Guinea-Bissau

Christoph Kohl

Throughout the year, -Bissau continued to be dominated by a conflict between President José Mário Vaz and his party, the ‘Partido Africano da Independ- ência da Guiné e Cabo Verde’ (PAIGC), led by the former prime minister, Domingos Simões Pereira. Parliamentary work remained blocked because the PAIGC prevented the election of the presidentially appointed prime minister, Umaro Sissoco Embaló (PAIGC). Human rights, the opposition and the media came under pressure. The political crisis contrasted with a positive economic development.

Domestic Politics

The conflict between the president and PAIGC-dominated parliament continued: in January and February Prime Minister Embaló failed to present his government pro- gramme within the constitutional time limit because the PAIGC-dominated par- liament bureau refused to discuss it. The bureau blocked an alternative majority that would favour Embaló’s cabinet, consisting of all 41 ‘Partido para a Renovação Social’ (PRS) parliamentarians and 15 rebel members of parliament excluded from

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:��.��63/9789004367630_012 Guinea-bissau 107 the PAIGC. Although the Constitution stipulated that President Vaz should dismiss Embaló, he remained in office without a legal basis. Attempts by the PAIGC to re- integrate the 15 renegade parliamentarians failed. Interior Minister Botche Candé’s (PAIGC) plans to replace parliamentary security guards in January gave rise to sus- picion; the step was interpreted by parliament as exceeding his powers. The ran- sacking of the office of the speaker of parliament, Cipriano Cassamá (PAIGC), on 24 January was conceived as part of a plan to attack parliament by former presi- dential candidate Nuno Gomes Nabiam (‘Assembleia do Povo Unido – Partido Democrático da Guiné-Bissau’, APU-PDGB), while on 21 April, Vaz in turn accused undisclosed political circles of planning to assassinate him. In October, supporters of the 15 rebel parliamentarians attacked the PAIGC headquarters. Throughout 2017, the Conakry Accord, signed on 14 October 2016 to end the politi- cal deadlock, was not implemented because Vaz had failed to appoint a consen- sus prime minister and continued to play for time, despite international pressure. In February, Embaló strongly criticised the ECOWAS mediator, Guinean President Alpha Condé. ECOWAS, in turn, threatened to accelerate the withdrawal of its peace- keeping Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB). In March, Embaló also attacked the president of the ECOWAS Commission, Beninese politician Marcel Alain de Souza. On 25 April, ECOWAS threatened to impose sanctions but a 30-day deadline expired without any action; instead, Vaz was granted an additional three months. During an ECOWAS summit in (), on 16 December, sanctions were back on the agenda after participants had become frustrated by Vaz’s erratic attitude. Well attended protest rallies organised by the ‘Movimento de Cidadãos Consci- entes e Inconformados’ (MCCI) against Vaz and his allies, demanding compliance with the Conakry Accord, took place throughout the year, starting on 23 February. On 13 April, the movement’s leader, Lesmos Monteiro, was beaten by unidentified men. A demonstration on 27 May was violently dispersed by the police, leaving 20 injured, after about 2,000 protestors had peacefully approached the presiden- tial palace. Opposition rallies reached new peaks in October and November. Again, police broke up a peaceful rally on 16 November, leaving ten protestors injured. The ‘Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos’ (LGDH) criticised the disproportionate use of force. A rally announced for 30 November was postponed when the police were unwilling to guarantee security. The authorities restricted freedom of assem- bly. Another rally was stopped by the police on 7 December. In contrast, demonstra- tions in favour of Vaz organised by the movement ‘O Cidadão’ lacked mass support. Human rights were ailing. When an arrested adolescent was found dead in police custody in January, the LGDH complained that police impunity was widespread. Seven police officers were arrested. The poor state of prisons was a cause for con- cern in TI’s report released on 22 January. A group of 19 child labourers known as ‘taliban children’ were repatriated from Dakar (), where they had been forced to beg and work in the streets to earn money for their Muslim marabouts. In