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The Iranian Central Governmental Bodies And 23.05.2017-29.05.2017 • No: 117 7 THE IRANIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENTAL BODIES AND THE EVALUATION OF 19TH MAY 2017 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN On May 19, 2017, the 12th presidential election was the candidates to the conditions defined by the products by 25% per year in total exports: h) Trying heldIRAN in Iran. The Interior Minister of Iran, Abdolreza Constitution (Article 99). Another main task of the to rejuvenate the Cabinet. 2) Social and Cultural Rahmani Fazli, announced that 41,220,131 regis- Council is to interpret the Constitution and to Field: In this field, Rouhani committed to improve tered voters (73,07%) took part in the elections and supervise the law enacted in the Parliament accord- the conditions for human rights and freedoms Hasan Rouhani was elected as the President of the ing to Islam and the Law (Article 72). The Parlia- development guarantying the participation of various country for the second time with 57,13% ment (the Islamic Consultative Assembly) does not ethnic and religious minorities in social and political (23,549,616) of total votes. hold any legal credibility without the Guardian life by removal of certain restrictions in the cultural Iran has a unique structure in its political system. Council, except in approving six legal scholars to the field and resolving issues about women's rights. 3) According to the Constitution, the powers of gov- Council and provision of the mandates to the mem- Foreign Policy and Security: In his pre-election ernment in the country are vested in the Supreme bers of the Parliament (Article 93). declaration, it is emphasized that politics based on Leader in accordance with the concept of "Velayet-i Totally, 1636 citizens presented themselves as mutual respect and common interests, especially Fakih" (Article 57). The Supreme Leader has candidates for the Iranian presidential election. with the Islamic countries, will be maintained by absolute authority over legislative, executive and However, after assessing the qualifications of adhering to moderate and common sense principles. judicial powers and can dismiss the President if registered applicants in the context of the appropri- It is emphasized that, while adhering to the Compre- necessary. In addition, the authorities to dispatch and ateness to the Constitution, Islam and the regime, on hensive Joint Action Plan the country will continue administer the armed forces and the security forces 20 April 2017, the Guardian Council announced to fulfill its own commitments and expects the and the authorities to determine the domestic and through the Interior Ministry that only six candidates counterparties to fulfill their obligations. Rouhani foreign policy priorities are gathered under the for the presidential election could be nominated: with the approval of the Supreme Leader noted that supervision of the Supreme Leader (Article 110). Hassan Rouhani (Moderation and Development he would work to remove other sanctions that are not In Iran, the Supreme Leader is elected by the Coun- Party), Eshaq Jahangiri (Executives of Construction linked to the nuclear program. As for the Syrian cil of Experts, which consists of 86 clerics, and Party), Mostafa Hashemitaba (Executives of Con- issue, he affirmed that Iran supports political negoti- remains in office until his death. However, the struction Party), Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf ations for a peaceful settlement of the conflict Supreme Leader can be dismissed from his position (Population for Progress and Justice Party), Ebrahim reaffirming its rejection for using military force and only in case he is incapable of performing his legal Raisi (Combatant Clergy Association), Mostafa confirming the importance of the North-South responsibilities, by losing or lack of the necessary Mirsalim (Islamic Coalition Party). In order to Transport Corridor project. According to the Consti- ability to deliver fatwa, which requires fairness, increase the support for Ebrahim Raisi, Mohammed tution, the task of making fundamental changes in piousness, becoming deficient in managerial skills Bagher Ghalibaf withdrew from the elections, while security and foreign policy is rather under the stated in Article 109. This decision can only be made Eshaq Jahangiri withdrew from elections for Hassan supervision of the Supreme Leader than the Presi- by the Council of Experts. Rouhani. Under these conditions, the distribution of dent. Recently, there are criticisms about the authori- The President is the head of the executive and is the the votes received by the other candidates is as ties of the Supreme Leader in the context of foreign highest official authority after the Supreme Council. follows: Ebrahim Raisi 38.5% (15,786,449); policy shaping. Thus, the fact that Mahmoud Ah- The President is responsible for implementing the Mostafa Mirsalim 1.16% (478,215); Mostafa madinejad applied for the presidency despite the Constitution and chairing the executive body in Hashemitaba 0.52% (215,450). Besides, 1,190,401 Supreme Leader’s warnings not to could be classi- dealing with all issues except the ones, which are votes were counted as invalid. fied as a sign of growing dissatisfaction of some directly related to the the Supreme Leader (Article Rouhani’s re-election took place in the critical political groups with current political priorities in the 113). The President is elected for four-year period by period for the country and during the second term his country. In this way, the Conservative camp might direct votes of citizens and his consecutive election strategic priorities can be classified under 3 main has given the message that they are looking for a is allowed just for one additional term. (Article 114). topics: 1) Economy: As known, after signing the strong leader who can resist the U.S. President According to the Constitution, a person should meet nuclear deal on July 14, 2015, the gradual removal Donald Trump’s policy towards Iran. In this context, the following qualifications in order to be a candi- of embargoes positively affected the Iranian econo- the Supreme Leader could seek to restore the balance date for the presidential elections: a) being a citizen my to a certain extent. As a matter of fact, the between the Reformist and Conservative camps of the country; b) Iranian origin; c) having adminis- country's inflation rate has dropped from 45% to suppressing the criticism of the latter without trative and foresight skills; d) be entrusted, pious and 8.7%. In 2016, GDP grew by 3.9% compared to opposing them. In this direction, Iran could strength- have an exemplary life; e) believing in the funda- 2015 reaching $412.3 billion. In addition to the en military cooperation with Russia (possibly with mentals of the Republic and the official religion of petroleum exploration activities in the country, oil the CSTO in future) as a respond to new bilateral the country (Shia Islam) (Article 115). In Iran, there production has also increased. However, mitigation military alliance agreements signed between the U.S. are no age and education qualifications that should of international isolation and sanctions did not and Saudi Arabia on the sidelines of the President be met by the candidates for the presidency. For this increase the number of projects, which could im- Trump’s visit to the country. Aforementioned reason, anyone who carries the above-mentioned prove employment in the country (especially among agreements are seen as opposed to the geopolitical qualifications could apply to the presidential elec- young people) and the private sector alongside with interests of Iran in its near abroad, which generates tions. According to Article 37 of the Presidential the amount of foreign investments. For this reason, the need to pursue a more active foreign policy in the Election Law, a person who is a candidate for the during his second term Rouhani would put more “Shiite Crescent” geographic area. Such situation presidency must resign before applying for the emphasis on the economic development of the may increase the power struggle between Saudi candidacy. He is directly responsible for the plan- country by implementing new policies to open up Arabia and Iran in the context of Syria, Lebanon, ning, budgeting, administrative and employment the country for more investments and to create new Iraq and Yemen. issues together with the implementation of the laws business opportunities. In his pre-election declara- As a result, Rouhani, in its second term of presiden- in the country. But he can transfer the management tion titled “Freedom, Security, Peace and Progress”, cy, will continue to carry out his political agenda that authority of these issue to other people (Article 126). Rouhani summarizes the priorities in this field as has already been determined and will give priority to After being elected, the President receives his follows: a) Employing 950,000 people annually; b) the development of the country's economy by mandate from the Supreme Leader and submits his Implementing the Developing Villages in the implementing new reforms. On the other hand, in resignation to the Supreme Leader and fulfills his Context of Social-Economic Development Program foreign policy and security, he will try to apply duties as long as his resignation is not accepted and to open new industrial enterprises throughout the policies that could disrupt the United States and its (Articles 110 and Article 130). country that will provide employment, especially for allies New Middle East politics adhering to the Another powerful constitutional institution in the young adults; c) Enhancing the fight against corrup- authority of the Supreme Leader. But these policies Iranian political system that influences the presiden- tion; d) Providing necessary conditions for the will have a chance of success if Rouhani could tial elections is the Guardian Council, which consists development of private sector and investments: e) implement them without overshadowing the of 12 members. The tasks and the authorities of the Limiting the activities of various economic institu- achieved successes in his first presidential term, Council are to supervise the Parliamentary, the tions inside the state, which are not directly linked to especially the nuclear deal.
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