The Danger Is Everywhere! Discourse on Security in Post- Socialist Hungary Barbara A

The Danger is Everywhere! Discourse on Security in Post- Socialist Hungary Barbara A. West, University of Rochester

Even as I write this article, the event itself is beginning to fade from people's memories. However, it is already such a part of Szeged's public life that the event itself is becoming lost in the discourse that it prompted. The event is the murders, on the night of January 24, 1994, of the prominent Szeged pastry chef Bálint Z. Nagy, his wife and their two children, as they slept in their family home. The rumor mills have slowed their pace; the Délmagyarország, Szeged's most popular daily, has ceased carrying the story. However, the public discourse of fear and uncertainty that accompanied the weeks of news stories focusing on the event itself continue. This particular family's tragedy has brought into the open, or publicized, a discourse that had been the primary focus of private discourse in Szeged, Hungary for at least a year prior to the event. As a cultural anthropologist living in Szeged from January 1993 until July 1994, completing the research for my Ph.D. dissertation on personal networks, national identities and the discursive elements that hold them together, I spent much of my time analyzing the most obvious and mundane, at least to Hungarians, aspects of life in Szeged. I employed private interviews, the gathering of life histories, and a time-use survey; above all, I participated in the daily life of one of Hungary's larger cities and spoke at great length with its residents. In other words, I engaged in participant observation. Throughout my research I found that the one constant in Szeged, among women and men, pensioners and students, factory workers and intellectuals, is a burdensome concern with security. From my first moments in the city, when small actions and material symbols were speaking louder to me than words, up until the time of the murders, by which time language and speaking had taken a more central place in my relationships with Hungarians, the people of Szeged used every communicational mode and setting to introduce the concept of security. My first reaction to this phenomenon was to think, of course they're concerned, unemployment is high, inflation is even higher and the elimination of the paternal authority of the Kádár system has left Hungary with an economy in which individual initiative, luck and

21 connections provide the only access to security. There is no guaranteed employment or living wage system and people are afraid for their future, as well as that of their children and parents. However, the words and actions that kept coming into focus were not solely concerned with the economic sphere. Almost any discussion, whether it be concerned with holidays, families, friends, shopping or housing, gets tied up into a discourse on the risks of being Hungarian in the post socialist era. In the following article I focus on one symbolic and three discursive devices in which security is central to private intercourse in the setting of post-socialist Hungary. I will then show the ways in which the murders of Z. Nagy and his family have served as the catalyst for making this private subject an important element in public culture. I conclude with a brief examination of a more recent event in Hungary's post communist history, the elections of May 1994, and the ways in which the results reflect the issues that I address in the article. My introduction to the discourse on security in Szeged came not through words, specifically, but rather through a series of communicative actions and symbols, combined with my preliminary attempts at using the Hungarian language. Taken individually each of these events and symbols concerns only individual preference or a single occurrence, but when viewed together they help to illustrate the omnipresent and oftentimes unconscious ways in which security serves as the central discursive feature in private communication events in Szeged. During my first week in this city I stayed in a private room arranged for me by one of the local tourist offices. Having done extensive research on this kind of establishment in Great Britain, I felt very comfortable being shown my room, located next to the owner's combination living and sleeping room, and the toilet, located next to the woman's kitchen. What I was not prepared for was the key that hung from the lock of every single door in the apartment. In the door to my own room, to the kitchen, into her room, in all six of the closets and cupboards in the entrance hall, into every lock had been inserted a key, a key that remained there day and night. I was baffled. It was understandable that a single woman who allowed strangers and foreigners into her home on a daily basis would want to keep her own possessions under lock and key, but that didn't seem to be the point of these keys. They remained in the locks when she went out shopping or to sleep at night. If I had wanted access to her belongings all I would have had to do was turn the key and let myself in. No, the keys had some other purpose that I had yet to understand.

I soon forgot about the keys, however, in the excitement of finding my first permanent home in Szeged. My new landlady seemed very nice and eager to help me practice the language. As I was moving my belongings into my room she began showing me all the amenities she had to offer, describing them in the simplest way she knew how: a sturdy table at which to eat and do my work, shelf space, a gas heater with which I could control the temperature of my room, and, of course, a key to the room. I was relieved to learn this, being worried not so much by my landlady's curiosity but that of the two middle aged men who lived in the back rooms of the house. My relief, however, was short lived. In the next moment, after showing me how to use the key, she then showed me where in the hallway she wanted me to store it. So, I thought, I've been given this key and I have been warned to keep my room locked because of the men, but I am supposed to put it on a shelf right next to my door. where anyone in the house has access to it. I was apprehensive. However, she then proceeded to show me how to lock and unlock her own door, through which I had to pass to use our shared kitchen, and where to put the key when I was finished: on a shelf next to her door, in full view of everyone. Throughout my stay there I never could remember to use my own key and it remained on its shelf collecting dust, though I did dutifully lock up her room and stash the key next to the telephone every time I ventured through her always locked door. Neither one of us ever had any problems with these men, nor any other of the multitude of people who moved into and out of those back rooms, though with each new tenant I was warned to lock my door. I always wondered if she likewise warned them to keep their doors locked because of the American living in the front bedroom. Although these two examples focus on internal space, that is, within personal living space, locks and keys are an important line of defense in maintaining external security as well. One family with which I have become very well acquainted is terribly concerned that their front gate remain locked at all times. They cite the terrible crime and threat from outsiders that could reach them if their gate remained unlocked for even one minute. Yet this very same family keeps one of their front gate keys stored on a semi-permanent basis in the mailbox, so that they can reach into it from the outside and let themselves into the courtyard. Any of these criminal types who happened to see them reach into the box could easily have done the same. It made about as much sense to me as my landlady's insistence on locking her door. The apparent contradictions in these behaviors and attitudes, however, eventually began to come into focus as my language abilities grew and I was able to ask more questions. It is not

23 so much the objects themselves that are important but what they symbolize. The keys and the gates symbolize individual attempts to maintain the security Hungarians once felt in all areas of their lives. Possessing the ability to lock a door or cupboard provides the security of knowing that the owner of the key is in control. Related to the use of locks and keys to symbolize a striving for security, a striving that was admitted to be in vain when I pursued the reason for leaving keys either within the lock or within sight of it, is the discourse on crime and criminality that is a regular part of most private intercourse in post-socialist Hungary. Continually talking about crime has become one of the most common ways of expressing the overall insecurity that people feel in their lives right now. Upon our first meeting, the first questions that most people directed towards me concerned crime in America. Some people wanted to know if my experiences have been like the images of America they receive in shows like Miami Vice and Kojak, while others are convinced they know what life is like in America from their viewing of Charles Bronson movies. I was told by Hungarians of the need for vicious guard dogs, as well as seen the dog schools in Szeged where Rottweilers, German Shepherds and Pitbulls are trained to attack intruders and to bark and snarl at strangers passing by on the street. The explanation always given to my queries about the gates and fences that surround every individual house in Szeged is a need for protection against crime. Many people, particularly women, are concerned for their safety and do not go out alone after dark any more. One twenty-four year old woman told me how thankful she is that she lives in a large apartment complex, surrounded by people in other apartments who could hear her scream for help, rather than in a private home where she would be alone. Another young woman has moved back into her parents' private house, from her own apartment that adjoins this house, because of her fear of living alone. In addition to personally taking part in innumerable conversations concerning crime, I also overheard and witnessed many others. My last landlady came home almost daily with tales of robbery or attempted robbery that others told to her while they waited for a bus or while she tended the flowers on her husband's grave. The people of Szeged did not only take advantage of the international audience they found in me to talk about crime, but also talk about it amongst themselves on a regular basis. All areas in which Hungarians feel the loss of their security are contained in this discourse on crime. Economic insecurity is expressed through fears that what little they have and all that they have worked for could be taken from them at any time. Personal security is also

often coupled with crime. I was warned time and again not to be too trusting, to find out what people want from me when they offer kindness, not to offer English conversation practice in my own apartment but only in public places. The message was always, you don't know who to trust and who is a potential criminal. Finally, the security of Hungary as a small nation is also often coupled with this discourse. The open border policy adopted by Hungary since 1990 has allowed thousands of Romanians, Serbians and others from countries further to the south and east to enter almost at will. These people, it is commonly believed by the population of Szeged, are often criminals, threatening to overrun Hungary's capability of dealing with the threats to its borders and citizens. Whereas crime serves as one primary discourse for expressing feelings of insecurity, it is not the only one. Before I left the United States to begin my work in Hungary I was warned by many Hungarian-Americans that if I asked a Hungarian how he or she is, I should expect a complete and truthful answer; I should not expect the American stereotyped answer of 'fine.' Instead, I found Szeged to possess its own standard exchange: 'How are you?' 'Tired.' Ask someone how he or she is and almost without fail he or she is tired. The reasons given for this permanent state of exhaustion vary: too much work or studying, staying up late to listen to music or watch television, inability to sleep. However, when I probed more deeply into the source of their tiredness the discussion invariably turned to security. While Hungarians do have one of the longest work weeks in Europe, the figure for many working people in 1987 was around 67 registered hours per week (Schöpflin, et. al. 1988:25), the worry that their work will disappear or that it won't pay enough to live on is a principal reason given for people's answer. I was told time and again that fear, stress and insecurity on all levels leave people in a state of exhaustion but, at the same time, unable to rest or sleep properly. One type of response to this way of channeling the insecurity of the current period into a discourse on exhaustion has been to turn inwards, to focus on the body. While few people are actually willing to break the habits and customs of generations of Hungarians, to quit smoking and drinking, cut fat from the diet, begin an exercise program and lose some weight, most everyone talks about ways in which one or more of these programs to help the body will help combat fatigue. One particularly astute Hungarian has realized this trend and used it to his or her advantage in marketing an expensive brand of supposedly American vitamin supplement. For several weeks in the autumn of 1993 everyone wanted to know if I knew of the tremendous

25 benefits of this particular vitamin in boosting energy; few people were daunted by the fact that I had never heard of the brand until I came to Hungary. The many agendas that people discuss for securing the body against fatigue. including these vitamins, various medications, exercise, losing weight, all serve as ways to channel their desire for security on all levels. However, like the keys that never get removed from the vicinity of the lock to provide real security, this discourse on improving the body rarely moves beyond the world of discourse into the world of action to provide real security against personal affliction. In addition to turning inwards to combat the exhaustion caused by the insecurities of the current period, many have also looked outwards to their personal connections and networks. I witnessed a full calendar year of holidays, both national and traditional, during my year and a half in Szeged and I spoke to dozens of people about their celebrations. Without fail they said that holidays just aren't the events that they used to be; the celebration and hoopla have diminished. The reason for this: everyone is too tired to make the effort. National holidays, such as March 15th and August 20th, were big events, I'm told, when they were not officially permitted or sponsored. Now they simply provide a day off from work on which people can stay at home and rest. Easter and Christmas have likewise fallen from a former state of cheer and excitement; people prefer now to remain at home with their most narrow family circle to enjoy the quiet and the time to relax. Even simple gatherings with friends and acquaintances have gone by the wayside; people don't have time, money or inclination for such pleasures. Many also speak of the disappointments they have suffered at the hands of friends. In the time-use surveys I conducted in Szeged from July-December of 1993, in which I asked respondents to record all of their activities for one week, only one in four people recorded spending time outside of work with someone whom they would consider an acquaintance (ismerös) and no one used the word for friend (barát) at all. All personal connections have been reevaluated and are spoken of in terms of the security they provide so that even such intimate details of life as holidays and friends have become part and parcel of this wider discourse on security that includes crime and foreigners. In addition to their concern for their possessions and selves, Hungarians are deeply worried about the security of their borders and their nation. The discourse that accompanies these fears is particularly acute in Szeged because of its position as a border city located approximately 15 kilometers from an official border crossing into the former Yugoslavia and 15 from the

Romanian frontier. Many of the problems from which Szeged is suffering or which people perceive Szeged to be suffering - crime, pollution, overcrowding, economic disorder - are felt to be the result of Szeged's geographical position, the opening of the borders in 1990 and the thousands of visitors from these adjoining countries who enter the city on a daily basis. Of particular concern to many people is the perceived threat from the Gypsies who enter Hungary from Romania and Yugoslavia. These two countries are described as "full of Gypsies" and a common fear is that Hungary, too, may become a "Gypsy nation." Alongside of this traditional antipathy to Gypsies and the racism that fuels it, however, are other fears for the perpetuation of Hungarian hegemony in Szeged. Since the wars that have plagued the former Yugoslavia began, wealthy and entrepreneurial Yugoslavs have flocked into Szeged to shop, both for themselves and to sell on the Yugoslav black market. Just before Christmas 1993 the Délmagyarország stated that 175,000 people per day were entering Szeged, a city of approximately 177,000 people, to shop. Interestingly, this figure included Yugoslavs of all nationalities, including Hungarian, without differentiation. While from the distance of Budapest Hungarian-Yugoslavs constitute a separate category from other Yugoslav citizens, from the position of the border all foreigners from the south are simply foreigners. The people of Szeged feel overwhelmed and threatened by these shoppers because of their numbers, their relative wealth compared with many people living in Szeged and general cultural differences in terms of propriety and demeanor. Rather than focusing on the good that their hard currency has brought to the Szeged economy most people prefer to complain of the lines in stores, the rudeness of foreigners or the proliferation of advertisements and notices to be found in Serbo- Croatian; all signs of accommodation to this foreign invasion. They fear the loss of their secure identity as a Hungarian city. Even now, after the imposition by the Yugoslav government of large fees in hard currency to be allowed to leave the country has drastically cut the numbers of foreigners entering from the south to approximately 41,000 daily, the people of Szeged continue to feel that their city and their nation are at risk from foreign elements. Up until January 1994 this multifaceted discourse on security was primarily of a private nature. The answers I received to questions about holidays, friends, health, Szeged, the economy, politics and just about everything else, invariably broached the issue of security. When I met with friends, for interviews, planned get-togethers or impromptu meetings, the topic often turned to address the concept of security. Also, I often overheard conversations on buses and trams, in

the markets and stores, and on the streets that indicated the topic was much more widespread than my own network of friends and acquaintances. The people of Szeged were speaking of little else. Security had become the master narrative circumscribing private life and private discursive events. On January 26, 1994, the first day in which the Délmagyarország ran the story of the murders of the Z. Nagy family, the situation in Szeged changed.1 No longer was security just a private subject but also an important facet of Szeged's public culture, and one that was destined to remain there for many months on the urgings of such public figures as the vice president of the Hungarian parliament. In an interview with the Délmagyarország on that first day of coverage of the murders he stated that, "It should be obvious to everyone that we shouldn't only mutter over these questions [of security and governmental responsibility] at home but openly as well" (1/26/94, 84/21: 7). The tidal wave of public discourse that this event unleashed can be seen in the words of law enforcement officials, government agents, media workers and individual citizens, who all expressed concern for a variety of public security issues. Not only had these murders publicized people's fears of crime, but all aspects of private discourse on security became part of public culture. Fear for themselves, their property and their nation all made the transition from private discourse to public culture. Writing in connection with the economic insecurities of the current period Mrs. József Szalay concurred with my friends and acquaintances who had spoken with me privately; "There wasn't so much violence in the old system....The living was better, the material security. In the first place, the strengthening of the economy should be primary in improving public security" (2/10/94, 84/34: 4). Speaking with regard to both personal and financial security, Jácint Hake responded to the Délmagyarország's question of the week that, "I think that everyone who has money can be afraid they'll break into your place.... They should take every preventative measure, barred windows, they need alarms, they should hire body guards. They should pay attention and lock everything possible" (2/10/94, 84/34: 4; italics added). Finally, the security of the nation was the theme of one of the most common public discourses to emerge from the murder of the Z. Nagy family. On the occasion of this murder, the private concern with the hegemony of Szeged as a Hungarian city and with the security of Hungary as a nation and state, was immediately brought into the public arena with very little regard for the relevance of this discourse to the specific crime. On the very first day of the coverage of the murders, before

28 anyone had been taken into custody or was even suspected, a Szeged council representative commented "on the indignation of the Z. Nagy affair - 'It comes to mind that the young soldiers of the Serbian army, as civilians, came to Szeged by bus to shop with their 50 [German] mark allowance. Who could have predicted what they were up to in the meanwhile?"' (1/26/94, 84/21: 7). The mayor of Szeged's statement with regard to the matter two days later supports the conclusion of the council person that Hungary, and Szeged in particular, are at risk: "We need to acknowledge that Szeged has become a transit city of a transit country, which is subjecting us to increased danger" (1/28/94, 84/23: 7). When the Délmagyarország asked Ferenc Nagy, a retired man, his opinion of the current state of the city of Szeged he also turned to the nation as his reference point: "We should look for solutions in our culture and upbringing because today's national values have totally disintegrated" (2/10/94, 84/34: 4; italics added). In short, all of the issues that had been generating private discourse on security became part of Szeged's public culture. On the second day of coverage of the event the city police captain tried to calm the mood by stating that, "The Z. Nagy affair is not the 'by-product' of the collapse of Szeged's public security ... I can establish this with certainty" (1/27/94, 84/22: 7), but the fears that had been building privately for many months were not to be assuaged with a few words from the captain. According to one reporter, "the Z. Nagy family tragedy is without change the main topic of conversation in Szeged. People keep guessing and they consider the city's public security appalling" (1/27/94, 84/22: 7; italics in original). In response to this charge, the police captain replied: "this is an individual event which is a sad tragedy. But this doesn't mean that the city's public security is in critical condition" (1/27/94, 84/22: 7; italics in original). The people and leaders of Szeged, however, were not convinced. The murders opened a flood gate of concern about security that only slowed in the spring of 1994 when the impending parliamentary elections, and the issues chosen by national politicians such as freedom of the press and trust, began to hold sway over the local media.2 On January 27, 1994, Ferenc Fehér, a wheel barrow operator in Szeged replied to the Délmagyarország's "Question of the Week" concerning the murders: "It's sad that we have to live this way! You go to bed at night and you don't know whether or not you'll get up in the morning... We are at mercy because anything can happen" (84/22: 4). As many as five weeks later, on March 3, 1994, the mood in Szeged continued to be tense and the public continued to be engaged in a lively discourse on security.

The county police superintendent wrote on that day, in the final of five installments written by him on the topic of public security in both Szeged and Csongrád county, that "it's possible to live in a Democracy only with the assurance of consolidated issues of public security" (84/52: 13). In the five days of his series, Dr. Lászlo Salgó addressed not only the responsibilities of the police, but also of lawmakers to enact legislation that will help the police to do their jobs and of citizens to obey the laws and to participate in the social responsibility for creating security. He also stressed many times that there exists in Szeged a vast difference between "objective security" as evidenced by police statistics and crime indices and "subjective security" as felt by individuals (2/26/94, 84/48: 15). The day following this series the Minister of the Interior at that time supported this claim by providing statistics on the improving face of Hungarian crime fighting in 1993 (3/4/94, 84/53: 17). Like other public officials, however, these two individuals were not listening closely enough to the public discourse that the murders had instigated. Crime was not the only concern at the heart of the "subjective feelings of security" that were vented in the public venue during the long coverage of the Z. Nagy murder. On Thursday, February 3, 1994, Zoltán Király, one of Szeged's city representatives in the Parliament, planned a "quiet demonstration" (2/2/94, 84/27: 16) to "protest against the fear" and to begin "a peaceful battle against the takeover [of Szeged] by the underworld" (2/4/94, 84/29: 1). Instead, the 400-500 person march down the main pedestrian streets of Szeged turned into a public arena for frustrated citizens to air their concerns. The shouts that were recorded in the Délmagyarország the following day include a concern with crime, "Bring back the death penalty!"; "Who defends the little guy on the street?" (2/4/94, 84/29: 3), but also other concerns as well. Expressing the frustration with national government felt at the local level one person asked, "Where has Zoltán Király been up until now?"; another wanted to know, "What's this, campaigning?" (2/4/94, 84/29: 3). Finally, the last printed jeer addressed the economic insecurity felt at almost all levels of society; someone suggested that, with regard to the Minister of the Interior and other Members of Parliament, "They should try themselves to live on 8 thousand [forints] a month!" [This was $80 at that time] (2/4/94, 84/29: 3). Such diverse groups in Szeged as the local leadership of the Hungarian National Trade Union Organization (MSZOSZ), the Forrás Management Club and a meditation group all participated in this public airing of the security issue during the months of January, February and

March 1994. The Trade Union leadership called all residents and officials in Szeged to participate in the Z. Nagy funerals and to "do everything possible so that Szeged, the city of sunshine, doesn't turn into the city of shadow and crime" (1/28/94, 84/23: 7). The Forrás Management Club took the opportunity of an open forum to raise the security issue from a number of different perspectives and they invited a psychologist, the main police speaker on crime prevention and representatives from several security services to address their group (2/11/94, 84/35: 7). A representative from the meditation group stated in the Délmagyarország that, "If one in 10 people in Szeged practiced transcendental meditation, the crime rate would go down" (2/17/94, 84/40: 6). The unidentified expert also claimed that individuals who practice this form of relaxation improve their possibilities for economic and business success, as well as the physical condition of their bodies. While crime is certainly important in all of these messages, other factors for the perceived insecurity are also addressed. The responses of three Szeged residents to the Délmagyarország's question of the week on February 24, 1994, which asked, "Aren't you afraid of the blood bath?", help to illustrate the width of the gulf between officials' concerns and those of ordinary people in Szeged. While the question clearly points to the grisly murders that occurred in Szeged in January, the responses indicate that the security issue goes well beyond the crime sphere and time frame of the murders in the minds of ordinary residents. Mrs. Erzsébet Havasi Kinda, a lecturer, begins her response by acknowledging her fear of crime, "I've had enough of the violence you can experience today" (84/46: 4). However, she soon moves on to other topics, voicing her concern for the economy she states, "The city is filled with homeless people; there is no security," and, "Of course it was another world in the past, there was work, money, it was livable." Mrs. Ferenc Volford, a book keeper, concurs with Mrs. Kinda on her concern with unemployment and adds her fear of "the large number of foreigners" (84/46: 4). Krisztián, a public opinion researcher, points to the problem that people "don't care for one another" and states that he would like to see people coming together again to combat the forces that are driving them apart (84/46: 4). According to much of the published statistics and information, the people of Szeged should have been publicly concerned with their own security, as well as that of their nation, long before January 1994.3 In general, the period between 1963 and the early 1980s was marked in Hungary by "solid existential security, gradual improvement of living conditions, and steady economic growth" (Kis 1989:236). But by the mid- to late-1980s foreign debt, the largest per

31 capita in Eastern and East-Central Europe, and economic stagnation had brought this period to an end. It has been estimated that the official inflation rate of 17 percent for 1988 was really closer to 25-30 percent (Schöpflin et. al. 1988:25) and since that time it has been estimated that "from one-fourth to two-fifths of the people ... live below the poverty line" (Schöpflin et. al. 1988:27). Schöpflin, Tökés and Völgyes also cite the health care system, housing shortage and hopelessness, which Mihaly Simai labels the "political apathy [that] is, perhaps, an inherited fact of life" (1992:53), as further problems that eroded this guaranteed 'existential security' prior to the system change in 1990. In the crime sphere, as well, Hungarians had begun to experience loss of security long before the public outrage that marked the beginning of 1994. In the words of the Minister of the Interior at the time, Dr. Imre Kónya, "In the past decade the number of crime events has gone up meaningfully" (3/4/94, 84/53: 17). County sheriff Salgó stated that between 2-3 thousand crimes per year were recorded in Csongrád county up until 1988; the figure he gives for 1992 was nine thousand (3/1 /94, 84/50: 11). However, none of these factors, no national event or local phenomena, including the death in office in December 1993 of the first democratically elected, post communist Prime Minister in Hungary, was able to generate the kind of public discourse that the murders of Bálint Z. Nagy and his family did. I argue that the murder of a famous Szeged family, in their own city, over the issue of work and the economy (it was conjectured throughout the period of coverage that Z. Nagy had become mixed up in the Mafia, either through smuggling, arms dealing or simply refusing to pay the 'protection money' demanded by the Mafia), possibly by a foreigner (the murders were linked almost immediately to similar killings in Subotica, or Szabadka in Hungarian, a city just over the Yugoslav border, and a Serb has been in custody since early February), hit all of the nerves that have been left raw and vulnerable during the past few years. People speak privately about their fear of crime and their need to secure their homes; this family was murdered in their own home. People speak about exhaustion, difficulties sleeping and a general sense of physical decrepitude; the bodies of the members of this family were the victims of the ultimate abuse as they tried to rest and combat their own fatigue. People speak often of the increasing inflation and stagnation of wages that has financially burdened most Hungarians; this family was working hard to prosper and is seen as a victim of either envious or greedy criminals taking advantage of their prosperity without working. Finally, people speak of their fear for Szeged and Hungary at the hands of foreigners; this family was assumed from the very

32 beginning to be the victims of Serbian violence, to symbolize the risk for Hungarians of allowing so many foreigners to cross the border. The death of the Prime Minister, while it moved many people privately to address Hungary's security in the community of democratic countries, could not generate a public discourse on security. Unlike the murders, it did not address these central issues in the lives of Hungarians; it was merely a political event that did not really touch them at the core of their concerns. On May 8, 1994 and again on May 29, 1994, the Hungarian electorate welcomed the left back into the arms of their political embrace. On these two days of parliamentary elections the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) easily defeated both the former coalition leading Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the party that had been, prior to the elections, heavily favored, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). While none of my acquaintances expected these results, especially the large gap that appeared between MSZP at 32.96% and SZDSZ at 19.76% after the first day of voting (5/14/94, 84/112: 5), neither was anyone taken entirely by surprise. For more than twenty years, beginning in the late 1960s, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP), from which the current MSZP is a descendent, provided both létbiztonscág and közbiztonság, existential security and public security, for the Hungarian people. Everyone could purchase bread, milk, meat, shoes, clothes and, if they could find it, affordable housing was available through subsidized rents and building schemes. Women of all ages speak of the past system as a time when they were able to walk alone in the city after dark, to ride the busses and trams without concern for their persons or their possessions; as one woman expressed it: "There wasn't so much violence in the old system. Maybe the criminals were also afraid" (2/10/94. 84/34: 4). Both publicly and privately the Hungarian people credit MSZP for their ties to the secure past. In an article that appeared in the Délmagyarország almost a week after the first round of voting Márta Jellinek, of the director County Folk Culture Union, wrote that, "the cost of milk, bread, school has gone up dramatically for the simple people and recently their feeling of security has disappeared. Many people in the ruling party made mistakes and people are blaming them for the present situation" (5/1484, 84/112: 5) Throughout the campaign the slogan repeated on MSZP advertisements drew attention away from these mistakes of their rivals and towards their own experience: "Megbízható megoldást" which encompasses a variety of meanings having to do with their experience and past: "The reliable/ trustworthy/ authoritative solution." In his victory statement to the Western press after the first round, MSZP campaign

chief Imre Szekeres also pointed to the party's past association with Hungarian security: "Voters chose our abilities as proven experts.... They know we understand their problems and will care for them"' (Bruner 1984, p. 12). In general Barnabas Racz's analysis of the political situation in Hungary after the 1990 elections has been accurate. He predicted that MSZP would "aim at becoming the rallying point for the 'leftist movement'" (1991 :127) and that even though "the current trend appears to be strongly anti-socialist on the surface, ... the deepening social and economic crisis may generate a more receptive attitude to the left' (1991 :129). Racz's mistake was in undermining the force of the crises experienced by Hungarians in their daily lives, especially in his conclusion where he wrote with regard to the left in general, and MSZP in particular, that "they are unlikely to become a governing party" (1991 :132). In Hungary during the post-socialist transition the force of perceived insecurities has been stronger even than any remnants of anti communism. Nostalgia for the security of the past and faith in the party that gave it to them were enough to persuade a large number of Hungarians to favor the same socialist party they had rejected four years earlier. Their private discourse on security was aired publicly in the most effective medium possible in the new, democratic Hungary, in the ballot box.

Notes

1. I also received information on the murders and the subsequent media blitz on security through the limited access I had between January and July 1994 to television and radio. The bulk of my information, however, came filtered through my friends and acquaintances and through my reading of Szeged's largest daily, the Délmagyarország. Unless otherwise noted, all citations concerning the Z. Nagy murders were taken from my own translations of articles in this paper.

2. Interestingly, the root, biz, of the Hungarian verb for trust, bízik, is the same as that for security, biztonság.

3. Hungary's national newspapers out of Budapest published a poll late 1993 or early 1994 citing Hungary as having the highest pessimism rate in all of the former Warsaw Pact countries with regard to their own political and economic future. But, other than rumors that savings deposits in the Southern border areas of Hungary increased dramatically after the influx of refugees began (Huseby-Darvas, personal communication 9/30/94), I have been unable to locate poll material on public opinion in Szeged or Csongrád County during the past year.

References Cited

Bruner, Rick E., 1994, Hungary's left revives; Socialists gain vote. Boston Globe Monday, May 9. p. 1 2.

Délmagyarország, 1994, About Csongrád county, about Szeged, about their public security (1). Have dispositions become stable? Anonymous, Saturday, February 26. 84/48:15.

_____. 1994, About Csongrád county, about Szeged, about their public security (3). Is Szeged a city of crime? Tuesday, March 1. 84/50:11.

_____. 1994, About Csongrád county, about Szeged, about their public security (5). Crime, security and democracy. Thursday, March 3. 84/52:13.

_____. 1994, At least five hundred went quietly. Friday, February 4. 84/29:1,3.

_____. 1994, The city police and councilmen on public security: Individual instances on the bill of the underworld.,Thursday, January 27. 84/22:7.

_____. 1994, Economy and fear. Friday, February 11. 84/35:7.

_____. 1994, Four murders on Barka Street. Wednesday, January 26. 84/21 :7.

_____. 1994, Four years later. Saturday, May 14. 84/112:5.

_____. 1994, How many jackals can be rented for a few hours? Thursday, January 27. 84/22:1,7.

_____. 1994, The mayor presses for police reinforcement. Friday, January 28. 84/23:7.

_____. 1994, The people of Szeged on the elections: "The people's feeling of security has disappeared...". Saturday, May 14. 84/112:5.

_____. 1994, Question of the week: Aren't you afraid of the blood bath? Thursday, February 24. 84/46:4.

_____. 1994, Question of the week: Do we need to fear in the city? Thursday, February 10. 84/34:4.

_____. 1994, Question of the week: Has hell broken loose? Thursday, January 27. 84122:4.

_____. 1994, Quiet demonstration. Wednesday, February 2. 84Q7:16.

_____. 1994, State security infiltrations into the constitutional state: Conversation with Dr. Alajos Dornbach, vice president of parliament. Wednesday, January 26. 84/21:7.

_____. 1994, We all protest. Friday, January 28. 84/23:7.

_____. 1994, The weapon fires sooner in stress. Thursday, February 17. 84/40:6.

_____. 1994, What do the statistics say? "Crime" cities, counties. Friday, March 4. 84/53:17.

Kis, Janos, 1989, Turning point in Hungary. Dissent Spring, 36:235-41.

Racz, Barnabas, 1991, ~Political Pluralization in Hungary: The 1990 elections. Soviet Studies 43(1):107-36.

Schöpflin, George, Rudolf Tökés, and Iván Völgyes, 1988, Leadership change and crisis in Hungary. Problems of Communism. January-February 37:23-46.

Simai, Mihaly, 1992, Hungarian problems. Government and Opposition 27(1):52-65.

Contact: Barbara A. West Department of Anthropology University of Rochester Rochester, NY 14627