Handgun Ownership and Armed Violence in the Western Balkans

ARMED VIOLENCE Issue Brief Number 4 September 2014 Handgun Ownership and Armed Violence in the Western Balkans Introduction by Gallup Europe in the countries and The Western Balkans is home to an territories of the Western Balkans in 2012. estimated 3.6–6.2 million registered In the 1990s, the countries and territo- The Small Arms Survey had the oppor- and unregistered firearms. ries of the Western Balkans1 experienced tunity to insert three questions relating At least 500,000 and up to 1.6 several transformations: a transition to firearms possession and armed vic- million households own firearms from socialism to liberal democracy, timization into the 2012 Gallup Balkan in the Western Balkans. widespread economic decline, and Monitor (see Box 1). Where necessary, Since 1995, the average homicide episodes of violent conflict in Bosnia the data from the survey has been rate in the region has decreased and Croatia (1991–95) and in Kosovo supplemented by information from drastically, stabilizing at around (1999) (see Map). Since the turn of the 21st century, the region has witnessed other sources, such as international 2.0 per 100,000 between 2007 and increasing political stability and socio- and national data, special reports, and 2010. Nevertheless, the homicide economic adjustment. Yet while the policy and academic research. The main rate is still significantly higher than threat of armed conflict in the region has findings are as follows: in other European regions, and decreased, levels of handgun ownership and armed violence remain high. Throughout the region, which has an overall population of about Map Western Balkans 25 million (UNDESA, n.d.), an estimated 3.6–6.2 million firearms are in civilian possession. The high prevalence of HUNGARY SLOVENIA civilian-held firearms has been linked Zagreb to the rate of violent crime, with the ROMANIA homicide rate in the Western Balkans CROATIA being higher than in the other countries of Southern Europe as well as in Belgrade Western Europe (Alvazzi del Frate and BOSNIA AND Mugellini, 2012; Geneva Declaration HERZEGOVINA SERBIA Secretariat, 2011, p. 60). In addition, the high prevalence of firearms and Sarajevo violent crime in the region is linked to the activities of organized crime, which MONTENEGRO is largely perceived by both the inter- Adriatic Pristina national and the local population as Sea Podgoricodgorica Kosovo one of the primary sources of insecu- Skopje rity in the Western Balkans. These findings call for an analysis Tirana MACEDONIA of the dynamics of firearms possession ITALY and armed violence in the Western ALBANIA Balkans. This Issue Brief examines the historical aspects of firearms prolifera- GREECE tion in the region in order to frame the issue. It also presents the results of a 0km 100 nationwide household survey conducted http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 1 homicides are more frequently based his most institutionalized form handguns; the same view was expressed committed with firearms. of social banditry on the Balkan notion by 16 per cent of respondents in Albania About 1.2 per cent of all survey of the hajduk (Bracewell, 2003, p. 22). and 15 per cent in Serbia. Elsewhere in respondents reported that a house- Despite the emphasis on the ‘home- the region, however, the tendency to hold member was held at gunpoint grown’ nature of the bandit (in both invoke tradition as a reason for hand- in the 12 months prior to the admin- abovementioned senses of the term), gun ownership was much lower (below istration of the survey. historical analysis suggests that it was 5 per cent) (SEESAC, 2006a, p. 13). not solely the product of the local cul- This Issue Brief is divided into three ture, but that it also reflects the prom- sections. The first section outlines the Conflict-related spread of firearms inent state-building practices of the cultural and historical factors that have During the 1990s, the Western Balkans Ottoman Empire, which dominated facilitated the spread of firearms among saw not only the War of Yugoslav the region until the 19th century. Unlike the population. The second section Secession (1991–95),3 but also general in Western Europe—where the state examines the post-conflict security political instability in the region. eventually consolidated its monopoly dynamics, the role of organized crime Albania was experiencing an economic over the use of force by suppressing in the proliferation of firearms, and the and political crisis that peaked in 1997, other forms of armed violence (Tilly, prevalence of registered and unregis- 1991)—the Ottoman consolidation of following the collapse of its banking tered firearms in the region. The section state power and authority was achieved sector, and Macedonia was witnessing ends with a focus on longitudinal by making bargains and deals with growing ethnic animosity along its trends in the homicide rate, as disag- local armed bands (Barkey, 1994). It borders (Fischer, 2010; Irwin, 2010). gregated by sex and firearms. Section was only in the 18th and 19th centuries, Following the signing of the Dayton three, which comprises the bulk of the when the Ottoman Empire began to Peace Accord in 1995, both Bosnia analysis, presents region-wide house- weaken and national liberation strug- and Croatia faced precarious peace hold survey data obtained from the gles swept across the Western Balkans, processes and post-conflict reconstruc- 2012 Gallup Balkan Monitor to generate that the image of the bandit, with all tion. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, an evidence-based understanding of of its trappings—including the style of which comprised Serbia and Monte- armed violence in the Western Balkans. dress and an emphasis on armaments— negro, underwent dramatic political Specifically, the section unpacks issues took on cultural salience (Bracewell, changes as Serbia’s Socialist Party lost relating to self-reported and perceived 2003, p. 24). Moreover, the period of power in 2000 and the push for inde- levels of handgun ownership, pro- insecurity that accompanied the emer- pendence intensified in Montenegro. vides estimates of household firearms gence of nation-states in the region The end of the 1990s also saw a more possession, and reflects on experiences led not only to the proliferation of assertive drive for independence in of armed violence. bandit groups, but also to the view that Kosovo and an increasing opposition weapons can guarantee personal, fam- to it from the Serbian government. Framing the small arms ily, and community security (SEESAC, This political crisis, in turn, led to a 2006a, pp. 4–7). 78-day NATO air campaign against problem in the Western While the notion of hajduk may thus the Serbian forces and government Balkans refer to an important cultural phenom- that paved the way for the emergence enon, it also reflects Ottoman power- of Kosovo as a UN protectorate under Cultural heritage of the hajduk sharing with local elites as well as a Security Council Resolution 1244 A common assumption regarding fire- certain degree of tolerance of local (ICG, 1999). arms in the Western Balkans is that the ‘bandits’ who posed no threat to That all of these transformations had region has a deep-rooted ‘gun culture’ Ottoman central power or colonial an impact on the levels of firearms that predisposes its populations not rule. While the socio-cultural image throughout the Western Balkans— only to carry firearms, but also to use of the bandit might shed light on the especially in terms of the large quanti- them. Yet there has been very little symbolic meaning of owning a gun ties of weapons outside of governmental analysis of this ‘gun culture’ in the and even condone its use in certain control—has been acknowledged by region.2 In academic literature, the use situations, it is not clear to what extent both academics and security analysts. of guns in the Western Balkans is often they actually shape the proliferation One of the primary reasons for the high traced to the socio-cultural category of firearms. Indeed, as argued in a numbers of firearms in the region has of the bandit—locally referred to by recent study, ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ to do with the fact that before 1991, the terms such as hajduk, haidut, uskok, and are not primary reasons for gun own- Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia klepht—which carries ‘connotations of ership in the region (SEESAC, 2006a). (SFRY)4 had the fourth-largest army— oppression, thirst for liberty, and heroic There are a few exceptions, however. the Yugoslav People’s Army—in Europe masculinity’ as well as ‘lawlessness, In Montenegro, about 22 per cent of and a matching military industrial primitivism, and violence’ (Bracewell, survey respondents stated that ‘tradi- complex (Anastasijevic, 2006, p. 10). 2003, p. 22). It has been argued that the tion’ was the reason why individuals The Yugoslav People’s Army was historian Eric Hobsbawm (1971) even within their neighbourhoods owned made up of two elements: the regular 2 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 4 September 2014 ground forces, controlled by the federal 1944 until 1985, under the communist arms traded on the international weap- government in Belgrade, and the ter- regime of Enver Hoxha, a great deal ons market, precursors (ephedrine) ritorial defence force (Gow, 2003, p. 52).5 of emphasis was placed on creating a and synthetic drugs’ (EUROPOL, The territorial defence units were strong and well equipped military 2013, p. 12). This remains the case especially important for guarding the (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008, p. 362). even though all UN Member States in country’s large stockpiles. When the This practice ensured that even after the Western Balkans have signed the wars in Croatia and later in Bosnia broke the fall of communism, large stock- United Nations Convention against out, these stockpiles were increasingly piles of weapons existed in the country.

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