CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY_, NORTHRIDGE

COVERAGE OF ITPJ:.O-E'TEIOPIAN HAR, 1936-1941 1 ' BY FIVE WES'I·Eim NEWSPAPERS

A thesis submitted in partial satisfa,::ti.on of the reqQirements for the degree of Master of Arts in

Mass Corrmnmication

by

Yohannes Melaku The Thesis of Yohannes Melaku is approved:

D,r. Ram Roy, Advisor __ _

California State University, Northridge DEDICATION

To those who shared their love:

Dr. Thomas Kilgore, Jr. & Mrs. Jeannetta Scott Kilgore

iii. p •

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have very little to claim for the success of this study. I owe it all to many people who have helped me in several areas. Some have given their advice and consent; more have put some work into it; and. many have shared my. worries.

Among all., I would like to pay tribute to my committee members, and, particularly, to Dr. Tom Reilly, Associate Professor of Journalism at California State University, Northridge, who has gone out of ~is schedule many times to straighten out my work. He not only helped put this thesis together, but he has also shared some moments of consulting that can be vital to any foreign student.

I am also grateful to Dr. Michael Emery, Professor of Journal­ i.sm, who has worked with such talent on my project and who was also wise in making the necessary changes without hurting my feelings.

Dr. Ram Roy, Professor of Political Science, deserves great appreciation from me, not only as a committee member of this thesis, but also for the help he has provided through my college years at the

University, going back to my undergraduate days.

Many of those whom I have not mentioned by name will always have a special place in my heart.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION • • ...... iii ACKNOWLEDm'lENTS...... iv ABSTRACT vi

CHAPTER r. INTRODUCTION •• ...... 1 Background Pre-'t-Tar Period Newspapers Under Study Foreign Correspondents and the Ethiopian \olar Organiz.ation of the Thesis

II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ...... 22

Abyssinia and World Politics Abyssinia and the League of Nations "rhe Walwal Incident and the War of 1936 Five Years of Italian Rule: 1936-1941

III. THE OPENING INCIDENTS ...... 52

The Wa1wal Crisis of 1934 Incidents of 1935 The War of 1936 · Victory for Ethiopia: 1941

IV. Su~~JU~Y AND CONCLUSIONS 91

BIJ3J..,lOGHAPfff • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . 100

v ABSTRAa!'

COVERAGE OF ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR, 1936-1941 BY Fri/E WESTERN NEWSPAPERS

by

Yohannes Melaku

:ttJB.ster of Arts in Mass Communication

August 1977

Although it was only one of many episodes in the crises lead- ing to the Second World War, the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1936-1941 has left a mark on world history. The purpose of this study is to analyze the coverage of selected newspapers in relation to this war from its beginning in 19311- to its end in 1941.

The publications selected for study include: the New York

~imes, the Chicago Daily Tribune, the Christian Science Monitor, the

Los Angeles Tim~, and the London Times. The newspapers were chosen as being representative of the region known as the "Western world", and also on the reputation of the newspapers and their perceived influence

11 on the tt~ie st •

The analysis of the press coverage is divided into four differ-

~nt 1~riods in the war. The first section covers the smaller but critical incidents of 1934. The second section looks at follow-up coverage of the incidents of 1935, which built the bridge leading to th(; \lur of 1936. The third section presents an analysis of' the "real

vi war" of 1936, which caused Ethiopia's defeat. The final section cap­

tures the highlights of the Ethiopian comeback and victory of 1941.

The study found many factors. Among these are: (1) an increase

in the space allotment that the newspapers provided as the war contin­

ued; (2) the pattern of continuity that the newspapers followed in pre­

senting the story; (3) generally favorable placement of stories; (4)

use of illustrations such as maps, drawings and photos; (5) the use of

lengthy stories to narrate the different events; and, (6) the positive

impact on Haile Selassie's world image.

There were also some ·weak points discovered in the coverage.

Most of the newspapers did not provide sufficient background to their

articles to make the news understandable to their readers. The use of

language, particularly in one newspaper in the study, was not justifi­ able in terms o~ fairness. And, most of all, objectivity and balance

in the reporting was considerably handicapped by government censorship and restrictions, language problems, transportation shortages, and

inadequate communication systems. The study indicates, with all fac­ tors considered, that these papers did a reasonably fair job in bring­

ing the news surrounding this war to the "Western world".

vU CHAP'l~R I

INTRODUCTION

The Italo-Abyssinian conflict of 1930-1945 was one of the major episodes among the string of events in the 1920's and 1930's which led to the Second World War. Several reasons account for its importance.

First was the unique position that Ethiopia and Liberia held at the time in sustaining their freedom through the full history of the slave states of Africa. Another was the political involvement of the Big

Powers of Europe at that period, particularly to the degree they remain­ ed silent about the crisis in Ethiopia. The seeds of further crisis could be seen in the indecision of the leading European democracies,

France and England, to respond effectively to the Italian initiative.

Third was the miscalculation by Italy in invading Ethiopia at a time when such an event might have raised a critical issue of world war.

Finally, the war exposed the weakness that existed in the League of

Nations, which was unable to solve the crisis or to even mediate it in an equitable fashion.

This crisis of African history raised considerable controversy in the late 1930's among nations, various world publics, different races, and the leadingpowers. All of Africa, except Ethiopia and

Liberia, was under foreign rule in 1934 when Italy threatened the integrity of Ethiopia. This overt act was not accepted without resist­ ance by the "never conquered" people of' Ethiopia.

1 2

In the 1930's, Ethiopia was at a strategic geographical spot in world politics, had an interesting history which in various ways was tied to ancient Arabian, European and Asian societies, and was the last remnant of' an important religious and cultl.lral center f'or A:f'rica. Thus, the aggression of Italy angered many Af'rican peoples who shared terres­ trial and cultural, as well as racial values, with Ethiopia. The aggression also threatened the balance of' power structure among- the Big

Powers of' Europe, who were watching each other suspiciously during the rising tensions of' the 1930's' pre-W.W.II period.

The motives of the Big Powers, such as France and Germany, were also a factor in this crisis. These countries bad deep feelings about the attack on Ethiopia by Italy, but they did not transform that feel­ ing into action in order to deter Italy's designs on Ethiopia. They were caught in a vicious circle of diplomacy with their Big Power ally, trying not to interfere with the status quo of' Europe, but also realiz­ ing that what Italy was doing was unwise. The power politics involve­ ment with Italy prevented them f'rom taking action, and they suffered the consequences by losing some reputation and prestige af'ter the def'eat of' Italy in 1941 in East Africa.

Even ¥Tithout the crisis in Ethiopia, which lasted f'rom the mid-

1930's to the beginning of' the 1940's, the entire world w~s in deep tension during this decade. This was primarily due to the rising com­ petition in an arms race among most nations of' the world in preparation for a war they soon expected to start. The Big Powers, although align­ ed to various allies, were keeping an eye on each other in case one gained more power and tried to dominate the course of' Europe. Also, 3

many non-European nations, in their own way, were watching the Big

Power developments in case they,attempted to threaten the sovereignty

of other nations. A second reason that increased tensions was the rise

of Fascism and Nazism to full power during these years. Obviously, this

had plunged all nations, big and small, into deep concern.

Although the creation and continued existence of the League of

Nations was a major accomplishment following W.W.I, its weaknesses in

performing according to its charter were already evident. By :failing to

handle important incidents such as the one in i934 between Ethiopia and

Italy, it paid the price o:f losing the :faith o:f its member states. Put

simply, the power of the League, which was theoretically a combined

power of 52 nai>ions, was tested and shown wanting by the action of one

country--ItaJ.y.

'1.1he Pre-War Period

In order to provide background for this study, it is important to look briefly into the history of both nations involved in the war.

In the far end of the eastern section of the African continent, at what is usually referred to as the horn of A~rica, the land o:f l Ethiopia rests just above the equator. Including Eritrea, which once was an Italian colony, the nation measures.450,000 square miles in 2 area. During the 1936-41 ¥;•ar, there v,rere 13,000,000 inbabitants in the Empire, including 6,000,000 Christians and 7,000,000 Moslems and 3 other groupings. The country is an a.ncient empire with age-old tradi- tions that go back 500 years before William the Conqueror set foot in

England and 1,000 years before Columbus st.art,~d the voyage to discover ).j. the New World. It is a country of great diversity in its topography, 4

p •

5 climate, people, language, and customs.

Its people are described in one historic source as brave, proud and unconquered people, who had always kept their highlands secure from 6 newcomers. This factor made them a nation of first-class fighting men.

Therefore, Ethiopians in the 1930's were a people who bad always depend- ed upon their past, which bad helped preserve their culture, art, 7 religion and ancestry in unbroken continuity.

Farming was and is a major occupation for the people. The main 8 crop that they produce is coffee. The country's forest areas have a great potential of timber which has not yet been fully developed. The large forest areas are found in the damp regions in the southern and 9 western sections of the country. These forests depend upon a favorable climate with soil and sufficient rainfall and a year-round growing 10 season for different crops. The rainfall is, in general, adequate for agriculture, except in the semi-arid and desert regions located primarily in the northern regions. The country bas numerous rivers, ll and 7% of the land is forested. The Ethiopian plateau extends towards the Mediter1~nean Sea. The western region is mainly mountain- 12 ous. The whole Ethiopian region, and especially that of the Rift

Valley Lakes, which runs from the center of the nation to the southern 13 provinces, is rich in diverse animal life.

The system of government in Ethiopia, until the overthrow of

Hai.le Selassie in 1974, was an absolute monarchy. The emperor was" the 14 supr~me authority, although there was a written constitution. The parliament was elective, theoretically; but the people of the country were never truly represented by the choice of representatives. The 5

emperor was his owr1 prime minister, and he had an Imperial Council divided into the Supreme Council of the Empire, the Council of Imperial 15 Advisors, and officers of the Imperial Court.

The emperor during the period l931t·-4l was Haile Selassie I, who 16 was born in 1891. He became Prince Regent in 1916, was crowned Prince

Regent on October 7, 1928, and became emperor on April 2, 1930, calling 17 himself "King of Kings, conquering lion of the tribe of Judah."

Italy is the oldest nation to exist among the other nations of 18 Europe as a distinct unit. The language--Italian--is one major factor binding the people together, and it is also the oldest living tongue.

In terms of cultures, the Italians have a long history in commerce and 19 the various arts.

The area of Italy that exists today is practically the same 20 I~aly from the Christian era of Augustine. Since that beginning,

Italians have always believed that all humanity could be brought under 21 one flag as "one world".

Before Fascism came into power in Italian politics, there was a parliamentary system in the country. The parliament, lasting from 1870-

1922, cannot be compared directly with the democratic systems of Great 22 Britain and America. Italians, unfortunately, had miscreated, mis- understood, and mismanaged the concept of democracy, and the end result 23 was Fascism. By 1930, Fascism had become a reality in Italy. In a historical context, Italians at the time thought that Fascism was the 24 answer to conditions peculiar to Italy.

Other political parties were suppressed by Fascism until the overthrmr of Mussolini in 1943. The Communist Party, founded in 1921 as 6

an extreme left-wing group, existed for only a few years until the 25 Fascists outlawed it. The Christian Democratic Party emerged after 26 the fall of Fascism as the successor of the popular party.

The pioneer and leader of Fascism in Italy was Mussolini, who grew to maturity at a time when many in the world were writing and 27 thinking things that fitted rather well into his character. Mussolini was basically a man of action. The thinking of his age included things such as survival of the fittest, Darwinian theory of evolution, and the 28 struggle for life. 29 By 1922, Italy was entering a period of dictatorship. This dictatorship preculded all ·alternative opinions as to politics and means. Dictators of that era, under the leadership of Mussolini, said that at heart they were interested in the people and claimed that was 30 the reason that they were involved in other people's lives.

Italy's industrial growth was far greater than that of the rest of Europe. By the beginning of the 1900's, Italy was showing a steady 31 economic progress and a steady political progress. Ultimately, prior to the start of the Second World War, she had developed substantially in 32 industry, and this progress was reflected by the strength Ital.y had over Ethiopia by the late 1930's.

The Newspapers Under Study

At this point, it would be appropriate to introduce the news- papers that this thesis is going to study and analyze regarding coverage of the war period between Italy and Ethiopia.

New York Times

The New Yo1·k Times is one of the major publications in the 7

United States. It was founded in 1851 in the city of New York for the 33 purpose of publishing political and business news. Today, this publi- cation includes separate sections for business, finance, family, editorial, and sports. Within these sections are also minor sub- sections such as book reviews, letters to the editor, entertainment 34 guides, movie reviews, music, theatres, and weather reports.

In three opinion polls taken in 1960-61 among 335 editors, 311 publishers and 125 journalism professors, the New York Times ranked number one among the six top dailies listed in all three of the polls.

This newspaper was ranked first for continuing to hold its place in the forefront of American journalism with its tradition of telling the news 35 with completeness and integrity.

Editorially, the Times is staunchly internationalistic in world outlook and is progressive/conservative in domestic affairs. The Times and its staff have won a record 38 Pulitzer Prizes, including two for 36 meritorious public service ·in 1918 and 1944.

Los Angeles Times

In the West, the Los Angeles Times is one of the most respected daily newspapers. It has the largest circulation in this area, with 37 1,020,479 daily copies and 1,289,183 on Sundays. This newspaper 38 began publication on December 4, 1881. Bursting out almost as dramat- ically as California's population, the Los Angeles Times became a major f'orce in national and international journalism by 1970. It has led all of the nations' dailies in total advertising linage by a wide margin, 39 and also in space allotted to editorial matters.

The T~' domestic bureaus include Washington, Sacramento, 8

San Francisco, Atlanta, New York, and Houston. Internationally, its offices are located in Paris, London, Rome, Madrid, Moscow, Buenos

Aires, Mexico City, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Tokyo, New Delhi, Nairobi, 40 Jerusalem, and Cairo. It won a Pulitzer Prize for public service in

1942 for fighting a contempt of court through the U.S. Supreme Court, 41 and again in 1960 for exposure of narcotics traffic.

Chic~go Tribune

On June 10, 1847, the Chicago Tribune was founded. This news- 42 paper is published every day, including Sunday. Its pages range from an average of 24· daily to an average of 48 pages on Sunday. The Sunday edition comes in eight sections. News pages, sports, perspectives and business are the major parts, with minor sections including travel, art, 43 entertainment and book reviews, school guides, and the Tribune magazine.

At one time, when Colonel Robert R. McCormick was the publisher, th1s paper was noted for powerfully advocating freedom of the press, but the publisher's style of personal journalism caused the newspaper to 44 distort the news coverage. Aside from this, the paper has seriously fought for the right to print without prior restraint, the right to 45 criticize, and the right to report.

Christian Science Monitor

The Christian Science Monitor was started late in 1908 by Mary

Baker Eddy, founder of the Church of Christ, Scientist, in protest against sen.sationaliom of the other dailies and their emphasis upon news 46 of crime and disaster.

It is noted by journalism authorities for its ability to look back periodically and take a long-range look a.t major news developments, 9

thereby contributing interpretative analysis of problems and trends in 47 government, world affairs, economics, and social developments.

In the first ten years of publication, it reached only 120,000

in readership. But by 1971, it had raised this number to 275,000 cir- 48- culation. Another unique element of the Monitor is that it is an

international daily newspaper with a weekly international edition that 49 is available only outside the United States. Its pages range from

25-40 daily and usually come in eight sections. Among these, the

important ones are: news, finance, sports, and opinion and commen- 50 tary.

The Times of London

The prime purpose of the world coverage of the London Times is to give news in the quickest, most convenient manner and to make sure 51 to pr~sent first things first. At the begiw1ing of the 19th Century, the London Times was not as large as it is today. Its circulation in

1800 was only 5,000 daily, and it grew to 50,000 in 50 years, but it has never reached a million per day, as have some of the world's other major newspapers. Still, it has long been considered one of the most 53 influential newspapers in the world.

Right from its start, the London Times has, tried to be a compre- hensive, int~resting and explicit newspaper. It has always strived to 54 be a paper for intelligent readers of all ages and all classes.

The arrangement of its pages b.."ls been kept as s:i.mple as possible.

The pages consist of topics such as front page news, the leader (editor- ial)page, weather forecast, court news, features, theatre, cinema, 55 entertainment, and advertisements •. 10

Taken as a whole, these papers constituted an influential and important segment of the Western news media in the critical decade of the 1930's.

Foreign Correspondents and the Ethiopian War

To understand some of the background to the reporting, it is necessary to say a few things about the foreign correspondents who were assigned to cover the war between Italy and Ethiopia. The personality, background, motives, handicaps, biases and conditions of work of these press corps on mission in the battle fields has a lot to say about the findings of this research.

May 1935 marked the formal beginning of the arrival of such foreign newspersons at the frontier of the battle. When the heavy fighting broke out in October 1935, -there were some 120 such men writ- 56 ing stories :from both sides. Some prominent journalists' names included in the coverage were Floyd Gibbons of the Chicago Tribune,

George Steer of the London Times, Herbert Matthews of the New York

Times, Webb Miller o:f the United Press International, and Al Wilson 57 and Eddie Neil of the Associated Press. Other correspondents who vitnessed the war came from places like Italy, Fran~e, Spain, Austria, 58 Hungaria, Poland, Japan, and Latvia.

This thesis will :focus on the historical background, personal- ity, and reporting style of four o:f these newsmen: Miller o:f U.P.I.,

~~tthews of the New York Times, George Steer o:f the London Times, and

Floyd Gibbons of the Chicago Tribune. This attention is given to these fot~ people because Herbert ~~tthews was quite familiar with Italy's performance in the war and :favored the Itali.an side, as he wrote in 11

his book, The World in Revolution. Webb Miller has also written a book,

I Found No Peace, in wh~ch he narrates his and other reporters' exper- iences. George Steer was from the British side, and he naturally focus- ed his attention on his country's involvement with Ethiopia.

The first assignment of a ten-year mission as a war correspon- dent for Herbert l4atthews was to cover the 1935-36 war of Italy against 59 Ethiopia. Matthews was a student in Italy from 1925-26 and covered the war of 1935-36 and also wrote editorials about Italy for the New 60 York Times until 1967. He claimed that he got the biggest and the best story of the war in November 1935 when he was the only foreign correspondent attached to the Italians, when they traveled across the 61 Danak.il Desert. Matthews seems to have been attached to Italy sen- timentally; this he admits in his book by stating that he knew Italy well because he loved her and her people.

George Steer, of the London Times, at one time became a "public relations counsel" for Haile Selassie. He was, as can be expected, 62 sympathetic to Ethiopia. His main source of news was from a colonel 63 from Russia who was in Haile Selassie's service. Webb Miller was a journalist who was caught in a dilemma of sympathizing with a weak nation--Ethiopia--, but who was obligated to report what was happening from an objective angle. He traveled extensively throughout the rough 64 terrain of Ethiopia and was familiar with the conntryside. This helped give understanding to his coverage. Floyd Gibbon~ of the Chicago

Tribune, sailed for Europe on his first mission in February of 1917.

He W'as described as a cbeer:ful and busy journs.list of that era whose 65 war-time stories caused a lot of sensation in the United States. 12

Gibbons, along with Webb Miller, was the first war correspondent to 66 witness the start of the war between Italy and-Ethiopia. -

The above four correspondents, and the many others, had to over- come several problems in trying to do their jobs of covering the war.

The main problems were communication, transportation, language difficul- ties, and censorship. Weather, primitive living conditions, and rough terrain also made the coverage difficult. Aside from the few cars used at times when they were available, the main means of transportation was 67 . muleback. Although cars were occasionally available as a means of transportation, they traveled less than five miles per hour because of the ruggedness of the roads; more time was lost in pushing cars out of 68 the mud when they were stuck. At times, correspondents were prevented from moving freely because of security reasons and for protection of their o-w-n lives from people who could.r'"l' t identify newsmen :from soldiers.

News filing facilities were primitive, and incoming communica- tions were worse. Also, the system of delivery was completely hap- 70 hazard. It was difficult to send more than a 20-word news bulletin on the military 1-Tire service. Thus, detailed descriptive stories had to be sent by motorcycle courier to a center which was as far away as 71 60 miles.

Language was a serious handicap for correspondents. 0. D.

Gallagher, of the London Daily Express, once commented that a reporter who cannot speak the language of the country he is working in can never get at the facts because he is completely at the mercy of either his 72 interpr~ters or of the offician handout. At times, interpreters hired. by one agency played a double role, because they were also employ- 13

73 ees of the other various agencies that existed.

Most serious among the problems faced by foreign correspondents in Ethiopia was the strict censorship imposed by both governments on the procedures of reporting. The stricter among the two was the

Ethiopian government. Though reporters often knew the exact happening which was due to take place, they were censored so much that they could not break the news until after it had occurred. In such instances, 74 they bad to develop a new code to tell some of their stories. when correspondents set out, found news and returned to the press center to transmit it, they first bad to submit their stories to censors, who 75 tended to remove everything worth reading. It was to the advantage of the Abyssinian cause to present photographic evidence along with the stories, but photographers covering the war worked under great diffi- culty. They had little !,reedom of movement and they were forced to pose photographs behind the lines. Herbert l4atthews wrote that 99 out 76 of 100 photographs used in the war story were faked.

Such were the circumstances that the foreign correspondents had to work under, and any kind of judgment given shouJ.d be rendered while keeping these above-mentioned problems in mind. Some of the resvJ.ts found in this thesis can be attributed to all or some of the above problems. 14

Organization of the Thesis

This thesis is organized into four chapters. The first chapter

begins by raising questions as to why- the study of a long-gone-VTar is

important, and also gives an over-View o:f the historical, geographic, and population :factors o:f both nations involved in the 1936-41 war.

This chapter also gives background about the five newspapers analyzed

in this thesis. These newspapers are: The New York Times, the London

Times, The Chicago Daily Tribune, The Christian Science Monitor, and

The Los Angeles Times. These papers were selected :for two major :factors:

:f'irst, because they are noted for being influential and responsible in the highest journalistic sense in attempting to give fair coverage to their readers regarding all o:f the world's major events; secondly, because o:f the availability of these specific 1936-41 newspapers in a · library or on microfilm for the war period.

Chapter II summarizes the historical consequences of the 1930's on the events that occurred between the two warring nations. This chap­ ter is broken into four sections. Section one, "Abyssinia and World

Politics", looks into the basic existence of Abyssinia and narrates the motives behind the Italian invasion of that country. The section entitled, ''Abyssinia and the League of Nations", explains the situation of Ethiopia's existence outside of the League of Nations and its strt~gle to be admitted to the League in the midst of considerable opposition. In the secti.on entitled, "The WalVTal Incident and the War of 1936", the thesis gj.ves the details o:f the first ruain incident which led. the two nations into a major war. It deals with the historical roots of' the~ dispute. over the -vm.t•:!X" wells at Walwal, and explains who 15

sought control and why. The last section of.the chapter, "Five Years

of Italian Rule", covers the period from 1936-41, during which the

defeated land was under Italian rule and was then recaptured.

Clmpter III presents the basic research for this study from the

newspapers surveyed. It looks into the news coverage of each paper

from 1934 to 1941. This chapter is divided into the following sub­

sections: (1) "The Incidents of 1934", (2) "Incidents of 1935", (3)

"The War of 1936", and, (4), "Victory for Ethiopia in 1941". Under

these headings, the newspaper coverage is analyzed for its strong·and

weak points, and criticisms from the author. Criticism was based

mostly upon the amount of coverage, the space allotrr~nt by each news-

paper, the balance and fairness in reporting.the views of both nations,

use of illustrations, placement of news items, and language application

·by the newspapers, which, if incorrectly applied, changed the tone of a

report.

The selection of major stories used for analysis was made in

accordance -.:-lith the important days mentioned in the historic coverage

in Chapter II. These important events are:

1. December 3, 1934: the Walwal Incident

2. Invasion by Italy, Autumn 1935

3. May 5, 1936: the fall of Addis Ababa

4. Yay 9, 1936: annexation of Ethiopia by Italy

5· June 20, 1936: appeal by Haile Selassie for help from the League of Nations in Geneva

6. Februar-.f 3, 1941: first sign of victory for Ethiopia

The fourth and final chapter o:f this thesis summarizes most of

the highlights of' the preceding chapters and. then presents the author's 16

conclusions based upon the news media coverage •. Specifically, this chapter summarizes the performance of the :five newspapers individually, and combines.t.he results inan attempt to give meaning to the overall effort of the Western media. This is followed by conclusion from the author. 17

p •

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Luther, Ernest W., Ethiopia Tod.ay (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 1.

2. Ibid. 3. Shaw, John H., Ethiopia (ACME Photo Offset Corp., U.S.A., 1936), P· 21. 4. ~-, p. 13.

5- Luther, Ernest W., op. cit., p. 1. 6. Shaw, John H., op. cit., p. 13. 7. Talbot, David A., Contemporary Ethiopia (Hallmark-Hubner Press, Inc., New York, 1952), p. 4. 8. ~., P· 18.

9~ Ibid., p. 17~ 10. Luther, Ernest W., op. cit., p. 71.

11. ~., PP· 6-7. 12. Talbot, David A., op. cit., p. 19. 13. Ibid. 14. I,uther, Ernest W., op. cit., p. 39. 15. Shaw, John H.,££· cit., p. 45. 18

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I, Cont'd.

16. Ibid. 17. Ibid.

18. I I A1bretch-Carrie, Rene, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (Columbia University Press, .New York & London, 19'50} ,p. 4.

19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., P· 5. 21. Ibid.

22. Finer, Herma.n, Mussolini's Italy (Victor Gollanca Ltd., London, 1935), P· 60. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid.

25. Kogan, Norman, A Political History of Postwar Italy (Frederick A. Preger Publishers, New York (Washington},- 1966}, pp. 28-29~ 26. Ibid, p. 29. 27. Finer, Herman, op. cit., p. 22.

28. Ibid. 29. ~., P· l. 30. Ibid. 19

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I, Cant 1 d.

3L I I Albretch-Carrie, Rene, op. cit., p. 77. 32. Ibid. 33· New York Times, May 26, 1977. 34. Ibid. 35· Emery, Edwin, The Press and A::nerica, 3rd Edition (Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, Hew Jersey, 1972), pp. 653-654 .. 36. Ibid., p. 655.

37- Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1977. 38. Ibid. 39· Emery, op. cit., p. 657. 40. Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1977.

Emery, op. cit., p. 657. 42. C hie ago Daily Tribune, June 3, 1977.

Chicago Daily Tribune, May 29, 1977. 44. Emery, op. cit., p. 707. 45. Ibid. 46. 20

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I, Cont'd.

47. Ibid. 48. Ibid.

Christian Science Monitor, June 8, 1977. 50. Ibid. 51. Smith, Anthony, The British Press Since the War (New Jersey, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, 1974), p. 71. 52. Bertrand, Claude-Jean, The British Press: A Historic Survey (O.C.D.L.: Paris, 1969), p. 91 53-

54. Smith, op. cit., p. 73· 55· Ibid, pp. 71-72. 56. Knightley, Phillip, The First Casualty (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), P· 173. 57· ~., PP· 173-185. 58. ~., p. 178. 59· I•latthews, Herbert L., The World in Revolution: A Newspaperman's Memoir (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p. 72. 60. !!?_id. ' p. 99. 61. ~., p. 115. "! 2-·..L.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I, Cont'd.

62. Knightly, p. 180. 63. ~., p. 180. 64. Miller) Webb, I Found No Peace; The Journal of' a Foreign Corres­ pondent (New York, Simon and Schuster, l93b), p. 272.

Knightley, op. cit., pp. 124-125. 66. Ibid. , p. l 78. 67. Miller, op. cit., p. 274. 68. Ibid., p. 286.

Knightley, op. cit., p. 175. 70. ~., p. 174. 71. Miller, op. cit., p. 266. 72. Knightley, op. cit., p. 175. 73· Ibid. 74. Hiller, op. cit., p. 288. 75· Knightley, op. cit., p. 178. 76. Ibid., p. 186. 22

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Abyssinia and World Politics

Italian interest in East Africa was first established in 1869, when she purchased a strip of land at the port of Assab, in Massawa, 1 ~ch today is a part of Eritrea in Ethiopia. Although Italy was encouraged by the examples of other natiGns to colonize the area, the

Italian public at home was not prepared to accept the expense and 2 trouble of developing a colony on the Red Sea.

The settlement in Eritrea was close enough to the healthier 3 lands of Abyssinia to tempt the colonizers to push inland. This was not the only temptation that Italy suffered. The primary motivation for Mussolini's adventure in the 1930's derived from the state of affairs in Italy. It lagged far behind Britain and France economically. It was overpopulated, a "proletarian state", and there had been a massive 4 emigration, primarily to the United States. Therefore, the Italians questioned, why should they not instead settle in Italian possessions overseas? In the meantime, they reasoned, they couJ.d contribute to the 5 "development and civilization" of those areas. Ethiopia, nence, came up on top of the list of places suitable for such settlement and develop- ment.

These social and economic considerations were, however, super- ficial. The baslc motivation was a feeling that Italy had not been properly re•t~arded for her contribution to the Allied victory in 1918 23 ETHIOPIA: 1936-1941

i·

0

--. •All. -...... GDtfQA. L~

' ......

Rey, C.F., Unco_E~ered Abyssinia (Seeley, Ser'liice & Co., Ltd., London, 1923) 6 after the First World War. It can be further described, thus, that

the projected conquest of the Ethiopian Empire was political in char-

acter. It arose both from the necessity of Italy to expand and from

her actual weakness, which forbade successful expansion at a high 7 cost.

The remaining reasons for Italy's aim to expand into Ethiopia were: to bolster up the tottering Fascist regime by an easy but spec- tacular success; to economically exp~oit Abyssinia, which was (and is)

particularly suitabled to growing cotton, and which was reputed to possess oil, an instrument of modern connnercial enterprise; and to

strengthen the hold of Italy on ~he Indian Ocean and East Africa, in 8 view of possible future re-division of the colonial world.

The Ethiopians stood firmly against the initial invasion in the late 1800's. Yohannes, then the Emperor of Ethiopia, clai~ed ownership 9 of the port of ~mssawa. A strong statesman of Yohannes', Ras Aloula, ordered the Italians to 'Withdraw from the area; when they refused,

Aloula attacked the Italian forces, which were very few in number as compared to the Ethiopian troops. More than 500 Italians were killed, 10 and they lost.

In 1889, Yohannes died and Menelik of Shoa proclaimed himself emperor. Menelik detached himself. from the rulers of the northern provinces of Ethiopia and established his own southern states, 'With 11 Addis Ababa a.s his capital. Menelik lmd two goal5: to break down the regional loyalties of the existing system, unifying princes and people behind the centralized government of the emperor; ancl to gain interna- 12 tional recognition for Ethiopia as a sovereign independent state. 25

The Italians supported Menelik' s bid :for the throne. He in turn entered into relations with them to defend his position. As a result of this interchange of favors, the Treaty of Uccali was signed 13 in 1889. Although things appeared settled by this treaty, a centro- versy arose :from differences in Ethiopian language documents and it raised a bitter issue between them. This disagreement led to the War of Adowa of 1896 where the Italian forces of 14,500 men were defeated 14 by some 100,000 Abyssinian soldiers.

After the war, Italy had to recognize Ethiopia as an independent 15 and absolute state. For the next l2 years, Menelik spent his time consolidating his :frontiers with foreign povrers. He also co-operated with British troops in the campaign against aggression from the other 16 borders.

In his latter days, .f..1enelik received assistance from the French, who were already settled in northern Somaliland, and who were jealous of Italian expansion in North Africa. The French supplied Ethiopia 17 with artille17 and firearms. The :friendship did not stop there for

France and Ethiopia. Ethiopia, in response to the gift from France, gave a 99-year concession for a railway :from Jibouti (French Somali- 18 land) to Harrar (a southeastern provi~ce of Ethiopia).

Therefore, at ·the beginning of the 1900's, Italy's power was tested by a n.-s.tion--Abyssinia--which was considered weak. This created and kept a sense of revenge a..'!long Italians. J'-~thut1.gh things seemed quiet, a psyc!hological w-e:.r w-as under way. In tb.e 1920's, Mussolini took control of the political apparatus o:f.' his nation and turned his attention to the deveJopment of Italian prestige abroad. Until 1934, 26

19 Mussolini' s major ambition was to create a "grande political europea",

in which Italy would become a more active participant in the determina-

tion of European affairs.

Mussolini claimed full autonomous power over decisionmaking of

the foreign policy of his countr,y. He did not consider the League of

Nations to have a say in such matters. Fascism rejected the principle

of the equality of nations, and Mussolini viewed the League of Nations as an unnatural and unmanageable institution wherein minute states, he 20 thought, were given extra power compared to their importance. Even if

Mussolini was totally against the League of Nation's existence in general, he never considered withdrawing from the League. Rather, at times, Mussolini cooperated with it to achieve special advantages for

Italy.

Italy; along with League members Britain, France and Germany, tried to establish a separate league from which Mussolini thought his country might gain leadership in Europe. Aside.from winning leadership for Italy, the other goal of this pact was to have an alternative to the League of Nations. In the meantime, Mussolini hoped these countries might develop a common gPOund in areas of economic and political inter- 22 dependence.

Such a proposal could not work for several reasons. Because of a severe economic crisis at home, Britain had nothing left to do but isolate herself from any kind of European community. France was very proud of her own prestige as an important power and could not possibly accept Italy's ambitions to become a great power. Besides, both of these countries were not sure of Italy's motives in vre.nting to establish 27

the friendship. Most of all, Germany, seeking its own soverignty at 23 the time, found it impossible to go along with Mussolini' s proposal.

For whatever reasons, these countries stayed independent and

claimed that they were all powerful by themselves, meaning, of course, powerful in only the continent of Europe; Russia claimed to be the power of Asia, and the United States claimed to be the power of the New

World. Therefore, by 1934, there were four "Great Powers 11 in Europe: 24 France, Italy, Britain, and Germany. Although Germany joined the 25 League of Nations in 1926, she left after a 7-year period.

These European powers, along with Russia, the United States and

Japan, had played their own different roles in the Abyssinian crisis.

Japan and Germany were monitoring the act from a distance while prepar- 26 ing to get into the act themselves at any moment. The United States

~nt along the same line with the League of Nations in the approach of the Abyssinian crisis. Thus far the United States had stayed neutral, but now she was at least sympathizing with Abyssinia and even agreed 27 to limit the oil that she sold to Italy.

In the League of Nations, there was a so-called Coordination

Committee which manipulated the market for oil. Fortunately, the United

States was not a member of this committee. Hence, this helped the decision that the United States could make. Therefore, if America acted independ.ently and cut down the oil purchase of Italy, this meant 28 that an e:ffecti.ve embargo might calln down Mu.ssolini. In the early days, the oil dealings of the United States and Italy had increased tre~endously. In a one-year period, 1934-35, the percentage figure 29 increased by 11.3. Thls was why it was assumed that the American 28

cooperation could ef~ect Italy's actions as a colonial power.

The First World War had taught a lesson to the world, especial-

ly the British and Americans. They were af'raid that the mistakes of

this war were going to be repeated. Thus, they were hoping to stop it 30 through the League of Nations. The-primary objective that they hoped

for the League to accomplish was to "enforce peace" and provide pro-

cedures for the settlement of international disputes.

Here is how they wrote what the standards of the League should

be:

' The signitory Powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or cormnits acts of hostility against another of the signitories before any questions shall be submitted (to conciliate or judicial procedures) as approved in the foregoing. 1 3l

It is appropriate to review the American relation with Ethiopia

in this matter; this study is mainly about these two countries--

specifically speaking of the American media and the Italo~Ethiopian war. In 1934, the United States had a foreign legation in the Ethiopian 32 capital of Addis Ababa, but Americans knew little about the tiny nation. There 'vas not much economic exchange. Missionary activity was conducted on a small scale.

It was even said that the United States kept her foreign legation in Ethiopia only to go along with the emperor's ambition of 33 having the funerican continent represented in his country. Emperor

Haile Selassie was wise enough to ma~e this choice at the time because he realized he had a big problem coming from Europe and that the only

"~ilaY to stop that was to keep America as a good friend. He thus 1nvited 29

a United States firm to construct a dam on one of the lakes of his 34 cotmtry.

The emperor talked about this consequence quite openly:

" We cheriSh our relations with the United States, under­ standing that their friendly character undisturbed by any political aims in this part of the world, and realizing our great need for politically disinterested cooperation in ottr economic development."35

Until this moment, Ethiopia was taking the initiative in form- ing and sustaining the relationship between herself and America. At first, the United States stayed isolated, but by 1934-35, public opin- ion shifted among Americans. Many of them stood against any aggression in Ethiopia. Such opposition >ro.s directed particularly to-vmrd Fascist

Italy. The public sent their opinion through various means of conmmni- cation, such us letters to the editor, newspaper articles and editor- ials, resolutions of various private organizations, and communications 36 . sent to President Roosevelt.

Ethiopia at times had a tough problem in maintaining its friend- ship with the United States while at the same time taking her case to the League of Nations. This was because the United States was not a 37 member of the League and never did join. The gap between the United

States and the League of Nations was so wide at the beginning that at one time, President Harding could not even read a letter sent to the 38 United States government by the League.

But as time went by, this attitude disappeared. Although the

United States did not join the League directly, a·t one moment there vras a proposal that the United States join the Permanent Court of Inter- national Sustj_ce. The ide'3, failed. The United States, hovv2ver, joined 30

39 the International Labor Organization.

During the Manchuria crisis of 1931, the League and the United

States developed a higher level of cooperation. When discussion went on in the League of Nations concerning this crisis, the United States 40 bad delegates at the table for one month.

This cooperation by the United States with the League of Nations created a healthy· atmosphere for Ethiopian politics. Also, America realized the problem that Ethiopia had and sympathized with her. In

1934, the United States military attache in Rome informed the War Department in Washington that Italy was arming herself .to fight 41 Ethiopia. The message also stated the feeling of the other big

European powers (France and Britain), which happened to favor non-

·interference with Italy's wishes in this operation.

The same version of this report was filed in the capitols-of

Europe and Ethiopia, vrhere America was represented. "The Italians 42 wanted a free hand in Ethiopia", the French said, but they declined to give the view of their government. The British pretended that they had not known anything about it.

No matter how the others responded to the issue, the United

States -was firmly with Ethiopia. Religious, civic and women's groups in the United S-tates agreed on a resolution that the nation should con- sult with the League of Nations to find a.peaceful means of solving the d.ispute among the two parties. Ethiopia also won public support of the

Protestant groups through the Federal Council of Churches, which advo- cated a peace movement for the country which is among the oldest 43 Cbristi'3.n nations in the world. 31

Focusing on the Ethiopian crisis, the Christi.an Century, a

leading independent Portestant journal, said, "We cannot be interested

in general world peace without being interested in specific episodes 44 which threaten to destroyit."

The Jewish community in America saw the Ethiopian problem as

being equal to that of German Jews--a struggle against Fascist aggres-

sion. The American Hebrew and Jewish Tribune criticized ~ magazine

for describing Haile Selassie as "the acquisitive, Semetic emperor",

and stated that the phrase fit Mussolini better, for he had tried to

suppress Ethiopia. Another publication, The Jewish Frontier, organ of

the League of Labor Palestine (sic) wa1~ed that minority people and

other countries ought to put an eye on the Italo-Ethiopian situation,

as they soon might possibly be the victim of the same kind of aggres- 45 sion.

Support for Ethiopia within the United States wa.s widespread.

Community groups, racial organizations, and religious denominations had

some say in the issue. But there were also some Italian Americans who

stood firmly on the side of their homeland--most of them from New York

city. Even normally pro-Italian Catholics, who were less concerned

with Ethiopia than Protestants and Jews, were a"t this moment sympathetic.

Most of all, American Blacks participated in the support for Ethiopian

freedom. Crisis, the offician organ of the National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People, wrote that the Ethiopian situation is 46 "a sad spectacle of 'white' civilization." Qpportunity, the journal

of the National Urban League, wrote,

11 The Anglo-French efforts to prevent war were motivated 32

not by a genuine regard for Ethiopia's rights, but by fear of the effect of a war on their own colonies and the threat of a worldwide challenge to white supremacy."

Abyssinia and the League of Nations

At the end of the First World War, the victorious Allied powers

· agreed that a League of some kind should be established for internation- 48 al cooperation. The main objective was to avoid a repetition of such

power struggles among nations that led to the war. The United States,

under President Woodrow Wilson, strongly· endorsed the idea, as did

Britain.

January 10, 1920 marked the formation of the League of Nations.

This was an association of governments which had a charter comprised of 49 only 26 articles (the United Nations has 111 articles in its charter).

To Britain and France, the covenant in the League's articles appeared

to mean justice for all nations and security for peace as. well. But

for Italy, it was interpreted as 'equity'. For Italy, this meaning

provided a simple guarantee for growth. The Italians related it only

to settling problems of economic disorder, such as foodstuffs, raw 50 materials, and international trade.

Despite misconceptions by some countries and misunderstandings

by some others; the League was able to be formed and sustained through

the years. By 1923, it was able to solve problems o!"" aggression and 51 international disputes peacefully. Such successes by the League were

possible because the disturbances in Europe had been continuous and

countries were weary of fighting.

Although President Wilson was the ILain supporter of the forma-

tion of the League, the United States never joined because Congress 33

52 failed to ratify its membership. This weakened the League . It was not only the United States' absence from the club that weakened the

League; dissatisfied nations, like Japan, Germany and Italy, undertook to upset the arrangement of the peace treaty of the First World War, and the League started declining. Japanese expansion in Manchuria and

China, Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, and Hitler's repudiation of the 53 Versailes Treaty all added up to bring the collapse of the League.

Ethiopia had gone through a series of changes during 1913-1934.

Menelik II died in 1913, and Lij Iyassue, who assumed power as the next king, converted himself to a Moslem, a belief not accepted by

Ethiopians for their king. This created a chaos within the country.

The new Moslem king fought to stay in power, but was finally forced out 54 after ruling only three years. Menelik's daughter, Queen Zewditu, took over the throne until she was succeeded by Haile Selassie I.

This internal crisis was observed as one more problem for

Ethiopia. The country could not afford another, as she was involved in defending herself against Italian interference. To be. sheltered from an invading power, Ethiopia thought it might be wise to join the

League of Nations. Thus, in 1923, she applied for a membership in the . 55 56 League. The request by Ethiopia was adopted by a unanimous vote.

Italy, as expected, stood against the membership of Ethiopia · in the League of Nations. Incidents between these conntries continued 57 to occur on the borderlands of Afdub, Walwal, Gerlogubi, and Ado.

Therefore, Italy, after all of these crises, said a neutral zone should be established between the disputed border spots before the settlement of the previous clashes. 34

Antagonism continued between the two countries. Ethiopia made

an accusation that Italy was mobilizing forces to dispatch them to the

frontiers, preparing for a big fight. Such a buildup in Italian power

forced Ethiopia to make an appeal for membership to the League of

Nations for the second tim~ since the first appeal was already jeopar- 58 dized by the ene~y. Though opposition was strong again by Italy,

Ethiopia was admitted to the membership of the League. Time and again,

Ethiopia tried to make an appeal for a peaceful settlement of the

Italian aggression against the country's border. On December 14, 1934,

following the l-lalwal Incident (discussed later in this chapter), 59 Ethiopia brought her case to the League. The case had to wait until

January 3, 1935. At that time, Ethiopia made another appeal under 60 Article 11 of the covenant.

In 1936, with smaller events leading to a larger war, Ethiopia

took her case to the League of Nations. On behalf of his own country -

and the rights of other small nations, Emperor Haile Selassie made his 61 appeal in person in Geneva on June 30, 1936.

He told the members that the attack on his country with the use

of poison gas was a violation of the rights of his as well as other

small states of the world, and he also added that it was a threat to the 62 collective security of the world in general. His speech on this date was one of the most recognized in the history of the League. He said,

in part:

" It is my duty to inform the governments assembled in Geneva o~ the deadly peril which threatens them by describing to them the fate vhich has been suffered by Ethiopia. It is not only upon warriors tbat the Italian government has made war; it has, above all, attacked populations far removed from hostilities ..• "

" I ask the 52 nations not to forget today the policy upon whic~ they embarked eight months ago, and on the face of which I directed the resistance of my people against the aggressor whom they had denounced to the world .•• "

" The collective security was at stake, and the value of treaties, the safety of small states, and the whole of international morality. ···I submit tnese issues to the Assembly; God and history will remember your verdict. "63

The verdict of the League was, however> was to not act upon the matter.

The Walwal Incident and the War of 1936

The southeastern region of Ethiopia was mainly a grazing ground 64 for nomads, and it contained many wells. Hence, farmers traditionally moved freely to these fields in search of pastures. It was also a boundary which Ethiopia shared with Italian Somaliland (the Somalia

Republic today).

Italy opposed Abyssinians coming so close to her boundary.

Thus, the British and Ethiopians organized a commission which signed the Treaty of Rennel Rodd of 1897, in order to regulate conditions that 65 existed along the border. A joint panel was organized to demarcate the frontier and to also keep an eye on both sides for violations of the law. The laws of the treaty somewhat favored the Italian side, 66 for i.t gave them authority to the area's wells.

The treaty was signed, but promises were not on either side.

It might be true that the border between Ethiopia and Italian Somali- land had never been fo:rmally set. Eleven years passed after the Treaty of Rennel Rodd was signed ancl it was still not settled, even by 19()8. . 67 It became necessary for the two countries to sign another agreement. 36

The commission set out to lay down this treaty and also took the responsibility of effecting a meaningful demarcation of borders for 68 both countries. It gave what it thought Abyssinia and Italy deserved.

When the demarcation was set by this treaty J WalwalJ an area of well fields in the regionJ happened to fall within the territory of the 69 Abyssinian border--to be exact, 50 miles inside her territory.

Except claiming authority, the Ethiopian government did not use this section of its land, nor care to develop it. It did not even care 70 for the tribes that lived there. The inhabitants still paid taxes to the government. This was not the case for the Italians, however.

Although they bad no legal authority; they wanted this restricted region 71 to use it as a control spot for their coastal colony. This area also was the only supply area for water to surrounding residents.

The need for this territory by both Ethiopia and Italy was ob- vious. By law, Ethiopia had authority over the land; Italy had to have access to it for survival. Such was the case, and the only way that

Italy could share the benefits of these wells was to try to take them by force. Ethiopia, of course, resisted. Hence, gun shots were heard 72 from time to time in the region.

By December 5, 1934J these firings of one shot here and another 73 there culminated in a bigger crisis. Six hundred colonial troops from

Italian Somaliland and 1,5000 Ethiopians clashed at WalwalJ with Italy hoping to conquer ·~he wells and the Ethiopians trying to maintain access to them. T!1is marked the first majur incident between the two countries.

Though such a clash took place, Ethiopia had never exerted power to keep the tribes from the colonial land out of the grazing areas or from 37

74 using the water wells.

After the incident at Walwal, both parties, as expected, accused one another of starting the fight. Obviously, the Italian and Ethiopian 76 versions of the story were contradictory. But the case had to be de- termined according to the Anglo-Abyssiniau agreement of 1897 and the 77 Italo-Abyssinian treaty of 1908. The first treaty signed among

British and Ethiopian commissioners, who finished their work in 1934, defined the frontier of the British Scmaliland. The line of demarcation 0 • they set ran east and west along the 8th parallel between 47 and 48 78 east longitude. Still, there was no exact line which defined the territory between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. The Italians stood 0 0 • G firmly that the boundary set was 4 7 x8 , not 48 x8 as the Ethiopians 79 claimed it to be .

However, according to the second treaty, Walwal seemed to fall 80 within the Ethiopian boundary. A portion of that treaty read:

" From the Wabi Shebeli the frontier proceeds in a north easterly direction, following the line accepted by the Italian government in 1897; all the territory belonging to the tribes towards the coast shall remain dependent of Italy; all the territory of Ogaden and all that of the tribes towards the Ogaden shall remain dependent of Abyssinia.8l

Af'ter the clash at Wal-wal en December 5, J.934, the attempt to settle the matter stretched through time. Several arbitrations had occurred between June 6 and September 3, 1935 bet~~en the two countries. 82 This all related to the conflict of Walwal. The weak nation,

Ethiopia, immediately requested arbitration in accordance with the treaty of 1928. She even appealed to the League of Nai:;ions. The League did not respond. Again, Ethiopia sent & second teleg~~ to the League 38

84 stating that Italy was accumulating troops at the Ethiopian border.

Italy refused to submit to the-arbitration procedure under the 85 . treaty of 1928. She strictly argued that Ethiopia had violated the agreement and should make the necessary reparation for the damage done.

Italy also believed she was stepping low to agree to submit to . 84 Ethiopia's accusation that Italy violated the agreement.

Italy managed to avoid any direct discussion of the matter in the Council meetings. Ethiopia too had not insisted that direct action be taken, but rather demanded that diplomatic negotiations be arranged 87 to look into this issue. Several months passed before any results were reached. Italy, in the meantime, was strengthening her forces in 88 Eritrea and Italian Somaliland in large quantity. The other European powers looked calmly at this action by Italy. Even the Ethiopian goveinment did little in regard to preparing to withstand an enemy force. Instead, she asked that a neutral zone be established on the border and again made an appeal to the League of Nations about the 89 apparent actions of the enemy force.

Trouble continued for Ethiopia •. The Italians finally crossed the border in force on December 5, 1936. On March 31, 1936 1 the emperor fought the Italians at the Battle of Lake Ashangi and he was badly 90 defeated. After another month, on May 2, 1936, the king fled the 91 country, and one month later he arrived in London. · On May 9, 1936,

Italy proclaimed the annexation of Abyssinia, and this marked the begin~ ning of the next step in the war between the two countries.

]'ive Years of Italia.n Rule: 1936-1941

On 14ay 21+, 1936, Italy cheered her successful victory over 39

92 Ethiopia. The citizens rejoiced in the victory. In Ethiopia, the whole country seemed to cooperate with the invaders. The Ethiopians, although treated as subjects, started living cooperatively with the .. 93 Italians. They were divided into categories according to their tribal origins. In this manner, Italy managed to stay in Ethiopia for five years.

In the meantime, Haile Selassie, who fled to exile in Britain in 1936, was building his army and friendship with England. By June 10, 1940, he was determined to go back to his country. A British pilot took Haile Selassie, his son and an Ethiopian army general to Egypt, 94 enroute to the Sudan and ultimately to Ethiopia.

On June 25, 1940, the emperor arrived in Alexandria and was welcomed by British officers who took him to Khartoum, where his army 95 was being organized. In Khartoum, the emperor remained for almost a year training his warriors. He also started a psychological war against the Italians in his country. He was quoted as saying, "Italy's 96 days in Ethiopia are numbered."

By this time, the Ethiopian army was making remarkable progress in training procedures. Newspapers reported 1-1ar drums were beating nightly to give the message of a Wd.r coming soon, and there was a positive indication that the British might attempt to begin the first 97 fight with Italy, aided by Ethiopian warriors.

An Italian def'eat in this section of Ai'rica soon occurred. The

British government was not only prepared for ~ar, but was also prepar- 98 ing for the safety methods for protecting women and children. By

November J.91+0, the British were ready to begin fighting. British 40

Major Orde Wingate was sent by the govern~ent to Khartoum to launch the 99 first attack.

By January 24, 1941, the Italians were on the retreat in 100 Eritrea in the north. There wa.s fighting in Libya in sections of'

A:pollonia, Derna, and Maraua. The towns of Keru and Aicotta were 101 evacuated, and fighting around Lake Tana in Ethiopia •res going strong.

The Italians soon f'ound that they were f'ighting on several fronts.

Libya had strengthened her forces and that reduced the Italians' courage 102 to f'ully defend their territory in Ethiopia. Libyan forces advanced westwards against the Italians. Vigorous patrolling was being carried on at the border of' Kenya. Neghelli, 250 miles from Addis Ababa, also 103 was attacked.

On February 1, 1941, the British captured a base in Eritrea. 104 l~ny Italian soldiers also were captured. Indian forces joined the 105 British and Ethiopians in this fight 2,000 miles f'rom the central force of the Italian army. Soon, the combined forces reached the heart of Eritrea.

Many prisoners were captured at Bia Cundi when the town was 105 taken from the Italians. The Italians withdrew from Walkit, another hot spot, and also abandoned the bulk of their mechanical transport.

By February 3, 1941, there was complete success in Eritrea

(the northern province of Ethiopia). Agordat, a major battlefield, was captured. Italy lost heavily in men and ma,terial and was in full 106 retreat in western Ethiopia. The Ite.l1a.ns sustained heavy casualties during the final attack, which was carried out by British and Indian 107 troops with Royal Air Force cooperation. Another Indian. force •res 41

making its way eastward through the mountains.

The prospect of victory for Ethiopia was quite obvious by this

time. The "conquering lion of Judah": Haile Selassie, waved his flag io8 and asked his people to fight strongly until freedom.was achieved.

Haile Selassie, who called himself the king of kings, was determined

to return to his throne which he had lost to Mussolini in the war of 109 1936. Ethiopia had little to fight with except shields, arrows,

horses and camels, but it was aided by British bombers, planes and

soldiers. It was also assisted by Indian troops and was given full

cooperation from the Sudan: Egypt and Kenya in the use of their coast- 110 lands for invasion by Ethiopian troops.

The bulk of the help came from the British government forces

led by Brigadier General Sanford. This brave soldier was known as "the ill Napoleon of guerrilla warfare". He organized the so-called Gildeon

Force comprised of 100 British soldiers, 2,000 Ethiopian fighters, and 112 15,000 camels to rush through and seize the capital. He succeeded and put the emperor back on his thr0ne after five years of fighting.

An analytical piece in the Los Angeles Times stated that the defeat of the Italian forces in Ethiopia could be linked to the follow-

ing events:

1. A continued British advance westward from capture

2. P:cessure by British tank forces and armored units against the defenses of Derne., accompanied by heavy British air blows against Derna, Haraua and Apollonia at the tip of eastern Libya. 42

3. Reports that British forces have occupied the Italian sea­ plane base of' Bomba, 48 miles from Tobruk., and the nearby air­ dromes of' Tmimi and Ganzla. One British force was beyond Baza.la. 4. Intensified British air bombings in Ethiopia in support of' Haile Selassie's rebellion, including heavy damage to Italian administration buildings and an airdrome at Neghelli.ll3

The Christian Science Monitor had given a dif'f'erent account f'or the def'eat of' Italy. It said, in part:

The meaning of' Britain's initial victory over the Italian f'orces in North Af'rica can be grasped f'ully only by examining the plight of' the 200,000 or so Italian soldiers and as many civilians who have been bottled up in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, with a revolt of' the natives of' Ethiopia already getting out of' control.

Italians in east Af'rica are separated f'rom their mother country, being surrounded by British possessions and cut off' by sea by the British fleet which patrols the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

Aside from the radio, the only existing communication between these colonies and Italy is a weekly airplane, which f'lies, when posstble, from Asmara in Eritrea to Cufra (Tripoli) and from there to Rome.

At the outbreak of the present conflict, natives in Ethiopia bad been appeased to a certain extent by means of force and gifts of money to leaders who had survived and ¥Tho were still within the country.

Since that time, however, friends and followers of Haile Selassie have been working to encourage rebellion in Ethiopia, with the aid of British authorities and natives friendly to Great Britain.

From the Kenyan frontier, envoys of Haile Selassie have found easy entrance into Ethiopia through the dense tropical forests which are di:fficult f'or the Italians to patrol. These envoys have brought into Ethiopia news of the war and of the return of the Nef?lS of Africa, which they lliwe spread throughout the tribes •11·+

Italy's a~bitions in east Africa began with ownership of a strip of land. For a variety of reasons outlined earlier in the first f'ew paragraphs of thi::; chapter, the expansion continued. At first, she was successful in taking over power, Italy established herself well and was managing the whole land of Ethiopia for five years, but because of the determination of Haile Selassie and the aid he received from friendly countries like Britain and India, he managed to take over power again in 1941, thus bringing the Italian rule over east

Africa to an end once and for all. 44

FOOTNOTES- TO CHAPTER II

L Baer ~ George W. , The Coming of' the Italo-Ethiopian \-Tar (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 19o7J, p. 1.

2. Ibid. 3. Abyssinia and Italy (Issued under the auspices of' the Royal Institute of International Af'f'airs, Oxford University Press~ London, 1935), p. 5· 4. Hardie, Frank, The Abyssinian Crisis (Hamden, Connecticut~ Shoe String Press, Inc.~ 1974), p. 29. 5· Ibid. 6. Ibid. 1· Ridley~ F. A., Mussolini Over Africa (London, Wisb.art Books Ltd., 1955) ~ P· 99· 8. Ibid.~ p. 100 9· Baer, George W., QP• cit., p. 1.

10. Ibid., p. 2.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid. 13. Abyssinia and Italy, op. cit.• , p. 5· 14. Baer, George W., 2P· cit., p. 3. FOOTNOTES TO CHAPrER II, Cont'd.

15. ~blssinia.end Italy, op. cit., P· 6. 16. Ibid. 17. Ridley, F. A., op. cit., P· 48. 18. Abyssinia and Italy, op. cit., P· 6. 19. Ba.er, George W., op. cit., p. 25.

20. Ibid.

2l. Ibid., p. 26.

22. Ibid. 23. Ibid.' p. 27. 24. Hardi, Frank, op. cit., p. 64. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. ~., P· 205. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. ~., P· 65. 4b

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II, Cont'd.

31. Ibid., p. 66. 32. Harris, Brice Jr., The United States and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1964), p. 30. FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II, Cont'd.

46. ~., p. 4l.

Ibid. 48. The New Encyclo eadia Britannica Mi~opaedia, 15th Edition (30 vols., Chicago, William Benton, Publisher, 193 -73 , VI: p. 102.

Hardie, Frank, op. cit., p. 75.

50. Ibid. 51. ~., P· 77.

52. ~he New Encyclopaedia Britannica ~ticropaedia, op. cit., VI: P• 102.

53· Ibid. 54. Abyssinia and Italy, op. cit., p. 9.

55· Ibid.

56. Ibid., P· 10.

57- ~., P· 32. 58. Ibid.

59- ~yssinia and Italy~ op. cit., p. 31. 60. Ibid. 61. London Times: July l, 1936. 413

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II, Cont'd.

62. Ibid.

Ibid. 64. Abyssinia and Italy, op. cit., p. 27.

Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. Baer, George W., 9P· cit., p. 45. 68. Ibid.

Ibid.,p. 46. 70. Ibid.

71. Ibid. 72. Harris, Brice Jr., oy. cit., p. 5·

73· Ibid. 74. Ibid.

75· Abyssinia anditaly, op. cit., p. 27. 76. ~., p. 28.

Ibid. 49

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II, Cont'd.

78. Ibid. 19· Ibid. 80. Ibid. 8L Potter, Pitman, The Walwal Arbitration (Y.lashington; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938), p. 1. 82. Harris, Brice Jr., o;e. cit., P· 6. 83. Ibid. 84. Potter, Pitman B., 0:£· cit., p. 4. 85. Ibid. 86. !~-, p . 5· . ·87. Ibid. 88. ~-, p. 6. 89. Hardie, Frank, op. cit., P· 249. 90- Ibid. 91. DelBaco, Angelo, The Ethio~an War: 1935-1941, Translated by P. D. Cummins (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 228. 92. ~·' p. 229. 50

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II, Cont' d.

93· Ibid., PP• 253-54. 94. ~., p. 254. 95· Chicago Daily Tribune, January 14, 1941. 96. Ibid. 97· Ibid. 98. Del Baco, Angelo, op. cit., p. 255. 99· London Times, January 25, 1941.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. Los Angeles Times, February 3, 1941.

104. Ibid.

Ibid.

106. London Time~, February 3, 1941.

.107. Ibid.

108. Los Angeles Times, .January 25, 1941. 51

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II, Cont'd.

109. Ibid. llO. Ibid.

11l. DelBaco, Angelo, op. cit., p. 255.

112. Ibid.

113. Los Angeles Times, January 25, 1941.

114. The C~~istian Science Monitor, January 2, 1941. 5·-1)

CHAPTER III

THE OPENING INCIDE~~S

The Walwal Crisis of 1934

One bad experience does not usually take two countries to war.

But if the bad experience continues, and remedies are not found, things

can get more and more bitter, until finally both sides can hardly handle another one • Thus, be it strong or weak, a country may be carried away

by an ego trip and try to ~aintain its integrity through power. Ob-

viously, no country intends to lose a battle when it starts to fight.

This experience held true in the Italo-Abyssinian war of' 1936-

191+1. History has documented the battle dates as covering a 6-year

range. Although Italy claimed that she l'1..ad Abyssinia under her rule

during these years, in truth, the latter continued a constant struggle

in that period to sustain its sovereignty. The struggle by Abyssinia

even went back another two years to 1934 and 1935. This is clear from

the newspapers of those times that reported the different incidents.

Although 1935 was a little quieter, disturbances between the

two nations continued. The newspapers identified 1934 as the year of

testing each other's wills. In 20th Century vocabulary, the "cold war"

portion of the Italo-Ethiopian war o:f 1936-41 had alread.y started

during the latter part of the year 1934.

There were several little incidents between the Italian colony

(what is known as Somalia today) then,and Ethiopian warriors. What

seemed most significant to the nevrspapers of the time was the Walwal 53

p '

incident. Four of' the five newspapers studied for this project picked the date of' December 8, 1934 to make the first short report on this

development.

The stories that appeared on this date had the same facts.

Two of these newspapers, the Los Angeles Times and the Christian Science

Monitor, quoted the Associated Press wire service as their source; the

London Times used its own correspondent's document from Rome; and the

New York Times sunnnarized. a radio broadcast from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The tone of all of' these stories was identical, except for one important difference. The New York Times blamed Italy for starting the incident, while the other three cla,imed that the Ethiopian army started the attack. The London Times said, "A strong body of armed Abyssinl.ans with machine gun detachments is officially reported to have suddenly attacked during the afternoon of last Wednesday, the isolated native 1 garrison at the wells of Walwal in Italian Soil1-").liland." Parallel to the London Times, the Christian Science Monitor also reported that,

"An attack by Ethiopians on the garrison at Walwal, Italian SoJTl~liland, 2 elicited a vigorous protest from the Italian government." Describing the same event, the Los Angeles Times of December 8, 1934 said that,

"A strongly worded Italian protest--the second in as many months--was made to the Ethiopian government today after armed bodies of Ethiopians 3 attacked Walwal, Italian Somaliland."

It is difficult to tell the origin of these stories, but the

New York Times and the Los Angeles Times used the same wire copy from the Associated Press. The two used different headlines; the Los Angeles

Times used a shorter form of the story, cutting out three paragraphs 54

which were a part of the wire report in the New York Times. The

Associated Press version blamed Ethiopia with starting the shooting.

The Christian Science Monitor, although it used the same

Associated Press wire story, had edited and done a considerable job on the story. Not only that, but it also tried to present the Abyssinian version of the incident as well. The fourth newspaper, the London

Times, used a correspondent to report the incident; however, this is open to question, as the story originated from Rome, indicating some possible influence in the reporting.

The report of the correspondent to the London Times was more objective. He added to his report that although the Ethiopian army reportedly started the incident, the Italians had received warr1ings · beforehand. Therefore, it.appears that one party was keeping an eye on the other, and it was just a matter of time until the first shot was fired, leading Ethiopia to be accused of starting the affai=. It is fair to say that the London Times had kept its standard of objectivity by reflecting both sides of the picture.

Regarding objectivity, the New York Times and the Los Angeles

Times used the same wire copy from the Associated Press; hence, there is little difference in their coverage. More credit can be given to the New York Times for having used the entire copy (if that is all that appeared on the Associated Press wire) or at least most of it (if there was more to it), which might have helped its readers to see a complete picture of the incident.

The Christian Science Monitor deserves full credit, because immediately after the story, it also reported the Abyssinian side of the same event. It said that the Abyssinian goverr~ent's version of the reported conflict at Walwal claimed the initiative was taken by 4 native forces from Italian Somaliland. The story continued by saying that the trouble arose on December 5 J when Italian forces, armed with tanks, artillery and planes, attached themselves to Abyssinian forces which were escorting a joint British/Abyssinian commission engaged in 5 surveying grazing land.

There is no criteria by which readers of history can judge which of these Christian Science Monitor versions of the event is right or wrong. But as far as contemporary journalistic ethics are concerned, the paper apparently did its best to present both sides of the coin.

In these Christian Science Monitor stories, the conclusion is always · left to the .readers. Another clear-cut reaction to these stories is the fact that none of these newspapers had their own correspondents on the spot to report what they saw or at least heard at a closer distance.

All things considered, the newspapers in this study did fairly well with this reporting. Such considerations include: shorter time; lack of foreign correspondents on the scene; the space that each news- paper had to allocate, again considering the smaller size of newspapers o:f the 1930's; and_, most of all, the lack of an adequate communication system in pre-World War II Africa.

There might have been a little miscalculation by the newspapers to have taken the event lightly. It :i.s difficult underany circumstan- ces to tell whether an incident could lead into a major war or not; eventually, this one did. The ;>rear 1934 was a vi+,al one in the history of Abyssinia, or cotlid be said. to have left a chapter in African history. 56

More specifically, December 7, 1934 lit the fire to a major historical event on the continent.

The Walwal Incident of December 7, 1934, between Italian and

Abyssinian soldiers on the border o£ these two fighting nation~ had shaken the integrity of the Abyssinian existence as a free nation in the midst o£ numerous slave colonies on the African continent. It also disturbed the Italians, :for their power was being tested by what they considered to be a tiny country, weak and ineffectual.

All o£ the newspapers neglected one important factor in the story. There was no background information provided to the readers as to why the incident happened. Of course, history eventually revealed the answer to this above question. But the newspapers were not able to do so. Therefore, although historians are bound to make a subjective judgment, the case was not handled completely. Newspape=s have the potential to formulate public perception, and when the public does not receive the complete story of an event, misjudgments can occur.

This might have been the case at the time. Abyssinia may have lost sympathy from the world community because newspapers of the day had not presented the full r~ture of the incident.

Incidents of 1935 Although 1935 had been a quiet year in the life of the Italo­

Abyssinian war, there were incidents that retained the pilot light of

1934 to begin the real fire of 1936.

The incidents were fewer than in previous years, and were not as big as the 1934 Walwal problem. But still, several of the news­ papers picked for this study neglected to report them. Two newspapers 57

continued to write on this subject--the New York Times and the Christian

Science Monitor. One means of the validity of news reporting, one could argue, is the value and consistency of the stories a newspaper comes up with in the days when there were no incidents or disasters to cover. Hence, these two newspapers could be commended for keeping history flowing without interruption. These newspapers not only went in search of news to report to their readers, but they ·also made im- provements in their style of reporting. Such improvements included space allocated, use of illustrations, origin of the stories, .types of stories, and, most of all, the length in which they were presented.

Such improvements can be observed in the stories that appeared in 1935 in the New York Times and the Christian Science Honitor. The stories of 1934, criticized earlier, appeared engulfed between adver- tisements and mostly on back pages. The change in this respect is drastic. For example, on Februa~J llJ 1935, a story appeared on page 4 of the Christian Science Monitor. The headline stood out boldly and was followed by three sub-headings:

"Italy Begins Rushing Army to Ethiopia"

Precautionary Measure Includes Call for Class of 1911

Hope to Avert War New African Border Clash Occurred Near Afdub South of Walwal6

There was a map, one column wide and five inches deep, presen- ted as an illustration of the incident. The map not only contained the topography of Abyssinia, but it also showed the surrounding areas with whom Abyssinia shared boundaries. Such information provided readers with the answer as to where exactly the event occurred. This small map had the necessary information that Abyssinia is not an island, as some people might conclude, but is rather a nation in the horn of Africa. Italian Somaliland in 1934 shared its boundaries in t~e east and southeastern section with Abyssinia and Walwal, where this specific incident occurred which proved to be a boiling pot for both parties.

The Christian Science Monitor provided excellent coverage, but there was another excellent example in the New York Times of October 3,

1935. Four columns of the right-hand-side of this day's issue were filled with a story about the Italo-Abyssinian.conflict. The story ran more than 22 inches, and the culmination of the story was located on the second page of the same section. The headline was set in visible, bold type consisting of 14 words. Furthermore, this was followed by 6 sub-headings which told a story by themselves. On the same page, two other stories appeared mentioning the same events as did the main story.

These two events were not only·relevent; they also provided· details missing in the lead story. The main story reported that the Ethiopian frontier had been invaded by Italian forces in the neighborhood of 7 Assab. Th"ls story naturally accused the Italians of attacking the 59

Etbiopian border. Next to this report, the Italian view of the event was also given. This accused Ethiopia of violating the borderline and

said that Mussolini would fight back. This is an example of balanced

reporting. Such reporting can give the reader a picture of both sides

of the incident.

Much more can be said about reporting from the point of origin

of the events. If one is dealing with cou."ltry "X", a story originat­

ing from "X" will have more reality than one told about the same event from country "Y". Such is the case in three of the four stories about this event. The point of origin for the three stories was Addis Ababa,

Ethiopia. The one other one was told from Rome, Italy. Another main problem was the lack of the source of the news. It did not indicate if the information was taken from a wire account or was adapted from other

sources. This is important because it is difficult to conclude whether

or not a reporter reported it live or whether the information was dis­

covered by other means.

Types of stories used by the newspapers ranged considerably.

Straight news was the main form, followed by newsfeatures, features, editorials and columns. The character of the stories of 1935 in this study was'of two major forms. Three were straight news, the easiest to report because it does not require investigation nor additional time, for it happens instantly. On one occassion, the Christian Science

Moni'tor of February ll, 1935 presented an investigative, detailed news­ feattU'e. Considerable understanding was provided by this article because it took thorough investigation and factfinding to do such a

job, and through this process, there was some reality presented about 60

p '

the border clashes.

On February 11, 1935, the Christian Science Monitor carried a feature story on its first page. This was about many Italian army 8 battalions being rushed to Ethiopia. The newspaper indicated that the story originated from Rome. After stating the facts, the paper extended the story to show the relationship of' this specific event·· to

several others that had occurred two weeks earlier. Such linkage gave an extended view of the situation to the readers and eliminated the

tmreported gap between events that culminated in a major war. The map

{mentioned earlier) also has to be given credit for pinpointing the war

spot of the time for the readers. There is an additional plus for this edition of February 11, 1935. This is the fact that the Monitor pre-

sented in a special article on page 5 of' the same issue the reaction of the League of Nations to the incident. These examples have a lot to say about the newspapers of the period. One is that the con~lict of

1934 which continued into 1935 was not something that a paper could downplay. It was not a minor event any longer. The situation was 9 admittedly serious, the Christian Science Monitor commented in its feature sto~J of' February 11, 1935. Secondly, at this point, the prob- lem was not only sectional, but rather ~s becoming increasingly global. This can be seen from its special article on page 5 of the same date about the League of Nations being concerned about the fighting.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the United States was caught up in the dilemma of either being involved in the crisis or of' not being involved.

This can be detected from the story of' October 3, 1935 on the front page of' the New York Times. Here is how the article's headline 61

read: "Big Italian Force Invades Ethiopia; Mussolini Rallies 10 20,000,000 Fascists; Roosevelt to Keep Us 'Unentangled'". The last five words in this 14-word headline indicated that the President was deeply thoughtful about possible American involvement in the crisis.

If the President was worried, therefore, it would be fair to assume that there might be a foreign policy shift for the United States.

October 1935 seemed to be the month for a clear-cut decision in the West, especially for the United States. This can be seen through investigating the nature of news reporting on October 3, 1935.

As seen in the preceeding paragraph, the New York Times article indica- ted that the United States was worried, or more moderately, concerned, about what was going on in east Africa. On the same day, the Christian

Science Monitor PBd a story on its second page, continued on page 5, about the necessity of the United States keeping free from war. It stated, "Despite what happens in continents overseas, the United States 11 shall ancl must remain unentangled and free. 11

Such a reaction could only exist because the United States was pressured by the crisis going on around the world. This piece and the story on page 1 of the New York Times of October 3, 1935 are two indica- tions that the West was monitoring what was going on in the horn of

Africa. A third indication could be the feature story that appeared on page 2 of the Christian Science Monitor the same day, October 3. This featUl~ appeared adjacent to the above news story and it included three photos of Ethiopian soldiers.

This feature article not only dealt with the crisis situation, but it also described the character of the Ethiopian warriors, whom the 62

12 Manito~ called, "the warlike Amharas". What made this feature article a plus to the handling of the crisis reporting by the news- paper was that, for the first time in the stories studied thus far, the story was covered by a staff correspondent sent to the scene.

Previously in this chapter, it was discussed as to how important a story becomes when it originates from the actual scene, and particu- larly when a correspondent has witnessed what has occurred. Such importance was demonstrated by the coverage of the Cbrist.ian Science

Monitor on October 3.

R.H. Markham was the staff correspondent at that time for the

Monitor. He was sent to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to report what he saw.

His article on page l of October 3 was 25 inches in length and was accompanied by pictures to illustrate what he was reporting. He also gave a fair description of the dominating class of Ethiopians, the

Ambaras. He described this group as a minority of "brave, aggressive, 13 militant" Christians, which corresponds with the factual historical record of this group.

According to the findings of the present research, 1935 showed a tremendous improvement in the work of the newspapers covered in this study, at least as far as basics of journalism skills is concerned.

Lengths of stories went up from five-ten inches to fifteen-twenty-five inches. Variety was added to the types of stories. The placement of stories moved up from where they generally appeared in 1931~, jammed between advertisements on back pages. By 1935, news of this war was becoming front-page news, with longer and more concise reporting and background information being provided to readers. Stories also origin- 63

ated more from the spot concerned, a healthy sien of fair reporting.

Illustrations, such as maps and photographs, were being used to add significance to the story by 1935.

The War of 1936

In the history of the Italo-Ethiopian war, practically the whole year of 1936 was full of turmoil and importance. · This was the year in which the two countries met each other face to face to make their own segment of history in the Second World War. This portion of the study provides a chronology of that year's reporting as written in the five newspapers included in this research.

On January 1, 1936, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported that the 14 Italians bombed a Red Cross unit in Ethiopia. The next day,

January 2, Haile Selassie made a front page story by filing a complaint about a poison gas attack by the Italians on his people. The emperor charged specifically that Italian flyers, while raining explosives on the southern army of his son-in-law, Ras Desta Damtew, near Dolo, used poison gas and destroyed a Swedish Red Cross ambulance laden with the 15 sick and wounded.

A story from Rome in the Tribune on March 2, 1936 affirmed another attack at the battle of the Tembien Sector and said, rather 16 proudly, that Italy had won. It appeared as if' the movement of the crisis was speeding up during the early part of ~~y 1936. On May 3, three major events were reported in three prominent newspapers.

The Christian Sc:i.ence Monitor said that Ethiopia had made an urgent appeal for aid from the Americans in the Addis Ababa legation 17 to help Haile Selassie to sail for refuge in Palestine. This same day, a story in the London Times explained that the emperor bad with-

drawn from Abyssinia, accompanied by his family, and was heading for 18 Jibouti, in French Somaliland. The New York Times gave a summary of

all of the events of this day. The headline of its issue read:

"Emperor in Flight, Capital Looted, Ethiopia's Resistence Collapses, 19 Foreigners Guarded in Legations".

Four days after the emperor's flight from his country, Italian

occupation of Ethiopia provided a clearcut victory for history. The

front pages of the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor

carried the event accordingly.· The New York Times quoted Mussolini 20 as saying that, "Ethiopia is Italian." "Italians in Gala Mood on

Entering Ethiopian Capitol", reported the Christian Science Monitor, 21 explaining the atmosphere on May 6, 1936. Among the big events reported during the month of May, 1936,

the biggest would have to have been the annexation of Ethiopia to Italy

on May 9. The major newspapers considered for this study reported in

detail on the next morning, May 10, about this historic event. A news

report from Geneva that appeared in the Christian Science Monitor

started its lead with a pessimistic sentence. It asked, "Economic and

financial sanctions having failed to prevent Italy from winning the 22 Ethiopian war, shall the League now allow it to win its peace?"

The London Times did not carry the storJ on May 10 since it did

not have an issue that day, but came back to the event on ~~y 11 and

explained what the League of Nations went through during the weekend of 23 May 9-10, resulting only in no immediate change of policy. King

Victor Emmanuel was declared the emperor of the defeated land, the New York Times of May 10 explained.

Such was the case in May of 1936. The events and their cover- age showed that it was a very chaotic year and was definitely a ttU'ning point in the history of' the long-lived independent state of Ethiopia and of that section of east Africa. In contrast, June seemed calm in the sense that Ethiopians were stunned and the Italians were cheering their victory.

But Haile Selassie did not stop fighting. As he began his dip- lomatic fight, his first move on June 30, 1936 was to speak to the del.egates at the Geneva co!l:ference. In regards to this event, there is value in reviewing what two newspapers wrote about. The London Times reported that the emperor appealed not only for his country, but also 25 that he spoke on behalf of the rights of all small nations. A story originating from Geneva appeared in the Los Angeles Times and quoted

Haile Selassie as declaring that the fifty-two nations of the League of 26 Nations deserted Ethiopia by not making a decision.

The Chicago Daily Tribune seemed to have been attentive to the war at the beginning of 1936. In regard to the poison gas attack of January 1, 1936, this newspaper presented the feelings of both nations involved. Both versions appeared in the same column. The Ethiopian version preceeded the Italian one. The Daily Tribune quoted the

Associated Press as its source for the Ethiopian version, which origina- ted from the Imperial Ethiopian Headquarters in Dessye. In this piece of about 12 inches, the newspaper covered what the charge was, who made the charge, why, when, and where it was made. The charge, according to the excerpt in this story, was, "the criminal act of the Italian govern- 66

ment." It was, of course, made by Emperor Haile Selassie to the League 27 of Nations on January 1, 1936.

This story presented a fair picture of the situation for sev-

eral reasons. The storJ, in the first place, originated from the

place of the event, Dessye, Ethiopia, and it reached the West through

the Associated Press wire service, which historically has attempted to

provid.e a somewhat balanced account of events such as these. Secondly,

it had an appealing and appropriate headline followed by sub-titles to

explain the different segments of the story. The length was consider-

able, 12 inches, to be exact. Most of all, it happened to give a brief

background of the incident first before it went into detail.

A point which is to the credit of the newspaper is the fact that it presented the Italian version of the incident right after the

Ethiopian version. The Associated Press wire sei~ice was again the

source for this story. It origlnated from Rome, Italy, attempting to follow the ne\vspaper style of fair reporting, and it discussed the

Italian view. The newspaper quoted the Italians as saying that, "the 28 bombardment on that African front was fully justifled" .

Tvo days later, on January 4, 1936, the Chicago Daily Tribune

continued its follow up story on the war conditions between the two

nations. In this issue, the Tribune had one big plus for its style of

reporting: altho\~h the stories were shorter this time, it presented

both versions once again. Interestingly, it even added a third version, the Tunisia.'l side, which Italy also happened to be fighting against.

A reader who gets all of this ir~ormation in one place could be expec-

ted to be reasonably well informed about the affair. 67

The story pertaining to Ethiopia originated from Paris and the

source was the Chicago Tribune press service. Inter~stingly, this

piece, about seven inches in length, talked about an anti-war riot in

Italy. It reported casualties of one killed and many arrested in 29 connection with this.

The Associated Press wire service story from Tunis reported,

"Thirty-seven mutinous native soldiers who killed their Italian

commander in Tripoli were arrested and disarmed at French advance 30 posts after crossing the Tunisian frontier." This report was actu-

ally very short, only one paragraph, but it gave a balance to the com-

pleteness of the reporting style of the newspaper.

What Italy, the third party involved in the fighting, felt

about the whole situation was placed right after the first two stories.

Rome was the place of origin, and the newspaper used its own press

service in reporting this version, too. The lead paragraph read:

"Italy tonight took extraordinary precautions for the safety of the 31 British and Swedish envoys." This was an indication of some resent-

ment about the involvement of these two nations.

As there were pluses for this issue of the Chicago Daily

Tribune, there were also some minuses. All three stories were short.

Therefore, obviously, they hardly tell enough to fully inform the

reader. The piece that taL~ed about Italy guarding the envoys from

Britain and Sweden did not even specify which British and Swedish

envoys it was talking about, although one can presume it was those in

Rome and not those in Ethiopia. The third point is that the three

stories did not relate to each other. They talked about three events 68

in three places which could fall into one category, but there was no editorial linkage to tie them together. One could ask if such linkage is really necessary. The ans~~r is yes, since the articles talked about a mutual subject which concerned all three nations and was impor- tant in world politics at that time, and which was certainly Lmportant to readers.

Again, something could be said about the good and bad points of the Christian Science Monitor in reporting the Ethic-Italian war of

1936. On March 2, 1936, there was a joint source on a Monitor article of the Monitor staff correspondent and the Associated Press. The story was very short, but seemed very controversial. The controversy begins from the point of origin--Rome. It was reported from there and it therefore gave glorious support for Italy's victory. Here are a few lines from that storJ:

11 • • • a victory so great that it may actually appease Il Duce's appetite for conquest in Ethiopia is chalked up for the Italian forces. 11

11 ••• the Tembien Sector is depicted as virtually wiped clear of Ethiopians, who are reported in headlong retreat, shedding their weapons, their equipment and animals, while some of them surrendered in great massP.s." 32 " this smashing victory receives a dramatic fillup .•. 11 From these lead sentences of the three-paragraph story, it can be judged that the reporting had strong propaganda emphasis, rather than reporting reality. "A victory so great ..•. 11 is not the language that normally represents reporting in a prominent newspaper like the

Christian Science Monitor. Victory should be called 'great' only when some country gets wr~t it deserved; in this case, Italy was a colonial power which took over a '1;feak nation by force and terror and therefore does not deserve to be complimented with reporting phrases such as a

'great victory' over Ethiopia. Clearly, such language was misleading for the newspaper audience of the time.

The second paragraph of this March 2 story quoted above had expressions such as " ... shedding their weapons, their equipment and animals." Again, there are problems about the language used here. The word 'animals' is not explanatory as it stands. To a foreign reader, it might have exaggerated the stereotype of Africans living in the jun­ gle with animals, whereas army supplies carried by animals is most likely the actual case.

The third paragraph opened with the phrase, " ... this smashing victory received a dramatic fill up .•. " To historians of' today, the acts of Italy were not either 'smashing' nor 'victorious' . This criticism runs parallel to that mentioned about the phrase, " ••. victory so great .•• " History tells it today that the Ethiopian army was never

'smashed' and that is why it was able to revive its force and eventually participate in winning this war. Secondly, there is nothing 'victor­ ious' in this case about taking another nation's dignity. Hence, this is not something that a newspaper normally would have complimented, but rather might well have condemned. However, in the context of the times, and because of the origin of the report, it should be seen more as propaganda tP~n as news.

This is why it was observed. above that this sto27 was short but controversial. The story could again be criticized on man,y other weak polnts. The fact that background was missing could have resulted in 70

:misunderstanding by readers, also. Nothing was mentioned. in it about

what the victory was about, or even why the battle was fought at this

speci:fic time.

As was true with the Ghicago Tribune, May 1936 was an important

month in the coverage by the Christian Science Monitor. Several

stories appea1~d on May 3rd, 6th, and lOth. There is one indication to

be noted as to why this occurred. The United States had become invol-

ved by being invited by Ethiopia to step into the scene of the conflict.

Paying close attention to the story of ~my 3, 1936 will emphasize this

fact. The headline on that story read: "Urgent Appeal for Aid from 33 11 Americans •

Another factor that made May an important month was that this

.was the month in which Haile Selassie sailed for refuge in Palestine.

Finally, a few days after the king's departure, Italy took total con-

trol of the land.

It could have been for these and other reasons, in contrast to '· the March 2 story, that the Christian Science Monitor provided an

exclusive, lengthy story. The story appeared on the front page of that

day, occupying four columns, and ran to a length of more than 20 inches.

'The stol"'J was accompanied by two pictures. One showed the three per-

sona.lities involved for the moment: Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Commander-

in-Chief for the Italian Armyj Haile Selassie, Ethiopian Emperor ready

to flee; and Cornelius Van H. Engert, United States Minister Resident

at Addls Ababa. The other picture showed the battlefronts of the time

and the people involved in the battle, especially Ethiopians who were

victj.ms in the incident. 71

This piece was complete for several reasons. The space allot-

ment was sufficient for understanding, and there was no dramatizations

of events. It was plain reporting of facts which history today has

covered in the same way, authenticating the earlier coverage. Impor-

tantly, there was no value judgment made since the story was handled

by plain and straight reporting. Background information was not neces-

sary, for the report itself provided a background for events to follow.

The newspaper appears to have taken a little advantage of the United

States' involvement to report so extensively, but it was a correct

judgment if at all this was the case, since the "local angele" ob- viously was greater with the appeal to American involvement.

There was another step in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia which was reported in the Christian Science Monitor of May 6. This •~s a moment when Italian army leaders entered the center of Ethiopia, which was and still is the capitol. It was surely a big step for the

Italians and a moment of great loss for the Ethiopians. The newspapers reported it respectively. It said that the Italians were "in a gala 34 mood" upon entering the Ethiopian capitol. The story originated from

Addis Ababa, which was not in Ethiopia's possession at the time and which could be considered Italian itself in the context of the moment.

There was a little reporting about the condition of American residents in Ethiopia and about the fact that they were being driven from the country.

Aside from projecting few fact.s in advance, the newspapers played down the occupation until the day of the event itself. This was, of cotrrse, the May 9t.h annexation of Ethiopia by Italy. On May 10, 72

1936, the Christian Science Monitor carried different versions and

reported feelings on the outcome of the situation. Such an act by

Italy was exciting to Italians, surprised the League of Nations, and

angered the Ethiopian emperor and the people of his occupied nation.

The Christian Science Monitor reflected all of these feelings

in its headline. Here is how it read: "Council Split on Sanctions 35 as Duce Annexes Ethiopia; Negus Voices New Protest." As there were

three parts to this headline, there were also three pieces of stories

beneath it.

A big story reported about what it called the "Greatest Enthu-

siasro in Italy over New Empire". Paul Cremona, a staff correspondent

for the Christian Science Monitor, reported from Rome about the excite- 36 ment of the Italians. "Italians are thrilled by the event." said

the story expressing the enthusiasm. "A salute o:f 101 guns fired. in Rome 37 and all the principal towns of Italy ... " it continued, and also

added an excerpt from Mussolini' s speech in the article. It read:

" .•. in the last 14 years, I have attended all the fascist ceremonies, 38 but never have I witnessed such a scene of unrestrained enthusiasm ...

Such was the excitement created among Italians due to this his- toric happening of May 9· As was mentioned above, the event had a lot ,

o:f surprises for the other two parties involved--the underdog nation of

Ethiopia, and the League of Nations, which was indirectly involved in the crisis by trying to bring an end to it.

The experience that Ethiopia went throllgh was expressed through her king's appeal to the League of Nations. A story next to the one about the Mussolini enthusiasm explained this version. It told of 73

Ethiopia's grievances about Italy's action. The king sent his plea to the League of Nations through his representative. Haile Selassie bitterly protested Mussolini's annexation of his country and asked the

League to stand firm for Ethiopia's cause. This story originated from

Geneva and the source was the Associated Press~ an origin which could be considered as neutral to both nations~ or at least more neutral than those that originated from Addis Ababa or Rome. The story was.

10 inches in length and was accompanied by a picture of the Ethiopian

representative to the League of Nations at the time. All of this was a plus to the style of journalism that the Christian Science Monitor used.

The third phase of excitement arose in the League of Nations.

Such feeling within the League was reflected in the third section of this newspaper, next to the story of the emperor's plea to the League.

This story ·was reported from Geneva by a staff correspondent of' the

Christian Science ~-!oni tor.

The League was caught in a dilemma. The main problem was that since the economic and financial sanctions had failed to prevent Italy from invading Ethiopia, the League was puzzled as to what measures it

should now take to punish Italy for the aggressive acts. There was the deeper problem of some members of the League being opposed to the idea of any sanctions against Italy. It was feared that this would create 39 a d.isasterou.s division among member countries. Such division on the question of sanctions was created for two reasons. One was that a number of the countries were waiting for the British and French to lead such an action. The other was a fear on the part of some cotmtries of losing the advantage of Italian support ln the event of European con­ l~O f1ict. 74

p '

Generally speaking, there was some harmony among the three

stories which appeared on the front page .of the May 10, 1936 issue of

the Christian Science Monitor. There were several journalistic quali­

ties maintained. The headline that ran three columns wide tells con­

sidei~bly about the tP~e versions detailed below it. The three

stories also were well placed on the page and were informative.

All of these stories originated from the correct scene. The

story of Italian enthusiasm came from Rome; the one about Ethiopia's feelings and appeal originated from Geneva, and, of course, the one about the dilemma of the League of Nations was written from where the

League existed. The stories directly interrelated to each other and also provided background information, which was explained in the head­ lines and sub-headings. Additionally, there was a reasonable length to them in which considerable information was provided. ·

Throughout the analysis of the Christian Science Monitor and the Tribune, it is evident that May 1936 was of real importance to the

Ethic-Italian conflict. The same highlights were captured in the New

York Times. May was again very important in the overall coverage of the event.

On the front page of the May 3 issue, the flight of the emperor to exile, the collapse of Ethiopian forces, and the situation of for­ eigners in the country were covered. Even more effectively than the

Christian Science. Monitor, the New York Times_ gave a four-column-wide spot to provide the details of the situation. Again, as did the

Monitor, the New York !imes reported different versions of the story, va~Jing as to source. 75

Numbering the four columns from one to four, left to right, the first column had its own sub-title and was reported by a New York

Times correspondent from Rome. He talked about the future of Italy to annex Ethiopia, aside from what Haile Selassie was trying to accom- plish in the League of Nations. In the second column, there was a story indicating that Britain should really consider the Ethiopian 41 crisis as a closed chapter.

In the third column was a report about the United States lega- tion in Addis Ababa being hit by bullets from Italian soldiers and the

U.S. counsel's home being looted. The fourth carried the most impor- tant story of all. This told about the flight of the emperor to a 42 foreign land and the condition of his army.

May 5, 1936 was another big day for Italians in their cor~lict with Ethiopia. This was the day they took hold of the count~J 1 S capitol; they were also quite sure of their conquest of the entire nation. This was the story that was reported in the Christian Science

Monitor to have raised enthusiasm among Italians, excitement in the

League of Nations, and anger among Ethiopians. The feelings that were observed by reading the New York Ti~es could be judged as the same.

There was a feeling o~ triumph for Mussolini, the confession on the issue of considering economic sanctions by the League of Nations on

Italy, and also the frustration and anger of Ethiopia--all of these issues were expressed well in the Times.

In one of the articles, Herbert I. Matthews, a foreign corres- pondent for the New York Times, wrote, "Ethiopia's era of independence, which had lasted since Biblical times, ended at four o'clock this ------·------·---::_-:-_-:-____ :--_-:------:----_~....------~ -~~---- 76

43 af'ternoon (that afternoon being May 5, 1936) . " There is one inter- esting side fact to this report: Matthews typed the story in the car he was traveling in with an Italian marshall from a remote town to Addis 44 Ababa.

The big event for the Times to cover was, of course, the annex- ation of Ethiopia by Italy on May 9, so this date ~s a main day for the New York Times, as was the case for the other newspapers in report- ing the east African war. Big headlines appeared on its front page almost telling the full story by themselves. The headline had two vital emphases: the fact that Ethiopia ~s annexed, and the takeover by the Italian emperor of the throne of Haile Selassie. Other sub- headings explained other situations:

Il Duce Reads Decrees

Vast Throng Cheers as He Announces Status of New Realm

Crowd Cries, 'Yes! Yes!' when Mussolini Pledges of Con~uest Against All

Harar is Found in Ruins.

Southern Army Also Occupied Dire~wa Graziani is Promoted to Marshal 5

All of these sub-headings followed the main headline and they all were explanatory by themselves. The stories originated from their respective places; Rome, Harar 9.nd Geneva. But the specific sources "((

were not mentioned. The London Times had also captured the drama of the emperor's flight and Italy's annexation of Ethiopia. On top of all of this, it had given exclusive coverage of the king's appeal to the

League of Nations on June 30, 1936.

On May 3, the day after the emperor fled his country, the

London Times wrote a front-page story capturing the scene from an ob- server's point of view. The story originated from Addis Ababa and was written by a staff correspondent for the Times. It appeared with four headlines which emphasized different perspectives of the event. The story occupied the left-hand side of the first page. 46 "Abyssinia ·Has without a leader." the story said, indicating that the emperor was gone to a foreign land. It expressed the grave disorder that existed in the capitol of Ethiopia and also anticipated 47 the Italian occupation of the country.

This piece in the London Times could be taken as an example of double checking on the validity of stories. That is to say that the

London Times story originated from where the event took place, was written at a reasonable length, and, since the British were more di- rectly involved in backing the Ethiopian government, the story was more thoroughly reported.

The annexation o:f Ethiopia by Italy bad caused deep annoyance among European powers, especially Britain and France. This perspective was covered in almost a full story in the London Times of May 11, 1936.

The pa.;,;er devoted the :first three columns of its first page to dealing with ':the Wrong" doing of Italy in taking such action, expressing the feel:i.:nG of the League of Nations about the issue. It also provided a 78

separate view on the French position in regard to the 9ituation.

"Mussolini announced in Rome that Abyssinia had been placed 48 under the sovereignty of Italy.", wrote the newspaper. It added

that there had been a number of conferences at Geneva over the weekend

after the action was taken in preparation for the council meeting of

May 11, 1936, which was to consider the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. In

the next column, the paper picked up the story of the variation of

opinlon among the member countries of the League of Nations. The

difference of opinion was divided into three categories. The London

Times said that some nations wanted to continue to regard Italy as an

aggressor and were determined to maintain the existing sanctionsj thus, 49 they refused to recognize the annexation of Abyssinia. On a second

level, Great Britain wanted to maintain her.position of "isolationism",

but with a strong belief in the League, and while expecting concrete

results from the council meetings. Finally, the neutral nations--

Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Rolland, Switzerland and Spain--were revising

their obligations in the League, but they intended to exercise their 50 influence on the policy of the Great Powers as they had done before.

It is important at this point to emphasize that the League's

role in the matter of the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1936 was extremely

important. It was still a major world forum in 1936. Such a view was

reflected in the newspapers from time to time when a new development in

the w-a.r took place. On July 1, 1936, . the London T:lmes vr.rote a detailed

story on the speech of Haile Selassie at the Geneva Conference. The f'i~~.' special correspondent covered the story from Geneva and reprint- ei most of the speech. In this address, Haile Selassie not only spoke 79

:for his country, but he also pleaded for the rights of small states and 51 the collective security of the world. In his speech, he emphasized the value of treaties being kept as promised and signed for the safety of small states.

The Los Angeles Times, the fifth newspaper selected for this study, neglected the important issue of June 30, 1936 in the League of

Nations and instead picked up and dramatized the minor violence that took place around the Assembly. The headline of its story on July 1,

1936 started off by saying that the king pleaded to the League, but, immediately following that, the paper wrote saying that police were

.called in to restore order around the Assembly and added that Haile

Selassie had declared that his country was deserted by fifty-two 52 nations.

It was a fact that such events had occurred at th~ conference, but it should have been reported as a mini-event to accompany what was the major event--the actual speech of protest and the feelings of the member nations. To illustrate, here is the leading paragraph of that day's Los Angeles Times' story:

" Riotous scenes of cursing and fighting in the galleries shattered the dignity of the League of Nations Assembly tonight as Emperor Haile Selassie told themembers, "You deserted us to Italy.•"53

It is even more interesting to look at the paragraph following this:

" Police were called in to restore order after a chorus of heckling boo's and curses greeted the Emperor without an Empire when he rose to make a final, dramatic plea for aid." 54

The news a1~icle continued, reporting about order being restor- ed after a great disturbance, and it quoted that the emperor condemned the conduct of the Assembly. This thesis is not assuming that the con- 80

tent of the story is wrong, but rather seeks to criticize the style of

journalism involved. The Los Angeles Times, at a critical moment tn the coverage of a major story, shifted the emphasis to the more minor detail of incidental violence, rather than concentrating on the facts

of the more historically important elements of the story. The paper did not begin with background information about what circumstances had

led to the violence, nor did it explain why those circumstances existed.

In addition, the paper contradicted itself by usage of words. Sometimes

it quotes the emperor as making a plea, while at other times it con- 55 demns the conduct of the Assembly.

As a general way of criticism, all of the newspapers studied for this thesis did a reasonably good job in reporting the Italo-

Ethiopian war of 1936. It is understandable that they mainly captUl~d only the key highlights of events. All the key situations as they came to pass were covered in one way or another by all of the newspapers.

But, of course, there were variations in the style of reporting from one paper to another. Some gave a reasonable amount of space; most placed. their stories on the front page; and quite a few reported witnessing the actual events. All of these qualities were important for the vitality and value of the information for the general readers who were far removed from the events and had to -rely on the press to provide an accurate picture of the crisis.

Victory for Ethiopia

January 1941 was a bad month for the Italians in Ethiopia.

The victory that they claimed in May of 1936 came apart in 1941. The revival of Ethiopia was so great that by Janua17 24, 1941, they were Ol

pushing hard into the border provinces of the occupied country. For their part, the Italian soldiers were losing control of the situation.

On January 25) 1941, the London Ttmes presented a story saying that Italian soldiers were on the retreat in Eritrea and that two towns 56 were already evacuated. This was an indication that the attack of

Ethiopian guerrilla fighters was growing stronger in the northern section of the country. The London Times had at that time a special correspondent in Cairo who was close enough for good observation of the situation, although it was not as good as reporting from where the actual event was taking place.

This issue of the London Times was accompanied by two maps which helped to illustrate to the reader exactly where that story took place. The maps drew borderlines and illustrated the ma.rchlng of the armies involved, giving a full picture of the situation. Statements from the four corners of the war front were written in brief at the beginning of this story. A report from Libya, a country Italy was also fighting against, said that Libyan troops were continuing their advan- ces westward. A note from Eritrea explained that Italian forces had 57 evacuated from Keru and Aicota and were continuing their retreat.

Abyssinia reported considerable guerrilla activities occurring south and east of Lake Tana, during which casualties were inflicted upon enemy troops. From a neighboring country, Kenya, came a statement telling of vigorous patrolling upon and over a large portion of the 58 frontier.

The entire story ran a reasonable length, more than 30 inches.

It is not only the length that is interesting to observe, but also the 82

importance of the fact that the content of the report ~res complete.

It took only a week's time for the Ethiopian army to punch

further inland and to gain back more of the country's freedom. This

success story was reported in the London Times of February 3, 1941.

uA further brilliant success has been won against the Italians.", the

Times reported. It said that -Agordat had been taken and that the enemy

bad lost many hundreds of prisoners and much material, including tanks 59 and guns. In general, this edition reported enthusiastically about

Ethiopia's success. This can be observed by reading the headlines.

There \.>ere three of them for one story. The headline read: "Brilliant

Success in Eritrea; Capture of Agordat; Severe Italian Losses in Men 60 and Material;· Full Retreat in Western Abyssinia".

On the same day, the Los Angeles Times also had a piece about

this event. Although this story captured most of the highlights, it

gave most of the credit to the British army instead of to the Ethio-

plans. By reading this item, one could get the impression that it was

a British struggle, rather than Ethiopia's. To illustrate this, it is

necessary to mention just what the headline read. It said, "British 61 Take Eritrean Base".

No one can deny that the British helped Abyssinia to win its war; even India provided a lot of effort, but by no means did Britain win the battle for herself, by herself, as the Los Angeles Times

reported. Further down in the story, the Times said: " .•• the British

2,000 miles away to the northwest were still concentrating their forces 62 west of ••• " There is again an indication of a misconception by the

Los Angeles Times, implying that the war was being fought in favor of Britain rather than Ethiopia.

The New York TL~es seemed to have taken the same avenue for reporting as the Los Angeles Times' story of February 3 by treating its article on a February 5 item in the same manner as had the Los

Angeles Times. The New York Times said in its headline t~qt the 63 British took Cirene in Libya and cut of£ a seaplane base. Both of these stories were received from the Associated Press.

Assuming that the job that these newspapers had done on the victory story was good, it would be of additional value to review the

:reporting of the before-and-after events of the success again. The

Chicago Daily Tribune was well ahead of the others in reporting the days before success arrived for the Ethiopian soldiers. This newspaper dramatized the courage that Ethiopia had at the time by quoting Haile 64 Selassie as saying, "Italy's days are numbered. 11 This story origina- ted from London through Reuters and was accompanied by a picture of the man who it vms talking about, which added a little flavor to it.

Regarding the after-event coverage, the Chicago Tribu..11e had a veljr interesting shor~ editorial on May 8, 1941. It summarized well the coverage of the highlights during those five years and called Haile

Selassie a forerunner in the whole world situation. The Tribu..11e stated:

" What may be a minor news note in the thunder of world events reveals the first of the exiles back home and on his throne. Five years almost to the day after Haile Selassie, the lion of Judah, fled from Mussolini's in­ vading army, he is back in Addis Ababa. One i.s uncertain as to whether to incJ_ude the king of Ethiopia as the ruler of a democracy. He was known as a liberal-minded man and was recognized in the League of Nations as the ruJer of a su:fficiently civilized country."

11 When :tviu.ssolini tested out the stability of what ¥:ras p •

then a new world order by jumping on the neck of his fellow club member in the League, among those watching attentively to see what happened was Adolf Hitler. Nothing but words happened, and Adolf decided that tanks and stukas could lick lexicons. Ethiopia passed into the new Roman empire. Mussolini decorated his probably indifferent king rTi th the title of the old emperors. Haile, having paid some back to the League and having the cold sholcler, retired to England to take his place among the landed gentry. His book appeared to be closed. Now be is the first to regain what was ··lost. He has it again, the first of the democrats to be rescued--a harbinger for whatever it is -.;mrth." 65 " Optimism will make the most o:f it."

What this project has attempted to do is not only related to

how much of the war's history was reported, but also to analyze how well it was written in the respective newspapers of the time. As a

summary note, therefore, it would be interesting to see what changes

there were :from what the project called the years of incident to the

days of victory. From late 1934 to late 1935, almost all the news-

papers played down the conflict that existed.between the two nations.

As the little incidents grew to bigger conflicts, and finally to a war, the papers increased their reporting. At the time of the real war in 1936, they provided it with full coverage. The beginning days were not taken seriously, perhaps because none of the newspapers sensed

that. these minor disputes would grow to a full-blown war. None of them

anticipated that Italy would take such aggressive action in the dis-

pute, but when it happened, the papers followed their only choice and

played the sto17 accordingly.

The actual war and the final victory were given more emphasis,

time, and space because of several factors: slowly, America herself was getting involved indirectly because of the growing greater conflict 85

with the Axis powers. The League o~ Nations was involved directly, and the whole world peace situation was increasingly at stake. In general, then, the papers went along with the events o~ the time and with the situation that existed. They waited too long to analyze the consequen­ ces o~ the early events, which were as important as the ~ighting o~

1936 and the de~eat o~ Italy in 1941. 86

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. London Times, December 8, 1934.

2. Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 1934. 3· Los Angeles Times, December 8, 1934. 4. Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 1934. 5· Ibid. 6. Christian Science Monitor, February 11, 1935. 1· New York Times, October 3, 1935. 8. Christian Science Monitor, February 11, 1935.

9· Ibid.

10. New York Times, October 3, 1935. 11. Christian Science Monitor, October 3, 1935.

12. Ibid. 13. Ibid.

Chicago Daily Tribune, January 1, 1936. 15. Chicago Daily Tribune, January 2, 1936. 16. Christian Science Monitor, January 4, 1936. 87

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III, Cont'd.

17. Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1936. l8. London Times, May 3, 1936.

New York Times, May 3, 1936.

New York Times, May 6, 1936. 21. Christian Science Monitor, May 6, 1936. 22. Christian Science Honitor, May 10, 1936. 23. London Times, May 11, 1936. 24. New York Times, May 10, 1936.

London Times, July 1, 1936. 26. Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1936.

Chicago ~ly Tribune, January 2, 1936. 28. Ibid.

Chicago Daily Tribune, January lJ., 1936. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Christian Science Monitor, March 2, 1936. 00

FOarNOTES TO CHAPTER III, Cont'd.

33· Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1936. 34. Christian Science Monitor, May 6, 1936. 35· Christian Scien::::e Nonitor, May 10, 1936. 36. Ibid. 37· Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39· Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. New York Times, May 3, 1936. 42. Ibid. 43. New York Times, May 6, 1936. 44. Ibid. 45. New York Times, May 10, 1936. 46. London Times, Nay 3, 1936. 47. Ibid. 48. London Times, May 11, 1936. FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III, Cont'd.

49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 5L London Times, July 1, 1936. 52. Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1936. 53· Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55· Ibid. 56. London Tim~, January 25, 194L 57· Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59· London Times, February 3, 1941. 60. Ibid. 6L Los Angeles Times, February 3, 1941. 62. Ibid.

New York Times, February 5, 1941. 64. Chicago Daily Tribune, January 14, 1941. p '

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III, Cont'd. 65. Ibid. 91

p '

CHAPTER N

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the following chapter, the behavior of each of the five newspapers studied for thesis will be reviewed and analyzed. Emphasis will be on the tone of the stories, their size and placement, balance of presentation, sources utilized in obtaining information, and the overall quality of the reporting and interpretation as it related to the historical record of the events.

It is a very difficult job to either compliment or to complain about the papers studied in this report. This is because the reporters who worked for the newspapers had to cope with a great number of in­ conveniences which were discussed in the introductory chapter under

"foreign correspondents". Such problems included lack of adequate communications, the problem of understanding language, strict censor- ship, and crude transportation systems. Minor handicaps that the newsmen were faced with were food shortages, extreme weather changes, bad living conditions, and rough terrain.

The international communications systems in those days were still in the primitive stages of development, as compared to today's standards. Transmission of messages took time and cable prices were expensive. Messages were delivered from one spot to another by motor­ cycle or by a mailman who rode a mule or drove a vehicle at a speed of five miles an hour due to the ruggedness of the roads. It frequently was difficult for reporters to understand. fully what the officials of both parties, particularly the Ethiopians, were saying, because of

language problems. Interpreters often played a double role, since

frequently they were paid by all-of the news agencies. The hardship of

telling what the newsmen bad witnessed became more and more difficult

as censorship became stricter and stricter as the war progressed. The

rough terrain made mobility slow and breathtaking for the correspon­

dents. Constant weather changes caused both health hazards and dis­

comfort f'or them, and food shortages went from bad to worse as they

traveled with the army of each side. Living conditions prevented them

from doing a better job than most did. They were also caught in the

dilemma of reporting truthfully what they saw, or of satisfying their

editors and publishers, who often persuaded them to provide an angle

favoring one or the other side because it helped circulation. And some

reporters had their own preferences between the two nations due to their

personal attachments or emotions. Hence, this entire atmosphere sur­

rounding the reporting conditions makes it difficult to compliment or

- to criticize one or the other of the newspapers for the job that they

performed.

The Chicago Daily Tribune took a conservative stand in report­

ing the Italo-Ethiopian war, not varying in its editorial style from

the beginning of the war in 1936 to its end in 1941. It reported the

dry facts, eliminating value judgments whenever possible. Like the

other newspapers studied, the Tribune carried little coverage of the

initial incidents of 1934-36. Few editors thought that those small

clashes would lead to a major interr~tional crisis. As the conflict

grew bigger, the Tribune increased its coverage, but did so without 93

:fear-eliciting headlines or sensationalism.

In 1936, when the war was underway, the Tribune increased its stories by length and number, at times reporting more than one story a day~ but rarely on the first page.· However, the Tribune was the only paper studied which gave regular editorial page opinions on the Italo­

Ethiopian war. The others seemed deeply concerned with their coverage of the news, but f'or the most part neglected their editorial page func­ tion. The major criticism of' the Tribune coverage is that it failed to give the reader sufficient background information within its stories, a

:fault shar-ed with the other four newspapers. However, it should be not­ ed that both the Italian and Ethiopian sides imposed censorship.

The New York Times took the lead in providing space in its pages to cover the Italo-Ethiopian war. As vas the case with the other papers, the pieces got bigger, more explicit, and occupied various spots in the pages. The Times was the only paper stud.ied that maintained an even pace in its coverage through the year 1935. Because that year had been neglected by the other papers, they contain gaps in their histories of' the war. Credit can be given to the Times for its stories of September

20th and 30th, October 3rd and 4th, April 8th, and ~une 2nd, in which the newspaper captured the mood of' the people of both fighting nations and anticipated the war policies being formulated.

When the war expanded in 1936, the Times used its traditional array of sub-ti"tles to illustrate long page 1 stories which sometimes filled columns. To its further credit, the paper provided ini~ormation about both sic1es in the conf'lict throughout 1936. The Times maintained this emphasis regarding space and style. But this study has found that during the next :five years, this paper, like the others, f'ailed to ade­ quately report the activities inside that sla'!e nation. It wasn't until

~94.1, when Italy was de:feated, that the -paper played the Ethiopian story with a sense o:f importance. The stories in the Times generally were shorter in 1941 and were also sometimes moved to the inside pages. O:f course, in that period, there were many international stories competing

~or space. As a whole, then, a graph tracing the Ethiopian reporting o:f the New York Times :for the 1934-41 period would show some variations.

The third newspaper selected :for this study, the Christian

Science Monitor, :followed a pattern similar to that o:f the New York

~imes. In 1935, the Monitor carried a number o:f impressive stories dealing with the mobilization process in each country. The following year, the Monitor captured the highlights o:f the war with exceptional quality, giving front-page coverage most o:f the time. A measurement of pieces using inches per story showed more than a two-:fold increase when compared with other years. The content was historically accurate and there was no attempt to impose values within the stories. The Monitor sent its own foreign correspondents, like R.H. Markham, to the scene, thus organizing stories with :fresh perspectives. In addition, the

Monitor had the largest amount of illustrations accompanying its stories, including photos of· personalities, maps, and action shots. In contrast to the New York Times, the amount of reporting by the Christian Science

Monitor during the years 1934-4i varied only a little bit. The Monitor continued with bold headlines and page 1 stories similar to its coverage of 1936.

According to the :findings of this research, the Los Angeles Times 95

did the worst job. Several reasons lead to this judgment. The Times provided mainly short stories and did not improve its performance as the crisis developed. The paper made many blunders in the usage of . language (as discussed in Chapter III)_and was biased in its report­ ing. The research shows that this newspaper tended to concentrate on the bad image of Ethiopia rather than the good one. This was exampli­ fied by the story of July 1~ 1936~ as analyzed in the previous chapter.

Because the paper did not have its own correspondent in Ethiopia~ most of the stories in the Times originated in Rome~ Washington,

Khartoum, Cairo~ or Geneva. It provided scanty coverage of this crisis, mostly in one-column pieces on inside pages. It neglected the use of illustrations to accompany the reports.

Historians have shown how Britain stood side by side with

Ethiopia during the course of this war and afterwards. It could be assumed that British papers would give fair coverage to the story effecting their nation. The London Times took the matter seriously from the beginning. While most of the stories originated in Rome, written by the London Times' own correspondent, they gave equal sup­ port to both Ethiopian and Italian versions. When things seemed quiet in 1935, the paper continued to offer double-column, big head­ line stories about the entire situation in Ethiopia. Tvro good exam­ ples of this could be seen in its stories of September 26 and October

4. In 1936, it accelerated this coverage. By 1941, of course, the paper celebrated the victorJ along with Ethiopia, for the British shared in the success. More space was allotted, maps were used for illustrations, and by-line reports were furnished. Wh~n the five newspapers are ranked in order of overall quality, the Christian Science Monitor stands first. This is because it began its coverage at a low level, like the others, but raised it consider­ ably and kept it there all the way through the war. The London Times did the same, but since Britain was involved in the war, this research­ er considered such coverage as part of' that paper's normal coverage.

The London Times thus follows the Christian Science r.lonitor .

. Third, according to this study, was the New York Times. This paper started equal with the others, but expanded its reports in size a.nd ran many of them on its front pages. It fell behind the coverage of' the London Times by underplaying the 1941 Ethiopian victory report, giving that less emphasis than the victory reports for Italy in 1936.

The Chicago Tribune was fourth, although it increased its amount of coverage in the 1936-41 period. The Tribune usually positioned the

Ethiopian stories on inside pages jammed with advertisements and other minor stories. The Los Angeles Times was last in performance. The use of what this researcher considered to be vague language took away the credibility of this paper. A tendency in its headlines to make the war look primarily like a British ef'f'ort.rather than that of

Ethiopia was confusing. And, as time went by,- its coverage did not show improvement like the other papers.

Based on the research in this study, it was determined that, in the context of the times, the five newspapers did a fairly adequate job of describing to their readers the .important incidents of' the

Italo-Ethiopian war. The papersdid a good job in providing prominent space. Story continuity, use of illustrative materlals, and the 97

p •

balancing of conflicting versions was adequate. They were somehow weaker, however, in clearly identifying their sources, providing background information, editing out occasional propaganda, and utiliz­

ing Ethiopian sources.

Regarding space about the war, the newspapers had to weigh the placement of these events around a wide range of news stories press­

ing for the world attention: the world-wide depression, the rise of

Fascism in Europe, nationalistic movements in many countries, growing

incidents of war in Asia, and the Spanish Civil War. In spite of this, the sma.ller Italo-Ethiopian events got sufficient coverage.

Examples of this could be seen in the front-page stories from the front photos, maps, and analytical articles written in other cities.

Although it was not the usual practice for the newspapers to give background to their stories, occassionally they did. This pro­ vided readers with some understanding of what preceeded the particular event. In addition, there ~~s tendencies towards continuity in report­ ing. · The newspapers did not neglect the little incidents that occur­ red between the znajor ones in general terms. Although America was not involved in the crisis, its media acted responsibly and fulfilled their obligation to the readers.

Another factor which comes to light in the coverage of these news­ papers is the favorable impact on Haile Selassie's world image. He was continually favorably portrayed in the coverage of the Western media, and through this sympathetic coverage, he was boosted into the role of an important African leader. The favorable image developed for him during the war had a positive impact for him for years to come-- ,_, 9u

both in Ethiopia and on the world scene.

But the papers are not immune from criticism. Two major weak~ nesses were detected by this study. The major one was that some of the newspapers, for, example, the Los A~les Times, did not make a distinction between what .is called straight news and propaganda. It tended to give emphasis to lesser important facts instead of to major developments. A second major weakness was that the papers failed to utilize Ethiopian sources. They mainly dealt with officials from the

American, British, and Italian sides. This might have caused

Ethiopia's pleas to be less understood in the Western world than the country's leaders might have desired.

This was was another chapter in the continuous struggle of small and weak nations against colonial powers. It happened at a time when the ideology of Nazi Germany under Hitler and Fascist Italy under

Mussolini 1vas flourishing and seemed to succeed. Despite the crushing of such repressive nations in the Second World War, that struggle con- tinues today in what is called the Third World.

The challenge for today's reporters and editors is to be more thorough and consistent in reporting incidents in Africa and Asia.

Too often, such stories appear rather short, and spaced in between a jungle of advertisements. As during the early Ethiopian crisis, there is a lack of background information needed to clarify points of controversy. Editors need to illustrate crucial points with visual aids. Importantly, there is little continuity in the news presenta- tion, causing the public to get a scramble of facts from which it cannot pull together a true picture of these events. Fortunately for 9S

Ethiopia, the editors of 1936-41 clearly outlined the brutality of the Italian invasion and kept the story in focus well enough to allow public opinion to form against Mussolini. Unfortunately, however, many people failed to heed the warnings presented by the coverage of

Ethiopia's fate in this war, and in a short time the world was plunged into a conflict on a global scale. .LUI...

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Albercht-Carrie, Rene, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini, Columbia University Press, New York & London, 1950.

Baer, George W., The Coming of the Italo-Ethiopian War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967.

Berkeley, G.F.H., The Campaign of Adova and the Rise of Menelik, Negro University Press, New York, 1969.

Bertrand, Claude-Jean, The British Press: A Historic Survez, O.C .D.L.: Paris, 1.969.

DelBaco, Angelo, The Ethiopian War: 1935-1941, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Translated by P. D. Cummins, 1969.

Emery, Edwin, ~he Press and America, 3rd Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1972.

Finer, Herman, Mussolini's Italy, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1935.

Hardie, Frank, The Abyssinian Crisis, Shoe String Press, Inc., 1974.

Harris, Brice, Jr. , The United States and the Ita1o-Ethiopian Crisis, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, l9G4.

Knightley, Phillip, The First Casualtyj Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975- Kogan, Norman, A Political History of Postwar Italy, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York (Washington), 1966. Luther, Ernest w., Ethiovia Today, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1.958.

Matthews, Herbert L., ·A World in Revolution: A Nevrspa:perman' s Memoirs, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1971.

Miller, Webb; I Fou."ld No Peace, :New York, Simon and Schuster, 1936.

Patendaude, J.O., Doc~ents Relating to the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict, Published by the authority of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ca~~da, 1936.

Potter, Pitman B., The Walwal Arbitration, Carnegie Endowment. for International Peace, Jackson Place, New York, 1938. lC

Rey, C .F., The Real Abyssini~, Seeley Service and Co., Ltd., London, - · 1935- Rey, C.F., Unconquered Abyssinia, Seeley Service and Co., Ltd., London, 1923. .

Ridgley, F.A., Mussolini Over Africa, London Wishard Books, Ltd., 1935. Shaw, John H., Ethiopia, ACME Photo Offset Corporation, U.S.A., 1936.

Smith, Anthony, The Britisb Press Since the War, Rowman & Littlefield, Totowa, New Jersey, 1974.

Talbot, David A., Contemporary Ethiopia, Hallmark-l:Iubner Press, Inc., New York, 1952.

Other Documents:

Abyssinia and Italy, Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London, 1935. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th Edition (30 vols., Chicago-,-W~i~lliarriBenton, Publisher, 1934-73).

The United States Army Area Handbook for Et~iopia, 2nd =E~di~.~t~i-o-n-,-F=-o-reisn Area Studies Division, Washington, June 19b4.

Newspapers:

Chicago Daily Tribune.

Christian Science Nonitor.

The T:i.mes of' London.

Los Angeles Ti.mes.

New York Times.