Turkey’s Black Sea Predicament: Challenging or Accommodating Russia? Mitat ÇELİKPALA* & Emre ERŞEN** Abstract This article seeks to explore the development territories, 4) accommodating the diverse of the new security environment in the Black Sea policies of its NATO allies Black Sea and its implications for the without alienating Russia. future of regional dialogue between Turkey and Russia. The radically altered strategic Key Words balance in the Black Sea after the Russian- Georgian war in 2008 and Russia’s Turkey, Russia, Black Sea, Caucasus, NATO, annexation of Crimea in 2014 have Montreux Convention, Jet Crisis. urged Turkish policymakers to revise their traditional policies toward this region. Introduction Yet Ankara currently faces four main Turkey and Russia are the two most challenges in this quest: i) maintaining significant regional actors in the Black the status quo established by the Montreux Sea region. While the former has the Convention, ii) protecting its interests longest shoreline among all the littoral vis-à-vis Russia’s strengthened military states surrounding the Black Sea, the presence in the Black Sea, iii) dealing with latter has geopolitically dominated the significant security implications of the th the region since the 18 century. three Russian anti-access/area denial Before the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (A2/AD) spheres built around Turkish in 1774, the Black Sea was mainly viewed as a “Turkish lake” due to the * Prof., Kadir Has University, Faculty of Ottoman Empire’s centuries-long Economics, Administrative and Social regional dominance in the Balkans Sciences, Istanbul, E-mail: [email protected] and Crimea. For many years, this ** Assoc. Prof., Marmara University, Department of Political Science and hegemony enabled the Ottomans to International Relations, Istanbul, E-mail: exercise absolute control over access [email protected] to the Black Sea through the Turkish 72 PERCEPTIONS, Summer 2018, Volume XXIII, Number 2, pp. 72-92. Turkey’s Black Sea Predicament: Challenging or Accommodating Russia? Straits. Yet the Ottoman supremacy of the two opposing blocs after World was challenged by an ever-expanding War II, the geopolitical balance that Russian Empire, which strived to was established in the Black Sea with gain access to the Black Sea’s warm their cooperation managed to survive waters. The Ottoman-Russian wars of the Cold War. the 18th and 19th centuries – including the Crimean War of 1853-1856 – were the most important signs of the fierce geopolitical rivalry between the Moscow’s economic and Ottoman sultans and the Russian tsars military support for the over the Black Sea. Turkish War of Independence in Anatolia started a brand Following the dissolution of the two new period in Turkish-Russian empires after World War I, their successor states- the newly founded relations. Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Union- succeeded in developing a different relationship with each other. The collapse of the Soviet Union in Moscow’s economic and military 1991 provided fresh opportunities for support for the Turkish War of the establishment of a new environment Independence in Anatolia started a of dialogue and cooperation between brand new period in Turkish-Russian Ankara and Moscow. The two countries relations. Eventually, during the 1920s worked together in order to preserve and 1930s the Black Sea became a their privileged status in the Black region of cooperation between the Sea, and built a number of regional two countries in parallel with their mechanisms to check the expansion improved political and economic of Western military influence in the ties. The Turkish-Soviet dialogue region. Yet the Russian-Georgian war particularly played an important role in the diplomatic process that led to the in 2008 and Russia’s annexation of signing of the Lausanne and Montreux Crimea in 2014 urged Turkish leaders conventions on the regime of the to revise their policies about the Black Turkish Straits. Signed in 1936, the Sea. The Turkish-Russian disagreement latter became the main international over Syria, which triggered a serious document regulating access to the Black crisis between the two countries in late Sea for commercial ships and warships. 2015, also significantly hampered the Even though Turkey and the Soviet regional dialogue between Ankara and Union became adversaries as members Moscow. 73 Mitat Çelikpala & Emre Erşen The goal of this article is to discuss has largely been shaped by its desire to and evaluate the development of develop a regional cooperation scheme the new security environment in the together with the Black Sea countries Black Sea, as well as its implications rather than its Western allies. This so- for the future of the Turkish-Russian called “regional ownership” approach regional dialogue. Although the two brought Turkey’s position closer to countries managed to normalize their that of Russia, as it is also in line with relations following the fighter jet crisis Moscow’s efforts to curb the rising of 2015, Ankara still finds it difficult influence of the EU and NATO in 1 to accommodate Moscow’s interests in the region. The Black Sea Economic the region. The rising tensions between Cooperation (BSEC), which was NATO and Russia also weaken established in 1992, in particular Turkey’s efforts to follow a policy of provided a significant platform in balance in the Black Sea. In this regard, which Ankara and Moscow could it can be argued that Turkey currently gradually strengthen their regional faces four key challenges in reshaping dialogue as well as bilateral economic its Black Sea policy: i) maintaining the relations in the field of tourism, energy status quo established by the Montreux and trade. BSEC also helped the two Convention, ii) protecting its interests countries develop new channels for vis-à-vis Russia’s strengthened military regional economic cooperation in presence in the region, iii) dealing with other sectors, including transportation, 2 the security implications of the three agriculture, banking and finance. Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/ AD) spheres built around Turkish territories, iv) accommodating the Despite its longstanding diverse Black Sea policies of its NATO strategic ties with NATO, allies without alienating Russia in the Turkey’s policy in the Black Sea region. in the post-Cold War period has largely been shaped by its Evolution of the Turkish- desire to develop a regional cooperation scheme together Russian Modus Vivendi in with the Black Sea countries the Black Sea rather than its Western allies. Despite its longstanding strategic ties with NATO, Turkey’s policy in the A major outcome of the improved Black Sea in the post-Cold War period Turkish-Russian dialogue in the Black 74 Turkey’s Black Sea Predicament: Challenging or Accommodating Russia? Sea has been the establishment of terrorism and other asymmetrical a number of additional multilateral threats in the region, it also contributed cooperation schemes designed to to the deepening of the Turkish- strengthen regional stability and Russian security dialogue in the Black security. Although Turkey supported Sea. the full membership of Bulgaria and Romania in NATO, which eventually Regional initiatives such as Blackseafor took place in 2004, it also launched and Operation Black Sea Harmony some important security initiatives indicate that maintaining special in cooperation with Russia and the relations with Russia without other Black Sea countries. In April alienating its NATO allies was an 2001, for instance, the Black Sea important pillar of Turkey’s Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group policy in the 2000s. This has also been (Blackseafor) was formally established one of the main reasons for Ankara’s with the goal of fostering regional determination to strictly implement cooperation in spheres such as search the clauses of the 1936 Montreux and rescue operations, protection of the Convention, which regulates the transit environment, and mine cleaning. of warships through the Turkish straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles and The idea behind the foundation of such guarantees the freedom of passage of multilateral mechanisms was not only civilian vessels in times of peace and to highlight the importance of Turkey’s war.3 geopolitical role as a major actor in the Black Sea, but also to prevent the region The Montreux convention includes a from turning into a theatre of military number of restrictions on the transit conflict between the West and Russia. of warships from non-Black Sea Ankara’s decision to launch Operation countries, which are not allowed to Black Sea Harmony in March 2004, have more than nine warships in the which was later joined by Russia and Black Sea. These vessels, the maximum other Black Sea states, can be viewed aggregate tonnage of which cannot mainly as a response to NATO’s plans exceed 45,000 tons, are not able to to expand its military influence into the stay in the Black Sea for more than 21 Black Sea through Operation Active days. They must also notify the Turkish Endeavour – launched as a U.S.-led authorities at least 15 days before their initiative in 2001 in the Mediterranean transit through the Turkish Straits. Sea following the September 11 While aircraft carriers are not allowed attacks. Although Operation Black Sea to transit at all, submarines of the Black Harmony similarly aimed at deterring Sea states may cross the Turkish Straits, 75 Mitat Çelikpala & Emre Erşen although they are also subject to very The importance of the Montreux strict conditions and limitations. regime was highlighted by Turkey once again in 2014 during the crisis During the Cold War, the delicate in Ukraine. When Russian officials balance established by the Montreux expressed their concerns about the Convention played a key role in keeping presence of U.S. warships in the Black the Black Sea region away from the Sea, one of which was conducting a joint geopolitical competition between naval exercise with NATO members NATO and the Warsaw Pact.