A Reappraisal of Wilhelm Wundt

ARTHUR L. BLUMENTHAL University of Massachusetts at Boston

Approximately 100 years ago, in an era of intel- of Wundt are in need of serious correction, then lectual ferment, events of marked consequence took one might again ask whether Wundt still turns out place in the history of psychology. It was in the to be irrelevant and of little interest. This article decade of the 1870s that the first handbook of is addressed to that question, and its answers will, experimental psychology appeared, followed soon I suspect, contain some surprises for many readers. by the founding of the first formal laboratory of There is another question that immediately fol- experimental psychology. Both were the achieve- lows upon these claims. It is, How could such ments of Wilhelm Wundt, ever since recognized as historical misinterpretations have arisen? This is experimental psychology's great patron, though surely a fascinating question but one requiring later barred from any role that might remotely separate treatment. For the moment merely take resemble sainthood. Soon after the wave of "new" note that Wundtian anecdotes have long been psychologists spread out from Wundt's laboratory, passed down from author to author without worthy a series of intellectual revolutions largely erased recourse to original sources, and, also, that it is from memory the content of Wundtian psychologi- common in intellectual history for later schools of cal theory. thought to foster distortions and misinterpretations Now that the movement set in motion by Wundt of earlier ones—psychology, of course, offering has come through its first century, it would seem numerous opportunities. For now, let us examine fitting to mark the centenary by briefly turning the fundamentals of Wundt's psychology that have, back, reexamining psychology's historical founda- for better or worse, been disguised or lost in the tions, and paying homage to the founding father. course of history's machinations. There is, however, another reason for review, being less ceremonial and clearly more interesting. To Wundt's Method put it simply, the few current Wundt-scholars (and some do exist) are in fair agreement that Wundt The basic premise in Wundtian psychology is that as portrayed today in many texts and courses is the only certain reality is immediate experience. largely fictional and often bears little resemblance Proceeding from this premise, Wundt had accepted to the actual historical figure (cf. Blumenthal, the following goals for all science: the construction 1970; Bringmann, Balance, & Evans, 1975; of explanations of experience and the development Mischel, 1970). of techniques for objectifying experience. By the Naturally, it might be suspected that the above latter, he meant that the scientist attempts to com- radical statement is only the nit-picking of a few municate and reproduce his experiences in others in antiquarians obsessed with minor matters of in- standardized ways; thus it becomes possible to per- terpretation. But alas, such is not the case. These form tests that lead to public agreement about are claims about the very fundamentals of Wundt's phenomena and to agreement about their explana- work, often asserting the opposite of what has been tion. This was commonplace for Wundt and is a standard description prevailing over much of the found at the outset of many of his texts. past century. Yet, if popular historical accounts In the natural sciences, as Wundt continues, it is the attributes of experience derived from ex- ternal objects and energies that' are subjected to tests, explanations, and public agreement. But in This article is a revised and expanded version of a talk presented to the New York Academy of Sciences, New the case of psychology, it is the attributes of ex- York City, October 19, 1974. perience derived from the processes of the ex- Requests for reprints should be sent to Arthur L. periencing subject that are made the object of Blumenthal, 48 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. tests, explanations, and public agreement. These

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • NOVEMBER 197S • 1081 psychological entities include experienced memory and replicable, in this case for the study of per- and perceptual capacities, fluctuations of attention ception, attention, memory, etc. To be sure, there or alertness, ranges of our sensitivities, etc. In were some disagreements, conflicting data, and un- the jargon of today, we would without hesitation supported speculations in those days, just as there say "human information-processing capacities." are today. Yet it is this subtle division between the physical Wundt's adherence to the canons of experimental and the psychological sciences that has led to in- procedure was so strict that, in fact, it sharply numerable textbook treatments of Wundt as a limited his use of experiments in psychology. Thus, mind-body dualist, and that is one of history's in the case of most "higher" mental processes such glaring distortions. For if you read Wundt, in as language or concept formation, he felt that true almost any of his texts, you will discover that his experiments were not feasible. Instead, these topics rejection of mind-body dualism is as emphatic a must, he argued, be studied through techniques of statement on the matter as you are likely ever to historical and naturalistic observation and also of encounter. He often said that psychology cannot logical analysis. This Wundt did by examining the be denned as the science of the mind because there social-cultural products of human mental activity, are no objects called "minds." that are distinct from making logical inferences about the underlying pro- objects called "bodies," a scenario that appears cesses. In the case of language, for example, he repeatedly in his works. went deeply into the technical study of linguistics Although physiologists and psychologists study (Blumenthal, 1970). So in these ways, a large one and the same organism, Wundt viewed them part of Wundt's psychological work is not experi- as analyzing and objectifying different experiences mental. derived from different vantage points. This is now usually called the "double-aspect" resolution of the Wundt's Theoretical System mind-body problem. And Wundt's use of the phrase "psychophysical parallelism" referred to But so far these are methodological matters and do this same view, though again it unfortunately led not speak to the essence of Wundt's psychological many later reviewers to the mind-body-dualism in- theory. What emerged as the paradigm psycho- terpretation. Rather, it referred to the separate logical phenomenon in his theoretical system would orientations of physiology and psychology where now be described as selective volitional attention. it is separate methodologies, in the sense of separate It is why he identified his psychology as "volun- types of observations, that here run in parallel. taristic" to distinguish it from other schools (see Another serious problem of misinterpretation especially Wundt, 1896b). He did not use the concerns Wundt and introspection. Contrary to label "structuralist" which was proffered and per- frequent descriptions, Wundt was not an intro- petuated by Titchener and James. spectionist as that term is popularly applied today. Mischel (1970) has recently surveyed Wundt's The thrust behind his entire experimental program writings, detailing Wundt's grounding in volitional- was the claim that progress in psychology had been motivational processes. Yet it was with apparent slow because of reliance on casual, unsystematic forceful impact on later historical interpretation introspection, which had led invariably to unre- that Titchener (1908) had given short shrift to solvable debates. In several books and mono- this theme, at the very heart of Wundtian psychol- graphs (in particular, 1888 and 1907) Wundt ogy, because of the overtones of continental idealist argued that armchair introspection could, in princi- philosophy in notions of volition. Titchener's ple, never succeed, being a logical impossibility as longest period of formal education came at Oxford, a scientific technique. The 1907 monograph was and not surprisingly he maintained certain biases a severe critique of the Wiirzburg psychologists for toward the British empiricist-sensationist tradition, their return to an earlier style of unverifiable in- even though that tradition was anathema to trospection. Wundt's views, and more than any other topic the Wundt promoted the cause of experimental brunt of Wundt's polemical writings. psychology more through accomplishments in his Without giving supportive citation, Boring laboratory than through polemics. From its out- (1950) states that Wundt had opposed the implica- set, the Wundtian program followed the general tion of an active volitional agent in psychology. conceptions of experimental science and the re- But now Mischel (1970) with extensive citation quirement that private experience be made public has shown, on the contrary, that volition-motivation

1082 • NOVEMBER 1975 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST is a central, primary theme in Wundt's psychology. of psychology, especially associationism. His reac- Briefly, that theme runs as follows: To explain a tions against associationism were directed mostly volitional act on the basis of its motives is different at the form it had assumed in mid-19th-century from the explanation of occurrences in the physical Germany in Herbart's psychology. sciences, and "volitional activities are the type in Herbart, you may recall, had atomized mental terms of which all other psychological phenomena processes into elemental ideas that became asso- are to be construed" (Wundt, 1908, Vol. 3, p. 162). ciated into compounds according to classical asso- Wundt's studies of volition, in turn, amounted ciationist descriptions. Wundt considered that ap- to an elaborate analysis of selective and construc- proach to be a mere primitive analogy to systems tive attentional processes (often summarized under of physical mechanics, and he argued at length that the term apperception), which he localized in the those systems teach little about the interrelations brain's frontal lobes. Other psychological processes of psychological processes (Wundt, 1894). For (perceptions, thoughts, memories) are, according those systems were oblivious to what he felt was to Wundt, generally under the control of the cen- the essential distinction between psychological and tral attentional process. physical causality; they portrayed mental processes It is on this basis that Wundt claimed another as if they were a "mere field of billiard balls" col- point of separation between psychology and phys- liding and interacting with each other, where cen- ics—a difference between psychological and physi- tral control processes are lacking. cal causality (see especially, Wundt, 1894). In Boring's widely repeated assertion that Wundt the case of physics, actions and events obey in- turned to chemistry for his model seems clearly violable laws; but in the case of psychosocial inaccurate to the serious reader of Wundt. How- phenomena, actions are made by an active agent ever, the Wundtian mental-chemistry cliche did with reference to rule systems. become popular among later textbook writers. Wundt acknowledged the principle of the con- Wundt did in his early years make brief, passing servation of energy and, consequently, the theo- references to J, S. Mill's use of a chemical analogy retical possibility of reducing psychological obser- to describe certain perceptual processes, namely, vations to physiological or physical descriptions. that one cannot determine the quality of water Still, he argued, these physical sciences would then (i.e., "wetness") from the separate qualities of describe the act of greeting a friend, eating an oxygen and hydrogen. Similarly, the qualities of apple, or writing a poem in terms of the laws of a perception are not directly given in its underlying mechanics or in terms of physiology. And no elements. matter how fine-grained and complicated we make But Wundt points out that this analogy does not such descriptions, they are not useful as descrip- go far enough, and by the end of the century he tions of psychological events. Those events need is describing it as a false analogy because the be described in terms of intentions and goals, ac- chemical synthesis is, in the final analysis, wholly cording to Wundt, because the actions, or physical determined by its elements while the psychological forces, for a given psychological event may take an synthesis is "truly a new formation, not merely infinite variety of physical forms. In one notable the result of a chemical-like formation." And, example, he argued that human language cannot be "J. S. Mill's discussion in which the mental forma- described adequately in terms of its physical shape tion is conceived as a 'psychic chemistry' leaves or of the segmentation of utterances, but rather out its most significant aspect—the special creative must be described as well in terms of the rules and character of psychic syntheses" (Wundt, 1902, p. intentions underlying speech. For the ways of 684). What the chemical analogy lacks is the expressing a thought in language are infinitely independent, constructive, attentional process which variable, and language is governed by creative in the psychological case is the source of the syn- rules rather than fixed laws (Wundt, 1900-1920). thesis. Wundt did, of course, write chapters on ele- Mechanism or Organism? mentary sensory-perceptual processes and elemen- tal affective processes, but with the emphasis on These distinctions lead to a related and consistent process. And he acknowledged that a major part theme in Wundt's writings concerning what he of any scientific methodology involved analysis of called "the false materialization of mental pro- a system into component processes. Further, he cesses," which he found prevalent in other schools stressed that these elements were to be taken as

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • NOVEMBER 1975 • 1083 hypothetical constructs. Such elemental processes "higher" mental processes and hence were mostly would never actually be observed, he thought, in nonexperimental investigations. pure isolation but would always be aspects or fea- Werner (1948) has written that Wundt repre- tures of larger images or configurations. sented the halfway mark in the transition from Here Wundt used the German word Gebilde. Herbart's atomism to the Gestaltist's holism. But For a translation, the dictionary (Cassell's) gives from the point of view of Wundt's voluntaristic us the following choices: either "creation," "prod- psychology, the essential central control processes uct," "structure," "formation," "system," "organi- were of no more primacy to the Gestaltists than to zation," "image," "form," or "figure." But in the Herbart—both conceived a rather passive orga- few English translations of Wundt, we find the nism, one that is controlled by external or inde- word "compound," unfortunately again suggesting pendent forces such as the a priori self-organizing the analogy to chemistry. "Compound" is a con- qualities of sensory fields. Both, in sharp contrast ceivable choice, but in the context of Wundt's con- to Wundt, appealed to physics for models and figurational system it seems not the best term. theories. Another example: Wundt's "whole or unified men- tal impression" (Gesamtvorstellung) is unfortu- Modern Reconstructions nately translated as "aggregate ideas." In the following note in an obscure book, pub- Now to describe Wundt's psychology in more de- lished in 1944, Wundt's own son, Max Wundt, tail, and to consider its present relevance, I want rebutted the caricature of his father's work as a to outline some six current trends that could be psychology of mental elements: viewed as reconstructions of Wundtian psychology in modern clothing: One may follow the methodologically obvious principle of First, Wundt's central emphasis on volitional advancing from the simple to the complicated, indeed even employing the approach that would construct the mind processes bears noteworthy resemblance to the from primitive mechanical elements (the so-called psy- modern work on "cognitive control" as found, for chology of mental elements). In this case, however, method and phenomena can become grossly confused. . . . example, in extensive research by Gardner, Klein, Whoever in particular ascribes to my father such a con- Holzman, and their associates (cf. Gardner, Holz- ception could not have read his books. In fact, he had man, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959). Both tradi- formed his scientific views of mental processes in reaction against a true elementistic psychology, namely against that tions used notions of different styles of attention of Herbart, which was dominant in those days. '(p. IS) deployment to explain a variety of perceptual and thought processes (sometimes even involving the To confound matters further, the later movement same materials, e.g., the Miiller-Lyer illusion). toward holism in Gestalt psychology placed Wundt The recent research, employing factor analyses in a contrastive position and again portrayed him of a variety of performance tasks, has determined as an elementalist and associationist in ways not two independent variables of cognitive control, characteristic of his intentions. True, there is which Gardner et al. call "field-articulation" and always a chapter titled "Associations" in Wundt's "scanning." These can be defined, as well, simply texts—but it is a far cry from the serial linkages by substituting a similar description found in of atomistic ideas found among many association- Wundt's psychology texts, as follows: First, in ists. Wundt's "associations" are "structural in- corresponding order, is Wundt's mental "clearness" tegrations," "creative syntheses," "fusions," and process that concerns the focusing or emphasizing "perceptual patternings." of a single item of experience. Wundt described Wundt's later students, including Sander, Krue- this as "apperceptive synthesis" where variations ger, and Volkelt, renamed their school Ganzheit from broad to narrow syntheses may occur. The psychology or roughly "holistic psychology," and second variable is a mental "distinctiveness" pro- throughout the 1920s and 1930s the old Wundtian cess which is the marking off of an item of experi- institute at Leipzig was a center for theorists with ence from all others. Wundt described this as a holistic bent. Wundt's journal, the Psycholo- gische Studien, which had ceased publication upon "apperceptive analysis," a relating and comparing his retirement, was then reactivated with the title, function. The discovery and testing of nearly Neue Psychologische Studien. It was the central identical attention-deployment factors in recent organ of the Ganzheit psychologists; however, its times occurred independently of the old Wundtian articles primarily followed Wundt's interests in the psychology. And too, the recent studies make fre-

1084 • NOVEMBER 1975 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST quent use of elaborate personality theories that high arousal versus low arousal, and concentrated were unavailable to Wundt. attention versus relaxed attention, Wundt had Second, detailed comparisons have been made adopted the first two dimensions from earlier recently between the development of psycholinguis- writers on the topic of emotion. The third dimen- tics in the 1960s and that of Wundtian psycho- sion reflects his characteristic emphasis on the linguistics at the turn of the century (Blumenthal, process of attention. 1970). Both the modern transformational gram- Around the turn of the century, an intensive marians after Chomsky and the Wundtian psycho- sequence of investigations to relate these dimen- linguists at the turn of the century trace their sions to unique bodily response patterns did not notions of language back to the same historical meet with popular success. However, years later, sources (e.g., to Humboldt). The psycholinguistic when factor analysis became available, statistical issues debated in the 1960s often parallel those studies of affective and attitudinal behavior again debated at the turn of the century, such as the yielded factors that parallel those of Wundt rather opposition between taxonomic and generative de- closely (cf. Burt, 1950; Osgood, Suci, & Tannen- scriptions of language. Very briefly, Wundt's baum, 1957; Schlosberg, 1954; and several others analysis of language usage depicts the transforma- reviewed by Strongman, 1973). Osgood's three tion of simultaneous configurations of thought into dimensions are described as "good-bad," "active- sequential representations in language symbols by passive," and "strong-weak." Schlosberg's dimen- means of the scanning activities of attention sions are "pleasantness-unpleasantness," "high-low (Wundt, 1900-1920, Vol. 1). activation," and "attention-rejection." A third reconstruction concerns abnormal psy- Emotions and affects held an important place in chology. Among his students, the one who main- Wundt's system because they were postulated as tained the longest intellectual association with the constituents of volition. Further, Wundt sug- Wundt was the psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (see gested that almost every experience (perception, Fischel, 1959). Kraepelin's (1919) attentional thought, or memory) has an affective component. theory of schizophrenia is an application of Thus, affect became the basis for his explanation of Wundtian psychology, an explanation of schizo- pattern recognition: a melody, for instance, pro- phrenias as abnormalities of the attention-deploy- duces a very similar emotional configuration as it ment (apperception) process. It conceives certain is transformed to other keys or played on other abnormalities of behavior as resulting from flaws instruments. Wundt speculated that affect was the in the central control process that may take the by-product of the act of apperceptive synthesis, form of either highly reduced attentional scanning, and as such it was always on the periphery of con- or highly erratic scanning, or extremes of atten- sciousness. That is, we can never focus our atten- tional focusing, Kraepelin proposed that ab- tion upon an emotion, but can only focus on ob- normalities in simple perceptual tests should show jects or memories that produce an emotional aura up in schizophrenic individuals corresponding to in immediate experience. these particular control-process distortions. Fifth, the study of selective attention has been The modern attentional theory of schizophrenia at the core of much of the recent work on human is a direct revival of the Kraepelinian analysis, as information processing (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; noted, for example, in an extensive review by Kahneman, 1973; Moray, 1970; Neisser, 1967). Silverman (1964). As in the Kraepelinian de- It is impossible here to relate this highly complex scriptions, abnormalities of behavior result from field to the early Wundtian psychology other than disruptions of the central attentional processes to note the prominence of attention in both and where there is either highly reduced or highly that the time variable is central to both. Space erratic attentional scanning and focusing. And permits mention of only two examples: these mental changes, again, are indicated by The seminal investigations of Sperling (1960) divergent performances in simple perceptual tests, concerning perceptual masking are one example. Fourth is Wundt's three-factor theory of affect, Sperling took direct inspiration from Wundt's 1899 which was developed by analogy to his formula- monograph on the use of tachistoscbpes in psycho- tions of multidimensional descriptions of certain logical research in which Wundt came to the fol- areas of sensory experience. For the description lowing three conclusions about the perception of of emotional experience, he used these three bipolar extremely brief .stimuli: (1) the effective duration affective dimensions: pleasant versus unpleasant, of a percept is not identical with the duration of

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • NOVEMBER 1975 • 1085 the stimulus—but rather reflects the duration of a psychologies. He also drew parallels, as did psychological process; (2) the relation betvyeen Wundt, between the development of individuals accuracy of. a perception and stimulus duration and of societies. And Werner acknowledged in- depends on pre- and postexposure fields (which debtedness to Wundt. But in Wundt's Volker- may induce what we now call masking); and (3) psychologie there is, again, greater emphasis on central processes, rather than peripheral sense or- volitional and attentional processes in the analysis gan aftereffects, determine these critical times. of the development of human culture; he theorized Wundt's observations spurred a body of early re- that those central mental processes had emerged search, and those early data are now relevant to as the highest evolutionary development, and that a large body of similar modern investigations. they are the capacities that set men above other Perhaps the most frequently employed technique animals. It is the highly developed selective-at- in Wundt's laboratory was that of reaction-time tention capacities that, as he claimed, enabled man- measurement. This was the direct adoption of a kind to make a consistent mental advance and to program suggested earlier by Donders (1868- develop human culture. For without these capaci- 1869). Essentially, inferences were made about ties, men would forever be at the mercy of sporadic human information-processing capacities on the thoughts, memories, and perceptions. basis of measured performance times under sys- tematically varied performance conditions. This program has now, in post-mid-20th century, been Wundt's Historical Contexts widely and successfully revived. It is well illus- Wundt was not a mere encyclopedist or compiler trated, for instance, in the seminal studies of of volumes, contrary to many descriptions. It was Sternberg (1970) on the attentional scanning of typical of him, however, always to compare and to immediate-memory images, in which Sternberg contrast his system with other schools of thought, draws the relation between his work and the earlier ancient and modern. Perhaps in that sense he Donders program. could be considered an encyclopedist. True, most For a sixth and final comparison, I must refer of his works begin with a long recital of his ante- to what Wundt called his deepest interest, which cedents and the antecedents of rival positions. resulted in a 10-volume work titled V' olkerpsycholo- Wundt's motivation for scholarly productivity gie: Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgestze should not be surprising, considering the strong •von Sprache, Mythus, und Sitte. An English ver- family traditions that lay behind him (and that sion of this title could be Cultural Psychology: An went unrecognized by most historical writers). Investigation of the Developmental Laws of Lan- Recent researchers (Bringmann et al., 197S) claim 1 guage, Myth, and Morality. Appearing from 1900 that no other German intellectual has a family through 1920, this series contains two books on tree containing as many ancestors engaged in in- language, three on myth and religion, one on art, tellectual pursuits. On his father's side were his- two on society, one on law, and one on culture and torians, theologians, economists, and geographers. history. If there is a current work by another On his mother's side were natural scientists and author that is conceptually close to these volumes, physicians. Two of his ancestors had been rectors it is Werner's (1948) Comparative Psychology of of the University of Heidelberg. Mental Development, today read in some circles of To conclude, I wish to draw an outline of the developmental psychologists. streams of history in which Wundt lived and Following Wundt, Werner described an organis- worked. Historians have often defined a few broad, mic psychology that is in opposition to mechanistic alternating cultural epochs in the 19th century. At some risk in using a much-abused word, one might call each a "zeitgeist"—a time that favored 1 Volkerpsychologie has also been translated as "folk a particular cultural style. These periods begin psychology," "psychology of peoples," and "ethnic psy- chology." Wundt quite deliberately avoided the terms with the dominant romanticism and idealism early sociology and anthropology because they were then heavily in the century, largely a German-inspired ethos identified with the midrlQth-century positivism of Auguste shared by Kant, Humboldt, Schopenhauer, Goethe, Comte and related Anglo-French trends, which Wundt opposed. Some later writers on the history of psychology Hegel, and Fichte, to mention a few. In that era, erroneously stated that the Volkerpsychologie is available philosophy, science, religion, and art were often in English translation. They apparently mistook a different combined into something called "nature-philoso- and simpler one-volume work that E. Schaub (1916) translated as Elements of Folk Psychology. phy." Such an integration was exemplified in the

1086 • NOVEMBER 1975 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST pantheistic writings of Gustav Fechner, an exotic tion. Few, especially outside Germany, understood latecomer to the romantic movement and an im- any more what the old term apperception had once portant source of inspiration for Wundt. (In referred to. several ways, Wundt's 10-volume Volkerpsychologie Strange as it may seem, Wundt may be more reflects the spirit of the old nature-philosophy.) easily understood today than he could have been Around the mid-19th century, a positivist and just a few years ago. This is because of the cur- materialist movement grew dominant by vigorously rent milieu of modern cognitive psychology and rejecting the previous idealism. There then ap- of the recent research on human information pro- peared the influential Berlin Physical Society, the cessing. Yet this new understanding does require mechanistic psychology of Herbart, the behavior- serious study of Wundt in the original German. istic linguistics of the sorcalled Junggrammatiker Most current textbook summaries of Wundt grew linguists, and Comtean positivist sociology, among out of a time when early behaviorist and positivist other examples across the disciplines. At the peak movements were eager to encourage a break with of this movement, academicians became methodol- the past, hence giving understandably little effort ogy conscious to the extreme. The taxonomic to careful description of the enormous body of methods of biology were imported into the social writings they were discarding. Simplistic historical sciences. There was often a downgrading of accounts resulted. "mentalism" in favor of "physicalism" and "en- Today much of the history of Wundt remains to vironmentalism." be told, both of his personal development and of Then, toward the end of the 19th century came his psychological system. It is well worth telling. a resurgence of the romanticist-idealist outlook, particularly in continental Europe. It has been de- REFERENCES scribed either as neoromanticism, neoidealism, or neo-Kantianism. H. Stuart Hughes (19S8) has Blumenthal, A. L. Language and psychology: Historical aspects of psycholinguistics. New York: Wiley, 1970. provided a summarization in his influential book, Boring, E. G. A history of experimental psychology. New Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950. European Social Thought 1890-1930. At around Bringmann, W. G., Balance, W., & Evans, R. B. Wilhelm Wundt 1832-1920: A biographical sketch. Journal of the time of World War I, this movement went into the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1975, 11, 287-297. sharp decline, being displaced by a rebirth and Broadbent, D. Perception and communication. New York: Pergamon, 1958. rise in popularity of positivism and behaviorism Burt, C. The factorial study of emotions. In M. Reymert which subsequently dominated many intellectual (Ed.), Feelings and emotions. New York: McGraw-Hill, circles well into the 20th century. 1950. Donders, F. Over de snelheid van psychische processen. Wundt's psychology rose and fell with the late- Tweede Reeks, 1868-1869, II, 92-120. (Trans, by W. 19th-century neoidealism. His core emphasis on Koster as On the speed of mental processes, In Acta Psy- volition and apperception comes straight from the chologica, 1969, 30, 412-431.) Fischel, W. Wilhelm Wundt und Emil Kraepelin. Karl earlier German idealist philosophy. It is not sur- Marx Universitat Leipzig, Beitrdge anr Universitat prising that this should be so, for as a youth he was Geschichte, 1959,1. deeply inspired by the romanticist-idealist litera- Gardner, R. W., Holzman, P. S., Klein, G. S., Linton, H., & Spence, D. P. Cognitive control; A study of individual ture and nature-philosophy (Wundt, 1920). Cer- consistencies in cognitive behavior. Psychological Issues, tainly his intellectual development also included 1959, Monograph 4. the influence of mid-19th-century positivism, es- Hughes, H. S. Consciousness and society: The reorientation of European social thought 1890-1930. New York: pecially in his promotion of experimental psychol- Knopf, 1958. ogy. Yet, during that positivist period, he had re- Kahneman, D. Attention and effort. Englewood Cliffs, mained largely unrecognized as a psychological N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973. theorist. The popular success of his theoretical Kraepelin, E. Dementia praecox and paraphrenia (Trans, by M. Barclay from selected writings of Kraepelin). system seems coordinated with the beginnings of Chicago, 111.: Chicago Medical Book, 1919. neoidealist reorientations, and his system became Mischel, T. Wundt and the conceptual foundations of fully formed in the Grundriss of 1896 (and later psychology. Philosophical and Phenomenological Re- search, 1970, 31, 1-26. editions; Wundt, 1896a). Moray, N. Attention. New York: Academic Press, 1970. But unfortunately for Wundt, Zeitgeist support Neisser, U. Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton- disappeared rapidly in the early 20th century; Century-Crofts, 1967. definitions of psychology were then changing, and Osgood, C., Suci, G., & Tannenbaum, P. The measure- ment of meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, his works were soon meaningless to a newer genera- 1957. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • NOVEMBER 1975 • 1087 Schlosberg, H. Three dimensions of emotion. Psycho- Wundt, W. Ueber psychische Kausalitat und das Prinzip logical Review, 1954, 61, 81-88. des psychophysichen Parallelismus. Philosophische Silverman, J. The problem of attention in research and Studien, 1894, 10, 1-124. theory in schizophrenia. Psychological Review, 1964, Wundt, W. Grundriss der Psychologic. Leipzig: Engel- 71, 352-379. mann, 1896 (10th ed., 1911). (Trans, by C. Judd of Sperling, G. The information available in brief visual 1896 and 1907 editions as Outlines of psychology.) (a) presentations. Psychological Monographs, 1960, 74(11, Wundt, W. Ueber die Definition der Psychologic. Philo- Whole No, 498). sophische Studien, 1896,12, 1-66. (b) Sternberg, S. Memory-scanning: Mental processes re- Wundt, W. Zur Kritik tachistokopischer Versuche. Philo- vealed by reaction-time experiments. In J. Antrobus sophische Studien, 1899, IS, 287-317. (Ed.), Cognition and affect. Boston, Mass.: Little, Wundt, W. Vdlkerpsychologie: Eine Untersuchung der Brown, 1970. Strongman, K. T. The psychology of emotion. New York: Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythus, und Sitte (10 Wiley, 1973. vols.). Leipzig: Engelmann', 1900-1920. Titchener, E. B. The psychology of feeling and attention. Wundt, W. Grundziige der physiologischen Psychologic New York: Macmillan, 1908. (Vol. 2). Leipzig: Engelmann, 1902 (5th ed.). Werner, H. The comparative psychology of mental de- Wundt, W. Ueber Ausfrageexperimente und ueber velopment. New York: Science Editions, 1948. Methoden zur Psychologic des Denkens. Psychologische Wundt, M. Die Wurzeln der deutschen Philosophic in Studien, 1907, 3, 301-360. Stamm und Rasse. Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt, 1944. Wundt, W. Logik (3 vols.). Leipzig: Engelmann, 1908, Wundt, W. Selbstbeobachtung und innere Wahrnehmung. Wundt, W. Erlebtes und Erkanntes. Stuttgart: Krohner, Philosophische Studien, 1888, 4, 292-309. 1920.

Scientific Awards Program for 1976

The Committee on Scientific Awards is accepting nominations for its award pro- gram. Each year the Committee selects up to three persons as recipients of the Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award who, in its opinion, have made the most distinguished theoretical or empirical contributions to scientific psychology in recent years. The Distinguished Contribution for Applications in Psychology Award will be given for the fourth time this year. This award will be presented to an individual who, in the Committee's opinion, has engaged in a program of research that is sys- tematic and applied in character. A new award, the Early Career Award, has been established to recognize the large number of excellent young psychologists. For purposes of this award, psy- chology has been divided into nine areas (human learning/cognition, psychopathol- ogy, physiological, animal, personality, developmental, methodological, social, and sensation/perception), and three awards are given in three-year cycles. The titles of the areas were chosen not to stereotype the field but only for convenient identifica- tion. The titles are not restrictive, and the Committee will be very inclusive in considering nominees. For 1976, nominations of persons who received their PhD after 1967 are being sought from the areas of developmental, personality, and animal learning. The Committee would appreciate receiving a statement on the worthiness of the nominee, along with a vita, list of publications, and reprints of his or her out- standing, early contributions to science. ' Names and appropriate information which will guide the Committee on Scientific Awards in conducting an intensive career review and evaluation should be forwarded to the Office of Scientific Affairs, American Psychological Association, 1200 Seven- teenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Deadline jor nominations is January 15,1976.

1088 • NOVEMBER 1975 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST