IDENTITY SECURITY and TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY in the POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: Relations with the EU, Greece and the Middle East
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
IDENTITY SECURITY AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: Relations with the EU, Greece and the Middle East A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Enver Gülseven Department of Politics and History, Brunel University December 2010 ABSTRACT Since the establishment of the republic in 1923 there has never been a consensus over Turkey‘s national identity, either internally or externally. Westernization was a top-down project that fostered societal resistance from the outset and which received only partial recognition from the West itself. The end of the Cold War has further intensified the debates over Turkish identity both in Turkey itself and in the wider world. This thesis examines the implications of a complex and insecure identity for Turkey‘s political development and in particular its ability to develop an international role commensurate with its size and capabilities. In doing so, it demonstrates the connection between different notions of Turkish identity and foreign policy preferences whilst emphasising also the important role of the international institutional context (for example membership of NATO and the EU) in shaping the preferences of diverse state/societal actors within Turkey in the post-Cold War period. The focus in this regard is on the military, political parties and business/civil-society groups. The thesis engages recent debates between constructivists and rationalists and argues that a constructivist account of Turkish foreign policy is more helpful than a rationalist explanation, through the case studies of Turkey‘s relations with the EU, Greece and the Middle East in the post-Cold War period. It shows how rational actor assumptions operate within a constructivist context and aims to shed light on the relationship between identity, political interests and foreign policy. The thesis also demonstrates that an insecure identity is a barrier to pursue consistent foreign policy goals, thereby lending support to the view that a secure identity is a condition of developing a stable and influential role in the post-Cold War system. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS II INTRODUCTION 1-5 RESEARCH DESIGN 6-13 LITERATURE REVIEW 14-21 CHAPTER 1 Theoretical Framework: Constructivism 22-68 Introduction: The Emergence of the „fourth debate‟ in IR theory 22-24 Middle Ground 25-29 Variants of Constructivism 30-34 Ontological Contributions 35-63 a. Identity 35-42 b. The Security of Identity 43-47 c. Logics of Action, Norms & Institutions 47-53 d. International Institutions 53-63 Strengths & Weaknesses of Constructivism: Concluding Remarks 64-68 CHAPTER 2 Historical Background 69-99 Introduction 69-70 Debates on Identity in the Late Ottoman Period 70-76 Establishment of the Republic and Single-Party Period 76-81 Transition to the Multi-Party System 81-89 Özal Era & Turkish Islamic Synthesis 89-92 The Rise of Political Islam & Identity Politics 92-97 Conclusion 98-99 CHAPTER 3 Turkey‟s Relations with the EU 100-131 Introduction 100 The Turkish Military and the EU 101-106 The Positions of Diverse Political Camps in the EU & Turkey 107-121 The Positions of Civil Society & Business Groups 121-126 Turkey‟s Image in Europe and Its Cultural Policy 126-130 Conclusion 131 CHAPTER 4 Turkey‟s Relations with Greece 132-170 Introduction 132-133 The Position of the Military: 133-139 The Positions of Diverse Political Camps in Greece 139-143 The Positions of Political Parties in Turkey 143-151 Identity Debates in the Turkish Cypriot Community 151-159 The Positions of Civil Society & Business Groups 159-162 Societal Perceptions 163-169 Conclusion 169-170 CHAPTER 5 Turkey‟s Relations with the Middle East 171-205 Introduction 171-172 The Turkish Military & the Middle East 172-176 The Position of Turkish Political Parties 176-181 The Kurdish Issue and Turkey‟s Middle East Policy 181-191 Business Ties 191-196 Societal Perceptions 196-204 Conclusion 204-205 CONCLUSION 206-222 a. Evaluation of the Research 218-220 b. Future Research 220-222 REFERENCES 222-247 APPENDIX 248 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS With grateful thanks to Dr. John MacMillan (principal supervisor) and Dr. Matthew Hughes (second supervisor) for their generous support, wise advice and patience. Thanks also to Havva and İlker Gülseven, my parents, for their encouragement and support throughout the period of the research. I LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ANAP= Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) AKP= Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) CHP= Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People‘s Party) CTP= Cumhuriyetci Türk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party) DYP= Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) İKV= İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfi (Economic Development Foundation) MGK= Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council) MÜSİAD= Müstakil İşadamları Derneği (Independent Businessmen Association) PASOK= Panelliniko Sosialistikó Kínima (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party) RP= Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) TESEV= Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfi (The Turkish Economic & Social Studies Foundation TRNC= Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus TSK= Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (Turkish Armed Forces) TÜSİAD= Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Turkish Industialists and Businessmen Association) UBP= Ulusal Birlik Partisi (National Union Party) CEECs= Central and Eastern European Countries II INTRODUCTION: Turkey‘s geographical and cultural location at the crossroads of different continents, civilisations and religions may in principle endow Turkey with unique credentials to play a key role in international relations. Turkey is the only Muslim-majority country in the world which is secular, democratic and pro-Western. With these credentials, it is the strongest case which can disprove the prevalent idea in the West that Islam and democracy are incompatible. In this sense, it is often thought as an ideal role-model for other Islamic nations. The potential benefits of such a role are particularly great given the sense that the 9/11 attacks on the United States have, as Taşpınar noted, ‗turned the implausible scenario of a ―clash of civilisations‖ into a ―self-fulfilling‖ prophecy‘.1 Indeed, in 1993 Samuel Huntington classified Turkey as a ‗torn country‘ whilst at the same time noting that it would be a decisive state in his controversial claims regarding a projected future clash of civilisations.2 For this reason, understanding the dynamics of decision-making in Turkish foreign policy is crucial for predicting the future relationship between the West and the Islamic world. Whilst the 1990-91 Gulf War and the 9/11 attacks did restore Turkey‘s geo-political importance after the end of the Cold War, Ankara has not been able to play the sort of pro- active foreign policy role many would like. In the past two decades, Turkish politics entered a period of instability which is manifest in rising tension between the military and the civilians, short-lived coalition governments until 2002, an ongoing civil war with the Kurdish separatist movement, the rise of both Turkish and Kurdish nationalism and the deepening of the polarisation between secularist Kemalists and Islamists in the country. Indeed, the Western media started to talk about the existence of two different Turkeys, namely European Turkey and Asia Minor.3 In this context, Turkey has pursued an ambivalent foreign policy particularly towards the European Union (EU) and the Middle East. This thesis will illustrate how Turkey‘s complex and insecure identity threatens its stability, slows down its political development and prevents the formulation of a consistent and effective foreign policy which would allow the country to develop an international role 1 Taşpınar, O. (2005), Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition, (New York: Routledge), p.4 2 Huntington, S. P. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster) 3 See New York Times, ‘30000 protest Islamic hue in Turkish System’, 15 April 2007 1 commensurate with its size and capabilities. In doing so, it will draw on constructivist approach since Turkey does not fit the static model of a stable state with relatively fixed interests that characterize rationalist approaches. National interests are understood differently by diverse groups and are pursued through defining or re-defining a collective/social identity for Turkey. Over the past two decades, Turkish foreign policy emerged as a platform in which rival identity claims have been contested in the context of enhanced polarisation between the country‘s two major political/social identities, namely secularist Kemalists and Islamists. At this point, it should be noted that these identities are neither monolithic nor fixed. Secularism and Islamism in Turkey is understood in a variety of ways. Moreover, Kemalists and Islamists have been transforming themselves according to changing internal and external contexts. By Islamists, this thesis will refer to those parties whose founders come from the ‗national view movement‘ (milli görüş) which embraced ambiguous references to the Ottoman past, disapproved of further rapprochement towards Europe, and called instead for closer economic co-operation with the Muslim countries. In recent years, the secular tone in the discourse of Islamists, represented by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) has gradually become more intense. Indeed, the AKP emerged as an ardent advocate of Turkey‘s EU membership. Nonetheless, the party is still called Islamist