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Character Requirements Penal Clearance Certificates

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Character Requirements Penal Clearance Certificates Character Requirements Penal Clearance Certificates Everyone who wishes to enter Australia is required to be of Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Zambia, good character. In order for the Australian Government to Zimbabwe. determine whether you are of good character, you may be asked to provide a police certificate. Unless otherwise SOUTH AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN advised by the Department of Immigration and Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Citizenship (the department), police certificates are not Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Cayman required for persons under the age of 16 years. Islands, Chile (Republic of), Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, This form explains how to obtain a police certificate. Please French Guyana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, check the list of countries and areas below. If you have Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mayotte, lived in any one of them for a total of one year or more in Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, the last 10 years, you must get a police certificate from the Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St Kitts & Nevis, St authorities in that country. Lucia, St Vincent & The Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Turks & Caicos, Uruguay, Venezuela, Virgin Police certificates are often only available to current Islands (British). residents or to citizens. Where these restrictions apply, it will be indicated under the relevant country. For some EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA countries, different procedures are shown for residents and Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, non-residents. Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus (Republic of), Cyprus (Turkish occupied areas), Note: The term ‘residents’ under each country listing refers Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, to applicants who are currently residing in that particular Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, country. The term DIAC refers to the Department of Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Immigration and Citizenship. Form 80 is ‘Personal Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Particulars for Character Assessment’ and is available from Republic of), Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro the department or the website: www.immi.gov.au (Republic of), Netherlands (The), Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia Details shown are subject to change without notice by the (Republic of), Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, authorities of the relevant country, and the Australian Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United government can take no responsibility for their accuracy. States of America, Vatican City. All details concerning you that are provided to the Australian government by a foreign government or law CENTRAL ASIA enforcement authority will be treated as confidential. For Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and further details, see information form 993i, Safeguarding Kazakhstan. your personal information. This form is available on the department’s website www.immi.gov.au/allforms/ ASIA/PACIFIC Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, COUNTRIES WHERE POLICE CERTIFICATES MUST BE Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, China (People’s Republic of, OBTAINED BY VISA APPLICANTS The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macau), East Timor, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, India, Indonesia, AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST Japan, Kiribati, Korea (Republic of), Laos, Malaysia, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Maldives, Marshall Islands (Republic of), Micronesia Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, (Federated States of), Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Caledonia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Israel, Ivory Philippines, Samoa (US), Samoa (Western), Singapore, Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Wallis & Futuna. Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Reunion, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, If a country is not listed, please contact the South Africa, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, nearest departmental office for further information purchased from Algeria. AFGHANISTAN To The Ministry of Justice,Citizenship Authority, Relevant document El Ebyar, Algeria, requesting the police clearance. ‘Certificate’ Provide ID, Birth certificate and 30 Dinar stamp. Apply Residents should apply with the Interior Ministry, Government of Afghanistan and then ANDORRA the certificate has to be attested to by the Relevant document Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Penal Certificate’ (Certificado Penales) Apply Non-residents to their nearest Afghan Apply in person or by mail to consulate/embassy. The applicant may be Tribunal de Corts asked to complete a few prescribed forms and Avenue Tarragona 62 Edefici Les Columnes pay the processing fee. Andorre La Vieille Fee payable. Principaute D’Andorre. Form apply in writing enclosing a letter of Provide copy of identity card, passport or residence introduction from the department. card. Fee payable 6.01 Euros (cash). ALBANIA Website www.justicia.ad Relevant document Processing time penal certificates are issued the ‘Certificate of the Judicial status’ (Vertetim i Gjendjes same day the application is received. This refers to Gjyqesore) name checks only. Residents and non-residents Note An authorisation may be given in writing to a Apply Judicial Status Office third party. Rr. Abdi Toptani, prane Torre Drini, Tirana, Albania). ANGOLA Provide application with a copy of an ID document Relevant document (birth certificate, family certificate or ID card) ‘Criminal Record’ At local post office in Albania in person or Apply Residents in person. through any relative or friend. At Department of Justice. Fee payable 420 Lek. Phone 244 22233 8375 Form available at any post office. The completed Provide I.D. Book. form must be signed by the applicant. Fee payable. ALGERIA ANGUILLA Resident and Non-resident citizens Apply Residents in person Relevant document At Police Headquarters ‘Judicial Certificate’ (Certificat du Casier Judiciaire) The Valley, Anguilla Apply Court, Ministry of Justice or the Tel: 264 497 2333. Tribunal Office Department in the place of Provide full name and alias(es), date of birth, residence in Algeria. place(s) of residence(s), purpose of the Algerian non-residents request and passport details. It is recommended the applicant sends authorisation Fee payable. or a Power of Attorney to a relative in Algeria to Apply Non-residents by mail obtain the certificate on their behalf. If this is possible To The Commissioner of Police apply through the Algerian embassy in their country PO Box 60 of residence. Parliamentary Drive Non Algerian non-residents – the applicant’s The Valley, Anguilla. embassy should communicate with the Algerian Providefull name and alias(es), date of birth, place(s) embassy in their country of residence, requesting of residence(s) in Anguilla, purpose of the the penal certificate. Alternatively the applicant request, a full set of fingerprints taken by a could send a letter including a 30 Dinar stamp recognised police authority, passport details and a stamped self-addressed envelope (if the applicant wishes the police clearance to be ARMENIA mailed). Relevant document Fee payable. ‘Police certificates’ (certificate of existence/absence of Note Certificates may need to be released directly criminal record). to the Australian office or post. Apply Residents in person to Consular Non-residents The applicant must have resided in Administration of Ministry for Foreign Affairs Anguilla for at least six months to be able to obtain a At Government House police certificate. 2 Republic Square Yerevan 375010 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA Phone (3741) 523531. Fax 151042 Apply Residents and Non-residents Non-residents through relatives in Armenia At Criminal Records Office or to nearest Armenian Embassy or Police Headquarters Consulate in India, Syria or Beirut. American Road Provide passport (copy not acceptable) St Johns, Antigua. Fee payable. Phone 268 462 0125 (local calls) Form on application. 268 462 2095 (overseas calls) Residents AUSTRALIA Provide Valid passport. Relevant document Non-residents ‘National Police Check’ Provide a copy of birth certificate, a list of places and Applicants who are required to provide an Australian dates of residence in Antigua and Barbuda, two penal clearance certificate must complete the passport-type photos, and a full set of fingerprints National Police Check Application Form which is taken by a recognised police authority. available from the Australian Federal Police website. Fee payable. http://www.afp.gov.au/~/media/afp/pdf/n/national- NOTE: Certificates may need to be released directly police-check-application-form.ashx to the Australian office or post. Apply by mail to AFP Criminal Records ARGENTINA At Locked Bag 8550 Relevant document CANBERRA CITY ACT 2601 ‘Certificado de Antecedentes Penales’ Fee For details of the charges payable, see above Apply Residents in person to the Registro Nacional website de Reincidencia Tucuman 1353, Capital Federal – Note Code 33 must be used when completing this Buenos Aires or Registro Provincial de las Personas. form. Fingerprints are not required. Website www.dnrec.jus.gov.ar
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