The Terrorism and Ethnic Conflicts: the Experience of the Western Balkans

issue 3 • year 2 January - March 2003.

FORUM ZA ETNIČKE ODNOSE FORUM FOR ETHNIC RELATION T h e m a g a z i n e o f F E R

REPORT ON THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE WESTERN BALKANS

april 2002. forum 1

C M Y K THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS Preface

n team of the experts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, leading by Dr. Budimir ABabovic, leader of the expert team of the Forum for Ethnic Relations (Belgrade, Serbia) and Dr. Dusan Janjic, Project Leader, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Belgrade and Forum for Ethnic Relations (Belgrade, Serbia); prepared this report for the Forum on Ethnic Relations. This report represents an outcome of work of Forum's experts in the framework of the project Terrorism and Organized Crime, Challenges to Security and Stability in the Western Balkans sponsored by the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, New York. The report was prepared based on an analysis of publicly available data in media, international documents, national laws, decrees and directives, expert analyses and other sources. For purposes of this report, the Western Balkans include Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FR Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro and Macedonia. The report covers the following issues: description and analysis of the concept of terrorism; methodology for monitoring and combating terrorism; the connection between politics, terrorism and armed rebellions; the interconnections between conflicting (economic, social, ethnic, religious and cultural) interests and values and terrorism; political motives, goals and profiles of terrorist organizations and networks and their supporters; behavior of government bodies and the public in conflict management, especially in facing with violence and terrorism; behavior of business, intellectual, church elites, journalists and civil society faced with ethnic intolerance, extremism, violence, armed conflicts and terrorist activities. The report also contains recommendations to national governments, especially to military and police officials, international organizations, representatives from media, academia, business, trade unions and civil society for the promotion of legislative and institutional framework of com- · Encourage political decision-makers in countries of the bating terrorism. Region to work on legislative changes and the establishment of institutions to combat organized crime and terrorism; The report seeks: · Suggest concrete policy measures, launch public cam- · Initiate expert and political public debates on the ques- paigns and lobby for implementation of the recommendations pertaining to security, development and democratiza- tions; tion in the Western Balkans, seeking to overcome preexisting · Encourage public debate and raise public awareness of problems associated with the fact that most information dangers of different forms of political extremism and crimi- through the media are often based on insufficiently checked nalization of society to security and stability of the state and data and abounding with stereotypes; the Region.

For internal informing • the publisher: The Forum for Ethnic Relations - Beograd, 45 Narodnog fronta; tel/fax: +38 11 361 6654: e-mail: [email protected] •for the publisher: Dušan Janjić the coordinator of FER• the editor: Tea Terzić • English editoring: Florian Biber, Barbara Davis design: Nikola Kostandinović • press: Inpres, Beograd

2 forum January - March 2003. INTRODUCTION

The Importance of Understanding Terrorism Regarding the first consideration, it needs to be noted that here has been a considerable record of experience with U.S. foreign policy towards the Western Balkans has been car- ethnic conflict, violence and wars, including terrorism, in ried out through the lens of the 'fight against terrorism'. This the Western Balkans. Political violence occurred has resulted in certain contradiction in U.S. foreign policy. Tbetween national groups, within individual countries and On one hand, it will seek to promote stability in the region, region wide. Like other citizens of the World, there have been as renewed conflict will (a) draw its own or European occasions when the inhabitants of the Balkans faced global resources and energy from confronting terrorism and (b) terrorism. In fact, the terrorist attacks on New York and because a conflict-ridden and instable area might be vulnera- Washington of 11 September 2001 were a strong experiences ble for use by terrorist groups. On the other hand, the United and a turning point in attitude towards terrorism in the States has been willing to undermine the rule of law in coun- region. The crimes committed on 11 September 2001 have tries of the region for the pursuit of terrorists, as evidenced in raised the possibilities for such terrorist actions globally and the recent arrest of six Algerians after Bosnian authorities for in-or from-the Balkans. It turned out that small but well organ- the lack of evidence against them released them. This con- ized terrorist groups can mount serious attacks even if they tradiction between long-and short-term goals of U.S. foreign do not have wide support in the local community. In fact, it policy in the region might result in some degree of instability can be asserted that frequently the forcefulness of a terrorist and uncertainty in the post-conflict reconstruction process, act is directly related to the decline of the ideology which its especially in Bosnia and Kosovo. seeks to promote. Terrorism gains ground when other means On a local level, the terrorist attacks have lead to a prolif- of bringing about change are or seem impossible. As such, the eration of perceived terrorist threats. Some politicians have terrorism of Al Qaeda can bee seen as a testimony of the fall sought to portray other ethnic groups, especially Muslim com- of political Islam. munities, as being prone to terrorism and sought to identify a Events of 11 September demonstrated that terrorism is a terrorist threat emanating there from. While this rhetoric major security concern of the contemporary world. As the peaked in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, it has not means and method for achievement of their objectives, yet completely subsided and prevents both an addressing of diverse groups, organizations and even some states have past responsibilities associated with the disintegration of endorsed the use of violence to achieve their political goals. Yugoslavia and hinders a more accurate identification of Global terrorism is truly a phenomenon of globalization, it threats to stability in the region. knows no boundaries and can appear in every part of the For Southeastern Europe, the main threat of terrorism is world. This is why terrorism is not only a challenge to indi- two fold: For international terrorism the danger lies in the vidual states but also a global one. Accordingly, terrorism as weakness of the states of the region, especially in the a global problem necessitates a global response. In regions, Southern Balkans. In facing this threat, the states should rein- such as the Western Balkans, were terrorism and related phe- force the control over their territory, in particular of their nomena have similar roots and causes, regional co-operation brothers. This task could be fulfilled only through a closer is a necessary intermediary level between the national and the cooperation between the states. The weakness of the state is global. both an encouragement to organized crime and terrorism, If measured by the number of acts and the number of vic- both of which are likely to have an impact beyond the region tims, the conclusion could be drawn that terrorism in general itself. and international terrorism in particular is considerably more The second danger might arise in the future from local ter- limited than other types of crime or political violence. rorist groups if the states fail to build institutions which However, when considering its psychological effects-one of accommodate its diversity and include populations which in the main goals of most terrorists acts-than this assessment has the past have not been given a stake in the state. Only more to be reconsidered. Especially the scale of destruction and the inclusive governments and states can prevent the (re-emer- number of victims resulting from the terrorist attack 11 gence of nationalist-separatist movements in the region in the September 2001 have dwarfed most previous acts of terror- future. ism in their scope. In addition to the impact terrorism itself on security and democracy, one has to take into account two additional con- What is Terrorism? sequences of terrorism. Firstly, the response to terrorism, Terrorism is a delictum sui generis, a specific kind of polit- especially after 11 September 2001, has impacted security ical violence, and the most serious form of organized crime, and democracy on a global level. Secondly, the rhetoric of 'ter- both nationally and internationally. International rorism' by authoritarian (and occasionally democratic) gov- Organizations have been making efforts to arrive at a defini- ernments has often been the justification for political repres- tion of terrorism that would be acceptable to all countries. sion. The absence of such a universal definition is indicative of the

January - March 2003. forum 3 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

difficulty to grasp the phenomena. ments have developed such a global agenda, despite the exis- Despite the divergence in definitions of terrorism, some tence of some types of coalitions between different move- similarities can be found in these definitions. For the purpos- ments. es of this report, the definition used by the FBI seems to be At the same time the use of violence might evolve to a appropriate, as it includes all the key elements: degree that actual agenda becomes submerged to a degree Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against that the movements' main raison d'etre is violence. In addi- persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, tion to violence become the primary motivator of such move- the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in further- ments; non-political criminal activities can become prominent ance of political or social objectives. stimuli for terrorist movements. While these organizations In addition to the definition, one can arrive at a number would merely become criminal organization if they seized of common characteristics of terrorist movements. Firstly, a entirely to pursue a political agenda, criminal and political group that engages in acts of terrorism can have other func- goals are often closely wed. One reason lies in the per definitions and the use of terrorism might not be the only way it tion criminal nature of terrorism. Another key factor can be acts. It might also acts as guerilla movement or as a political attributed to the need to use illegal sources to raise funds for party at the same time. Obviously terrorist groups can trans- criminal activities. form themselves over time permanently into parties or organ- Whereas so far, the main description of terrorism focused izations that pursue their aims only peacefully. Alternatively, on non-state actors, it is important to also consider the state. many terrorist groups just disappear because of arrest, the From the institutional point of view, i.e. its links with the state full-filament of their goals or the decline of the movement's apparatus, terrorism can be classified as state and non-state ideological underpinnings. Most terrorist organizations are terrorism. State terrorism implies the one that is instigated or characterized by their small size, most often numbering only committed by governmental bodies while groups or organiza- a few dozen or few hundred members. This is to their military tions that are opponents of a particular political regime resort advantage and political disadvantage, as Laqueur has empha- to non-governmental terrorism. Terrorist activity of a state sized: "…[w] hile it is difficult to detect small groups and while can be either direct or indirect one. Direct terrorist actions they can inflict considerable damage, their political effect is are carried out through intelligence services and other organ- bound to be limited." izations and institutions specialized in such actions, but also An act of terrorism is distinguished from another act of through terrorist groups that they form in their territory, in violence by three elements: (a) a political, religious, ethnic or the territory of a third country or the country against which social motivation; (b) a message communicated through the the action is directed. Indirect terrorist activity of a state man- creation of a climate of fear, horror, mistrust or defeatism; ifests itself in instigating the existing terrorist group or organ- and (c) performance of the act in public and making the name ization - in provision of assistance (delivery of arms and of the organization behind it known. equipment, training of people, financial and other logistic When further attempting to understand terrorism as a support, providing refuge to terrorists, provision of false or form of political violence, one should distinguish different original passports, etc.). This form of action is the most fre- categories of the political underpinnings of terrorism. These quent one. It is so much in use that it is almost impossible to include ideological movements, based on universalistic ide- find a terrorist organization that does not enjoy intelligence, ologies, such as communism; anti-colonial movements, reli- logistic or operational support of a foreign state. In this case, gious movements and nationalist-separatist movements. In the terrorism appears as a means of foreign policy. the western Balkans, as will be demonstrated in the case stud- When trying to establish a matrix for understanding dif- ies, most terrorism was linked to the last type of movement. ferent expressions of terrorism and political violence, we can These categories are not to be conceived as being rigid establish the following taxonomy distinguishing between the dividers. Many movements have combined characteristics relationship to the government, the readiness to use violence from several categories. The strength of the different cate- (and degree) and the nature of the violence employed. gories of terrorist movements has changed throughout time. What emerges from this taxonomy is that terrorism in its While in the 1970s ideological movements were identified as more narrow definition constitutes merely a small segment of the main threat to peace, religion-based movement replaced organized political violence. While groups of nearly all sub- them by the 1980 and 1990s. Although the reach of activities categories will have been described as 'terrorists', it is more of organizations might be global and direct not only at the useful to focus on the distinctions between the groups. As all particular regimes they seek to change, but also their interna- groups share at least the rhetorical support for the use of vio- tional supporters, they mostly keep a local political agenda. A lence to achieve political goals, boundaries might be fluid and few movements, however, have extended their activities and commonly cooperation between groups belonging to differ- goals primarily beyond the national framework and sought a ent categories will be identifiable. As development is a key global goal, most notably and recently Al-Qaeda. By defini- factor in all movements, one will often observe groups mov- tion, neither nationalist-separatist nor anti-colonial move- ing from one to another subcategory in the course of time. As

4 forum January - March 2003. Use and Relationship to the Government Type of Violence Governmental Government- Government- Governmental Anti- Groups sponsored tolerated Indifference Government Rhetoric of Governments Extremist Political Parties and Movements violence Rhetoric of Secret Parties, Paramilitary Extremist groups and violence Services, Movements, groups movements with special police Paramilitary sporadic and army groups incidents of units violence. Low degree of organization Organized Secret Paramilitary groups, ‘Convention violence Services, ‘Conventional’ terrorist al’ terrorist (Material special police groups (in other countries) groups damage, and army against units individuals and groups) Organized Special police Guerilla groups (in other Guerilla violence and army Countries) groups (Control of units Land) Table 1: Taxonomy of Terrorism and Political Violence (shaded area will be considered in the report as terrorism) such, the study and understanding of terrorism will have to Southeastern Europe, we can exclude some categories, which monitor actors from a broader range of political violence than might be applicable elsewhere, but are uncommon in the just terrorism in its most narrow form. Balkans. Firstly, most political violence and terrorism have been motivated by ethnicity and/or national identity. Related The Context of the Western Balkans: Political Violence one can find elements of religious fundamentalism and and Historical Legacies racism, but both are mostly connected to nationally motivated political violence. Other motivators, such as left wing or Political Violence and Terrorism right-wing ideology, have been marginal or non-existent in political violence of recent years. The only significant type of Turning to the context of the Western Balkans, contrary to internationally active terrorism has been linked to Islamic fun- many expectations, especially in the West during the NATO damentalist groups, some with possible connections to Al- bombing only relatively little terrorism by non-state actors Qaeda. These groups have not carried out terrorist acts in the took place during 1990s, in contrast to other types of politi- region itself, or where prevented from doing so. cal violence. In most cases, the violence cannot be qualified Furthermore, their targets have not been targets connected to as terrorism. For this phenomenon, we can identify three ten- the countries themselves, but rather representations of US tative reasons: (a) most violence was state organized and/or interests. As such, they constitute a largely foreign group tar- sanctioned; (b) despite the high degree of interethnic ten- geting other non-domestic actors, transforming the countries sions, the political-criminal elites pursuing the wars and vio- of the Western Balkans into the 'stage' rather than the target. lence engaged with each other to an unprecedented degree; and (c) the goals of the war were largely confined to the con- The main threat of political violence in the past decade quest and/or control of territory while expelling or control- emanated from governments and organizations sponsored by ling populations of other ethnicity. recognized or unrecognized authorities. With different governments at conflict with each other and supporting groups When examining terrorism and political violence in using violence as a means to achieve political objectives, little

January - March 2003. forum 5 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

room for terrorist groups in the narrow sense existed. We can movement Mlada Bosna shot Archduke Franz Ferdinand in note a certain amount of attacks against buildings and mem- Sarajevo. bers of ethnic, religious and social minorities through the After World War I, a target of terrorist activities was the years. Some of these attacks were specific to the conflict, such regime in Belgrade. One of the first cases of inter-war terror- as the bombing of houses and religious monuments, while ism was the attempted assassination of the Yugoslav regent others were mirrored throughout Europe, i.e. Skinhead Alexander on 2 August 1921 by Spasoje Stejić, member of the attacks against Roma. In most cases, however, these incidents Communist Party of Yugoslavia, resulting in the death of the were either perpetrated by paramilitary groups with govern- former minister of interior Milorad Drakovic. The most noto- ment consent, or were rather sporadic with either nobody rious act of terrorism in the interwar period was the assassi- claiming responsibility or shady groups with little structure or nation of king Alexander in 1934 in Marseille, carried out by consistency. The Kosovo Liberation Army and the National a member of the VMRO but organized by the Ustasa move- Liberation Army in Macedonia have in many aspects been ment, with the support of Italian and Hungarian authorities. structurally rather resembling other guerilla movements, During World War Two the intensive fighting on the terri- rather than terrorist groups. This was largely the result of the tory of Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and parts of Croatia, absence of an effective (quasi-) state, which would have exer- would most adequately be described as guerilla warfare, cised a similar role as in the other conflicts in former whereas the German and Italian occupation forces labeled Yugoslavia. Partisans and to a lesser degree Cetnici as terrorists. With the end of the authoritarian regimes in Serbia and After 1945, opponents of the regime to destabilize the Croatia and the substantial international military presence in new authorities by force faced Communist Yugoslavia with the region the risk of outright state-sponsorship of political attempts. Most terrorist acts against the regime were carried violence has declined. Despite the change of regimes, politi- out by nationalist (Ustase, Cetnici) emigre organizations. cal and ethnic violence continued to be significant problem in From 1945 until the late 1970s, 657 terrorist attacks were Macedonia, Kosovo and Southern Serbia. In these areas mounted in which 82 persons were killed and 186 persons there is a continued danger of violence perpetrated by para- were wounded. During this period a number of murders of military and terrorist groups. opponents of the regime in Belgrade were committed abroad, most of which have been attributed to Yugoslav secret servic- Historical Legacies es but no criminal charges have been brought against those services. In the context of the Western Balkans, a quick examination at historical antecedents is useful in understanding cur- Experience of the Balkan wars, 1991 - 1999 rent developments and assessing future threats emanating from terrorism and related forms of political violence. The experience of the wars in former Yugoslavia from Terrorism has not been alien to Southeastern Europe. 1991 to 1999 shed a new light on the definition of terrorism. Throughout the 20th century, a significant number of terror- There can be little doubt that the violence associated with the ist movements have been active in the region, profoundly wars frequently qualifies as the application of non-selective affecting the region. Its initial causes in this area are primari- violence as a means of deterrence for the purpose of achiev- ly associated with the idea of 'national liberation' from the ing a political objective, thus falling within the above-men- Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. tioned definition of terrorism. Due to the role of the state in In Macedonia, the Internal Macedonian Liberation such acts, this particular aspect of terrorism is of special rele- Organization (VMRO) emerges as a reaction to the increas- vance for this report. Thus, terror or spreading of a general ingly oppressive nature of Ottoman rule in the 19th century, and diffuse fear to everybody, without regard to commitment, and begins carrying out terrorist actions in the beginning of loyalty or guilt - by way of violence, such as 'ethnic cleansing' the 20th century. Two of the most prominent terrorist acts and massacres, will be considered in this report as a form of were the kidnapping of an American missionary in 1901 and terrorism. In addition to state-sponsored acts of violence, one explosion in the Ottoman bank in Thessalonica. The annexa- also needs to consider political violence, guerrilla warfare tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908 and terrorism in the Western Balkans. Guerrilla warfare and caused a wave of discontent in Serbia and other parts of the terrorism often overlap in certain segments in case of the region. A radicalized young generation of nationalists subse- wars in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. There was, quently engaged in a number of assassinations, such as of the however, no significant 'classical' terrorism by marginal royal commissary for Croatia and Slavonia Slavko Cuvaja and extremist groups, such as the Red Brigades, ETA, or IRA. his successor, as well as Austro-Hungarian representatives in Bosnia. The climax of these activities, permeated by aspira- During the 1990s most acts of violence were not investi- tions to achieve national liberation, was reached on 28 June gate by the state, including 'ethnic cleansing' in the war zones, 1914, when Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Serb nationalist the destruction of property of minorities, and the assassina-

6 forum January - March 2003. The road of one terrorist

1966: moves to London 1968: Studies in Moscow, where he establishes connections with his family with the Palestinian liberation org. Carlos December 21, 1975 in Wienna takes 70 OPEC members for hostages movements are deprived of any state 1979 to 1983 operates from Bucharest legitimacy because the concept of chain Ilich Ramires and Budapest of command and responsibility, which Sancesh reaches the political office holders in the 1973 to 75 Bomb explosions country, is usually not applicable. in Paris and London War crimes committed by organized 1983 to 1991 lives in Damascus and legal forces of recognized states lie beyond the scope of this report, which (Syria)1970 " Black September" confines itself to terrorist activities of Caracas (Venezuela) Para-military/-police formations, criminal Ilich Ramires Carlos was born on groups and guerrilla movements, all of 1993 Arrives in Sudan, August 15, Oct 12, 1949 Since 1994 in prison in Paris which employed terrorist methods. The 1994 French secret service arrests largest segment of these formations was Carlos in Sudan deliberately recruited by the state securi- Carlos's terrorist acts ty services from the criminal milieu and for which he took the responsibility from prisons. The coupling of political Paris Septebmer 15, objectives, terrorist tactics and methods August 25 West Berlin, 1 1974, San Germen Bld, 2 of operation (mass terror against dead, 23 wounded dead, 34 wounded Deuchland unarmed civilians) with perpetrators June 27, 1975, Tuje from a variety of backgrounds and insti- France Austria December 21, 1975, Street 3 dead, including tutions (policemen, extreme nationalists Wienna 3 dead 2 policeman and criminals) was the product of pop- April 22, 1982 Marbef ulist and ethno-nationalist authorities March 29, 1982 Paris December 31, 1983, Marseille Street, 1 dead, 63 and political elites on most successor wounded Toulon train, 5 dead, 77 Paris Marseille train, 2 dead, 40 wounded wounded, 3 dead, 11 wounded states of Yugoslavia. Readiness to self-sacrifice is a common characteristic of ideologically moti- tion of public figures. Endorsement of the violence came at vated terrorism. In the case of former Yugoslavia, however, time from the state, as well as from extremist organizations the influence of ethno-nationalist extremism was supplement- and parties, which support ethnically, motivated crimes (see ed with the motive of plunder and enrichment, prevailing table 1). over self-sacrifice. In fact, terrorist methods and tactics applied in the Western Balkans as part of ethnic cleansing The tactics of terror, applied in Croatia, Bosnia, and focused on plundering. Another very widespread terrorist tac- Kosovo and to some degree in Macedonia, are neither new tic was taking of hostages in order to exchange them for own nor specific for the Balkans. The infiltration of Serbian and prisoners of war. In addition, a feature of terrorism in the Yugoslav secret services of Para-military formations followed Western Balkans has been the systematic destruction of sym- similar operations, such as the Franco-Algerian war (1956 - bols of ethnic, especially of religious identity of local commu- 1961). nities by planting explosives or setting fires. In analyzing the tactics of the parties during the conflicts After the end of the authoritarian regimes in Croatia and in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, a distinction Serbia/Yugoslavia in 2000 the state support for terrorist should be made between actions of (a) organized armies and groups came to an end, some extremist groups, however, con- the police of recognized states and emerging stateless; (b) tinued to operate in the Western Balkans, seeking to pursue paramilitary and police-police formations that are to varying political objectives through the use of force. degrees controlled by their kin-states; and (c) guerrilla move- Finally, this report is also exploring the instrumenaliza- ments with elements of terrorism. tion of 'terrorist threats' by the authoritarian regimes and Terrorist acts committed by regular armies and the police nationalist elites during the past decade to suppress political of recognized states and new ethnic entities belong to the cat- opposition. Throughout the period covered in the case stud- egory of war crimes, the violation of the rules of warfare or ies, political opponents have been described as 'terrorist' or crimes against humanity. Regrettably, the statutes of the encouraging 'terrorism'. This usage of the term has obscured International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia do real cases of terrorism and dictates particular care when not cover terrorist acts committed, supported or instigated by employing the label 'terrorism' in the context of the Western states that emerged after disintegration of former Yugoslavia, Balkans. but those acts were subsumed under the above-enumerated crimes. Paramilitary formations, mercenaries, and guerrilla

January - March 2003. forum 7 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS Part I CASE STUDIES

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA tions with certain Western and Arab countries. efore the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and On the eve of war, the economy experienced a collapse Herzegovina (B&H) was often described as "Yugoslavia that culminated in destruction of the financial sector, hyperin miniature". The social, political and economic fabric inflation, and a catastrophic fall in exports and imports. Bof B&H were said to contain, in microcosm, conflict, Considerable dislocation occurred in the supply and delivery compromise and coexistence maintained in dynamic balance. of raw materials, consumer goods, food and medicines. This The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed onto opened up space for black marketeering and organized B&H. The result is that the republic's experience of conflict crime. Public perception of these activities began to change: and post-conflict includes elements common to all parts of smuggling was not a negative phenomenon, but a necessary the former whole, but in concentrated form specific to B&H. and useful replacement for legal economic activity. The black market rapidly adjusted to provide products necessary for Common elements in former Yugoslavia war, such as arms, fuel, and foreign exchange.

Certain elements can be seen as ripe for potential conflict: 3. The role of the JNA, police, paramilitary and para- police formations in exacerbating social, political and 1. A complex ethnic structure and specific historical interethnic conflicts. The composition and ideological-politi- circumstances. When Tito's policy of brotherhood and unity cal association of armed forces, particularly the JNA, made it was called into question by demands in some circles to organ- impossible to keep peace and separate forces in the conflict. ize ethnic communities into states (co federally or as inde- The leaderships that decided on the use of the military and pendent states), borders between federal units -- between the police neither wanted to nor knew how to end conflicts Serbia and B&H, B&H and Croatia, and Serbia and Croatia through negotiations. Instead, they created popular discon- -- were also questioned. This necessarily questioned the legit- tent, a process difficult to control. In seeking a solution, the imacy of the very existence of B&H, Macedonia and JNA relied on the numerically largest group, always a risky Montenegro, as a state. tactic in interethnic conflicts. While most of the JNA sided with Serb interests, territorial defense forces disintegrated 2. Considerable differences in the degree and structure along ethnic lines, siding with nationalist interests. of economic development of individual areas. The policy of regional development placed inhabitants of cities, especially Against this background, war was waged within B&H, a the capital Sarajevo and regional centers (Mostar, Banja link in a chain of wars over the question of secession or Luka, Tuzla and Zenica) into a privileged position in relation forcible maintenance of the union. Powerful social and polit- to other inhabitants of B&H. Villagers, making up roughly 30 ical restructuring took place within B&H at the same time. percent of the population, were marginalized, above all in the New political, economic and social elites emerged, as did a central part of B&H. This is one of the socio-economic rea- new hierarchy. At the top were those linked with the new elite sons that the devastation of war assumed the form of destruc- that had acquired its position in the preparations for war, tion of cities. dealing in arms, procuring fuel and food, trafficking in for- Moreover, those employed in non-productive, i.e. admin- eign exchange, engaging in often-criminal activities? istrative and bureaucratic, activities had additional advan- tages, including that they were closer to formal and informal centers of decision-making. The conflict throughout former Factors linking political instability and terrorism Yugoslavia was aimed at the destruction of the old social structure, recruiting especially from provincial or ethnically A constant element in the region's recent history, political homogeneous entities and creating new political and business terrorism is present in B&H proportionate to the political sta- elites. One of the quickest means for new elites to rise was to bility of the country and to the degree of democratic develop- take advantage of war and political position to transfer capi- ment of its institutions. Many factors affect this situation. The tal from the military-industrial complex of former Yugoslavia, following deserve mention: which had concentrated its capacities in B&H, to regional cof- fers. In doing so, Serb actors used connections with Belgrade, 1. The sufferings of war were enormous. Human and the federal government and leadership in the JNA. Croat rights, freedoms and human dignity were brutally trampled actors turned to the newly developed center of Zagreb. on such a scale that the international war crimes tribunal for Bosniak actors used an alliance with Croatia but also connec- the region has brought its greatest number of indictments for

8 forum January - March 2003. tions that maintain excellent cross- border, cross-entity ties with each other and enjoy protection from authorities.

8. Few perpetrators of war crimes have been brought to justice. Those investigated, indicted or convicted by The Hague are extolled as national heroes. Attempts to establish responsibility for war crimes in domestic pro- crimes committed in B&H, including genocide. The number ceedings have not succeeded. of dead and missing totals 250,000 and mass graves are still being discovered. B&H was the scene of the greatest expul- 9. Known perpetrators of war crimes hide in neighbor- sion of populations in post-WWII Europe. According to offi- ing states, while several hundred foreigners whose involve- cial estimates, 2.200,000 inhabitants fled their homes; ment in terrorist activities is indicated remain in B&H. 1.200,000 of these became refugees outside B&H. Another 1.000,000 persons were forcibly displaced within the borders 10. Nationalist forces use domestic terrorism to keep the of B&H. At the end of March 2001, more than 610,000 political-security situation unstable, to maintain and produce refugees were still living outside B&H, while another crises, thereby creating an unfavorable climate for establish- 550,000 were displaced within B&H. ing and building B&H institutions.

2. The conflict so instrumentalized national and reli- 11. The antiterrorist activity of B&H authorities reflects gious elements that crimes against humanity became standard the divided state of B&H society, in that authorities are most means in a war against civilians. often willing to combat the terrorist acts of the "others" and display little interest in addressing terrorist acts committed by 3. The ruling nationalist parties instigated the war, their "own" people. building a cult of force. Violence by "my people" was explained as a necessary and just reaction to "their" violence 12. The statutory regulation of terrorism falls within the - or as the act of an "uncontrolled group" outside the chain of competence of entity authorities rather than institutions of command. Violence by "others", on the other hand, was B&H. Until 11 September 2001, it was difficult to speak of explained as a natural, even genetically determined, tendency. the existence of a B&H-wide security system. Hatred for the "others", it followed, was a "sacred act." 13. Specialized government agencies to prevent, detect 4. Nationalist goals not attained during the war are still and prosecute terrorist acts do not cooperate with each other. operational and contribute to a climate in which violence and even terrorism are considered ways to achieve them... Violence and terror that prevent the return of refugees and Terrorist acts recorded after the Dayton Agreement displaced person and threaten the few returnees are the most frequent manifestations of domestic terrorism. Since the Dayton Agreement, many terrorist activities took place in B&H, but only since 11 September 2001 has 5. The massive devastation and human losses in increased attention been paid to associating terrorism with wartime nurture individual and collective desires for revenge. ethnic conflict and the division of B&H into Serb, Croat and Bosniak parts. B&H has become an important transit country 6. Individuals and groups possess large quantities of suitable for all kinds of international organized crime, includ- undocumented arms left over from the war that is beyond any ing the operation of international terrorist organizations. control. Discovery of a number of large caches of arms and The "Alliance" governing coalition has demonstrated its inten- of organized training for terrorist acts has fuelled nationalist tion to bring B&H as close as possible to EU standards and fears and counteraction in all parts of B&H. to join NATO. Thus B&H joined the international antiterrorist coalition and established a coordination team to com- 7. War profiteering is in the hand of criminal organiza- bat terrorism and to draw up an antiterrorist plan.

January - March 2003. forum 9 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

According to the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the signs of growing presence. Some of the historic mosques Federation of B&H, 35 crimes of terrorism and 307 crimes damaged in the war have been restored are again places for that can be associated with terrorism were committed on the prayer. New mosques replacing those destroyed in the war territory of the Federation from 1997 to 2001. On the terri- are often built in the Gulf style, an architecture far removed tory of Republika Srpska, according to its Ministry for from local tradition. Islamic education centers, endowed in Internal Affairs, three crimes of terrorism and 1,665 crimes many cases by Saudi princes, have been established in that can be associated with terrorism were committed from Sarajevo and other cities where, as a result of the war, the 1996 to 2001. As noted above, most terrorist acts in B&H population is by far less "mixed". Observers inclined to see since the signing of the Dayton Agreement are directed "Islamic fundamentalism" often point to the (small) number against return of refugees and displaced persons, thus instill- of veiled women on the streets and the fact that many restau- ing fear and attempting to preserve ethnic homogeneity of ter- rants no longer serve pork. ritories. Violent nationalist acts were, to a great degree, Nevertheless, B&H's connections with Islamic countries encouraged or supported by ruling political parties at the strengthened during the war. Some 3,000 fighters from those time. Few of the cases have been resolved. countries came to B&H. Many of them formed a unit called A number of international terrorist organizations and El Mujahid that became an integral part of the Seventh individuals use B&H for transit. The state borders of B&H Muslim Brigade of the Third Corps of the Army of B&H; Alija have been effectively uncontrolled for years, resulting in vari- Izetbegovic was the unit's honorary commander. Izetbegovic ous forms of trafficking of drugs, arms, cigarettes, alcohol, claimed that no one invited the fighters to come to Bosnia and and human beings. The state border service of B&H was that no one could ask they leave "because the majority had established only in early 2000 and does not yet control the noble intentions: to help people who were threatened and state's entire border, although it now controls close to 90 per- under attack." The El Mujahid unit was disbanded in 1996 cent. This is representative of the generally fragile state of under U.S. pressure; soon afterwards, the Seventh Muslim domestic structures that has made B&H attractive to perpe- Brigade was disbanded as well. Some of the former muja- trators of illegal activity. hedeen settled in a village in central Bosnia where, western media have alleged, they represented a threat to the security of SFOR and may have been responsible for crimes against The practice of Islam and links to Arab countries Croat returnees and members of the police. Former mujahedeen dispersed in 2001 when new authorities moved them The report argues that weak states throughout the west- out of homes that belonged to Serb returnees. Western ana- ern Balkans are conducive to illegal activity of many kinds, lysts repeat the speculation of local media that the former including acts of terrorism. Its drafters have not had the ben- mujahedeen are now concentrated in "strategic" areas of the efit of reviewing media sources in the Muslim world or even Federation, such as near the Sarajevo-Mostar railroad line. many in the western press about B&H. The report cannot In 1993, under directions from the presidency of B&H, document conclusively how B&H is portrayed and how B&H all volunteers in the Bosnian army were entitled to the citi- is seen from outside its borders. Where terrorist acts specifi- zenship. According to figures calculated by international cally associated with Islamic fundamentalism are concerned, authorities in B&H, approximately 12,000 Bosnian passports this report can only recount what has appeared in domestic were issued under questionable circumstances during and and available foreign sources speculating as to what might immediately after the war. B&H leadership has pointed out make B&H appear to be an environment in which terrorist publicly that, of the several hundred naturalization decisions groups and foreign operatives can function or escape detec- issued after 1992 to persons of North African and Near tion. In the waves of anti-Muslim rhetoric and security prac- Eastern origin, only 70 persons did not have permanent resi- tices that have followed the events of 11 September, the mere dence in B&H before the war. perception that B&H might be such an environment has been During the war, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya were among sufficient cause for the state to be the special target of con- the countries that responded to President Izetbegovic's cern in the international antiterrorist campaign. appeal for financial assistance and helped to circumvent the In an international antiterrorist campaign largely directed UN arms embargo. The process established lasting connec- against Islamic groups, B&H's social composition has made tions. The then-ruling party, the SDA, benefited from these the country the subject of international scrutiny. The national connections -- not to promote Islamic awakening, as anti- composition of B&H differs from that of its neighbors. Of a Muslim nationalist elements in B&H have charged -- but to total population of 3.7 million, 44 percent of B&H, or two- foster lucrative deals and maintain nepotism. Exponents of thirds of the Federation population, are Muslim. It is perhaps Islamic awakening, like Hasan Cengic, are minor personali- the heritage of the war that all faiths in B&H now claim more ties. During the war, Islamic orientation was a useful and practicing adherents than before 1992; this is also the case understandable strategy to secure much-needed assistance. with the Muslim faith. As with other faiths, there are visible Subsequently, however, the perception of SDA connections to

10 forum January - March 2003. the Arab world was problematic, especially after 11 current estimates, roughly 740 persons from African and September 2001. On 12 October 2001, Izetbegovic Asian countries obtained B&H citizenship under question- announced his withdrawal from SDA leadership and sought able circumstances. Review is also underway of all name and to facilitate movement of his party to the political center. identity changes before administrative organs within the past The coordination team to combat terrorism, established ten years. At issue are tens of thousands of cases. in B&H in September 2001, has, together with entity internal affairs organs, reviewed all unsolved cases of terrorist or terrorist-related acts. The review has yielded results. An inter- The Pogorelica training camp national action has been underway to examine the operation of certain Islamic humanitarian organizations, including In autumn 1995, the Agency for Information and branches in B&H. Examination of financial records, bank Documentation ("AID") set up a training camp for intelli- statement and other documents revealed evidence of illegal gence officers in Pogorelica, near Fojnica, in the Federation. financial transactions by some organizations. In the searches, The camp was in existence for several months, when in mid- a few materials inconsistent with humanitarian work were February 1996, IFOR troops stormed the camp and arrested found, such as drawings of military projects, notes on troop eight B&H citizens and five Iranian citizens. Training in assas- disposition, and comics with anti-American and anti-Semitic sination, diversion and other activities had been organized in messages. Some involved in these activities have been arrest- the camp for groups of 10 to 12 persons. Experts from the ed, some have been deprived of B&H citizenship, some have Iranian intelligence service conducted the training. been asked to leave the territory of B&H, and others have left Although state leadership at the time promised represen- voluntarily. tatives of the international community that a detailed investigation of the camp would be conducted, none appears to have taken place. Instead, one day after the IFOR action, an order The "Algerian group" and citizenship decisions was issued to change all documents that could establish identity (such as internal identity cards, passports, military book- On 13 January 2002, Federation authorities handed over lets, driver's licenses, medical care booklets) for 15 trainees. to U.S. representatives, at their request, the six-person In late 2001 and early 2001, however, pre-trial detention was "Algerian group". After three months in pre-trial detention, ordered for five senior officials of the Ministry of Interior and the Supreme Court of B&H released the group for lack of evi- AID who were in office during the camp's operation. dence that could connect them with the terrorist network Osama Bin Laden. The action by B&H authorities was undertaken in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution Relevant law and regulation 1373. Five persons of the "Algerian group" had B&H citizenship that was revoked after it had been ascertained that Under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the citizenship had been acquired on the basis of forged docu- "Dayton constitution", implementation of international and ments and false statements. Handing over the "Algerian inter-entity criminal-legal legislation, including relations with group" to U.S. authorities created heated controversy and Interpol is within the competence of B&H central authorities. protests in B&H. However, this provision was not elaborated into law until The "Algerian group" case called into question the cir- recently. Statutory regulation of crimes has so far been with- cumstances and criteria under which B&H citizenship has in entity jurisdiction. Given that there was no central B&H been obtained. It has been alleged in western and domestic supreme court, judicial authority was also at the entity level. media that individuals with terrorist connections have been Entities have not cooperated with each other. In 2000, the operating on the territory of B&H, that they have obtained Court Act of Bosnia and Herzegovina came into force, creat- B&H citizenship that they have married locally, that they have ing a central court and defining its competence. The court even procured diplomatic license plates. As noted above, has not begun to function, but is expected to do so during international officials note that approximately 12,000 pass- 2002. ports were issued under questionable circumstances. After With considerable involvement of international bodies, the Dayton Agreement, more than 30,000 persons were changes to criminal legislation have begun in both entities. given B&H citizenship. Most of these were Serbs from the Existing criminal laws include crimes that have characteristics Republic of Croatia and Bosniaks from FRY. A re-examina- of terrorist activity. The criminal statute of the Federation, tion of all decisions granting citizenship and passports issued which is essentially identical to the criminal statute of since 1992 is currently underway. Results so far indicate Republika Srpska, sets out a group of 16 crimes against the irregularities, and some citizenship decisions have been constitutional order of B&H and the Federation of B&H, the revoked. In some cases individuals were granted B&H citi- crime of terrorism and the crime of sending and transferring zenship several times under separate identities. According to to the territory of the Federation of B&H armed groups, arms

January - March 2003. forum 11 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

and ammunition. A group of 18 crimes against humanity and tered bodies. international law provides, inter alia, for the following crimes: Finally, B&H signed and ratified the UN Convention for international terrorism , taking of hostages and endangering the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Ratification of persons enjoying international protection. In the group of 23 five other international conventions concerning terrorist crimes against public order and legal system, the following activity is underway. crimes are specifically set out: call to resistance and association for the purpose of committing a crime. As a result of the Approach of media heightened danger of terrorism after 11 September 2001, legislative activity underway aims to replace these two crimes After Dayton and especially after the events of 11 with organization of resistance and criminal association. September 2001, media in B&H have often questioned the In addition to those described above, other measures ambivalent attitude of the international community toward were undertaken after 11 September 2001 to create a legal terrorism in B&H during the war, when terrorism was explic- basis to combat terrorist activity. Amendments to entity laws itly a standard means of intimidation, ethnic cleansing and on criminal procedure are underway. In cooperation with warfare. Media of all ethnic groups in B&H have equally con- representatives of international organizations, the Presidency demned global terrorism. They have mounted a vigorous and the Council of Ministers of B&H proposed passing or campaign for increased state action against terrorism, but amending so-called "umbrella laws" that would be applicable throughout the territory of B&H. These include a law on special safety measures in case of international armed conflict or international terrorist crisis endangering the safety of B&H, as well as amendments to the Law on Asylum and Immigration and the Law on Citizenship. Activity is underway on a legislative package to assure uniform identification of documents for citizens of B&H. These include the Law on Identity Documents, the Law on Uniform Registration Number of Citizens, the Law on Residence and Sojourn of Citizens of B&H, the Law on Central Records and Exchange of Data and the Law on Protection of Personal Data. The need for improvement is acknowl- edged in uniform regulation and record- keeping of documents such as driver's licenses, registration also against antiterrorist measures by the state that could vio- cards and vehicle permits. The Ministerial Council of B&H late human rights and endanger the establishment of rule of recently introduced a landing card for foreigners entering law. B&H, providing fuller records on international entries and In the post-war period from 1996 to September 2001, departures at airports. B&H media reported many terrorist acts. Most of these were A draft law to create a B&H-wide information and pro- explosions in urban areas, usually car bombs that claimed at tection agency, thus investing the B&H government with least one life, injured others and caused considerable materi- greater responsibility, was introduced into parliamentary pro- al damage. Bombs and other explosives targeted at members cedure. The law would promote research to combat terrorism of international organizations and SFOR were rarely and organized international and interethnic crime, as well as described in media as terrorist attacks and were usually the protection of "very important people and security of gov- explained as isolated acts. ernment buildings where government institutions are accom- Media reactions to terrorist acts can be best seen from modated, and cooperation with Interpol". Merger of the two several well-covered events in 1997 and 1998. A series of intelligence services on the territory of the Federation has explosions in West Mostar in 1977 attracted the greatest also been proposed. Entity-level laws have also been pro- media attention. Cafes and cars were targeted in night posed to establish special agencies to protect people and attacks. The most damaging explosion occurred on 18 property of economic societies, institutions and other char- September 1997, when a black "Golf" exploded on Splitska

12 forum January - March 2003. Street, leaving a crater 247 cm in diameter and 85 cm deep. other western media changed, too. In the aftermath of 11 The explosion injured 50 people, destroyed 56 flats and seri- September, B&H was often characterized as a country in ously damaged 152 flats. The attack spread panic in divided which international terrorist organizations, including Al Mostar and was depicted in media as a "terrorist bombing" Qaeda, were passively, if not actively present. In October heretofore unseen in B&H. Other media speculated that the 2001, SFOR commander Gen. John Sylvester was quoted as attack was part of a conflict within the Croatian mafia but saying that B&H is not threatened by radical Muslim ele- nevertheless called it "terrorist". Some Croatian media quot- ments, but the U.S. and British embassies in Sarajevo were ed Croat officials in B&H who claimed that the attack was closed for three days after a reported credible threat of ter- directed at the position of Croats in the country. Others rorist attack. Later, NATO officials claimed that they had pre- blamed the Hezbolah organization. Bosniak media charged vented an attack on U.S. SFOR bases in northeastern Bosnia. that the terrorist act targeted the peace process with the aim At the same time, NATO officials denied that any evidence of destabilizing B&H. had been found of the existence of camps for training terror- On 16 March 1999, then-Deputy Minister for Internal ists. On 25 October, SFOR claimed that it had cut all Bosnian Affairs, Jozo Leutar, of Croat ethnicity, was killed in a car connections with the Al Qaeda network. A day later, bomb explosion in Sarajevo. The act is still the subject of Secretary-General of NATO Lord Robertson stated that "at media debate, with some media arguing the violence was all least one" out of ten suspects detained by local police or the more brutal because it came "from within" and not "from SFOR in the period after 1 October, had had "direct connec- outside", as during the siege of Sarajevo. The killing of Jozo tion with Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden." "Danger," added Leutar was generally described as a terrorist act. Bosniak- and Robertson, "is still present." Croatian-controlled media commented as they had on the car Such international media focus on B&H contributed to bombing in Mostar. All media condemned state and local the government's response in creating a coordinated antiter- authorities for failing to find perpetrators of these acts, par- rorist team and proposing the legislation and measures ticularly for failing to bring anyone to justice for the murder described above. Both the government of the Federation and of Jozo Leutar, and accused governmental bodies of being the central government of B&H denied assertions appearing incompetent to carry out investigations and establish rule of in media that Osama Bin Laden had ever been in B&H and law. In these cases, media critics have not spared the inter- that he had been granted a Bosnian passport. The leadership national community, claiming that B&H's international stressed that B&H was by far not the only government from organs have not fulfilled their responsibilities to establish rule which the U.S. had requested information on individuals with of law and that massive funding has been squandered in the alleged terrorist connections. process. Media also criticize the police and all authorities for their entire approach to the search for perpetrators of acts of terror who, it is claimed, "rage" through B&H. Actions by government authorities and critical reactions

Reaction after 11 September 2001 Among its antiterrorist actions, the government's much- publicized review of naturalization decisions issued during As they did throughout the world, the events of 11 and after the war has been subject to criticism. So, too, have September 2001 in the U.S. dominated media in B&H for policies of the ruling Alliance coalition and actions of the weeks. In initial reactions the attacks and terrorism in gen- antiterrorist coordination team. The government has been eral were severely condemned. Subsequent U.S. conduct in taken to task on the timing of its expressed interest in terror- the war against Afghanistan, as well as the anti-Islamic ism, for setting up a coordinated antiterrorist team only after approach of western media, was criticized. Western media the events in the U.S., for doing little to investigate acts of ter- carried often-unattributed stories that linked B&H with rorism committed within B&H from 1992 to 1995 or to bring Islamic fundamentalism and even with Osama Bin Laden perpetrators brought to justice. himself. Western media reported that many fighters from Media have extensively covered the reaction of human Islamic countries fought on the Bosniak side during the rights activists to antiterrorism measures. Human rights Balkan wars and that they illegally obtained B&H citizenship. activists have drawn attention to the high number of cases in Such stories fuelled divisions within B&H. While Bosniak which individuals persons were deprived "overnight" of B&H media condemned anti-Islamic campaigns, Serb and Croat citizenship, extradited or deported to countries in which cap- media feasted on reports of Islamic terrorism and suggestions ital punishment is in force. The president of the Helsinki that implicated the B&H government. Committee for Human Rights in B&H has condemned these Media pointed out the danger of an outbreak of new hos- as serious violation of human rights and as violations of B&H tilities in B&H as a result of U.S. expressions of waning inter- law and the European Convention on Human Rights. The est in regional peacekeeping. The image of B&H in U.S. and "Algerian group" case described above has so far been drawn

January - March 2003. forum 13 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

the greatest media criticism. The government's handover of 2000. Its priorities are to detect and prevent illegal border detainees to U.S. authorities was characterized as violating crossings, illegal trade in goods subject to high customs tariffs human rights and the laws of B&H. Media accused the B&H and excises, transferring stolen cars across the border, traf- government of going to any lengths, at any cost, to maintain ficking in human beings and drugs, people, and use forged good terms with the U.S. A dispute within the Helsinki documents. The service performs all border control tasks, Committee for Human Rights in B&H over how to react to including in the 10 km border zone and at international air- the case also drew media attention. ports. Under certain circumstances, the service can exercise SFOR responded to local critics of its antiterrorism meas- its authority more broadly than the border zone. As noted ures by explaining that, immediately after 11 September, it above, the service now functions over approximately 90 per- had to take unilateral measures to locate and detain potential cent of the B&H international border and at two of four inter- terrorists on the basis of intelligence data that could not be national airports in B&H. Regulations further elaborating shared with Bosnian police. After formation of the B&H the work of the border service are forthcoming. antiterrorism coordination team, it appears that information Efforts to improve the efficiency of civil aviation in B&H and responsibility for detention and deportation of suspect have intensified. An air traffic security plan is in preparation. individuals is being shared, and there is less criticism in local Observance of flight and passenger security provisions has media of SFOR overstepping its authority. The 24-member been heightened, and regulations have been promulgated coordination team was set up in late September 2001 and concerning coordination, control and regular reporting to includes representatives of B&H central authorities, the enti- competent bodies. All these measures are being taken in ties and the international community (SFOR, IPTF, OHR, cooperation with international organizations, especially the OSCE, UNMIBH, U.S. embassy and others). The coordina- ICAO, OHR, SFOR, Euro control and IATA. tion team operates in accordance with the institutional action For the first time since Dayton, all state and entity leaders plan to prevent terrorist activities approved by the Ministerial in B&H met on 24 September 2001 to address the issue of Council of B&H. The plan includes measures to accomplish terrorism. Despite their differences, they grasped the need the following: (a) to create a legislative framework for com- for joint action. Progress has been made toward cooperation, bating terrorism; (b) to improve protection of civil aviation; but B&H's public actors are far from universal agreement on (c) to intensify works of internal affairs bodies and the border means to confront the political, social and economic causes of service, especially in verifying identity documents, passports, terrorism. To do so, they would have to agree on how to elim- citizenship, residence permits, and other documents; and (d) inate the consequences of the war and create conditions for to improve controls on an international level, harmonizing reconciliation and return of trust among citizens and peo- the visa regime with Schengen rules and standards, examin- ples of B&H. This would include return of refugees and dis- ing activities and financial practices of international associa- placed persons and return of their property; equal status in tions and NGOs etc., and accelerating B&H accession to employment, education, enjoyment of national and religious remaining international anti-terrorist conventions and proto- freedoms; participation in the exercise of government and all cols that have not yet been ratified. other public affairs. This would also include bringing all per- Local media and human rights organizations have not petrators of war crimes to justice. been the only critics of antiterrorist actions taken by the B&H In order to prevent the spread of terrorism, B&H leader- government. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for ship at all levels should universally condemn such criminal Human Rights (OHCHR) and representatives of the UN High acts, regardless of the nationality, ethnicity or political per- Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) criticized the suasion of the actors and victims. Organizational structures Ministerial Council's hastily prepared rush antiterrorist pack- that promote rule of law particularly those at the central state age of new or amended laws. A working group including rep- level should be strengthened, since combating terrorism and resentatives of selected embassies and heads of the OSCE, organized crime cannot be efficient if kept within the compe- OHR, UNMIBH and UNHCR drew up the package. Over tence of entities. They should be permitted to function free objections of OHCHR and UNHCR, the working group pack- of political party influence. In B&H and throughout the west- age was presented to the Ministerial Council on 17 October. ern Balkans, the large quantity of undocumented arms that The two UN agencies protested that the proposed measures are currently beyond any control should be brought under were not in accordance with international human rights stan- regular control with appropriate legislative measures. Those dards, that they violates international conventions incorpo- who continue to amass and conceal arms caches should face rated into the Constitution of B&H, and that they had been criminal prosecution and stiff penalties. All measures to pre- drafted by an ad hoc group without competence to make leg- vent and combat terrorism can only succeed if undertaken in islative proposals to the government that was properly the a framework of regional cooperation. preserve of a long-established UN working group on legal reform. Law established the B&H state border service in early

14 forum January - March 2003. CROATIA

Throughout the western Balkans, terrorism has been a tactic of war, and Croatia has been no exception. Croatia saw intense ethno-nationalist violence and terrorist activity during the period 1990 to 2001. The goal of organizers and actual perpetrators of such violence has been similar on all sides: to instill fear and insecurity among members of another ethnic or political group. As they have been used throughout the region, acts of terror have been used in Croatia to send the message that the specific victims of violence, as well as the ethnic or political group with which the victims identify or are identified, should leave their homes, places of work and the area. Terrorism in Croatia has been used for political ends to destabilize authorities with whom initia- tors of terrorist activities are dissatisfied; to obtain and maintain power; to draw support from outside territorial borders; to engage international bilateral and/or multilateral actors in condemning acts of violence or measures taken by authorities against the violence; to cause economic and social damage to certain regions or communities. As in all countries, the roots of terrorism in Croatia lie in unad- dressed sources of political and social conflict. During the period 1990 to 2001, the following causes of political and social conflict have given rise to acts of terrorism in Croatia: "Classic" terrorism

a. Underdeveloped democratic relations, processes During the period 1990-2001, Croatia experienced few and institutions; incidents of "classic" terrorism associated with actors or tar- b. Lack of resolution of problems facing national gets from outside the western Balkans. The only such act dur- minorities, particularly the Serb minority; ing the period was a car bomb attack on a police administra- c. Economic and social differences within the society; tion building in Reduce on 20 October 1995. According to d. Actions by government authorities that effectively Reuters news agency, the Egyptian organization Al-gam?a al- give impunity to organizers and perpetrators of terrorist acts; islamiya claimed responsibility for the attack, stating it was a e. Extreme nationalism; warning to Croatian authorities for the alleged abduction of f. Expansionism and desire for ethnic, territorial, eco- one of its leaders, Abu Talaat. Authorities in B&H nomic, social, religious and cultural hegemony; announced that Abdal Isendar could be extradited to Croatia, g. Religious fundamentalism; following a report that claimed Abdal Isendar was really h. Claims of retribution; Hassan Al Sharif Mohammad Sejjid, accused of planting a i. Uncontrolled access to arms; car-bomb in Rijeka in 1995 and wanted in Egypt for charges j. Unresolved border disputes and unresolved status of of terrorism. Al Sharif is allegedly a member of Al-gam?a al- certain areas; and islamiya, the Egyptian organization accused of carrying out k. Domestic and international crime interests, includ- the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. In ing trafficking in drugs and weapons. October 2000 Croatian media carried new threats from Al- gam?a al-islamiya, if the country's new, post-Tudjman author- Croatia's experience of acts of terror can be divided into ities did not uncover what happened to Abu Talaat. three categories: "classic" terrorism associated with actors or In 1991, the JNA air force shot down a European targets from outside the western Balkans, acts committed by Community helicopter over Croatian territory, resulting in armed adversaries during armed rebellion and armed con- loss of life. Media widely described this as an act of state ter- flict, and domestic terrorism. rorism. Criminal and civil charges have been brought in

January - March 2003. forum 15 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

domestic and international courts, including against the pilot tutions. Most of these acts can be attributed to ethno-nation- who brought down the helicopter, but the case has yet to be alist or political motives, but a smaller number can be classi- resolved. fied as acts with a clear organized crime background. Other Croatian courts did act in the case of two citizens accused such acts are committed for purely personal, e.g., family, pro- initially of committing an act of international terrorism for prietary, or retributive, reasons. supplying weapons and explosives from the territory of the The experience of the capital city of Zagreb at the start of Republic of Croatia to dissident factions within the Irish the conflict is illustrative of events throughout smaller cities Republican Army (IRA). The arrests resulted from a cooper- in Croatia. During the night of 7-8 December 1991, reservists ative investigation by Croatian authorities and police and of the Croatian Ministry of Interior entered the Zagreb intelligence services of the United Kingdom. The Croatian apartment of Mihaljo, Marija and 12-year-old Aleksandra court rejected charges associated with international terror- Zec, of Serb ethnicity, and murdered them. Explosive ism. The accused were instead tried for unauthorized pos- devices were detonated in front of the Jewish community session of arms and explosives. building and in the Jewish cemetery in Zagreb (19 August 1991), in front of the Museum of the Serbian Orthodox Church, in Zagreb (11 April 1992), and in front of the build- Armed rebellion and armed conflict ing of the U.S. Embassy (1 May 1992). After the explosions at the Jewish community building and the Jewish cemetery, During the period 1990-1995, acts of terror were an inte- media reported that more than 600 cars and 174 apartments gral tactic of armed rebellion and armed conflict. These were searched, identity documents of 540 people were included planting explosive devices along railroad, electric checked, and that 948 persons were questioned in the crimi- and communications lines, as well as many attacks on police nal investigation. As of this writing, none of the perpetrators checkpoints, particularly during the spring and summer of these acts has been found. months of 1991 leading up to war. In public statements, offi- At the time, Croatian media portrayed acts of terror in cials of the Ministry of Interior and members of the Croatian Zagreb as the work of the Yugoslav military intelligence serv- Sabor described attacks by extremist members of the Serb ice (KOS) or state security operatives. The speech of then- community as terrorism. So, too, did Croatia's official news Premier Franjo Greguric in the Croatian parliament (Sabor) agency, HINA. Croatian military and civilian court prosecut- was characteristic of government reactions after the attack on ed these acts under armed rebellion provisions of the crimi- the U.S. embassy. "Having lost the war," Greguric said, "the nal code. Later, after legislative acts amnestied the charge of enemy tries to inflict maximum political, economic and social armed rebellion, the charges in many cases were requalified damage, to spread a feeling of insecurity among our citizens as war crimes. From 1990 to 1996, the Ministry of Interior and discourage all those who want to come here to invest brought more than twenty thousand criminal charges, mostly their knowledge or capital or to spend their vacations. At in absentia, against persons suspected of participating in issue are state terrorism and the foulest methods of a special armed rebellion and other associated activities. State bodies war banned by all international conventions." Only in very qualified certain acts directed against the constitutional order rare circumstances did media suggest implicitly or explicitly and territorial integrity of the Croatian state as armed rebel- that acts of terror might be linked to "ultra radical" groups or lion, and only in rare cases as terrorist activity. According to individuals trying to destabilize Croatia and to demonstrate official statistics, on the territory of Croatia in the period that rule of law do not prevail in Croatia. from 17 August 1990 to 2002, authorities registered 2,279 Ten years later, however, acts of terror had not ceased in acts with attributes of terrorism, in connection with which Croatia's capital: criminal charges were submitted to competent legal bodies for suspected acts of terrorism. --On 23 November 2000, a device exploded in a trash container in Zagreb's main open market. The act was timed to Domestic terrorism coincide with the Zagreb summit that convened leaders from 24 European countries in Croatia's capital; Domestic terrorism usually takes the form of targeted killings; targeted assaults on persons; blowing up or burning --On 15 January 2001, an explosive device was planted in down houses; blowing up or burning down places where per- front of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Zagreb. A house- sons congregate socially, usually restaurants and cafes; blow- keeper found it and, not knowing what it was, threw it in a ing up or burning down businesses or shops; blowing up nearby trash container, and the bomb exploded in a city utili- vehicles; blowing up or defacing monuments, particularly ty company truck several hours later. This attack was not those dedicated to WWII antifascist forces; blowing up or revealed to the public. defacing places of worship; disrupting communications; and acts of violence directed against government and public insti- --On the evening of 1 February 2001, a five-six kilogram

16 forum January - March 2003. Croatia must now undertake a great effort to address the issue of impunity for acts of terror. Efforts to prevent and sanction terrorist activities were modest and inefficient, particularly after the end of the war in 1995, when a large number of terrorist attacks on civilians and their proper- device on a slow-burning fuse was detonated in Mirogoj ty took place. Government institutions with the jurisdiction to cemetery at the monument to WWII antifascist national act, including the legislature, took little or no action and heroes. The event drew great media attention. addressed only a very narrow spectrum of terrorist activity. From 1990 to 2001, prosecutors and courts rarely qualified --On 15 March 2001, another trash container explosion in acts of terror under provisions governing terrorism. Instead, downtown Zagreb, this time in front of City Hall, caused con- acts of terror such as blowing up homes and businesses were siderable material damage and destroyed five cars parked on qualified predominantly as "generally dangerous activities". Trg Stjepana Radica. Some were requalified further as perpetrated in connection with acts of general and organized crime. Not until after the Reacting to these events, Zagreb media criticized the death of Franjo Tudjman and the defeat of the HDZ-con- work of the police, pointing out that police had no informa- trolled government in 2000 did the Croatian Ministry of tion on other potential terrorists groups in Croatia and that Interior take steps to resolve certain "booby trap" cases. In no information is available on the circulation, type and quan- early 2001, Croatian Minister of the Interior Simo Lucin tity of explosives freely available in Croatia. observed that police had just resolved 13 cases of mines and explosives planted in the Lika-Senj region from 1996 to 1998. In August 2000, an act of terror outside Zagreb reverber- Six persons lost their lives in the incidents. ated in the nation's capital and throughout the Republic of Victims of acts of terror in Croatia also regularly encoun- Croatia. On 28 August 2000, in Gospic, Milan Levar, a pro- tered legal and administrative obstacles when seeking com- tected witness cooperating with the ICTY , was killed when pensation provided by law for damages caused by acts of ter- he activated a bomb planted in his car parked in his own yard. ror and even when seeking payment from an insurance com- Although police suspected that one of those responsible was pany. Recent decisions by the European Court of Human arrested with the "Gospic group", no indictment has been Rights and the Croatian Constitutional Court address these brought in Lever's death. obstacles. Article 180 of the Law on Obligations allowed civil claims The availability of and ease of access to explosive devices for compensation for personal injury and damage to residen- throughout the western Balkans has presented special prob- tial, nonresidential and movable property caused by "terrorist lems in Croatia and B&H. Throughout the war and immedi- acts" that state authorities were responsible for preventing. ate postwar years, hand grenades and antipersonnel mines During and after the conflict, a significant number of proper- were widely available at low cost. Combatants did not reveal ties in Croatia were damaged by acts of violence or terror. the exact location of mines laid by paramilitary adversaries; These properties, mostly owned by Serbs, were located out- these remain an obstacle to return of all refugees and IDPs side the conflict zone in cities and villages. Although in many and to the resumption of economic life. Mines, explosive instances the police had completed a report, no proper inves- devices and other "booby traps" continue to be set in Croatia, tigation was conducted to identify the "unknown perpetra- as in B&H, to prevent the return of refugees and IDPs. The tors" of the violence or terror. On 17 January 1996, the Croatian Helsinki Committee reported that on the territory of Croatian Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Vojnic, for example, mine attacks on returning Serb refugees Obligations that repealed Article 180 and suspended all pro- occurred on 10 August 2001, 2 October 2001 and 20 ceedings until enactment of new legislation on the subject. October 2001. The perpetrators of these acts have not been The amendments also stated that before the enactment of brought to justice. such new legislation damages for terrorist acts could not be

January - March 2003. forum 17 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

sought. At the same time, the amendments suspended all activity: court cases, including some in which verdicts had been ren- dered awarding damages for claims that were brought under --Penal Code of the Republic of Croatia ; Article 180. --Law on Taking Over the Penal Code of the SFRY ; On 1 March 2002, the European Court of Human Rights --Law on amending the Law on Taking Over the Penal issued a decision in Kutic v. Croatia, establishing that Code of the SFRY ; Parliament's 1996 suspension of Article 180 proceedings and --Law on Criminal Acts of Subversive and Terrorist its failure to adopt new legislation violated the right to access Actions against State Sovereignty and the Territorial Integrity to court. Vojin and Ana Kutic brought their case to the of the Republic of Croatia ; European Court of Human Rights in 1999. Their case con- --Basic Penal Law ; cerned two sets of civil proceedings related to explosions that --Penal Law of the Republic of Croatia ; and destroyed their property, one on 26 December 1991 that --Penal Law of the Republic of Croatia. destroyed their house in Martinec and another, on 13 November 1994, that destroyed their garage, an the adjacent In the Penal Code and Basic Penal Code in force from storage room and a meat-curing shed in Bjelovar. 1990 until 1997, terrorism was included in two articles. In 1999, the Croatian parliament again amended the Law Under the Penal Code, Article 236, "Terrorism" read as fol- on Obligations to suspend proceedings under the law for lows: A person who, intending to threaten the constitutional- compensation for damages caused by army and police. The ly established state order and the social establishment or the amendments provided that new legislation would be adopted security of the Republic of Croatia, effectuates an explosion in six months, but such legislation has not been enacted. In or fire, or undertakes another general dangerous action, or 1997, the Jorgic family initiated two separate lawsuits on the an act of violence that creates a feeling of insecurity of the cit- basis of the Law on Obligations, seeking damages from the izens, will be sentenced to prison for at least three years. Republic of Croatia for their possessions and their destroyed property. In May 2002, the European Court of Human Under the General Penal Code, Article 155, Rights issued a partial admissibility decision in Jorgic v. "International Terrorism" read as follows: Croatia. On 11 July 2002, the Constitutional Court of the Republic (1) A person who, intending to inflict damage to a for- of Croatia ordered damages in the amount of 4,500 HRK eign country, liberation movement or international organiza- (approximately 620.00) and directed the Municipal Court tion, abducts a person or perpetrates another form of vio- of Split to issue within six months a decision in the case of an lence, effectuates an explosion or fire, or through a generally applicant whose house near Split was destroyed by a mine dangerous action or generally dangerous means produces explosion on 11 July 1991, exactly eleven years earlier. The danger to the lives of people and property of great value, will applicant, a former judge who was reportedly dismissed from be sentenced to prison for at least one year. the Split Municipal Court in 1991, filed a complaint in March 1994 for payment on her insurance policy. Despite a number (2) If, as a consequence of an act under subsection 1 of of attempts to continue the proceedings, the only hearing was this Article, death of one or more persons results, the perpe- held in March 1995, after which no further action was taken. trator will be sentenced to prison for at least five years. The applicant submitted a constitutional complaint in April 2002, claiming a violation of her right to fair trial within a rea- (3) If, during commission of an act under subsection 1 sonable period in light of the more than eight-year delay in of this Article, a person is deliberately killed, the perpetrator obtaining a decision from the court in Split. The Municipal will be sentenced to prison for at least twenty years. Court of Split failed to answer the Constitutional Court's first request for a response to the applicant's complaint, respond- (4) Bringing criminal charges under this Article is to be ing only upon a second request. In reaching its decision, the undertaken upon approval of the Public Prosecutor of the Constitutional Court referred to the fair trial provisions of the Republic of Croatia. Croatian Constitution and the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Under the prevailing Criminal Code, terrorism is addressed in the following provisions: Article 141, "Anti-state terrorism". If a person with inten- Legal framework tion to disrupt the constitutional order or security of the Republic of Croatia effectuates an explosion or fire, or by a The legal framework to address acts of terror has changed generally dangerous action or means produces danger to the significantly over the period 1990 to the present. The follow- lives of people or to property, or abducts a person or perpe- ing laws currently regulate terrorism and counterterrorist trates another form of violence in the territory of the Republic

18 forum January - March 2003. of Croatia or against its citizens, and by this creates a feeling President Franjo Tudjman, particularly because state broad- of personal insecurity among its citizens, he or she will be sen- cast media frequently reuse old video clips and replay old tenced to prison for at least three years. voiceovers. International terrorism has been and still is occa- This article is essentially identical to the earlier provision, sionally portrayed as an ideology. As in the FRY and B&H, except that it stresses the consequences of criminal acts: a Croatian media today are coping with the legacy of media ter- feeling of personal insecurity among Croatia's citizens. In ror that relied on hate speech, total control of information, addition, the danger to life and property must be real and physical blockade of alternative sources, and spreading disin- must affect at least two persons. formation. A common theme in Croatian media is that certain ter- Article 169, "International Terrorism", differs from Article rorist acts support the approach of those authorities and 141 in that it addresses the security of foreign interests: political forces who favor solving society's problems through violence and repressive measures, instead of through political (1) A person who, with the goal of inflicting harm to a for- means. What changes over the period from 1990 to the pres- eign country or an international organization, effectuates an ent is media identification of which authorities and political explosion or fire, or through a generally dangerous action or forces favor that approach and to what end. Media have also means produces danger to the lives of people and property, strongly criticized specifically the Ministry of the Interior for or abducts a person, or perpetrates another form of violence, not reacting properly to prevent terrorist acts. Croatia's sev- will be sentenced to prison for at least three years. eral intelligence agencies, however, have not come under similar media criticism. (2) If the perpetrator in committing a criminal act under Media did not contemporaneously report the many acts of subsection 1 of this Article deliberately causes the death of individual or collective terror that occurred during and par- one or more persons, he or she will be sentenced to prison for ticularly after the 1995 armed operations "Flash" (Bljesak) at least ten years, or for a long-term sentence. and "Storm" (Oluja). In most media, stories that have appeared subsequently on some acts of terror from this peri- (3) If, through a criminal act under subsection 1 of this od characterize them as acts of common criminality commit- Article, death of one or more person is caused, or great dem- ted by individuals. olition produced, the perpetrator will be sentenced to prison for at least five years. Reaction after 11 September 2001 (4) Approval of the State Attorney of the Republic of Croatia is necessary to begin criminal proceedings for acts Immediately after the events of 11 September 2001, under this Article President Stipe Mesic in a televised statement said that "It was not just the United States of America that was attacked, but Article 5 of the Law on Criminal Acts of Subversive and the whole democratic and civilized world." Croatian Prime Terrorist Actions against State Sovereignty and the Territorial Minister Ivica Racan and members of the government signed Integrity of the Republic of Croatia, enacted 4 September the book of condolences opened in the Society for Croatian- 1992, reads as follows: A person who through a terrorist act American Friendship. On the occasion, Racan observed, "We threatens peace and security of the citizens of or the state sta- in Croatia know only too well how difficult it is to be exposed bility of the Republic of Croatia, will be sentenced to prison to terrorism and aggression and what it is like to face their dif- for at least five years, up to twenty years. ficult consequences." Following the example of the European Union, the government of Croatia proclaimed 14 September 2001 a day of mourning. In the immediate wake of the Approach of media attacks in the U.S., Croatian authorities heightened border controls and security at embassies and consulates. A govern- Croatian media have dedicated a great deal of tabloid- mental crisis headquarters was formed, headed by then- style coverage to the notion of terrorism and have used the Deputy Prime Minister Goran Granic. term "terrorist" indiscriminately. Media in Croatia have por- Croatian media regularly reported on events connected trayed terrorism in peacetime as a doctrine and during con- with 11 September 2000. Media carried statements of lead- flict as a standard means of warfare of Croatia's "enemies". ing Croatian political and public figures, as well as interviews, With the administration of President Stipe Mesic, and partic- comments, analyses, statistics and polls. Some newspaper ularly in the vocabulary of the president himself, this language polls cited an increasing degree of intolerance of Croats has modified in some media. However, when media today toward Bosniaks. Media carried allegations that collabora- refer to Croatia's war years, it is not uncommon for them to tors of Osama bin Laden were active in Croatia during the lapse into terminology that was standard during the regime of war in B&H, when several humanitarian organizations were

January - March 2003. forum 19 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

active in the country, and when arms from Islamic countries over the western part of its territory. By creating the impres- were smuggled to B&H via Croatia. sion that Macedonia is (re) definable, these debates have From the reaction of Croatian authorities and media opin- served the interest of nationalist, extremist and antidemocra- ion makers to the events of 11 September 11, it was clear that tic forces within Macedonia, many of who have shown a they were concerned to strengthen Croatia's ties to western repeated willingness to use violence, repression and terror. Europe and to prevent western opinion makers from placing At this writing, in the weeks leading up to national elections Croatia in the same company as its Balkan neighbors. approach, several acts of terror per week have been shaking the foundations of Macedonian social and political stability. The Preamble of the Constitution defines Macedonia as a MACEDONIA "national state of Macedonian people that provides for full equality of citizens, as well as permanent coexistence of the Macedonia is the only component of the former SFRY to Macedonian people with Albanians, Turks, Wallachians, have obtained its independence without war. The Roma and other national groups living in the Republic of Macedonian people are dominant with 66%, than the Macedonia". The Constitution stipulates that the Macedonian Albanian minority with 23% and the rest of the minorities: language and its Cyrillic alphabet are in official use and pro- Turks with 3,9%, Roma with 2,3%, Serbs with 1,9%, Vlach vides for official use of minority languages in those areas With 0,4% and others with 2%. By religion: Macedonian peo- where national minorities make up the majority of the popu- ple as Ortodox Christian consist the majority of the popula- lation. Article 78 allows for creating, in accordance with the tion, the Islamic religious community is on the second place parliament, a Council for Interethnic Relations that has an according the number of population, then follows the advisory function. The constitution provides protection of Catholic and some other 30 smaller religious communities. ethnic, cultural, language and religious identity of national Macedonia has shown divisive signs of political strife at vari- minorities, including government support for education in ous times since its independence, particularly within its minority languages in secondary schools. In practice, howev- Albanian and Macedonian communities, but it has also er, freedom of expression and association for Albanians and enjoyed long periods of resilience and stability. Relations other minority groups is limited. Obtaining citizenship is dif- between the Macedonian and Albanian communities have ficult as well, since it is conditioned by 15 years' residence in been delicate. Preoccupied with developments in other parts Macedonia. of the Balkans, international actors paid little attention to This report cannot examine the historical scope and use Macedonia. With few exceptions, little international effort of terrorism in post-WWII Macedonian history. In the past was devoted to shoring up a positive factor in regional stabil- decade, however, two periods stand out in particular until ity and democracy. International actors paid little attention 2001, when Macedonia saw widespread acts of terror by even as troubling signs emerged in Macedonia's presidential paramilitary organizations. The first period coincides with and municipal election campaigns of autumn 1999 and the recruitment and activity of paramilitary groups and autumn 2000, respectively. Both campaigns saw an upsurge armies throughout SFRY/FRY, Croatia and B&H. In 1992, of nationalist rhetoric and, on Election Day in September Macedonia experienced great internal and external tensions. 2000, polling-place shootings claimed one life and injured In early February 1992, 10,000 Serbs, mostly from several others. The election observers of the OSCE/ODIHR Kumanovo, organized a peaceful protest led by the duly reported the violence that, with one exception, occurred LC/Movement for Yugoslavia against Macedonia's decision in predominantly Albanian municipalities. However, not not to remain in the SFRY. Tensions were exacerbated, with until acts of interethnic violence and terror in Macedonia in help from Serbia, when on 14 February 1992 the ultrana- early 2001 did international decision makers act to curb a tionalist Serbian Radical Party and Serbian "Chetnik" conflict that threatens to destabilize the entire southern Movement blocked the entrance to the Yugoslav Peoples Balkans. Army (JNA) headquarters in Vranje, Serbia, demanding that Aspects of Macedonian ethnicity and state sovereignty are the JNA protect Serbs in Skopje and Kumanovo. On 3 April debated openly and, in one case, officially in several of 1992, a group of Albanian activists proclaimed the "Republic Macedonia's neighboring states. Persisting in academic and of Albania in Yugoslavia - Illyria", and the Macedonian media discourse, these debates fuel a perception that Ministry of the Interior reacted by banning such political Macedonia, despite nearly ten years of international recogni- activity and closing the border to Kosovo. Four Albanians tion. The government of Greece officially disputes the coun- were killed and several wounded on 6 November 1992, dur- try's right to the name "Macedonia". Many in Bulgaria believe ing an intervention of the Macedonian police; thousands of that the majority population of Macedonia is of Bulgarian Albanians protested against the police action. That year spe- ethnic origin and speaks a dialect of the Bulgarian language. cial units of the Macedonian police sealed the Greek and Media in Pristina, Tirana and within Macedonia itself have Albanian borders to stop the flow of arms intended for Serbia disputed the fact and/or the nature of Macedonian control and Kosovo.

20 forum January - March 2003. The second period focuses on an event: on 3 October Acts of terror against civilians are also ascribed to the 1995, President Kiro Gligorov survived a car bomb assassi- "Lions", a paramilitary unit that ran recruiting advertisements nation attempt. Seven years later, the investigation still has on Macedonian state television, occupying the time slot not yielded results. The pace and intensity of investigation has immediately after the major evening news broadcast. It is varied over time. It was last renewed after 1998 parliamen- argued, but not officially established, that the Lions are para- tary elections, when the new government offered a reward of military members of the political party VMRO-DPMNE. one million DEM for information leading to the arrest and According to the Interior Minister Boskovski, the Lions have conviction of perpetrators. The offer has not seen results. a "legal framework" as reservist police forces. Macedonian The conduct of the Gligorov investigation has itself become a President Boris Trajkovski demanded disbanding of the matter of political controversy. In early April 2002, the Lions" as well. Media reports also have alleged that merce- Municipal Public Prosecutor`s Office of Skopje initiated an naries from Serbia and Slovakia fought with Macedonian investigative order against former Interior Minister, Ljubomir state forces. Frckovski, and several of his associates for suspected corrup- The official White Book: Terrorism of the NLA, pub- tion and abuse of authority in connection with obstructing lished by the Ministry of Interior the Republic of Macedonia investigation of the attempted assassination. in 2002, cites the following as consequences of terrorist activ- The third period covers numerous attacks on the police ity through August 2001: 15 police officials killed, 43 sol- stations as well as some other public institutions (in Skopje, diers and military officers killed, 150 police officials wound- Kumanovo, Prilep, Kichevo, Tetovo…) The responsibility for ed, 119 soldiers and military officers wounded, 10 civilians the attacs took various albanian groups under the name of killed, 75 civilians wounded, 20 persons abducted and miss- KLA, NLA… ing. However, according to more recent data from the Macedonian government, 148 persons were abducted during the armed conflict, and nothing is still known of 12 of them. Violence against civilians No statistics are officially available on armed Albanian para- militaries killed, wounded or unaccounted for during the con- The start of armed activity in Macedonia in 2001 resem- flict. bled the start of armed activity in other Balkan conflicts. In February 2001 in Tanushevci, (small vilage on the "Spillover" Macedonian-Yugoslavian border), the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Macedonia was affected by an armed agres- Politicians, experts, analysts, diplomats and media have sion from Albanian terrorists. That happened at the time offered two interpretations of the events of 2001. when the ruling macedonian-albanian coalition announced According to one interpretation, terrorism in Macedonia that there is a state of relaxed inter-ethnic relations in the was imported from Kosovo and southern Serbia, i.e., these country, and right after the Association and Stabilization crises "spilled over" into Macedonian territory. Who exactly Agreement with EU was signed. Like the other conflicts, "spilled over" and why is open to debate. In comparison to Macedonia's experience has been called "civil war", "ethnic its escalation over a long period time in Kosovo, where acts war", "ethnic conflict", "internal conflict", "struggle for human of targeted violence took place over many years, contempo- rights", "conflict with mafia and organized crime", "imported rary terrorism in Macedonia appeared relatively suddenly. terrorism", "rebellion", and "guerrilla warfare". Regardless of Many domestic and international observers cite as the major its classification, the violence in Macedonia - as in other parts contributing factor the failure of the UN and KFOR to curb of the western Balkans -- has been directed against civilians: extremism, prosecute crime and control the borders of terrorist organizations acted to create ethnically "clean" terri- Kosovo. tory. Similarities in tactics used in Kosovo, southern Serbia and The U.S. Department of State Annual Report on Human Macedonia support "spillover" arguments. So, too, did the Rights in Macedonia (2001, international observers from the appearance of cross-border coordination, such as the EU, NATO, and OSCE, and the Helsinki Committee of February 2001 violence in the village of Tanusevci. KFOR Macedonia all cited excessive use of violence toward citizens made several highly publicized arrests in the border region, of Albanian ethnicity. Killings in the village of Ljuboten, confirming the cross-border nature of the crisis. There were where citizens of Albanian ethnicity were victims, have been also similarities in demands of Albanian insurgents in south- ascribed to paramilitary activity. At the request of the ICTY ern Serbia and Macedonia. In both areas, differences and and a special commission of the European Union, exhuma- occasional open tension characterized the relationship tion of gravesites in this village was undertaken. The U.S. between armed Albanian extremists and members of the Department of State report also specifically noted that the Albanian political elite. ONA expelled thousands of ethnic Macedonians from their homes from the northern and western parts of Macedonia. Other causal factors support a "spillover" approach.

January - March 2003. forum 21 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

There is no consensus for a democratic, multiethnic move- speculation, but the timing is not: difficult negotiations ment within Macedonia or southern Serbia or Kosovo. As among all actors in the Macedonian crisis were in progress. result, nationalist movements, including pan-Albanianism, Moreover, the absence of unanimity among international are not challenged effectively in political and social life. actors on the role of armed Albanian actors was clear, and the Insufficient attention has been devoted to education through- relationship between international envoys and Macedonian out the southern Balkans, and young people have few oppor- government officials was frequently explosive to the point of tunities for employment, professional training or other pro- highly publicized scandal. On 13 August 2001, the compro- grams that can broaden their horizons. Centralized power mise Framework ("Ohrid") Agreement was signed. The has impeded realization of local interests and, thus, conflict agreement was effectively a letter of intent, as many issues prevention. The many international and regional actors pres- remained to be resolved or confirmed within the Macedonian ent in the Balkans disagree openly - and vie with each other parliament. *With Ohrid Agreement the minorities are on the ground -- on security and political issues, including on named as "communities". The Preamble of the Constitution the status and tasks of the NATO presence in the region. The has been also redefined in the part related to the minorities: north-south disparities in Albania and how these affect its "Albanians, Turks, Roma, Serbs, Vlach and Bosniaks are political stability have not been adequately addressed. And, defined as parts of peoples". After the Ohrid agreement the perhaps most importantly, there is no international or region- Constution changes are as follows: Instead of the Council of al dialogue on the Kosovo status question. interethnic relations there is a Committee, which has a different status from the Council, in the part of decision making of the Parliament on the issues related to the ethnic communi- Internal matter ties (there are mechanisms that do not allow over voting…) Less than a month later, the crisis engendered by the It has also been argued that the recent crisis is Macedonia events of 9 September 2001 threatened to disrupt the agree- is purely an internal matter. Albanian actors note that the ments reached in Macedonia. Macedonia's recent history of conflict is a product of their frustrations as second-rate citi- crisis, its infant Framework Agreement and the presence (as zens, and that NLA has insignificant links to the KLA. in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) of NATO forces made Albanian actors demanded to be recognized as a constitutive the country particularly vulnerable to real or perceived nation of the Republic of Macedonia and that their language threats of infiltration by terrorist networks. As in other parts be accepted as an official language in Parliament and public of the western Balkans, the rhetoric of international "war administration. They demanded the right to higher education against terrorism" was rife for appropriation and potential in their own language and proportional representation in the exploitation. On 17 September 2001, the Macedonian bureaucracy, courts and especially the police. They called for Parliament adopted a declaration against terrorism, express- an end to harassment and abuses by police and for increased ing solidarity with the American people and declaring that local self-government. These, it is claimed, are problems of Macedonia had been a victim of terrorism during the previ- the Macedonian state that have no relationship to crises in ous seven months. Stojan Andov, president of the parlia- Kosovo or in southern Serbia. ment, proposed a "regional anti-terrorist pact"; the proposal was deemed inflammatory and not supported by the ethnic Albanian political parties in the Macedonian parliament. Mixed messages In the wake of 9 September, certain politicians and Macedonian-language media alleged that the NLA cooperated Before and after the events of 9 September 2001, with Osama bin Laden in training and financing acts of terror Macedonia has been receiving mixed messages from the inter- and that mujahedeen were active in the NLA and responsible national community that complicate an already complex cri- for crimes against Macedonian forces in the village of Vejce. On sis. On 27 June 2001, a U.S. executive order banned transfer, 6 October 2001, Macedonian television suggested that an ethnic payments, export, withdrawal or other actions concerning the Albanian attempted to kill Prime Minister Georgijevski using a property or interests of persons involved in violent and car filled with explosive. International and domestic analysts obstructive activities. The U.S. government has also prohib- suggested that police and security services were "planting" sto- ited entry to the U.S. by persons who actively prevent imple- ries in certain media. U.S. officials in Skopje claim there are no mentation of the Dayton Peace Accord and UN Security proofs linking fractions of Macedonian Albanians with bin Council Res. 1244 or in some other way attempt to disrupt Laden, while U.S. envoy James Perdew and the U.S. ambassa- the peace and stability in the region, as well as by persons dor to Macedonia said on 19 September 2001 that they were responsible for war crimes executed in the region since 1991. appalled by the attempt to "make use of the American tragedy" Seven persons from Macedonia are on the list of prohibited to undercut the commitments made in the Ohrid agreement. EU persons, as is the NLA as an organization. The reason for and NATO officials supported the U.S. position and warned issuance of the U.S. executive order at that time is a matter of Macedonians not to use those events as an excuse to delay

22 forum January - March 2003. adopting constitutional changes. In October 2001, President Boris Trajkovski told the Conference on Euro-Atlantic Security meeting in Sofia that the "war against terrorism" was evidence of a double standard in the West, since it did not include action against the NLA.

Legal provisions

Macedonia has no special legislation dealing with terrorism. In the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia, a criminal act of terrorism is defined as follows in Article 313: "The person aiming to endanger the order or security of the Republic of Macedonia, who causes or seriously threatens to cause an explosion, fire, flood, or other social activity or an act of violence, creating a feeling of insecurity or fear with the citizens, will be sentenced to prison for at least three years." Other provisions linked to this are Article 307, Jeopardizing Territorial Integrity; Article 312, Armed Rebellion; Article 314, Sabotage; Article 318, Espousing Violent Change of the Constitutional Order; Article 319, Causing National, Religious and Racial Hatred, Division and Intolerance; Article 320, Violation of Territorial Integrity; Article 323, Aiding the Enemy; Article 324, Associating for the Purpose of Antistate Activity; Article 403, Genocide; Article 407, Use of Illegitimate Means for Struggle; Article 406, Crimes against example, in summer 1992, in Pljevlja, at the north of Prisoners of War; Article 405, Crimes against Wounded and Montenegro, there were several cases of bombing or planting Ill Persons; Article 404, Crimes against Civilians. of explosive devices to buildings owned by respected Within the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Moslems, or to Islamic religious facilities, with the aim of Interior, newly formed units are being trained to combat ter- causing fear and panic of the members of those groups, and rorism, including how to contend with inaccessible terrain thus provoking them to leave Montenegro. Executors, it and how to deal with guerrilla activity in urban, densely pop- seems, belonged to the political group that supported the war ulated environments. in B&H and creation of Serbia in ethnically clean territories.

A well-known case is also the one when members of an extreme nationalist party, Serbian Radical Party, organized "blockage" of Pljevlja, which threatened to turn into a prob- MONTENEGRO lem of wider proportions. This event occurred in August 1992, after an informative interview with the Cetnicks major All acts that could be included in the category of terrorism Ceko Dacevic in the police premises in Pljevlja. While the in Montenegro, in the period 1991 - 1995, were connected police interviewed Dacevic, cca 800 to 900 citizens blocked with the wars, primarily in B&H, i.e., for the concepts and the whole town, all entrances to the town, and placed armed goals that inspired wars in the territories of the former ambush. Dacevic was released under the pressure, and the Yugoslavia. Targets of attacks were independent media. passions calmed down. However, several days later, when the These were bomb attacks on the head office of the most police tried to remove from office and punish those responsi- famous Montenegrin independent weekly, "Monitor", which ble for the inefficient and unprofessional behavior, the town criticized war events, pointing to persons and political struc- was blocked again. Barricades were placed, Post Office tures that created or helped wars in the territory of the former seized, as well as the Town Hall, the relay transmitter, Electric Yugoslavia. An explosive device was planted onto the door of Power Utility building and the petrol station, in a word, all the the flat of the independent journalist Velibor Covic, former most important facilities in the town. Soldiers of the famous editor of JUTEL. For this act as well, although executors have nationalist and president of Cainica municipality, Dusko not been found, motives and messages may be found with Kornjaca, arrived to offer help to Dacevic. Police was power- great certainty, for concrete subjects, as well as for the whole less. The Pljevlja crisis was resolved in the night of September antiwar oriented public. 22, when Montenegrin police, in a quick action, arrested Individuals of Islamic religion were attacked as well. For Dacevic and several of his collaborators. Still, at the time of

January - March 2003. forum 23 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

the "rule" of the Cetnicks` major Dacevic, in the night elections or boiling political events, when important decisions between August 26 and 27, there was an explosion in the for the future of Montenegro were to be brought. craftsmen centre, in the shop of Bosniak Dzemal Dizdar, For Montenegro in this period unsolved murders of pub- while in the fire that followed seven shops of his fellow nation- lic characters from the state establishment were characteris- als were burnt down. Armed rebellion was crushed, but polit- tic. The first of such murders was the assassination of Goran ical ideas and their creators and executors continued their Zugic, security advisor of the President of the Republic of activities. As soon as September 23, explosive was thrown on Montenegro. The victim was also a high ranking officer of the the shop of Enes Hekal for the second time. The extremists state security, who was extremely well informed on the most believed that terrorism, although war activities could not be confidential secrets related to the security of Montenegro, brought into the territory of Montenegro, were the best way especially at the time of the NATO attack on FRY. He was to realize political goals. murdered in front of the building where he lived, in a highly In this period terrorist activities were characterized by the professional manner, with no traces left behind. Investigation fact that their target was a certain ethnic community or polit- has not yet discovered any part of this crime. According to ical group; even when acts were aimed against individuals, consequences it provoked in the public, and the time of exe- the message was meant for a larger group of people, even a cution, about ten days before the extremely important local whole ethnic community, or a number of these communities. elections in the capital of Montenegro, Podgorica, this act These activities were under a strong impact of the war in could be characterized as a terrorist act. B&H. Assassination of a high-ranking official of the state securi- The second cycle of violent actions with characteristics of ty, Darko Raspopovic, alias Beli, belongs to this type of assas- terrorism started in January 1998. The political process of sinations. The assassination was executed a couple of days separating from Milosevic`s politics started after the victory after the New Year's celebration of 2001, in the centre of of Djukanović at presidential elections, in October 1997, Podgorica, in early evening hours and in front of the passers- induced a change of the goals of terrorist attacks. In fact, dur- by. The manner of execution indicates a high professionalism ing that period, extreme Milosevic`s followers used violence and calmness of the executor, who managed to leave the as well as legitimate means of political struggle. On January scene of the crime undisturbed, and to disappear in unknown 12, 1998, three days before the presidential inauguration of direction. Investigation did not come up to much, nor was the Djukanovic, his political opponent, Momir Bulatovic, with his assassinator identified, and it is believed this was a paid pro- party followers, extremists and the Bozidar Bojovic`s group, fessional killer. organized a "Great popular meeting", at 5 to 12 a.m. in front of the Montenegrin Parliament. The goal was to gather as As in other countries, in Montenegro as well terrorist many sympathizers as possible and to prevent taking over of attacks on New York and Washington presented a test of its power, to introduce the state of emergency in Montenegro, kind. It so happened that the Montenegrin President with the intention to secure basis for intervention of the Djukanovic received the President of FRY, Vojislav Yugoslav Army. The meeting ended in the evening of January Kostunica, in Podgorica at that very day, September 11, 2001. 14, when, according to estimates of the organizers, a deter- The two politicians discussed the possibility of spreading of mined action was to begin. Bulatovic called on the people terrorism from Kosovo into Serbia and Montenegro. present to walk in front of the Montenegrin Government Speaking about the danger of the Albanian terrorism, building, with him on their head. The gathered people shout- Kostunica stressed "all that is happening in our immediate ed: "We want arms!" It was obvious that Podgorica was on the neighborhood in recent months causes concern and points to brink of horror. Around 6.5 p.m., in front of the building of the danger of spreading of terrorism from Kosovo to the rest the Government a close contact occurred of the protesters of Yugoslavia". Djukanovic said that Kosovo was "the central trying to enter the building, where Montenegrin leadership security issue in the Balkans", but stressed "Montenegro was at the time, and the police protecting the entrance to the passed the exam in multi-ethnic stability during the recent building, when the crowd began throwing stones on police- period of tumults in the Balkans". Still, "in spite of the high men. A "stun grenade", which only special units should have level of good relations with the Albanians living in according to the law, was thrown into the building, and then Montenegro, we cannot deny the possibility for some of the protesters fired bullets with tear-gas from "chemical" rifles. extremists in the region, outside Montenegro, to want to Police forces pushed the protesters away, which prevented the ensure that the crisis in the region continues with involving attempt of a coup d`etat. Then the protesters turned to anoth- Montenegro as well " (ICG, 2001: 25). That same day er type of violence, throwing a bomb and wounding 50 police- President Djukanovic sent a telegram to the American men. President George W. Bush, with "deepest expresses of condo- After these events, several explosive devices were planted lences on behalf of the Government of Montenegro, its citi- under cars of high police officials. For all these actions a joint zens and on his own behalf, after today's hard events caused denominator was that they were undertaken at the time of by an insane terrorist activity". He also expressed "undoubted

24 forum January - March 2003. readiness of Montenegro, within the lim- its of its capabilities, to join the forces, led by the USA, that declared war to international terrorism". Following the example of the EU, Montenegrin Government declared September 14, 2001 as a Mourning Day. (ICG, 2001: 25, 26).

Attacks on America were not a subject of interest of the public and the media in Montenegro for long. The fact that there were no anti- Moslem views in the main Montenegrin media distinguishes Montenegro a lot from the majority of European states, and speaks of relatively stable ethnic relations in Montenegro itself. The attacks on the USA offered food for pro- Yugoslav media that had for months warned of the danger from spreading of Albanian terrorism flation in history, high corruption and criminalization of soci- into Montenegro. Such spreading of fear found its reflection ety; in the report of the Russian newspaper agency ITAR-TASS, - Permanent ideological, political and ethnic conflicts in which claimed that people close to Osama bin Laden trained the country; "Albanian terrorists" in a camp near the border of Kosovo and - Change of cultural patterns and recognized moral and southern Serbia, and that, beside Kosovo, terrorist actions social norms of life, including a high degree of intolerance were planned for Montenegro as well. (ICG, 2001: 26). and violence; Trying to improve the capability of the state for anti-ter- - Establishment of Milosevic's dictatorship hidden behind rorist activities, Interior Ministry of Montenegro formed a the underdeveloped multi-party system and presidential special unit for fighting terrorism, whose training is support- authority; end of Milosevic's dictatorship caused by rising of ed by the instructors from the EU, i.e., NATO. The impres- citizens, electoral defeat followed by a coup d'etat, when sion is that the Government of Montenegro recognizes the those considered as a violent segment of society joined the significance of the international cooperation in struggle opposition and majority of citizens on October 5, 2000. against terrorism, which is frequently connected with other This was a period of raising Serbian question openly in serious forms of crime. In that sense, a proposal is important public, unlike during the time of the former Yugoslavia when for the alteration of the Criminal Law of the Republic of this issue was latently mentioned. The answer to this question Montenegro to include the criminal act of terrorism and inter- has not been found yet. The main reason for that is ethno- national terrorism. The Government of Montenegro has nationalist orchestration and manipulation with the Serbian passed the Law on July 2002 regarding the agency for nation- question. The new elite was a factor of orchestration and al security, allowing a possibility of using advanced technical manipulation, established mainly from members of former means for discovering of terrorism, to narrow the limitations middle class and segments of old political, business and intel- regarding the violation of the right to inviolability of corre- lectual elite transforming from communist into nationalist spondence and confidentiality of telephone conversations. form. The aspiration of Serbian leadership to establish "national sovereignty" and structure Serbia as a unitary centralized SERBIA state was viewed by other republics and ethnic communities as reawakening of Serbian hegemony, and they searched for The period from 1987 to 2002 was one of the most tur- the defense in developing anti-Serbian alliance. Serbia and bulent periods on the Serbian political scene. During that Serbian ethnic community responded by stronger claims time the following events occurred: about Serbs living outside Serbia being endangered. The idea - End of Communism; of "being concerned about Serbs" triggered hatred, state vio- - Breakup of the former Yugoslavia; lence and armed conflicts that resulted in war. For that rea- - Wars with Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH as most influential son, a big part of the Serbian public viewed the wars as "lib- factors, armed conflicts in its territory (Kosovo and southern eration movement of Serbian people", and any disagreement Serbia), and placing Kosovo under the international protec- was characterized as terrorism, secession or treason. The torate; international public mainly viewed the same wars as "Serbian - Forming and breakup of the Rump-Yugoslavia compris- aggression". ing Serbia and Montenegro; One of the features of Serbia is that a high degree of vari- - OUN and EU sanctions; international isolation of Serbia ous ethnic communities live in the same areas, the same city, ended by NATO air strike; and the same municipality. A special weight to this issue is - Economic decline going along with the highest hyperin- given by territorial concentration of the most numerous

January - March 2003. forum 25 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

minorities in border areas. On their part, minorities manifest marked ethno homogenization, and more numerous and influential minorities (the Albanian, Hungarian and Bosniak ones) put up their requests for political-territorial independence or autonomy. Prospects for democracy in Serbia are directly related to successful solution or directing of stubborn ethnic conflicts, and within this, to solution of the question of the minority status and guaranteeing of their rights. The largest burden shall bear government and the Majority in this respect. Terrorism has been one of the biggest public safety issues in the Republic of Serbia for decades. In the first place, it is the terrorism generated by Albanian extremism, politically linked with the extreme part of Albanian political emigrants, who chose violence (abductions, assassinations, armed attacks on non- Albanian citizens and members of Serbian police, etc.) as a tool for achiev- ing their political goals. The main goal is independent Kosovo. The Albanian terrorism has some ele- announced in the press that Bosniak authorities issued ments of international terrorism due to links with emigration Bosnian passport to Bin Laden and that it was possible that and certain structures of international terrorist organizations Bin Laden was behind an allegedly planned attack on Pope from the Islamic world. In fact, during the Milosevic's regime during his visit to Sarajevo in 1997, and that he planned an and different forms of state terror, organized assassinations attack on world leaders during the Stability Pact Summit held and hiding perpetrators, the citizens of Serbia, regardless of in Sarajevo in 1999. ("Alija's Followers Fear", Glas Javnosti, their nationality, were exposed to many other forms of strong September 17, 2001). In spite of the fact that some informa- violence that featured terrorism. Montenegro was not spared tion in these newspaper articles were based on reality, like the either. Perpetrators of many assassinations and abductions information that some former Mujahedins stayed in BiH, they that took place during that time have not yet been revealed. were written as sensation-seeking headlines, with many Car bombs, assassinations in public places, even in front of unconfirmed allegations. The denial issued by Slobodan many witnesses, have been an everyday occurrence in Krapovic, Federal Minister of Defense, was not of much help. Yugoslavia. The press continued to publish sensational and often untrue After Milosevic's defeat, the "war against terrorism" in articles about 'terrorists'. One of the most noted articles was 2002 was for some leaders and creators of policy in Serbia the false report printed in Politika, a pro-government news- the first opportunity to revive mythical vocation of their coun- paper from Belgrade, claiming that Ibrahim Rugova stated try being a "defender of the West". Many media and politi- that KLA was hiding foreign terrorists in the territory con- cians revived in their statements the same language against trolled by its forces, and that "KLA is ready to organize ter- Muslims and Albanians, which was used during the war in rorist attacks to support Osama bin Laden' ("Rugova: The So- BiH (1992 - 1995) and in Kosovo (1998 - 1999). By using that Called KLA is Hiding Terrorist Military Bases", Politika, language they tried to equal Osama bin Laden and the "ene- September 26, 2001). Media in Serbia did not announce mies" of Serbia in the last decade, Albanians and Bosniaks. Rugova's denial of the report (ICG, 2001: 28). The first article referring to this was printed in the Glas The first politician who claimed that Bin Laden had two Javnosti, a daily paper, on September 17, 2001, claiming that military bases in Bosnia and several more in Kosovo and there were 15.000 Mujahedins in the Balkans, and that the Albania was Dusan Mihajlovic, Minister of Police. He said USA sponsored Islam against Serbs. Another statement in the that Bin Laden was in Bosnia during the war and in time of same article was that Bin Laden paid a secret visit to KLA in crimes committed by Muslims against Serb civilians in the Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 (Dangerous Time for "holy war- area of the Ozren Mountain. These allegations got another riors", Glas Javnosti, September 17, 2001). It was also dimension when Nebojsa Covic, Deputy Prime Minister in

26 forum January - March 2003. charge of joint Yugoslav and Serbian Department for Kosovo Albanian community, respect of human and minority rights, and southern Serbia, stated on September 20, 2001, that on the one hand, and control of the border territory in which extremists from southern Serbia were preparing terrorist there is a considerable concentration of Albanians, on the attacks on Belgrade. Covic claimed that "many of 10 000 other hand. This conflicts has also its multiethnic dimension: Mujahedins who were in Bosnia and Herzegovina stayed that is a conflict between Albanians that constitute a minori- there, and that over 3 000 Mujahedins were in Kosovo; NIN, ty at the level of the RS, and a majority in the Presevo Valley a weekly magazine featured a picture with the text "Belgrade and in Presevo in particular, on the one hand, and the Serbian as a Target" on the cover page. This brought Covic back to his majority which is also represented by governmental authori- former political party - Milosevic' SPS, and referring to all ty, on the other hand. Albanians as "separatists", that is, "terrorists". Even the This crisis was mounting in the past ten years of the twen- Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia announced the tieth century. In Milosevic's Serbia, and this also applied to strengthening of security measures around many facilities the Presevo Valley, a policy of systematic exclusion of throughout the country as prevention against terrorist Albanians from the educational system, political and public attacks.52 President Kostunica publicly accused the USA of life, state economy, etc. was pursued. During 1998 and 1999, being a cause for the attacks of September 11, and criticized with armed conflicts in Kosovo and expulsion of Albanians the USA for having double standards about terrorism. from this part of the RS to Kosovo and their joining the KLA, Nevertheless, former President Milosevic tried to join those conditions were created for armed conflicts. The establish- fighting terrorism by stating to the ICTY judges in The Hague ment of the Ground Security Zone (GSZ) favored the cre- that he was accused because he defended "his people from a ation of such conditions, cruel aggression and terrorism". This reminded very much of The GSZ was established under the military-technical Milosevic's time when the public and especially media classi- agreement of Kumanovo on 9 June 1999. It is strip 5 km wide fied Albanian rebels as "terrorists". along the borderline with Kosovo, the total length of which is Furthermore, similar reactions to September 11 event 402 km, out of which 139 km being in the Presevo Valley. The once more reminded that the safety situation was poor and population of this section of the GSZ is 22,000, only 20 of that crime, violence, and even terrorism were increasing. This them being Serbs. The GSZ was established as a separation statement is proved through the following: a number of crim- zone between the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) and international inal offences that featured all elements of terrorism; different security forces in Kosovo - KFOR. Access to and movement of political motivation of perpetrators of criminal offences; big the VJ forces is prohibited in the strip, while members of the number of unresolved assassinations, abductions, attacks on Ministry for Internal Affairs (MUP) are only allowed to carry property and similar acts; destructive effects of these acts on firearms of "the caliber below 12mm". society in general, slowing down the solution of social, eco- Early in 2000, it seemed to all those interested in the nomic and political crises. change of borders that the "right time" had come. After with- This was certainly a heritage of disastrous Milosevic's gov- drawal of the VJ and the RS police from Kosovo and the state ernment, as well as the inability of the new elite to cope with border with Albania and in part with Macedonia, according inherited and newly created problems. Hence, the aforemen- to the official estimates of government of the FRY and RS, tioned assessment in particular refers to the last few years "uncontrolled entry of refugees, terrorists, criminals and for- when violence escalated through assassinations and abduc- eign citizens" into Kosovo occurred, mostly from Albania and tions of politicians, businessmen, and other public figures. "due to a tolerant attitude of KFOR towards Albanian terror- Organized criminal structures also strengthened their terrorists…transfer of terrorism" from Kosovo to the Presevo Valley ist activities in southern Serbia, Kosovo and Central Serbia. area took place (Information, 2001: 2). The GSZ became a power vacuum where extremist Albanians formed their Southern Serbia armed units - OVPMB (Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac) and out of which they launched The Presevo Valley zone consists of municipalities of their armed actions. Though the presence of armed Albanian Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja on the very border with extremists in the Presevo Valley was increasingly noticeable, Kosovo. This area is important for Serbia as major railroads Milosevic's government tolerated it ). and highways run through it connecting the southern and cen- The first KLA formations appeared in this region at the tral parts of Serbia with Kosovo. That is also the connecting end of 1999. From January 2000 they were openly present in line between Serbia and Macedonia and Greece. Accordingly, the south of Serbia with 60 guerrilla fighters from OVPMB it is through this area that Central Europe is linked with the who used various weapons, even artillery pieces for their Mediterranean. Around 70,000 Albanians live in the area. activities. Serb police forces and authorities, as well as media Albanians consider the Presevo Valley as "eastern Kosovo". were trying to marginalize these events ("Armed group of The Presevo Valley crisis is taking place against the back- Albanians", "A Mystery in South of Serbia", Reuters - Vijesti, ground of actual social conflicts regarding the status of the Podgorica, August 7, 2000, 10). The main idea was to accuse

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NATO and the West for supporting Albanian terrorists. of citizens and police did not completely end, but the new Milosevic's government advocated this approach in order to government managed to substantially reduce the intensity of have an excuse for a large-scale action when necessary. violence and terrorist activities. Targets of attacks are Serb After Milošević's fall and establishment of democratic and Montenegrin citizens. This statement is confirmed by the power, the DOS government answered to the armed insur- recent terrorist attack that took place in Bujanovac on gence of extremist Albanians in the south of Serbia by diplo- February 3, 2002, when four Albanians placed explosives in macy, cooperation with the EU, OSCE, NATO and KFOR the pedestrian zone (Ministry of Interiors Press Release, and negotiations with Albanian leaders, including representa- Internet 16/03/2002). Local Albanian citizens are also the tives of extremist Albanians. Anyhow, it turned out that with targets, particularly active members of the multi-ethnic police. Milosevic's departure the major proponent of militarization In the last ten months they have been the victims of many ter- and the use of violence against those who do not share same rorist attacks with the clear message to make them leave the views also left. However, this is not still sufficient to solve multi-ethnic police and stop any collaboration with the official problems, including the one of the south of Serbia. authorities of the Republic of Serbia. It might be said that the problem of the Presevo Valley, by its dimensions, is a small one but it is also a dangerous one. Danger of this problem results from its connection with Sandzak Kosovo and Macedonia. Actually, a circle has been created: Albania (the state, the institutions of which are falling apart) During the war in BiH, the official policy was expulsion of - Kosovo (a society with destroyed substance and without Bosniaks from this area. Police and paramilitary forces state identity) - South of Serbia (a hot point in Serbia the enforced ethnic cleansing of several villages near the BiH bor- state-building of which has not been completed yet) - der. This included killings, burning down of houses and Macedonia (a country faced with the trial of expulsions. The Yugoslav Army surrounded Novi Pazar, using "Lebanonization") - Albania - Kosovo. Should it happen that artillery, tanks and infantry. Paramilitary groups and police this part secedes from Serbia that would boost any Albanians' roamed Sandzak causing incidents, including murders, requests against governments of Serbia and Macedonia? As abductions, beating, theft, extortion and other actions in was noted by Carl Bildt, significance of this area exceeds the order to intimidate local population (ICG, 2001:30). issue of strategic roads since this can grow out into a broader A drastic example of terrorism, obviously sponsored by regional conflict. 54 (International Crisis Group, 2001:39). the state, is represented by the abduction of 19 Bosniaks from Presevo Valley, however, has turned out to be a remaining the train Belgrade - Bar; at the train station Strpci, in "pocket" of the ethnic recomposition of former Yugoslavia, as February 1993. Through its independent investigation, the if a "wrong" ethnicity found itself in "somebody else's" territo- Humanitarian Law Center established that high officials of ry. Growing out of Serbian enclaves in Kosovo corroborated the Yugoslav Army, Serbian Ministry of Interiors and FRY the view that Presevo Valley is an Albanian enclave in Serbia. civilian authorities were responsible for the abduction and In that perspective, the Presevo Valley serves as a counter- murder (Danas, 18. 19, 2002). Information available to the weight to Mitrovica and northern part of Kosovo controlled railroad management, headed by Milomir Minic at the time, by Serbs. There are some opinions that OVPMB is linked with secretary general of Milosevic's SPS, on January 28 already extremists from neighboring Macedonia, ONA and ANA, indicated that "members of the Serbian Army of the Rudo Kosovo, and some KLA groups that are under the auspices of Municipality would stop the train and take passengers away". Kosovo Protection Corps. The railroad company informed the Ministry of Interiors and After numerous problems in the south of Serbia, murders, State Security Service of this. A conversation was held with wounding, abductions and destruction of property in the Assistant to the Serbian Minister of Defense, General municipalities of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac, the new Kuzmanovic, who suggested to the railroad management to government in cooperation with the international community stop further activities related to the case. Uzice Department managed to reinstall trust among the most of the Albanian of the Ministry of Interiors held a meeting on February 2, population. This was achieved by establishing multi-ethnic 1993, where information on the announced abduction were police forces whose members are representatives of all ethnic confirmed, and the action itself was characterized as a "strate- groups from the area. On the other hand, the effects of reveal- gic operation of the Serbian Army for the purpose of creating ing in public, prosecution and suspension of members of the conditions for exchange of captured and dead persons". Also, Ministry of Interiors who violated the rules of service were the decision was made to inform the Minister, as well as positive. In the last two years, with a few exceptions, the General Marko Negovanovic, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav media also contributed to the restoration of trust among citi- Army Zivota Panic, Commander of Uzice Corps Dragoljub zens and a relatively stable situation by reporting more or less Ojdanic, as well as Minister of Interiors Zoran Sokolovic and objectively on problems and their solutions. Car bombings in Head of State Security Service Jovica Stanisic. Therefore, it these three municipalities and occasional armed provocations is appropriate to assume that the top authorities of Serbia,

28 forum January - March 2003. In other parts of Serbia that is, Milosevic who was President of Serbia at the time, There were many murders committed in Serbia in the past knew about it. Also, representatives of the federal authorities ten years. The perpetrators have not been found or indicted. (ministries of minorities and justice) were involved in the A significant number of those criminal actions may be classi- activities of disclosing or concealing events after the abduc- fied as typical homicides with various motives, without politi- tion, and according to some indications even the Cabinet of cal background, that is, without any connection with politics. the then President of the FRY Dobrica Cosic was involved. Still, a number of those actions may be classified in the so- Thus, the initiative of the Humanitarian Law Center to con- called "gray zone", i.e. criminal actions between common duct an investigation about the involvement and responsibili- crime and terrorism (murder of Radovan Stojicic Badza, ty of some officials who "knew about the plan of abduction, Deputy Minister of Interiors of the Republic of Serbia; Zeljko endorsed it, and protected responsible persons from criminal Raznjatovic Arkan, a businessman from Belgrade; Zoran pursuit" (Danas, May 18 - 19, 2002) represents a significant Todorovic Kundak, an official in the JUL; Pavle Bulatovic, step and seriously tests the readiness of the new authorities to FRY Minister of Military; Bosko Petrosevic, a high official of fight Milosevic's legacy and terrorism. Judicial bodies of SPS; Slavko Curuvija, owner and editor-in-chief of the Montenegro, Appellate Court in Bijelo Polje, have conducted Nedeljni Telegraf newspaper; journalist Pantic; several high proceedings against Nebojsa Ranisavljevic, one of the per- officers in the Ministry of Interiors of the Republic of Serbia, sons responsible for the abduction, etc.). These are all murders and abductions committed in the People in this area and in the sub-region (Serbia, period before October 5, 2000, when the ruling regime used Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina) were disturbed in measures of state terror towards its opponents or "disloyal" terms of safety by distribution of leaflets by Active Islamic persons. There were political consequences of these acts, but Youth (AIO), an organization which is active in Bosnia and it is still difficult to classify them, since other circumstances Herzegovina and connected with the soldiers of the El have not yet been clarified. Among many unresolved cases, Mujahid Unit, which gathered most extremist groups from special significance is given to the abduction and murder of Middle East and the Balkans on the side of Bosniaks during the former Serbian President, Ivan Stambolic. the war, as well as with some soldiers from the Sandzak area. During Milosevic's rule in Serbia and Montenegro it was This Unit is connected with many war crimes committed dur- almost impossible to discern severe criminal acts without ing the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, AIO is sus- motive of political background and those which crossed the pected to have connections with Al Qaeda. 'bounds' between typical organized crime and terrorism. Even today official institutions do not offer any help on that issue. Police and judicial bodies are still not able to resolve In other parts of Serbia many crimes from previous years, even though it is clear that many of them had political motives. The biggest problem is

January - March 2003. forum 29 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

seen in the fact that there was no clear boundary between ple from gangland, from which he allegedly made a lot of activities of state bodies and organized crime during money. It is interesting that Stojicic's friend, Mr. Milorad Milosevic's regime. As a matter of fact, many state agencies Vlahovic; leader of the team in charge of resolving Stojicic's served the criminals. The most obvious example is "success- murder was killed subsequently. ful business career" of Milosevic's son Marko. Additionally, The murder of Bosko Perosevic, a high official of SPS, many politicians, primarily from ruling parties, but also from was the only one resolved. He was murdered by an acquain- the opposition, were involved in activities, which were known tance from his young days that was established as being men- to be illegal. Therefore, many criminals eventually became tally deranged during the trial. He committed the crime more involved in politics than in their "original profession". because he believed that Perosevic could but did not want to Thus, motives of politics and crime became completely help him in resolving financial troubles. mixed. The following fifteen murders certainly belong to this The brutal murder of Slavko Curuvija, journalist and category: owner of newspapers Dnevni Telegraf and Evropljanin, is First, the murder of Zoran Todorovic - Kundak, a high characterized as a political murder without precedent. official of JUL and close friend of Mirjana Markovic, on Curuvija was killed on April 11, 1999, on Orthodox Easter, October 24, 1997, in Belgrade. An unknown person who during the first days of NATO bombardment of the FRY, at immediately escaped shot Todorovic during the day, in front the entrance of the building where he resided. Two masked of several witnesses. The police have not collected relevant attackers murdered him. Although it was established after data, which would identify the perpetrator of this murder, the political changes in Serbia that the State Security Service and person who ordered it. Even though the members of JUL of Serbia was intensively following Slavko Curuvija until the immediately declared that this murder was a political crime moment of murder, the judiciary still has not processed this and terrorist attack, unofficially it was said that Todorovic, terrorist act. Data requested from the State Security Service director of "Beopetrol" at the time, was killed because of have not been obtained. Therefore, it is impossible to con- unsettled "deals" related to import and sale of oil. firm or deny whether the state leadership, State Security The case that has been least mentioned, known about and Service, ordered the murder or, as is also being assumed, a speculated about was the murder of Pavle Bulatovic, FRY narrow circle from the then political "elite" close to Milosevic Minister of Military. Bulatovic was murdered on February 7, family. 2000, in Belgrade restaurant "Rad". Another person who was Also, the murder of Zeljko Raznatovic - Arkan, a contro- sitting at the same table with Bulatovic was wounded by the versial businessman, President of the Party of Serb Unity, machine gun fired by the murderer. Even though both mili- commander of volunteer Serb Guard which participated in tary and political departments undertook investigation, no the wars in Croatia and BiH, for which he was indicted by the reliable information about results of the investigation has Hague Tribunal, has been very often interpreted as a political been made public. After the establishment of a parliamentary murder. The trial was completed without such label, although committee which investigated this terrorist attack, and which a partially political background was being talked of and spec- was composed of representatives of the former regime par- ulated about during the trial and in the media. Dobrosav ties, the media published assumptions that Minister Bulatovic Gavric was sentenced to 20 years in prison for the murder of was murdered because he was opposed to suspicious busi- Arkan and his two friends, even though he pleaded innocent ness deals, which would result in a great financial loss to the until the end of the trial process. military and state. Many Albanians from Kosovo have been tried and con- Zika Petrovic, Director of Yugoslav Aero Transport (JAT), victed of terrorism in recent years. For some of them sen- was liquidated on April 25, 2000, in front of his house in tences were changed after the change of the Serbian regime, Belgrade. Nobody saw the murderer, and all suspicions and the majority of them were released or sent to prisons in regarding the background of the murder boiled down to pos- Kosovo. Due to difficulty to reliably differentiate murders sible JAT affairs, the role of this company at the time of with criminal and political connotation, only one case labeled strongest sanctions against the FRY, freight transported by as a political murder, and not inspired by national motive, is airplanes to and outside of the FRY. Like the Bulatovic case, currently in progress in the FR Yugoslavia - the murder of there is speculation that these terrorist attacks served to elim- four persons on Ibarska Magistrala road. inate "witnesses who know too much about dirty jobs of the When four close associates of Vuk Draskovic were killed top leadership". on Ibarska Magistrala road on October 3, 1999, and the Radovan Stojicic - Badza, Deputy Minister of Interiors of leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) was lightly Serbia, was bullet-riddled on April 11, 1997, in an over- injured, independent media immediately rejected the nonsen- crowded, elite restaurant in Belgrade. The murderer has not sical official police version of "a crash" with a truck. The trial been found. It is thought that Slobodan Milosevic had great for this act of terrorism started in 2001, and the indictment by confidence in Stojicic. The assumption was made that he was the prosecutor was - attempted murder of the leader of SPO liquidated because of close ties and cooperation with the peo- and murder of his close associates, Veselin Boskovic, Zvonko

30 forum January - March 2003. Osmajlic, Vusur Rakocevic and Dragan Vusurovic. It was the gather and unite a significant number of the then opposition first time in the history of the FRY judicial system that the sus- and ruling Socialist Party members. Although media, non- pects were convicted of crime - two members of "Red Berets", governmental organizations, UN official representatives for which until recently was an operational unit of the Serbian human rights and other international bodies started a great State Security, but also the person who ordered the murder - action in order to find out something about Ivan Stambolic's the former head of the Serbian State Security Service, Rade case, the same as in the case of Slavko Curuvija's murder, not Markovic. Since the proceedings are ongoing, it is only a single detail has been made public, almost two years after appropriate to mention that the list of potential accessories is he was abducted. not final yet. High police officers and inspectors Milorad Vlahovic, There was another attempt of assassination of Vuk Dragan Radisic and Dragan Simic were brutally killed in Draskovic in summer of the next year, in Budva, reported as Belgrade, in an almost identical manner, as well as Miroslav a terrorist act by all media, including the ones under the con- Bizic, a private detective and before that one of the best trol of the regime. police officers in Belgrade. People who were more or less Frequent attacks on premises and headquarters of some known for having close connections with representatives of political parties should be characterized as a completely new certain political parties, or with people who had power 'at form of terrorist actions in Serbia after October 5, 2000. reach of the hand' were killed before that: Radojica Nikcevic, Majority of parties characterize bombing attacks (DSS Branislav Matic - Beli, and Vlada Kovacevic - Tref, who was a Headquarters in Belgrade) and breaking of windows (DHSS business partner of Marko Milosevic. premises in Belgrade) as "typical acts of political violence". A After the change of power, in an attempt to resolve some bit milder characterization is given for demolition of tombs, of the murders, in 2001 police announced an award of and writing slogans and graffiti inspired by religious and 300.000 German Marks for any information which would racial hatred. Media in Serbia provide comprehensive lead to revealing the perpetrators or persons who ordered reports about this and warnings about each individual case crimes, however, with no results so far. and the danger it implies. Unfortunately, the impression is Political violence has not stopped even after the changes that the citizens of the FRY, given everything they went in October 2000, but it changed in the form. Mainly business through in the past ten years, still do not understand the seri- people and rich people are being abducted, for the purpose ousness and possible effects of such actions. of ransom, which gives these actions clear criminal character- The death of judge Nebojsa Simeunovic, whose body was istics. However, another journalist was killed in a similar way. pulled out of the Danube on December 3, 2000, several Correspondent of Vecernje Novosti from Jagodina, Milan weeks after he disappeared, caused much suspicion. The Pantic, was killed at the entrance of his home, on June 11, autopsy did not establish the cause of death, that is, whether 2001. All suspicions regarding the motive of the murder it was a murder or suicide. These suspicions were founded, boiled down to the fact that Pantic was writing about malfea- since Simeunovic, who was respected among his colleagues, sance of former local power holders and thus was included in was complaining of being threatened with murder. Judge the black list of many. Simeunovic was in charge of the investigation of murders of The first similar case that occurred under the new author- Radovan Stojicic - Badza and Pavle Bulatovic. On October 3, ities and caused great consternation among the new leader- 2000, two days before the political breakdown of the former ship and divided the media was the liquidation of the former regime in Serbia, he refused to issue a warrant for arrest of inspector of State Security Service, Momir Gavrilovic, on Nebojsa Covic, one of the DOS leaders. After that, he said August 3, 2001. As published by Blic daily, Gavrilovic was that many were congratulating him, and some were threaten- killed on the same day he attended a meeting with advisors of ing him. The most suspicious detail related to this case is said FRY President, Kostunica. During the meeting, according to to be an identification card found in Simeunovic's clothes, Blic, he stated many examples of bad work of the police and which was not damaged at all after an allegedly long stay of State Security Service, as well as persons from certain DOS the body in the water, as well as many technical details which parties who were covering up dirty actions of their predeces- indicate that Simeunovic most probably was killed and than sors. Displeased parties and political leaders immediately thrown into the river. reacted through strong press releases, and President Although much abduction in Yugoslavia remain unre- Kostunica confirmed the text published by Blic in direct solved, the case of the former President of Serbia, Ivan address to the people the day after. Tensions caused by this Stambolic, is especially important. Stambolic was abducted were reduced after some time, while circumstances or rea- on August 25, 2000, a month and a half before the break- sons for the murder have not been explained. Also, the mur- down of the Milosevic's regime, while jogging in Kosutnjak, der of Bosko Buha, Police General and Assistant to the Belgrade. One of the assumptions, which almost immediate- Minister of Police of Serbia, in charge of fight against organ- ly appeared in media, is that Stambolic was removed because ized crime, was not resolved until the end of 2002. He was of the fear of regime that he would be the person who would killed in summer 2002, in the way, which Minister of Police

January - March 2003. forum 31 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

Mihajlovic rightly classified as a terrorist act, given the organ- violence, attack on democratic order in Serbia and its citi- ization of the murder as well as the aim of spreading distrust zens, their rights and freedoms, as well as all political forces in the power of the state, that is, police, and of spreading fear that oppose violation and advocate cooperation with the among citizens. This case, however, showed the difficulty of international community" (Vecernje Novosti, March 1, 2002; the fight against terrorism and organized crime, including Danas, March 2-3, 2002; Blic, March 2, 2002). Several days conflicts within political leadership. For example, Prime later, windows at the premises of the Headquarters of the Minster Zoran Djindjic on the same day reclassified this mur- Demo Christian Party of Serbia, led by Vladan Batic, the der as a criminal act. Of course, both characterizations are Republic Minister of Justice, were broken. There were no vic- possible, given the many-year involvement of Buha in police tims in either of the attacks. These two acts may be classified work on organized crime, and given the high level of corrup- as terrorist acts, according to their effects on the public, dis- tion in the state and police apparatus. However, more impor- gust, fear and horror. Besides, their political background is tant is the undisputable indication of a triangle between polit- clear, these are the parties, which have been actively partici- ical leadership, terrorism and organized crime. This relation pating in the democratization process in Serbia. These events is separately treated in the Forum's Report on Organized are especially highlighted by the fact that they happened dur- Crime in the FRY. ing the days of the establishment of cooperation with The There are more and more bombing attacks on political Hague Tribunal, and denial of security services to General opponents, committed as typical terrorist acts. The most Mladic by the Yugoslav Military. striking example is attack on the Headquarters of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) in Belgrade, at the end of February 2002. This terrorist attack strongly affected the The media on terrorism public in Serbia and elsewhere. The Headquarters of one of the ruling parties was attacked and also the most popular Regardless of the fact that the media report on issue of ter- party led by President of the FRY, Kostunica. According to rorism, the way in which it is reported, as well as the events information from the media and announcements from the for which this term is used, indicate that media in the FRY Ministry of Interior, at about 11:45 pm unknown attackers still do not have a clear understanding of the definition of ter- passed by in a red 'Audi 80', threw two bombs in front of the rorism and all of its forms. Internal terrorism has been espe- doors of the premises of the party, and disappeared. cially neglected. Members of the Ministry of Interior and a number of high Until the escalation of armed conflict in Kosovo, in 1998, state officials of Serbia and FRY immediately came to the the media in Serbia had been reporting mainly on interna- spot. Most political parties and political and state leaders tional terrorism (events in Middle East, terrorist organiza- characterized the terrorist attack as a "typical act of political tions ETA, IRA, "Red Brigades" and "Bader Meinhof"). The

32 forum January - March 2003. ideological position, taken over from the period of the former members in Racak, and that all reports of international Yugoslavia, was that terrorism did not exist as an internal observers and foreign media were fabricated. problem. Regardless of the bombing attack in cinema "20. Among information on events in Racak, the independent Oktobar" in Belgrade, and incursion of an Ustasa terrorist media also included reports of the OSCE and conclusions of group into former Yugoslavia, in 1972, the term terrorism has foreign media that a massacre happened; proving that the not been connected to the territory of this state at all. State FRY regime was conducting organized terror against media (Politika, Borba, Politika Ekspres and Vecernje Novosti Albanians. Certain independent media openly doubted the and Radio Television of Serbia) were reporting on terrorism official position of authorities, representatives of police and in a rather neutral way. Political weeklies NIN and Vreme, as the VJ, that it was "a usual" conflict between state forces and well as the independent daily Nasa Borba were the first sig- KLA terrorists. Because of the headlines and reports on nificant media to take a more serious approach to this inter- Racak, these media were proclaimed to be traitors and for- national problem in the first half of the 90s. eign mercenaries by regime representatives and the state The escalation of armed conflict in Kosovo practically media. introduced the use of the term terrorism for events within the Since the change of the regime in the country, in October country. Based on the position of official state institutions, 2000, the attitude of the FRY media towards terrorism has the media named as terrorist acts those armed conflicts in changed, that is, has become closer to the way in which inde- which victims and targets of attacks were police officers, pendent private media were earlier reporting on the problem. members of the Yugoslav Army, and in most of cases non- In the last two years, significant activities have been Albanian civilians. This issue, like many other issues, polar- undertaken in fighting and preventing violence that repre- ized the media in Serbia. By writs of the Public Attorney's sents typical terrorist acts. This especially relates to resolving Office in Belgrade police questioned editors-in-chief of the problems in the area of the "Ground Safety Zone" (munici- newspapers, which reported that, for example, "X Albanians" palities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja). Unlike the pre- were killed instead of "X Terrorists". Radio-Television of vious state bodies, the new state bodies have significantly Serbia, the only TV Station covering the whole country, pri- improved cooperation with representatives of the interna- vate BK Television covering 60 per cent, and a number of tional community, that is, with UNMIK and KFOR in regional TV and Radio Centers, newspapers Politika, Kosovo, as well as with Albanian political leaders and the Vecernje Novosti and Politika Ekspress, represented the local Albanian population in Southern Serbia. Better and regime's main tool in forming public opinion, fully justifying closer cooperation was established with the local population every action of Serbian forces. Weeklies like Nedeljni and Albanian political parties, even local elections were par- Telegraf and Svedok were dealing with the problem of terror- tially held, while within public safety activities the project of ism in the FRY and events in Kosovo in a sensation-monger- Multiethnic Police was implemented under the auspices of the ing way, constantly making connection of events in Kosovo international community, which proved to be successful, with foreign terrorist organizations, primarily from the Arab despite its being opposed by extreme Albanian structures. world. On the other hand, dailies Blic and Danas, Radio B92, weeklies NIN and Vreme were the strongest and most influential independent media in Serbia. Glas Javnosti differenti- Legislation and institutional fight against terrorism ated from other independent dailies by publishing stricter reports on activities of Albanian terrorists, and at the same Yugoslav penal legislation classifies terrorism in the cate- time milder reports on actions of security forces. It is worth gory of criminal offences punishable in accordance with the mentioning that Beta and FoNet Agencies were very impor- Criminal Code of the FRY (KZJ), which became effective in tant sources of information for the independent media, while 1977, and to which latest amendments and addenda were the state Tanjug Agency was the biggest and most loyal "infor- made in March 1994. Depending on whether an act has been mation producer" for the needs of maintaining the regime. targeted against the FRY or against another state, liberation An event in the village of Racak in 1998 may be taken as movement or international organization, the Criminal Code the most important example for the assessment of reporting discerns the following criminal acts: of the FRY media on terrorism. This event was one of the First, the criminal act of terrorism (against FRY) which direct causes for NATO bombardment of the FRY in the fol- Chapter 15, Article 125 of the KZJ defined as "Criminal act lowing year. According to the report by William Walker, against constitutional order and safety of the FRY" ("Whoever Head of the Kosovo and Metohija Verification Mission, mem- causes an explosion or fire or undertakes another generally bers of the Yugoslav Army and Police massacred innocent dangerous action or commits an act of violence with the Albanian civilians in Racak. All world media, including pho- intention of endangering constitutional order or safety, thus tographs of dead bodies in civilian clothes, broadcast this creating a feeling of personal insecurity of citizens, shall be report. The then Yugoslav authorities gave the statement that punished with not less than three years in prison."). The pre- there was a clash between Serbian security forces and KLA scribed sentence for this criminal act is at least three years

January - March 2003. forum 33 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

rorism. Therefore, Article 155a of KZJ, titled "International Terrorism" reads: "Whoever commits abduction of a person or another violation, causes explosion or fire or causes endangerment for human lives or property of a great value by any generally dangerous action or means, with the intention of harming a foreign state, liberation movement or international organization, shall be punished with not less than one year imprisonment". If one or more persons die during such criminal act, the prescribed sentence is five years, and if perpetrator kills a person with premeditation, the prescribed sentence is the same as in the case of criminal act of terrorism - from ten to twenty years. Criminal prosecution for the criminal act of international terrorism is undertaken upon approval of the federal state prosecutor. Chapter 16 of the KZJ also envis- ages punishment for some international criminal acts of terrorist acts, which are subject to special international treaties: endangerment of persons under international protection (Article 155b), taking hostages (Article 155v). However, based on the above-mentioned discussion, it does not seem appropriate to differentiate between "domestic" and international terrorism in the described way. In bilateral agreements of Yugoslavia on providing international legal aid, the problem of the political background of terrorism is treated in various ways, depending also on the state with which the given agreement was signed. Accordingly, in the agreement between SFRY and Spain from 1981, no terrorist act against life is considered to be a political act. The French-Yugoslav Convention on Extradition (1971) is different from the previous one insomuch that criminal acts of a terrorist nature are considered to be political ones, however, that "it is not a hindrance for extradition by force of law if such attack on the life of an individual was not committed in a direct fight". imprisonment. However, if such an act has caused death of The period from 2001 to 2002 is also characterized by an one or more than one person, or has endangered human intensified activity of all state and political structures on draft- lives, or has been coupled with severe consequences, violence ing and passing laws (Law on Police, Law on Criminal or destruction, or has caused endangerment of safety, eco- Procedure, etc.), which will make up the legal framework in nomic or military power of the country, the minimum pre- the future, basis for planning further measures and activities scribed sentence is ten years (Article 139, paragraph 1, KZJ, for resolving pressing safety problems. related to the severest forms of criminal acts). If one or more Serbia and Montenegro are actively involved in various persons have been killed with premeditation in such a crimi- international initiatives in the sphere of the fight against ter- nal act, the prescribed sentence is from ten to twenty years rorism as a global security threat, both through ratification of imprisonment. The same sentence is prescribed for a perpe- international conventions dealing with specific demonstra- trator of such criminal act during a state of war or war alert tion of terrorist acts, and active participation in international (Article 139, paragraph 1, KZJ). According to the KZJ, the security cooperation. To that end, the harmonization of local longest prescribed sentence is up to twenty years imprison- legislation with international legal documents covering this ment. However, if the criminal act of terrorism was to be reg- field has been initiated. The Federal Government of the FRY ulated by the Republic Law, the new Criminal Code of the ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Republic of Serbia (2002), the perpetrator could be sen- the Financing of Terrorism in 2001. tenced to up to forty years imprisonment (Article 47). Second, a criminal act of international terrorism, which is classified in the category "Criminal acts against humanity and international law" (Chapter 16, KZJ). Sentences for this criminal act are much milder than sentences for criminal act of ter-

34 forum January - March 2003. Security to invest a lot in the future with small chances of reaping the fruits of changes. This exposes all politicians, especially those In Serbia in 2002, the question of security and stability is that are power-hungry and frustrated by many years of mar- the priority one. Risks appear in the domain of political reac- ginalization in conditions of dictatorship, to difficult temptations to reforms and in the internal situation of the political tions. Temptations are additionally increased by ever-present leadership of Serbia. corruption, grey economy and organized crime. As a segment of political leadership in Serbia opts for acquiring their own Weaknesses of political leadership gains overnight, it becomes a risk factor. This also applies to politicians in the Government of Serbia who settle on politi- The situation within the political leadership and, above cal voluntarism, decision-making in a narrow circle, govern- all, its incapacity to govern the state and to continue the ing by decrees, using the funds from privatization for adding reforms that have started are the subject of increasing con- to the budget, improvement in the standards of living and pro- cern of the domestic public. motion of economic power of businessmen and politicians Total confusion characterizes the political scene in Serbia, that are loyal to them, rather than for investments, for invig- almost daily bursting of scandals at the very top of govern- oration of privatization and deepening of reforms. ment. There is, however, a complete absence of clear mes- Republican government made an attempt to determine sages from the political leadership about desirable and politi- some basic strategic reform directions, but did not succeed to cally compulsory values towards which the society after a long establish a clear framework. The adoption of system laws authoritarian experience should strive to. Constant and tiring providing such a framework has not happened. The fact that disputes between the new government and political opposi- the Government of Serbia underestimates the significance of tion consisting of the remains of the old regime (primarily the necessity of constitutional changes for reforms in Serbia Socialist Party of Slobodan Milosevic and Serbian Radical is of a great concern. Except one, the so called Omnibus Party of Vojislav Seselj), as well as conflicts in politically package of legal provisions for somewhat more complete deeply divided ruling DOS coalition, and first of all between implementation of already valid, constitutional concept of the DS Prime Minister of Serbia Djindjic and FRY President Vojvodina inherited from Milosevic, and several legal initia- Kostunica from DSS, together with real difficulties in which tives for the strengthening of local self-government, nothing Serbia after a decade of the destruction of economy and wars else has been done on building of institutions in Serbia, that finds itself, produce the following consequences: is on constitutional and legal reforms (Ljudska Prava, 2002, - Deterioration of the authority of government, institu- 9, 10, 19). tions and policy and politicians in general, Synergistic effect of unification of 18 parties into the - Downsizing of initial successes in reforms particularly in DOS was lost in October 2001 but this coalition continues to the field of macro-economic stability; have majority support. Changes in the support of the public - Increasing disappointment of citizens who expected bet- to individual political parties and politicians are small in com- ter life after the removal of Milosevic from power and wear- parison with the situation before the elections of 2000. The ing off their support to changes and reforms. reason lies in the fact that former ruling parties or rather pres- All together, it may be said that disputes in political lead- ent opposition have been marginalized. Accordingly, should ership and weak institutions are basic risk areas for the deep- the DSS quit DOS, the balance of power would not be ening of political instability and turning of the existing con- changed (UNDP, 2001, 9). However, should some of the flicts into wider social conflicts including violence, all the way DOS parties quit Djindjic's DS, he would have extremely through to terrorism. poor chances to remain in power. Furthermore, further dis- The experience of many reformist governments in transi- integration of the DOS is not excluded because it is, within, tion societies, and especially of those that were supported by in political conflicts. In that respect the most influential polit- a broad coalition of parties and movements, tells us that their ical parties and people set the example (Kostunica and the life is not long. Their position is paradoxical: they would have DSS, and Djindjic and the DS). There are deep misunder-

January - March 2003. forum 35 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

standings between them almost on every question of policy, - Ethnicization in terms of narrowing downs the ethnic above all on priorities, pace, the cost and instruments of composition of the army. reforms. These conflicts go so far that each of the conflicting parties tries to establish control over "its own" repressive- The process of transformation of the VJ is developing security structure: Djindjic has established, through the con- under extremely negative conditions: stitution the Council for Security by the Government of Serbia a monopoly on the police, state security service and - Strong presence of negative elements inherited by the special anti-terrorist units (SAJ), and the SAJ represents a breakdown of JNA, from which VJ originates; mini army consisting of people many of which were involved - Constant possibility of outbreak of internal ethnic and in wars, and even crimes, and have strong connections with social and political armed conflicts and rebellions; organized crime, above all in Serbia, Republika Srpska and - Constant danger from the involvement of the VJ in war Montenegro. All these structures are outside efficient public operations in the area of the former Yugoslavia, in Kosovo control. Kostunica tries to strengthen his influence on the mil- and against NATO; itary, using military intelligence and counterintelligence serv- - Difficult economic situation and overall economic and ices as a powerful means to " discipline" the army but also his social crisis, isolation from the world, etc. political opponents. As for intelligence service attached to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs - SID, it is in all likelihood disor- In the circumstances of war, international isolation and ganized and marginalized and, therefore, of lesser interest for economic sanctions imposed by EU and UN on FRY, strong the conflicting parties. coupling of the state, ruling political oligarchy, illegal econo- Numerous affairs in the Army and the police (for exam- my, organized crime took place. State terror and the state ple, on occasion of arrest and charge for espionage of former supported terrorism represented instruments in the struggle Secretary of Army Headquarters and present Vice-President of Milosevic government against political opposition, disobe- of the Government of Serbia general Perisic, or more recent- dient members from their own lines and other ethnic com- ly removal of general Pavkovic from the post of the Secretary munities (Croats during the war in Croatia, Bosniaks during of Army Headquarters, and later unresolved murder of the the war in Bosnia, Albanians in Kosovo). With the fall of Deputy of the Minister of Police, police general Bosko Buha, Milosevic and shattering of political control existing until then etc) signal that Djindjic and Kostunica do not control these over intelligence services and those controlled by them, services. In fact, such a control has been omitted to be estab- including frequently established groups of organized crime lished at the very beginning of DOS government - when DOS and terror, these groups remained both without support in enjoyed the support of citizens with a relative internal cohe- the state apparatus and without control. Some of these sion. It is difficult to say who is controlling whom: whether groups found new political sponsors in the new government. politicians are those who control these services and centers of A special risk represents enormous financial power of financial and other powers linked with them, and thus the informal power centers and their fusion with the state, certain centers of organized crime or whether these centers control politicians, media, police and judicial bodies. To the special politicians. It is certain, however, that these services have risk group belong extreme nationalistic groups mobilized by sympathies towards old extremely chauvinistic ideas, politi- the resistance to the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal cians and movements, such as Obraz. and condemnation of new authorities, particularly of pro- When it comes to the crisis of military and police, Serbia European politicians and non-government organizations. is no exception. Similar problems exist in all countries in Anti-globalism of these groups is directed against the USA transition; however, Serbia's particularity is its late transition, and EU, and frequently appears in the shape of anti-Semitism, frequent engagement in armed operations and lack of a more anti-Islamic attitudes, and racism. The risk that such extrem- clear vision of its way out of crisis. ism may turn into violence and terrorism is high. On the other Withdrawal of the JNA from BiH followed (May 19, 1992) hand, the increase in political violence, terrorism and crimi- after a special declaration that was passed by the FRY nal violence in conditions of a weak state may turn the public Parliament (April 27), which contained the position on against economic reforms and political democracy, and respect of territorial integrity of BiH by the FR Yugoslavia. toward shortcut solutions, that is, towards the policy of strong Since then, cumulative acting of three trends has been evident hand and dictatorship. in the development of army and police in the FRY: Thus, the control of intelligence - security services has become an issue causing anxiety in Serbia and in the interna- - Militarization, politicization, primarily in terms of politi- tional community (International Crisis Group, 2001, 35). It is cal tasks - prevention of a broader articulation of intra-nation- positive that monopolizing the military, the police and their al social and political turbulences which could jeopardize the intelligence and security services by Kostunica and Djindjic current regime and emphasizing political national and patri- represents a risk for the future reform of Serbia, especially for otic tasks, and adaptation of the military to new relations between Serbia

36 forum January - March 2003. and Montenegro. A situation in which the majority of officers tance, etc. the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and of the Army harbor a high degree of mistrust towards the European Bank for Investment and Development have assist- Government of Serbia and the Prime Minister Djindjic, and ed the authorities in creation of favorable macro-economic the Prime Minister and his associates, on their part, addition- environment, the stabilization of banking system, recovery of ally exacerbate these relations, for instance, by threatening to monetary policy and the like. OSCE and the Council of stop financing the Army, grows into a serious security risk. Europe have supported some of the projects for legal and For instance, if the Army would be denied finances that could political changes, and OSCE and NATO have given assistance bring about an open conflict in which chances of the Prime in the control of the crisis in the Presevo Valley, etc. The Minister to win would be small. That would certainly result European Union, that is, European Commission was directly into the total separation of Montenegro and long-standing involved into the solving of the relations between Serbia and destabilization of Serbia and, necessarily, suspension of the Montenegro, that is, the institutional change at the level of the reforms. The monopoly of the Prime Minister on the police, federal state. However, despite everything, for many in the and especially the SAJ, represents also a risk because it makes international community post-Milosevic Serbia is Serbia it impossible for the Government of Serbia, inters alia, to without Milosevic, but not a new Serbia. The international fight against organized crime. community has also helped in the removal of Milosevic from All this confirms the necessity of establishing without fur- power, without deeper changes in institutions. Especially ther delay the civil control over the armed forces. This will problematic was the support offered to the strengthening of necessitate new laws on the military and police, establish- the upset pro-Milosevic personalities and groups from ment of the rights of parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro Montenegro in federal government. This was one of addi- to control activities of the military and police, including their tional factors in the intensification of the conflict between funding. A reform of the military doctrine, structure and Kostunica and Djindjic, and the political destabilization of composition as well as disbanding of the present SAJ should Montenegro as well. Certain governments or representatives be also made. Demilitarization of the police of Montenegro of international organizations could not resist the temptation and Serbia is also necessary. to get involved in internal political disputes, that is, offering of support to one of the parties. A proof of this are the activities of the Special Representative of the Council of Europe The international involvement, strategic problems and for FRY Mr. Fourer, who has unrealistically encouraged the the problems of monitoring and screening politicians in Serbia and FRY to remain on old federal structures and promised a quick and easy admission to the mem- Serbia is increasingly a partner and a source of stability bership of the Council of Europe. Thus, an opportunity has rather than a source of war (Taking Stock and Looking been missed to use the admission process into the Council of Forward. Intervention in the Balkans and beyond, (2002, Europe as a motivation, even as a pressure, for more solid Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, political, constitutional and legal changes in the field of February 22, pp.1, 3). Serbia today represents an opportuni- human rights, democratization, etc. ty more than a problem: democratization coupled its economic recovery would allow resolution of remaining issues Post-Milosevic Serbia still represents an obstacle to throughout the Balkans (Serbia Still at the Crossroads, 2002, regional stability in key areas, and in many cases it openly Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, confronts the policy of the international community, especial- May, p. 1). ly of the EU, UN, OSCE and NATO. Regional instability is The international community has strongly supported and affected by the following at the most: welcomed the change of government in Belgrade. It has also given support to the programs of economic stabilization, - Weakness of government, i.e. of institutions and political recovery and reforms. Through donations, technical assis- leadership;

January - March 2003. forum 37 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

- Non-existence of the civil control over the military and ness of the cooperation with the NATO. The solving of crisis police that are not reformed and are under the control of in the Presevo Valley in cooperation with NATO and KFOR Milosevic's followers; has been particularly important for this purpose. - Lack of cooperation with the International Criminal In exchange for membership of the Council of Europe, the Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in The Hague (ICTY); PFP and SAA, the international community can expect from - Undermining of the international community policy and Serbia to harmonize its policies with objectives of the policy the Dayton Peace Accord in the neighboring Bosnia and of the international community in the Balkans. It can also Herzegovina; make the PFP, membership of the Council of Europe and the - Violation of some important aspects of the UNSCR SAA conditional upon removal of obstacles to regional stabil- 1244, above all by blocking an active part of local Serbian ity. leaders, financing and running illegal parallel security forces Serbia finds itself at the very beginning of the EU process and administrative structures in Kosovo. of Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. Opening up of Serbia/FRY towards the world, especially With the last meeting of the Consultation FRY and EU Work towards the most influential countries, European integration Group on 10 July 2002, the warming up before the start line structures and neighboring countries is at the very beginning. took place. In order to coordinate these activities in the In actual fact, a sort of new realism has been demonstrated by Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations of Serbia a Sector the public opinion to the effect that the international com- for European Integrations has been formed. There follows munity will help to overcome delay in the process of democ- the harmonization with 18,000 EU provisions (Politika, ratization. Thus, 80% citizens of Serbia support efforts to join 19.06.2002, A2). the EU, 47% citizens are against joining the NATO, while In fact, EU and US face the dilemma of balancing the stick 31% supports the idea of close cooperation (UNDP. United and carrot in the case of Belgrade. In order to have pressure Nations Development Program. Federal Republic of without undermining the democratic legitimacy of the friend- Yugoslavia/ Republic of Serbia, 2001, Challenges of ly regime and risking a more nationalistic turn, it is necessary Implementing the Reform Agenda: One Year After the to choose carefully issues in respect of which it will be Democratic Breakthrough. Annual Review (Serbia) of the applied. The best framework for this pressure is the Early Warning System for the FRY, October 2000 - October Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. There 2001, pp. 9, 28). are at least three arguments in favor of such a choice: In an effort to integrate into the European and international economic and political processes, post-Milosevic Serbia - First, already undertaken obligations on the part of gov- should set a number of political targets for 2002. The most ernments of Serbia and Montenegro, and also the EU, to important among them are the following: cooperate in building new relations between Serbia and Montenegro. In fact, it may be said that the EU by March - Membership of the NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP); agreement about new relations between Serbia and - Membership of the Council of Europe; Montenegro signed by Solana, became one of the parties in - Signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement the establishment of new institutional arrangements and (SAA) with the EU. should therefore carry out this role with least costs and risks. - Second, need to prevent further aggravation of the situa- The question of the admission to PFP was opened imme- tion in Kosovo that would be caused by further destabiliza- diately after 5 October 2002. An impression was created in tion of Serbia; the public that this was just a question of time. Some politi- - Third, interest in helping reforms in Serbia and preven- cal leaders stated that FRY would become the member of PFP tion, by using preventive methods, of present risks from esca- in 2001, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Svilanovic lating into political, social and even ethnic conflicts (for announced the membership for November 2002. However, instance, in the south of Serbia and Sandzak) and further on the application in official form expressing such a desire has into a disintegration process that would land the central not been submitted as yet, and NATO has not given such a Serbia and Vojvodina into a situation where they would be a public offer either (Ljudska prava, 2002, 109). In fact, the factor of instability and of checking integrations in the government has not enough authority to carry out the reform Region. of the Army, whose staff is out of proportions, training old In case of the worst scenario of deepening of conflicts, the fashioned and its standards differ from those of NATO. EU and U.S.A. could be faced with the necessity of establish- Efficient civil control of the Army and the like has not been ing a sort of protectorate over Central Serbia and Vojvodina. established. Although no actual steps have been made for This is a more risky and more costly option for the EU than a closer approaching to PFP, a significant change in the attitude preventive reaction. This applies directly to the feasibility of the public took place, which from belief that NATO was an studies and the Task force for the SAA with Serbia. enemy of Serbs and Serbia moved to the question of useful- Indeed, both in Serbia and the Region there is agreement

38 forum January - March 2003. on the necessity of integration into the Euro-Atlantic struc- the acceleration of social, political and economic reforms in tures, primarily in the EU. This implies that regional stability Serbia. In this, the EU could offer assistance through one is a condition for Euro-Atlantic integrations as well as accept- form of a Task Force for Institutional Building Support. ance of regionalism both by the EU and the countries of the Region. But, a longer association phase of 10 to 15 years b) The following areas in the field of regional economic under the SAP seems to be the most plausible scenario (CAP. cooperation deserve special attention: to eliminate barriers, Center for Applied Policy Research, Bertelsman Foundation, obstacles to economic changes that are on the increase. In Policy Planning Staff, German Federal Ministry of Foreign this case, inadequate regional structure (roads, railroads, the Affairs (2002) Discussion paper: Integration the Balkans: Danube) is at issue. International community should support Regional Ownership and European Responsibilities. Balkan building of this infrastructure. Likewise, investment priorities Forum, Berlin, July 15 - 16, p. 7) should encourage Serbia and the Region through promotion of conditions for small business, encouragement of bilateral and regional trade contracts, relaxation of the visa system and Recommendations expansion of opportunities for establishment of economic ties. Special attention should be paid to economic environ- a) The process of negations between Montenegro and ment in small communities. In the field of agriculture and Serbia and the process of creating a new Serbian constitution rural development, Serbia has potentials for being a "bread should be taking place at the some time. Adopting a new basket" for South-eastern Europe; this particularly applies to Serbian constitution is the main responsibility of DOS. Vojvodina and Presevo Valley. Montenegrins cannot decide the problem of Vojvodina or c) The establishment of new relations between Serbia and Sandzak. These problems should be solved in Serbia and by Montenegro on the basis of two independent states, which Serbia. It is to be done through parliamentary and enlighten- coordinate fields of joint interest, could be a model of inter- ment of the population, i. e. through creation of a new, dem- est for other countries on the territory of former Yugoslavia. ocratic political culture. The same applies to the redefinition For this purpose, a support should be given to the establish- of Serbia as a state/nation. Serbia should be defined consti- ment of the freedom of movement between the two republics, tutionally as a democratic, multiethnic state that can be, but including the rights of citizens of one republic in the other, need not be, in union with Montenegro. such as the access to the university education, health institutions, etc. presupposes openness of borders between the two Also, the judiciary sector belongs to the reform priorities, republics. In case of a different outcome, freedom of move- primarily the reform of the Prosecutor's Office including new ment and numerous rights of Montenegrin citizens in Serbia rules for work and new personnel. could not be guaranteed. The possible target groups are the following: Montenegrins living in Serbia, Moslems - Bosniaks It is essential to establish democratic control of the Army from Sandzak, students, etc. and the police, particularly their following segments: In order to secure the desired solution, it is necessary to exert pressure on key political leaders. It is particularly risky - The work of intelligence services (state security and the whether and how the EU will talk politicians from Serbia into Army counter-intelligence service), implementing the Union. This is made harder by a careless attitude of politicians from Serbia towards their own public, - The use of budget funds, the majority of which is otherwise in favor of independence - Abolishing of the monopoly of the Army on military- of Serbia. industrial complex and some strategic products. This Long-term regional cooperation should be established requires that all Army and police property (buildings, pro- between the international community, governments, the pri- duction capabilities, agricultural land, etc) should be put vate sector and NGOs. Domestic institutions that should see under public control, and that the Government should take to the transition and regional cooperation have to be devel- over the control of all those facilities and production capabil- oped and qualified for the job. In fact, the international com- ities essential for the functioning of the Army and the police, munity should encourage Serbia and the Region to take a - The cooperation of the Army and the police with the regional approach to problems solving. To that end, the EU armies and police in the Balkans and Europe, the cooperation could work out together with Serbia a list of priorities where of the police with the Interpol, as well as the inclusion of the objectives of Serbia and the international community or Army into the program of equipment and training of the rather the EU would converge. NATO and in the PFP. It is also necessary to establish cooperation with other The international community should refrain from taking international institutions, funds, governments, and financial political sides but should continue to push for reform. Using institutions in order to encourage regional projects and cross- economic and other incentives, EU and US can contribute to border cooperation. The regional approach should be devel-

January - March 2003. forum 39 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

oped through sub-regional cooperation. For that reason, the The history of Serb - Albanian relations in the former existing Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the Yugoslavia went through the following stages: Southeast European Cooperation Initiative should accord priority to sub-regional investments, promoting cooperation - First stage, 1918 - 1941/45: A period of shifting domina- among, for instance, Serbia - Montenegro - Bosnia and tion, occasional violence and armed conflicts. At first, Herzegovina and Croatia. The second sub-region would be Albanians were under Serbian domination. Later, from 1941 Serbia - Montenegro - Kosovo - Macedonia - Albania. This - 1945, in Greater Albania, created in co-operation with Nazi could lead to a passport-free zone, the customs union, and the Germany and fascist Italy, Serbs were persecuted in Kosovo. free trade zone and, for a medium term, to a uniform economic and market union (Reconnecting Serbia Through - Second stage, 1945 - 1966: A period of oscillations from Regional Cooperation. An Action Plan Report of the Euro - occasional violence (Albanian rebellions and their suppres- Atlantic Initiatives Project. Serbia and the Challenge of sion by the military and police) to solution of disputes by Regional Integration (2002) The Stanley Foundation, political means. In this period, massive and numerous admin- Muscatine, pp. 4, 5, 13) istrative limitations of Albanians rights have occurred, as well as occasional violence.

KOSOVO - Third stage, 1966 - 1981: A period in which the rights of Albanians are recognized and guaranteed at a very wide Kosovo covers the territory of 10,908 sq. km and is pop- range, while the autonomy of Kosovo within the federal struc- ulated with approximately two million people, ethnic ture of Yugoslavia strengthens. This upholds the emancipa- Albanians account for 1.600.000. Accounting for 82% of tion and self-assertion of the Albanian community, but also Kosovo population, ethnic Albanians are the prevailing ethnic gives rise to an Albanian nationalist movement, supported by community. However, in the context of Serbia (17%) or FRY the local communist elite. (16,5%) ethnic Albanians are a significant minority. Kosovo is a ground where peoples and communities meet, co-operate - Fourth stage, 1981 - 1999: A period of disintegration of and clash with their different ethnic, religious and cultural the former Yugoslavia, strengthening of both Serbian and backgrounds. Albanian ethno-nationalistic movements and political and armed conflicts of Serbs and Albanians. This period could be Serb-Albanian relations are marked by confrontations, divided into four sub-stages. which reveal numerous characteristics of ethnic conflict. The The first sub - stage began in 1981 and lasted until 1986: conflict itself is over the status of Albanians and control over at that time, the Albanians, primarily combining mass politi- the territory of Kosovo. The order in Kosovo was not based cal demonstrations with the use of state institutions (mostly of on the rule of law, but on the balance of fear: either fear of the local branch of the Yugoslav Communist Party), demand- the revenge ("vendetta"), which is especially widespread with- ed their own state - a "Kosovo - Republic". in the Albanian community, or fear of state sanctions. Serb- The second sub - stage started in 1986 and lasted until Albanian relations in Kosovo are established according to the 1998. It was characterized by a conflict over the constitution- domination model. Both communities seek to institutionalize al status of Kosovo and the Albanian community. their domination. The third sub-stage, 1989 - 1998, was marked by open The territory of Kosovo became an administrative entity political conflicts. In fact, invoking the "ethnic principle" the in the second half of the 20th century. The 1946 Constitution Serbian authorities tried to constitute Serbia as an ethnic of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia for the first state and protect all Serbs on the territory of the former time in history gave Kosovo and Metohija the shape of an Yugoslavia. The Albanian leaders, on the other hand, tried to administrative and political entity - an autonomous region. build institutions of a "parallel state" - self-proclaimed The 1963 Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Republic of Kosovo. After Dayton, at the end of 1995, two Yugoslavia, determined status of an "autonomous province" parallel processes begin: Official public discussion on Kosovo for Kosovo and Metohija, as well as Vojvodina in northern status emerges. The government, political leaders and parties Serbia. Constitutional Amendments made in 1968 extended (Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS and LDK), both hard-liners the powers of the province of Kosovo. and moderate ones joined the discussion later on. And, radi- The Constitution of 1974, linked Kosovo with the federal calization of the Albanian movement and political life in state directly referring to it as a "constitutive element". After Kosovo, which took the courses of the intensification of the coming to power in Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic changed the Albanian political conflicts. Among the Albanians, especially constitution in 1990 and limited the autonomy of Kosovo, the younger ones, there was a growing tendency to reject the which has become a territorial autonomy only. peaceful policy of Ibrahim Rugova. At that time, strengthening of an anti-Serbian attitude culminating in a series of "test

40 forum January - March 2003. attacks" by LKCK and KLA, which began on April 22nd, and elimination of the Jashari clan, became a symbol of 1996 and turned into armed resistance in 1998 and 1999. Albanian resistance and was the first area declared as "free The beginning of the year 1997 was ominous. In March, territory", which attracted thousands of refugees. The second protests in Albania grew into a chaotic rebellion against the KLA group was formed around Malisevo, and it was com- government of President Sali Berisha. The events in Albania posed of Maoists who advocated unification of all Albanian had two consequences for Kosovo: first, in an increasing inse- countries. The third one, Djakovica group, was the most suc- curity and nervousness among Kosovar Albanian political cessful one in military terms. In October, though, KLA with- leaders, along with the strengthening of radicalization and drew from many of those areas (Kusovac, Zoran, 1998, reinforcement of military activities of the KLA , which used Round Two: Serbian Security Forces, »Transitions«, vol. 5 no. training camps in northern Albania. KLA's power rapidly 9, September, pp. 22 - 24). In that, KLA groups were fully increased with the provision of hundreds of thousands of supported by the local population. For the Serbian side and weapons from Albania, during rebellion at the beginning of the international community, the KLA became a political fac- 1997. Volunteers, money and weapons also came from tor, which should be included in any negotiating process. 600.000 Albanians living in Switzerland and Germany. Many According to data of the Serbian police, in the period former officers of the former JNA and Territorial Defense of between January 1, 1998, and September 28, 1999, Kosovo found themselves among the leading people of the "Albanian terrorists" undertook 5.527 attacks in total, out of opposition. The targets of their attacks were the Serbian which 2.599 attacks since KFOR forces were deployed in this police and state officials as well as Albanians who were per- area. There were 3.647 or 66.5% attacks on citizens/civil- ceived to be "collaborators" or "the people of the Serbian ians, and 1.849 or 33.5% attacks on buildings and police regime". members. 945 persons were killed in these attacks, out of Finally, the fourth sub-stage was marked by an open whom 654 civilians (291 Serb and Montenegrin, 19 members armed conflict 1998 - 1999. of other ethnic groups and 101 so far unidentified persons) Diplomatic efforts during 1998, which culminated in and 287 police members (Press Office of the Ministry of Rambouillet, were marked by confusion and ambiguous sig- Interior of the Republic of Serbia, Extremism: Attacks, nals. Given Milosevic's strategy of repression and utmost Incidents and Armed Provocations in the Ground Safety requests of LDK and KLA, there was a little chance for diplo- Zone, Belgrade, December 2000, 25). matic solution. In January 1999, the self-organization of local Serbs into During 1998, the influence of the KLA, which supported "village guards" began, and the first militant actions took the radicalization of the political fitting including armed place in Kosovo (blocking of roads around Pristina, on resistance to Serbia and which influence among Albanians January 7, 1999. At that time, Milosevic decided to defeat the kept growing. In the middle of 1998 KLA established its con- KLA with massive military and police action. Milosevic's control over a significant part of central Kosovo. The first loca- viction (shared by most political parties and the Serbian pub- tion of KLA was Drenica, which after the incident in Lausa lic) that the problem can be solved by the use of force was one

January - March 2003. forum 41 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

reason why Serbia and the FR Y were pushed into an armed tion regarding the violence conducted by ethnic Albanians in conflict with the strongest powers of the world (NATO Kosovo and Macedonia. The Head of American Mission in alliance). Kosovo presented a demarche to main leaders of Kosovo In taking up arms, Serbs and Albanians believed they took Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, Hashim Taci and Ramush their destiny into their hands. The war in Kosovo, which Haradinaj, on September 15, 2001. According to later issued began on February 28th, 1998, is yet another in the line of press releases, the key part of the message read: "It is impor- armed conflicts waged on the soil of the former Yugoslavia tant for KLA to understand… that the United States of over the past decade. These wars were part of the process of America will consider all provocative actions of armed the former Yugoslavia's disintegration and the inception of Albanian groups as support to terrorist forces". new states. International institutions in Kosovo pay special attention The war of 1998 - 1999 aggravated unresolved problems to Islamic non-governmental organizations, acting in Kosovo from the past, and added the status of Kosovo as a new prob- thanks to Saudi, Kuwait, and other Gulf countries money. In lem, including: Lack of institutions to deal with general the period between July 19 and 22, 2001, American troops crimes; Organized crime and the lack of domestic capacities arrested four Iranian citizens who were working for a medical to respond to it (another aspect of security concerns), and humanitarian organization in Pristina, under the suspicion lack of a harmonized strategy to deal with inter-ethnic based that they represented danger for secure and safe situation in crimes. Kosovo. Four of them were released in mid September, after The fifth stage begins in July 1999, with the adoption of the diplomatic pressure from Teheran (International Crisis the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and is character- Group, 2001, After Milosevic. A Practical Agenda For Lasting ized by international military (KFOR) and civil (UNMIK) Balkans Peace, ICG Balkans Report No 108, International presence in Kosovo. Milosevic's control over Kosovo came to Crisis Press, Brussels, pp. 20, 21). an end and a new reality was established in Kosovo. Kosovo The meaning of terrorism in Kosovo is a subject of acri- has undergone significant changes since the establishment of monious discussions and an instructive example of political the UN protectorate and the arrival of KFOR forces on the and especially ethno-nationalist manipulation of this term on ground. both sides in the conflict. During the Milosevic's time, Two typical terrorist attacks took place in this period: on Serbian media and politicians routinely used the term sepa- February 16, 2001, in Livadice, close to Merdar, 100 kilo- ratist - terrorist for all Kosovo Albanians who opposed the grams of explosive was activated under a UNHCR bus, killing Belgrade authorities. At the same time, the Serbian authori- 11 and injuring over 40 Serbs; on April 18, 2001, an explosive ties negated any existence of terrorism in the customary device was activated in front of the building of the FRY meaning of the term. Only when political violence and indi- Committee in Pristina, killing one employee of the vidual terrorist acts developed into armed rebellion, in Committee. The media reported and representatives of inter- September 1997, was a seminar organized in Subotica, which national institutions in Kosovo agreed with them, that the was supposed to contribute to the clarification of the term of goal of this attack was to send a message to the Serb popula- criminal act of terrorism. According to newspapers reports, tion to leave the Province. the then Federal Minister of Justice, Z. Knezevic, said that After September 11, the Kosovo Albanian public was what happened in Kosovo was "typical terrorism" requiring a expressing condolences for American victims. Newspapers lot of time and means to be eradicated, creating thus an illu- and TV stations invited citizens to participate in rallies sion of armed rebellion or great-scale conflicts. One part of throughout Kosovo on September 12, and local leaders, rep- the FRY territory was not under the control of Yugoslav resentatives of UN and the USA addressed the silent proces- authorities, but of rebelled ethnic Albanians at that time. sions with candles; the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) Knezevic also stated that mere mentioning of armed rebellion condemned the terrorist attacks and invited all citizens of in that context "encourages terrorist acts in the Province". Kosovo to express their sympathies for the American people; Finally, under the pressure of the international community Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK), lead by Agim Ceku, organ- and after Milosevic's agreement with the USA representa- ized an action of sending blood to America, and Kosovo tives, on October 13, 1998 the Serbian Government made a Lottery donated 10% of total income collected from declaration which obligated judicial bodies not to apply the September 23 - 30 to the victims of terrorist attacks. provision of Article 125 of the KZJ for persons accused of ter- Rada Trajkovic, representative of Serbs in the KTC stat- rorism, but provisions of Chapter 16 ("Criminal acts against ed: "After the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, humanity and international law"), which - inter alia - relates to only those against terrorism, violence and attacks on international and not "internal" terrorism. (From the Orthodox Christians remained on the side of Americans" Declaration of the Government of Serbia, dated October 13, (Kosova Live September 20, 2001). 1998.) September 11 attacks had a positive effect at the level of The fact that Kosovo Albanians committed a relatively Kosovo as well, for they forced Washington to clarify its posi- small number of acts of violence until the end of the nineties

42 forum January - March 2003. sanction Milosevic's refusal of agreement for Kosovo, the KLA became an ally and protege of the NATO. Later, in the period from summer 1999 to September 11, 2001, Washington and its allies were tolerant for Albanian extremism, which was the result of refusal to risk the lives of members of NATO forces in order to prevent and punish interethnic crimes in Kosovo (ICG. 2001:20). Faced with increase of violence in Kosovo, the international community introduced stricter security measures. After the murder of a Serb, an additional number of KFOR soldiers were deployed, with the task of strengthening patrols in the region of Kamenica, where terrorist act took place. The media took one of the key posi- tions in the development of conflict, terrorism, and finally NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia. Majority of the world media see the repressive system of Serbia as main culprit, while other foreign media discovered another side of the conflict. In the middle of 1997, the New York Times published an interview with one of the KLA members. That was the first has not wavered Serbs in their conviction that "terrorism" was time that one of the members of the Albanian terrorist organ- appropriate term. Such perception also spread on broader ization showed up in the media in order to "explain the pro- interpretation of events. The NATO bombardment of the gram and goals for which his organization fights". FRY in 1999 was thus seen by many Serbs as use of terrorist Political violence and violence driven by ethnic, that is, means in order to protect terrorists. Murders and abudction motives of revenge, represent two very serious problems that of about 1.300 Serbs in the period after June 1999 con- impose skepticism about possibilities to democratize Kosovo, firmed, in the eyes of Serbs, that terrorism was inevitably con- and create true political tolerance and tolerance between eth- nected with ambitions of Albanians in Kosovo. nic groups. Political violence happens in Kosovo mainly dur- For Albanians, terror and terrorism are synonyms for ing pre-election campaigns. The same happened in actions of the state authorities, and Albanian extremism and November 2001. With that regard, Koha Ditore in its issue even murders and abductions of Serbs represent reasonable from November 17 published an article from famous acts of revenge that in no way discredit the political project of American daily "The Christians Science Monitor", under the separating from Serbia. title "Political Violence on the Eve of Elections", emphasizing, From the perspective of the international community, among other things, the following: "Reports of the UN Police which is placed between these two communities, the nature of indicate that the most of crimes committed by Albanians were local terrorism was eventually changing. At the beginning, committed against Albanians, who make up 90% of the total the USA reacted on KLA with animosity. The western press population. Most of violence is pure crime - for gain, plunder, claimed that KLA cooperates with Osama Bin Laden. James local conflicts, score-settling, etc. That is the reason why Jolly, spokesperson of the USA stated that the VJ action on international officials, judicial bodies and police are con- the border with Albania was "legitimate and legal" and vinced that an insignificant number of violent acts has politi- Richard Holbrook was talking about "Ho Chi Minh Road" for cal motives". The most cases of violence remain unresolved, weapons transported from Albania to Kosovo (Karadjis, primarily because judiciary has not been functioning. 2001). In 1998, Special American Envoy Robert Gelbard Besides, there is obstruction and intimidation by criminal repeated the words of official Belgrade and described KLA as groups and networks. Also, there is no coordinated coopera- terrorists. One year later, when western forces decided to tion between judiciary and police, which create ground for

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the development of organized crime that is striking deeper ment was by Baton Haxhiu, the then editor-in-chief of Koha and deeper root. In the situation of such a judicial vacuum, Ditore, who emphasized: "This crime reminds me of the mas- the media sometimes take one of the sides in the conflict, but sacre in the village of Racak." Other media published the they also try to interpret motives and identify persons news mostly on the first page, characterizing this act as involved in crimes and organized crime. For example, daily "severe crime that casts a blot upon Kosovo", but they did not Koha Ditore, published by well known publicist Veton Surroi get involved with comments and in depth analyses about per- and daily Zeri, published by Blerim Shala, also well known sons involved and motives of the crime, although some media Kosovo publicist, are regarded as media with most influence timidly used the syntagm "crime motivated by ethnic hatred.". in forming public opinion in Kosovo, based on many UNMIK faced the complexity of the situation in Kosovo researches and public surveys. Rilindja and Kosova Sot also during 2002, in attempts to make first serious steps towards have a certain influence. the establishment of the rule of law. The arrest of Dukadjin The comprehension of political violence and terrorism in Group, on June 18, 2002, composed of five leading members Kosovo is aggravated by omnipresent belief in so-called con- of the former KLA, including Daut Hharadinaj, brother of spiracy theory. Such interpretations are used by daily Bota Ramush Haradinaj, leader of Alliance for the Future of Sot, which has the biggest printing run, and is partially pub- Kosovo, was the reason for big demonstrations in South-West lished abroad, in western countries with the biggest number Kosovo that lasted for several days. Their sentencing to of Albanian emigrants, as well as by Epoka e Re, which is not imprisonment by international judges, for murders they com- published in Albanian Diaspora on the West. These media mitted on June 25, 1999 in the village of Ratish, four mem- explain the political crime in Kosovo from the aspect of views bers of the Armed Forces of Republic Kosova (FARK), which and interests of certain parties. Everything boils down to were loyal to Rugova, deepened mistrust between Albanians "instrumentalized truths" about each particular crime, that is, and international judges. The reactions to this trial, however, to the "truth" that improves political rating of a certain politi- only indicate some higher security risks in Kosovo: cal party. Bota Sot so claims that murders of politicians in Kosovo (most of them were activists of Rugova's LDK or for- - High level of criminalization of Kosovo, including the mer KLA members), labeled as "political", are in fact the connection between organized crime and political leadership, result of organized crime by political rival LDK, that is, PDK and even some international representatives (Democratic Party of Kosovo) lead by H. Thaci. On the other - Still active presence of former members of Para-militia hand, Epoka e Re, close to Thaci's PDK with its political line forces both among Albanians and Serbs, of whom only a few and editorial policy, writes that LDK kills its own people in are members of Kosovo Protection Corps and Kosovo Police order to accuse of it its political opponents, such as PDK and Forces AAK. - High level of ethno-nationalist mobilization of both com- Koha ditore further suggests that nonpolitically motivated munities, especially of the Albanian community violence is present in addition to politically motivated vio- - Large concentration of international soldiers, police offi- lence. Koha Ditore does not give in to arbitrary interpreta- cers, diplomats and bureaucrats who represent potential, and tions of political crime. Daily Zeri follows the same line, and very easy targets of possible politically motivated terrorist acts often publishes declarations and announcements of political - Weakness of institutions of the interim government of parties on particular cases of political violence and crimes. Kosovo as well as insufficient efficiency of UNMIK, Kosovo The fact that the Albanian media in Kosovo view violence Police Forces and judicial system, which together with des- over minorities, especially Serbs, with "half attention", was perate economic and social situation creates fertile ground confirmed through monitoring of the media in Kosovo by for violence and terrorism. "Center for Humanities - Gani Bobi" in Pristina. Information is published with a minimum of fact-orientated proofs, with There have been more and more indicators of increased no analytical approach, in depth analyses or comments. They violence within the Albanian community itself but also tar- are most often published in not very visible spots, unlike the geted against the international community in the past months. ones on violence over Albanians. Again, Koha Ditore repre- The proof for that is the explosion of an automobile bomb in sents an exception, which published the information on the December 2002, in Pristina, on the Klinton Square, where murder of Turkish-Moslem Skenderi family on the first page, many international bureaucrats are located. Also, the murder under the transparent title "Crime in Prizren". of a key witness in the trial of Dukadjin Group, who was Koha Ditore published two political comments on one of under the protection of the international prosecutor, warns the severest crimes against Serbs, the attack on UNHCR bus, about continued intra-Albanian score settling where political where 11 Serbs were killed. Author of one of them is analyst and criminal motives narrowly overlap. Shkelzen Maliqi, who described the crime as a "reflection of anonymous crime in the process of burying the good image of Kosovo before the international community". The other com-

44 forum January - March 2003. Part II CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions of the rule of Milošević. Unlike classical terrorist attacks by hile high-profile terrorist acts, excluding crimes com- marginal political groups, nobody claimed responsibility for mitted during the wars in former Yugoslavia, have most of these acts. These assassinations can mostly be linked been rare throughout the past decade in the Western to three different origins: (a) Some of these acts are closely WBalkans, the number of incidents in the region high- linked to organized crime, highlighting the intrinsically links lighted in the country studies point to terrorism as a signifi- between organized crime, politics and business in the cant problem. Most of the acts were motivated by extreme Western Balkans; (b) in other cases the acts were aimed at nationalism and endorsed by the authoritarian regimes of the political opponents of the authoritarian regimes and suggest 1990s. Whereas the nature of terrorism and the degree of ter- state involvement in the assassination attempts; (c) finally rorist activity varies considerably throughout the Western some acts were carried out by groups and individuals threat- Balkans, some common trends can be detect which will sug- ened by the policies or revelations of politicians or journalists. gest a number of recommendations, as described below. While the continuing democratization of the region might In total four different types of terrorism and terrorist acts have reduced the number of such acts, assassinations are still can be identified: a serious problem for political stability in the region, as evidenced by the assassination of Boško Buha in June 2002 in Assassinations and Bomb attacks against Public Figures Belgrade. Most countries, especially Serbia, have encountered a series of assassinations (or attempts) of politicians, journal- Ethnically-motivated Attacks against Civilians and ists, and businessmen. The most well known incidents include Property the car bomb against Macedonian president Vladimir Outside the frame of the actual wars, a number of attacks Gligorov and the assassinations in Serbia during the last year occurred in all countries under consideration here against

January - March 2003. forum 45 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

members of other ethnic groups either by small-unknown Drawing on the country studies, the following contributing groups or individuals or by larger military or paramilitary factors can be identified: groups. These include the bombing of houses in Krajina and Bosnia, as well as attacks on Serbs living in Kosovo. Strong Nationalism Individuals and groups with implicit state endorsement have The rise in extreme nationalism has been the key-con- usually carried out these acts and only few cases have lead to tributing factor to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. convictions of perpetrators. Such instances usually occurred While the height of nationalist mobilization was reached in in the framework of political instability and a high degree of the early 1990s, extreme nationalism remains an important ethnic polarization and have thus generally declined in recent aspect of politics in the Western Balkans. Extremist parties, years. The aim of these attacks has usually been to consoli- which endorse the use of force and have been implicated with date ethnic homogeneity and to accelerate 'ethnic cleansing' paramilitary organizations, continue to receive a substantial by instilling fear with members of other ethnic groups. In share of votes in recent elections across the region. Hate some areas there has, however, been an increase of desecra- speech continues to be disseminated by some media. The tion and graffiti against the Jewish community or other absence of any significant steps towards reconciliation and minorities in recent years. establishing responsibility for crimes committed during the wars, with the exception of the ICTY has allowed for the per- International Terrorism sistence of resentment-based nationalism in the Western Internationally organized terrorism has been a relatively Balkans minor phenomenon in the Western Balkans during the past decade. The main expression of international terrorism in Weak States recent years has been the activities of internationally active The states and entities which have emerged from the ruins Islamist terror networks, most importantly Al-Qaida. of Yugoslavia have been often authoritarian but at the same Whereas there have been no attacks by internationally oper- time weak. Many of them do not control their full territory ating terrorist networks in the region, with the exception of and a high degree of corruption and nepotism weaken the Croatia, there is likely to have been a presence of Islamist ter- effectiveness of state organs. This applies in particular in rorist groups in Bosnia. The targets of these groups have been regard to combating organized crime and political violence largely the United States and its representations abroad, against members of other ethnic groups and the dominant rather than domestic targets. one in the state. Instable coalition governments in many of the countries have further weakened effective government Terrorism as Part of Warfare control and lead to intra-governmental power-struggles, A large number of terrorist acts have been carried out by which often link particular parties closer to the administra- both state-run or -controlled actors and Para-military forces tion than the government at large. during the wars and conflicts of the past decade (Croatia 1991-1995, Bosnia 1992-1995, Kosovo 1997-1999, Little Cooperation Macedonia 2001). As the most common aim of most com- The Western Balkans under study here formally consists bating parties was the control of territory and the expulsion only of three states. Two of these states, Yugoslavia (Serbia of members of other ethnic groups, terrorist tactics were and Montenegro) and Bosnia, however, fall into three or two employed to achieve 'ethnic cleansing'. Whereas some move- entities. As a result, the region under study, with approx. 20 ments engaging in such tactics mostly resembled guerilla million inhabitants, is divided into seven countries and enti- groups, others were rather structured as paramilitary forces. ties. Not even these seven units control their full territory, While their activities ended with the end of the respective con- considering enclaves (Kosovo), districts, provinces and other flicts, only few members of such organizations have been formal and informal types of territorial autonomies. The penalized for their activities. cooperation between these units, often mutually antagonistic, only improved slightly in the past year. The relations between These four expressions of terrorism in the Western the countries and entities under study here have been charac- Balkans throughout the past decade have been part of a high terized by a lack of substantial cross-border cooperation. degree of political violence which lead to the death of hundred of thousands citizens of the region and degree of human Socioeconomic Decline rights violations and instability which lead to a massive inter- The process transition has only just begin in most coun- national presence in the region. While it lies beyond the scope tries of the Western Balkans, despite a decade of economic of this report to identify the causes for terrorist activities in decline which leaves large segments of the population below the early 1990s, it is noteworthy that for number of reasons the poverty line and with little prospect for employment. The the political and socio-economic situation in most countries absence of large investments and the low living standards con- of the Western Balkans remains conducive to terrorism. tinue to provide for a source of political instability and social

46 forum January - March 2003. Support Long-term Efforts in Peace- building Here, a reform and development of institutions are the best way to close the area in which terrorist networks could potentially act in terrorism. Economic development, democratization and the stabilization of the societies are especially important in eliminating the conditions that give rise to terrorism. The government and civil society must strive to take seriously the fight for human rights, including minority rights and representation to avoid instrumentalization by terrorist and extremist groups.

Avoid a Too Broad Understanding of Terrorism The conflicts in former Yugoslavia confirm that a too broad usage of the term 'terrorism' to label political and ethnic opponents is conducive to justify extreme government policy prevents the resolution of conflicts, and in fact obscures the causes of the conflict. It also out to be avoided to solely attribute the responsibility for terrorist acts to the perpetrators or some of the organizers, and thus hide the weakness of the state. dissatisfaction, which can easily feed into support for radical The absence of full state control over its territory and borders political options favoring the use of force. is a principal cause for the spread of terrorism and organized crime, while the crisis of economy, society and national iden- Little Rule of Law tity are their principal sources. The rule of law is only nascent in most countries under study. Institutions tasked with upholding the law have been Monitor Recruitment and Support for International considerably involved in breaking the law in most countries Radical Islamist Networks throughout the 1990s by participating in or endorsing organ- In the western Balkans there is no risk that a significant ized crime and the use of violence against members of other number of Moslems would support Islamic extremists. Still, ethnic groups. Despite overall improvement in the rule of law activities of some Islamic organizations, in B&H and in with the end of authoritarian regimes in the region, the rule Kosovo, could pose an increased danger for the security, of law remains only weakly entrenched and a considerable since these organizations often promote radical interpreta- number of individual for breaches of law in the past remain tions of Islam, incompatible with democratic societies and a in office. multinational environment. While support has been limited, there is a threat that such groups might attract parts of the Recommendations population impoverished and traumatized by the conflicts. Therefore, it is necessary to follow carefully the activities of The analysis in the country studies suggests that a combi- Islamic organizations in Bosnia and in Kosovo that could be nation of factors common to of to all Balkans countries, iden- linked to terrorist networks and might present a potential tified above, and creates an environment, which is conducive danger for security. to terrorism. The following consideration should be the basic priorities Establish Early Warning and Terrorism Monitoring of the combat of terrorism in the region of the western Instruments Balkans: It is especially worrying that there is no independent documentation, research and training unit in this region, which

January - March 2003. forum 47 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

would address these issues in a systematic and long-term manner. While these issues are carefully analyzed around the world, in the countries of the western Balkans they are only a subject of sporadic news articles or individual political affairs. Especially absent is the knowledge of new forms of organized crime, such as Internet financial crime. Only recently, links of terrorism and organized crime have started to be analyzed more carefully. All in all, the state of affairs is paradoxical: the society is crim- inalized, and the public is incapable of taking over the function of control over politicians, who in many things appease those of them actively involved in cooperation with organized crime. In the aim of increasing the degree of public responsibility and the feeling for the harmfulness of these occurrences, and for additional encouragement of domestic politicians and the public for struggle against terrorism and organized crime, an organized campaign and education should be initiated in the countries of this region, with participation of governmental institutions, - Fourth, cooperation should include defense ministries but also of nongovernmental institutions and the media. and interior ministries, and that would, on its part, be a significant stimulus to spreading of regional trust, agreements Support Substantial Regional Cooperation and cooperation. In this, the experience of the Nordic The cooperation in the region is possible and necessary, Council could be instructive. since these are countries that constituted a united system until the beginning of the 1990s. All these countries are in the process of transition and have gone through the phase of Continue International Involvement in the Region wars, i.e., armed ethnic conflicts. A part of that cooperation should be the cooperation in the struggle against terrorism Among the means for prevention of lethal violence in the and organized crime, which belong to fundamental hin- Balkans or the violence that would derive from the Balkans, drances to democratization. This cooperation should evolve is the continuation of the engagement of the international in different levels: community in preserving and building of peace. Active inter- - - First, by establishing free passport zone, and customs national involvement in the region, supporting the reform of unions, borders between these countries would become soft, the states and monitoring their development, is a prerequisite easily crossed by people and goods. for the success of the policy recommendations outlined - Second, with organized exchange of data, experience, by above. harmonizing the legislature and institutional frames, as well Terrorism emerges from a particular political, social and as by direct actions of cooperation of competent services, bor- economic context. Without considering this background, ter- ders would become impenetrable to organized crime and terrorism globally and in the Western Balkans will not be tack- rorists. led successfully. Combating terrorism requires a comprehen- - Third, the following is necessary: alignment of the visa sive strategy and has to be embedded in a broader plan for regime with the visa regime of the countries of Schengen; supporting effective, transparent, and democratic states signing of the agreement on accepting illegal immigrants to which interact peacefully with their neighbors and treat their return to their mother country; providing of a reception cen- citizens with equal and with dignity. The freedoms associated tre for foreigners, resolving the problem of repatriation and with modern democratic societies, not their limitations, are asylum providing; ensuring the necessary information and needed in the Western Balkans to curtail terrorism in the radio communication links among competent bodies. future.

48 forum January - March 2003. January - March 2003. forum 49 THE TERRORISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

50 forum January - March 2003.