profit during the current year, while all others should be able to gradually reduce their losses. It is also to be noted that special public assistance has temporarily been granted to CFL and Vicicongo to facilitate their recovery from the serious damage and loss of traffic attributable to recent disturbances in the northern and eastern parts of the country.

35. The tariff adjustments since independence have not been uniform for the commodities and passenger traffic. As a result important changes have taken place in the tariff structure. Calculated in terms of a stable foreign currency, the tariffs for passenger travel by rail other than first class are about one-third of the corresponding rates prevailing before 1960. Current freight rates for manufactured products are about 30-50 per cent higher than before independence, while the rates for agricultural commodities to be exported are about the same. However, the current rates applicable to agricultural commodities for local consumption or processing are generally about 40 per cent of the pre-independence rates; except for rice, maize and cotton which are about 60 per cent of the pre-independence rates.

36. The tariff adjustments since independence reflect the Government's concern to protect the population from rising food prices and to limit the cost of passenger travel. It seems that the freight rates for agricultural commodities for domestic consumption or processing are insufficient to cover the cost of transport, whereas the rates for manufactured products probably exceed the cost of transport. This cross-subsidization should not be continued indefinitely and the mission, therefore, recommends that a study of the rate structure should be undertaken.

37. In comparison with other countries, the level of road user charges in the Congo is low. Also, total public revenue from such charges are insufficient to finance proper maintenance of the road network. On the basis of incomplete information, it is estimated that total public revenue from road user charges (mainly fuel taxes and import duties on transport equipment) is even less than the current highway budget of about $3 million equivalent, which is by far insufficient to finance an adequate program of road maintenance (see naras 193-199). - in -

38. For the moment, the low level of road user charges do not give ru ad= transport.. a coA..4etiti,e a..A.. e o e 4t currently very little competition between different modes and any advantage

'.L8 irequeutly or^£set my -the p00rL Cuo"d.4ItOin Of.Pthe roads-.

n.L V.L±Wevto- UI eucure4,def'Ul.rrI L U.LALI.I --- L VuI CI ±ncreasc in road user charges merits serious consideration as a means of raising additional revenues for f^inancinUg road maintena . The w vernUMent is prepared to consider such an increase to help finance an "emergency program" for the maintenance and rehabilitation of the more important roads in the country. The preparation and implementation of such a program is one of tne principal objectives of a technical assistance project, which the Govern- ment has submitted for financing to the UNDP and the Bank group. The con- sultants to be engaged for this project, wil' be asked to study the merits of an increase in road user charges and make recommendations on the desired level of charges. - 11 -

IV. WATERWAYS

A. River Network

4o. The Congo river and its tributaries provide one of the best net- workI Of nat,-nl-l, navigable wa+n v4%ra in the wornl.- The tew=V.Au ran + deeply inland and are widely distributed throughout the larger part of the country (ee- Map). Almost4 all permit navigati4n yea-rond Them Cngro rivJr has a length of 4,700 km (2,718 miles) and 4Is the fourth largest in the worldIA T+Sa+er ar. arage O hl41,00 n s, 4* +.4^.o +ha+ 0+ bhe oru.&a ,*- -' . - -*a- - …-'- -.. . - .4 Mississippi. In total, the navigable sections of the Congo river systems am,oo...t to ' 12,840 uzz 1(7 ,n9 "41' To th4i w,.muO AAbA Iadde148 O3 ile.s) for the navigable sections of its estuary and also 1,300 km (807 miles) of ,l,e routes. nh4i- sy.em c.- ha A 4 ,4 A4A -.-^_A4-+ 4-h a 4tbra m.an va .6s^ - wo*ag,Vv-c jw v*--W b v - - -_ .-.- -i -- hydrological basins of the country.

41. Bief Maritime: This comprises the estuary, 148 km long, which is J.L..thIe co-unt;-ry's. I m-ai.,.... di,-ectA... access route to the.. M%#LCWUticA 4-1 --. 4 -t ocear, T.UereM are two major ports on the Bief Maritime - Matadi and Boma - and some minor po s. Tbmhe access t1o MatCLAdi, the LUMin port 14,L b..Jupsre i8O ra'vherbL difficult because of unstable approach channel and the fast current (10 knots). Previously, dredging permitteU ships With a dralt of 30 feet to reach the port, but at present insufficient dredging has reduced the draft to 26 feet.

42. Bief Moyen: .Li8s comprises the Congo anu Rasai rivers and Lneir tributaries, above Kinshasa, and provides about 12,000 km of navigable waterways. The main terminals are Port Francqui on the K-asai, Kisangani at the far north-eastern end of the Congo river and Aketi on the :Itimbiri river. Tne 1,740 km long stretch between Kinshasa and Kisangani is one of the finest navigable river routes in the world. Conditions on the Kasai are less favorable than on this stretch because of shiIfing sand banks and swift currents on some sections. If adequate dredging and navigational aids are assured, it is possible to reach Port Francqui even in the dry season with convoys carrying a cargo of as much as 2,000 tons (1.3 m draft). Navigability on the itiinbiri is limited during the dry season, because of the low water level and shifting sand banks, to barges carrying only about 40 ton each.

43. Bief Superieur: This comprises two sections of the Lualaba river in the eastern part of the country. One section connects Ponthierville to Kindu (305 km) and the other Kongolo to Bukama (645 km%). It also includes tributaries of the Lualaba and the Lakes from Lake Moero to Lake Albert.

44. In sum, the navigable network comprises:

(i) about 2,655 km allowing a draft of 1.30 m at low water and of 2.00 m at high water, for barges with a cargo of 750 tons and up to 1,250 tons respectively. - 12 -

(ii) about 6,580 km, allowing a draft of 1.00 m at low water and 1.50 m at high water for barges with a cargo 150 tons and up to 375 tons respectively; and

(iii) about 5,265 km, allowing a draft of 0.80 m at low water anti 1 .2 m at hi¢hwatetr fnr hargen with a narag or S0 tons and up to 150 tons respectively.

B. Services des Votes Navigables

45. The organization responsible for maintaining navigation on this netuWork -s. "ft--.AsJhe de la*S4.es a+ es Voies *w.-g^..O , ..ich sinc December 1, 1967 is part of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. ITIoies Navigsbules iz responsible for hydrollogic.' ztudies, river ainin works, dredging, the provision of navigational aids and for the design, con- st-ruction*tLL U.ULI anudLU maint-,enanceA1.U~*A.~L OfP the'SAAL0u'.." int4ratructure4.ALI. M ofLJ. port8 and-"U1 ladnAg-.L -~.Ing stages. It is also responsible for the preparation and implementation of 4 4 .na itime lawa. and f40r port adA rve r -- pol^eI 4 A plard - er4rice ot,h AMfS.. a.,, 4.~ .SJ - ~ '*. - *'x .pve- .A.--- -- a.-St - I...- - estuary; in addition it operates three boatyards for repairs and ma.inte- nance o'L it.s equipmer.t.

L Ui 1. m;x_JDzuQA2J.A.1.__w @1._5 _ _ _ kmvw _

Kinshasa, but operations have been organized on a regional basis according to the three main hydro g'c 1as ns of te Sin the efficiency of its operations and the conditions of navigation on the U.iree basins hla-ve deteriorated. Briefly, the pr nt s.iUUat.LUo isaLb follows:

Bief Maritime

47. The Congo and Angola maintain adequate navigational aids for this section, which is marked with light buoys for day and night navigation. This section has been subject to heavy siltation since 1961, folloving a change in the hydrological regime of the river. At the same time, the efficiency of dredging operations deteriorated and the depth available in the access channel to Matadi decreased resulting in navigation difficulties and higher insurance and freight rates, while a dredger provided by USAID managed to restore the previous depth of the channel. For some time, the service has been unable to carry out normal maintenance, mainly because some of the four dredges operating on this section are out of commission for lack of spare parts and the depth in the channel has again decreased to 26 feet.

48. A detailed hydrographical study of the Bief maritime financed by Belgium is being carried out by the "Laboratoire hydraulique de Borgerhout- Anvers". With the aid of a model-design, this study aims to analyze the problems of siltation and seasonal changes in the river bed in order to determine the best shipping channel, which could be maintained at lowest cost. Bief Moyen

49. Markings need to be improved and their number increased, espe- c i a'ILJL. y on tUhLeLLWhLAere Kasai conditions o.L navigation are more LiLt u lI. They consist mainly of buoys with scotchlite tape, permitting night-time na v ig Ii on w i u theIth aidz of-Lse a r c I l -.t s ; they are not Cal-Wrays c'lear'ly viLsbl'Le and no longer conform to a standard design.

50. The Service operates four dredgers to maintain the access to and the depth in the port OI K'nshuas uud Port FraneqCul and to maintin depth on the silted stretches of the Kasai, Itimbiri and Mongola rivers. Deter- ioration of dredging effIiciency haa aggravated the problem of docking in Port Francqui and has contributed to disruptions in shipping schedules.

51. The dock area in Port Francqui is periodically silted so that dredging is required regularly to maintain port operations. A nydrograpnic study of the Kasai river, north of Port Franequi, is in process which aims to determine whether it would be possible, with minimum works, to ensure a natural self-maintaining channel and deep water alongside the quay, thus increasing the cargo handling capacity of the port. Tnis study is being financed by France.

Bief Superieur

52. The Service des Voies Navigables ceased to function during the recent disturbances in this area and operations had not yet been revived at the time of the mission's visit. In view of the lower volume of traffic, the Service has some time to do so. Dredging operations in the port of Kalemie ought to be resumed, but no equipment is available.

Staffing

53. The Service employs about 3,000 people, including about 25 expatriate experts, in comparison with 152 in 1959. The current number of expatriates is insufficient to provide adequate managerial assistance and at least 12 additional experts are urgently needed. In general, labor morale and discipline are poor, partly due to low wages. Headquarters has failed to exercise adequate supervision, which is no easy task for the vast network of waterways, especially in view of the recent disturbances and the lack of communications.

Equipment

54. The Service has a fleet of 332 craft, including: dredgers, river marking boats, pontoons, barges, etc. (Table 7). Voies Navigables operates three boat yards, one in each basin for the maintenance and repair of its equipment. For the moment, all repair facilities and floating craft at Kalemie have been taken over by the Army. Some 90 craft are usually being repaired and maintained by outside contractors. Maintenance and repairs have been seriously nrglected since 1960 and the equipment is in poor condition. Of 28 river marking vessels, seven are in need of urgent repairs and four will have to be replaced. Four of the eleven suction dredges have to be replaced in the near future. Of the tro grabu Udrges , One has ueen coun- fiscated by the Army and the other has been out of service for the past three years because necessary spare parts were lacking.

55. The lack of efficient equipment causes consiueraele losses to the economy. For example, the full benefits of deepening the access channel to Matadi, which was financed by USAID at a cost of about US$3.0 million, cannot be realized because the Service cannot maintain the channel. Unless repairs are made in the near future, some of the equipment and other assets will be lost completely.

56. The ordinary budget for equipment and supplies has been greatly reduced, from about US$1.0 million equivalent before independence to less than $250,000 equivalent in 1968. This latter sum is barely sufficient to pay for essential supplies and leaves no room for the purchase of spare parts. The 1968 budget also makes no provision for a program to combat water hyacinth, which is again obstructing navigation. It should also be noted that the Service has had no investment budget since independence and so that all new port projects and renewals of equipment have been postponed. investment

57. The Service des Voies Navigables has prepared an investment program for equipment and construction projects (Table 10) amounting to Z 5.5 million (US$11.0 million), including Z 3.2 million (Us$6.4 million) to be spent in 1968. This program will have to be adjusted to the limited resources, financial and other, available for the rehabilitation of the economy. Under present economic conditions, only the procurement of two suction dredgers for the Bief Maritime and, to a lesser extent, the reconstruction of the Port of M'Bandaka appear to deserve high priority. The Government has requested financial assistance (US$4.2 million equivalent) from the European Development Fund for the purchase of the two dredges.

C. River Transport

58. There are no restrictions on entry in this field and anyone interested can organize river transport, either as a common carrier or for his own account. In earlier years, several enterprises and plantations operated their own vessels, but this practice was abandoned in 1935, mainly because it resulted in high transport costs since individual operators found it difficult to secure upstream return freight. Since then, river transport has been entrusted to two companies, OTRACO and CFL.

59. CFL is the sole operator on the Bief Superieur and also operates on Lake Tanganyika . As a result of recent disturbances in the area, its river transport operations have been reduced to a minimum and it accounts for less than 5 per cent of total water borne freight traffic. CFL also operates the railways in the eastern part of the country, which are more important for the company thann water transport. For these reasons, the situation of CFL and of its water transport operations will be discussed 4n C -ter UT.VTIt +he ro 1wra

60.MD OAPC ia the sole operator on +he Bief maritime and +he Bief moyen, and also on Lake Kivu. It accounts currently for more than 95 per cent. of all11 domest-ic water bone frei-J5gt. traffic. Despite thle recent deterioration in its transport services, there is little interest on the pal-t, of pr'.vate enterprises or planta6tions 4to orgn.ize th1eir own fleets; they continue to count on OTRACO to provide the necessary transport serv- i *ces.Considering thsLt-1the situation ofJriver tLlranspo'.v in Ithl1le Congo is intimately related to the performance of OTRACO, a brief review of this organization fOlloaws.

D. OTRACO

Organization and Management

61. OTRACO is an autonomous public agency, a so-called "parastatali which comes under the general supervision of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Besides river transport, OTRACO has also been entrusted with the operation of all maritime ports and almost all ports on :its river routes, the railroads from Kinshasa to Matadi and from Boma to Tshela, and road transport from Boma to Tshela and in the Bukavu area. OTRACO operates a shipyard and workshops for the maintenance and repair of its equipment. New constructions and major maintenance and repairs are customarily awarded to outside contractors.

62. OTRACO owns all buildings, plant and equipment connected with its operations, except the basic infrastructure of the ports and the land on which its facilities are situated. The latter are owned by the Government. In return for their use, OTRACO is supposed to pay 4 per cent on the net value of such assets. Apparently this interest has never been paid, although it continues to figure as a liability in the accounts. OTRACO is responsible for its budget and is expected to cover its operating expenditures, including repairs, renewals and debt charges. The Government is expected to cover any losses and debt charges which OTRACO is unable to pay; these payments can be recovered, however, from subsequent surpluses. Because of its character as a public enterprise, OTRACO must submit its budgets and audited financial accounts for approval to the Government.

63. Since independence management has been entrusted to Congolese nationals. OTRACO is being administered by a Board, called "Conseil de Gerance". It comprises eleven members so called "administrateurs", including the President and two general managers, nominated by the President of the Republic for a period of six years. Except for the three top- officers, the other members have been appointed from the outside, from business and the civil service. This is an improvement in comparison with previous practice, when all Board members were officers of OTRACO. In aduition to these eleven administrator-, the BoaVad comprises ri-e reppresn- tatives of the Government. The Board may delegate authority to a "Conseil de Direetion", consisting of'the President, the teo g n t-o Government representatives and two other members of the Board.

64. Just before independence, plans had been adopted for a major reorganization of OTiRAC. Until then, the organization relied heavily on its four operating departments, which functioned largely as self-contained enterprises and enjoyed a large degree of autonoW . This arrangement had some disadvantages, such as duplication of administrative services and facilities. To avoid such duplication and for other reasons, it was decided to centralize operations and to establish an organization based on a functional division of all activities. The plans for this reorganization have not yet been fully implemented because of the shortage of experienced personnel and the difficulties in communicating with the interior.

65. In general terms, the present organization is based on a distinc- tion between administrative services, which have been centralized, and transport operations. It should be noted, however, that some of the operating units continue to maintain their own administrative services. All transport operations are being handled by two major departments: one for railway operations and the other for river transport. For the time being, however, the railway department is also responsible for the maritime ports and for road transport. Thus some of the characteristics and disadvantages of the old set-up still prevail.

66. Before 1964, all sixteen directors reported to a single general manager. This was a burdensome arrangement, which has since been changed. Currently, a small number of officers report to top management, consisting of the President and two general managers (administ2ateurs-gerants). It is doubtful, however, whether reporting procedures have been improved to enable top-management and the operating departments to maintain the same close contact as before.

67. OTRACO is overstaffed. Employment still fluctuates around 23,000, which is about the same as before independence. Surplus labor is being maintained at the request of the Government. Labor productivity has declined and labor morale and discipline are low. One of the reaons is that OTRACO personnel has recently been assimilated to that of the government administration and that salaries and wages for some OTRACO personnel are low.

68. The staff includes 285 expatriates, against about 1,000 before independence. OTRACO estimates that it needs about 380 expatriate experts to meet minimum requirements. However, few expatriates now occupy positions of authority in the present organization; most of them are employed as advisors and thev assume little responsibility. Since their cost to OTRACO is high, proper arrangements ought to be worked out to obtain the full benefit of their services. - 17 -

69. Generally speaking, OTRACO has continued to conduct business in the same way as before independence and little has been done to keep pace with progress, say, in the field of inventory control, personnel management, accounting, programming, etc. In sum, despite some recent improvements, serious weaknesses persist in organization, management and staffing. They have contributed to the decline in efficiency, together with such other factors as the shortage of spare parts and materials over which OTRACO has no control.

70. The river transport services provided by OTRACO consist of:

a) regular weekly courier services from Kinshasa to Kisangani on the Congo river and to Port Francqui on the Kasai. These couriers are mixed units, made up of a passenger motor ship and specially designed barges, for passengers and for cargo, to make a compact and streamlined unit carrying 500 tons of cargo. Time schedules are usually adhered to. This type of service is also provided at less frequent intervals, for the towns along malor tributaries.

b) regular cargo convoys to Kisan2ani (one convov of up to 3,000 tons every two weeks) and to Port Francqui (three convnvs of up to 3.300 tons each everv two weeks). Other main route ports are serviced every three or four weeks a nd some minor norts once everY six months.

71. The serveis rendered to the town. en rou-te and along the tributaries make an impressive list of schedules and boats. In recent Years, OTRfLCr's river tr-nsport constituted for mnnv -remote vi11esn th-- only remaining link with the outside. For this reason, the Government has refused to short-en the network; althonnh the reduire's traffic in sev.eral minor ports does not Justify continuing the service.

72. The Port Francqui route has recently attracted much attention as the main evacution route for the inneral produetion of Katanga, becase it-. is entirely within Congolese territority. This route includes 194 km on the Congo river d 604 km on the Kasai. AR eplaiiAned tbove, prevailng transportation and navigation conditions on the Kasai do not permit shipping Of much more thn -40000 tons r -ear, made up of 2r50,000 tons of e-orted mining products and 150,000 of general import/export cargoes. This route 4s ... ,,1-rent ,,,.sbhl +,, -u.,a usq4+4h g vinawal Y%^i' v^.,i.+i4% ,^-s f C+ avirra lqh4ln i4 i8 _z - s e l-0toemacwte the -4 « production of ._.ga which- is being offered, much less part of the Zambian production. Its limited capacity is partly a+tribDutab le +toA4,4a-1 4aencies of bhe Seh, -ce des Votes Navigables, which has been unable to dredge regularly the access to Port rlrancqdi auU some dJULLiLcul5 passesDKaas*ai on toD"he . It is -'ao attributable to a deterioration of OTRACO's river transport services. The round trip U'oPort Frrancqu.4., .Lr exa11le, no-"Utkes about 21 days, in compLarison withL,ll 14 days before independence. Present schedules are frequently not adhered vlo Loor a numlber of reasons: -breakdo- w-n off equLipment, w.uschleuduled stops, poor labor discipline, etc. The deterioration in performance is illustrated by the fact that, with basically the same eq-ui-pment, OTRACO w"as barely able to handle 50 per cent of the river traffic in 1959, as explained above. - 18 -

Traffic

73. The relative importance of OTRACO's rail and river traffic since 1Q99 is shown in the following table:

Rail and River Traffic

Entire Network OTRACO Total River Rail Total River Rail

Passenger traffic (million pass-km)

1959 468 91 378 136 75 61

1966 651 122 528 259 118 141

Freight traffic (billion ton-km)

1959 4.3 2.0 2.3 2.4 1.9 0.5

1967 3.0 0.9 2.1 1.2 0.9 0.4

74. Total passenger traffic, in passenger-km, by rail and river increase fPror 468 mil'Jon -wits in -19590 too 651 million 1*nASs iJn 16,a increase of 39.1 per cent. The increase on the OTRACO network amounted to per90 cenr.t . rI'he expa.sion w-reate a+ Uo+eA4adi=iqnsh- a41i.w. and on the ferries serving the Bief maritime. The reasons for this ex- ____1_~~~~~~~.~WJ~__AW _n_, :_ ... P_-^l. of e._._.._^, low fares. Passenger traffic on the Bief moyen is about 50 per cent higher

75. On the other hand, total freight traffic tell from 4.3 billion ton - km to 3.0 billion ton - km, a decline of about 30 per cent. Freight Lraiii L.re.±±1co1:n014 UlleIL1~~~~~~ v.LnIRwvV±LUi.1.AJ net:woE-11~~~~L.WUIh. I.J.~~~~~1..J..L11~~~U ±10111UUcSvWc O.U1.JL3.~~~~~~L . ~~tU.LL±t.LI.J11 ;i, oeglc 1L.I.UOULI oUI --a X1X111tU.L .1.11$n1 1959 to less than 13. billion ton - km in 1966, or by about 50 per cent. it currently accounts for about 42 per cent of suCh traffLc in the country, against 55 per cent before independence. OTRACO's rail traffic declined by about 27 per cent and its river traffic by somewhat more than 50 per eent. This decline, especially of waterborne traffic, is mainly attributable to the fall of agricultural production in the interior. The eommodities which have been most affected are: cotton, palm oil and palm kernels, coffee, manioc and rice, as can be seen in the following ta'ble: - 19 -

Commodities Arriving in Kinshasa by Bief Moyen (000 tons)

19 67

Peanuts 7.7 4.3 Palm kernels 127.7 69.2 Palm oil 173.9 128.2 Cotton 45.7 4.4 Lumber 54.6 41.8 C'nf fee 149.2 27.1 Cacao 3.0 3.3 Maize 125 121.4 Manioc 48.9 10.9 Ricee 22 Li Oil Cakes 23.3 1.9 Mining Products 200.14 195.6 of which: ^per I169 lr3 zinc concentrates ( 53.9) ( 12.3)

ITh.. 878. 571.1

76U. J0A-shGUwn itn th1-e tabule below, thu-1l08s in A*-str- f-eiAht-1 ist greater on the Congo river than on the Kasai. This is to be expected, since t0he -LOO-ZWerserVres an c re@gionL -eer.w1AilAn 1.4060 s=e-Vr.el,Y. affe cted by the recent disturbances. There has been a sharp drop in freight shipped ,-rom LKLDLsanganiL and.. V.L-a the Itm.L1iUr.L.L (bU.Le 12). On the ot6IherI IandSU te Kasai route has been less affected since it is the main evacuation route for a la-rge part 01 th11e mLning produtiUoL VI KatalnL, wlich Ias been able to maintain itself. It is to be noted that copper shipments have increased at texp^ense of zinc cooncentIrcates . The KaDai1 river Ji8 now temost,:L-LOrt'at and profitable route of OTRACO's river network.

Freight registered on arrival in Kinshasa

Routae96_

Congo River 415.9 187.3 213.5

Kasai River 462.7 326.14 357.6

Total 878.6 513.7 571.1

77. hne fall in agricultural production and incomes forced the population to concentrate their spending on bare essentials and to reduce out- lays on manufactlvred products. This is reflected in the volume of rreight shipped upstream, especially via the Congo river. Freight shipped from Kinshasa to the Interior (000 tonal-

1959 1967

Congo River 44&2 8 1391-4

lanaPiRu-r w65.o 2

77-A7 .4o h

E -4 went

78. zpite4+ +he re-A-tln 4n traffic, OF",^>O's ri,-r t 8o- .4g- - 1-JJ * *~. .L.C- 0. *1t., 'JflJL%JI 0 UV=CU "1 SfL0PJ LL, services have been strained to the limit. Last year, large quantities of p 1-il haA- to Ike storedA 4-- mae-hift storae0. faclIltes because &404_ Iw/ k' w UJJ.S'. I - .L %a 0 ,*J.L e. .4* A.L. "..LJ. ULOW"ubw C-Ra-V.LnAJIL,.L 1- river fleet was unable to move the oil in time to processing plants. The stlorage increaed acid-it'y and considerably lowered t-he mr-'Xet '-Vue--oD t-ne oil.

79. One of the reasons for OTRACO's limited capacity is the poor the same as in 1959 (Table 14). About one-third of the motive paver and ov tuotalD _Awuarge_ capaci-tyJ_. iswA~' .aidU-up.}_J .._ nepairs haiveU__X_ %L- ueen slow___- partly__ __uue _ .to the lack of imported materials and spare parts.

Financial Situation

80. OTRACO has had a chronic financial deficit since independence, a...,J lm..... in n... ,nC., .,_a -2.a J- __ - , except Un J1966±mU4X 1to.3). ±L1e liv0 uei c±u is aVGriOutable deiay of six months in adjusting tariffs in line with the devaluation of the currency. It is expected that the tariff adjustment whiv h became effecTive early this year will enable OTRACO to balance its accounts. Meanwhile the cash position remains tight, because the Government and private snippers have been slow in paying their bills. Measures have now been taken to recover such payments from the private sector, and in the second half of 1968 the Government apparently took steps to liquidate its arrearages in payments which, at the end of July 1968, amounted to more than Z 2.0 million (us$4.o million).

81. Under the law, the Government is also liable for OTRACO's deficits. The uncertainty regarding Government payments made it more difficult for OTRACO to establish firm investment and financing plans. For this reason, firm arrangements ought to be worked out for settling the accounts between the Government and OTRACO on a regular basis.

82. The deficits are mainly attributable to losses on account of river transport, including river port operations as shown in the table below. OTRACO is obliged as a public enterprise to service many ports which are no longer profitable, vhere traffic is insufficient to cover operating expenses. In addition the Port of Kinshasa has a deficit which - 21 - reflects overstarring ana poor productivity. La-e deficit on the MLayumDe rail line and associated bus services is principally due to the imbalance of traffic and competition between road and rail transport. The losses of the Kivu network were unavoidable in view of the disturbances in that area. Despite the loss in traffic, the Matadi-Kinshasa railway and the Port of Matadi were able to realize a profit, partly attributable to recent improvements in their operations.

OTRACO: Financial Riesults inl2bT~ (in millions of Zaires)

River Transport - 1,475

Kinshasa - Port - 213

Kivu - Road Transport - 90

Mayumbe Railway - 31

Sub-Total 1,809

Kinshasa-Matadi Railway + 1,048

Matadi-port + 287

Sub-total + 1,335

Grand Total - 474

Deficit (-); Surplus (+) a/ Preliminary, excluding special taxes on the re-evaluation of assets.

Investment

83. OTRACO has prepared a ten-year investment plan, amounting to Z 44 million (US$88 million). Of this amount, orders for about Z 5.1 million (US$10.2 million) have already been placed or are being placed. According to OTRACO, this program has been limited during its initial years to essential renewals of equipment and a few additions to meet traffic requirements. The mission is of the opinion, however, that this program ought to be adjusted: some equipment seems ill-suited; some items may not be needed if operations are better organized; and investment planned for the Mayumbe railway would become superfluous if this line were closed (see Chapter VI Section B). The mission feels that the proposed investments have not been evaluated properly, that appropriate priorities have yet to be established and that the process of investment planning requires re-examination. - 22 -

Conclusion

84. River transport is in a critical condition. It is unable to handle all the traffic being offered and it is unduly slow, of poor quality and subject to frequent delays. The Government is aware that unless measures are taken promptly to remedy this situation, river transport could become a serious obstacle to the recovery of the economy and might even increase the country's dependence on the transport networks of neighboring countries. The authorities have, therefore, agreed to give first priority to the rehabilitation of this sector. At the suugestion of the mission, the Government is soliciting technical assistance from UNDP, for a team of hiahlv qualified experts to appraise the management, organization and operations of the Service des Voies Navigables and OTRACO. This team will be requested to nrenare and assist in implementing recommendations for improving the performance of both organizations and to draw up an investment nrnoram fnr 1969-71. The Bank has been asked to serve as Particinatlna and Executing Agency for this project. - 23 -

V. PORTS

A. General

85. The Congo has two malor ports for ocean coing vessels ; Boma and Matadi, which nonmally are able to accommodate ships with a draft of 30 ft. The nnrt of Banana- St the amomt of the Congo river; i8 alsn ahle tn hvAndle a small volume of maritime traffic, but this port was designed for military use "Ad the draft limit in much lover. Its imnortance ham inereAse rnme- what following the recent completion of a petroleum refinery nearby.

86. In addition, there are some 70 ports and landing stages on the river network and lalkes. Themost impoerant are the prtsne of Ki,iahna Kisangani and M'bandaka on the Congo river, the port of Aketi on the it4mbiri, Port- Wrancn,i4 on the Kaniw Tirwit on the KFilii anA Wnlwmn4a (formerly Albertville) on Lake Tanganyika.

87. Of the above total, OTRACO operates 66 ports: 35 on the Upper Con=s 2' ^-np the K-aai avA its tribitariea Wnd 6 ports on +he ufi 4 ^iia lafna. Port Francqui is operated by BCK; the port of Kalemie by CFL; and the port ,~P hir+4 'hi, Vie'4en,"g.n,

QSI *l tioTe11-- foLlowing t-1.'_ 4.A4ind - +1 handled '- some those ports:

TRAFFIC IN MAIN PORTS

^taJ'~~~~~Y 1,386~A 926JU 94

Boma 218 183 183 r"nshasa 954) 585 598p

BCA Po rT - Por-t Francqui 450 391 400

Cr- Port - Kalemie 215 95 93

Vicicongo Port - Aketi 135 16 44

89. The evolution of traffic in these six ports reflects tbe different economic development of several parts of the country in recent years. The considerable decline of traffic in the ports of Aketi and Kalemie reflect the serious disturbances and attendant fall of production in the areas they serve. This also explains the reduction in traffic volumes in the ports of Kinshasa and Matadi, which handle freight for all parts of the country. On the other hand, the traffic handled by the port of Boma has declined less than 15 per cent since 1959, reflecting the more stable conditions in the surrounding area. The volume of traffic through Port Francqui declined less - ?4 -

than 10 per cent, thanks to the expansion of copper production in Katanga 4n recent irnarS.

n An P1ne mai ort+s hba.e ba-4ical-l the some eql4pm.-an.o a in 1959 oAd they are well managed, although some suffer from overstaffing and a decline in la"-bor proA c-_dat. Tbese ports wot- ld be able t h..a.ale. the same volume of freight as before independence provided productivity is restored. The sitnu"Uation of *ae4h `n4or pots. is qujie+ A4 ff.erent hevaer, mony a-e barelr tJ±~~~~~~.UUA~ WJs.JI j9J vO LA -0 -e S.. - a ..- V. _~.a..j.Y t.I~ 0.5. ULflULUIU 9 able to handle 40-60 per cent of pre-independence traffic since a signi- .icant part of their equipment is out of orAer, mainly de +to a lac, 0o spare parts. Most of them have also poor management and poor labor discip-

.l'ne, altho-UM1 """ere are some outstandir.g exceptions 'wh-ere Cale man,agers have succeeded in overcoming serious difficulties.

B). isMatadi

91. The port is located on the left bank, 140 km upstream from the Luth OIl the CLongo rfiver. Becausme Of the st0rong current anau the narro-.W width of the river at this point, ships of over 120 m are not allowed to berth. The few ships -which exceed this limit can dock at the auxiliary port of Ango-Ango, which also handles dangerous cargoes. Matadi has nine deep water berths and one anchorage place for waiting ships. In the event these facilities are occupied, ships may dock at Boma, about 50 km downstream, wnere there are six berths.

92. The following table shows the tonnages and principal export commodities handled by the port.

Freight Traffic in the Port of Matadi tthousand tons)

1L959 160 1962 1964 1966 Exnorts Palm Oil 225 194 174 150 104 Copper ioo 58 - 79 133 Lumber 80 76 53 53 50 Zinc concentrates 50 41 - - 8 Oil cakes 73 78 56 50 31 Manioe & flour 47 26 2 3 - Cotton 45 37 5 3 Rubber 40 37 36 34 30 Other - - - Total 851 658 397 454 451 Imports

Grand Total 1,386 981 771 872 926 93. Total traffic in 1967 amounted to about 950 million tons, about 3.0 per Cent less in m99ainly due to the fall in forei- trade: the- volume of exports declined by about 38 per cent and that of imports by 20 per.cent,t. 1With1 the r,otable exception of copper, tbe volume ofP -1 otber export commodities is lower than before independence. Previous export sury-lwaes oil manioc and rice bhave disappeared a_,d 4the Congo is now - net importer of these commodities. Exports of palm oil are currently less than one half of the violue expoted in 195. T'.hese fe- exales illustrate the serious fall in agricultural production and the important gain which th e cIunt-I.y coUld reap from its revi-val.

94. As explained above, Voes Na-vigables is responible for channel markings and dredging operations and for maintaining the basic port infrastructure. Thse pOrt itself 's managed and operated by the department wILh- in OTRACO which is responsible for the Matadi-Kinshasa railway. Since the

larger part of traffic moves in anu out of the port, uy rail, 'nib arrangement appears to be acceptable.

95. The port is well managed, port operations are up-to-date and the equipment is well maintained and in good working order. With present equipment, and by introducing pre-palletization and pre-slinging of copper bars, the output of the port could be increased 50 per cent. On average, the port is currently operating one and one-half shifts per day.

C. Boma

96. In addition to a significant volume of foreign trade, Boma handles a significant volume of local cargo. This port is also managed by OTRACO, but operations are less satisfactory than in Matadi. The equipment, which is well maintained, could handle about 50 per cent wore traffic if required.

D. Kinshasa

97. The port and other ancillary installations are located on the left bank of the Congo river, which at this point widens into a broad road- stead. The port has two sections, one for river bound cargo (import section) and another for cargo Coming in by river (export section). These two sections are separated by an area, 502 m long, which is available for extensions if required. The port is connected to the Matadi-Kinshasa railway. This port is also managed and operated by OTRACO, by the Department responsible for river transport, in view of the fact that it is the focal point of most river transport. The port is being managed efficiently, port operations are modern and the equipment is adequate and being well maintained.

98. The traffic handled in 1967 amounted to about 600 million tons, or 62.7 per cent of the traffic in 1959, showing the same relative decline as in the port of Matadi. The composition of traffic is about the same as in Matadi since the port of Kinshasa serves as a transit point for Matadi. Freight Traffic in the Port of Kinshasa ktnou5ancd tons }

Unloaded Loaded Total

1959 5i7 L437 954 1960 408 250 658 1961 175 142 317 1962 190 234 424 1963 223 230 453 1964 264 215 479 196c 248 203 451 1966 319 266 585 1967 340 257 597

99. Under current operating conditions, the export section is nearly saturated and the authorities are considering building a new extension of about 250 m. This would also make it possible to accommodate an eventual increase in lumber traffic. Another stated reason for the extension is that the export section was built 40 years ago on metal sheet piles, which may have to be replaced to bear the heavy loads. The construction of this extension is somewhat premature in view of the greater needs elsewhere and also because measures could be taken to permit continued use for some time of the existing facility. The problem of overloading could be solved by a better distribution of cargo over the dock area. Furthermore, this section works only 1-½ shifts per day and, if traffic were to increase, it would be possible to increase capacity by about 40 per cent by introducing a full second shift and pre-palletization and pre-slinging of copper shipments. If still greater unloading capacity were required, two or three berths of the import section could be converted. After these possibilities have been exhausted, work could begin on the planned extension.

E. Port Francqui

100. Port Francqui on the Kasai river was built in 1921, as a terminal to the BCK railway line, mainly for the evacuation of mining products from Katanga. This port is operated and managed by BCK. The construction of the port has apparently influenced the hydrological regime of the river with the result that the dock area is regularly silted up. Constant dredging is required to enable port operations. Freight Traffic in Port Francqui

Total 3_ 24 382 | 04 Unloaded 164 130 212 200 Loaded 217 117 170 204 of which: mining products (181) (10T) (159) (190) other (36) (10) (11) (14) a/ Preliminary

101. In contrast with all other ports, the volume of freight handled by Port Francqui in 1967 apparently exceeded that of 1959. This expansion is attributable to an increase in upstream traffic, due to larger shipments of fuel oil and some other items, while the volume of downstream traffic is practically the same as before independence. This development reflects the continued expansion of the mining production in Katanga, as shown in the following table.

Exports of Mineral and Metal Products from Katanga (thousand tons) 1959 1967

Via Port Francqui 182 192 Copper 125 175 Other a/ 57 17

Via Dilolo 435 4o8 Copper 63 72

rSeu / 372 336

Y4ia S *i-arOa 100

Copper 90 35 Other A/ 19 94

Via Kalemie (copper) 5 44

Total 730 774

Zambia copper via Dilolo 84 101

A! Co(amrisinc mainly: managanese; zinc and zinc concentrates - 2A -

102. The port itself cannot be regarded as the bottleneck on the Ya-sai route; it4. output iss hi4g -dA ^ai0A Ie 4-iroasA 4f nTheee port works normally two shifts per day and occasionally a third shift during 4 the. night. With present eq 4pment on order aor "`J. rA.A.4 the port could probably handle up to 600,000 tons provided operations are s r 4_l.Lned Aril pre _p _ lletiz on_i and ping of _Ao_p_ApAer shipm_ts isA_ introduced.

103. Beyond this volume, facilities will have to be expanded and the JUverLUUmL. will. have to choose between Uwo a"lUCaL c.LVCi U.of: ) expanding the existing port or, (b) constructing a complete new port downstream at a site -wnere the regime of thie river is more stable and the problem of siltation is avoidable. To meet the Government's objective to increase the capacity of the Kasai route, BCK is proposing to extend the existing quay by 300 m. This solution is obviously the least expensive but it does not solve the siltation problem. On the other hand, building a new port would be expensive. It is therefore desirable that the model study of the river regime near Port Francqui (para. 51) be compieted before a decision is taken on the alternative to be built. It is hoped that this study can be compleed b-y the end of 1969 and that ix may inuicate whether it would be possible to provide, at minimum cost, a natural self maintaining channel and deep water access to the existing faciiities. To postpone a decision would not involve a waste of valuable time because the matter is not that urgent. In fact, the interim period could be utilized to prepare a technical and economic feasibility study of the relocation of the port.

F. Aketi

104. This port is located on the Itimbiri river, which is a tributary of the Upper Congo river. It constitutes the western terminal of the Vicicongo railway. For this reason, the port is operated and managed by Vicicongo. As explained before, the Vicicongo railway serves an area which has been seriously affected by rebellions. As a result, traffic came practically to a standstill in 1965 and again during some months in 1967, but is picking up again.

Freight Traffic in the Port of Aketi (thousand tons) Year Loaded Unloaded Total 1959 74.9 60.4 135.3 1960 72.9 41.4 114.3 1961 30.5 22.9 53.4 1962 32.1 36.4 68.5 1963 41.5 43.0 44.5 1964 35.4 34.0 79.4 1965 - _ _ 1966 9.4 6.2 15.6 1967 23.2 21.1 44.3 - 29 -

105. The port is well managed and with present equipment it could handle about 150,000 tons of cargo per annum.

G. Other Ports

106. Most of the ports in the interior have been neglected since independence. Therefore, high priority must be given to streamlining their operations and to the rehabilitation of their equipment. Besides the projects mentioned above, the Service des Voies Navigables is preparing plans for several other ports. In the near future, the Port of Ka:Lemie, which suffered serious damage from the flooding of Lake Tanganyika in 1966, will have to be rehabilitated. The port of M'Bandaka, which is over-age and dilapidated will have to be rebuilt. In total, the Service des Voies Navigables is preparing plans for the construction of about 1,000 m of new quays. Ihese plans ought to be evaluated carefully in order to establish necessary priorities and proper time schedules for the construction of these projects. VI. RAILWAYS

A. Geners"'

107. The railways are an essential complement of the waterways since they serve etlher as a by-pass for river sections WhAich are not na-vigable (CFMK and CFL), or as extensions of the waterways into the hinterland (BCK and Vicicongo). L-rlus, comb±ineu ra'l± nd ri-ver tLrar.sport- forms a great circular route within the country, enabling goods from far inland to reach Kinshasa or the port of Matadi. in addition, the railways in the eastern part of the country are connected to the networks of neighboring countries (East Africa, Zambia and Angola) and thereDy provide several alternative routes to ports on the Atlantic Ocean in the West and on the Indian ocean in the East.

108. The total lengtn or the railways is 5,U40 km, comprising 4,200 km of meter gauge and 840 km of narrow gauge lines. The first railway, from Matadi to Kinshasa, was completed in 1898 and the last section, from Kamina to Kabalo, in 1956. Details on each section are given in Table 16.

109. The railways will continue to play an important role in the economy considering that a large part of the traffic in the country is bulk cargo to be hauled over long distances. The railways are well suited for this type of traffic. The threat of competition from road transport is bound to be limited since there are few roads running parallel to the railways. The only lines which may have become uneconomic are: the railway from Boma to Tshela, 136 km long, and the line from Kisangani to Ponthierville, 125 km long. In these two areas, road transport may have a more economical alternative.

110. The railways are operated by four organizations:

- OTRACO, operating the mainline from Kinshasa to Matadi and a branch line from Boma to Tshela, or a total of about 500 km;

- Vicicongo, operating a narrow gauge line, 840 km long, serving as a feeder line for the rich agricultural areas in the north-eastern part of the country. Its western terminal is at the port of Aketi, which is served by OTRACO river transport.

- Societe Congolaise des Chemins de Fer des Grand Lacs (C.F.L.), operating lines, 1,140 km in total in the eastern part of the country; and

- Nouvelle Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga, (BCK-KDL), managing a network of 2,560 km serving Katanga. - 31 -

111. From a strictly operational point of view, the latter two networks could be considered as one since they complement each other. Together, they provide the following evacuation and entry routes for Katanga and the.Eastern part of the country.

- via Port Francqui or Kisangani to Kinshasa and Matadi;

- via Dilolo to the port of Lobito in Angola;

- via Lake Tanganyika to Dar es Salaam, and via Sakania to Beira and other ports on the Indian Ocean.

The existence of these alternative routes has provided considerable flexibility in getting goods in and out of the eastern and southern parts of the country.

112. Before independence, the four railway systems were well equipped and well managed and were able to meet traffic requirements without difficulty. Meanwhile, operating efficiency, equipment and track conditions have deteriorated. At the present time, only the BCK network is able to handle a greater volume of traffic than in 1959. The other three networks are able to meet current traffic requirements and have some excess capacity only because requirements are significantly lower than before independence.

113. Railway traffic since independence shows similar development to river transport.

Railways: Passenger and Freight Traffic (millions of units)

Passenger - km Ton - km 1959 1966 1959 1966

OTRACO 61.4 141.2 519 377

BCK 278.7 353.0 1590 1644

CFL 31.9 32.4 166 70

VICICONGO 5.8 1.3 57 8

Total 377.8 527.9 2332 2099

114. Passenger travel increased 40 per cent between 1959 and 1966, or about 5 per cent annually, whereas freight traffic decline 10 per cent. This pattern is not uniform for all parts of the country: rail traffic declined considerably in the areas served by CFL and Vicicongo. which were most affected by the disturbances in recent years; it declined less on the Matadi-Kinshasa line and it increased on the BCK network. A brief review of the current situation of each network follows: - 32 -

B. OTRACO

General

119. The original eonneesion fnr the Matadi-Kinshana railwav waR granted in 1887 to a private organization, the "Compagnie du Congo pour le Cnmmerep et 11Tnd' trie". The line woa eompletedti irn 1898. A new Alignmment and a new 1.067 m gauge track were completed in 1932. This layout has basical-ilyr remained +.ha nam ainnFP +ha+t *I,mo Thlt Mayuimha hrarnh 14va %rna completed in 1923. In 1936, these lines were transferred to OTRACO, which had been established the -ear before to operat.e all trans-ort facilities indicated by the State.

Equipment

116. Despite the new layout completed in 1932, the main line has about 640 curves, of which about 20 have a radius of less than 200 m, limiting speed to maximum 60 km/h. The track has been laid with 33 and 40 kg/m rails, long=eldedAar.d laid s+ore nl"st The line has been fairly- well maintained and is in sufficiently good condition to meet traffic requirements. Renewals on about 120 ', are behind schedu-e and Adeserve high priority in the investment program. Signalling equipment is in good working order. In sm, the basic in.frastrC. re is still adequate to meet, current and foreseeable traffic requirements.

117. As to the Mayumbe branch line, the condition of the track is poor an-d commlete t1rack- rene-v- Isi8eing considered. Before a decision Jis made on this matter and on the purchase of new locomotives and rolling stock Ifor thi1-1'Lslin e,' ,t seems aud'visable tLo in-iest-igeatle whether- thLisLl'"ne o-ughit to be maintained. The traffic on the line shows a great imbalance, because almost all general cargo moving inland aud all pasusnger trafllc is being transported on a parallel road. Consequently, the railway is being operated at a financial 'Los mainly to transport agricultural goods from inland (lumber, bananas, palm oil,and Palm kernels, cacao, coffee, etc.) to Boma. It may be more economic for the country to move all trafiic by road. Shippers of such commodities as lumber admittedly find rail transport cheaper than road transport, but this is because they do not bear the full cost of rail transport.

U18. OTRACO's locomotives and rolling stock are shown in Table 17. This equipment is fairly modern; some 60 per cent was put into service after 1947. All wagons are bogie type, equipped with automatic couplings. The vorkshops are well equipped and fairly well managed.

Traffic

19. As shown in Table 18, passenger travel has more than doubled since 1959 as a result of the rapid increase of population and rising money incomes in the Province of Kongo Central, and low fares. The volume of freight handlea in 1967 was the highest since 1961, but only about 60 per cent of that before independence. Local traffic on the line reflects - 33 -

the growing attraction of Kinshasa as a market; thus freight movements to Kinshasa are increasing proportionately more .api-'y tn- +.raffi^ +o Matadi. Export traffic consists mainly of copper, zinc, palm oil, etc. and local traffi o bd1ding-s, materi lber .d suAga (Table 19).

Performance

120. Trains are running according to pre-established diagrams and 'ime*tables. Regu'ar trains h'anuLe maUbout U8 per oi theIcLL Iraffi.L. Except for one suburban passenger train, no trains run on Sundays.

121. On average, diesel locomotives cover about 60,000 km annually, which is low. Thlis poor performance is due to inefficient employment of equipment and frequent breakdowns attributable to poor maintenance. With Improved control and maintenance, it sho-ud be possible to doubie locomotive performance.

122. The turn-around time of wagons used in transporting minerals is 20 days, which is very long. In this case, the main reason is insufficient storage space in Matadi, where wagons are frequently immobilized 10-15 days. Tne storage problem ought to be remedied and/or freight arrivals more closely coordinated with shiploading before new wagons are ordered. Turn- around of other wagons averaged 12 days in 1967, but this has been shortened to 6-7 days since the beginning of 1968. This improvement has been achieved through the establishment of a modern control office, which is being expanded gradually. Besides controlling the movement of trains, this office also aims to coordinate the distribution and utilization of all locomotives and rolling stock.

123. CFMK employs a labor force of about 4,000, which is in excess of reasonable requirements: productivity is only 97,000 gross ton/km annually per employee, which is low. On the other hand, CFMK needs more experienced staff who, for the time being, will need to be foreign.

Financial Situation

124. The financial results of CFMK have been as follows: - 3L4 -

CFMK - Financial Results (in thousand Zaires)

Year Revenue Expenditures Surplus Deficit

1958 685 586 99 1959 675 608 67

1960 526 563 37 1961 471 596 124 1962 568 661 93

1963 871 598 273 1964 1,793 1,300 493 1965 1,692 1,549 143 1966 2,697 1,885 802

1967 a/ n.a. n.a. 1,408 a/ Preliminary

125. CFMK has been earning surplusses since 1963 but incurred a deficit in 1967 following devaluation of the currency in the middle of the year while tariffs remained the same. Following an increase in tariffs on January 11, 1968, CFMK is again earning a surplus. In general, the financial situation of CFMK seems to be satisfactory as earnings are sufficient to cover operating expenditures, depreciation and interest charges.

Investment

126. OTRACO has prepared a ten-year investment plan, as explained above (para. 83). Investments in the railways are projected at Z 21 million ($42 million), including Z 10 million ($20 million) for an electrifi- cation scheme to be realized after completion of the Inga hvdro power plant.

127. CFMK has already ordered 6 diesel locomotives. 11 first class and 20 second class passenger wagons, 10 refrigerator wagons, and it is considering the purchase of 7 diesel shunting locomotives and 100 sliding roof wagons. In addition it has already replaced fifty freight wagons and is ennsidering the purchase of 4 dieRel locomotives for the Ma&nybe railway.

128. Several consideratinns dintate a review of this program: The economic justification of maintaining the Mayumbe line requires re-exam- inatinn; snme ePniniment ,nsv not he needed if orperationri are hptte'r norgam- nized; and higher priority should be given to track reneval. Procedures - 35 - for preparing and implementing investments ought to be reviewed. Proposed investments have not been evaluated properly, especially from an economic point of view; more attention ought to be paid to determining appropriate priorities and there is apparently need for more consultation between the Board and interested departments.

Conclusion

129. Generally the organization of CFMK within OTRACO follows a pattern which is commonly adopted by railways and appears to be satisfactory. Oper- ating efficiency is low, due mainly to a lack of spare parts and inadequate maintenance; inadequate authority, control and supervision and poor labor discinline. Experienced personnel is insufficient in number and expatriates are frequently placed in positions with little responsibility and authority. The currentv investment nrogram ought to be reviewed and pronerlv coordinated within OTRACO.

C_ rninoanip eiu rhpmin die Fer

Katanga - Dilolo - Leopoldville (KDL - BCK)

Organization, Management and Manpower

130. This enterprise was established in 1927 as a Congolese holding company, with headquarters in Lubumbashi (Elizabethville), to studly, build and operate the railway network in Katanga. KDL owns the railway network and ancillary facilities in Katanga. Its capital is shared between the Congo Republic (46 per cent) and private interests (54 per cent), but the Congolese Government holds 62.5 per cent of total voting rights.

131. Management and operation of the railway has been entrusted to the "Nouvelle Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas Congo au Katanga" (BCK), which is a management firm established in 1961 as a subsidiary to succeed the parent BCK company. The latter has become a Belgian consulting-firm, which currently receives about Z 54,000 ($104,000) annually for services rendered to its subsidiary, the "Nouvelle" BCK.

132. Initially, the organization of BCK was based on the departmental system, but this was changed to the divisional system in 1931. The network is divided into operational districts which are assuming increasing respon- sibilities and autononm in day-to-day operations. Specialized technical departments at headquarters are responsible for all studies and plans and for the execution of new construction. This organization is satisfactory and fairly efficient.

133. The labor force at the beginning of this year was 16,340 including 550 exDatriates, in comparison with a total of 14,227 including 668 expatriates on January 1, 1960. Although the total labor force has risen, this is at least partly justified by the increase in traffic and it would appear that staffing is reasonably well controlled by management.. In 1967, - 36 - total expenditures for personnel amounted to about 25 per cent of total operating expenditures, including renewals, which is reasonable. BCK is in a more favorable position than other transport organizations in that it has been able to maintain a relatively high number of experienced expatriate staff.

Equipment

134. The network consists of a single-track line 2,560 km long, of which 673 km are electrified and an additional 179 km are in the process of being electrified. The main line has been laid with 30 kg/m and 40 kg/m long-welded rails, on crushed stone ballast, except for 200 km between Kamina and Kabongo. The track has been well maintained and is in good condition, although renewals have been delayed. To improve the situation, BCK intends to renew about 130 km annually during 1969 and 1970, instead of 65 km p.a. which is the normal rate. The signalling equipment, which consists of an electrically interlocked single-line token system, is also in satisfactory condition.

135. Motive power and rolling stock, as of January 1, 1968, is indicated in Table 17. Most of the 139 steam engines are 30 to 45 years old; they are in bad condition and will have to be replaced. First orders for diesel locomotives have already been placed. BCK had also taken the decision to convert remaining steam locomotives from coal to fuel oil, since this would improve their output and at the same time save foreign exchange. However, this program had to be interrupted because no arrangements have been made to ship fuel oil from the new refinerv at Moanda to BCK's terminal at Port Franequi.

136. More than one-third (1,200) of the freight wagons are over-age and will have to be replaned. To meet the exnected increase in nassenger travel and to replace over-age cars, additional passenger coaches are also reqnired. The wo-rkshonR are well enuipped and managed and require no large investments.

Traffic

137. Traffic on the BCK network, in terms of passenger-km and ton-km, is currently greater than before independence, as sh n, in the r,ing table:

BCK Traffic

1959 1963 1964 1965 1966 Passenger travel W-1ber (4thousa,d)1 1,17 I1,249 'I'M 1,73I,0 1,5 Pass./km (million) 279 296 467 470 353 Freight Tons (thousand) 5,109 3,357 3,963 4,307 4,500 Tons/kms (million) 1,590 897 1,191 1,367 1,644 - 37 -

138. Traffic declined after independence, during the years of rebellion in Katanga; but has exnanded since 1963. The reasons for the exnansion in passenger travel, both in numbers and traffic units, have been explained befnre: rapid urbanization, greater freedom to travel and low farer- The decline in passenger travel registered in 1966 reflects the disturbances tll_ring_tht enre

139. The lover fr.p1fht. vnlim,e i tiBe tn a dieelline of 1Int-rl traffi,- following the fall of agricultural production in the area. On the other hand, the volume of long haul of forein. trade traffic has increased more than 20 per cent (Table 20) and this traffic, which accounted for less third. This development is attributable to higher exports and imports (manly"1, co-al andl fuevl a. repacen 1^^aocl fireoodA). Atog total tonnage declined between 1959 and 1966, from 5.1 million tons to 4.5 4 4 ,n 114,.,. tons, toa.l tr 4 in te',e of Inn /r, inrea-ed 1-i.tlcafse- the average length of haul rose from 311 km to 365 km.

140. The prospects are that traffic will continue to increase during "tbe nr,ex fsew years as a res,k't1 of a fu"ri`ber exa.in npsege rvl an increase of about 5 per cent p.a. in mineral production and the revival ofL agricult-ual- production1. UTnlessV-- capacity-h of river transport -via 04. O.~L.I.U.f.U.O.J J9UU L3 "I3J11. U L~_0 I..1w L'..a. Y .L±3.. V.1± L. Vwu. 3 I CLa.11 P3 L, V.3.0. Port Francqui can be raised, a large part of the expected expansion in the vVolumte oi iurti±gnI tradue W±±± il hvUe to be chne eled -via otherUUrot, V.a Sakania, Kalemie and Lobito.

Performance

141. In many respects operations are efficient, but in others improvements are possible. Tne utilization of electric locomotives amounts on average, to 10,000 km per month and that of steam locomotives to 6,700 km, which is acceptable but the utilization of freight wagons amounts to 2,100 km only. The average turn-around of ore wagons to Port Francqui or Lobito is 20 to 25 days, which is too long. Also, the gross tonnage of trains is about 470 tons which is too low even taking into account that freight limits are imposed by steep gradients on the line Tenke-Luena. Labor efiiciency has decreased from 131,000 traffic units per man in 1959 to about 122,000 in 1966. Passenger trains have a regular schedule, DUT all freight train movements are controlled by dispatchers and have no regular timetable. If traffic increases significantly, this practice ought to be abandoned.

Financial Situation

142. Une financial situation started to improve following the revival of traffic and BCK has been able to earn a small surplus during the past two years, even though the currency devaluation affected operating results adversely in the second half of 1967. - 38 -

(million Zaires) 1959 1965 166 1967 1968

Revenue 20.2 6.4 9.6 15.3 24.8

Expenditure 16.8 7.3 9.5 15.2 23.0

Surplus (+) or 3.4 -0.9 0.1 0.1 1.8

±LL~ .LLI ma..JAJL I.~1U.D .L LIA-L UI..I ULLW6.I I.A1S 4- PJ ffne avalablNe information tends- to ind-icate that 4the cost of trasport has increased from about 1.1i8 US per traffic unit in 1959 to 1.7* per tIraffic unLit in 1968, or by aboVtA 40 per cen. Theur.lt cotsar apro ximative. The main reason for this increase is the relatively sharp rise .LnL eXp-elU1.l[ure on L.ue uan materiaX s.

143.aa Ito the 'ncrease in tariff8 on1Ja nuary- 1, 196U. BCKD. expects to realize a profit in 1968 of Z 1.8 million ($3.6 million) which w-ou'u corresponrd tCo about. I.3 per cent of eete re.-

144. Present tariffs for different cLasses of trafLic relate as follows to the corresponding tariffs applicable in 1959:

Coefficient

General merchandise 1.06

Luggage 0.77

Mineral products for export 1.00

Passengers (lst, 2nd and 3rd class) 0.91

Passengers (4th class) 0.36

Investments

145. BCK has a five-year investment program (1966-71) which has been prepared on the basis of: (i) decisions reached at Lusaka in June 1966, whereby the Congo undertook to assist Zambian copper exports via Lobito, Matadi and Dar es Salaam and; (ii) a program made in July 1967 to improve the "Voie Nationale" from Katanga to Matadi, via Port Franequi. The total cost of this program is estimated at Z 24 million ($48 million).

146. Since the agreement with Zambia has not been fully implemented, the investment program has to be adjusted and BCK has, therefore, prepared a list of materials and equipment urgently required for 1968 and 1969 (Table 21). This list seems reasonable in view of the present condition of equipment available and the additional equipment needed to meet the expectecd - 39 -

increase in traffic. ItB total cost is estimated at Z 13.6 million ($27.2 millio'), of whic.h 7.3 million !$12-6 million) hal alrpmaiv bhen rirtiprpdi under bilateral credit arrangements with Italy and Japan. Assuming that BCK vrill wish ton t -apr qoma itpmTq frnom Rnptifiri qimrYnlit-rR fnr qxtandAvtEii- zation purposes, there remains still a balance of about Z 4.9 million ($9o A n411i4on) for- +trae-krT,atprial andi enquinpnt to 'ha financea fronn othp" sources.

147. At present both BCK and OTRACO face uncertainties in framing their in..,.eetment progrwe..-. I+ is not clear 1- Z.imuch cop an pery need to be transported via the "national" route in the Congo, particularly

ir, the l ight ofJ a ±ternat,ves for. theJ- C._AAdlng ofJ +s 4 traffic being developed by Zambia and Tanzania. It also remains uncertain whether and -whLen thlie proposed' ra'il linlk IDet4ween Port Francqu1 and4 Kinsbasa wil'" be WU~i~J Uj~JD~.LL5L~ . ~.J. LLLLL LJ UW L. JL U I' .5 .. ~A4AL~L ~ 1 A4 .L.L.L WU_ constructed and what investments should be made in the meantime to improve transport& on the Kassai River --d ---- d the 4acilitiez at- Port4 Frcqui.

F1.W 1la..J..LUOy J.A.LJVne £ %JLL. rEVAnuLi. - Kinsllhasa

±~~4U.148.~~~~~~~ ~~ ie POSSuLLLLyposblty I.he 01of buligarlUULLULng±U a1 raL.LW~. ylne.L11 ±L.Lft.LLlrng teL,II BKnet-DWI,I'. J, . work to the CFMK line, as a by-pass for the Kasai river, has a long history. The concession for such a line was incor porated in the 1906 Convetrion, between the Congo and the parent BCK company. As a first step in this scheme, BCK completed in 1928 the railway from B-ukama to POrt Franequi. This provided an integrated rail-river route between Bas-Congo and Katanga, entirely within Congolese territory. Construction of the by-pass railway link has been revived recently, mainly as a means to reduce Katanga's dependence on the railway services of neignDoring countries and to assist Zambian copper exports. The Government considers that the capacity of the river transport services on the Kasai is too limited to handle such traffic and that river transport is slow, being currently subject to long and frequent delays.

149. Three possible alignments have been studied, initially by the former BCK and more recently by a Japanese railway mission. Tne estimated length and construction costs of these alignments are as follows:

Construction Cost Line Length Total Per km

Northern line 857 km $ 94 min $110,000 Middle line 1,267 km $250 mln 197,000 Southern line 1,360 km $192 mln 141,000

150. The Japanese mission favors the middle link, although more costly, on the grounds that it would help develop a potentially rich agricultural area and that the cost of operation of this line would be lower than on the two other lines. The BCK study, on the other hand, favors the noxthern route for technical reasons and also because it is the least expensive. The construction of either line would require about 6 years, after contracts have been let. Construction of the southern route would require about 9 years. - 40 -

151. The above cost estimates must be regarded as tentative. They are based on preliminary surveys, except for the northern route which was surveyed in more detail by BCK in the early thirties. On the basis of preliminary discussions with BCK, the mission believes that the construction cost of the northern route. including an allowance for contingencies and price escalation, might be closer to $125 million. It should be noted that the above estimates do not include the cost of locomotives or other equipnment needed to operate the line.

152. On the basis of 1966 and a traffic volume of 800,000 tons annually during the first ten yeavr Of oneration and of 1;100;000 tons thereafter, the BCK study estimated the financial return on capital to be 4 per cent nmd f ner eent renpeetivelv- The traffin estimAte of 8OO,000 tnsi Anuimaied that the railway would carry all of Katanga's mineral production (480,ooo tons), AYecpnt manganese, All imnnrt. itn Kattnga via West Cost nnprts (250,000 tons), and some interregional traffic (75,000 tons). The traffic eaa,,ww.+t., nsof +he J.Tnyeoo ra4aailn-,u mi s q+ii&v area imie.h %more 4pt4is4i since traffic on the middle line is expected to reach 3.4 million tons, consistin- of 1.2 million tons of e-ports,an eli1 l uvol imna nfPj.rtsr.4a, onA 1 million tons of interregional traffic.

153. The proposed link raises complex issues, and the studies which have been prepared so far do not provide an adequate b-ss4 for -- aching a decision. There is still considerable doubt, for example, concerning the 4 +raf.fj- wrhic4h wo-itA bea a+treted b, eah ,..c +he propsedA nerw l nes. Z bia is likely to make alternative transport arrangements for its copper before ne.U-ay line co-dA be eon+rac+ed,… this trafficA ou.+ Wh.it. o +o- be disregarded. As the BCK study indicates, the continued export via Lobito of tAh mAnganee produced nes=r theLJ -g ol= border m. y be necessaryj in order to avoid prohibitive transport costs via the national route; any traffic f orecast shol d inc.lu1de o&.L'4L. U.'y1those co dit'tes -M-h1J.ich361co-%"-"%'L U'de transpor'l elu at acceptable cost by the national route. Other complications are: (1) accord.ing to an inVernstionnal agreement", .10 per cent, o,L thie Kaltanga production has to be exported via Beira; (2) part of Katanga's production o co-pper or otbher UniU vLU-Le prucLts5 may haVy tu ub eApor1.dU V.La witUo in order to ensure continued transport of manganese, which is not very proliabUt.LC ±ur t.he DCUKUC.LIL LLL.L-WMYUj 0.nU, (D31 part of the prouuuiuon of Katanga may have to be routed via CFL in order to ensure the financial viability Of that sys tea.

154. None of the studies have seriously exaMined the impact which tne construction of the line would have on river transport, although ensuing losses would have to be taken into account in the economic evaluation of the proposed alternatives. Also a proper evaluation of alternative transport costs will have to be made to ensure that copper exports remain competitive on the world market if prices decline.

155. The cost of raising the capacity of river transport will have to be considered and compared with the cost of the railway line. The Japanese railway mission has estimated that the cost of raising the capacity of river transport services to 1.0 million tons, which is more than double the - 41 - current volume of traffic, would be about $14.0 million. This would mean that only one or two years of interest on the capital invested in a new link would be sufficient to pay for the expansion of river capacity. This alone casts some doubt on the economic justification of the railway, although obviously other factors have to be considered. In any event, as the urgent need is for rehabilitation of river transport there should be sufficient time to undertake a comprehensive and objective study of the technical and economic feasibility of a new railvay link.

Conclusions

156. Taking into account the difficult conditions in recent years, the BCK is still reasonably weli organized, although measures ought to be taken to improve staff training, labor productivity and the efficiency of some equipment, especially the utilization of freight wagons. Suitable arrangements should also be worked out promptly to supply fuel oil from the new refinery at Moanda so that BCK can complete the conversion of steam engines from coal to fuel.

157. The construction of a new railway link between Bas-Congo and Katanga can be postponed until a comprehensive economic and technical feasibility study has been completed. In the meantime, first priority must be given to increasing the capacity of river transport.

D. Societe' Congolaise des Chemins de Fer des Grands Lacs (CiF

Organization and Manpower

158. The present company is the successor of the "Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Congo Sunerieur et Grands Laes Africains". a Belgian com.aanv established in 1902 to construct and operate a combined system of rail- river and lake transnort. The Congo aceuired ownershin on Januarv 1. 19659 and the system was then managed by a "mixed company" which included representatives of both the Congolese Government and the former Belgian conces- sionaire. The "mixed company" was abolished on January 26, 1967, when CFL took over comnletely and became a "narastatal"_ an autonomous public organization, like OTRACO. However, one-half of the fleet on Lake Tanganyika hsa remained the pnroertv of the Beiitan comnanv which continues to onerate on the Lake.

159. CFL operates currently 2,905 km of combined rail-river and Lake routes (see MAn at end Of this vonump as indicated belevw

(a) Railwva lines: (1,067 m gauge!) Kabalo-Kalemie: 273 km Kabalo-Kabongo: 246 km Kabalo-Kindu: 441 km vUbv -du=KisngW.i: 125 Total 1,085 km - 42 -

(b) River svstem:

Kindu-Ubundu: 310 km

Kathln-Mal emha N'K1 u :300 km

Tnt.al 61O km,

(!e) Tanown.nirka T.&IrP avSatets:

Kalee...-Ki gom a 345 im

Kaletie-Kal"du345 1'

Ka.ToMlt-tbv71 ID'i- ad

T,.sis ar. e-xtensive network- and the average ha'-U, of' 4re;. i84 «but4, km and that of passenger travel about 200 km.

160. The general organization of CFL is similar to that of OTRACO. J'Ue preserli't mar.s4ement h'as beer.D insta.ULled recentuIL-y, iL sI..L.L unLIrired aMau will have to demonstrate its capacity to undertake the difficult task of rehablitU...&6atingL _iL. L.L. j LA. .L11.1 thL.L cLU=POnyLIp.1* . "Th'e. B1oardUUL consist-s.f.L U o V ele-vrenVZ diwtarsu .L r r , including the Chairman, and five "Commissaires du Gouvernment". The admin- istrators, althio-ugh nomfinated by the Government, Lnclude representatives of outside interests and two OTRACO managers. All departments have Congo- lese nationals as directors, except the Technical DO-partment wnicn is managed by two expatriates.

161. The labor force of 6,400 is excessive in relation to the current volume of traffic. CFL currently employs 8Oexpatriates; additional expatriate staff is needed urgently to fill important positions in the Technical Department (assistant directors for permanent way, rolling stock and motive power, electricity and signalling) since qualified Congolese are not for the time being available.

Equipment

162. As a result of inadequate maintenance during the past few years, the track is in poor condition and track reneval (ballast, sleepers and rails) should be carried out without delay, especially on the Kalemie- Kabalo sections, at the rate of about 30 km annually during the next four years. To carry out such a program, it may be necessary to reorganize the Permanent Way Department and to give prompt consideration to proper staff training. - 43 -

163. The 125 km railway line from Kisangani to Ubundu, which is isolated from the main network, is in poor condition. If the line is to be retained the track will have to be renewed completely and practically all rolling stock and locomotives replaced. However, before these investments are made, it seems necessary to investigate whether this line should be retained, in view of the low volume of current and expected traffic. Road transport might prove to be more economic even though this would require the construction of a road and the organization of efficient road transport services between Kisangani and Ubundu.

164. Signalling equipment over the entire network has been neglected and will have to be inspected for proper maintenance, and the telecommunications equipment, which has been seriously damaged during the recent disturbances, must be rehabilitated as soon as possible.

165. Motive power and rolling stock, of January 1968, is shown in Table 17. Maintenance and repairs have been neglected, and the locomotives and rolling stock are in poor condition. The company may be unable to imnrove this situation during the next few months because of the shortage of spare parts and qualified personnel, especially for maintaining the dipsel locomotives. After taking into account the four diesel shunting engines ordered recently, the number of diesel locomotives is adequate. Rpnpnt nrders for pight pnassnar rcsnhes - six ref'rig rator wagons a nd thirty freight wagons for the transport of copper should considerably al leviote the riir-nPtn shotr+ae of roll inng stok. ThiS erni nTp,,jt is sufficient to handle a moderate increase in traffic.

Traffic

166. Both passenger and freight traffic have declined as a result of the seriou- dis1turbances in t I,ea (Tables 4 and R). Recently, traffic has begun to recover and, at the present time, passenger travel is about 4 4 the sme as before independenc, but4 fre i h +raffic is only about+ one third of pre-independence level. Current freight traffic would have been much lower if no emergency arrangements had been made to ship a sizeable volume of copper from Katanga via Kalemie to Dar es Salaam. Copper ship- mr.ts 4a t+h-a rou+e re rver stall i n 1090, hii+ reached aobou,+ 4ILI 000 +on in 1967 (Table 2). Without such shipments, the current financial diffi- cul es of 'LT Y-d have been mch meor ase4 rious

167 Current freight onsistc+s mnca ly of coppr 4in +rar.i from Katanga or Zambia, to Dar es Salaam; tin and cassiterite in transit to

AT."IJ_L UiJ o. A4 . , W . ..L4 . _La _ M 4J B.5. 5 . . U A_ lo_dA. seed; cement and various agricultural products. About 80 per cent of total t±raffic is concent4J1Lrat.ed on the main line from Kabongo. (.JctUAnc41'o.&A wiL BCK) to Kalemie and Kigoma (junction with East African Railways).

168. The commodity position of the traffic on CFL is illustrated by the cargo handled in the por-L of Kalenir-e, WLhIch in 1967 was as follo-ws: - 44 -

Main Commodities

Tonnage imported via Kigoma: 23,989 t. fuel & gas oil: 13,000 t.

Tonnage exported via Kigoma: 43.400 t. copper: 42.000 t.

Traffic from Congolese ports: 8,500 t. cement: 2,400 t. sugar: 2,300 t.

Traffic to Conzolese ports: 16,000 t. Coal: 7,831 t. general mprehAndise

Th'ci fi oi-rp illimtrate thA importance of cnnner AhinmentRs vhir'h are carried at more profitable rates than most other goods.

Performance

169. The performance of CFL has been adversely affected by the break- down of law ani nordr in the are- and b' the re'eent ehnune in management. Currently, the average load is barely 10 tons per freight car, while the average annual run of a loaded raoi$ht ear is 60oon km only; the traffic densit over the system is 90.10 net tons whereas the gross tonnage is inn in . to. q,,wt,.awnrot.d time of the freight4h+ a Jis very long. This is reflected in the relatively high cost of transport, which on ave.-sge corresponds to about UTS 'J nperton-km or naa ffay...-min-

170. Despte the l3 ofP,vl t+raffc,4 CFT-L 'h. bee" alt floanCe its operating accounts and to make a small profit in 1966 and probably also in 1967.J I* Fo.llowing5 theU. tariff tVmen.J el this year, C".L s tWilas that total revenue and total current expenditure in 1968 will amount to Zy 2. 08mi''on ar,d Z7 2.4- milIlion respectivelyr. Thus, re-ver,ues are e.-evted *_ U IL -".LLJI uL~ ". L ~ I .L.L'.J.L& 4 *. A P=%.. %,=u. to be sufficient to cover all operating expenditure, including depreciation anu interest cLwarges, aAau to ' aeav.cabuL'an ceu L. ." orL I ur I.±tiuiLg the rehabilitation program. This favorable result is mainly attributable to th.)1-e speciael arrangements for ship p 'L rLg cop p e r f.ro-m v LatUs,Lt he CF, network to Dar es Salaam. The financial viability of CFL would be seriously undermined if such shipments failed to materialize.

Investment

171. CFL has prepared an investment program for the rehabilitation of its network. This program, covering rail, river and lake transport, amounts to Z 6.0 million ($12.0 million). Of this total, the railways account for Z 4.6 million ($9.2 million), including Z 3.5 million ($7.0 million) for the line Kisangani-ubundu. As suggested a?bove, the closing - 45 - of this line ought to be considered. Without this line, the investment for the rest of the railways is E 1.1 million ($2.2 million), mainly for track materials, rehabilitation of stations and buildings, machinery for workshops and a school for trainees.

172. The mission is of the opinion that this program is inadequate and ought to be increased by a further Z 1.0 million ($2.0 million) for spare parts and the rehabilitation of signalling and telecommunications equipment.

Conclusions

173. CFL provides important transport services in the eastern part of the Congo and to ports on the East coast of Africa. Its present position has been undermined by serious disturbances in the areas it serves, bv the destruction of equipment and also by the shortage of qualified personnel. Its recoverv is denendent on the revival of production in the area and on continued shipments of copper from Katanga. To provide a low cost service and to meet future traffic renuirements. CFL needs nhvsical rehabiLitation and adequate qualified personnel.

174. In the rehabilitation program, high priority must be given to: track renewal of the main line Kahbongo-Kalemie; proper repair and maintenance of diesel locomotives; inspection and maintenance of signalling equipment and the estgablishment of a reliabhle teleetomminjcntionns syscteAmi The implementation of such a program will probably require a thorough reorganization of the technicna-l deartme+nts , QaAdditinal qualified st+apf frtofil vacant positions and an effective training program. The closing of the Kisangani-Ubundu railway line ond i+s replacement by efficient road transport ought to be seriously considered. Since the CFL and KDL networks be considered. Such an arrangement would offer important benefits. CFL wo'dbe able to relIy on the well ognzd+cncldprmnso C and both networks would be able to realize important savings in operating exnenditures. Such an arrangement may not be feasible, however, and CFL may have to rely on its own forces to prepare and carry out a suitable rehabilitation program, as indica+ed above.

E. Societe des Chemins de Fer Vicinaux du Congo (Vicicongo)

Organization, Management and Manpower

175. Vicicongo was established in 1924 by "Cominiere", a Belgium h'o'ldLing comp,an,y, butL a'Ler iLndependnce--c it bck.;et a -Lt:nux UUcr1.pay", in1 which the Government now holds 43.56 per cent of the capital and Cominiere 'l.he remalnuer. - 46 -

176. Vieicongo oper^tes:

- rrailsyv line from Aketi to Mungbere: 683 km

- a hriqyfh line frnTn Komha to Bondno 121 km

- a br-nch line f-wnm T.ipJ1nar to TJtm1e:I ^ km

of Ue16s, Kibali-Ituri and North Kuv-u 15,000 km

- the port of Aketi on the Itimbiri River

177. The Board has eleven members, including the Chairman. Five Board

Broadly speaking, the organization of the various departments seems satis- foact.ory.

I178. As of T-.,- 1, 1968 Vicicongo bad a labor force of 2,609, 4r- .5. I '-' nQ vi UGut.ALA j 4., .A.J- WU~.UWfl5WJ A.. - . WLJ *'JU1- W..J I.. 7 LIA cluding 20 expatriates which compares with a total of 4,808, including 158 expeatriatles, at6 theA be.Y&LA.& Wn.L 1960. "Despite this. Di.LISI.Lcant redLuctiOn, the total labor force is still more than sufficient to handle the current

±lWw volume of traff ic. JVWWY=L , th=e nL-mu"Der Of eixLperience"d stUaff.Ls . .LLLU cient and while it is intended to raise the number of expatriates to 34, V.Liccongo 'Ls flindUing i1t, Udifi.LUUL.Lt t1ertcpeter.tLLUV e L+at LU=A* -W.L±± .LLIng to work in this remote area, which has been the scene of several serious disturbances.

Equipment

179. Motive power and rolling stock, as of January 1, 1968, is indicated in Table 17. Some equipment has been lost or damaged during recent disturbances and repairs and maintenance have been deiayed because or the shortage of spare parts and materials. Currently, efforts are being made to rehabilitate the 17 diesel locomotives; the 7 steam engines are over-age and will be replaced soon by 5 new diesel locomotives ordered in September 1967 under bilateral credit arrangements. Other rolling stock is sufficient to handle the present low volume of traffic. Vicicongo is taking advantage of this slack period to repair its equipment, which should be able to handle the anticipated increase in traffic during the next two or three years.

Traffic

180. As shown in the following table, both passenger and freight traffic has been very low during the past three years, due to the serious disturbances in the area. The situation is expected to improve rapidly, provided peace and order can be maintained and expatriates feel secure enough to return and stay. The considerable potential of the area is best illustrated by the sharp increase in the volume of cargo handled by the port of Aketi since 1967. - 47 -

Vicicongo - Traffic (in thousands)

Year Railways Road Transport Port of Aketi Inland River Pass.-km Ton-km Pass.-km Ton-km Bound Bound

1959 5,759 57,198 13,037 24,310 60.4 74.9

1960 5,482 50,521 13,818 20,898 41.4 72.9

1961 8,134 24,611 16,909 12,472 22.9 30.5

1962 8,o43 35,450 19,758 12,237 36.4 32.1

1963 8,173 40,230 15,o40 8,883 43.0 41.5

1964 3,566 35,586 10,184 6,771 34.0 35.4

1965 25 61 20 2,368 - -

1966 1,345 7,750 829 2,234 6.2 9.4

1967 2,827 a/ 15,664 a/ 3,215 1,723 a/ 21.1 23.2

/ n mor&.ILs only.

-I81. T111-e VJicicongo network serves asa n ev,acu_ation. road 4rwrc'ua J_.L%J A V, V~O.. ,S U &A t.Ya Af 4J* *S . xWxJ 1fA.L%LLLLL.U.L f.& products of the north-eastern part of the country. Its western terminal is the port 0o zL.eti wrhence the goodus are for-IJrWde.L-II uy ±-±ver 1.0to L1Kinshas. Freight from Kinshasa consists mainly of manufactured goods, fuel, cement, salt, seed and general cargo. Its future very mucli depends on 'th'e revival and development of agriculture and connected industries, the rehabilitation ar.d proper mai..tenar.ce ox'eee ro-A_ tote alaya, - +the i.-prvm, ~L1U~L 1Jj3~L ~ 'J± I. A L. 1J O VW.' AV .L aj~ C..LLLU. Vlz_ .AU.± 0V -1UUALLt of river transport services, especially between Aketi and Bumba. The Vici- congo railv..L-jr is a simp.Le JLLn, Ui..L1t U=VLor LLoUa t spUIb Ue.VULM a pr- tical possibility. With the advent of road transport, keen competition deve'loped an i's lik1ely to bU rUienwWu as sUUUo aLsh road nUt.woUr& has ueen rehabilitated.

182. A large number of the expatriates living in the area fled before the recent disturbances, but were beginniug to return at the time oI tne mission's visit. Some industrial ventures had resumed operations and there are now definite signs that a revival of agricultural production is under way. The agricultural potential of the area is roughly estimated at: 50,000 t of cotton, 25,000 t Of coffee, 25,000 t of palmoil, 20,000 t of palm kernels and about 10,000 t of rice. Vicicongo estimates that it should be able to attract sufficient tonnage in two or three years to achieve financial viability. - 48 -

Financial Situation

183. The financial position of Vicicongo is difficult. Due to the decline in traffic, its operations have resulted in a deficit since 1960. Thanks to a Government grant of Z 494,000 made in 1964, the company has been able to rehabilitate its facilities at least partially. The remaining balance of Z 208,000 under this grant will be insufficient, however, to complete the rehabilitation program and Vicicongo is requesting additional financial assistance from the Government.

184. The 1968 deficit is estimated at Z 342,000 ($684,ooo), despite the expected increase in traffic and tariff increases granted earlier this year. This deficit will be covered by a Government loan, bearing no interest, but reimbursable out of future profits. As indicated above, the prospects are that Vicicongo may continue to operate at a deficit during the next two or three years, until the revival of agricultural production is well under way and traffic exceeds 150,000 tons per Year.

Investment

185. Vicicongo has no definite investment Program, because of the high degree of uncertainty regarding future developments in the area and the availability of resources to finance such a program. To meet the exnected increase in traffic, Vicicongo has placed orders for the following items:

- 5 diesel locomotives Z 217,925

- rail welding equipment and mehAnicmal ahovels z 43,553

- mateHi1 for trae,k rehabilitation Z 115,U00

Total Z 366,500

186. The mission discussed with Vicicongo the proposed extension of 4 the ra 1%rair fProm Amef4 tohia,Rnv wh4ih o.rtlderi ve aP a ar...y-paaab #0-., then Itimbiri. Navigation of this river is rather difficult. Low water during aloiftl f-,,- wn- +ha - +kho A_v, oza^oer f^1 +'Ha+ho 1e%4 ap-lfi4 o h1 v'al bout fourmonths of v A., seas on r th e we __ _ 4..1 hallo.w draft barges, which often cannot carry more than 40 t each. High stormy wtr occ.alls+to a'' +rafi A,d4urr.g +he r.4r- sas--on. Theae dfP4-4 culties weaken the competitive position of Vicicongo vis-a-vis road trans- port1_I_J. an%d the.5I port4 Ofo.05555JIr. Ksrgn.Frsanar.~ .4 . 5.'..5 4fA.shs resaon,A.V4** Vc-icor.go has organ-ized-J since 1949 several studies on the feasibility of improving navigation on theiItimbiU.ri: an(d of1 ext-ending the railwayt from^t oBw r 94 it decided in favor of the railway extension and subsequently completed

devsglie eLIg±ineer±ng. of al~. .LU)1855 n rai.LJ.Way WdLL±of requiredU exAtens'Lor,s t1.o the port of Bumba.

187. The cost of the railway extension has been estimated by Vicicongo at Z 44.5 million and that of the port extension at Z i 1.6, or a tota±l oI - 49 -

Z 6.1 million ($12.2 million). These estimates include 3 per cent to 5 per cent for contingencies, but no allowances for price escalation, engineering and interest during construction. Taking these into account it is tenta- tively estimated that the cost could increase to about Z 6.2 million for the railway and Z 2.2 million for the port, or a total of Z 8.4 million ($16.8 million). Assuming a foreign exchange component of about 70 per cent, the required foreign financing would be about US$12.0 million. On this basis, the average construction cost of the line would be about $35,000 per km, which is reasonable. No additional locomotives or rolling stock would be required if the line were built.

188. Recognizing that river transport via the Itimbiri is not ideal, the mission nevertheless is of the opinion that the economic benefits to be derived from the railway extension do not justify the investment. These benefits are limited because of the low volume of traffic. The mission suggests, therefore, that construction of the line is not urgent and ought to be postponed. Meanwhile, navigation on the Itimbiri could be considerably improved by organizing adequate dredging. If traffic increases sub- stantially during the next few years, a comprehensive economic reevaluation of the project would be justified.

Conclusions

189. Vicicongo is a light railway, which despite serious difficulties in recent years is still reasonably well managed and operated. It has sufficient equipment to handle the anticipated traffic in the foreseeable future, provided it receives the necessarv Government support to complete its rehabilitation. The harbor of Aketi is also operated efficiently and could easilv handle 15.000 tons per month with nresent equinment. Measures ought to be taken without delay to improve dredging operations of the Itimbiri and to ensure more adequate river transnort. The proposed extension of the railway line and of the port of Bumba does not seem to be justified in view of the present and fnreReeable low volume of trraf'fi(- and, therefore, ought to be postponed. - 50 -

VIT R1nAfl.q AND ROrA TRANSPORT

A. The Road Network

190. ~ T.hePh road ne+ ork aerves- mairwlir so a feedan r sys+em to rier-- rt and railway stations. Only where no navigable rivers and railway connec- 4 tions exist, miinly in tvhe area east of Ks4angani, are th-er e io… trunk roads. The total length of the road network is about 140,000 km, cm L.A A40 _ __~ _A~C 10 1- -- _A. ,-to 35\4 uR e-_ 4whk,_A W~ prisi ng roa 1o.1 a"" s 1I0AJ1Av vA.O M 1U - / * - 4 - - * ...... P the network consists of earth roads and tracks. Roads of national importance amou.t to about , m,00, thILe rest bUeiLng of regionaL. o loc.r _ rac.L Only about 1,900 km have a bituminous surface, not counting about 500 km of

Jnn _ --- t __ ___- _+_ _44 A _ _ n C.L U L C L.IU Z JU3 U 51 . 5 A0.LL/I.LbAl. 15IJ

.L Y.L e roaluGu C6- lluw I. J. L,;Lv L. %v" VA.s 1%ve*L/C s=sF the roads had been lightly constructed since this was generally adequate ior lij.uLg isola+UvU areas, ge1eratin.LLg ±.is11. 6II.L.L Wtrafi11th W-th . rt.eriLCe of the transportation system. It was general practice to upgrade the roads gradual-l.y, pari ptssu withL tche g5rM"h" in t raffnic andJ t1he s-ize otl vehicles. This policy was rational, but it resulted in a road network which could not W.L.th1stand long periods Uo LAnef ec m6LC%HL.ainten.ceL. Conseq0 'AuentUl.y, the= %"0sfuA- tion of maintenance services since 1960 has led to serious physical deterioration of Ihie roau network. 'The surface or mnwuy roaud has eti...Lrely -worI off or has become very thin; deep longitudinal troughs have formed and many sections are full Of holes- Since 1960, manIy of theI 300 ferries in the country have also become inoperative and many bridges have to be replaced or are in bad need of repairs.

192. *While the existing network deteriorated, some new roads were built after 1960; altogether some 600 km of which the Bank helped finance about 300 km and U.S. AID and FED the rest. U.S. AID has aiso assisted in the reconstruction of 17 bridges and the repair of 35 ferries.

B. Administration and Finance

193. Responsibility for the roads rests primarily with the Department of Roads and Bridges, which is one of the six departments of the Ministry of Public Works. The Department has three divisions: (i) National Roads, (ii) Bridges and Structures, and (iii) City Streets, Drainage and Sewerage. The performance of this department has seriously deteriorated, to the point that considerable strengthening of personnel and a fundamental reorganization are required. The department is poorly staffed and the education and experience of its officers are inadequate. The United Nations is pro- viding 26 advisors, but since they have not been integrated into the services, their effectiveness is limited, except of those managing maintenance programs under conventions. Working conditions are not conducive to retaining expatriates on a Jong-term basis. The staff situation is even more cri- ticial in the provinces and it is no exaggeration to say that the department has virtually ceased to function in many areas. - 51 -

194. Budgetary allocations for the Roads and Bridges Department have fluctuated widely during the past few years, dropping from the equivalent of about $12 million in 1958, to practically zero in 1961 and 1963 and rising to about $3.0 million in 1968. This latter figure should not be regarded as a measure of physical work on the road network, because the larger part of this sum is being spent on salaries and wages for staff which accomplish very little maintenance or rehabilitation.

195. In addition to the budget, other funds are being spent on the highways by U. S. AID and FED. Altogether, these sums are insufficient to maintain the existing network, which continues to deteriorate.

196. It is at present not possible to quantify precisely all revenues accruing to the Government from road-user charges. The main source of revenue is the tax on fuel, which yielded about $400,000 in 1960 and $2.7 million in 1966. It is estimated that about half of the fuel is consumed by motor vehicles, so that road users would currently contribute about $1.4 million from this source to the maintenance of roads. Taking into account all other possible charges paid by road-users, it is safe to say that they provide only a minor part of the funds currently requirecl to finance an effective program of road maintenance and rehabilitation. In this connection, it is to be noted that the retail prices for motor fuel in the Congo (U.S. 7.7w per liter of gasoline and 5.20 per liter of diesel fuel) are among the lowest in Africa. This was discussed by the mission with the Government, which has agreed to consider an increase in fuel taxes as a means to help finance an effective program of road maintenance.

C. Road Maintenance

197. The works carried out by the Department ox' Roads and Bridges is minimal, and what little maintenance there is, is of little avail. Some construction enterprises still exist and, although lacking equipment and spare parts, could have been entrusted with some road improvement work. But the Government has not provided the necessary funds, although some enterprises are working on projects financed by U.S. AID and FED.

198. U.S. AID is financing a worthwhile program of road maintenance from counterpart funds. Under this program, maintenance is entrusted by "convention" - a contract - to privatelv-owned plantations, industrial enterprises and others, which have mostly a direct interest in specific roads for their own operations. Currently, about 80 "conventions" have been concluded, covering about 22,000 km of roads. The system is being supervised by U.N. advisors delegated to the Ministrv of Public Works. Maintenance under this system is limited to a minimum and the average cost is equivalent to about $130 ner vear kilometer. The difficulties of the road transport industry are illustrated by the fact that, even on the limited nart of the network which is being maintained under the eonvention system, the maximum safe speed for trucks iB 30 kilometers per hour. - 52 -

199. The system of Conventions is inadeauate. however, to meet nresent requirements. It does not cover some roads which are important to the economv, mainly in Areas vhere peasant agriculture nrecdominat.u and where there are no large enterprises prepared to enter into road maintenance. Mnot of the enterprises eu,irrentlv invnlved In thia program d, An on a temporary basis as an emergency measure. Furthermore, U.S. AID is not ypreparedaA toi net%niiinue this rverP-m 4inei4nite,ly Anti the TT_N in con_isering progressive withdrawal of its advisors provided under special technical assistance ,v%r,^n,'ma. Teot hiit not leas+ a lafero pn_rt Of t'he ron_a nawe-rr has already deteriorated beyond the point where Convention maintenance 4 non s0,-rce a uss-aft_l n,,r_nr Up.oreM ascin.,ns an+4,e re cr major reconsitruc+4n '-a. t,. *_ O- .. k'_ . r..f.J _ __.a ,_**<_. _ _.. 9^ and rehabilitation and it will be necessary to reshape and regravel several roads at-. A.acost ...4.-4..,P Of $51,000~ AA_. 4.,VW.... tin $10n01A AA per k-, ..vulch-I,.1,.,n,4 4s clearly b-;ond the.1..o present range of the "conventions". Also, about 80 per cent of the paved roadAs require urgent main.tenan.ce tIo prevent costly r trtcItio works at a later date.

D.Road Transport

200. The trucking industry is in a difficult situation. At times, tbLe -indu-str-y almost- ceased -to 4.Wc-t-on -in 'large parts of th1e country plagued3 LIL ~..U.J.IAUO .JL LC~0LA LiJ 1. L~t.Li Lt Al.~. ~, 9.L Li0 4 Li.&C LLL ULi jJL LL by rebellion, where production was interrupted and the vehicle fleet deci- mated by- frequent requisitions.*In fact, some entrepreneurs have virtually ceased operations, while the remaining enterprises often have to work with only part of- their prev-io-us fleet. In addition, the deterioration of the roads, poor labor discipline and the lack of spare parts have made trucking a high cost Indust-y. On the basis of rough data, it is estimasted that average vehicle operating costs may be of the order of U. S. 10 cents per ton- km; or 40 pereent to 50 per cent higher than before independence. Since tariffs were frozen in 1967, most enterprises operated at a loss. Tne inaccessibility of some areas and the high cost oI transport are currently a major impediment for the recovery of the economy, especially of agricultural production.

201. There is little reliable information available on the volume of traffic or on the size of the vehicle park. The last time that systematic traffic counts were carried out was in 1959. The results of this survey confirmed the feeder road character of the network. The count revealed that less than 5 per cent of the roads carried more than 50 vehicles per day and 85 per cent of the network had less than 10 vehicles per day. The count also showed that traffic was heavily concentrated on a small part of the network; more than 90 per cent of all traffic was carried by 14 per cent of the network. Isolated spot counts performed in recent years by the enterprises carrying out road maintenance under the convention system have indicated that traffic has declined on most road sections.

202. At present, there is no information on the size and age composition of the vehicle fleet. No such statistics are kept by the Government. The only information available is the number of trucks and buses imported into the country since 1959: - 53 -

Year Trucks Buses

1959 2600 60

1960

1961 1010 80

1962 2170 80

1963 2310 70

1964 1850 110

1965 4280 90

1966 7300 90

1967 640 20 (1st quarter)

203. It would not be correct to infer from these statistics that the vehicle fleet has crown. To the contrary, manyv possibly most, of the vehicles imported in previous years have been lost during the disturbances or have depreciated ranidlv due to noor road conditions and noor driving. Trucks rarely last longer than two years in the Congo.

204. The recent restoration of peace and order and the revival of the econnmv nnv uinder wnv hsave incrpAead the demand for vehinles in rec!ent months. Transport enterprises plan to rebuild their fleets as soon as possible. This will be eas ier to do than in nrevioun veart becluse foreign exchange restrictions on the import of vehicles and spare parts have been lifted. F1iithePrmone truicking nperations have beonme profitable agaistin- following the adjustment of trucking rates earlier this year. Consequently, thp gpneral cnnditions fnr A revival of road transport Are favorEble. Thp most important obstacle still remaining is the poor condition of the road network. Its rehabilitation is an urgent re-uirament to provide the necessary access to certain areas, to reduce vehicle operating costs, and to prevent more costly repirs enA recn,struction ata later dat.a

E. Conclusions

205. T.h.e foremost problem for the road sector i8 not the prov-sionof new roads, but the rehabilitation and preservation of the existing network. A major problem in this c^rnection is thea c%yon+s+tio+4 n of a highwmy aAin= istration capable to prepare and carry out the rehabilitation of the highway network. - 54 -

206. The Government has agreed to these priorities and is prepared to take effective measures to improve the highway administration and to rehabilitate the highway network. The Government is soliciting the assistance of the UNDP and the Bank Group to help finance and organize an effective program to improve the highway administration, or to establish an autonomous highway authority, and to prepare and implement programs for the rehabilitation of the more im=ortant highways in the country. The Bank has been asked to act as Executing Agency for the UNDP project. The Government would be prepared to entrust management to expatriates during a transitory period and to allocate part of its extraordinary investment budget to help finance this program. ANWEX

List of Tables iable INo

1 Exports and Imports by iMajor Routes

2 Export Routes of Mineral and Metal Products from attanga

3 Transport Costs to Antwerp

4 Passenger & Freight Traffic

5 Passenger Traffic

6 Freight Traffic

7 Service des Voies Navigables: Floating Equipment

8 Personnel

9 Dredger Output

10 Voies Navigables Investments

11 River Traffic

12 Incoming Cargo in the Port of Kinshasa

13 Otraco Financial Results

14 Otraco - Floating Equipment

15 Otraco - Investment Plan 1968-1978

16 Railways

17 Railwvays: Equipment

18 Otraco Railways: Passenger and Freight Traffic

19 CFMK: Principal Commodities Transported Direction Matadi

20 BCK - Traffic at Main Connections

21 BCK - Investment Plan 1968-69

22 Road Network

Table 1

&,ports and Imports byl iair t1toutes=/

(000 tons)

Total

Years Matadi - Boma Lobito Sakania Tota1-/

1959 1522 532 393 2,4h7

1965 752 727 523 2,002

1966 935 628 467 2,030

19673/ 976 642 354 1,972

Exports

via Matadi via via - Boma Lobito Sakanie Total

1959 950 4X7 1L2 1;q39

1965 L35 51L 128 1;077

1966 h75 396 173 lNO

1967_/ 573 )L16 162 1,151

Imports

ex Matadi ex ex -Boma Lo-bito SkraTo+ '

I9oAc9 57 85 21 1965 317I1 79925_

i1OAA L4.J'J 03)ol74o

L46J4) 23 29' U98L

1/ ZEfcZ.Luding a smalwlii t u± fLfLUnpOruS nu esx-porus burough Kalimie and other less important routes. el Exxclucing imports oI petroleum products. 3/ Preliminary estimate.

Source: Estimates prepared by IBRD Mission.

Tabl,Je 2 ~~fl.~~~.L ~~~ - a - ,- Th0.. .L

-. Urt a±ULes ofi rU!± fer -d a ±ItjuCt.Leiu PrvIuUcts LIIflmL Kdtlga

(Thousand tons)

1959 1965 1966 1967

GRAND TOTAL 730.1 7h8.7 731.6 874.6 Via Port Franqui

Total 181.8 107.0 166.4 192.3 Copper 124.9 104.8 138.8 174.7 Cassiterite - 2.3 13.8 3.1 Zinc concentrate 56.8 - 13.8 14.6

Via Dilolo

Total 434.7 501.3 395.1 509.h Copper 62.9 95.2 69.9 72,5 Zinc concentrate 29.2 57.1 44.8 15.7 Zinc - metal 34.5 36.3 24.4 34.5 Cobalt 7.0 3.5 5.0 3.3 Manganese 299.6 310.6 2h1.0 272.4 Other 1.5 8.6 9.9 9.9 Via Sakania

Total 108.9 116.h 138.1 129.3 Copper 90.3 63.3 67.2 35.3 Zinc concentrate - 32.7 32.6 66.6 Zinc - metal 18.6 20.4 35.7 27.4 Otnhr - -

Via RTalamnia or Kisnganni

Copper 4.7 92. 3 -AR,.

Zambia via Dilolo (83.5) (1.4) (1004.) (101.0)

Table 3

Transport Costs to Antwerp (Zaires per ton)

1. Copper price: Z. 400.00 per ton ($800.00)

Route Lubumbashi Luilu L:Lkasi blister cathodes electro

Matadi 72.71 72.71 '72.71 Lohito 72,68 6h.61 '72.73 Beira 59.30 75X09 67.09 nhnr-es-Sal 22m 60-2Q _ 67e92

2. Coppeer Pricp 2. 700 per ton ($1l400)

Ma-tadi A87.77 87.77 87.77 Lobito 87.74 77.75 87.80 Beira 63 el5 82.70 '79.77 Dar-es-Salaam 64.05 73.60

N.B. Transport costs vary in accordance with the world market price ofL copp-er. C' - So-rce:. GDCO¢=Ni

Tahle Ji

rSASENGEt ANID tFREIGHT Tr AFF I

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 raessener Traffic

Tntalrs t 9 9 38 1333 61T (720) 17) 2

P-i~v 01 or) OR I i! - AiRN ' Railways 378 339 214 258 508 602 608 528

River Transport 1,997 484 1,029 1,017 (720) e 8

Railways 2,339 15991. 1,336 1,267 1,275 (1,596) 1,730 2,110 BCK-KDL 1,590 1,388 1,003 8°7 897 (1,191) 1,367 1,644 ,-mACO 526 440 303 328 313 369 316 386 CFL 166 115 5 7 25 n.a. 47 72 Vicicongo $-7 $1 2c 35 4o 36 - 8

Source: OTRACO, KDL-BCK, CFL and Vicicongo.

Table 5

PASSENrER TRAFFIC

(million passenger-km)

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

OTRACO

Matadi-Kinshasa 61.4 63.2 96.1 94.3 161.4 131.9 108.9 141.2 River Transport 70.7 72.6 84.8 120.9 122.2 109.0 117.7 110.5 Lac Kivw 1.9 2.2 2.5 1.9 3.1 2.8 3.2 2.7 Bief maritime 1.7 2.2 3.5 1 5.0 5.9 6. .6 Total 135.7 10h.2 186.9 222.2 291.7 -29.6 _33 259.0

Vicicongo

Aketi-Mungbere 5.8 5-5 8.1 8.0 8.2 3.6 - 1.3 3.8

CFL

Kisangani-Ponthierv:Oe4.4 4.6 6.3 7.1 5.2 na 0 - 1.2 Lualuba-N 1.6 0.7 0 1.5 2.5 na 2.8 2.9 2.6 Lualuba-S 4.6 4.4 3.9 3.4 4.0 na 0 0.7 1.2 Railway-Rest. 27.5 22.7 7.5 20.4 37.h na 29.6 32.4 33.7 Lake Tanganyika 10.1 7.6 3.7 2.1 5.8 na 1.4 1.4 1.6 Total 48.2 0.0 21.4 34.5 54.9 na 33.8 37.4 40.3

BCK

KDL-BCK 278.7 243.0 96.2 128.0 296.0 466.6 469.5 3530o

GRAND TOTAL 468.4 428.7 312.6 392.7 650.8 (719.8)739.6 650.7

Railways 377.8 339.0 214.2 257.8 508.2 602.1 608.0 527.9

River 90.6 89.7 98.4 134.9 142.6 (117.7)131.6 L22.8

Sorces OTRACO. Viticongo, CFL and BCK.

Table 6

Freight Traffic (000 tons)

OTRACO 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 196r 1966 1967 /

CF INiatadi-Kin 2169 1534 1005 -1124 1206 1230 1076 1285 1312 CF Mayumbe 111 123 132 125 119 127 133 120 126 River-Voies fluviales 1740 1253 729 909 935 801 713 961 970 Lac Kivu 49 25 14 23 26 11 26 46 n.a.

Vicicongo 135 114 53 69 85 69 n.a. 16 44

CFL

CF Kisangani- Ponthierville 157 .11 21 34 46 n.a, 0 0 15 LualubN-N 37 18 0 2 14 n.a. 31 43 26 Lualuba-S 157 112 21 30 42 n.a. - 11 15 CF Rest. 319 226 19 18 62 n.a. 105 156 159 Lac Tanganika 347 281 196 195 196 n.a. 124 95 112

CF BCK-KDL 4109.396 3870 3637 3357 3963 L307 hSOO

1/ Preliminary estimates - Chiffres provisiores

Source: OTRACO, Vicicongo, CFL and BCK

Table 7

Service des Voies Navigables: Floating E2uipmentl

Bne f BiePf Bieof Item Maritime Moyen Superieur Total

Dredgers 4 5 3 12 River Marking Boats 21 3 28 Push Boats 1 1 2 Tug Ro+ 5 7 2 . Barges and House-Boats 2 9 2 13 Pontoor.s 15 7 10 32 Floating Cranes 6 1 7 Pile Drivers 1 3 2 .6 Lighters and Barges 17 15 12 44 Launches and Ferries 76 61 3)L4 171 First Aid Boats 3 - - 3 L O k1aL L6_) II) 70{ U332

1/ as of january 1, 1968

Source: Service des 'Voies Navigables

Table 8

PERSOlitE

1959 :!9067

0Y'tA rf)

Th-'t,iates 88 1 _J.2 AT~44 -I1) ± n ral 1~

CFL

National 10,3ll 6,606 Expatriates 335V/ 70

Total 10,569 6 ,676

BCK

National 13,2579 16,3L0

Expatriates 663 750

Total 10,5267 6,690

Vicicons o

lNational 13,5789 .,7)580

Exratriates 668z/ 29

Z' atiates Total II4,6249 '7,60gC

li/ 1o9LJ~J54.%~Le Ti.kA&a%l/~ A5J aS m .

Table 9

]DREDGER OUTPUT

Year, Vlaan- Deren Boma Maxae11 Moanda Mateba MatadiL Total 195EI 378,950 590,000 - _1,872,500 1,744,?50 4,582,700 58,00DO 499,200 5b1, 800 1,494,850 1,5?29, 600 h,123,h50 196C) - 993,300 - 858,700 1,:L37,900 2,990,000 1961 - - 1,367,500 7C9, 800 1,106,800 1,377,200 4,5151,300 196' - 1,750,200 4CI7,200 1,432,,000 1,:386,(Ooo h,975,4,00 1963 - 1,575,000 824,60o 1,288,900 136,1600 4,459,100 196- - 1,034,800 7C08,200 1,505,,6oo 1,035,1400 4,5'54,00oo 1965' - 1,242,000 53 4, 8o0 1n,192J,800 787,200 3,7156,8800

1966 - 588,800 .226,0 oo 755,200 952,600 2,722,800

196* - 1,014,800 297,400 963,200 1, 079, 800 3,35;5,200

Source: Service des Vo:les Navigables

Table 10

OlSIT ,rAI TTl-A PTI: _T, r*T1.1

To ' ± ore>gn Dlf-ilr Description Cost Exchange for 1968 '.7 '7 First Priority Construction

1) Addition of one quay at Bukavu 115,000 0,o000 115,000 2) Construction of the new port of M'Bandaka 899,000 315,000 500,000 3) Construction of 250 m quay at Kinshasa 1,156,000 405,000 100,000 4) Major repair works at the Port of Kalemi (Albertville) 200,000 48,000 120,000

Equipment

1) Purchase of two suction dredgers for Bief Maritime 1,600,000 1,600,000 1,600,000 2) Purchase of two river marking vessels for Bief Superieur 500,000 400,000 250,000 3) Purchase of dredger for Lake Tanganyika 350,000 280,000 175,000 L) Purchase of two cranes for work on Lukuga 60,000 57,000 60,000 5) Reconstruction of four river marking vessels for Bief Moyen 320,000 192,200 160,000

Sub-total 5,200,000 3,337,000 3,080,000

Socond Priority Construction

1) Construction of fishery port at Kas-- a ( uap,-1a) 105,000 36,000 20,000 2) Repair works at the port of M-, (La-k T---,. 20,000nr 7,000 20,000

.1) ru-chase: Lugoa±tu ±or theWiti.LU.L Moyen 150,000 90,000 4o,o00 2 ) rurch.ase; uwo Ur1g.Ule for tugs working on the Bief iaritime 45,000 45,000 45,000

Sub-total 320,000 178,000 125,000 Total: ist & 2nd priorities Z 5,520,000 3,515,000 3,205,000

Source: Service des Voies Navigables.

Table U

River Traffic

(thousaud lins)

Yeare Upper CDngo Kasai Kwango - Sanknru -Kwilu Laxc LIo II TotaL Total Up Dowmn Up Down Up Down Up Dbown Up Downz Pool

1959 442.8 41L9.0 201.4 3Q5.9 50.1 123.4 13.5 37.1 707,,8 885414 31.2 1960 263,6 393.2 130.5 19:2.5 35.9 109.3 8.8 32.2 438,,8 727,,1 :19.7 1961 159,8 2213.3 72.7 6L.4 32.7 90.6 7.5 31.5 272.7 411.9 1.8 1962 226,3 2583.1 LL9.2 63.2 41.1 105.8 7.9 33.7 3914.5 460,,8 11.2 1963; 210,0 280.9 131.7 82.8 39.:2 88.5 8.5 31.8 389.14 484,,O 7.1

19614 157,14 229.8 LL6.8 120.5 30.6$ 72.4 8.1 31.5 312.9 454,2 8.4 1965 98.1 15:1.6 142.3 lilL.8 28.0 75.6 6.3 29.8 274.6 398.8 6.2 1966 125.3 187.5 236.0 2013.3 29.5 84.9 6.6 33.2 397.5 514.,1 2.8

19671/ 139.41 207r.6 188.2 2414.8 28.9 75.0 5.9 29.1 362.4 556.,5 3.3 1/ Preliminary zestixatea,

Sour-ce: OTR4CO

Trablie 1 2: iLH.&k&LL.R.T a

ORIGiIN TER P16A02 ?"MaNKkELS -UURML COTIU OIIIEOIL WIUUE COFFrg COO0L C.T.C. CDOPAL FIBMS NAIZ 11*11C &P10GR 2aCR FROUDIC2 0I1AII2S IUf]31G PBDTS SnT! DARIU ML3CELAU-f OA

IIShNAIIFI.R.. 59 121 3.609 51.9 2.231 1.045 73 514 114.9 26 2.141 9514 14a 3.2. 14214 77 5.988 35.7143 66 12 113 2.193 .86 1 145 2.2141 14.6914 112h10A3l2.R.O.59 ~~1.983. iT 1 L 1 V 2 ti O ~5 27 93 66 CIR. tILL.-Bank 59 1185 3.3 6 14 12 7i 5 6. 2 ~ 7264 13147 54.2142 66 966 14.933 142 1.8lo 69 14 393 50 08.317 B0MMR 59 12 2.814143141 772 2147 1.9 52 3 fl16627 9.06 66 1.359 27 13 1.023 97 66 52 1 92 14 1436 3.170

CM.B'BAL-BAED. 59 6.1415 11-093 1.05.2 11. 5 -363 1.106ai$M 136 21.7 66 5.309 19.939 363 2.739 1429 1436 1.573 5 1414 125 881 31.903 H.PIO1 59 3 70516.371l.778 Y ~ 271470 3.326 2.3.575 66 176 7.757 726 814 203 JJ6 9 2 3 131 1.6146 UI.T89 A4.KIN.i~~AND.59 1 ~ 2114 13 13517 0 5A93 32D3522.695 11'.905 66 1 114 2.519 66 6214 is 2 10 la, 575 3.-930

- 5916.2267.935 1.253 2.~~~~~ i~17 14.93 178114A .11 4u01 2.719 3 2. 7M39 8 1.171 814.565 66 3.11 9.61.3 59 .1.112 39 50 7.7614 1.66 596 a 277 .26; 317 2:1.172

66 5.393 7*996 1.1514 1.6143 237 233 5.3914 1.622 8.8116 1.938 1 117 112 1.991 37.0147

I..1ANO 59 39 l.718 2.2,36 1.:M8 25 36i 85 5!,1.7 66 ,t19? ~~14141fllA~QjI 2.190 3 30¶3 1 !WI 9TM!Eh I 7.lfl 219.140 66 5 1.147 1 1.078 1ii0 2149 2 30 768 35 148 99 159.811' 865 7.220 1712.30 C.1J.R.US&2 59 1.1L62 1.3 1.268 2.263 1074 5 1 1 23~. W2 0 0 J 742.1147 52. 292 66 1414 84914 7.351L 882 6.133 356 1.77 14.7914 2.236 7 15870 33.581 59 1.114 2. b .9L .56 ..AXXRU1R - .5 1.0 715 2.7141421 1.56 176 198 V?.3u8 66 20 85 3157 1-14w4 122 1 606 61. 291 2.773

H.KASAI.MT. 59 IL32 2.37 71 501 0573 T.83M 12i 201 9 .853 66 72 52 214 us4 616F 119111 59 s1 720 :0427MY E87 2W 8217. 12597- 1.165 36.668 66 5 1481 .360 26.5145 1.5714 1.9214 9 1.060 33 3141 214 29P 615 3.3.218

f[WILU-K1WaT 59 2.800 31.7R 2.62 10817 921 SW.65590 5.063 1019.914 66 3.687 28.631 22.915 3.316 L 10j) 62 5.063 6.179 14 00 2.829 7:2.836

'_IZIA-VAMRA 59 60 14.0131 2.772 1.!565 1 -2.172 33 131 1.39 728 11.7814 66 500 -3.9147 3.1416 519 IN8 17 1.651 140 77 19 126 627 12.061 1XJ6A3N 59 2.14 1.352 .3211 759 381. 189 765 10.2147 66 1.579 .135 51412.1477 2.,609 614 1.8714 2 82 3 n1l 818 20.1475 BIIF UJL2NO& 596* 7!69 1.239 9 9 214 2.6 IT 2619 134, 681 20.601 66 -3.329 8.6311 :107 i Ug 29 622 18 214 ILI 29!. 13.739 B2~~~-RUK99 206 4T 00 3 i .143 3972.k )130 102 66 10 2.770 102.257 1416 10 5 2.4141 11.1,59 73 6 97... 380 622 213.6026 67L89 103 2.092- - - 7 2 -WAL--5L-M 65 2 2 3~~~~~~~~5 1412622 213.626L_ IRXL.IAC-1¶JNE& 59 714 107 61 601281413 L6 170 66 2 15 1.395 30 314 L1479

TUTALWACO 6 n .988 5191w3 3 _6_2_852 222a21 26_91

(1) inc1 -ding 1483tn, of compr ad .13,866 tms5 of other einerva pro3eta. ______..Lf.3~~~...7. 2 to.q cassiterite. ____ 70111LKjAI j106 2 0.9 1.8 ____ 28 2. ldl~18.73 o6L L.§- 37~ .7 .3 3301 3428 -2 2.76- J 1 k L9 . 1901 229267 3ig7______L-29 J.3i2-9.67 36A,5 6L7 _ 2. 4 1 2.00 J 2 4.541 i1.13i 10.92~9 ___ (1) in2.].: 126.935 T. copper, 5:1.869 T. sine co.cntcotes, asd !021 . of~ .t.er siieral pzvdota. (2) inl.ci 139.1.32 T. coqppr, 6.,7b9 T. of cassite.rite, .13.607 T. ol' zinc coneenteoats, 3nd 309 f. of othar olneral proi.ctst. (3)inc.:1 7,?59 Z. c Yr .21 .) cae,iterie. 2.289 T,.3L6'c mertes. 3 o.....1o.therolne-.3 pmd~t.______G.CW OTAL .596 _LL.J'L . 10.710 h-6 U1 3 .75922 2.19125.1 MU211.326871L. .6 .69 6.1 102.77 8.hI80 i. 514a .276 53. I 26.e3.10 21 62.05 d5 Y.. I Ua .;- 5,B 2 a i 2 1,8 - 7 h31L3 69.219 -121. T1 6. y4 3.o7 ,Z' 141. )i 2'.5 3,3146 -14jl.328 1-6 4.56 _1....12.1420 1o.2945 5...... 5'6 1.6 19.7 .? 8 7. Source: OTRACO

Table 13 OTRAACO: FINA.I4 DCLAR[>2JLTS (In thousands oif Zaires,f

1958 1959 196,0 1961 1L962 1963 fTf964 1965 1966 1967

Earnings 2,097 2,116 1,670 1,,375 :L,7 5 2,429 4,746 L.,731 7,248 9,d56

Expenditures 1 7765 1 ,65 'L96'7 2,238 57 6,697 9,819 Operating resuLts +283 +318 -.95 -280 -218 +192 +161 -1 ,lMh +551 +37 Financial charges on:

Loans: -162 -165 -166-667 .180 la -195 -3hh-286 -22B Capital: -242 -239 -239 -239 -239 -239 -239 -23'9 -239 -239

Miscellaneous - - - - -289 - - - -129

Balance -122 -86 -500 -699 -642 -531 -422 -1, 440 +26 -559

1/ Interest duae on capital invested by Govermnent

SOtRCE: OTRACO

Table 14

OTRACO - FLOATING_ EQUIPHiEIET

A) Motorized Units

Fast vessels HP/unit i'P Total

6 integrated towing boats (ITB) 1050 6300 4 boats Class H 280 1120 18 smaller boats Class G 90 1620

Tugboats

12 tug boats Class K 1000 12000 3 tug boats Class 0 700 2100 1 tug boat Class Kinshasa 500 500

Smaller tugboats

5 tug boats Class Cm L00 2000 10 tug boats Class A 200 2000 26 tug boats Class C 175 h500 5 tug boats Class B 90 750 13 boats Class Ebuitv 100 1300 21 boats Class E 70 1470

Various

3 landing craft of 500 tons 400 1200

44 various vessels including floating cranes, waterboats, floating work.shlops, etLc.

B) Non-rotorizeU

51 Passenger barges

331 cargo barges of a total nominal capacity of 200,245 T.

102 tank barges for liquid cargo of a total minimal capacity of 47,950 F.

343 smaller barges for local river traffic.

Special purpose barges

18 for log transport 1 for heavy loads 10 livestock carrying barges

Source: OTRACO

Table 15 OTRACO: INVESTMENT PLAN, 1968-1978

Orders placed: Amournt

6 diesel locomotives (20U0Upi 113 radio-telecom sets for tugs_, 150,,000 11 1st class passenger coaches--/ 310,530 20 2nd class pass,enger coachesT/ 632,400 1 tug (matadi)'/ 137,800 2 launches for passengers2/ 218,600 10 refrigerator wagonsi/ 14 5,1 Total 2,887,306

Orders being placed:2/ 7 diesel shunting locomotives 420,000 100 sliding roof wagons 587,688 50 freight wagons (Mayumbe) 81,600 4 wharf cranes 333,727 4 floating cranes (25 t) 561,332 20 tractors and semi-trailers 250,000 Total 2,23143h7

Orders under consideration:2/ (anProximate estimates) 1 substation (Matadi) 30,000 1 batterv charring station 5jOnOO (50 lift-trucks (

(120 trailers (

-, scrp 1- 3 cranes 3-6 t 200,000 ' diesel-lcrotVes V 2i,-..b)20,n 3 vessels "Hil"440 nP 1,000,000 3 barges BA" -LUU00*0V Total 2, 000

Orders to be placed before 19702/ k La;p.proximat e est,ma-1L tesI, 1 220 !P workshop boat 70,000 2 Karry-Krane and 3 Lorrain cranes 60,000 9 1120 t fuel barges 1,500,000 3 1500 nr tugs :,OuoOOO 24 passenger lighters 360,000 m -,l 2,990,000

1/i Transport and interest included. 2/ Transport and interest not included.

-2-

Orders to be placed before 1973_/ (approximate estimate's Track materials CFNIK 500,000 Track materials Mayumbe 150,000 Machine-tools for workshops 750,000 5 hydrocarbon barges (4503) 1,000,000 h " " (1000 m3 ) 1,500,000 3 1500 HP tugs 1.000,000 Total 4,900,000

Orders to be placed before 19782/ Tapproximate estimates) 12 300 HP tugs 1,800,000 20 550 t barges 1,000,000 10 barges type P 1200 700,000 5 barges tvne 0 500,000 2h barges 1000 t (iron ore) 1,700,000 16 diesel mainline 'locomotives 3;500;000 20 diesel shunting locomotives 1,500,000 Tmnrovemient to traek layout 9ln000on Buildings and hospital 3,500,000 Tm etrificatn+fl scheme 10,000,000

Balenger Port 1,060,000 Extension to Kinshasa Port 191h0 000

Grand Sub Tot^' 3C2,4l6

IAUd.itiLVVI. '_equip.m.e..It requiredl if the Port Francqui-Kanshasa proposed

railwy i9noblr b-uilA t 1,30,00 GRALvD TOTAL 43.746,653

2/ iransporu andu iaerest nou LicLUuUeU.

Source: OTRACO

Table 16

RAILWAYS

Completion Length OTRACO Date (km)

Matadi-Kinshasa 1898 388 Boma-Tschela 1923 136 Total 52 CFL Kisangani-Ponthierville 1906 125 Kindu-Konpolo 1910 355 Kabalo-Kalemie 1915 273 Kongoo-nl hqI 1939 164 Kabalo-Kabongo 1956 2h6 Total 1163

BCK

Lumumbashi-boundary 1910 255

IL:"ut k-a ma 1019 Bukama-Fort Francqui 1928 1123 tt_n__ n: 1 _ 1011 Us Kamina-Kabalo 1956 4h7 Total 2800

Vicicongo

Aketi-Mungbere 1937 683 Branch line to Bondo 1928 121 Branch line to Titule 1932 Total 55

Grand Total 5323

Source: Governirenn. of t.he Gngo

Table 17

Rai l^_aus: F ipent_/

OTRACO BCK/1DL CFL ViciconRo Locomotives

Steam - 139 35 7

mainline - 91 22 4

shunting - 8 13 3

Diesel 63 8 23 17

mainline 27 2 133J' 7

shunting 36 6 10 10

Electric - 40 - -

mainline - 35 - -

shunting - 5

Railcars 3 - - -

Passenger coaches 70 150 25 16

Freight wagons 3,119 4,100a 556 345

Privately owned wagons 231

1/ As of January 1, 1968

2/ Including 150 hired from OTRACO 3/ Including four locomotives on trial Source: OTRACO, BCK-KDL, CFL and Vicicongo

OTRACO Railways: Pasoeryger and ]Frei4ht Traffic

CGMI Maymbe Passn&ers3Freigh_ t Freight (~]Lion thouisand (nillion (thousand (illion (thousand) passenger/knt) tons) tonh/kn) tons) ton/lkm)

19'59 ',23 61 2 ,135 519 111 7

15'60 575 63 1,533 431 123 9 1961 843 96 1,006 294 132 9 19562 880 '94 1,119 320 125 8 19S63 1,1,89 161 1,206 303 U9 10

19564 1,1L23 132 1,230 356 127 13 1965 865 109 1,076 303 133 13

1966 1,,093 lloL 1,284 377 120 9

1967 n.a. nma. 1,312 n.a. 126 nt.a.

Source: OTRAGO

Table 19

CFMKs Principal CommRodities8Transporqted MZLrSiSb* N&tadi

(thousand tons) (11 months) _1959 _ 1960 19'61 _ 196A' 6 _ 1961 1965 _ 1966 1967

Copper l10.0 42.2 20.3 77.6 102.8 137.8 156.3

Tin 225 2.1 _- _-

Cassiterite 8E.5 10.1 31.9 7.6 i7.4 5.L :2.1 6.3 4.9

Palm kernels 20 .3 4.7 10.6 2.2 1.0 2.1 __ 2.6 10.8 Palm oil 205;.7 191.1 142.7 171.8 160.6 144.8 102.5 .11.9 112.1

Cotton 47.3 35.8 11.3 4.5 83.6 3.5 --

Ooffee 43.3 50.7 2'.3 19.8 32.9 32. 2 12.0 27.8 22.9

Maiz 8.2 0.9 0.6o 06:2 0.2 n.a.

Peanuts 1.3 0.7 -. 0..1 o.1 --- n.a. Manioc & flour 57'.1 28.1 5-7 3.9 1L.2 2.B 0.4 1.2 neaO Oil cakes 77.6 74.0 44.2 40.3 39.0 48.1 36.1 30.7 13.0 Wood 59.1 62.8 52.2 41.2 313.9 40.2 31.7 24.8 29.6

Zinc concentrates 63.4 34.4 ------10.6o- 9.1

Rubber 37e? 33.? 30.8 38c6 35e9 31L8 214 23 5 25.7

Source: OTrRACO

Table 20 BCK - TRAFFIC AT MAIN CONNECTIONS (thousand tons)

1959 1___ 1966 6196

Total - transit not incl. 1221.3 U47.2 1T5.7 13299.7

Export 773.7 758.9 737.2 781.9

I,mort ,hh7.6 728.3 738.5 617.8

Port Francoui - Total 296.7 21±7.2 382.1 403.4

'PPo?t Francqui. 181.3 116.9 169.8 203.5

minino prn'cinats 183.0 107.2 158.7 189.7

- other 12.3 9.7 11.1 13.8

Frro Port Frnelq-ul 1 1.A 11( 212.3 199.9

Ilolo - Total 71.6. 6277l.-776J II9

Exports l}6j7 5R9-95-7 1 6.o - mining products 434.1 511.2 395.1- 411.9 - olh'er 2.6 o.6 4.1.

Imports 8R.O 9202n7 232.n 229 - general merchandise 52;5 124i 1E6;6

_-__ __,,1Q9 2.3_,_n_h. 91.1 - fuel 26.5 53.7 59.,7 6.1

Sakania - Total 392.9 523.4 465.9 354.4

Exports 141.7 128.1 171.7 162.4 - mining products 108.9 116.4 138.1 125.9 - other 32.8 11.7 33.6 36.5 Imports 251.2 R9q., 291.2 192.0 - general merchandise 60.0 96.0 117.5 79.1 - coal 191.2 299.3 176.7 112.9 Transit

to Zambia 18.8 14.9 122.7 97.& ex / b 8..1-4.3.5 1.4 ^n . n.L

Source: BCK

Table 21

BCK - Investment Plan, 1968-69

Ite.mscu Dg>.crPir ntion RF.tAmqtt-ri Cosqt A-1re?eadv Ordered (Z) (Jo.) Cost (Z) 1) Track niateri)'nl R.2Pnn ra;is 29 kg,/rn An 000 Equipment

50 km rails 40 kg/mn 207,000

150,000 sleepers for 29 kgr' rails5

40VU000 sleepers for 40 kg/m rails 180,000

Miscellaneous 845, 000 Total: Z2,425,000

2) Motive Power 15 main diesel locomotives 1,875,000 12 1,500,000 10 25 KV electric locomotives 1,350,000 5 675,000 35 shunting diesel locomotives 1,487,000 25 1,062,500 Total: Z4,712,500

3) Rolling Stock i) Freight wagons 500 40t open 2,500,000 300 1,500,000 200 40 t covered 1,300,000 - - 20 refrigerating 350,000 - -

ii) Passenger 10 3rd class 300,000 10 300,000 coaches 30 4til class 1,233,000 30 1,233,000 Total: Z5,603,000

4) Machine tools 156,500 - -

5) Port Cranes *1 cranes 660.000 - -

Grand Total: Z13.6 million Z6,270,500

Table 22

Road NIetwork

Min. 6 rn wide L tha n 6 m wnde Total Bitumen Gravel Earth Gravel Earth

Primary Roads 36,700 1,800 1,600 1,hoo 12,200 19,700

Secondary Roads 91,30n 100 100 100 16,000 75,000

Private Roads 12,700 - 100 - 600 12,000

1"O,700 1,900 1,800 1500 28,800 106,700

ource: Report of± EEC Economic IrUssion, 9635

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4 II