’s Black Sea Predicament: Challenging or Accommodating ?

Mitat ÇELİKPALA* & Emre ERŞEN**

Abstract This article seeks to explore the development territories, 4) accommodating the diverse of the new security environment in the Black Sea policies of its NATO allies Black Sea and its implications for the without alienating Russia. future of regional dialogue between Turkey and Russia. The radically altered strategic Key Words balance in the Black Sea after the Russian- Georgian war in 2008 and Russia’s Turkey, Russia, Black Sea, , NATO, annexation of in 2014 have Montreux Convention, Jet Crisis. urged Turkish policymakers to revise their traditional policies toward this region. Introduction Yet Ankara currently faces four main Turkey and Russia are the two most challenges in this quest: i) maintaining significant regional actors in the Black the status quo established by the Montreux Sea region. While the former has the Convention, ii) protecting its interests longest shoreline among all the littoral vis-à-vis Russia’s strengthened military states surrounding the Black Sea, the presence in the Black Sea, iii) dealing with latter has geopolitically dominated the significant security implications of the th the region since the 18 century. three Russian anti-access/area denial Before the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (A2/AD) spheres built around Turkish in 1774, the Black Sea was mainly viewed as a “Turkish lake” due to the * Prof., Kadir Has University, Faculty of ’s centuries-long Economics, Administrative and Social regional dominance in the Sciences, Istanbul, E-mail: [email protected] and Crimea. For many years, this ** Assoc. Prof., Marmara University, Department of Political Science and hegemony enabled the Ottomans to International Relations, Istanbul, E-mail: exercise absolute control over access [email protected] to the Black Sea through the Turkish

72 PERCEPTIONS, Summer 2018, Volume XXIII, Number 2, pp. 72-92. Turkey’s Black Sea Predicament: Challenging or Accommodating Russia?

Straits. Yet the Ottoman supremacy of the two opposing blocs after World was challenged by an ever-expanding War II, the geopolitical balance that , which strived to was established in the Black Sea with gain access to the Black Sea’s warm their cooperation managed to survive waters. The Ottoman-Russian wars of the Cold War. the 18th and 19th centuries – including the of 1853-1856 – were the most important signs of the fierce geopolitical rivalry between the Moscow’s economic and Ottoman sultans and the Russian tsars military support for the over the Black Sea. Turkish War of Independence in Anatolia started a brand Following the dissolution of the two new period in Turkish-Russian empires after , their successor states- the newly founded relations. Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Union- succeeded in developing a different relationship with each other. The collapse of the Soviet Union in Moscow’s economic and military 1991 provided fresh opportunities for support for the Turkish War of the establishment of a new environment Independence in Anatolia started a of dialogue and cooperation between brand new period in Turkish-Russian Ankara and Moscow. The two countries relations. Eventually, during the 1920s worked together in order to preserve and 1930s the Black Sea became a their privileged status in the Black region of cooperation between the Sea, and built a number of regional two countries in parallel with their mechanisms to check the expansion improved political and economic of Western military influence in the ties. The Turkish-Soviet dialogue region. Yet the Russian-Georgian war particularly played an important role in the diplomatic process that led to the in 2008 and Russia’s annexation of signing of the Lausanne and Montreux Crimea in 2014 urged Turkish leaders conventions on the regime of the to revise their policies about the Black Turkish Straits. Signed in 1936, the Sea. The Turkish-Russian disagreement latter became the main international over Syria, which triggered a serious document regulating access to the Black crisis between the two countries in late Sea for commercial ships and warships. 2015, also significantly hampered the Even though Turkey and the Soviet regional dialogue between Ankara and Union became adversaries as members Moscow.

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The goal of this article is to discuss has largely been shaped by its desire to and evaluate the development of develop a regional cooperation scheme the new security environment in the together with the Black Sea countries Black Sea, as well as its implications rather than its Western allies. This so- for the future of the Turkish-Russian called “regional ownership” approach regional dialogue. Although the two brought Turkey’s position closer to countries managed to normalize their that of Russia, as it is also in line with relations following the fighter jet crisis Moscow’s efforts to curb the rising of 2015, Ankara still finds it difficult influence of the EU and NATO in 1 to accommodate Moscow’s interests in the region. The Black Sea Economic the region. The rising tensions between Cooperation (BSEC), which was NATO and Russia also weaken established in 1992, in particular Turkey’s efforts to follow a policy of provided a significant platform in balance in the Black Sea. In this regard, which Ankara and Moscow could it can be argued that Turkey currently gradually strengthen their regional faces four key challenges in reshaping dialogue as well as bilateral economic its Black Sea policy: i) maintaining the relations in the field of tourism, energy status quo established by the Montreux and trade. BSEC also helped the two Convention, ii) protecting its interests countries develop new channels for vis-à-vis Russia’s strengthened military regional economic cooperation in presence in the region, iii) dealing with other sectors, including transportation, 2 the security implications of the three agriculture, banking and finance. Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/ AD) spheres built around Turkish territories, iv) accommodating the Despite its longstanding diverse Black Sea policies of its NATO strategic ties with NATO, allies without alienating Russia in the Turkey’s policy in the Black Sea region. in the post-Cold War period has largely been shaped by its Evolution of the Turkish- desire to develop a regional cooperation scheme together Russian Modus Vivendi in with the Black Sea countries the Black Sea rather than its Western allies.

Despite its longstanding strategic ties with NATO, Turkey’s policy in the A major outcome of the improved Black Sea in the post-Cold War period Turkish-Russian dialogue in the Black

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Sea has been the establishment of terrorism and other asymmetrical a number of additional multilateral threats in the region, it also contributed cooperation schemes designed to to the deepening of the Turkish- strengthen regional stability and Russian security dialogue in the Black security. Although Turkey supported Sea. the full membership of Bulgaria and in NATO, which eventually Regional initiatives such as Blackseafor took place in 2004, it also launched and Operation Black Sea Harmony some important security initiatives indicate that maintaining special in cooperation with Russia and the relations with Russia without other Black Sea countries. In April alienating its NATO allies was an 2001, for instance, the Black Sea important pillar of Turkey’s Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group policy in the 2000s. This has also been (Blackseafor) was formally established one of the main reasons for Ankara’s with the goal of fostering regional determination to strictly implement cooperation in spheres such as search the clauses of the 1936 Montreux and rescue operations, protection of the Convention, which regulates the transit environment, and mine cleaning. of warships through the Turkish straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles and The idea behind the foundation of such guarantees the freedom of passage of multilateral mechanisms was not only civilian vessels in times of peace and to highlight the importance of Turkey’s war.3 geopolitical role as a major actor in the Black Sea, but also to prevent the region The Montreux convention includes a from turning into a theatre of military number of restrictions on the transit conflict between the West and Russia. of warships from non-Black Sea Ankara’s decision to launch Operation countries, which are not allowed to Black Sea Harmony in March 2004, have more than nine warships in the which was later joined by Russia and Black Sea. These vessels, the maximum other Black Sea states, can be viewed aggregate tonnage of which cannot mainly as a response to NATO’s plans exceed 45,000 tons, are not able to to expand its military influence into the stay in the Black Sea for more than 21 Black Sea through Operation Active days. They must also notify the Turkish Endeavour – launched as a U.S.-led authorities at least 15 days before their initiative in 2001 in the Mediterranean transit through the Turkish Straits. Sea following the September 11 While aircraft carriers are not allowed attacks. Although Operation Black Sea to transit at all, submarines of the Black Harmony similarly aimed at deterring Sea states may cross the Turkish Straits,

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although they are also subject to very The importance of the Montreux strict conditions and limitations. regime was highlighted by Turkey once again in 2014 during the crisis During the Cold War, the delicate in . When Russian officials balance established by the Montreux expressed their concerns about the Convention played a key role in keeping presence of U.S. warships in the Black the Black Sea region away from the Sea, one of which was conducting a joint geopolitical competition between naval exercise with NATO members NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This is Romania and Bulgaria, Turkey once also why Turkey and Russia refrained again assured Russia that everything from changing this regime in the post- was in line with the clauses of the Cold War period, as it granted them a Montreux Convention.6 In this respect, privileged status in the Black Sea. In Ankara continued to follow a cautious 2008, for instance, Turkey invoked the policy of balance between the West and clauses of the Montreux Convention Russia in the Black Sea. For instance, in response to the U.S. request to send although it supported the territorial its military ships to the Black Sea via integrity of Ukraine and rejected the the Turkish Straits with the purpose of results of the referendum in Crimea, bringing humanitarian aid to which eventually paved the way for the right after the Russian-Georgian war. annexation of the peninsula by Russia, This was an indication of Turkey’s it refrained from using strong language desire to resolve the issues in the Black against Moscow, unlike the other Sea together with the countries of NATO members. More importantly, the region, rather than with external it refused to participate in the Western powers, despite its alliance with the U.S. sanctions against Russia and continued and NATO. It was also the main reason its economic cooperation with Moscow. behind Ankara’s active mediation The announcement of the Turkish between Moscow and Tbilisi during Stream natural gas pipeline project 4 during President Putin’s visit to Turkey and after the Russian-Georgian crisis. in December 2014 in this regard was an However, Turkey’s diplomatic efforts important sign of the special economic could neither prevent Russia from ties between Turkey and Russia. recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, nor facilitate At the same time, however, it should the de-escalation of tensions between be indicated that the crises in Georgia NATO and Russia in the Black Sea in and Ukraine significantly changed the following period.5 the already fragile balance between

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NATO and Russia in the Black Impacts of the Fighter Jet Sea. Russia’s growing tensions with Crisis NATO in the post-2007 period- as indicated by Moscow’s decision to The annexation of Crimea in March suspend its participation in the Treaty 2014 further tilted the strategic balance on Conventional Armed Forces in in the Black Sea in Russia’s favor, as Europe (CFE) and resume long Moscow started to directly control distance reconnaissance flights near the naval base, which was NATO member countries including previously leased from the Ukrainian Turkey’s Black Sea coast- weakened government within the framework the influence of the multilateral of an international agreement. This regional cooperation initiatives that development, however, contradicted 7 were founded in the 1990s and 2000s. Turkey’s efforts to maintain the status Russia’s Black Sea Fleet played an quo in the region. Sustaining the important role in Moscow’s new strategy Turkish-Russian modus vivendi in the against NATO’s rising influence in the Black Sea became even more difficult region. Moscow’s objective, particularly after September 2015, when Russia started direct airstrikes in Syria. after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, was to possess a multi-regional Russia’s decision to militarily naval power in the Black Sea, which intervene in Syria raised significant would also allow it to sustain a much concerns in Turkey.9 President larger force in the Mediterranean Erdoğan even publicly criticized the Sea and the . This goal Russian airstrikes, saying he could was hinted at by then-commander of not understand the rationale of this the , Admiral Vladimir military intervention given that Russia Masorin, who said in a speech at the does not share a border with Syria.10 Yet Russian Black Sea Fleet headquarters Ankara and Moscow failed to resolve in Sevastopol in 2007, “the operational their disagreements and eventually zone of the fleet extends across the in November 2015, Turkish armed Black Sea and the Mediterranean all forces shot down a Russian fighter jet the way to the Atlantic Ocean. It is near the Turkish-Syrian border due at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and to its violation of Turkish airspace. Africa, and here we must re-establish Following the incident, Ankara sought the permanent presence of the Russian the support of its NATO allies, while Navy.”8 Moscow responded by declaring a

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series of economic sanctions against represented not only by the “one nation, Turkey. two states” slogan, but also by their grand energy transportation projects, Following the incident, political, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil economic and cultural relations pipeline which became operational in between Turkey and Russia were 13 2006. The two countries have also almost completely frozen until June been in close cooperation regarding the 2016. During this seven-month construction of the Trans-Anatolian period, Ankara found itself in a very Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which complicated geopolitical situation is viewed by Turkish leaders as a vital which entailed the revision of its project to decrease Turkey’s dependence approach toward the Black Sea. For on Russian natural gas. example, Russia and Armenia signed a security deal for a united regional Despite the strong political and air defense system.11 Armenia already economic links between the two hosted two Russian military bases as countries, it should be noted that well as approximately 5,000 Russian does not have a formal soldiers and is a member of the military alliance with Turkey. Turkish Russia-led Collective Security Treaty military support to Azerbaijan Organization (CSTO). In addition, the has largely taken place within the two governments made an agreement framework of NATO’s Partnership for in February 2016 enabling Russia to Peace (PfP) program. Although the two provide a 10-year state export loan countries signed a strategic partnership of up to US$200 million to Armenia agreement in 2010, which on paper with payment deferral until early allows Turkey to take “all possible 2018.12 Yerevan supported the Russian measures” to help Azerbaijan in case economic sanctions against Turkey the latter is militarily attacked by a following the fighter jet incident. third country, the clause is too vague to indicate a genuine alliance between Strong military assistance from Russia 14 Ankara and Baku. Moreover, Turkey’s is crucial to helping Armenia maintain military assistance to Azerbaijan has so its military advantage over Azerbaijan far been largely restricted to sending in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, even advisors and providing training to though Baku also invested immensely Azerbaijani soldiers. in the modernization of its army in the last decade, mainly with the support Given the fragile geopolitical situation of Turkey. The strategic partnership in the Caucasus and Turkey’s strategic between Turkey and Azerbaijan is ties with Azerbaijan, the sudden

78 Turkey’s Black Sea Predicament: Challenging or Accommodating Russia? escalation of the military conflict Azerbaijan chose to follow a neutral between Yerevan and Baku over policy between Ankara and Moscow Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2017 was after the fighter jet crisis. President quite alarming for Ankara. During the Aliev, for instance, offered mediation four-day violent clashes that killed at to solve the Turkish-Russian spat.18 least 200 people in both sides, President It can be argued that close economic Erdoğan gave a strong message of relations with Russia, and Moscow’s solidarity with Azerbaijan and blamed significant influence on the Nagorno- Armenia for the escalation of tensions Karabakh peace process, prevented in the region.15 It should be noted that Baku from openly siding with Ankara. Ankara’s political support for Baku Yet, Azerbaijan still opened its borders during the crisis was criticized not to Turkish commercial vehicles only by Armenian President Sargsyan, carrying goods to Central Asia after but also by Russian Prime Minister the entrance of these trucks to Russia Medvedev.16 was restricted by Moscow as part of the sanctions against Ankara.19

Apart from the issue of Nagorno- Given the fragile geopolitical Karabakh, Ankara and Moscow have situation in the Caucasus remained at odds with each other and Turkey’s strategic ties regarding other regional conflicts in the with Azerbaijan, the sudden Black Sea as well. For instance, Turkey escalation of the military continued to develop its political and conflict between Yerevan and economic relations with Ukraine and Baku over Nagorno-Karabakh criticized Moscow’s policies regarding the situation of the Tatars in Crimea. in April 2017 was quite During the official visit of Ukrainian alarming for Ankara. President Poroshenko to Turkey in March 2016, the two countries decided to enhance their cooperation in the Although Russia played an important military-technical field.20 At the same diplomatic role in the de-escalation of time, Georgia, which has an uneasy the latest crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, relationship with Russia, emerged as some analysts viewed the incident as a major strategic partner of Turkey in Moscow’s signal to Baku that it should the Caucasus. Ankara supports the be careful about its special relationship development of Tbilisi’s relations with with Ankara.17 It is also important NATO, while the Georgian leaders to emphasize in this regard that actively cooperate with Turkey and

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Azerbaijan in regional energy and anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, transportation projects including the in order to respond to all kinds of air, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the surface and submarine threats. By the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas time its modernization is completed in pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars 2020, the Black Sea Fleet is expected to railway. The foreign ministers and receive 30 new vessels of various sizes presidents of the three countries have and classes, including six Bykov-class been meeting on a regular basis since patrol ships, three additional Admiral 2012, indicating their commitment to Grigorovich-class frigates, and nine a trilateral strategic partnership. Project 21631 small guided missile corvettes.23 Russia’s Strengthened As a result of this ambitious Military Presence in the modernization program, just one year after the annexation of Crimea, the Black Sea Black Sea Fleet had already reached a strategic capacity to serve Russia’s As the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia regional objectives and become a “blue rapprochement continued in the water” force capable of carrying out Caucasus, Russia significantly extensive operations in open waters.24 strengthened its relations not only The ships of the Black Sea Fleet are with Armenia, but also with Georgia’s on permanent combat duty as part of breakaway republics Abkhazia and the Mediterranean squadron which South Ossetia.21 The modernization was re-formed in 2013. According to and expansion of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral Igor Kasatonov, advisor to also became an imperative for Russia, the Russian Chief of the General Staff, especially after the crisis in Ukraine. In developments in Crimea and Syria 2014, Moscow announced its plans to justified the modernization of the spend more than US$ 2 billion dollars Black Sea Fleet: “if strikes are launched by 2020 to bolster the fleet, including on targets in Syria from the Caspian the procurement of more modern Sea, the Black Sea Fleet, if such a task surface ships and submarines outfitted is assigned, can fire at the Gulf area with advanced cruise missiles, as well as and even further. The fleet has good integrated air-defense and amphibious- 22 prospects as long as preference is given landing capacities. It also deployed 25 to its underwater component.” three new advanced surface warships in the Black Sea, heavily equipped It should be noted that the Black with Kalibr cruise missiles and other Sea Fleet makes up only a fraction of

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Russia’s military power in the Black measures against developments that Sea. Moscow’s combined land, sea had turned the Black Sea into a and air forces, as well as its electronic “Russian lake.” In his address to the capabilities, enable it to effectively deny Balkan countries’ chiefs of defense access to the NATO forces seeking to in Ankara, he emphasized the need enter the Black Sea.26 In other words, to transform the Black Sea “into a the main objective of the Russian anti- basin of stability again on the basis of access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” cooperation among riparian countries in the Black Sea is to hinder NATO’s around the Black Sea.” ability to protect its member states A short while ago [NATO Secretary and deliver military assistance to its General Jens] Stoltenberg was in partners in the region. Turkey. During his visit I told him: The annexation of Crimea has been ‘You are not visible in the Black Sea. a crucial turning point in this regard, And your invisibility in the Black as the peninsula has been turned into Sea turns it into a Russian lake, so a base to reinforce the Russian naval to speak.’ As riparian countries we infrastructure in the Black Sea. Moscow should live up to our responsibilities. also significantly strengthened its air As NATO members, we should forces in Crimea and deployed 10 Tu- take all required steps in all spheres, 22M3 Backfire bombers along with including the sea, air and ground. patrol and anti-submarine aircraft. In Otherwise, history shall not forgive addition, the peninsula was equipped us. And we should also deepen our with various missile and coastal defense existing cooperation in accordance systems, such as the S-300PMU with an approach of regional surface-to-air missile system and the inclusiveness.28 K-300P Bastion-P anti-ship missile Although the Warsaw Summit of complex. In August 2016, Russia also July 2016 mainly focused on the deployed the S-400 system in Crimea, enhancement of NATO’s forward which is known to be one of the most presence in Eastern Europe, as indicated advanced anti-aircraft and missile 27 by the alliance’s decision to deploy four defense systems in the world. multinational battalion-size battle The radically altered strategic balance in groups to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania the region was publicly acknowledged and , some key decisions were by President Erdoğan, who demanded also taken about the Black Sea. Most only a few weeks before NATO’s importantly, NATO member states Warsaw Summit to introduce counter- agreed to initiate “tailored measures

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to increase NATO presence in the so far failed to unite their efforts in southeast of the Alliance on land, at sea building joint defenses and developing and in the air with more multinational a common framework for security and land training, combined joint enhanced threat assessment in the Black Sea. training, more maritime activity and Some of the impediments to sub- increased coordination.”29 regional cooperation include budgetary limitations and the three countries’ The decisions taken at Warsaw diverging regional interest perceptions. demonstrated NATO’s intention to move from reassurance to actual Moreover, the degree of their bilateral deterrence or defense measures vis-à- relations with Russia- including their vis Russia, to reinforce the alliance’s dependence on Russian natural gas- eastern flank, which includes the influence Ankara, and Black Sea region. Accordingly, NATO Sofia’s willingness to work with each decided to deploy a multinational other regarding Black Sea security. framework brigade to be based in Romania, for instance, has been much Romania and to further discuss military more eager to see a stronger NATO measures to enhance the alliance’s presence in the region in comparison collective presence in the Black Sea to Bulgaria or Turkey, which both in subsequent ministerial meetings. have very close economic relations Although these measures have yet to be with Moscow. Romania’s Craiova and specified, NATO may decide to launch Mihail Kogalniceanu bases also play air or sea patrol missions or further a very important role as the land and increase the number or scope of its air components of NATO’s tailored joint naval exercises in order to boost forward presence strategy in the 31 the interoperability between the Black Black Sea. Additionally, Romania Sea countries. has hosted the Aegis Ashore ballistic missiles of NATO’s missile defense The success of NATO’s tailored forward system at its Deveselu base since 2016. presence strategy in the Black Sea above all depends on the close cooperation of the three NATO members in the The success of NATO’s tailored region. In other words, “the expansion forward presence strategy in and credibility of any NATO deterrent the Black Sea above all depends largely depends on three littoral NATO on the close cooperation of the states to modernize and reinforce their three NATO members in the maritime capabilities.”30 However, region. Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey have

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Starting a rotational NATO air patrol Turkey’s Reconciliation mission similar to the Baltic air policing mission, creating a regional with Russia maritime task group and establishing a joint fleet with the participation of Relations between Turkey and Russia Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, are started to normalize in the summer some of the ideas on NATO’s agenda of 2016. In Turkey’s case, the fight regarding the Black Sea.32 However, against DAESH and the PKK became it should be noted that none of the the most important factor as their contemplated steps would be enough attacks against Turkish security forces to balance Russia’s power projection and civilians intensified during the capabilities in the region. Indeed, some 2015-2016 period. Reconciliation with analysts believe that the Montreux Moscow, in this sense, became crucial Convention is an impediment to a for Ankara in order to take cross-border robust NATO response against Russia security measures in the north of Syria. in the Black Sea, since a strengthened Russia, on the other hand, required the NATO presence in the region would cooperation of Turkey as an important require frequent exercises by the navies regional actor to secure its long-term of the non-littoral states, including the geopolitical interests in the Middle 33 U.S. East and the Black Sea following its 35 So far NATO has only considered a interventions in Ukraine and Syria. rotational naval deployment in the The normalization process in Turkish- Black Sea that does not compromise Russian relations officially began with the Montreux Convention. Another President Erdoğan’s letter to President proposal, which appears to have some Putin in June 2016.36 The letter was supporters especially in Washington, warmly received by Moscow and the is to reflag the warships of the non- Black Sea NATO member states with two leaders decided to meet in St. either Romanian, Bulgarian or Turkish Petersburg in August. Yet the failed flags to circumvent the limitations of coup attempt that took place in Turkey the Montreux regime.34 Yet, it may not on July 15 suddenly gave new meaning be an easy task to convince Turkish to the Turkish-Russian reconciliation policymakers on this issue considering process. Moscow expressed strong Turkey’s historical experience with the support for the Turkish government, reflagging of two German warships in while the official reactions of Turkey’s 1914, which eventually triggered the NATO allies were unexpectedly Ottoman Empire’s entry into World hesitant and mixed.37 This created War I. disappointment in Ankara about its

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relations with the U.S. and the EU, Turkish-Russian relations also rapidly providing another real impetus for the developed in the military sphere. Turkish-Russian reconciliation. In September 2016, Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Vasilyevich In August 2016, only a few weeks Gerasimov paid a significant visit to after the coup attempt, Erdoğan and Turkey. The most important outcome Putin finally came together for the of this military dialogue was Turkey’s first time since the fighter jet crisis, “Operation Euphrates Shield,” which restoring the Turkish-Russian bilateral was launched in August 2016 not ties. In the following months, the only against the DAESH, but also the two leaders met many more times PKK-affiliated PYD/YPG in northern and spoke frequently on the phone- Syria. More importantly, the foreign particularly regarding the situation in ministers of Turkey, Russia, and Iran Syria. During Putin’s visit to Istanbul came together in December 2016 and in October 2016, they also signed an signed the “Moscow Declaration,” intergovernmental agreement for the which announced a comprehensive construction of the Turkish Stream ceasefire in Syria and launched a new natural gas pipeline which is expected peace process in Astana between the 40 to supply large amounts of Russian Assad regime and opposition groups. natural gas to Turkey by the end of Although cooperation in Syria 2019.38 In addition, Turkey and Russia remained at the heart of the improving confirmed their commitment to finish Turkish-Russian strategic relations, the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear the two countries also declared their power plant. Ankara also expressed its intention to revitalize their dialogue interest in purchasing Russia’s S-400 in the Black Sea. In line with this system in order to develop its own agreement, when the NATO Defense national missile defense, despite the Ministers endorsed an enhanced 39 concerns of the NATO officials. NATO naval presence in the Black Sea, as well as a maritime coordination Although cooperation in Syria function between NATO Standing remained at the heart of the Naval Forces in February 2017, Ankara improving Turkish-Russian made reference to the clauses of the Montreux Convention and asked strategic relations, the two all of the countries to avoid actions countries also declared their that could trigger new tensions with intention to revitalize their Russia.41 In addition, the Turkish navy dialogue in the Black Sea. and the Russian Black Sea fleet held joint exercises in April.42

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Despite these signs of cooperation, it including the Crimean peninsula, should be noted that Turkey chose to Gerasimov said, “Several years ago join the Sea Shield 2017 naval exercise the Russian fleet’s combat capabilities with other NATO countries, even were in stark contrast with that of the though the exercise was criticized Turkish Navy. Some even said Turkey 43 by Russian officials. This can be was in full command of the Black Sea. viewed as a sign of Turkey’s security Now it’s different.”45 concerns regarding the network of A2/AD capabilities built by Russia It can be claimed that Gerasimov’s simultaneously in the Caucasus, Syria statement was rather a response to and Crimea- given that Turkey is NATO’s plans to increase its military located right at the intersection of presence in the Black Sea with the these three A2/AD spheres. Moscow deployment of more vessels and also built a similar A2/AD bubble in strengthening of the fleets of NATO Kaliningrad when it moved its nuclear- members, particularly Bulgaria and capable Iskander-M missiles into the Romania. Yet it also sent a message to enclave in response to the decisions Turkish leaders about the way Moscow taken at NATO’s Warsaw Summit. It perceives its military position vis-à- was also revealed at a military parade vis Ankara in the region. Therefore, it in Yerevan in September 2016 that seems that despite some positive signs Armenia possesses the same Russian and efforts to revitalize their dialogue Iskander-M missiles.44 in the Black Sea in the last couple of years, the region’s two most influential Although the Turkish public remains countries have changed their stance strongly skeptical about relations with about the “regional ownership” NATO in the wake of the July 15 approach. coup attempt, it can be argued that Ankara is very much concerned about the rising Russian military presence Conclusion in the Black Sea. These concerns were aggravated by the statement made In an article they recently penned by General Gerasimov in September together, the Turkish and Serbian 2016 right before his visit to Turkey. foreign ministers warned that the In his assessment of the performance political, economic and security of the Black Sea Fleet in the Kavkaz challenges in the Black Sea region can 2016 military drills, which were held only be effectively addressed through across Russia’s entire southern military increased interaction, enhanced district on the border of Ukraine coordination, constructive dialogue,

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and focused and result-oriented be quite negatively affected in the event cooperation.”46 This statement can also of a sudden Russia-NATO crisis in the be regarded as an acknowledgment Black Sea. of the failure of the extant regional cooperation mechanisms to create effective structures for solving the Yet the radically altered complicated security problems in the strategic balance in the Black 47 Black Sea. As Tanrısever argues, Sea urges Turkey to revise efforts at cooperation between Turkey its approach, even though and Russia “over a number of issues in Turkish-Russian relations have the Black Sea region have been guided significantly improved in the by their general foreign policy priorities rather than their shared approach to the last couple of years. regional issues.”48 The sheer number of unresolved ethnic-separatist conflicts In its effort to keep the Black Sea in the region further complicates a stable maritime domain, Turkey the problem. In 2014, Crimea and has traditionally preferred collective Donbas were added to the long list of security mechanisms involving the frozen conflicts which already included littoral states in the region. Yet the Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno- radically altered strategic balance in Karabakh and Transnistria. the Black Sea urges Turkey to revise Rising tensions between NATO and its approach, even though Turkish- Russia have also weakened efforts to Russian relations have significantly enhance the security and stability of improved in the last couple of years. the Black Sea region. In February 2017, Ankara first of all needs to consider for instance, the U.S. military claimed developing an effective A2/AD concept that multiple Russian warplanes to protect its territories and reinforce “buzzed a U.S. navy destroyer in the the security of its allies in the region. Black Sea in unsafe and unprofessional This was the main rationale behind maneuvers.”49 Both Moscow and Turkey’s endorsement of NATO’s NATO are seeking to strengthen strategic concept in November 2010 their military presence in the region that called for the development of in a way that can potentially disrupt a ballistic missile defense system. maritime trade, including energy Eventually, Ankara agreed to the routes. It is clear that the economies of deployment of an early warning BMD the littoral states as well as the energy radar in the town of Kürecik in Eastern diversification schemes in Europe will Anatolia. Yet Russia countered this

86 Turkey’s Black Sea Predicament: Challenging or Accommodating Russia? move by deploying S-300 and S-400 emphasized that the meeting between systems in its southern military district the foreign ministers of the two as well as in the territories of Armenia, countries at the BSEC Summit in Crimea and Syria – establishing three Sochi in July 2016 was a major step formidable A2/AD spheres that cover in the Turkish-Russian reconciliation a large swath of Turkish territory. process after the fighter jet crisis. BSEC can also act as a platform for providing Second, and more importantly, Turkey new momentum to important has lost its naval superiority in the transnational projects such as the Black Black Sea to Russia since 2014. The Sea ring highway, as well as promoting delicate Montreux balance which the development of Motorways of the Ankara sought to maintain for so many Sea and visa liberalization policies for years has been significantly changed business initiatives.51 by Russia’s accelerated military build- up in the region. Although Ankara and Moscow are currently in a close strategic dialogue with regard to Syria, Although their influence has their differences regarding the conflicts been significantly weakened in the Black Sea such as Nagorno- due to the shifting geopolitical Karabakh and Crimea are far from balances in the Black Sea, being resolved. At the same time, regional cooperation platforms Russia’s developing military relations may still play a key role in with Armenia are a major concern managing the disagreements for Ankara, while Moscow is uneasy between Turkey and Russia. about Turkey’s enhanced strategic ties with the governments of Ukraine and Georgia. The tripartite official meetings which Although their influence has been in the last few years have become significantly weakened due to the increasingly popular among the shifting geopolitical balances in countries of the Black Sea can also the Black Sea, regional cooperation be helpful in handling the regional platforms may still play a key role in disagreements between Turkey and managing the disagreements between Russia. The creation of a regular Turkey and Russia. BSEC, for instance, meeting format between the presidents is still the most comprehensive and of Turkey, Russia and Azerbaijan in institutionalized structure in the August 2016 was quite important region.50 It should be particularly in this regard. As indicated earlier,

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Turkey has held similar summits the regional conflicts of the Black with Azerbaijan and Georgia since Sea. This could provide much needed 2012, while there is also a recently momentum for the eroded “regional started Russia-Azerbaijan-Iran ownership” approach which had been summit mechanism which held its last quite successful in the post-Cold War meeting in November 2017 in Tehran. Such mechanisms can be utilized period in keeping the rising tensions more efficiently in order to achieve between Russia and NATO away from a breakthrough in the resolution of the Black Sea.

88 Turkey’s Black Sea Predicament: Challenging or Accommodating Russia?

Endnotes

1 Regarding the regional ownership concept, see Sergiu Celac, “The Regional Ownership Conundrum: The Case of the Organization of the BSEC”, Ronald D. Asmus (ed.), Next Steps in Forging a Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, (Washington: German Marshall Fund, 2006), pp. 215-226. 2 See for instance Mustafa Aydın, “Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and the Role of Institutions”, Perceptions: Jorunal of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Autumn 2005), pp. 62-66. 3 See the English translation of the full text of the Montreux Convention online, at http:// sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Montreux_ENG.pdf (last visited 10 December 2010). 4 Also see Burcu G. Punsmann, “The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: An Attempt to Foster Regional Accountability”, ICBSS Policy Brief, No. 13, 2009. 5 For Baev and Kirişci, the war in Georgia rendered the BSEC “practically defunct”. See Pavel K. Baev and Kemal Kirişci, “An Ambiguous Partnership: The Serpentine Trajectory of Turkish-Russian Relations in the Era of Erdoğan and Putin”, Brookings Institute Policy Paper, No. 13, 2017, at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/pavel- and-kirisci-turkey-and-russia.pdf (last visited 1 Decemer 2017). 6 Serkan Demirtaş, “Turkey under NATO and Russia Pressure over Black Sea”, Hürriyet Daily News, 5 April 2014. 7 Serhat Güvenç and Sıtkı Egeli, “Changing Naval Balances in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for Turkey,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol.15, No.1 (2016), pp. 102-103. 8 Robert Coalson, “News Analysis: Russian Build-up Focuses Concerns around the Black Sea”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, at https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-black-sea- military-buildup-turkey/27569877.html (last visited 1 December 2017). 9 The Turkish Defense Minister, for instance, claimed that 88 percent of the total Russian air operations in Syria were directed against the opposition groups. See “Rusya 7 Bin 200 Hava Saldırısı Düzenledi”, Yeni Şafak, 16 February 2016. 10 “Rusya Suriye’yle Niye Bu Kadar İlgileniyor”, Hürriyet, 2 October 2015. 11 “Why Did Russia, Armenia Create Joint Defense System in Caucasus?”, Sputnik News, at from https://sputniknews.com/military/201512231032214928-russia-armenia- defense-system-turkey (last visited 8 December 2017). 12 “Russia Grants $200 Million Loan to Armenia for Purchasing Weapons”, Russia Beyond, at https://www.rbth.com/defence/2016/02/19/russia-grants-200-million-loan- to-armenia-for-purchasing-weapons_569219 (last visited 4 December 2017).

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13 Also see Murad Ismayilov and Norman A. Graham (eds.), Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations: One Nation – Two States?, New York, Routledge, 2016. 14 The full text of the agreement is available online, at http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/ eskiler/2011/05/20110528M1-30-1.pdf (last visited 3 December 2017). 15 “Erdoğan: Karabakh will be returned to Azerbaijan One Day”, Daily Sabah, 4 April 2016. 16 See the full text of Medvedev’s interview with the Rossiya TV Channel, at http:// government.ru/en/news/22541 (last visited 10 December 2017). 17 See Can Kasapoğlu, “Is Armenia the Next Turkish-Russian Flashpoint?” The Washington Institute, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/is-armenia-the- next-turkish-russian-flashpoint (last visited 10 December 2017). 18 Durna Safarova, “Azerbaijan: Can Baku Broker Peace between Turkey and Russia?”, Eurasianet.org, at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77386 (last visited 3 December 2017). 19 “Türk TIR’larına Alternatif Güzergah”, Hürriyet, 2 December 2, 2015. 20 See http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-ta-turechchina-pogliblyuvatimut- strategichne-partne-36833 (last visited 22 December 2017). 21 Also see Thomas Ambrosio and William A. Lange, “The Architecture of Annexation? Russia’s Bilateral Agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 44, No. 5 (2016), pp. 673-693. 22 See Janus Bugajski and Peter B. Doran, Black Sea Rising: Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Europe, Washington, Warsaw, Center for European Policy Analysis, February 2016, p. 12, at http://cepa.org/files/?id_plik=2096 (last visited 4 December 2017). 23 Natalia Konarzewska, “A New Balance of Power in the Black Sea?”, The Central Asia- Caucasus Analyst, at https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/ item/13393-a-new-balance-of-power-in-the-black-sea?.htm (last visited 2 December 2017). 24 See Coalson, “News Analysis”. 25 “Russian Black Sea Fleet Marks 233rd Anniversary”, TASS, at http://tass.com/ defense/875406 (last visited 4 December 2017). 26 Bugajski and Doran, Black Sea Rising, p. 12. 27 Konarzewska, “A New Balance of Power”. 28 See https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43924/suriyede-tum-kirmizi-cizgilerin- asilmasina-ragmen-bir-adim-atilmadi.html (last visited 4 December 2017).

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29 See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en (last visited 4 December 2017). 30 Janus Bugajski and Peter Doran, Black Sea Defended: NATO Responses to Russia’s Black Sea Offensive, Washington, Warsaw, Center for European Policy Analysis, July 2016, p. 4, at https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2684https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2684 (last visited 12 December 2017). 31 Boris Toucas, “NATO and Russia in the Black Sea: A New Confrontation?”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, at from https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-and- russia-black-sea-new-confrontation (last visited 3 December 2017). 32 Bugajski and Doran, Black Sea Defended, pp. 4-5. 33 John C.K. Daly, “Hot Issue: After Crimea: The Future of the Black Sea Fleet”, The Jamestown Foundation, at from https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-after-crimea- the-future-of-the-black-sea-fleet (last visited 1 December 2017). 34 Ariel Cohen, “NATO Should Stand up Black Sea Command before It’s Too Late”, Atlantic Council, at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-should- stand-up-black-sea-command-before-it-s-too-late (last visited 4 December 2017). 35 Emre Erşen, “Evaluating the Fighter Jet Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2017), pp. 94-95. 36 See http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52282 (last visited 10 December 2017). 37 Also see Dimitar Bechev, “What’s Behind the Turkey-Russia Reset?”, Aljazeera, at http:// www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/08/turkey-russia-reset-160808103350290. html (last visited 6 December 2017). 38 Also see Mikhail Krutikhin, “‘Turetskiy Potok:’ Tsena Uporstva”, [Turkish Stream: Price of Perseverance,] Inosmi.ru, at http://inosmi.ru/economic/20161016/238027885.html (last visited 4 December 2017). 39 Ali Ünal, “Turkey’s Interest in Russian Missile System May Spark New Tension with NATO”, Daily Sabah, 16 August 2016. 40 For the full text of the document, see Sputnik Turkey, at https://tr.sputniknews.com/ ortadogu/201612211026428478-rusya-turkiye-iran-suriye-ortak-bildiri (last visited 10 December 2017). 41 “NATO’dan Rusya’yı Kızdıracak Kritik Karadeniz Kararı”, Habertürk, 18 February 2017; Mustafa Aydın, “Power Struggle in the Black Sea”, Hürriyet Daily News, 30 March 2017. 42 “Russian, Turkish Navies Hold Joint Drills in Black Sea”, Sputnik News, at https:// sputniknews.com/military/201704051052314680-russia-turkey-fleet-drills (last visited 1 December 2017).

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43 “Russia Monitoring NATO Exercise in Black Sea”, Anadolu Agency, at http://aa.com.tr/ en/todays-headlines/russia-monitoring-nato-exercise-in-black-sea/739436 (last visited 10 December 2017). 44 Eduard Abrahamyan, “Armenia’s New Ballistic Missiles Will Shake up the Neighborhood”, The National Interest, 12 October 2016. 45 “General Staff: Russia-Turkey Balance of Force in Black Sea Has Changed over Years”, TASS, at http://tass.com/defense/899730 (last visited 3 December 2017). 46 Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Ivica Dacic, “BSEC: A Useful Instrument in Promoting Culture of Cooperation and Synergy among its Member States”, Daily Sabah, 12 January 2017. 47 Mitat Çelikpala, “Escalating Rivalries and Diverging Interests: Prospects for Stability and Security in the Black Sea Region”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2010), p. 290. 48 Oktay F. Tanrısever, “Turkey and Russia in the Black Sea Region: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict”, EDAM Black Sea Discussion Paper Series, 2012, p. 22, at http://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/bsdp3.pdf (last visited 4 December 2017). 49 “U.S. Says Russian Military Jets Buzzed U.S. Ship in Black Sea,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, at https://www.rferl.org/a/us-says-russian-military-jets-buzzed-us- destroyer-uss-porter-black-sea-russia-denies/28310377.html (last visited 11 December 2017). 50 Mustafa Aydın, “Turkish Policy towards the Wider Black Sea and the EU Connection”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2014), pp. 383-397. 51 Özgür Özdamar, “What Should Turkey Do to Stabilize the Black Sea Region?”, in Anahit Shirinyan and Louisa Slavkova (eds.), Unrewarding Crossroads? The Black Sea Region amidst the European Union and Russia, (Sofia Platform, June 2015), pp. 187.

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