NO: 4 PERSPECTIVE FEBRUARY 2014

Iranian Foreign Policy on the 35th Anniversary of the Islamic Revolution

ABDULLAH YEGİN

• Which approach has shaped ’s understanding of foreign policy after the Revolution? • What are the differences in the Iranian foreign policy in different periods after the Revolution? • What are the basic approaches to Iran’s “interest-based” foreign policy?

The Iranian Islamic Revolution in February 1979 had • Not to adjust foreign policy relations according to regional and international repercussions. The Iranian economic interests, revolution took place in a period predominated by the • To fight against while supporting the Pales- understanding of a bipolar world and the Cold War. tinian popular movements, The revolution pursued a foreign policy independent • To keep aloof with strategic interests of big polit- of these two polars and adopted a new discourse and ical powers. approach not only inside but also outside. On the axis While doing so, Iran has concentrated on objectives of this objective, Iran was eager to create a theoret- such as the full independence of the country, the protec- ical foreign policy framework with a “revolutionary” tion of the rights of Muslims in the international arena, perspective. The country preferred to practice the said and the defense of the aggrieved against aggravators. discourse during the Imam Khomeini period in par- As in all revolutions, the Iranian revolution as well ticular. In the following periods, some changes were spoke through the discourse of providing a good alter- made in practice - though the initial discourse was not native not only for themselves but also for the whole theoretically abandoned - and numerous initiatives world and uniting masses around a common ideology have been taken to date. in order to be successful. After the success of the rev- olution, the pillars and objectives given in a nutshell A FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH above were written into the Constitution, since it was CHANGING IN TIME necessary to put them in theory. Iran stressing political independence by the slogan of However, when it comes to put the theory in “Neither the East nor the West” has set forth its for- practice, again as in other revolutions, mostly the re- eign policy pillars as follows: quirements of being a state; therefore, the future and • To have close ties with peoples and movements the interests of the state have been prioritized in par- rather than States, ticular after a desired ground had been set-up for the

ABDULLAH YEGİN Abdullah Yegin graduated from the Art History Department in the Faculty of Art, Istanbul University. He studied Shiite Teopolitics and the Midd- le East between 2000 and 2005 in Iran. Yegin translated two books, various articles and papers. He is pursing MA in the Department of Political History of the Middle East and International Affairs at the Middle East Researches Institute, Marmara University. Yegin is also a Foreign Policy researcher at SETA. PERSPECTIVE

system and presumed that the revolutionist staff had termined principles. The period of Imam Khomeini complete control of the State. While doing so, how- was, at the same time, a period of struggle for the Is- ever, it was voiced that there was no deviation from lamist cadres to gain absolute control within the state; theory, and arguments were developed accordingly. therefore, Iran adopted an idealist and ideological ap- After the revolutionary cadres have completely proach in both national and foreign politics. taken the state under control, the argument to justify However, it would be wrong to say that the ap- the change they made in foreign policy was that the proach of an idealist foreign policy was actualized as main country where Amir al Mumineen (Command- soon as the revolution occurred. After the revolution, er of the faithfull/believers, Imam Ali, son-in-law Mahdi Bazergan became the interim Prime Minister, of Prophet Mohammad) lived must be protected; if and following his resignation, Abu’l-Hasan Benisa- needed, again for the sake of the long-term interests of dr took the presidential office. During the period of the aggrieved around the world, the protection of the Benisadr, both figures seemed to follow a smoother main country must be the priority for the protection foreign policy as a result of their conciliatory liberal of the long-term interests of the aggrieved. approaches. According to this argument again, a strong Iran The interim government lacked a certain foreign is needed for the final liberation of the aggrieved policy strategy and did not internalize Khomeini’s slo- around the world, so the priority not only for the gan “Neither the East nor the West”, but inclined to state of Iran but also for everyone who wishes for have good relations with the US. As a result, he stood a better world should be the protection of the Ira- against the occupation of the US Embassy by uni- nian interests. For a better understanding of which versity students in and resigned when Imam phases the Iranian foreign policy has gone through Khomeini backed the students. Afterwards, Benisadr and reached its current phase, it would be illuminat- became the President of the country and dealt with ing to examine it by periods. three major foreign policy issues. These were the issue of American diplomats held THE IMAM KHOMEINI PERIOD AND AN hostage by the students who occupied the US Em- IDEALIST FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE bassy; the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets Until the 1979 Revolution, Iran had completely po- Union, and the beginning of the eight-year war with sitioned itself next to the United States and the West- Iraq. Since Benisadr was more willing to have good re- ern block in the bi-polar world. The country, however, lations with the US than Bazargan, he was accused of started to experience radical changes in foreign policy betraying the regime and this left him no chance but with the arrival of the revolution. In the early days of to flee the country. the revolution, Imam Khomeini revealed the Iranian Established by the Islamist groups who followed foreign policy through the slogan of “Neither the East the footsteps of Imam Khomeini, the Islamic Repub- nor the West.” The slogan was an indicator of the Irani- lican Party took the power after Benisadr. From there an objection to the current international system. With on, the Iranian foreign policy in the hands of Imam this, Iran, on the one hand, signified that they could Khomeini adopted a revolutionary character. In this not take side with either one of the two super powers period, rulers of the Muslim countries in the region and, on the other hand, tried to prove that a third way were openly accused of cooperating with the West as was possible. This attitude made Iran an assertive state opposition movements in these countries were sup- in the international arena rather than a state aloof. ported to the full extent. Iran was on good terms with The natural consequence of this was to follow an organizations more than States. In this period, the active foreign policy within the framework of the de- main argument of the State was the final liberation of

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the aggrieved around the world, and the country had riod and Iran started to act like a country prioritizing problematic relations not only with Muslim countries its foreign policy interests. in the region but also with the West. Since then Iran has maintained to generate pol- On the one side, the West reacted against the itics on the axis of this basic approach. During the Iranian discourse on Israel that “it is an illegitimate Rafsanjani period, the Iranian foreign policy adopted regime of occupation; therefore, Israel must be annihi- a more realistic approach in economy and security-re- lated”; and Imam Khomeini, on the other hand, issued lated issues. Concentrating on generating viable poli- a death fatwa (order) against author Salman Rushdie cies, acknowledgement of a system having a grasp of for insulting Prophet Mohammad. This was the reason international relations, respect for international rules, for many Western states to recall their ambassadors. active membership in international and regional insti- However, Iran did not give up its aggressive for- tutions, efforts to have no problems with neighboring eign policy in this period, and acted upon the prem- countries and transition from the policy of exporting ise that isolation is useful for full independence. Iran revolution to Islamic policy in a single country, were initially turned down the ceasefire calls by the United the main features of the approach. Nations (UN) for the eight-year war between Iran and Although Iran intended to have good relations Iraq. In the end, in August 1988, however, Khomeini with the European countries, this was prevented, how- signed the ceasefire agreement which he described as ever, when Iran did not step back from its stance about “drinking a cup of poison.” Israel and assassination attempts were made against This agreement may also be seen as the first sign some opposition elements in European countries. that Iran would regard international institutions and states as its addressees in the future. About a year after THE IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE the ceasefire, Imam Khomeini died in June 1989. Ali KHATAMI PERIOD: SOFTENING AND POLITICAL Khamanei became the new Ayetollah and Ali Akbar DEVELOPMENT MAINTAINED Hashemi Rafsanjani the President. Therefore, a new , the candidate of the reformist period in the Iranian foreign policy began. wing, won the presidential elections in 1997. Khatami maintained his predecessor Rafsanjani’s softening ap- THE IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER IMAM proach in foreign policy by the same token. Attempts KHOMEINI: THE PERIOD OF SOFTENING AND of economic development by Rafsanjani were accom- ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT panied by political development during the Khatami The Islamic staff managed to take the state institu- period with the discourse based on “cohabitation and tions under control during the Imam Khomeini pe- intercivilization dialogue.” The Iranian foreign policy riod and they, themselves, were practically considered during the Khatami period was as the following in brief: as the State. In addition, the Iran-Iraq war that lasted Although the international system positively re- eight years had necessitated the overview of the inter- acted to Khatami’s soft policy, it failed due to the US nal situation and foreign policy priorities. Iran had opposition, and the US regarded Iran on the axis of been devastated in all areas and a significant devel- evil. In fact, given the dominant international per- opment and economic recovery was important more ception of the period, the optimistic discourse of than anything. intercivilization dialogue lost strength against the For the reconstruction of the country, an increase dominating global perception after the September 11 in oil income; therefore, cooperation with other states attacks, in particular. was needed. That, the aforementioned idea of the pro- Still, Khatami followed a soft foreign policy dis- tection of the main country, was introduced in this pe- tant from global powers. In the aftermath of the Sep-

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tember 11 attacks and following the US occupation this, big powers were acting despotic and making mil- in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran and the US made joint itary and political interventions in other states as they efforts about these two countries. A shift from the an- wished to do so, nuclear weapons were in the hands of ti-imperialist foreign policy line in the early years of tyrant states, and the world was split into two polars as the revolution to joint efforts of cooperation with the the rich and the poor. US, which was termed as the Great Satan, is a good ex- Ahmedinajad stressing that a fight against all ample for the aforementioned state-oriented evolution these was necessary, claimed that the Holocaust is a of the Iranian foreign policy. myth fabricated by Zionism in the Western world and Again, in the Khatami period the Iranian foreign that the reality of this should be investigated. policy makers inclined to have conciliation on the nu- Besides, Ahmedinajad tried to have friendly ties clear energy issue; therefore, acted in favor of negotia- with the Latin American countries; to begin with, the tions. The West, however, did not make any compro- formation of an anti-imperialist front was necessary. mise to Iran at all, and the Iranian nuclear works were As it may be noticed, the Iranian foreign policy in suspended for two years. this period returned to the foreign policy instruments of the Imam Khomeini period. Although this political THE AHMEDINAJAD PERIOD: REJUVENATION approach was similar in style to that of the first period, OF REVOLUTIONIST DISCOURSES the content was the continuation of the approaches of Mahmoud Ahmedinajad, the candidate of the con- the later periods. That is to say, it was pragmatic not servatives, won the presidential elections in 2005 and principal. For the confirmation of this, it would be suf- took office. At that time, US President George W. ficient to examine the Iranian foreign policy in Syria Bush and his new neo-conservative staff were exhibit- during the Ahmedinajad period. ing tense and aggressive behaviors. In such a political In this period, idealistic foreign policy discourses climate, Iran could not protect its national interests in many areas were voiced as mentioned above. How- through a soft discourse. Khatami tried this but turned ever, the interests of Iran became determinant when unsuccessful, and Iran could not save itself from being it came to the Syrian issue. In fact, Syria occupies a placed on the axis of evil. great deal of space on the “axis of resistance,” a key But instead, Iran took a new route and preferred component of the defense doctrine. Nonetheless, to respond in an equally aggressive tone to the dom- Iran preferred to overlook some critical points, which inating global aggression in that period. To this end, were previously set as “principles”, with the start of Iran rejuvenated the old revolutionary discourses in the popular unrest against the regime in Syria. For in- foreign policy. First of all, it announced to resume its stance, the principle of the protection of the interests nuclear activities from where they left off despite all of the main country was prioritized over the defense external pressures, and implemented an aggressive for- of the aggrieved against aggressors, and the principle eign policy. of affiliation with popular movements rather than Not satisfied with this, Iran took the tension to states, was ignored. a further level when the President himself announced Iran overtly sided with Syrian President Bashar al that Israel must be eradicated. The Iranian foreign pol- Asad on the Syrian issue. Iran acting so decisively on icy in the Ahmedinajad period criticized the interna- this issue did not hesitate to pull Hezbollah of Jordan tional system, claiming that: International institutions into the civil war in Syria at the expense of wiping off were gradually losing prestige, Israel was usurping the the prestige of this organization in the Islamic world. rights of the Palestinian people more every day and In fact, Hezbollah was established in Lebanon to fight that international institutions remained reluctant to against Israel and had won the approval of all Muslims.

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Despite the big tragedies and slaughters of un- would adopt a political line in foreign politics similar armed people in Syria, Iran has never considered a re- to those of Rafsanjani and Khatami. vision in its Syrian foreign policy, and a possible revi- sion would be achieved only through some assurances. CONCLUSION These are the evidence that the Iranian administrators As Iran took a new turn owing to the Islamic Revolu- now think like statesmen, not revolutionists. There- tion in 1979, the foreign policy discourse of the time fore, it is possible to say that the Iranian foreign policy was redesigned by a revolutionary approach. The slo- of anti-imperialist stance in the Ahmedinajad period gan of “Neither the East nor the West” may be seen as served to the aggressive policy tactics. an insubordination against the bi-polar international In any case, Iran maintains this aggressive poli- system that paved the way for Iran to enter the inter- cy and takes nuclear energy works to a further level national arena, as the country believed that a third way while facing trouble inside due to the international was possible. sanctions. In order to beat the economic dire strait Later on, however, Iran faced with the common and the crisis, finding a way out was imperative fate of perhaps all revolutions; that is, the ideological for Iran, and the international system has adopted revolutionary discourse was mellowed through various a softer discourse resulting from the fatigue due to explanations and fitted into the interest and future of wars. These two points bear the signs about the Ira- the State following the absolute control of the revolu- nian foreign policy in the new period. It is possible tionary cadres over the system. to read the developments taking place after Hassan Even in the Ahmedinajad period where the revo- Rouhani’s election as president, as an indicator of lutionary discourses were revived and national inter- this new position. ests were at issue, revolutionary principles could be First of all, the religious leader Khamenei stressed explained, as can be observed easily by looking at the the concept of “heroic flexibility” about the foreign Iranian foreign policy on Syria. policy, and this was interpreted as a sign of possible This example shows that Iran acts like a modern tactical changes due to the economic situation. In any nation state with the aim of maximizing its own inter- case, Iran was to maintain the interest-based foreign ests rather than a State with revolutionary ideals. policy approach during the period of the current Pres- ident Rouhani and apply tactical changes, if needed, as it was tried before. Rouhani’s getting closer with Original Title: Devrimin 35. Yılında İran Dış Politikası Rafsanjani and Khatami is also an indication that he Translated by Handan Öz

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