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There is an increasing awareness of the artificial based on opportunistic alliance building. Relation- nature of the concept of the South Caucasus, group- ships between governments, outside forces, and domes- ing together three countries, which are indeed not to tic actors cease as quickly as they develop. Though giv- be treated as one entity. Especially the countries of the ing an impression of political progress, the region as a South Caucasus regard this concept with hesitation as whole stagnates socially and economically and leaves they see the danger that it neglects, at least conceptu- itself exposed to outside intervention. Peaceful coexis- ally, the individual development paths and character- tence and local escalation of conflict come and go. istics of each country. Countries of the South Cauca- While mild forms of authoritarianism assert them- sus will not fulfill the external expectations of regional selves in the countries of the South Caucasus, the integration, but fragment. Over time, individual coun- region remains a contested space. As Europe becomes tries might integrate with outside neighbours. It may less engaged, due to lack of progress and the political well be possible that in 2025 Armenia will have under- developments on the ground, and Turkey real- gone advanced integrated with Turkey, Azerbaijan will ize mutual benefits from cooperating economically and have become part of the Caspian region and Georgia politically in the region. Meanwhile, Russia is able to will have oriented West and become an integral part of create a space of “sovereign democracies” including Mol- the region. dova, Belarus and Ukraine. If this development coin- cides with the EU maintaining a closed door policy Scenario 4: Muddling Through toward Turkey, a new East–West divide will be consol- The region continues to be based on balance of power idated and the countries of the South Caucasus will face concepts. The survival strategies of regional players are further isolation westward.

About the Authors Sven Behrendt is a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center. Iris Kempe is the Director of the Heinrich Boell Foundation South Caucasus.

The 2014 Winter Olympic Games in : Implications for the Caucasus By Stanislav Secrieru, Bucharest

Abstract Predicting what will happen next in international politics is never an easy task. When it comes to the Cau- casus, anticipating the region’s alternative futures is even more complicated. However, a high degree of vola- tility makes such an effort worthwhile. The Sochi Olympics is among the factors which should not be under- estimated in scenario building for the Caucasus. Intensive preparations for 2014 already serve as a catalyst for economic development as well as a cause for environmental concerns. Looking beyond the immediate effects, the Sochi factor is also likely to affect politics and security in the entire Caucasus.

Future Scenarios and the Sochi Factor are a case in point. The Russian Black Sea resort city of Regional scenario building traditionally revolves around Sochi is located in the immediate vicinity of Georgia’s optimistic, hybrid (combining a mix of positive and neg- breakaway region of (113 km separate Sochi ative trends) and skeptical projections. However, this from Sukhumi) and the politically fragile republic of classic approach is far from perfect. To reduce uncer- Karachaevo-Cherkessia (part of Russia’s North Cau- tainty about the region’s possible futures as much as pos- casus Federal District). The geographical location of sible, the foresight exercise needs to address the impact the 2014 Olympic Games venue, coupled with the eco- of local mega-events on regional developments too. As nomic opportunities it offers (the event’s budget is esti- far future scenarios for the Caucasus are concerned, the mated at $30 billion) and a variety of ongoing political Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, scheduled for 2014, and security challenges transforms Sochi, for the next 4 caucasus analytical caucasus analytical digest 19/10 digest

four years, into one of the region’s focal points. Thus and the importance it attaches to the Olympic Games in any realistic scenario planning for the Caucasus should Sochi. In Russia, international sports victories are associ- consider the immediate and potential far-reaching con- ated with the performance of the political regime. Thus, sequences of this sporting event. Moscow will work hard to prove in 2014 that Russia Intensive preparations for 2014 already serve as a is still an elite sports nation. Domestically, a successful catalyst for positive as well as negative developments. performance at the Olympic Games should uphold the Sochi is a huge construction site which attracts work- Kremlin’s slogan, promoted over the last decade, that ers from the economically depressed Northern Cauca- the country is “rising from its knees.” In terms of for- sus (in particular North Ossetia which is home to refu- eign policy, the extensive media exposure surrounding gees from South Ossetia) and South Caucasus republics the games (an estimated 4.7 billion viewers followed badly battered by the global financial crisis. An influx the Beijing Games in 2008) provide Russia with a great of Armenian workers into Sochi is already underway, a opportunity to boost its “soft power” potential by over- process facilitated by the compact Armenian minority hauling its image and portraying itself as a “civilized which resides in the city. In this way, the Sochi Olym- great power”. The construction of Olympic venues from pics provide job opportunities, alleviating to some extent scratch may help demonstrate that Russia has not lost the social pressure across a region known for high unem- the ability to implement highly complex projects. As ployment rates. On the negative side, the massive con- President Medvedev put it “this is our chance to show struction campaign inflicts irreparable damage on local the world that we are a capable, hospitable and techno- ecosystems. Russian NGOs have identified grave irreg- logically-advanced country.” ularities during the construction projects, imperiling the Sochi National Park and Caucasus State Nature Russian-Made Stability Biosphere Reserve, the latter of which is included on In light of the Chinese experience in dealing with the the UNESCO World Heritage site list. Civil society in protests supporting Tibet along the Olympic flame route, tourist-dependent Abkhazia has quietly raised concerns it is reasonable to assume that Russia will strive for sta- about the massive extraction of local sand and stone for bility (as this term is understood in Moscow) in the Sochi construction sites, worrying that this effort will South and North Caucasus. Moscow would not like harm coastal river deltas and Black Sea beaches. Thus, to see public opinion distracted by security and politi- instead of improving living conditions, the “Sochi affair” cal problems in the North Caucasus, its illegal military could significantly deteriorate the environment of the presence in Georgia, or the potential renewal of hostili- local communities and damage the tourist industry. ties between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the worst case Looking beyond the socio-economic and environ- scenario, such developments could deliver a heavy blow mental impact, it is plausible to assume that the Sochi to the Sochi Olympics PR campaign, provoke a boycott factor will affect politics and security in the Caucasus. by an influential part of the international community, As the Olympic Games approach, state, non-state and or result in the non-participation of the belligerent sides. anti-state regional actors are likely to either restrain their There are early signs that point to Russia’s intentions behavior or engage in spoiler tactics. As the host of the to assure stability in a highly volatile region. The cre- games, Russia will actively pursue its objectives in the ation of the North Caucasus Federal District in Janu- region. However, other regional players also see in the ary 2010 and the appointment of the former business- Olympics a window of opportunity, and are determined man Alexander Khloponin to lead it indicate that the to push vigorously for agendas often running counter Kremlin is looking for a more balanced mix between to those professed by the Kremlin. blunt power projection and a transformative approach in the North Caucasus to address the structural problems Sports and Politics Nexus which breed violence and unrest. Khloponin’s demand Russia traditionally has been strong in winter sports, to appoint an ethnic Cherkess as a prime-minister of winning more medals than the average country. How- Karachaevo-Cherkessia in accordance with the infor- ever, the national team’s poor performance at the 2010 mal power distribution algorithm (the president of the Games in Vancouver proved to be a major disappoint- republic is an ethnic Karachai, the vice-president and ment. President Medvedev’s last minute decision to can- speaker of the republican legislative is an ethnic Rus- cel his trip to Vancouver and the subsequent “purge” of sian) shows that Moscow keeps an eye on the poten- the country’s sports federations provide a good sense of tial flashpoints close to Sochi and is willing to contain how Russia perceives its failures in international arenas any manifestation of ethnic discord. In the South Cau- 5 caucasus analytical caucasus analytical digest 19/10 digest

casus, Russian diplomacy played a positive role favor- ers harbor no illusion about the chances of a pro-Rus- ing, even if half-heartedly, the Turkish-Armenian rap- sian candidate. The best case scenario for Russia would prochement. Far from being decisive, the Sochi factor be a succession to power in Georgia of a Timoshenko- is likely to influence Russian policy seeking to maintain type politician—one who is more sensitive to Kremlin the power equilibrium between Armenia and Azerbai- interests and who would engage Russia in a pragmatic jan to minimize the chances of conflict unfreezing in co-existence in the South Caucasus, pursuing a multi- Nagorno-Karabakh ahead of the 2014 Games. vectoral foreign policy. Georgian Politics and the Kremlin’s Game Given the tradition of turbulent power transitions, With the Moscow Olympics of 1980 in mind, Russia elections in Georgia might get messy. It is difficult to is likely to prefer avoiding another military confronta- anticipate how Russia would act in the case of a pro- tion with Georgia, at least until 2014. But this does not longed power vacuum generated by a political struggle mean that the Kremlin will stay aloof from Georgian which in a worse case scenario could degenerate into politics. Moscow perceives the current Georgian regime small-scale armed clashes. Given its massive military as unpredictable, too unilaterally oriented towards the presence in South Ossetia and the short distance (40 km) West in its foreign policy, and thus predisposed to play from there to the Georgian capital, Russia could rela- a spoiler game in the “Sochi affair” (for instance by sup- tively easily seize Tbilisi by mobilizing additional forces porting the campaign for the recognition of a “Circassian from the North Caucasus. But such a move would heav- genocide” or upholding the ecologists’ concerns about ily damage its plans for 2014, embroiling Moscow in a the resource drain from Abkhazia). Therefore, Russia is risky enterprise and strengthening the Olympics boy- likely to work hard to ignite regime change in Tbilisi well cott camp. Unwilling to pay the costs of such a move, as before the Olympic Games begin. To achieve this goal, an alternative, Russia could join the international com- Russian top politicians will prefer to address directly munity (EU, US, Turkey) or foster a regional “consor- the citizens of Georgia, reiterating Moscow’s “peaceful tium” of security stakeholders with Turkey to facilitate intentions” and portraying President Mikheil Saakash- negotiations for a political solution to end the standoff. vili as a political outcast (this was the gist of President International mediation would receive strong support Medvedev’s message to Georgian citizens on Victory from Armenia and Azerbaijan since both heavily rely on Day). In parallel, Russia will multiply its channels of trade routes or energy transit through Georgia. A pro- political influence in Georgia by cementing ties with longed political instability and the potential disruption what it sees to be the moderate or pragmatic segments of transit through Georgia might serve as an additional of the opposition. Friendly NGOs and representatives incentive for Yerevan to make further steps towards the of the Georgian Diaspora in Russia might be co-opted normalization of relations with Turkey which might lead in this effort. Occasionally Russia will demonstrate the to the opening of borders. advantages of a more “accommodationist” approach to put additional pressure on the government in Tbilisi. Russia–Georgia–Abkhazia Knot Former prime-minister Nogaideli’s visits to Russia fol- The new Georgian leadership which will probably lowed by holiday flights between Moscow and Tbilisi, emerge after exhausting political battles could adopt as well as the liberation of Georgian citizens detained a cautious and less emotionally-charged line on Rus- by the South Ossetian militia, provides insights into the sia. Opinion polls show that the overwhelming major- tactics Russia will employ. ity of the Georgian population (52 percent) disapproves Since the results of the local elections in May sug- the government’s policy towards Russia. Thus, if public gest that the prospects that Saakashvili will be forced opinion remains unchanged on this matter, the newly to resign are bleak, Russia almost certainly will be indi- elected president might prefer to refrain from combat- rectly involved in Georgia’s 2012–13 parliamentary and ive rhetoric and could take cautious steps to improve presidential electoral cycle. Moscow will act to upset the relations with Russia as much as possible in the post- formation of a pro-presidential majority in the legisla- 2008 war environment. If Georgia opts for this track, ture and to weaken the domestic standing of President then the Olympic Games in Sochi could provide a good Saakashvili so that he will not be able to stay in power occasion to employ sports diplomacy, especially if Turk- beyond 2013 or steer his heir through managed elections. ish–Armenian joint efforts to open the border prove suc- Russia will seek a similar “revenge” as in Ukraine’s 2010 cessful by 2014. presidential elections, looking to reassert its position in Nevertheless, the opposite scenario, Georgia’s boy- the Black Sea region. However, Russian decision-mak- cotting the games in Sochi, can not be ruled out either. 6 caucasus analytical caucasus analytical digest 19/10 digest

The move could be motivated by Russia’s meddling in ready to deepen economic ties with Sukhumi. Despite the electoral campaign, its continuous illegal military frustrations over the EU’s decision not to recognize its presence in Georgia, and the involvement of Abkhazia in sovereignty, Abkhazia regards Europe also as a potential the Olympic Games preparations. But without dramatic source of investment and know-how transfer. There are changes in the post-war status quo in relations between fears in Abkhazia that after the 2014 Olympics, inter- Georgia, the separatist regions and Russia (including, national interest in the region’s fate will recede, leav- for example, the occupation of new territories in Geor- ing Sukhumi one-to-one with Moscow, which, while gia proper close to the breakaway republics or an escala- upholding de jure Abkhazia’s independence will effec- tion of violence resulting in civilian deaths), it would be tively hamper any efforts to assert de facto statehood hard to “sell” the international community on a boycott absorbing it (as Moscow did many times in relations of the Olympic Games and would reduce the chance with its “client-entities”) into the “Russian world”. to improve relations with Russia. Contemplated also as a punishment of Abkhazia, a boycott would do little Terrorist Threat to help Georgia’s cause by further alienating Sukhumi Russian authorities intend to generate a spill-over effect from Tbilisi. More than that, such a decision could por- that could project development efforts from Sochi fur- tray Georgia as a state unable to find a long termmodus ther into the neighboring North Caucasus. However, vivendi between imperatives of domestic reform, nor- chances for the opposite to happen are unfortunately malizing relations with its important northern neighbor high. Russian official statistics for 2009 show a signifi- and upholding its territorial integrity by more concilia- cant rise in the number of attacks by Islamic fighters and tory and flexible means that might pay off in the future. their victims. Ahead of the Sochi Olympics, the Islamic Preparations for the Sochi Olympics will facilitate rebels will be tempted to spread the violence beyond the Russia’s economic expansion in Abkhazia, paving the North Caucasus. The May 2010 deadly terror attack way for the de facto incorporation of this region into in Stavropol (240 km from Sochi) is a warning bell Russia. The Russian government earmarked for the for the Russian authorities. In 2013–2014 the world’s period 2010–2012 around $100 million for the social- attention will be attuned to Sochi, which makes it for economic development of Abkhazia. The breakaway the Islamic insurgents a perfect location for a shocking region already serves as an important provider of natu- attack. If Russia intensifies its campaign to pacify the ral resources (construction materials) and as a transpor- North Caucasus by military means and fails to address tation hub (Russia gained control of the railway infra- the roots of the violence, a new generation of radicals structure for ten years) for Sochi. Furthermore, Moscow will be extremely motivated to hit back. expects Abkhazia to provide cheap accommodation to Sochi is the summer residence of the Russian head 100,000 workers from the Olympic construction sites. of state (Bocharov Ruchey) which means that there were Russia is also considering taking over the Sukhumi tight security measures even before the city’s successful airport (Babushera) and operating flights to Moscow. Olympic bid. Over the last decade, Russian security ser- The Kremlin actively promotes the idea of a Customs vices have gained valuable experience in counter-terror- Union between Russia and Abkhazia, which Sukhumi ist tactics. Hence, these factors, coupled with the com- has resisted so far. As Moscow solidified its military plex security plan to be implemented by the Russian footprint in Abkhazia, it was quick to suggest signifi- authorities, suggest that there will be enhanced safety for cant reductions in the Abkhaz armed forces. Thus, Rus- participants and visitors during the winter competition. sia’s overwhelming economic and military penetration in However, global experience in fighting against terror the years to come could alter demographics, eliminate has made clear that despite draconic security measures, the incipient political pluralism in Abkhazia and set the terrorist attacks took place even in the most securitized stage for importing Russian-style “sovereign democracy.” zones. Given the trend of suicide attacks in the North In contrast to Moscow, Sukhumi perceives the Sochi Caucasus, terrorists might employ the same tactics in Olympics as a unique time that maintains Abkhazia in Sochi. Such acts are difficult to prevent and, unfortu- the spotlight and thereby opens a window for its “de-iso- nately, the March explosions in the Moscow Metro are lation” strategy. Turkey, home for a half million Abkhaz a grim reminder of what could happen in 2014. Diaspora, is seen as a channel through which Sukhumi Many construction sites in Sochi could serve as a per- hopes to break its isolation. In turn, Ankara, keen to fect place to stock explosives in advance. Russian secu- diffuse Russia’s growing clout in Abkhazia and boost its rity services announced that in 2008 terror attempts influence in the South Caucasus, sent signals that it is involving explosive materials were prevented in Sochi 7 caucasus analytical caucasus analytical digest 19/10 digest

and Anapa. Islamic rebels could target the critical infra- Conclusions structure, the destruction of which could lead to delay, There is no doubt that the Sochi Olympics will have a suspension or cancellation of the event. As the Olympic multidimensional impact on developments in the Cau- Games will be organized in separate mountain (Kras- casus. The interpretation of regional trends and pat- naya Polyana) and coastal (Sochi) clusters, railway links terns coupled with a bit of imagination presented above will be important for transporting athletes, officials, revealed how the Sochi factor could influence politics, and tourists. A number of explosions on the gas pipe- economics and security in different parts of the Cauca- lines and railways which connect Dagestan with Azer- sus. Although the prestige calculations of hosting the baijan show the rebels’ interest to inflict damages to the Olympics in Sochi will push Russia to seek stability in transportation infrastructure. If not prevented, terrorist the region, some instruments and means employed to attacks could incite violence throughout the entire Cau- this end could generate contradictory effects. Other state casus. Encouraged by its ability to carry out attacks in or non-state actors’ competitive agendas could breed ten- a highly securitized environment, the insurgents could sions or, in a pessimistic scenario, create an explosive try to extend the “front,” for instance from Dagestan to mix affecting parts of the region or the whole area, ulti- northern Azerbaijan (in 2008 Azerbaijan’s Special Forces mately jeopardizing the 2014 Olympics themselves. Nev- clashed in the Gusar district with Dagestani militants). ertheless, there are fair chances that the Sochi factor will The Russian authorities might also try to camouflage play a positive role too by restraining states from openly their failure by accusing Georgia of providing shelter aggressive actions and diluting to some extent the pat- and support for Islamic fighters, fueling another spiral terns of enmity in a region with an acute deficit of trust. of tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi.

About the Author Stanislav Secrieru is an Associate Researcher at the Center for East-European and Asian Studies in Bucharest.

Armenia–Turkey Relations: Options for 2025 By Alexander Iskandaryan, Yerevan

Abstract Armenia–Turkey relations are of extreme importance for the entire Caucasus region. How they look in 2025 will affect the entire region. An assessment is not very difficult as there are few options. Armenia–Turkey rap- prochement began in 2008 and stalled by early 2010; however, following the political logic, normalization will happen sooner or later. The timing will depend on political developments in Armenia and Turkey but also on the regional context. Moreover, the situation in the South Caucasus will only have a limited instru- mental effect on the rapprochement; it’s the geopolitical context in the wider region, from the Balkans to the Larger Near East, which will define the place and role of Turkey by 2025.

Most Probably, By 2025 the Borders Will of whether or not the country will have joined the EU, Be Open Turkey will remain part of European geopolitics also in Where Turkey is concerned, the true question is “when” 2025. Turkey’s relations with Armenia are part of Tur- not “if.” It is extremely unlikely that Turkey will give key’s European agenda and of the EU and US agenda up its engagement with the West in the coming years. with regard to Turkey. With all the domestic problems Even a dramatic development such as coup d’état or this involves, 15 years is a long time for Turkey to with- change of rule in Turkey will not make it abandon its stand European and US pressure with regard to normal- Europeanization plans. Turkey’s choice is about civili- izing ties with Armenia. zation, not current politics. Something like the Iranian Turkey’s efforts to boost its role in Middle Eastern revolution is not nearly feasible in Turkey. Irrespective politics (manifest as an estrangement from and even a 8