2922 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

Enemy Dispositions. Cassino and Liri valley sectors. This obser- On the main front, held by Tenth Army, vation covered not only the forward areas and Kesselring adapted his dispositions to a fairly approaches but also many of the gun areas and close copy of our own. On the Adriatic sector ammunition dumps and even, in the case of he organised a holding force which defended a the Poles, Corps Headquarters. In this parti- long stretch of front from the sea to Alfadena, in cular sector it was necessary to erect a vertical the centre of the mountains, with three infantry screen over a mile long to conceal vehicles divisions; this was put under General Hauck passing along the road to the Headquarters of 305 Division and called the " Hauck of 3 Carpathian Division, which was in full view Group"; in function it corresponded to from Monastery Hill. Many new tracks had 5 Corps on our side. From Alfadena to in- to be constructed in 13 Corps' sector leading clusive Cassino was LI (Mountain Corps with down to the chosen crossing sites over the river, three divisions, including i Parachute in and these had to be carefully concealed with Cassino. XIV Panzer Corps commanded the brushwood. All moves forward were made by Liri valley sector, the Aurunci mountains and night and dummy tanks and vehicles were left the west coast as far as Terracina. In the in the areas vacated by armoured formations. valley was a " Blocking Group " in regimental The new artillery positions were so well camou- strength from 305 Division (Hauck) plus a flaged that hardly a shell fell on them before regiment of 15 Panzer Grenadier Division; in the battle opened, although some of the guns the Aurunci mountains were two infantry divi- had carried out registration from their new sions strengthened by three 'battalions from a positions. The French concentration was third in LI Corps and the remainder of 15 particularly well concealed. Into their Panzer Grenadier Division guarded the west Garigliano bridgehead, with a radius of only coast. Fourteenth Army, at Anzio, had five some four thousand yards, they packed twenty divisions, one a Panzer Grenadier division, in battalions, five batteries and two divisional line and a Panzer division in reserve. headquarters; the enemy only credited them These dispositions, especially when con- with one division forward on the whole Corps sidered together with the location of the sector. An even greater feat was the conceal- German mobile reserves, which I shall come ment of the entire Canadian Corps. This was to shortly, were gratifying evidence of the vital to the success of the whole scheme for success both of our security measures and of if the enemy had discovered their true location our cover plan. As I have already explained, our bluff would have been exposed. in order to achieve a secret concentration The plan succeeded perfectly; that it had against the vital point hi sufficient strength to done so was clear to us at the time from give us the necessary superiority it was essential Kesselring's dispositions and was confirmed by not merely to conceal our troop movements but documents subsequently captured. All the also to induce the enemy to believe that the available German mobile formations were dis- troops whose whereabouts were concealed from posed up the west coast. Between the him were intended to be employed in' a totally " Gustav " line and the bridgehead was 15 different direction. I therefore early decided Panzer Grenadier Division (less a regimental that we would take steps to simulate the inten- group); between the bridgehead and the Tiber tion of launching another amphibious landing was 90 Panzer Grenadier Division (less on the west coast, this time directed against elements in Tenth Army reserve); north of the Civitavecchia. The fact that, as was well Tiber in the Civitavecchia area was 29 Panzer known to us, the enemy constantly over- Grenadier Division. In the last area there estimated our total strength in the theatre and, was also 92 Infantry Division, which had not from his own lack of experience of amphibious yet finished training but was fairly complete. operations, was (bad at assessing the probability The other two mobile divisions were .on the of such a threat, would help us in our design; Anzio front, one, 3 Panzer Grenadier, partly moreover I considered that the surprise which in the line and the other, 26 Panzer, in reserve; had (been sprung on him at Anzio would make these two also were regarded as available for him more than ever willing to believe such use against a seaborne landing.* A natural a landing possible and more cautious in guard- corollary of this misappreciation was that ing against a repetition of his surprise. Such a Kesselring badly underestimated the forces cover plan had the further advantage that which we could bring against his main front. Kesselring would be bound to expect that, as in As late as I2th May, the day after our attack, January, we should begin with a strong attack he calculated that between Cassino and „ the oh the Garigliano so that the actual opening of west coast we had six divisions in line, against the offensive would not cause him to revise his which his four should be quite adequate, con- appreciation. Orders to put this plan into sidering the strength of his defences; in actual effect were issued on :i8th April. The forces fact we had the equivalent of over thirteen. which were notionally to 'be employed in the By this means we ensured that we had our amphibious operations were to be I Canadian three to one superiority at the vital point, that Corps with its two divisions and 36 United the German reserves were far away and that States Division. They were directed to simu- they were eventually committed, when Kessel- late wireless traffic and take other measures to ring had at last realised the trap into which create the impression that they were training he had fallen, reluctantly, piecemeal and too in the Naples—Salerno area for the proposed late.j operations. * The Hermann Goering Division was at Leghorn, Besides the positive measures of deception and responsible for guarding the coast in that area it was necessary to carry out negative but for this we cannot claim the credit; the division measure of concealment and camouflage on a was still earmarked for France. very large scale. This presented great diffi- f The date of the attack was also well concealed. Captured documents show that General von Vietinghofl, culties, since almost the whole of the front of commanding Tenth Army, proposed to return to attack was overlooked by the enemy and he Germany on leave on u May. One of his Corps had particularly good observation m the Commanders picked on 24 May as our D-day.