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Copyrighted Material Trim Size: 6in x 9in Alrifai bindex.tex V1 - 02/06/2015 3:21pm Page 223 Index Page numbers followed by f or t refer to figures and tables, respectively. A Arboun, 134–136 Abraham, 8 Arcapita, 152 Abu Dhabi, 151 Argentina, 25, 30 Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (ADIB), 107, Arizona, 93 150, 169 ARMs (adjustable-rate mortgages), 56, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UK, 111 63 Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), 56, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 63 Nations), 40 Aegean Sea, 9 Asia: Afghanistan, 161–164 and financial crisis of 2008, 75 Ahli United Bank, 111, 169 Islamic finance and banking in, AIG, 51, 62, 68, 189 108–110 Al-Ahli Commercial Bank, 111 Asian financial crisis (1997), 39–42 Al Baraka Banking Group, 108 Asset-based financing (asset-backed Al Baraka Turk, 108 financing), 187–188 Alcohol, 117–118 Asset monetization, 11 Algeria, 107, 162 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Alinma Bank, 105 (ASEAN), 40 Al-Qaeda, 162 Aston Martin, 167 Al-Rajhi Bank, 105, 109, 169 Asya Finans, 108 Aluminum, 122 Australia, 32, 200 Auto financing, 144 Amanah Islamic Bank, 110 Amana mutual funds, 166 Ameen Housing Co-operative (Palo B Alto, California), 113 Babylon, 8 American Home Mortgage Investment, Bagehot, Walter, 25, 46 55 COPYRIGHTEDBahrain, MATERIAL 1–2, 104, 105–106, 152, 153, Amundi, 109 155, 176 Anadolu Finans, 108 Bailout (Barofsky), 64–65 Animals, as form of money, 7–8 Bangladesh, 110 Ansar Co-operative Housing Banks, first, 13 Corporation, 112 Bank Albilad, 105 Arab Bank, 164 Bank bailouts, 66, 67t, 80–82 Arab oil embargo, 101 Bank failures, 27, 34, 35, 35f, 66, Arab Spring, 85, 107 67t 223 Trim Size: 6in x 9in Alrifai bindex.tex V1 - 02/06/2015 3:21pm Page 224 224 INDEX Bank for International Settlements BNP Paribas, 106 (BIS), 17, 81, 91, 97, 189, Boesky,Ivan,33 192–193 Bosnia, 162 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB), Boubyan Bank, 105 108 Brady, Nicholas, 31 Bank Negara, 108, 109 Brady Bonds, 31 Banknotes, 10, 13 Brady Plan, 31 Bank of America, 169, 190, 191 Brazil, 25, 30, 31, 204 Bank of Canada, 201 Bretton Woods Agreement, 18–19, 28, Bank of Credit and Commerce 93, 182, 186 International (BCCI), 164 Bretton Woods System, 18–20 Bank of England, 10, 13, 14–15, 29, BRICS nations, 204 69, 76, 78, 201 Brunei, 41, 104, 108, 110 Bank of Japan, 37, 78, 79, 88 Buffet, Warren, 189 Bank of London and the Middle East, Bundesbank, 201 111 Bush, George W., 52, 163 Bank of Sweden, 10 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, 151 C Bank of Whittier, 113 California, 93 Barclays, 89, 90 California Gold Rush, 199 Barofsky, Neil, 64–65 Call options, 135 Barter, 8 Canada, 27, 28, 32, 38, 112–113 Bay al-salam (forward sale), 131, 132, Capital Purchase Program, 66, 67t 132f Caribou Coffee Company, 114 BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce Carlyle Group, 1 International), 164 Cass Business School, 170 Bear Stearns, 2, 55, 66, 67 Caste systems, 8 Belgium, 75, 199 Cattle, as form of money, 7 Benes, Jaromir, 202 Cave of the Patriarchs, 8 Benevolent loans, 100 CDOs, see Collateralized debt Berkshire Hathaway, 189 obligations Bernanke, Ben, 51, 199 CDSs, see Credit default swaps Bernstein, Jared, 204 Cecola, Randall, 33 Bible, 8 Central banks, 75–79, 76f, 83 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 104 Central Bank (Russia), 43, 44 Bills of exchange, 11 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 164 BIMB (Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad), Certificates of deposit, 141 108 Charitable giving, 99 Bimetallic standard, 14 Charles I, King, 12 BinLaden,Osama,162 Chechnya, 162 BIS, see Bank for International Checking accounts, 141 Settlements Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 43 Bismarck, Otto von, 15 Chicago Plan, 202–203 Black Monday (1987), 31–33, 32f Chile, 25 Blackstone Group, 92, 93 China, 9, 10, 41, 75, 79, 197, 200, 201, The Black Swan (Taleb), 188 204 Trim Size: 6in x 9in Alrifai bindex.tex V1 - 02/06/2015 3:21pm Page 225 Index 225 Church’s Chicken, 114 Credit cards, 143–144 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 164 Credit default swaps (CDSs), 61, 62, CIMB Bank, 139 62f, 69, 92 CIMB Islamic, 139 Credit ratings, 169t Cisco Systems, 48 Credit Suisse, 106, 110 Citibank, 30, 106, 163, 190, 191 Crude oil, 122 Citigroup, 89, 90, 169 Cuba, 160 Citi Islamic Investment Bank, 106 Currency, 13–14 Clinton, Bill, 38, 53 Currency Wars (Rickards), 204 Clipping, coin, 9 Current accounts, 141 Code of Hammurabi, 8 Coinage, 8–9 Cold War, 160 D Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), Dar al-Mal al-Islami (DMI), 110 59–62, 60f, 65, 69 Daric, 14 Colorado, 201 Davis, Polk & Wardwell, 33 Commercial Bank of Kuwait, 105 Debt: Commodities, 122 growth of, since 2008 financial crisis, Commodity value, 10 91f Conference of Finance Ministers of and instability of financial system, 82, Islamic Countries (Karachi, 1970), 83f, 90, 91, 97, 181–182, 182f, 102 186–189 Construction financing (istisna), 132, origins of, 8 133, 133f Debt: The First 5,000 Years (Graber), 8 Consumer banking, 140–147 Debt slaves, 100 consumer finance, 143–144 Defense industries, 118 deposits and savings accounts, Deferred-payment financing, 127 141–143 Deflation, 27 home finance, 144–147 Denarius, 14 Conventional finance and insurance, Deposits, 141–143 prohibition against, 118 Depository Institutions Deregulation Copper, 122 and Monetary Control Act, 34 Corporate finance, 147–154 Derivatives, 67–68, 91–93, 189–191 alternatives to lending in, 147–149 Derivatives market, size of, 81 sukuk in, 149–151 Deutsche Bank, 89, 90, 92, 106, 170 venture capital and private equity in, Devon Bank, 114 151–154 DIFC (Dubai International Financial Cost of funds, 141–142 Centre), 106 Cost-plus financing (murabaha), 127, Diminishing partnership structure, 145 127f, 128, 146–147, 172–175, Dimon, Jamie, 89 174f Dinar, 14 Counterparty risk, 68, 170 Discount rate, 53f Countrywide Financial Corporation, 64 DJIA, see Dow Jones Industrial Average Credit: Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and origins of, 8 Consumer Protection Act, 74, 75, secured vs. unsecured, 143 80, 190 Trim Size: 6in x 9in Alrifai bindex.tex V1 - 02/06/2015 3:21pm Page 226 226 INDEX Dot-com bubble (2000), 20, 46–48, European Islamic Investment Bank, 47f, 188 111 Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), European Market Infrastructure 2, 26, 26f, 27, 29, 85 Regulation (EMIR), 190 and Black Monday, 31, 32, 32f Eurozone debt crisis, 82, 90 and financial crisis of 2008, 52, 66 Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), 38, Draghi, Mario, 197 39 Dresdner Bank, 163 Drexel Burnham Lambert, 33 F Dubai, 69, 106, 107 Factoring, 148–149 Dubai International Financial Centre Faisal Finance, 108 (DIFC), 106 Faisal Finans Kurumu, 108 Dubai Islamic Bank, 102, 107, 140, Faisal Islamic Bank (Egypt), 102 150 Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan, 102 , Dutch tulip mania, 23, 24f 25 Faisal Private Bank, 110 Fannie Mae, see Federal National Mortgage Association E Fed, see Federal Reserve Bank Easy credit, 56, 88–89 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation EEC (European Economic Community), (FDIC), 35, 51 20 Federal Home Loan Mortgage E.F. Hutton & Co., 33 Corporation (FHLMC, Freddie Egypt, 28, 85, 101, 102, 107 Mac), 51, 53, 54, 57–59, Egypt, ancient, 9 63–64 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Federal National Mortgage Association 51, 52, 74 (FNMA, Fannie Mae), 51, 53, EMIR (European Market Infrastructure 57–59, 63–64 Regulation), 190 Federal Reserve Act, 15 Emirates airline, 150 Federal Reserve Bank (Fed): Empires, 8–9 and Black Monday, 33 Energy commodities, 122 creation and purpose of, 13, 15–16 England, 10–13 and financial crises, 73 Enron, 61 and financial crisis of 2008, 52–54, Entertainment, 118 66, 66f, 76–78 Environmental concerns, 118 and gold, 17, 201 ESF (Exchange Stabilization Fund), 38, and oil crisis, 30 39 quantitative easing policy of, 76–79, Ethics, 119–121, 194–195 183, 184 Eurisbank, 112 Federal Reserve System, 15 Europe, Islamic finance and banking in, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 110–112 Corporation (FSLIC), 34, 35 European Central Bank (ECB), 76, 78, FHMLC, see Federal Home Loan 87, 88, 197 Mortgage Corporation European Commission, 75 Fiat currency, 14, 20, 181, 182 European Economic Community (EEC), Finance One, 40 20 Financial centers, 15 Trim Size: 6in x 9in Alrifai bindex.tex V1 - 02/06/2015 3:21pm Page 227 Index 227 Financial crises, 7, 23–50, 24t. See also Forward sale (bay al-salam), 131, 132, Global financial crisis (2008); Next 132f financial crisis; Prevention of future Fractional reserve banking system, 13 crises France, 20, 112, 199 Asian financial crisis (1997), 39–42 Franklin Templeton, 109 Black Monday (1987), 31–33, 32f Fraud, 33, 34, 49, 62–65, 168 dot-com bubble (2000), 46–48, 47f Freddie Mac, see Federal Home Loan Dutch tulip mania, 23, 24f, 25 Mortgage Corporation Japanese asset bubble collapse Freeman, Robert, 33 (1990s), 35–38, 36f –37f FSA (Financial Services Authority), Latin American debt crisis (1980s), 111 30–31 FSLIC (Federal Savings and Loan Mexican peso crisis (1994), 38, 39, Insurance Corporation), 34, 35 39f FT30 Index, 29 OPEC oil crisis (1973), 28–30, 28f, FTSE 100 Index, 32f 29f FX (foreign exchange) swaps, 192–193 Russian ruble crisis (1998), 42–46, 44f, 45f U.S. savings and loan crisis G (1989–1991), 33–35 G-10 (Group of 10), 20 Wall Street crash of 1929 and Great G-20 (Group of Twenty Finance Depression, 25–27, 26f Ministers and Central Bank Financial Crisis Enquiry Report, 65 Governors), 74 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery Gambling, 117, 121 and Enforcement Act, 35 Games of chance, 117 Financial Services Authority (FSA), 111 Gatehouse Bank, 111 Financial systems, 7–9, 181–186 GCC, see Gulf Cooperation Council Financing: GE Capital, 150–151 construction, 132, 133, 133f Genesis, book of, 8 cost-plus, 127, 127f, 128 Georgia (U.S.
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