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Entanglement Virtualization After the First Quantum Key Teleportation Mario Mastriani

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Entanglement Virtualization After the First Quantum Key Teleportation Mario Mastriani Entanglement virtualization after the first quantum key teleportation Mario Mastriani To cite this version: Mario Mastriani. Entanglement virtualization after the first quantum key teleportation. 2019. hal- 02083356v3 HAL Id: hal-02083356 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02083356v3 Preprint submitted on 18 Aug 2019 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Entanglement virtualization after the first quantum key teleportation Mario Mastriani ORCID Id: 0000-0002-5627-3935 Abstract— In this draft, we present a new technique of quantum key distribution, where the first time the initial key is teleported, and after that, the entanglement is held in a fictitious way. In the transmitter, the new key is built with the previous key and the plaintext and with the new key and the plaintext we obtain the ciphertext. On the receiver side, with the previous key and the ciphertext we obtain the new key and with it and the ciphertext we obtain the plaintext. In other words, it is as if we emulate successive teleportations of the new keys that do not exist. Keywords—Quantum Entanglement; Quantum Key Distribution; Quantum Teleportation. 1 Introduction In the literature, there is a great amount of papers about Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); those which do not use quantum entanglement [1-10] and others which use it [11-18]. In our humble opinion, they all make an excessive exposure of the keys by using a pair of channels (classic and quantum) complementary to the channel that transports the ciphertext. See Fig.1. The idea behind this paper is the presentation of an enhanced QKD technique that minimizes such exposure. Fig. 1 Typical QKD architecture. 2 Enhanced QKD 2.1 How does it work? 1. An interlaced pair of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type is generated 2. Both EPRs are distributed between Alice and Bob 3. Teleportation [19-21] of the initial key is done k0 4. From Alice’s side and thanks the Boolean functions FA and GA we obtain the first ciphertext PT1 ,k 1 FA PT 1 ,k 0 and CT1 ,k 1 GA PT 1 ,k 1 (1) where PT is the plaintext and CT the ciphertext. In a generic way, PTi ,k i F A PT i ,k i1 and CTi ,k i G A PT i ,k i (2) 1 5. From Bob’s side and thanks to a couple of complementary Boolean functions FB and GB, we obtain the first plaintext, CT1 ,k 1 FB CT 1 ,k 0 and PT1 ,k 1 GB CT 1 ,k 1 (3) In a generic way, CTi ,k i F B CT i ,k i1 and PTi ,k i G B CT i ,k i (4) Fig. 2 Enhanced QKD. 6. The PTi can be portions of a message in frames, in such a way that the key changes with each frame, consequently, this automatic change of key could be given several times during the transmission of the same message. 2.2 Advantage 1. No human has ever knowledge of any key, not even their own and yet the keys change with each plot or portion of them. 2. There is never migration or distribution of any key by any channel, with the exception of initial teleportation. 3. As each message usually occupies several frames, with each frame the keys change. It can also be configured so that the process is applied several times during a frame. This causes that any hacker does not have the necessary latency to break a message, in fact, even a single frame. He cannot even perform an expert off-line intervention (batch or quasi-batch). 4. The corresponding functions can act from the messages themselves or according to a certain characteristic of them. 5. Since the functions used are Boolean, then: - there are no coding and decoding delays, - it is actually the encryption algorithm that is parameterized with the keys and therefore said algorithm changes with each frame or portion of the frame, - It is very easy to program, implement and maintain, and - It does not require additional occupation of the network service, i.e., accessory to the encrypted message itself. 2 6. nobody should remember a single key, or think about future keys, 7. It is ideal to be applied in: - blockchain - home banking - interbanking - government - defense - among others In fact, even a purely classical version can be applied to: - mobile phone communications. 3 Conclusions and Future Works The current quantum communications systems distribute public keys using a pair of additional channels (classical and quantum) to the channel used by the ciphertext, and they do this as a standard procedure. This causes the exposure of these keys to an apocryphal presence, as well as implies a culture of remembering keys and renewing them periodically. In this work, we have presented a new QKD protocol which minimizes said exposure. Competing Interests The author declares that there are no competing interests. Funding Statement The author acknowledges funding by LosWW under contract NMQCLC-06#5/1/2015. Acknowledgments M. Mastriani thanks boarding of LosWW for his tremendous help and support. References 1. Brassard, G., Salvail, L., Secret key reconciliation by Public discussion. Advances in Cryptology: Euro crypt 93 Proc. 410-23 (1993) 2. Gobby, C., Yuan, Z.L., Shields, A.J., Quantum key distribution over 122 km telecom fiber. Appl. Phys. Lett. 84, 3762–3764 (2002) 3. Gottesman, D., et al, Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices. Quantum Information Computation. 4, 325–360 (2004) 4. Gordon, K.J., et al, Quantum key distribution system clocked at 2 GHz, Optics Express 13, 3015– 3020 (2005) 5. Henle, F., BB84 online demo <http://monet.mercersburg.edu/henle/bb84/>. An online demonstration of the original BB84 algorithm from, Bennett et al. (1991) 6. Bennett, C.H., Quantum cryptography using any two no orthogonal states, Phys. Rev. Letter, 68:21, 3121-3124 (1992) 7. Haitjema, M., A Survey of the Prominent Quantum Key Distribution Protocols http://www.cs.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-07/ftp/quantum/index.html#b92 8. Scarani, A., et al., Quantum Cryptography protocols robust against Photon number Splitting attack. PRL, 92 (2004) http://www.qci.jst.go.jp/eqsi03/program/papers/O26-Scarani.pdf 9. Gisin, N., talk presented at the workshop on Quantum Computation, Torino. July 1997; D. bruss. Physical review letter. 81:3018 (1998) 10. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, H., Gisin. N., Incoherent and coherent eavesdropping in the six-state protocol of quantum cryptography. Phys. Rev. Letter, A59, 4238-4248 (1999) 11. Gisin, N., et al, Quantum Cryptography, Review of Modern Physics, 74:1, 145-194 (2002) 12. Stucki, D., et al., Appl. Phys. Lett., 87, 194108 (2005) 13. Gisin, N., et al, Towards practical and fast quantum cryptography, arXiv:quant-ph/0411022 (2004) 3 14. Inoue, K., Waks, E., Yamanoto, Y., Differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution using coherent light. Phys. Rev. A 68.022317 (2003) 15. Waks, E., Takesue, H. Yamamoto, Y., Security of differential-Phase-Shift quantum key distribution against individual attacks. PRA, 73:012344 (2006) 16. Khan, M.M., et al. “High error-rate quantum key distribution for long distance communication” New J. Phys. 11 063043 http://iopscience.iop.org/1367-2630/11/6/063043/ 17. Hernandez Serna, E.E. Quantum Key Distribution protocol with private- public key arXiv: 0908.2146v4 quant-ph (2012) 18. Hernandez Serna, E.E. Quantum Key Distribution from a random seed. arXiv:1311.1582v2 quant-ph (2013) 19. Mastriani, M.: Teleporting Digital Images. <hal-02064813v1> (2019) 20. Mastriani, M.: Every entangled stuff has its own avatar. <hal-01655231v8> (2019) 21. Mastriani, M.: Simplified protocol of quantum teleportation. <hal-01833706v8> (2019) 4 .
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