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THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION of THOMAS KUHN and THEIR RELEVANCES for HUMANIZATION of ISLAMIC LAW By: Muhamad Ali Mustofa Kamal Lect

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THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION of THOMAS KUHN and THEIR RELEVANCES for HUMANIZATION of ISLAMIC LAW By: Muhamad Ali Mustofa Kamal Lect THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION OF THOMAS KUHN AND THEIR RELEVANCES FOR HUMANIZATION OF ISLAMIC LAW By: Muhamad Ali Mustofa Kamal Lecturer in Major of Qur’anic Studies Faculty of Syari’ah and Law in University of Qur’anic Science (UNSIQ) Email: [email protected] Abstract This paper tries to explore the views of Thomas Kuhn that science is moving through the stages that will culminate in normal conditions and then "rot" because it has been replaced by science or new paradigm. So next. The new paradigm threatens the old paradigm that had previously become the new paradigm. With this thinking concept, Thomas Kuhn is not just a major contribution in the history and philosophy of science, but more than that, he has initiated the theories that have broad implications in the social sciences, arts, politics, education and even religious sciences , provide an important contribution in order to project humanization Islamic sciences. in showing Islamic humanist deconstruction re the primary sources of Islam, namely the Qur'an and Tafseer already should keep abreast of the needs of Muslim humanist paradigm so that the functional interpretation theories and theories of literacy is very possible to grow, to challenge the needs of the times. Keyword: Paradigm, Humanization, Interpretation. A. Introduction are created by a man who was born in Still fresh in our minds that there Cincinnati, Ohaio. He is Thomas Kuhn. is shifting Paradigms in the discourse He studied Physics at Harvard University of logic and metaphysics. Logical in 1922, then continued his studies in thinking has evolved from Aristotle's graduate school, and decided to move formal logic, mathematical logic, into the field of the history of science. Descartes, Kant's transcendental logic, "Structure of Scientific symbolic logic to Pierce. In metaphysics Revolutions", a lot of changing people's eruptions also occur the ideas of being perceptions of what is called science. If qua being (rationalism), being perceived some people say that the movement is as a being (empiricism), being nothing linear science-accumulative, it is not the and Becoming (phenomenology), being case in vision Kuhn. According to Kuhn, and time (existentialism), to being as science is moving through the stages that process (pragmatism) (AC Ewing, 2003: will culminate in normal conditions and 11-14; and Noeng Muhadjir, 1998). then "rot" because it has been replaced by The emergence of a book "Structure science or a new paradigm. Similarly of Scientific Revolutions" in 1962, which further. Paradigm a new threat to the old Vol. II No. 02, November 2016 paradigm that had previously become the starting point and the main spectacles new paradigm (John Cottingham, 1996: highlighting the fundamental issues in 349-350). epistemology that is still an enigma. The The paradigm of positivistic clarity and intelligence of his mind, he epistemology has been entrenched for asserts that science is basically over and decades in the history of the development paradigm characterized by the revolution of knowledge (epistemology), until after that followed. about two or three decades emerging new This thinking concept, Thomas Kuhn developments in the philosophy of is not just a major contribution in the science as an effort to break-up the old history and philosophy of science, but theories. Break-up of knowledge the more than that, he has initiated the positivistic philosophy of science was theories that have broad implications in pioneered by figures such as Thomas the social sciences, arts, politics, Kuhn, Toulmin Stepehen and Imre education and even religious sciences etc. Lakatos (Zubaedi et.al, 2007: 198). The Therefore, discussion of this paper, I characteristics that distinguish this new will focus on the scientific revolution that model of the philosophy of science with has made Thomas Kuhn and relevance for the previous models is that there is great humanization of Islamic religious attention to the history of science and the sciences. role of science in an effort to get as well as constructing forms of science and B. Discussion scientific events that actually happened. 1. Biography of Thomas Kuhn The history of science is basically a Thomas Kuhn was born in discipline relative still new. Its Cincinnati, Ohio to Samuel L. Kuhn, an development at the beginning of the field industrial engineer, and Minette Stroock is handled and developed by experts from Kuhn. He holds a BS in the field of other disciplines, such as physics, wich in physics from Harvard University in 1943, recent decades the field of the history of and the MS and Ph.D. degree in physics science has been handled by people who in 1946 and 1949, respectively. As he are particularly concerned in this field. states in the first few pages of the preface (Verhak and Imam R. Haryono, 1989: of the second edition of The Structure of 163). Thomas Kuhn himself with his Scientific Revolutions, three years of physics background trying to give total academic freedom as a Junior discourses on the history of science as the Fellow at Harvard was crucial in allowing 214 The Scientific Revolution Vol. II No. 02, November 2016 him to switch from physics to history (and a. Science History Of Urgency. philosophy) of science. He then taught In the introduction I mentioned courses in history of science at Harvard above that the figure of Thomas Kuhn from 1948 to 1956 at the university was initially as a physicist in the presidents suggestion James Conant. development steeped in the history of Upon leaving Harvard, Kuhn taught at the science and philosophy of science. University of California, Berkeley, both Because so enthusiastically to the in the department of history and awareness of the importance of the philosophy department, named Professor history of science, he even claimed that of History of Science in 1961. At philosophy of science should be studied Berkeley, he wrote and published (in to a new history of science. 1962) of the best known and most In the 1950's, when Kuhn began the influential: The Structure of Scientific study of history of science, history of Revolutions (Alexander Burung, 2004). science is still young academic In 1964, he joined Princeton University discipline. Nonetheless, it became clear as Professor M. Taylor Pyne History of that scientific change is not always Philosophy and Science. directly as a standard, the traditional He joined the Massachusetts Institute view would have it. Kuhn is the first and of Technology (MIT) as S. Laurance most important writer to articulate an Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy In alternative developed value in the 1979, staying there until 1991. Kuhn philosophy of science. Kuhn fully aware interviewed and taped Danish physicist of the importance of innovation to his Niels Bohr Bohr days before death. philosophy, and work is called 'history Records containing the last words of for philosophical purposes' (Thomas Niels Bohr caught on tape. In 1994, Kuhn Kuhn, 1970: 276). was diagnosed with cancer of the Thomas Kuhn's notion is both a bronchial tubes, where he died in 1996. response to the approach of Popper's Thomas Kuhn has been married twice, philosophy of science. According to first to Kathryn Muhs (with whom he has Kuhn, poppers distort reality by first three children) and then to Jehane Barton outlining the empirical sciences with the (Jehane R. Kuhn). hypothesis that followed the attempts of falsification. But Popper instead put the 2. Framework of Thomas Kuhn's epistemology. history of science as an example to The Scientific Revolution 215 Vol. II No. 02, November 2016 justify his theory (Verhak and Imam Explanation this phase is generally R.Haryono, 1989: 165). characterized by some theories those This is in sharp contrast with the do not fit and are not exhaustive. mindset of Thomas Kuhn who prefers Finally, one of these theories are the history of science as the starting "winning". point for any inquiry. Thus the 2) The second phase, Normal Science. philosophy of science is expected to be A scientist who works in this phase getting closer to the reality of science has overriding theory (set theory) and scientific activity of real. The which Kuhn called a paradigm. In urgency of history of science proves normal science, the scientist's job is theories or systems, can deliver progress complicated, expand, and further of scientific revolutions. According to justify paradigm. Eventually, Thomas Kuhn that scientific advances however, problems arise, and the that are revolutionary in the first place, theory is modified in an ad hoc not forward cumulatively. manner to accommodate experimental evidence that might b. Paradigm and Normal Science seem to contradict the original Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922-1996) theory. Finally, the current once wrote extensively about the history explanation of the theory fails to of science and developed several explain some phenomenon or group important ideas in the philosophy of thereof, and someone suggested science. He is most famous for his book replacement or redefinition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions theory. in which he expressed the idea that 3) The third stage, a paradigm shift, science does not "evolve gradually ushered in a new period of towards the truth", but instead undergo revolutionary science. Kuhn believes periodic revolution, which he called a that all scientific fields through this paradigm shift. Kuhn's analysis of the paradigm shift numerous times, as history of science to show him that the new theories replace old ones. practice of science comes take into three For instance the phenomenon of a phases, namely: shift in paradigm is about suggestion 1) The first stage, pre-scientific, which Copernicus that the earth revolved experienced only once where there is around the sun, not the suggestion of no consensus on any theory. Ptolemy that the sun (and the other 216 The Scientific Revolution Vol.
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