Strategic Identity Signaling in Heterogeneous Networks
Strategic Identity Signaling in Heterogeneous Networks Tamara van der Does1, Mirta Galesic1, Zackary Dunivin2,3, and Paul E. Smaldino4 1Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe NM 87501, USA. 2Center for Complex Networks and Systems Research, Luddy School of Informatics, Computer Science, and Engineering, Indiana University, 919 E 10th St, Bloomington, IN 47408 USA 3Department of Sociology, Indiana University, 1020 E Kirkwood Ave, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA 4Department of Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, 5200 Lake Rd, Merced, CA 95343 USA Abstract: Individuals often signal identity information to facilitate assortment with partners who are likely to share norms, values, and goals. However, individuals may also be incentivized to encrypt their identity signals to avoid detection by dissimilar receivers, particularly when such detection is costly. Using mathematical modeling, this idea has previously been formalized into a theory of covert signaling. In this paper, we provide the first empirical test of the theory of covert signaling in the context of political identity signaling surrounding the 2020 U.S. presidential elections. We use novel methods relying on differences in detection between ingroup and outgroup receivers to identify likely covert and overt signals on Twitter. We strengthen our experimental predictions with a new mathematical modeling and examine the usage of selected covert and overt tweets in a behavioral experiment. We find that people strategically adjust their signaling behavior in response to the political constitution of their audiences and the cost of being disliked, in accordance with the formal theory. Our results have implications for our understanding of political communication, social identity, pragmatics, hate speech, and the maintenance of cooperation in diverse populations.
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