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Revisiting Al-Qa`Ida's Anthrax Program

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Revisiting Al-Qa`Ida's Anthrax Program MAY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 5 Revisiting Al-Qa`ida’s This article outlines al-Qa`ida’s known as “al-Zabadi” (“Yogurt”), with justifications for using weapons of a budget of only $2,000 to $4,000. Anthrax Program mass destruction (WMD), provides `Atif and Ayman al-Zawahiri started background information on the first and the program in May 1999 after studying By René Pita and Rohan Gunaratna second phases of al-Qa`ida’s anthrax- different Western biomedical books based BW program, and then assesses and publications on the weapons.8 An since november 2008, a number whether it could begin a third phase. electronic message sent by al-Zawahiri of developments have occurred to `Atif dated April 15, 1999 stated: concerning al-Qa`ida’s biological WMD Justifications weapons (BW) program. On November Since Usama bin Ladin declared in I have read the majority of the 24, the Malaysian government released 1998 that the acquisition of WMD was book…[It] is undoubtedly useful. It from jail Yazid Sufaat, previously a “religious duty,” there have been emphasizes a number of important responsible for al-Qa`ida’s anthrax numerous statements indicating that facts, such as: program in Afghanistan. On February 2, jihadists are not restricted from using 2009, Abdallah al-Nafisi, identified as these weapons.5 In fact, they have a) The enemy started thinking a Kuwaiti “professor,” appeared on al- argued that it is justified as retaliation about these weapons before Jazira television promoting an anthrax for what they consider use of WMD WWI. Despite their extreme attack against the United States. “There by the United States and its allies danger, we only became aware of is no need for airplanes, conspiracies, in Afghanistan.6 Moreover, the al- them when the enemy drew our timings, and so on,” al-Nafisi reportedly Qa`ida structure that was formalized attention to them by repeatedly said. “One person, with the courage to in the early 1990s included a WMD expressing concerns that they can carry four pounds of anthrax, will go to Committee, a subcommittee under its be produced simply with easily the White House lawn, and will spread Military Committee, led by Ali Sayyid available materials… this ‘confetti’ all over them, and then Muhammad Mustafa al-Bakri (also will do these cries of joy. It will turn known as Abdul Aziz al-Masri). b) The destructive power of these 1 into a real ‘celebration.’” Compounding weapons is no less than that of matters, the police chief of Pakistan’s First Phase nuclear weapons. North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) After the beginning of U.S.-led military stated that some al-Qa`ida and Taliban operations in Afghanistan, one of c) A germ attack is often detected militants had “expertise in making the main discoveries that provided days after it occurs, which raises 2 biochemical weapons,” and in April information on al-Qa`ida’s BW program the number of victims. 2009 the Islamic State of Iraq said that was made by journalist Alan Cullison the mujahidin are “in great need” of of the Wall Street Journal.7 He purchased d) Defense against such weapons 3 chemical and biological warfare agents. two computers in Kabul that the seller is very difficult, particularly if These developments have raised claimed had been stolen from the office large quantities are used… concern about a possible reactivation of Muhammad `Atif (also known as Abu of al-Qa`ida’s anthrax program Hafs al-Masri), the head of al-Qa`ida’s I would like to emphasize what and demonstrate the importance of Military Committee. `Atif was killed by we previously discussed—that understanding the terrorist group’s prior a U.S. Predator airstrike in November looking for a specialist is the 4 attempts to obtain a BW capability. 2001 in Afghanistan. The computer fastest, safest, and cheapest contained documents that described al- way. Simultaneously, we should 1 Al-Nafisi said that “four pounds of anthrax—in a suit- Qa`ida’s attempts at starting a chemical conduct a search on our own… case this big—carried by a fighter through tunnels from and biological weapons program, Along these lines, the book guided Mexico into the U.S., are guaranteed to kill 330,000 me to a number of references that Americans within a single hour, if it is properly spread in 5 For an analysis of these statements, see René Pita, I am attaching [articles published population centers there.” The transcript can be read at “Assessing al-Qaeda’s Chemical Threat,” Athena Intelli- in Science, The Journal of Immunology www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/2027.htm. gence Journal 2:2 (2007): pp. 34-45; Sammy Salama and and The New England Journal of Medicine, 2 Muhammad Bilal, “Qaeda, Taliban Planning 9/11-like Edith Bursac, “Jihadist Capabilities and the Diffusion as well as the books Tomorrow’s Attacks in US, Europe: NWFP IG,” Daily Times, March of Knowledge,” in Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett Weapons, Peace or Pestilence and 31, 2009. eds., Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Boca Ra- Chemical Warfare]. Perhaps you can 9 3 The transcript can be read at www.memri.org/bin/ar- ton, FL: CRC Press, 2009), pp. 101-128. find someone to obtain them… ticles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP232009. 6 This allegation is based on coalition forces using 4 See, for example, Mark Hosenball and Michael Isikoff, conventional weapons (e.g., missiles) that cause a large According to former CIA Director George “A Germ Warfare Guru Goes Free: Why did Malaysia number of casualties and destruction. For this reason, Tenet, al-Qa`ida became interested Release Al Qaeda’s Bioweapons Expert?” Newsweek, De- some jihadists argue that these weapons could be con- in WMD after Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 10 cember 17, 2008. Also, members of the al-Wafa “charity” sidered WMD. See Pita, “Assessing al-Qaeda’s Chemical sarin attack on the Tokyo subway. organization linked to the anthrax program have been re- Threat.” Al-Zawahiri’s e-mail, however, stated leased recently from Guantanamo Bay. See Thomas Jos- 7 Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, “Files Found: A celyn, “Al-Qaeda’s Anthrax Scientist,” Weekly Standard, Computer in Kabul Yields a Chilling Array of al Qaeda 8 Ibid. December 12, 2008; William Glaberson, “U.S. Decides Memos,” Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2001; Alan 9 Quoted in Cullison, “Inside al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive.” to Release Detainee at Guantánamo,” New York Times, Cullison, “Inside al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” Atlantic Month- 10 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the March 31, 2009. ly, September 2004. CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 260. MAY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 5 that it was “the enemy” who brought training camp.16 These documents Second Phase BW to his attention, possibly by U.S. included letters addressed to al-Zawahiri Rauf’s letters indicate that he was Secretary of Defense William Cohen.11 from a person who was later identified incapable of obtaining the pathogenic In November 1997, Cohen appeared on as a Pakistani doctor in microbiology, strain of B. anthracis or the anthrax television showing a five pound sugar Abdur Rauf Ahmed. Rauf worked in vaccines, and that he did not have package and saying that if it were to the Pakistan Council of Scientific and adequate financial resources. In contain spores of Bacillus anthracis—the Industrial Research (PCSIR).17 The first 2000, al-Zawahiri, unhappy with etiological agent of anthrax—and letter was written in Europe in 1999. Rauf’s results and attitude, dispensed spread over Washington, D.C., half its In it, Rauf claimed to have attended or with his services,21 thereby initiating population would die.12 A photograph obtained information on a conference the second stage of al-Qa`ida’s BW of Cohen holding the five pound sugar on biological agents that took place in program. As part of this stage, al- package was allegedly also found in Europe and to have visited a biosafety Qa`ida attempted to benefit from its Afghanistan.13 level three laboratory (apparently in the relationship with Jemaah Islamiya (JI), United Kingdom) where efforts were a terrorist organization in Southeast A subsequent message dated June 1999 being made to obtain a pathogenic strain Asia with which al-Qa`ida’s leaders in insisted on the need to find qualified of B. anthracis and anthrax vaccines.18 Afghanistan stayed in contact by means personnel for the BW program in Finally, he assessed the expenditure of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), educational institutions. This seems required to purchase the material for the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks.22 to be the strategy followed with the a laboratory and complained about the KSM declared before a military court collaboration of Saud Memon (allegedly scarce financial resources available to at Guantanamo Bay on March 10, 2007 involved in Daniel Pearl’s assassination him. that he was involved in al-Qa`ida’s and who died in May 2007 in BW program after Muhammad `Atif’s Pakistan) whose search for qualified In a second letter (whose pages have death.23 KSM was arrested on March microbiologists focused on Pakistani the Society for Applied Microbiology 1, 2003 in Rawalpindi at the house of scientists. Documents retrieved letterhead), Rauf explained his scant Pakistani microbiologist Abdul Quddoos from the Kabul house of a Pakistani achievements in the start-up of the Khan, and in subsequent interrogation nuclear scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin program with B. anthracis. He claimed sessions explained that there was a B. Mahmood, included diagrams of what to have been unable to obtain neither anthracis program for which Yazid Sufaat, seemed to be a plan to disseminate B.
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