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Ideology and Moral: Relationship of Norm and Ideal in the Light of Synergetic Philosophy of History

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E3S Web of Conferences 210, 16031 (2020) https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202021016031 ITSE-2020 Ideology and moral: relationship of norm and ideal in the light of synergetic philosophy of history Sergey Busov1,*, Mariya Zobova2, Alexey Rodukov2 1St. Petersburg National Research University of Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics (University ITMO), Saint Petersburg, Russia 2St. Petersburg State University of Telecommunications after prof. M.A.Bonch – Bruyevich (SUT after prof. M.A.Bonch-Bruevich, Saint-Petersburg), St. Petersburg, Russia Abstract. The formation of notions about the mechanism of transition from the social order to the chaos and vice versa - from the chaos to a new order, represented by the synergetic philosophy of history, which is entirely based on the ideas of V.P. Branskiy, allows us to take a fresh look at the process of changing value systems in society. It is based on the process of changing ideals. The social ideal aims to overcome the contradictions of life. However, when its main function is implemented, some contradictions disappear, but others appear. The selection of viable ideals leads us only to a temporary softening of social contradictions: the implementation of new ideals deduces the society from the deadlock, but at the same time, it forms the conditions for new contradictions and new crisis in the new system of values. The study of the process of self- organization of ideals and values allowed the St. Petersburg school of social synergetics to discover the operation of law of correlation of the standards of behavioral stereotype to the standards of ethical ideal. The study of this law serves as a system-forming element in the study of the ideology of society, it allows us to understand why an adequate form of existence of such cultural universals as freedom, goodness, beauty, truth, besides the ideal, is also the norm - as value and the regulator of relations. 1 Introduction We live in a complex and rapidly changing world. Theoretical comprehension of social processes, represented by the synergetic philosophy of history, entirely based on the ideas of V.P. Branskiy (1930-2017), allows us to understand the mechanism of transitions from social order to chaos and vice versa from chaos to a new order. Such transitions are made in all spheres of social life, but in this case we are interested in the process of changing value systems. In order to explain the evolution of culture, it is necessary to identify the general patterns of the development of social ideals that underlie the value orientations of people. The concept of an ideal is expressed in the concept of an object devoid of contradictions. Hence it follows that the main function of the ideal in the process of its realization is * Corresponding author: [email protected] © The Authors, published by EDP Sciences. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). E3S Web of Conferences 210, 16031 (2020) https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202021016031 ITSE-2020 associated with the construction of such an object. The social ideal is designed to remove the contradictions of life, however, with its implementation, some contradictions disappear, but others arise. Any ideal sooner or later becomes obsolete and leaves the historical scene. A new ideal, which, of course, is not the only one that claims to dominate, arises through the mental liberation of society from the system of contradictions. According to D.A. Zhurenkov, the selection of viable ideals leads to a temporary softening of social contradictions, softening of the crisis and, by the implementation of new ideals, brings society out of the impasse, but at the same time, it “brings in the new unified system of values the beginnings of new contradictions and the embryo of future discord” [1]. Social crises also have a pronounced existential coloring and are associated with the meanings of people's lives. If the concept of truth is not capable of answering the question about the meaning of human life, then the ideal within a certain system of values is directly responsible for this question, which is clearly demonstrated by the history of society. The life and activity of people, illuminated by a certain ideal, are filled with deep meaning until this ideal is replaced by another. With the decline of the dominant ideal, the activities of many people lose their former meaning. But only a new viable ideal and a new ideology can bring an individual out of the crisis, but, unfortunately, neither truth nor science can claim this role. However, ideology needs truth in order to consolidate its ideal and at the same time it opposes science in the struggle for domination over the minds of people, claiming the role of a universal means for solving any problems. As E.V. Shcherbakova, leader of the St. Petersburg school of social synergetics, correctly noted that the meaning of both history and individual life is revealed not by science, but by ideology, but to understand how she does is possible only with the help of science [2]. 2 Materials and Methods Ideological contradictions are the mirror of all social problems. An important question, in this regard, remains the question how social evolution absorbs the universal human content of cultural values in the stream of people's value orientations at different historical times and levels of social relations. The answer suggests itself: an adequate form of existence of cultural universals such as freedom, goodness, beauty, truth, in addition to the ideal – with its inherent functional wealth, is the norm (as a value in general and a regulator of relations, in particular). Thus, freedom appears as a norm (most often – moral) and as an ideal, i.e. there is a relationship between being and what should be in freedom as a source of development of relations. The same applies to other cultural universals – truth, goodness, beauty. Yet the universal of freedom occupies a special place; it is a kind of universal equivalent in the world of cultural values, leading to the formation of a norm as a range of adaptive activity of the subject, directing a person, guided by an ideal, to transform himself and his environment. Another aspect is the contradiction between everyday life and ideology. Ideology seeks to overcome, destroy the world of everyday life forms based on the norms and values corresponding to them, and replace them, through sacrificial rejection of them for the sake of a “bright future”. In order to form a moral assessment of people's actions, it is necessary to have an ethical criterion, a certain integrative standard of value, which, being the core of the system of ethical standards, creates its integrity. Such a standard is an ethical ideal (as a rule, an ideal person) as a subject of obligation. The moral aspect of the ideal person assumes that over the area of his activity, which is determined by the formula: “I do everything what I want and can,” dominates the area “I do what I have to do.” The ethical ideal, therefore, is associated with obligation, but not only, but also with what a person can do in specific 2 E3S Web of Conferences 210, 16031 (2020) https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202021016031 ITSE-2020 conditions, i.e. connected with existence. According to the apt expression of V.P. Bransky, the opposition of the real and the proper is formed, expressed by the opposition of truth and ideal [3]. All the diversity of views on life and on the conformity of norms and ideals is carried by ideology. Delving deeper into the content of ideology, it should be recognized that the core of this social phenomenon is the ratio of norm and ideal. Ideology has three points of support – the ideal, the canon and the ritual – and these latter are dressed in a special allegorical “suit”, the elements of which are symbols, images, myths and cults. Only in such a “suit” does the ideal become universally valid, takes possession of the mass and descends from “heaven” to earth, S.S. Horuzhy [4]. The listed features of ideology are a common place for all any significant ideological attitudes, ideological systems, value orientations that unite people, direct and motivate them to implement any significant social, political, cultural or technical project. So, for example, the generally recognized “theoretical” part of the ideology of Catholicism is the treatises “On the City of God” by Augustine and “Sum of theology” by Thomas Aquinas, in which the religious ideal is not only colorfully drawn, but also philosophically substantiated. There, the ideal is represented by an ideal person – Jesus Christ, and is also expressed in the person of the saints of the Christian Church, S.S. Horuzhy [5]. More straightforward and at the same time more perfect than in world religions, the ideal, as a phenomenon of the spiritual life of man, is apparently not represented anywhere. And where there is a secular ideology and a secular ideal is clearly expressed, they invariably have a reflection of religiosity and holiness. This “sinned” not only the communist ideology, but even the Nazi and ISIS. The last two are prohibited in the Russian Federation, however, it is difficult to talk about their spirituality in view of the strong discrepancy between the norm and the ideal: the social norm they introduce does not allow a person to successfully adapt to the proposed conditions, and the ideal ignores the possibility of his self-realization, requiring excessive sacrifices. As history shows, no ideal can be realized without making sacrifices on its “altar”, without the sacrifice procedure, which becomes the norm of behavior.
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