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Open Door for Forces of Finance at the ECB Five Hundred Lobbyists for the Financial Sector at Large in the European Central Bank – by Invitation Table of Contents

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Open Door for Forces of Finance at the ECB Five Hundred Lobbyists for the Financial Sector at Large in the European Central Bank – by Invitation Table of Contents Open door for forces of finance at the ECB Five hundred lobbyists for the financial sector at large in the European Central Bank – by invitation Table of contents Table of contents 2 Introduction 3 1. The ECB advisory groups: mandates and composition 5 2. Regulatory capture via advisory groups 10 3. Ethics rules 15 Conclusion 20 Endnotes 21 Published by Corporate Europe Observatory, October 2017 Written by Kenneth Haar Edited by Katharine Ainger With thanks to Vicky Cann, Theresa Crysmann and Pascoe Sabido Design and layout by Stijn Vanhandsaeme ([email protected]) 2 Table of contents Open door for forces of finance at the ECB Introduction It matters how the European Central Bank (ECB) makes its decisions, and it matters who it considers its experts and advisors. Especially if those advisors bear all the traits of lobbyists for the financial sector, and not least when the ECB is becoming a more and more powerful institution. In response to the financial crisis it has seen its mandate and working area increased. Supervision of the biggest banks has been handed over to the ECB, it is taking on a bigger role in setting up rules and procedures for financial markets, it has become co-administrator of debt ridden countries, and a series of asset purchasing programmes have seen it spend trillions to boost the European economy. Yet an incredible two thirds of the banks and financial entities under ECB supervision hold 346 seats in its own advisory groups, and this is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to conflicts of interest between the role of the ECB and those whom it chooses to advise it. The growth in the ECB’s role notwithstanding, its ethics rules have remained static and do not match the current status of the institution. This is particularly the case for There is an intense and troubling the way the institution associates with the private finan- traffic in and out of the doors cial sector. This report puts the spotlight on the role of the bank’s advisory groups – a much overlooked but important of the building in Frankfurt, of part of decisionmaking at the ECB. It shows an intense and representatives from the biggest troubling traffic in and out of the doors of the building in Frankfurt, of representatives from the biggest financial financial corporations in Europe, corporations in Europe, on their way to and from meetings on their way to and from meetings with the ECB leadership. As it stands, they are in a position with the ECB leadership. to play a key role in shaping responses of the ECB to devel- opments in the economy. They serve as advisors on matters that relate to their businesses, and when doing so they fora involving the private sector”, that can involve mixed often appear to be mere lobbyists for vested interests – in- audiences with participation from the public sector and/or vited through the front door to influence decisionmaking. independent specialists; these enable the ECB to “maintain the necessary dialogue with representative associations Interaction is both frequent and broad in scope. At the time and civil society.”1 of writing, the ECB is running 22 advisory groups with 517 representatives from 144 different entities: either corpora- Who can argue against the ECB interacting with the outside tions, companies or associations, mainly trade associations. world in a broad sense? Would anyone be against engage- They deal with both the ECB’s bond purchases, banking ment with the public per se? Hardly. But the message from regulation, technical regulations, frameworks underpin- the ECB is misleading if we agree that “civil society” implies ning securities trading, and much more. The questions are a variety of interests, some economic, some non-econom- who they are, and how the ECB handles its interaction with ic, some with links to companies and corporations, some outside groups. that represent other interests. When looking at the advi- sory groups of the ECB, it quickly becomes clear that the When challenged by Corporate Europe Observatory the composition of these groups are not representative of the ECB responded that participation in such groups helps public, and digging a bit deeper, reveals no attempt is made the ECB gather information, helps it effectively “dis- to ensure representation of interests outside the private charge its mandate”, and finally it helps the ECB “explain financial sector, nor is the ECB interested in gathering in- its policy decisions to citizens”. The ECB, a letter from spiration from independent academics. All groups but one the Chief Compliance Officer asserts, hosts “a number of are completely dominated by financial corporations, and Open door for forces of finance at the ECB Introduction 3 the number of seats taken by the private financial sector is an astonishing 98 per cent (508 out of 517). This begs the question whether there is a risk of ‘regula- tory capture’ or undue influence exerted by lobbyists from financial corporations via the privileged position that a seat in an advisory group offers them. Corporate Europe Observatory believes there is. The way some financial scan- dals and serious reform proposals are handled by the ECB resembles the handiwork of what one Commissioner in 2013 said is “probably the most powerful lobby in the world”, the financial lobby.2 So far, the ECB seems to have ignored the issue completely, and appears to be agnostic about the inherent dangers in an advisory regime dominated by the private sector that con- trols the financial markets, the very sector ECB is supposed to help regulate. Now is the time to push from the outside. Luckily, we don’t need to look far to find a way to start: a similar phenomenon – corporate dominance of ex- pert groups – was detected long ago in the case of the Commission. While the problem of corporate dominance still remains there, the Commission has at least been forced to make several reforms. Thanks to the work done by the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman, a yardstick by which the legitimacy of a system of advisory groups can be measured and reformed, now exists. By contrast, the ECB has undertaken no reforms whatsoev- er. The ECB seems to live in its own bubble, setting its own low standards on key ethical issues. We argue that situation is not sustainable and needs to be addressed. 4 Introduction Open door for forces of finance at the ECB 1. The ECB advisory groups: mandates and composition The ECB groups with private sector participation serve several purposes. They provide platforms to explain the positions of the ECB to big players in the market, as stated by the ECB, but their significance goes far beyond that. That becomes clear when reading the mandates for the groups and the minutes from the meetings. They are about gathering information and exchanging views to ensure decisionmakers in the institution are well informed ahead of political decisions. They can be “either topic-based or open-ended”, the Chief Compliance and Governance Officer of the ECB wrote to Corporate Europe Observatory.3 In other words, they can deal with anything related to the mandate and the activities of the ECB, and nowadays that is no small matter. The original mandate of the ECB is to conduct help of representatives of financial corpora- monetary policy to “maintain price stability” by tions in the advisory groups. setting the key interest rates and control money supply. From 1999 to the advent of the financial While monetary policy remains the chief con- crisis, this was the simple, important task allocat- cern, the ECB of today sees financial markets in ed to the central bankers in the decisionmaking general as its remit, and that is reflected in its structure of the ECB. But from 2008, the ECB advisory structure, big in numbers as well as in started undertaking initiatives that went beyond scope. its earlier remit. These include: ˍ A broad programme of infusion of capital into the economy via diverse forms of asset How many groups, purchases, including corporate bonds under the Corporate Sector Purchasing Programme and who is in them? (CSPP) and government bonds purchased on the market, typically from banks, under The use of advisory groups with private industry programmes such as the Securities Markets participation has been a hallmark of the ECB Programme (SMP). from early days. Of the existing groups, some ˍ Participation in the Troika (along with the have been up and running since 1999 when the Commission and the International Monetary ECB took charge of monetary policy, with the Fund) which saw the ECB co-responsible newest ones formed in 2016. The number of for severe austerity programmes in indebt- groups at any given time depends on whether ed Eurozone member states, as well as very there are ongoing projects with private industry forceful direct, political intervention in coun- participation. One such project is the T2S pro- tries such as Ireland, Italy, and Greece. ject, now in its final phase, which has included ˍ Supervision of the biggest banks in the EU a high number of industry participants in a big under the Banking Union. structure. It is a European system of handling ˍ An increased involvement in financial regula- securities (ie tradable financial assets) transac- tion, both by pushing for reforms such as the tions – both clearing (about making sure both Capital Markets Union, by addressing regu- sides of the trade are in sync about the terms), latory issues on the political agenda (such as and settlement (about the execution of the deal, the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT), and by or honouring of the agreement so to speak).
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