INDEX of DENPASAR AS ISLAMIC CITY: PARADOX and REALITY (Accountability of Political Parties and Institutions)

INDEX OF DENPASAR AS ISLAMIC CITY: PARADOX AND REALITY (Accountability of Political Parties and Institutions)

1 Nazrina Zuryani and 2Muhammad Ali Azhar Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Udayana University, Sudirman Campus, Denpasar BALI e-mails : [email protected] dan [email protected] mobiles: +6281337301823 and +6281392548622

Abstract

In May 2016 the Maarif Institute ranked 29 cities in Indonesia on an Index of Islamic City (IKI/Indeks Kota Islami). Those cities are ordered according to safety, welfare and happiness. Denpasar was ranked third, after Yogyakarta and Bandung. This ranking shows that shocks from the Bali bombings of the early 2000s have not had any deep impact on the nationalist parties and the non-sectarian Muslim (PKB party) play a significant accountability in local policy making. Furthermore no nationalist party supported the manifestations against 2. Neither did the PKB. As for the Islamist parties, they are absent on the Balinese stage, except for the PKS, which plays an ambiguous role. On the whole the achievement for Denpasar of a high Islamity index position is a result of non sectarian policies resting on the convergence of NU/Nahdatul Ulama moderate Islam with the tradition of tolerance embedded in Balinese culture.

Key Word: Index of Denpasar Kota Islami, Political institutions, Cadre Parties Accountability

INTRODUCTION

The Maarif Institute is an institution which supports and promotes, within the context of a multi- cultural Indonesian, the principles of humanity and culture such as embodied in Islam. Among its studies, it has recently produced an index of Islamity, and ranked selected Indonesian cities according to their relative respect of Indeks Kota Islami/IKI or Islamic indicators in three variables. The first variable selected was security and safety, consisting of religious tolerance, security, law enforcement, leadership including women leadership, rights of children and

1 Lecturer of Program Studi Sosiologi or Sociology Department and 2 Lecturer of Political Sciences, Faculty of Social

and Political Sciences, Udayana University in Bali 2 On the 26th September 2016, during his regular visit to Pramuka Island among thousand islands compound, the governor of the Special Region of Jakarta, BTP/Basuki Tjahaja Purnama popularly called Ahok made in front of fishermen a reference to the manipulation of Quranic verses for political purposes. His statement was quickly foremost among them the FPI (Front

of media frenzy, pro- and anti-declarations by almost every member of the political class, justice suit, huge demonstrations in Jakarta (on November 4th and December 12th 2016) and eventually condemnation, sentencing and jailing of the governor, who is now rotting in jail. For a critical interpretation of the whole affair, see Halkis, M. (2017), Redefinisi Penistaan Agama, Mitra, Jurnal Budaya & Filsafat, No. 17 Year XVII/May pp 30-39.

disabled. The second one was welfare and the third was happiness3. The general approach used to set up this index obviously rested on a non-literalist reading of the Quranic text such as practiced by modern clerics and researchers of Maarif Institute. According to Rais from the menjaga agama) in a narrow-minded way. Its meaning is broadened to mean (exercize) the right for anyone (Savitri, 30 Mei 2016 https://news.detik.com/berita/3221194/ maarif-institute-klarifikasi-soal- penelitian-indeks-kota-islami)..

Denpasar is indeed a case in point. In the final ranking of the Maarif Institute, the city among twenty nine selected comes third, after Yogyakarta and Bandung. This is indeed a remarkable position: even though it is a Hindu-majority city with an important Muslim minority, it ranks as more Islamic than most Indonesian cities4. An example of city intolerance was the case of may exercise and challenge the nationalist parties and the non-sectarian Muslim such as PKB (National Awakening Party) in Denpasar to show their responsibility as political cadres on the position for Denpasar as IKI.

The classification of Denpasar as an Islamic city raises questions. Is it a reality and in which way? How do Muslim political parties and organisations react to this paradox? What is the role of local traditions and culture in this achievement.

To properly judge it, two ways have been chosen. Evaluating the attitude of Muslim political parties and organizations toward Islamist politics in the context of Denpasar; and taking note of framing the accountability of political parties and institutions in the pro and contra point of views on Denpasar as a melting pot city so as the reality of its safety, welfare and happines of the population. The information collected is then set for evaluation in the specific socio-cultural context of Bali.

Data collection was methodologically based on direct or phone interviews of cadres, who are deemed best reflecting the accountability of their organizations. Information from other institutions such as NU and Muhammadiyah so as Jamaah of Al Qomar mushalla was also punctually recorded, and a short socio-historical observation of the Balinese background undertaken. The data analysis was conducted in two phases: The first step was interpreting the various responses regarding the variables used to define an Islamic city, with a focus on Denpasar and through a baseline survey on attitude and response of political parties and Muslim organisations from Denpasar about the 4/11 and 2/12 2017 mass demonstrations in Jakarta in 2016. Then second phase of data analysis based on several socio-cultural context of Balinese tolerance to focus on the findings that paradox and reality can be seen as juxtaposition of Denpasar in the so called Islamic indicators and variables.

3 Safety includes freedom of political rights, children and disability rights. Welfare comprises job availability and opportunities, proper income and access to health services; happiness comprises sharing, friendship and environmental harmony that creates conditions living comfort. 4 Jakarta is a region governed by a governor and not a mayor. For this technical reason, and owing to the

ISLAMIC INDICATORS AND VARIABLES

First things come first. What is the actual state of affairs regarding the Islamic indicators mentioned above. Do the indicators used to judge variables such as safety, welfare and happines in the city of Denpasar correspond to reality. Balinese is 1,69 percent of Indonesian total population who claim to be 87 percent is Muslims. However, Statistic Buerau in Denpasar, published in 2013 the population of Hindu was 535.768, Muslims was 242.893 (almost 50 percent of the Hindu Balinese urban dwellers), while Katholic was 17.359, Protestant was 37.346, Budhist was 12.460, Other faiths was 374 and the total number of people in Denpasar was 846.200. Kompas.com predicted in 2012 that within two years, around 400 people were influx to Denpasar after Iedul Fitri occasion. Most of them were from Java. This data has no impact on Denpasar as Islamic city with those indicator and variables published by Maarif Institute in May 2016.

First, regarding safety. The safety of Denpasar is demonstrated by the fact that various communities live harmoniously side by side: Muslims, Hindus, Budhist, Catholic, Christians, Kong Hu Chu and other religious minorities. The Bali bombing of 2002 and 2005 did not significantly disturb Islamic values in the city5. Even though cynical comments can be heard here and there regarding the December 2016 Jakarta demonstrations, following the imprisonment of Ahok, the ex governor of Jakarta last May 2017, it can be said that the level of safety of the city of Denpasar is still high.

Regarding welfare, it cannot be denied that the city of Denpasar is one of the most dynamic cities of Indonesia. It attracts thousands of migrants every year. Many of them are Muslim. To people ere gold is income and sometimes even an easy access to health services.

Regarding happiness, Denpasar is a favorite spot for tourists, not only from abroad, but also from Jakarta and other great Indonesian cities. Numerous cultural events take place in the city. Every year a cultural festival --Pekan Kesenian Bali is held in the city center of Denpasar and it is a place of cultural and social exchange across ethnic and religious lines. Must we add that non- Hindu, i.e Muslim Balinese are historically, and up to this day, traditionally considered as nyama Selam and participate to many social and even ritual events alongside their Hindu brothers (Trisila, 2015; Darmayana, 2005; Couteau, 1994; Vickers, 1989). On a more anecdotal level we can mention here that when Ahok was sued, there were invitations to have him run for the

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

What is the role of political parties towa

Generally speaking. Commenting on the index of Islami cities released by the Maarif Institute, Jimly 6 Asshidiqie , a reputed expert in Islamic law and Islamic governance, underlines the role of

5 Couteau Jean: After the Bali Bombing, 2003 6 http://kelanakota.suarasurabaya.net/news/2016/171612-Indeks-Kota-Islami,-Denpasar-Jadi-Kota-Paling-Bahagia

Muslim leaders,

e the syariah is implemented, where people pray, and where there are many mosques, but where criminality is very high (Abidin Z, 2016). In other words, he sees no correlation between Islamity and shariah.

(2004, 24), he says that all political institutions should aim at building an Indonesian civil society. ummah itself beyond religious affiliation, and beyond the politics of religion. The politics of Islam itself, should follow the same principle as its main source of legitimacy. Within the same scope of understanding, the pursuance of Islamic values should respect and adapt to the local conditions that are deemed favorable. For example Hinduism in Bali, Animism in Papua and the likes in other parts of the country. In such contexts, the interpretations of the Quranic text should rests on the principles that irrigate the whole text rather than on litteral and often contradictory statements found in such or such verses. The interpretation should be contextual and tolerant toward other environments. In short, Al Chaidar asserts that achieving substantive Islam requires that political Islam and normative syariah be abandoned.

What is the position of individual Islamic parties7?

Not all Islamic parties are ready to agree with an open undertanding of the scriptures such as advocated by Al Chaidar. Three attitudes can be identified.

Islam peacefully introduced in the archipelago via the use of local symbolism, in

humanism, the PKB advocates an open attitude toward habits of non-Islamic origins that have irrigated Indonesian Islam and a conciliatory coexistence with non-Muslims in the context of the Indonesian nation state. It enthusiastically embraces Pancasila.

At the local level, the PKB, in symbiosis with the NU (Nahdatul Ulama)8 organization, permeates much of the local Balinese Islamic life. It is presenting ancient Muslim villages such as Pegayaman and Tegallingah, as well as in the city among the new migrants of East-Javanese origin. Through NU, it controls pesantren schools and mosques. Well rooted in Balinese politics, the PKB regularly presents candidates throughout the island and has its office and private opinion that the high index of Islamity achieved by Denpasar is largely due to the PKB openness toward local Hinduism.

The second nir-response parties is that of the PPP (Unity in Development Party) and PBB (Moon and Star Party). Those two parties have at the national level a stricter, more normative and orthodox understanding of Islam. The first one, the PPP, is an emanation

7 Indonesian politics and their Islamic parties have been discussed by Feillar and Madinier (2011). 8 On NU, see Feillard (2013)

Yet, unlike the latter though, it has officially retained its Islamist ideology, although it does not anymore include syariah as part of its political programme and has become an open party. The second party, the PBB was born from the 1998 Reformation. Officially Islamist, PBB recruits its followers from the Muhammadiah. It still includes the implementation of the syariah in its political programme.

The open Islamist advocacy of these two parties (PPP and PBB) has consequences for the presence at the regional level. Of the 12 most important national parties, they are the only two parties which do not have a local representation in Bali. Because they have no followers. This also means that they play no role in defining the local level of Islamity such as ranked by the Maarif Institute.

The third attitude is that of the PKS (Justice and Welfare Party)9. PKS is a party that is grew out from the Islam Brotherhood and is thus ideologically Islamist (article 2 of AD/rules of PKS). Created after the 1998 Reformation under the name Partai Keadilan, it first openly advocated syariah as its political platform. In 2003 its changed its name to become the PKS. Then, in 2010, it became an open party and replaced its promotion of syariah by the promo Thus, even though it is remains ideologically connected with Islamism, and even though it reluctant to acknowledge Pancasila as the only basis of Indonesian nationhood, it does not hesitate to field non-Muslim candidates. To go back into history, for the 2009 elections, hence before the Maarif Institute devised its IKI or Index of Islamic City, the PKS presented no less than 26 Christians candidates to fulfill the available seats at the distric council level throughout Indonesia10. At the local Bali level, in the 2014 national election, the PKS was able to field as candidates at least four non Muslims cadres, namely: Made Sutirta (Province parliemantary/DPRD Province), Komang Giri (District Council/Dapil II Blah Batuh), Ngakan Made Rai (District Council/DPRD Dapil I Gianyar) and Ni Nyoman Ayu Yudiani (District Council/DPRD Dapil II Belahbatu-Tampak Siring)11.

At first view, the fact that the PKS is one of the Muslim parties to have gained political support in Denpasar, it seems to confirm the tolerance both of the local society and of Islam in the context of urban city living. Contrary to what Gede Gedzha Aldino Putra Mahayadnya, a young researcher from Udayana (2015), is stating, the fact that the PKS has representatives who are Hindu seems to show that the PKS is not stuck in identity politics. This is all the more interesting as the PKS, unlike other political institutions such as the PDIP and the GOLKAR (respectively the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle and the Functional Groups Party), is a cadre party in the sense defined by Duverger12, i.e a party dominated by an elite group of activist with clear political goals in view. It may have followers from the Kampung Java and other strongly Muslim environments in Denpasar, it does not ipso factor mean that it is stuck in politics of identity. As such it may well play a role in the implementation of Islamist values. It must be noted here it is

9 On the PKS, see 10 Voa Islam.com Non Muslim di Tubuh PKS Edisi 21 Octobre 2010 11 Antara, News.com PKS Punya Empat Caleg Hindu Bali 12 Les partis politique (1951)

not only Hindu Balinese who refuse the presence of the FPI (Front Pembela Islam) in Bali, but also all local Muslim institutions and associations of some importance.

In this part of explanation, all Muslim parties present in Bali support the politics of substantive Islam.

From the point of view politics, and to better evaluate it, it might be interesting to delve for a moment in the sociology of politics, and, considering the fact that a large majority of Balinese Muslims are of Javanese origin, to delve more particularly into the sociology of Javanese competition existing in Indonesia between political parties and organisations. He bases his

Javanese Muslims between santri and abangan. Anderson speaks of unending or permanent fights between the santri and abangan Muslims (orthodox Muslims and nominal Muslims). estioned by Donald K Emerson (1989) who, after doing some field research, argues that this idea of a competition between santri and abangan does not translate the actual reality13. There are no real cultural and sociological boundaries between the so-called santri and abangan. This fluidisation of Islamist identity is probably the result of the improvements achieved in education during the late forty years all over Indonesia. There are much less uneducated Muslims now and the madrasah or pesantren do not shape one single, but many types of Muslims, not to mention that there are other ways, such as mosques tabligh, to spread Muslim teachings.

With regard to what has been said above, mention must be made of the prominent role played by the two biggest Muslims organizations of the country, namely NU (Nahdatul Ulama), arguably the biggest Muslim organizations in the world, whose strength is mainly found in rural areas and closer to the old abangan paradigm of a poorly educated peasantry; and the more urban, and classified as moderate, the first one by emphasizing the role of local culture in Indonesian Islam, and the second one by making a more modern, yet still moderate reading of the Islamic tradition. As already mentioned above, both institutions have played an important role in stabilizing14 the Muslim communities in Denpasar whenever tensions occurred, like after the Bali bombings or . In Denpasar itself, at the peak of this affair, neither the Nadhatul Ulama nor the Muhammadiah took side. They clearly disencouraged their members to go to Jakarta and take part in the 4th November and 12th December 2016 mass demonstrations.

What has just been said above warrant further comments. All the more so as new informations are pouring in. Some observers, such the editorialist of the Jakarta Post (July 5/017, p.6), referring to the Maarif Institute, attribute the rise in ultra-orthodox or radical teachings to the proliferation in schools of uncontrolled extracurricular teachings called rohis. This is of

13 Harold Crouch, a specialist on the Indonesian military and Indonesian politics in Indonesia was asthonised by what he saw of the ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) during the Suharto era (Crouch: ). He found that the ICMI elites who spoke in the name of Islam more often than not had little knowledge in the Islamic field. This is one of the mysteries of Indonesian Islam, to be sometimes represented and discussed by people with little Islamic

knowledge. 14 Kompas, 12 September 2016

paramount importance. As seen above, one of the result of improvements in education has been the waning of the gap between santri dan abangan in Java. But the situation has evolved differently in Bali, where the local government is controlled by Hindu-Balinese. If some among the many types of post-santri-abangan Muslims in Java can become radical, this is much less likely to occur in Bali, where both the local government and the local Muslim parties and organizations keep an eye on rohis lecturer to prevent radicalism from taking hold over the Muslim population. It must be noted here that both Hindu Balinese and all local Muslim organizations and institutions of some importance have stated their refusal of the presence of the FPI (Front Pembela Islam) in Bali.

If there is any doubt remaining about the attitude of the local Muslim party, a review of the various attitudes of existing l party cadres, sheds light on the type of Islamity promoted locally in Bali.15 Let us give a look at the information collected.

Table 1: Attitude of the Selected Parties/Muslim Organisations From Denpasar supporting the 4- 11 and 2-12 Mass Demostrations in 2016

Parties Negative Positive Demonstration Demonstration Response Response (4 November ) (2 December) PDI-P ++ No No Golkar + No No Gerindra ? ? ? ? Demokrat + No No PKB + No No PKS - - Yes/No Yes/No PAN - - Yes/No Yes/No NU + No+ No+ Muhammadiyah + No+ No+ Source: Azhar and Zuryani 2016. Quick Count of JKT Demos on 18 Medsos Users

Intitutions in Bali regarding the Ahok Blasphemy affair. By a negative response; it means that the party or organisation is against Ahok and thinks that he has proferred blasphemy against Islam. By a positive response, it means that the party or organisation thinks that Ahok is innocent and has never been blasphemous. By No Demonstration it means that the party or organisation mentioned above thinks that no action should be taken againsts Ahok meaning here the massive demontration in Jakarta during November and December 2016. Further more, Yes/No means it is a personal choice to attend or not the demos. However, by question mark, this means that some

15 Using a quick count on social media (mainly WA and Facebook), there are 18 users from various political parties cadres made comments during November to December 2016 on the Ahok affair. The information those people made in Jakarta.

members answered positively, while others negatively to questions about the mass demonstrations.

PDIP, Golkar, Demokrat, Nasdem and Hanura were clearly against any anti-Ahok (demonstrations, incrimination and sentencing), owing to their non-sectarian ideological fundation, but so were the main Muslim parties and organizations PKB, NU and Muhammadiah, whose members and followers comprise a large majority of Balinese Muslims. There was a tendency to belittle the whole affair. A PKB cadre even said: the tongue. It did not involve blasphemy. If he had said it over and over again, it would be

What about the other parties and organizations.

The Gerindra, a minor party in Bali, supported the anti-Ahok movement, but for its own reasons: it is a nationalist party, but its leader, Prabowo, have been in conflict with Ahok for reasons inherent not to religion, but to the Jakarta politics. The Hanura and Nasem, nationalist parties with a low-level presence in Bali, did not provide enough information to the researhers to draw a conclusion about its attitude. PAN National Mandatory Party position is particular: it has been a nationalist party since its inception, but it is rooted in Islamist politics through the majority of its present cadres. Its attitude was therefore ambiguous: it neither discouraged nor allowed its members to participate in the two mass November and December 2016 demonstrations against Ahok. th June 2017 sentencing to two years of imprisonment, a PAN cadre said: phone interview, 26 June 2017).

and its fielding of non-Muslim candidates, it allowed its members to demonstrate against Ahok,

personal communication, 29 June 2017). Later on in July 2017, a lady PKS follower, hearing of our survey made a phone called purposedly to say that real muslims cadres are those who make clear statements in relation to Muslim identity, which was an implicit acknowledgement of support for anti-Ahok actions.

Considering the above reactions, we cannot but ponder on the positive role played by the PKB and the traditionally moderate Islamic organization Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiah. In Bourdieu lingo they have been providers of positive social capital for the Denpasar Muslim community: both are definitely instrumental in sustainly tolerance and security.

This general atmosphere of tolerance and security was found beyond the scope of partisan politics, among ordinary Muslim citizens. During face to face interviews held at the Mushalla Al Qomar in Pura Demak street in Denpasar city center, 2 jamaah (members) of that mushalla stated clearly, and in public, that Ahok sacrificed himself for the unity of Muslims in Indonesia. One jamaah

funds he said were made available for the FPI (Forum Pembela Islam) in Bali, e

All this the Islamity index, the role of the Muslim parties in this index, the weakness of the points in the same dirction: there is a near-unanimity among all Muslim political and religious actors to maintain Bali as it is: free of sectarian politics and behavior. In other words, going bak to al- this article, all concur that the Muslim ummah affiliation, and beyond the politics of religion.

ROLE OF THE BALINESE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND

The substantive understanding view of Islam held by the majority of the Muslim community of Bali did not come in a socio-historic void. It rests on a large extent on the specific historical and cultural background of the Balinese society, which has been in contact with Islam for centuries.

On the historical side, we must underline that the Balinese have all along lived alongside Muslims in a religiously non-confrontative way: The Muslims never came to Bali as invaders; They usually came on the request or with the agreement of kings or princes to fill specific functions, such as mercenaries, doctors, traders, syahbandar (port officials). The Muslims usually settled in empty areas that were given to them, for example a forest near by main road to Denpasar in the case of Pegayaman (Northern Bali) or a river estuary in the case of Loloan in Jembrana or Dusun Wanasari, Kampung Jawa in Denpasar; this means that they did not unsettle local populations. The conflicst that occurred between Balinese kingdoms and other polities never had the seal of religious conflicts; most date back from the days of Waturenggong in the 16th century or took place outside the island of Bali.

On the cultural side, religion was never, until a recent past, a prominent factor of social identification and political organisation: For both the Hindu and Muslim Balinese, the main foci of social identification and political organization were the village, and, beyond, the local principality. Obedience was due to the first, fealty to the second. Except for rare clerics, no blind submission was owed to an abstract God. As a result, local Hindus and Muslims naturally perceived one another as members of a single community, living on and from the same land.

performed customary duties toward their Hindu village or Hindu principality of reference. For example the Muslim people of Kepaon in Denpasar, or of Pulau Serangan used to perform ceremonial duties as part of their traditional dependance toward the Principalty of Pemecutan. Local Hindu villages fulfilled other ceremonial duties by no pork offerings. Such situation was further reinforced by the absence, among the population at large, of any theological discourse. Religion rested on the teaching of symbols and moral principles, mainly through the narrative means of theater, rather than on the discursive and normative

interpretation of holy texts, which was the preserve of a remote elite, brahmins on the side of the native Balinese

never applied to the Balinese Hindu16 by Muslim Javanese. As for the Hindu-Balinese, they sradha). One often heard them saying that

Dutch colonization created a cross-religious cement. Muslim Javanese fought alongside Balinese in the mountains of Bali against the Dutch (1947) as part of the independence struggle. In the set up of identity of people living in Bali, nationalism was long a more important factor than religion. A related factor is the fact that Sukarno, even though he was a Muslim, was a Balinese by his mother.

Thus, as just explained above, harmonious cohabitation between Hindu and Muslim Balinese was a reality, in history and culture, throughout the whole island. There are still many living examples to this day of the resilience of this harmony, in all fields of life, well beyond the urban space of modern Denpasar:

The picture below shows on the night of 4th February 2017, in Pacung village temple, a performance of Gambuh.

Picture No. 1 A Performace of Muslim as Tabib/traditional Doctor in Pacung th Temple (4 February 2017)

Ratu Mekah

16 , Archipel

Another interesting case is the village of Pegayaman (Barth: 1993), already mentioned above.

Panji Sakti at the end of the 17th century. They were settled in a forest area and mixed with neighborly Balinese to the extent that all now do have Balinese names. Historically, during the Jagaraga war of 1849, when the Dutch launched themselves to the conquest of North Bali, it was a Muslim from Pegayaman who organised the strategic defense of the kingdom. This demonstrates that their primary loyalty laid with the local Balinese king. Up to now, the people of Pegayaman are still using Balinese name of birth order --Wayan, Made, Nyoman/Nengah and Ketut before they Muslim names. Hence we have Nengah Abdul Gofar Ismail or Ketut Abbas.

CONCLUSION

A long history of tolerance irrigates local Balinese Muslims and Hindus. For Hindus, there is pride in being reputed tolerant. This is a recurrent theme of their public discourse. For Muslims the combination of shared traditions and modern nationalism irrigates the non-sectarian discourse of their main party, the PKB. This creates a common ground with the local Balinese and prevents Muslim organizations with an interpretation of Islam deemed narrow by the local Muslim community from taking hold in the island.

On the whole, regarding the attitude of the local Muslims, it can be said that the Islamic precept:

ers of core rites and religious practice: the Muslim have their mosques, (in former days built with the help of the king) and their own ritual and food-related practices; but in all other social, political, cultural and even minor ritual matters they do not hesitate to share as big a part of their life as they can with their Balinese brothers or nyama.

Thus the Bali case clearly shows that strains can be managed and that a positive local cultural than satisfying level of Islamity in Indonesian cities. To paraphraze Azra17 of Bali enables local Islam to contextualize itself and all the more flower to a higher level.

17 Santosa, D.A (2015) wrote on, Azyumardi Azra: Islam Nusantara is Islam which is Tolerant, retrieved on 07 July 2017 from www.beritasatu.com

To conclude this at a broader level, this raises another issue. When, in other parts of Indonesia, cross-religious solidarities, and compete instead for ever greater support of syariah-based policies (this is now taking place in many parts of Indonesia), the result intolerance, insecurity is that their area ends-up being less substantively Islamic than in a region like Bali and particularly in Denpasar.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We thank to the parties that support the writing of this paper mainly Ditbinlitabmas and Kemeristek Dikti through LPPM Udayana University in providing research funds for excellent writing of text books and internship program of FISIP students (grant of Competence/Hibah berbasis Kompetensi) for almost three years. Our sincere thanks also go Rector, vice rectors of Udayana University and also to the staff at the faculty of Social and Political Sciences Unud for supporting the research. To the students who did survey from FISIP Udayana University to the political parties in Denpasar and the assistance of several lecturers and those gentlemen and ladies participated in this research interviews that cannot be mentioned one by one, thank you as well as apologize for this research is still far from perfect.

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