Turin: the Vain Search for Gargantua

Maurizio Maggi, Stefano Piperno TURIN: THE VAIN SEARCH FOR GARGANTUA

W.P. 124/1999

Working paper n. 124, giugno 1999

IRES PIEMONTE

ISTITUTO DI RICERCHE ECONOMICO-SOCIALI DEL PIEMONTE L’I RES PIEMONTE è un istituto di ricerca che svolge la sua attività d’indagine in campo socioeconomico e territoriale, fornendo un supporto all’azione di programmazione della Regione Piemonte e delle altre istituzioni ed enti locali piemontesi. Costituito nel 1958 su iniziativa della Provincia e del Comune di Torino con la partecipa- zione di altri enti pubblici e privati, l’IRES ha visto successivamente l’adesione di tutte le Province piemontesi; dal 1991 l’Istituto è un ente strumentale della Regione Piemonte. Giuridicamente l’IRES è configurato come ente pubblico regionale dotato di autonomia fun- zionale disciplinato dalla legge regionale n. 43 del 3 settembre 1991.

Costituiscono oggetto dell’attività dell’Istituto: – la relazione annuale sull’andamento socioeconomico e territoriale della regione; – l’osservazione, la documentazione e l’analisi delle principali grandezze socioeconomiche e territoriali del Piemonte; – rassegne congiunturali sull’economia regionale; – ricerche e analisi per il piano regionale di sviluppo; – ricerche di settore per conto della Regione e di altri enti.

Si autorizza la riproduzione, la diffusione e l’utilizzazione del contenuto del volume con la citazione della fonte. Working paper n. 124, 1999

Contents

TURIN: THE VAIN SEARCH FOR GARGANTUA

Introduction 5

1. Institutions and economic development in the Turin metropolitan area 7 1.1 Socio-economic trends 7 1.2 Institutional trends 15 3 2. The development of the main networked metropolitan services 22 2.1 The aqueduct service: municipal concerns, private firms, communal management 22 2.2 Effluent water softening services 23 2.3 Other services 24 2.4 Privatisations in progress 25

3. In search of political leadership 27

Conclusions 31

References 35 Questo lavoro costituisce il primo contributo dell'IRES Piemonte per un programma di ricerca comparata sulle dinamiche istituzionali nelle regioni urbane in Europa, iniziato nel 1996 e svolto attraverso una rete di istituzioni di ricerca in Francia, Inghilterra, Germania e Olanda. Sono state analizzate, oltre a quella di Torino, le regioni urbane di Bologna, Lione, Bordeaux, Rotterdam, Stoccarda, Manchester, e del bacino lemanico. Il Laboratoire de recherches Interdisciplinai- res Ville, Espace et Societé de l'Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat di Lione è stato il capofila del programma di ricerca finanziato dalla Agence Rhône- Alpes pur les Sciences Sociales et Humaines. La versione definitiva di questo lavoro è contenuta nel rapporto finale della ricerca recentemente pubblicato in Fran- cia (B. Jouve, C. Lefèvre, a cura di, Villes, Métropoles. Les nouveaux territoires du politique. Paris: Economica, 1999). Working paper n. 124, 1999

Turin: the vain search for Gargantua

Maurizio Maggi* Stefano Piperno*

erased from the political agenda Introduction of the principal local institutions. The decision to use the case of Tu- Vice versa, it may be useful to at- rin in a comparative study of me- tempt a parallel reconstruction of tropolitan governments in Europe the theoretical and institutional might appear an anomalous one. debate on the prospects of metro- More than anywhere else in Italy, politan governance and the initia- the problem of governing the Tu- tives of the principal wide area rin urban area has, de facto, been service policies to answer some of

* Istittuto di Ricerche Economico-Sociali del Piemonte - Turin. E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Working paper n. 124, 1999

the questions posed by the overall mal general metropolitan govern- research project. ment structure? The first of these questions This report is split into four concerns the emergence of a mo- parts. The first sketches an extre- del of governance to replace tra- mely schematic outline of the pa- ditional government. The fact rallel institutional and socio-eco- that the term ‘governance’ is so nomic development of the area hard to translate into Italian gives over the last thirty years. The fact some idea of the difficulty which is that Turin as a city is a symbol this new paradigm is meeting he- of the post-war Italian economic re in Italy, although awareness of miracle and national urbanisa- this need is now precisely felt in tion, just as it has since become a the Turin area. The concept of typical case of deindustrialisation, metropolitan governance implies in which new models of urban de- governing a metropolitan area velopment have begun to emerge without a formal local govern- and the need for institutional ment organisation. It is thus pos- change is sharply felt. sible to verify whether a model of The second part describes how this type, albeit partial and em- the principal networked services 6 bryonic, has emerged in the Tu- – the ones, that is, which ideally rin area. require a wide area institutional The second question concerns organisation – are run, verifying the development of the system of the advantages and disadvantages intergovernmental relations in of the functional models curren- Piedmont. Relations between the tly being adopted. various levels of government have The framework which emerges a specific regional dimension: is still unclear. The fact is that lo- they vary, that is, from one part of cal elites’ awareness of the pro- the country to another according blems of urban governance to existing socio-economic and within the new context of inter- politico-institutional conditions. national competition and their The fact that metropolitan gover- capacity to come up with strate- nance has developed one way in gic new projects are still conspi- Turin and another in Bologna cuous by their absence. In the confirms this hypothesis1. third part of the report, we seek The third question is about in- to understand why. stitutional innovation. It asks: is The fourth and final part ad- innovation possible without a for- dresses the basic question of

1 It is interesting to note that this is the second time that the two cities have been com- pared in an international comparative research project (cf. Euricur, 1996). Working paper n. 124, 1999

Figure 1 Administrative borders of the Turin metropolitan area

Communes comprised in the delimitation of 1972

Communes comprised in the delimitation of 1991

CHIVASSO CASELLE T.SE VENARIA

COLLEGNO RIVOLI TORINO GRUGLIASCO

CHIERI PIOSSASCO

7 CARMAGNOLA

whether Turin needs a new model this one simple question. Geo- of urban government or not. Or, graphers, sociologists, economists alternatively, are minor correc- and urban planners have argued tions to the policies in progress all over what criteria to use to delimit that is needed? the plausible boundaries of the area without ever coming to any unanimous conclusion. For our 1. Institutions purposes, we follow the only exi- and economic development sting administrative delimitation in the Turin metropolitan area (fig. 1), which dates from 19722, 1.1 Socio-economic trends and which comprises 52 of Turin’s What exactly is the Turin me- neighbouring ‘comuni’, or com- tropolitan area? It would take a munes, in two concentric circles. whole report on its own to answer The demographic and econo-

2 An area comprising the commune of Turin and another 52 communes on the basis of DPGR No. 719 of 1972 issued by the Piedmontese Regional Authority. Working paper n. 124, 1999

mic evolution of Turin over the last thirty years reflects some of the typical phases in urban development: urbanisation, suburbanisation, deurbanisation and reurbanisation.

“In the urbanisation phase, population and economic activity concentrates in urban centres. In the suburbanisation phase the growth of the suburbs out- strips that of the city centre and, eventually, there is a shift of population and jobs to the suburbs. In the deurbanisation phase the wider conurbation as a whole loses population, smaller urban areas grow and a mo- 8 re decentralised urban system develops. In the reurbanisation phase, cities which have been losing population begin to grow again” (Commission of the Eu- ropean Communities, 1992).

In the seventies (in some cases even earlier), the population of the central city of the metropolitan

area began to decline, while the - Mela, 1997). 1995 data see: Conforti - Davico . (For growth of that of the inner urban rings also began to dwindle. At the same time, the population of the external rings and often also of the

periurban agricultural belts has in- No. Population Population Population Population Growth Growth Growth

creased, with a consequent diffu- communes 1995 % 1991 % 1981 % 1971 % ’71-’81 ’81-’91 ’91-’95 sion of residential settlement and Population Census Data Population production activities. Since this is not the place to address the causes of the phenomenon – which stem from transformations in urban Table 1 Population patterns in the Turin metropolitan area (1971-1995) 1 Population patterns in the Turin Table area ‘72Total Istat, Source: 53 1,705,518 92 1,731,039 93 1,843,993 94 1,802,723 94 2.3 -6.1 -1.5 Turin ringFirst Second ring ringThird 109Total 23 29 1 1,845,212 56 100 523,445 258,967 923,106 1,865,233 28 100 14 50 139,694 1,968,580 526,310 242,222 100 962,507 8 28 13 1,913,196 52 100 134,194 1,117,154 494,922 231,917 57 7 25 12 2.9 1,167,968 124,587 446,885 187,870 61 -5.2 23 6 10 -1.1 -4.4 10.7 23.4 110,473 -15.9 6 6.4 4.5 -4.1 12.8 -0.5 6.9 11.4 4.1 Working paper n. 124, 1999

Table 2 Migration from and to Turin

Immigrants Emigrants Balance to Turin % from Turin %

Rest of metrop. area 33,661 35.7 65,118 49.9 -31,457 Rest of Piedmont 15,186 16.1 26,365 20.2 -11,179 Rest of Italy 33,632 35.7 34,906 26.8 -1,.274 Abroad 10,435 11.1 3,472 2.7 6,963 Not determined 1,247 1.3 517 0.4 730 Total 94,161 100.0 130,378 100.0 -36,217

Source: Conforti - Davico - Mela, 1997.

economic bases, production tech- it set off the drop in the number nologies and real estate markets – of inhabitants of the central com- we refer the reader to the vast lite- mune, but this only happened un- rature which already exists on the til the eighties. Subsequently, the 9 subject. For our purposes, it is suf- growth of suburban areas ceased ficient to stress that Turin is not to compensate for the decrease in devoid of this tendency, although Turin so that, in 1991, the popu- it does display peculiarities with lation of the metropolitan area respect to other Italian and Euro- fell by more than 100,000 inhabi- pean metropolitan areas. tants – a clear symptom of deur- In 1951, Turin had a popula- banisation – although between tion of over 700,000 inhabitants, 1981 and 1991 the growth rate of in 1961 of more than a million, the population in the first ring ex- and the number continued to in- ceeded 6.4% and that of the se- crease continuously until 1974, cond ring 4.5%. Yet it would be when it reached a peak of premature to interpret this trend 1,205,000 inhabitants (urbanisa- as a sign of reurbanisation. tion). The trend was subsequently The most recent migratory reversed and Turin’s population trends (1991-’95) show (see table began to decrease; since 1990 it 2) that the drop in population in has dropped below one million. Turin stems from the exchange In the same years, the popula- with other Piedmontese commu- tion of the suburbs grew (subur- nes and between the latter and banisation) to such an extent that the extended metropolitan area3.

3 Composed in this case of the 52 communes of the original delimitation plus another 56 bordering communes (cf. Conforti - Davico - Mela, 1997). Working paper n. 124, 1999

Table 3 Level of education in some metropolitan areas in Italy (percentage of over six by degree of education) 1991

Graduates High Lower Elementary Without school middle qualifications

Central cities Turin 6.0 21.9 34.0 29.0 8.8 Milan 9.3 27.7 32.8 23.6 6.4 Bologna 9.6 24.2 27.5 30.6 8.1 Rome 8.5 28.3 30.2 24.3 8.7 Provinces Turin 4.0 19.7 34.3 32.2 9.0 Milan 5.2 23.4 33.8 29.4 8.0 Bologna 6.0 21.4 28.7 33.0 10.9 Rome 7.0 26.2 31.1 25.8 9.9

Source: Istat. Central cities: data refer only to the biggest municipality in the area; 10 provinces: data refer to the provincial administrative area.

Against an influx of 94,000 new tember 1996 17,000 non-EU citi- residents, the city registered an zens – 33% of whom from Mo- outflow of 130,000 people. rocco – were registered in Turin. Breaking down the total figure by The figure considerably underesti- areas of origin/destination, it mates the effective presence of fo- emerges clearly that the drop is reigners, failing to take into ac- largely due to the population ex- count the number of illegal immi- change with communes in the grants (at least 10,000). Although metropolitan area (31,467 inhabi- it corresponds to a relatively low tants). As a consequence, a dyna- percentage of the total population mic trend in population was re- of Turin, and is hence by no means corded only in the second and comparable with other European third rings (table 1), and this, in metropolises, it has been large turn, suggests that the deurbani- enough to trigger a good deal of sation phase is persisting. social tension. The 1997 election Within this framework of demo- campaign in Turin, for example, graphic decline, one important was dominated by the question of new development is the growth in urban safety, relegating serious the inflow of immigrants from problems such as that of economic countries outside the EU. In Sep- development to a secondary role. Working paper n. 124, 1999

Table 4 Occupation in firms and other activities in Turin and its rings

1981 Industry % Others % Total %

Turin 212,490 49.8 262,735 71.5 475,275 59.8 First ring 136,269 32.0 64,798 17.6 201,099 25.3 Second ring 59,446 13.9 29,420 8.0 88,880 11.2 Third ring 18,203 4.3 10,733 2.9 28,940 3.6 Total 426,408 100.0 367,686 100.0 794,194 100.0 Total area ‘72 408,205 356,953 765,254

1991 Industry % Others % Total %

Turin 147,455 43.8 277,719 67.4 425,218 56.8 First ring 119,018 35.3 84,117 20.4 203,170 27.1 Second ring 52,478 15.6 36,329 8.8 88,823 11.9 11 Third ring 18,020 5.3 13,974 3.4 31,999 4.3 Total 336,971 100.0 412,139 100.0 749,210 100.0 Total area ‘72 318,951 398,165 717,211

Source: Istat, Industrial Census Data (agricultural occupation not considered).

This process is transforming nomic system based on industrial the urban area of Turin from a activities to one dominated by ter- ‘monocentric’ structure to an in- tiary services, even though the Tu- creasingly ‘polycentric’ one in rin area continues to be much mo- which the emerging ‘subpoles’ re industrialised than other me- are displaying growing autonomy tropolitan areas in Italy. This tran- with respect to the central pole. slates (table 3) into a lower level of This has undoubtedly hampered education in the Turin metropoli- the building of a metropolitan tan area due to the increased im- identity, aggravating the fears of portance of relatively skilled occu- surrounding communes vis-à-vis pation in industry. the risk of exploitation by Turin, A brief glance at tables 4-5 as we see below. shows how the importance of oc- The way the economic structure cupation in the various economic has developed also reveals a gra- activities, in industry especially, dual transformation from an eco- has gradually increased in the pe- Working paper n. 124, 1999

Table 5 Percentage of occupation in industrial firms in Turin and its rings

1951 1981 1991

Turin 82.1 52.0 46.2 First ring 12.4 33.4 37.3 Second ring 5.5 14.6 16.5 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Istat, Industrial Census Data.

ripheral rings. Hence in 1991 (ta- This series of transformations ble 5) the two rings outstripped has been widely interpreted as a Turin in terms of their share of in- symptom of the decline of the dustrial occupation (53.8%). Fol- area following the decline of the lowing a perfectly symmetrical traditional production base, cen- trend (table 6), Turin became a tred round the mechanical engi- 12 largely service-based city as early neering industry and means of as 1981 (55% of employment), transport. In the early nineties, whereas the metropolitan area of the high rate of unemployment, 53 municipalities (TMA) registe- which has risen from an average red the primacy of service occu- of 8% in the late eighties to pation in 1991 (55%). Between 10,5%, the constant drop in the 1981 and 1991 the metropolitan number of industrial workers and area lost about 90,000 jobs in in- firms and Turin’s descent in clas- dustry, most of them located in sifications of Italian provinces in the central city. terms of income per capita (figu-

Table 6 Share of occupation in industry and services in 1981 and 1991 % Industry % Others 1981 1991 1981 1991

Turin 44.7 34.7 55.3 65.3 52 TMA* 67.5 58.7 32.5 41.3 Total 53.3 44.5 46.6 55.5

* TMA: Turin metropolitan area. Source:Istat, Industrial Census Data. Working paper n. 124, 1999

re 2) were signs of a situation of subject of analysis and discussion. stress against which no new form In the period from 1992 to 1995 of metropolitan polarisation th- the prevailing feeling in Turin was rough the development of tech- undoubtedly one of pessimism, nological/managerial managed to but in recent years a significant emerge. Another sign of the pro- shift has taken place, bolstered by blems of transition of the Turin some of the strong points of the economy was the fact that, in system. 1994, the city and its province The area’s industry still looks were earmarked as one of the re- abroad a lot. Between 1988 ex- gions covered by objective 2 of ports from the province of Turin the European Union’s structural accounted for 9% of the Italian policies. total; in 1993, the figure had fallen to 6.9%, although it has sub- Whether the economic revolu- sequently risen again, thanks ini- tion was doomed to progressive tially to the devaluation of the li- decline or whether instead it con- ra, returning to 8% in 1995 and cealed positive factors for ele- 7.9% in 1996, thus offering proof ments of reorganisation and proof the competitive capacity of 13 ductive conversion is still a firms in the area.

Figure 2 Added value per capita per inhabitant in four provinces (index with respect to the Italian average = 100)

140 135 130 125 120 115 110 105 100 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993

Torino Milano Bologna Roma Working paper n. 124, 1999

Furthermore, on the basis of re- affected by deindustrialisation cent projections, from now until processes, the local economy 2000 exports from the province shoulders the burden of over-spe- of Turin will show an annual cialisation in some mature pro- growth rate in excess of 8%. The duction sectors, as well as Turin’s most recent estimates of provin- image as a ‘one company town’. It cial revenue for the same period is a well known fact that other old show growth rates significantly industrial regions with more dif- higher than in other areas of the ferentiated economic structures country (i.e., the North-east and have suffered the reorganisation- the Centre). redevelopment-image relaunch A recent survey by the Turin process much less (Chinitz, Employers’ Association revealed 1961). Fiat’s economic weight in that industrial firms in the area the Turin area has nevertheless are extremely internationalised, decreased considerably. Accor- not only in terms of the export- ding to IRES estimates, between production ratio. One firm out of 1986 and 1996 employment gene- every five interviewed has decen- rated by the Fiat group decreased tralised production phases from 92,000 to 47,000 units, fal- 14 abroad, 17% receive funding out- ling from 25% to 15% of total inside Italy, 23% use foreign tech- dustrial occupation (craft-based nicians and 37% buy in technolo- enterprises excluded). gies from abroad. Generally speaking, the occu- Last but not least, 67% of so- pational importance of small and called ‘innovative firms’ registe- medium enterprises increased. red in Piedmont in all size classes Between 1981 and 1991, the per- are concentrated in the province centage of people employed in of Turin4. firms with fewer than 100 em- Turin is thus by right one of the ployees increased from 55% to European areas most heavily af- 64%. In the metropolitan area, fected by economic globalisation made up of 53 communes, the in- processes and the competitive cidence of occupation in innova- stress which they generate. Com- tive segments of the service sector pared with those of other regions (financial, business and professio-

4 Cf. IRES, 1997, and CCIAA, 1996. Analysis of the information pool produced by the Ob- servatory of the diffusion of innovation, set up by the Chambers of Commerce of Pied- mont and built on the basis of a set of selection criteria, highlights how, of the 2,600 firms recorded, about two thirds make use of leading-edge technologies and acquire technological knowhow through an autonomous research centre. To give an idea of their rela- tive incidence, suffice it to think that in the 1991 census about 13,000 manufacturing firms were present in Piedmont, about 7,000 of them in the province of Turin. Working paper n. 124, 1999

nal services) increased from 24% few years, this diagnosis of Turin to 30%. has been relatively widely shared As a consequence, processes of and has influenced the debate on reorganisation of the social metropolitan institutions: the hal- morphology of the city and its ting of the economic decline of metropolitan area due to post-in- Turin and its metropolitan area dustrial transition are also less and its relaunching on new eco- evident than in other urban areas. nomic bases was one of the key More specifically, analyses of messages of the 1993 electoral 1991 figures highlight the fact campaign (the first to envisage that Turin displays none of the the direct election of the mayor), conspicuous phenomena of ur- which saw the victory of an ban dualism5 which have charac- unorthodox centre-left coalition terised the largest European me- led by a university professor, Va- tropolitan areas (Ires, 1995b). lentino Castellani, from outside In conclusion, all the classic in- the world of politics. dicators highlight that the Turin metropolitan area is passing 1.2 Institutional trends through a phase of demographic The framework of intergovern- 15 and occupational stagnation, ac- mental relations in Italy is a com- companied by processes of redi- plex one. The debate on a possi- stribution of population and local ble federalist-oriented reform of economic business activities. This the Italian state has now brought socio-economic and spatial reor- the entire three-tier Region-Pro- ganisation involves a redefinition vince-Commune system under both of the reciprocal roles of Tu- review. For our purposes, two ba- rin and its external rings to re- sic aspects deserve mention. The launch both the economic attrac- first is the growth of the political tiveness of Turin in terms of high clout of medium-large cities quality service activities and its thanks both to electoral reform residential attractiveness for the and renewed commitment to lo- population working in these sec- cal development policies. The dy- tors. In this respect, it is worth namism of such cities has been pointing out how Turin’s transi- evident in the initiatives of their tion into a post-Fordian metro- mayors, of the National Associa- polis has been littered with hold- tion of Italian Communes (ANCI) ups and difficulties. Over the last and of the Union of Italian Pro-

5 By ‘urban dualism’ we mean the concentration in the central city of population of high social class and groups with low, irregular income, with an accentuation of the process of suburbanisation of the middle classes and blue-collar workers in the Fordian sector. Working paper n. 124, 1999

vinces (UPI). The latter two orga- In Turin, the process of urban nisations are powerful national development described in the lobbies which have fostered the previous paragraph has had noto- setting up of a new intergovern- rious institutional consequences. mental decision-making and ad- The lack of cohesion between ad- visory body, the State-City-Auto- ministrative units and the urban nomies Conference, alongside system within which all the func- the pre-existing State-Regions tional interdependencies of a gi- Conference. Basically speaking, ven community happen demands local authorities are unwilling to a reorganisation of local govern- accept any form of subordination ment according to alternative mo- to the Regions, a sine qua non for dels which can be either structu- federal reform. ral or functional6. Our research The second aspect is bound up hypothesis was to verify the ex- in the phenomenon of the growth tent to which, whereas the Turi- of functional administrations nese political-institutional debate (health, hydrogeological and en- over the last thirty years has, vironmental protection, water cy- theoretically, been dominated by cle management and so on), as we the need to arrive at a structural 16 see below vis-à-vis networked ser- solution of metropolitan gover- vices in the Turin metropolitan nance, we have, de facto, witnes- area. Combined with privatisa- sed the gradual emergence of a ty- tion processes, this tends to strip pe of metropolitan governance local government of technical and that we might define as implicitly managerial-type activities, with functional. the risk, on the one hand, of ca- Albeit approximately and ex- mouflaging forms of creeping re- tremely synthetically, it is worth centralisation and, on the other, identifying some of the phases of of eroding citizens’ control over the institutional debate that are activities of public interest. Both connected with the phases of the aspects have weighed negatively economic and urban develop- on metropolitan reform in Italy. ment that we saw above.

6 Given the aims of this seminar, the differences between the structural and functional models of metropolitan governance are taken as understood. The structural solution is based on the creation of a new level of government to carry out a plurality of functions at metropolitan level; the functional solution, instead, identifies the different procedural and administrative structures to address the main metropolitan problems; for example, general associations among local authorities, a transport authority, miscellaneous agreements among local authorities for specific policies, programme agreements, etc. These models stem also from the intercommunal and supracommunal models presented in Lefèvre, 1996. Working paper n. 124, 1999

During the industrialisation and Canadian models or, at all and urbanisation phase (which la- events, of the debate in the An- sted until the mid seventies), the glo-Saxon world, the prevailing debate focused on institutional hypothesis was to assign the re- hypotheses based on co-operative gional authority the role of mana- models – especially at the plan- ging the planning of the metropo- ning level. An initial proposal for litan area as part of the urban an intercommunal planning sche- planning competences envisaged me (envisaged by the town plan- by art. 117 of the Constitution. ning law of 1942) can be traced As the process of industrial de- back to 1951. It was subsequently velopment and urbanisation came to develop through a series of to an end, so an important new projects up to the Turin munici- player – the regional authority – pality’s approval of the scheme in appeared on the stage. The period 1964, although only a few com- between 1975 and 1980 (the se- munes in the metropolitan area cond regional legislature) was ar- were to follow the city’s lead. The guably the most florid for the va- experience had no practical con- rious regional authorities, in terms sequences7, one of the reasons for both of their institutional planning 17 this being that, throughout the capacity and their ability to in- period in question, single com- fluence central government and munes had pursued planning po- other local autonomies. The regio- licies totally at loggerheads with nal authorities – and Piedmont’s the aims of the scheme. Parallel fits perfectly into the model – be- collaboration initiatives were de- gan by reorganising the system of veloped among the communes of autonomies, introducing new in- the ring administered by left-wing termediate levels of government majorities, often in conflict with (‘comprensori’, or local districts, the decisions taken in Turin whi- including that of Turin) to down- ch, until 1975, was governed by grade the role of provincial autho- centre-right and centre-left majorities, seen more as decentralised rities. An important factor in that offshoots of central government period was the approaching birth than as local government bodies. of regional authorities. Although Clearly, a strong level of governan- some participants in the cultural ce of the metropolitan area, espe- debate argued in favour of expe- cially its structural variant, was riences of metropolitan governan- seen by the regional authorities as ce along the lines of European a hindrance to the implementation

7 For an effective reconstruction of the Turin intercommunal planning scheme episode, see Urbanistica, Nos. 50-51, October 1967. Working paper n. 124, 1999

of its local policies. This contradic- In Turin, the ‘Fiat shock’ trigge- tion arose in those years and, as we red a debate, which was to deve- shall see, still continues to this day. lop in the course of the eighties, 1980 marked an important poli- against the paradigm of re-equili- tical and economic turnaround brium which had dominated re- for Turin. It was in that year, in gional policies in the previous fi- fact, that Fiat embarked upon a ve-year period. It soon became major reorganisation process ba- clear that the big risk for the me- sed on massive lay-offs. After tropolitan area lay not so much in blocking production for almost a phenomena of congestion and ex- month, the unions were forced to ternal diseconomies caused by an accept a compromise. Industrial excessive concentration of pro- occupation began to fall in the duction activities as in the gradual metropolitan area, and the pro- economic and social decline to cess of industrialisation/expan- which it was prone (as had been sion of the service industry typical or was the case in other European of many European cities and urban areas) due to the decline of towns speeded up. traditional industries – the car in- From an institutional point of dustry, first and foremost. 18 view, 1980 also marked the begin- As early as 1982, Turin was ning of the third regional legisla- swept by a series of scandals which ture (1980-’85). This was a period caused a political crisis in the left- in which regional authorities lost wing municipal administration, much of the planning vigour they subsequently replaced by a cen- had shown in the previous five tre-left administration in 1985 years and, at the same time, tradi- (and the same happened at regio- tional local autonomies – provin- nal level). The following years we- cial authorities and, above all, re marked by instability and the communes – reasserted their in- communal government’s activism fluence; directly aided and abet- – alas, without any strategic plan- ted by the political parties they ning or agreement with other were able to leapfrog the regional communes in the metropolitan authorities and deal directly with area – on major infrastructural central administrations. and real estate projects8.

8 One of the most important investments in Turin was made in the new municipal stadium, built for the 1990 World Cup. Turin’s leading soccer club, Juventus F. C., are currently involved in a dispute with the franchisees over excessive rental costs, and are th- reatening to play their matches in other stadiums elsewhere in Italy unless they are gran- ted permission to build a new smaller stadium with additional commercial centre functions (on the Dutch and British model). This is one example of the consequences of the euphoric climate of those years (cf. Ires, 1989, 1995a). Working paper n. 124, 1999

The nineties, finally, have been So how has the problem been characterised by two major addressed over the last 30-40 reforms of the system of local go- years? It is worth stressing that, in vernment in Italy – Law No. this period, the metropolitan pro- 142/1990 and Law No. 81/1993 blem has been formulated in dif- on the direct election of mayors – ferent ways with contradictory in- which have changed the institu- stitutional effects. tional reference framework For brevity’s sake, we built the profoundly. More specifically, the model shown in table 7 in which figure of the mayor has become we outline the institutional deve- much more representative, capa- lopment of Turin in relation to its ble of promoting significant inno- economic and urban develop- vations in the local political sy- ment and some reference para- stem – but also many an illusion digms of possible conceptualisa- and unrealistic expectation – at tions of administrative challenges. least until further reforms of the local administrative system9, un- Institutional innovations stem der review by parliament in re- directly from the analytical refe- cent months, are passed. It is also rence categories which can be 19 true, however, that the direct elec- used to define the metropolitan tion of the mayor has returned the area concept. Bruno Dente’s ef- commune ‘to the centre of the in- fective classification (Dente, stitutional system’, further deple- 1989), widely used in the debate ting the institutional clout and over the last few years, identifies prestige of the regional authority three main innovations: ‘big villa- and, secondarily, of the provincial ge’, ‘functional region’ and ‘capi- authority. In the final analysis, the tal city’. Below we provide a brief problem of the metropolitan area outline of Dente’s theory, but was shelved in the eighties due to anyone wishing further details institutional conflicts between the should see Dente’s essay and the various levels of government. But, now very extensive literature on as we shall see, this did not mean the subject10. that no metropolitan policies we- The first identifies the metropo- re implemented with regard to lis as a ‘big city’, with an ‘outsize networked services. urban settlement’, characterised

9 See the recent book by Luciano Vandelli, 1997, a brief and effective reconstruction of the effects of the electoral reform of 1993. 10 Cf. Dente, 1989. The literature on metropolitan areas is very rich indeed: see the bi- bliography contained in Dente’s article and Ires’ two previous studies: Ires, 1991a and Ires, 1991b. Working paper n. 124, 1999

Table 7 Economic growth, urban growth and institutional change in Turin: a preliminary and tentative analytical framework

Economic Urban Years Institutional Administrative growth growth change challenge (paradigm)

Industrialisation Urbanisation- 1955-1975 Weak ‘Big village suburbanisation intergovernmental problems’ (vertical and horizontal) co-operation Deindustrialisation Suburbanisation 1975-1985 Regionalisation ‘Urban agglomeration problems (functional region)’ Growth service Suburbanisation- 1985-1995 Stronger ‘Capital city industry deurbanisation intergovernmental problems’, (horizontal- ‘big village functional-indirect) problems’ 20 co-operation Post-Fordism Deurbanisation- 1995-… Strong regionalism ‘Capital city reurbanisation or functional problems’ flexible metropolitan governance

by a high concentration of popu- characterised by a functional spe- lation, extra-agricultural activities cialisation vis-à-vis residential, and infrastructure around one productive and, in general, ‘envi- main urban pole. The principal ronmental’ functions (to describe problem of metropolitan gover- the phenomenon, we also speak nance is to produce public servi- of functional or urban regions). ces efficiently, capturing econo- This set of interrelations demands mies of urban scale and taking in- the governance of interdependen- to account the effects of service cies at a supramunicipal level by overspills. planning an area vaster than the The second identifies the urban one linked to the urban agglome- metropolitan area as a complex, rate itself. integrated set of several interde- The third, finally, identifies me- pendent centres, each of which tropolises as places characterised Working paper n. 124, 1999

by the presence of advanced ded to get mislaid in a dispute functions connected with strate- over the boundaries of the new gic decision-making activities and authority. In 1991 the regional innovation-intensive technologi- junta presented a bill proposing a cal processes demanding a speci- relatively small-sized metropoli- fic socio-cultural environment tan area of 33 communes by way and high quality urban infrastruc- of application of the structural ture. In this case, the metropolis model envisaged by Law No. has a radius of influence which 142/1990. transcends the regional and natio- During the ensuing debate a re- nal dimensions and develops a gional position developed in fa- network of relations with metro- vour11 of the setting up of an ex- polises of comparable rank. perimental form of metropolitan Over the years these three ima- governance based on association, ges of metropolitan problems in beginning as a consortium and Turin have succeeded one subsequently becoming a confe- another, thus creating the need rence of metropolitan communes; for special institutional solutions. here we saw explicit acceptance Only rarely, however, have they of a functional (intercommunal) 21 been addressed together. model. In 1995, the new regional Only the administrative chal- junta suspended all institutional lenge of wide area services has al- initiatives in this direction, and lowed major steps forward to be since then central commune has made, as we see in the section adopted a wait-and-see stance, that follows. although it officially favours a In Turin’s case, the questions of functional approach. The mayor the functional region and capital Valentino Castellani has explicitly city role were addressed as part of referred to the experience of the the debate on the implementation Agreement for the Metropolitan of Law No. 142/1990 during the City in Bologna12. 1990-’95 regional legislature, The role of the province of Tu- although at the outset they ten- rin has also been marginal,

11 This position emerges with some force in a document published by the regional authority (cf. Regione Piemonte, 1994) proposing the setting up of an association for the Turin metropolitan area made up not only of the regional and provincial authorities and communes in the area, but also the Chamber of Commerce, universities and research establish- ments, non-profit associations, banking foundations, interest groups and public and private firms. This is the only explicit proposal to date for a model of ‘metropolitan governance’. 12 “Now, luckily, a new school of thought is prevailing: the one of a bottom-up functional approach. In this way we can deal with a variable geometry geographical structure” (cf. Castellani, 1996, p. 111). Working paper n. 124, 1999

although by virtue of its increased those of the so-called ‘water cy- functions it might be able to un- cle’ (aqueduct and effluent water lock the situation of institutional softening services). stalemate in the future. This is why institutional chan- 2.1 The aqueduct service: ges (table 7) since 1995 only show municipal concerns, private an increase in forms of technical- firms, communal management functional horizontal co-opera- Drinking water supply services tion, developed largely through in the metropolitan area are ope- municipal concerns, and a que- rated by a plurality of bodies stion mark looms over the scena- adopting different management rio of intergovernmental relations models. Services are currently that can be hypothesised in the supplied by: near future. – a municipal concern in Turin Ultimately, the case of Turin ef- and another 11 communes, fectively shows how the mono- which represent 45% of the po- poly of geographical representa- pulation of the rest of the area; tion by existing institutions has – private firms in 12 communes de facto blocked processes of in- accounting for 46% of the po- 22 stitutional innovation. pulation outside Turin; – direct production by the commune in 8 communes. 2. The development of the main In addition, a mixed private-pu- networked metropolitan services blic company with a majority Even without an institutionally communal stake operates for the structured governmental autho- aqueduct of Alpignano. The early rity, since the second half of the nineties saw increases in the num- nineties the principal networked ber of inhabitants served by the services have been developing in municipal concern of Turin and implicit accordance with a metro- SAP-Italgas, which replaced direct politan reference scale. This type managements and the drinking of development was led by public water company. and private sector entities with The water company considera- different forms of management bly enlarged its area of activity in (franchises, contracting, reliance 1982, first to small hillside com- on municipal concerns or consor- munes and then, from the late ei- tia, tenders, production through ghties, gradually to other commu- communal municipal concerns nes in the area. The process of ex- and so on). The services that are tension continued until recently most interesting to analyse from (figure 2), especially outside the an economic point of view are metropolitan area. Working paper n. 124, 1999

Figure 2 Expansion of the municipal aqueduct concern in the eighties and nineties

8 7 9 3 7 3 6 6 5 7 8 2 4 6 8 8 2 4

2 Sap-Italgas Aam 1987 2 = 1988 2 3 = 1989 4 = 1990 5 = 1991 23 3 6 = 1992 7 = 1993 8 = 1995 9 = 1996

The lack of a structured metro- An oligopolistic concern, be it politan area appears not to have public or private, can achieve given networked service the mu- economies of scale even without ch feared ‘leopard-spot’ configu- structured metropolitan gover- ration. nance, but the problem of consu- If anything, the real problem is mer guarantee and protection re- that, despite the presence of two mains open. concerns which compete against each other (AAM and SAP-Italgas), 2.2 Effluent water softening communes appear not to have services reaped the benefits of competi- Technological and operational tion. One explanation for this mi- unhomogeneities also exist for ght be the administrative naiveté services related with effluent wa- of communes, undemanding ter (the collection and softening when they stipulate contracts. of water from civilian and produc- Another might be the lack of tive installations, the disposal of transparency of the main bidders. softening muds and so on). The Working paper n. 124, 1999

quality of communal sewage 2.3 Other services networks varies greatly; this partly The area in which solid waste depends on their degree of wear cycle and transport activities ope- and tear and the separation rate has also expanded. between water for civilian use and The collection and transport of water for industrial use. The urban solid waste apparently re- networks are almost always opera- quires minimal ceilings of users ted by the communes themselves served to enable the operating with their own personnel and pe- firm to use the capital allocations riodical interventions by speciali- needed optimally. It is also felt, sed firms; only in a few cases is the however, that it fails to give rise service completely delegated to to sizeable economies of scale private firms through special con- above this level (minimal ceilings ventions. Water softening, in- are, nonetheless, low, fewer than stead, is almost entirely publicly 100,000 inhabitants). A large operated, carried out largely by number of private and public the Azienda Po Sangone which, firms in the area provide a servi- through a network of sewage col- ce similar to that of the munici- lectors, receives the effluent water pal concern of Turin, with com- 24 of 18 communes in the area other parable cost burdens, calculated than Turin, and covers 85% of the in terms of spending by quintal population. Three consortia also collected or inhabitant served, operate on behalf of 6 communes and chargeable to the communes (10% of the population of the involved. area). In the remaining 9 commu- Less homogeneous procedures nes, water is softened at small are adopted to dispose of waste. communally-owned plants self- In certain cases, the service is in- managed by private firms. In two tegrated into municipal concerns cases, a single firm operates both or consortia which already hand- aqueduct and sewage networks, as le the collection of solid urban well as softening plants. waste and dispose of it within the The water softening concern area of the commune; in other ca- has expanded considerably in re- ses, disposal is totally delegated cent years, especially outside the to the solid urban waste collec- metropolitan area. A total of 31 tion contractor. communes have joined the con- The other services considered – sortium and, in 1997, five com- street cleaning and washing and munes in the area stipulated an differentiated collection – are agreement with the company for provided virtually everywhere. the management of sewer net- Albeit without expanding, the works. transport service also has become Working paper n. 124, 1999

more integrated, especially throu- sport, be it rail or road, simply by gh tariff innovations. buying one unified travel docu- This service boasts a multiplicity ment (ticket or season ticket). of operators in the area, and the transport supply is largely radial, 2.4 Privatisations in progress converging on Turin. It consists of Law No. 142/1990 has laid the both rail and road transport. bases for a large number of com- The rail service is made up of munal activities to be performed 10 lines belonging to the Turin FS through autonomous forms of or- State Railway division and the Tu- ganisation, thus creating a new rin-Ceres and Canavesana lines model of communal management operated under franchise by Satti. which has been dubbed in some Road transport is differentiated quarters as ‘the Commune cum into an urban/suburban service holding company’. It is argued (more frequent and continuous that the Commune ought to with a basic fixed fare) and an in- behave like a parent company tercommunal service (less conti- which performs no direct pro- nuous with a fare system based on duction and trade activity, but block distances). The suburban confines itself to directing subsi- 25 service largely covers the first ring diaries. From the point of view of of Turin. Forty-seven companies the economy of local government, provide the local transport servi- these innovations are of broad in- ce in the area. In view of the mo- terest for at least two reasons. In bility and commuter-type travel the first place, a sizeable part of round the node (Turin), not to the activity carried out by Com- mention the present complexion munes could be privatised: the of the transport supply, the area economic criteria used to choose clearly has the right characteri- between public and private sector stics for the integrated control of for the supply and production of mobility. The metropolitan city a given service are thus of consi- configuration which emerges is derable operating importance. almost circular in shape with a ra- Secondly, the legislation in que- dius of 15-20 km and is made up stion stems from the gradual cut- of 35 communes besides Turin. ting of costs of the so-called natu- The single basic fare policy was ral monopolies as a result of a se- launched in 1996 under the ‘For- ries of technological innovations, mula’ project. The distinction which now tend to make forms of between urban, suburban, inter- competition possible even in sec- communal and rail fares was eli- tors (water, electricity, etc.) tradi- minated so that any user can tra- tionally entrusted to communal vel on any means of public tran- monopolies. As in Bologna, the Working paper n. 124, 1999

municipal concerns of Turin were azioni’ (limited company) model also swept by a wave of ‘neo-libe- offers them three types of advan- ralism’ – validated by the Partito tage. First, it facilitates the re- Democratico della Sinistra – whi- course to indebtedness (through ch led to the setting up of a speci- forms of project financing, for fic communal department as early example) or, in any event, capita- as 1993. Now, four years on, the lisation to make the investment gradual introduction of munici- necessary to develop networks pal concerns onto the market and service areas. Secondly, limi- (quotation on the stock exchange ted companies are no longer cannot be ruled out in the future, subject to legal constraints from but for the moment the Commu- the geographical point of view; ne is holding onto a majority more precisely, unlike municipal stake) is, de facto, only just begin- concerns they can provide their ning. The Commune has now services anywhere. Thirdly, the converted the water and electri- choice of limited company legal city concerns (AAM and AEM) in- status ensures greater transpa- to limited companies, while the rency in patrimonial and financial 26 urban transport and urban hygie- dealings with the Commune, ne concerns (ATM and AMIAT) ha- although it reduces competition ve stayed under communal con- for the service, which may be en- trol with ‘special company’ status. trusted directly without a call for Only in the case of the electrical tenders. concern has a minority share of The social connotation of the the capital been put on sale to the public services to be entrusted to private sector. Delays have been limited companies demands an caused both by political forces in effective control system to assure the city council and by the trade the public interest and ensure ser- unions and managers at the con- vice quality. Whereas in the case cerns themselves, who are favou- of disposals (entrustment to third rable towards leaner forms of or- parties), these guarantees are con- ganisation but also determined to tained in the deed of concession, maintain the balance of power of in the setting up of limited com- the monopolistic management of panies the control is envisaged in services. Concerns have seen the the convention which accompa- reform as an opportunity to im- nies the entrustment of the servi- plement their strategies more ef- ce and is also guaranteed by the fectively in a supracommunal per- powers attributed by law to the spective, further developing the communal assembly. implicitly functional model refer- Two final considerations may red to above. The ‘società per be pertinent to the analysis of our Working paper n. 124, 1999

research project. First, the con- munity’. Big industry plays a cept of the metropolitan area as a major role among private local tool for solving the problems of élites in Turin. The saying ‘If Fiat big cities through the direct pro- is well, Turin is well too’ shows duction of public services exploi- how the city was long identified ting economies of scale and scope with the large-scale enterprise loses further ground. In contrast, round which its economic and, in greater recourse to the market th- part, political systems rotated. In rough privatisation stresses the recent years Fiat, which, it would need for an authority monitoring be wrong to forget, is Italy’s lar- efficiency, guaranteeing competi- gest private industrial group, has tion, controlling quality and pro- fully integrated in globalisation tecting consumers over an area processes, successfully installing that is probably larger than that new production locations in Asia strictly needed to achieve econo- (India) and South America (Bra- mies of scale. Secondly, the diffi- zil, Argentina). Turin, of course, culties encountered in the pro- is more than just Fiat and, as we cess of privatisation reveal the on- have seen, the area boasts a tech- going mutual diffidence and im- nologically rich industrial fabric. 27 permeability of public and priva- In the services sector, it boasts the te actors. Hence the problems in- recently privatised Istituto Banca- volved in building coalitions of rio San Paolo which, in terms of interests at an urban level. It is no assets, is Italy’s largest banking coincidence that certain under- group. Private players have failed, the-surface signs of interest for however, to perform an active ro- the municipal electrical concern le in building a system of metro- from Fiat group companies were politan governance. The most at- not received with overt enthusia- tentive observers of the Turin sm in the city’s political debate. area as a local society (Bagnasco, 1996, 1990; Gallino, 1990) have long been agreed that difficulties 3. In search of political of policy-making are due to the leadership political subsystem’s weakness Why doesn’t the metropolitan with respect to the economic sy- question figure in Turin’s political stem. “Turin emerged from For- agenda? dism with an urgent need to re- The answer lies in the insuffi- build politics” (Bagnasco, 1990, cient initiative of local public and p. 17). From this point of view, private élites in building what, in the absence of an explicit metro- other parts of this study, has been politan government is simply the defined as a ‘public policy com- other face of the absence of what Working paper n. 124, 1999

has been defined as ‘orgware’13: operation of private interests, namely, organising capacity or especially through real estate and “the ability to enlist all actors in- infrastructure policies (i.e., tran- volved, and with their help to ge- sparent governance of the urban nerate new ideas and develop and revenue). For example, the Fiat’s implement a policy designed to old Lingotto car production respond to fundamental develop- plant, built in the twenties and a ments and create conditions for splendid example of industrial ar- sustainable development” (Van chaeology, was converted into a den Berg - Braun - Van der Meer, service centre without a clear ur- 1997, p. 256), a concept which ban development strategy on the can easily be traced to that of go- part of the city of Turin and still vernance14. It is also true, howe- shows unsatisfactory economic ver, that it is not easy to weld the returns (Bobbio, 1991; Van den economic strategies of the leading Berg - Braun - Van der Meer, local private sector and political 1997). actors (Mazza, 1990). The first Will the new municipal political are part of a network of interna- class in the Turin area be capable tional economic relations which of recovering these delays? In 28 inevitably pushes them away from Italy detailed analyses have yet to their local roots, given the lack of be made of the effects of commu- a lucid political-institutional stra- nal electoral reform on the local tegy capable of fostering the co- political class15. In Turin and some

13 The reference is to a study carried out by Euricur on behalf of the Eurocities Associa- tion based on eight European cities, among which Turin, Bologna and Rotterdam. The study sets out from the model of Porter (1990), who identifies three types of factors un- derlying competitiveness in the different areas: tangible, ‘hardware’ factors such as la- bour, capital and infrastructure; intangible ‘software’ factors such as those connected with the quality of life; and, finally, ‘orgware’, the ability to handle urban hardware and software effectively. Leadership, vision and strategy, strategic networks, political support and societal support emerge as the critical factors for a successful organising capacity in an urban area. 14 Attempts have been made to overcome this delay. The first was based on a cycle of se- minars, ‘Discussions on Turin’ promoted by economic actors (including Fiat, GFT, Ban- ca CRT, Istituto Bancario San Paolo) in 1988 and 1989, which sought to encourage scho- lars, administrators and firms to open a debate on the future of the city (cf. Bagnasco, 1991). In 1992, through the Torino Incontra Association, the Turin Chamber of Com- merce presented a dossier of proposals to relaunch Turin (Torino Incontra, 1992), invol- ving all the strategic local economic and political actors. A similar initiative was launched in July 1997 (Torino Incontra, 1997). The aim of these initiatives was precisely to iden- tify a shared vision of the future of the area, but they appear to have had no political fal- lout to date. 15 The most recent was that of Bettin - Magnier, 1995. Working paper n. 124, 1999

communes of the metropolitan activities in civil society, especially area, two elections have already in the world of economics. Politics been held under the new rules. It is no longer defined as ‘the capa- is thus possible to ask to what ex- city to deal with men but to deal tent this has affected the prospects with the rules and financial re- for a new metropolitan govern- sources offered by the communal ment. Various Italian studies have machine with a view to achieving shown how, in the first 25 years in short-term concrete objectives’ the life of the Republic, the mayors (Bettin - Magnier, 1995, p. 116). of large cities displayed all the In reality, the failure to solve the characteristics of local notables, problems of a large urban area su- but were actually selected through ch as Turin confirms how the intermediation by the parties16. In 1993 reform has mainly influen- the sixties, a new type of mayor ced forms of communal govern- emerged, more closely tied to the ment, stabilising executives and phenomenon of the professionali- helping bipolar electoral models sation of politics as a consequence to emerge, but also that this is a of the growing role of political necessary but not a sufficient con- parties in Italian society. The 1993 dition to perform a role of gover- 29 reform, combined with the inten- nance. In other words, it has in- se process of delegitimatisation of fluenced the capacity to solve col- traditional political parties increa- lective problems such as the pro- sed the clout of mayors and city motion of an adequate process of spokesmen arriving directly from development of a metropolitan civil society, although empirical area17. As analysis of other study evidence shows that the channels cases shows, local institutions mu- of recruitment are still very often, st be capable of governing a com- directly or indirectly, linked to the plex network of interactions political parties. What would ap- among the principal public and pear to be becoming more conso- private players inside a metropoli- lidated is a managerial-entrepre- tan area. Indeed, in Turin the par- neurial vision of the mayor’s role, tial ‘de-professionalisation’ of po- an experience to be exploited sub- litics is, in all likelihood, in para- sequently not so much in high-le- doxical contrast with the need for vel political posts as in managerial a ‘metropolitan political entrepre-

16 See Bettin - Magnier, 1995 and Spreafico, 1963. For differences between French and Italian mayors, see the now classic study by Tarrow (1979); on the effects of the 1993 electoral legislation, see Vandelli, 1997. 17 For an analysis of the problems connected with the decision-making processes of Ita- lian communes, see Bobbio, 1997. Working paper n. 124, 1999

neur’ capable of building a new and the central commune itself supracommunal political space are regarded by mayors as diffi- and creating a specific coalition of cult and conflictual and the image interests – a sort of Turinese ur- of the commune of Turin which ban growth machine – specifically emerges is one of a subject with for the purpose. The lack of a hegemonic intentions, keen to strategic metropolitan planning dump the negative effects of its scheme as a symbolic foundation own policies on bordering com- for the new political space is munes. The meagre technical-po- further proof of the fact. The ab- litical interactions which take pla- sence of a clear metropolitan poli- ce are concentrated exclusively in tical leadership – a feature clearly the communes of the first ring. evident in the other case studies, Vice versa, networks of relations with the exception of the Geneva- based on mutual confidence have Lausanne metropolis – is proba- developed among the various bly the main cause of Turin’s insti- groups of communes of the me- tutional stagnation. tropolitan area, which often cor- All of which is bound up with respond to the administrative the problems, outlined above, of spaces previously occupied by lo- 30 intergovernmental relations in cal health units. Likewise, it is Italy, where existing institutions worth noting that these co-opera- are an objective obstacle to me- tive formulas are often designed tropolitan reform – and not only to promote economic develop- in Turin, as the history of Bologna ment initiatives. If friction some- shows. times arises among communes, it The picture we have outlined usually stems from differences in here would be incomplete size (i.e., small communes versus without a brief reference to the large communes). conduct of the mayors of the Answers to a specific request communes in the metropolitan for an assessment of the metropo- area. In a recent Ires survey on litan model reveal the existence of the 42 mayors of communes in three categories of mayors: those Turin’s two concentric suburban in favour of structural solutions, rings18, the absence of a metropo- supporters of a functional-type litan political space – i.e., a con- solution and mild opponents, text of preferential co-operative those with strong doubts but, no- relations – clearly emerges. Rela- netheless, open to a functional so- tions between satellite communes lution, which thus gains majority

18 Cf. Ires, 1998. Working paper n. 124, 1999

Figure 3 Opinions of mayors in the metropolitan area about models of metropolitan government

8 14 6 9 4 7 2

0 structural functional uncertain 31

approval (figure 3). All, however, tional and political. The problem betrayed a certain unwillingness of metropolitan governance has to side with one solution rather invariably been addressed in than another out of fear of larger terms of the second. The special entities such as the Commune of authorities set up to solve secto- Turin and the Provincial and Re- rial/functional problems have, vi- gional Authorities. This diffidence versa, low political visibility. ce also derives from the fact that There is more talk about the in- mayors have very vague knowled- clusion of Poirino (a commune ge – if any at all – of metropolitan on the outskirts of Turin) in the government reform proposals or metropolitan area than the exten- of the experiments in progress (in sion of the aqueduct service the- Bologna, Rome and Florence). reto by the city of Turin’s municipal water company. In this sense, the technical bureaucracies of Conclusions special companies have played a The Turin area has long expe- major role, fostering the emer- rience of the problems caused by gence of what we have defined as the two main types of institutio- an implicit functional model th- nal fragmentation: namely, func- rough a variable geometry geo- Working paper n. 124, 1999

graphical structure. This model appear to rely more on privatisa- looks bound to be consolidated tion and market decentralisation vis-à-vis an emerging phenome- than on the building of new pu- non mentioned above – that of blic co-ordination structures at the privatisation of some net- the metropolitan level. worked services – which makes There can be no doubt, though, the problem of co-ordinating lo- that responses to the ‘functional cal public services among the va- region’ and ‘capital city’ challen- rious communes of the con- ges have fallen short of the mark. urbation less important, irrespec- The need for co-ordination of tive of certain aspects of strategic land planning policies (the func- policies in the area (for example, tions communes are most jealous choices for water sourcing or the of!) has yet to mature, with the location of refuse disposal sites). consequence that there is no sha- The consequence of political red vision of the future of the area fragmentation has been poor co- – a necessary premise for any at- operation between the central tempt at strategic planning (it is commune and the communes in important to note that this state the area, which have always felt of affairs exists despite the fact 32 ‘exploited’ by Turin (in the field that, politically, the local govern- of public building policies, for ment majority is relatively homo- example). This has hindered the geneous). There are contradic- development of a ‘metropolitan tory signals that the need is now community’; as a result, today the beginning to be felt. For example, metropolitan problem is one of an agency (Agenzia per gli inve- governance and, as such, cannot stimenti a Torino e in Piemonte) be easily solved using the original has been set up to promote inve- proposals envisaged by Law No. stment in Turin and Piedmont, 142/1990. through a partnership among the The sad fact is that Turin has Region, the Province, the munici- failed to respond equally well – pality of Turin, the Chamber of returning to Dente’s effective ter- Commerce and some industrial minology – to the problems of the associations; a convention has ‘big village’, the ‘functional re- been stipulated between the gion’ and the ‘capital city’. Commune of Turin and 17 com- Our initial research leads us to munes in the surrounding area to feel that the ‘big village’ challenge co-ordinate cultural policies, but has been partly addressed and the new urban policy planning won. The management of large- and co-ordination mission recen- scale networked services in the tly established for the CIT (the Turin metropolitan area would Turin Intercommunal Consor- Working paper n. 124, 1999

tium, an association of 17 com- with weak metropolitan govern- munes in the metropolitan area) ments (along the lines of Ger- so far has been unsuccessful. It is, many and Spain). If, vice versa, nonetheless, significant that in the regional experience were to the election programmes of the progressively decline, we might candidates of the two major poli- find ourselves with a network of tical groupings (Polo per le Li- large cities allied with their re- bertà [Pole for Liberties] and spective provincial authorities, L’Ulivo Alleanza per il Governo which would negotiate directly [Olive Tree Government Allian- with the central government over ce]) in the recent mayoral elec- the most important urban poli- tions in Turin, the metropolitan cies. Likewise, there continues to issue was entirely marginal. The be reciprocal diffidence between programme of the outgoing Turin and the communes of its va- mayor Castellani (re-elected on rious rings, which are afraid of May 11, 1997) only speaks of the being dominated by the central hypothesis of building a ‘forum commune, seen as a sort of ‘big for development’ to promote Tu- brother’. The interviews with the rin’s development on new econo- mayors show that the climate of 33 mic bases, open to entrepreneurs, diffidence is caused not only by social forces, cultural institutions objectively bad past experiences, and universities, without any but also by a lack of mutual con- mention of the other communes tact and information; the fact is in the metropolitan area19. that no federal model can be in- A variety of different explana- troduced if there is no entity to tions can be put forward for all promote a network of trust these hold-ups. First and foremo- (although it is not clear what that st, comes the conflict between re- entity should be) similar to the gional authority and local authori- one that has underpinned the Bo- ties. For the regional authority, logna experiment. After all, the the birth of a powerful metropoli- failure of the project to set up a tan local government would se- new province in Rotterdam20 riously jeopardise its role. If Italy shows just how hard it is to build were to embark on the road a model of consensus round the towards a strong regional model, government of a large urban area, we would most likely be faced even when external conditions are

19 The proposal is contained in a paragraph in the programme entitled precisely ‘A capital city’. 20 Cf. Te Velde, 1996; Vergès, 1997; Van der Veer, 1998. Working paper n. 124, 1999

exceedingly favourable, as well as Law No. 142/1990 and replace it the importance of effective public with contractual/federative-type communication when under- hypotheses22 consistent with the taking courageous institutional in- proposals of national laws, iden- novation; last but not least, the tifying what we have called the lack of visible political leadership. ‘capital city challenge’ as the crux In conclusion, to use the ever of the metropolitan problem. A effective metaphor of Ostrom, new proposal is under the scru- Tiebout and Warren21, no one in tiny of parliament and, if appro- Turin is waiting for Gargantua to ved, could open a new way for solve all its metropolitan pro- the building of a functional flexi- blems, but the emergence of a ble model. metropolitan governance model It is hard to say, however, if and is still a long way behind schedu- when the issue will be addressed. le. Nonetheless, over the last two Only when the future develop- or three years there has been a ment of regionalism in Italy beco- clear tendency – at least in the mes clearer shall we able to un- cultural debate – to question the derstand the direction that policy 34 structural model envisaged by will move in.

21 Cf. Ostrom - Tiebout - Warren, 1961. 22 For a reconstruction of the problem of the government of metropolitan areas in Italy, see Ferlaino - Piperno, 1996. Working paper n. 124, 1999

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