Development and Decline of the British Crosshead Type Marine
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Development and Decline of the British Crosshead Type .. Marine Propulsion Diesel Engine Denis Griffiths A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Liverpool John Moores University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy September 1994 1 The following Figures/Tables/Appendix have been omitted on request of the University- Fig. 2.1 pg.20 Fig. 5.4 pg.193 Fig. 2.2 & 2.3 pg.22 Table 6.1 pg.198 Table 2.1 pg.24 Table 6.2 pg.201 Table 2.2 pg.25 Fig. 2.4 & 2.5 pg.30 Published papers - Appendix 3 Table 3.1 pg.40 Table 3.2 pg.41 Table 3.3 pg.43 Table 3.4 pg.45 Table 3.7 pg.48 Table 3.8 & 3.9 pg. 49 Table 3.11 pg.51 Table 4.g.1 pg.137 Table 5.1 pg.188 Table 5.2 pg.189 Fig. 5.1 & 5.2 pg.191 Fig. 5.3 pg.192 Ph.D. Thesis Development and Decline of the British Crosshead Marine Diesel Engine Denis Griffidls Summary The Thesis is divided into seven chapters with chapter four comprising nine subchapters which describe the types of crosshead marine diesel engines designed by British companies. Early application of the diesel engine to marine purposes is covered in chapter I and this also looks at the initial interest shown by British companies to this form of propulsion. The following chapter deals with the British attitude to the motorship both in terms of the shipowner and the shipbuilder. The influence of the British coal industry is considered and the evidence offered to show that the coal lobby was influential in obstructing adoption of the diesel engine by British shipowners; this in tum hindered development of British marine diesel engines. Continental owners faced no such opposition. Economics of motorship operation are covered in chapter 3 and show that, during the 1920s and early 1930s, for most cargo ships of moderate power diesel propulsion was more economical than steam. Diesel machinery cost more than steam plant but the lower operating costs and reduced size, which allowed more cargo to be carried, gave the diesel an economic advantage on many world routes and even in the tramping trades. Evidence is offered to support this. All British designed crosshead marine diesel engines are discussed individually in terms of technical detail and possible reasons for their failure to make an impact on the market. Only Doxford and Harland & Wolff (H& W) engines were constructed in the post- WWII years and these are covered in some detail. Work done by other British engine builders in terms of co-operation with overseas designers is also considered together with the apparent unwillingness of British designers to actively licence their designs overseas, or even in Britain. Reasons for the failure of British crosshead marine diesels, apart from Doxford and H&W, to make any impact on the market are discussed and conclusions drawn. Reasons for abandonments of the H& W engine in the 1960s and Doxford engine in the 1980s are also examined. These show that technical difficulties alone were not responsible for the decline, particularly in the case of the Doxford engine. 2 Contents OJapter Oiapter Paae No No Acknowledgments 4 I Introduction 5 1. The Diesel Engine for Marine Purposes 7 2. British Motorships 18 3. Economics and the British Motor in the 1920s 39 4. British Crosshead Marine Diesel Engines 56 4.a The Vickers Engine 58 4.b. North British Diesel Engine Company Engines 69 4.c. The Swan Hunter Neptune Engine 85 4.d The Fullagar Engine 94 4.e Scott Engines (Still & Straight Diesel) 109 4.f The Richardsons Westgarth Double-Acting Engine 125 4.g The Alfred Holt Engine 135 4.h Harland" WolfT Engines 139 4.j The Doxford Engine ISO 5. British Engine Builders and the Diesel 182 6. Epilogue 198 7. Conclusions 208 Appendix I. Spare Gear Requirements 213 Appendix 2. Ship Casualties of the 1920s; ships fitted with 218 British Diesel engines Appendix 3. Refereed publications resulting from research detailed in the thesis Insert 3 Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the following for assistance given throughout this research project. The Royal Society which provided funding for travel by way of a History of Science and Technology award. Staffs of the libraries of Lloyd's Register of Shipping, the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, the Institute of Marine Engineers, the National Maritime Museum, the Science Museum, the Guildhall Library (London), Liverpool City Library, Hull Library Service and the Mitchell Library (Glasgow). Staffs of Tyne & Wear Archives (Newcastle), Wirral Archives (Birkenhead), National Maritime Museum Archive (Brass Foundry, Woolwich), Lloyd's Register of Shipping Archive (London), The Ballast Trust (Johnstone, Scotland), Vickers' Archives (via Ron Fitzgerald at Armley Mills, Leeds), and The Maritime Records Centre (Liverpool). Fred M. Walker (formerly of the NMM. Greenwich), Peter Gee (Chief Engineer Surveyor to Lloyd's Register of Shipping), Jim Grandison and Barbara Jones (Lloyd's Register of Shipping), Dr W. Lind (The Ballast Trust), Dr Johnston Robb (formerly of Scotts of Greenock), Tom Gourley (formerly of Barclay Curle), Dr Finn Orbeck and Bryan Taylor (formerly of Doxfords), David Stables (formerly of Blue Funnel and Doxfords), Willie Falconer and Andy Crawford (formerly of Blue Funnel), Ben Crowdy (formerly of Hawthorn Leslie), Roddie MacLeod and Keith Corlett (Andrew Weir Shipping), Paul Neilsen and N.E. Rasmussen (of B&W), N.W. Fleming (former seagoing engineer), P.J. Humphreys (formerly of Newbury Diesels) and Ron Fitzgerald. Staff at VSEL (Barrow) and Swan Hunter of Wallsend for attempting to find old records and to Stan Wakefield for advice on wordprocessing packages. Professor Ben Mills and Professor Mike Lalor, my supervisors, for advice and to various staff in the School of Engineering & Technology Management, particularly the late I.C. Watson, for encouragement and advice. 4 Chapter I Introduction During the 1950s Britain was still a major maritime power, at least in terms of commercial ship operations and shipbuilding, and many of the ships owned by British companies or built in British yards were propelled by diesel engines. Two crosshead diesel engine designs were recognised as being British and both were of the opposed- piston form, the Doxford engine and the Harland & Wolff engine. By the mid-1960s production of the Harland engine had ceased whilst the Doxford was in serious decline, however, diesel propulsion of ships increased during those years at the expense of steam power. European designed engines, particularly Sulzer and Burmeister & Wain, increased their share of the available market whilst Japanese engine builders also made an impact as shipbuilding in that country expanded. The fact that only two British crosshead engines were available during the post-WWll period gave the impression that, despite Britain's significant share of the shipbuilding market, British engine/ship builders were not really interested in the diesel engine for propulsion purposes. The investigation originated with this belief, the intention being to find reasons why Britain did not embrace the diesel engine for marine propulsion purposes, but it soon became apparent that far from ignoring the diesel a significant number of British engine/ship builders enthusiastically developed designs of their own. The number of marine crosshead diesel engines designed in Britain exceeded the number of designs produced by any other country but British shipbuilders launched fewer motorships during the critical 1920s than did their European competitors. British shipowners also tended to remain in favour of the older steam reciprocating engine than the newer diesel engine. Of the British crosshead marine diesel designs which evolved during the post-WWI period only the Doxford was a commercial success; the only other successful British design, from Harland & WoltT, did not enter production until after WWII and its period of commercial prosperity lasted less than 20 years. 5 Despite the failure of British designs to make an impact on the market there was a demand for the diesel engined ship, especially from Scandinavian shipowners and a few enterprising British shipowners. A significant number of British engine/ship builders took licences for European designed engines and some played a very active role in developing those designs. British shipowners still, however, remained firmly wedded to the steam engine. British designed engines were studied in order to determine possible reasons for their failure to make an impact on the market whilst the general situation regarding shipping operations during the 1920s was also investigated as was the attitude of the British marine industry to the diesel engine. Such investigations were necessary in order to determine reasons for the apparent reluctance of British shipowners to order motor ships when their European competitors favoured the internal combustion engine. Despite the fact that Britain was still the world's leading shipbuilding nation during the 1920s very few home developed diesel engines went into its ships. During the post-WWII years both the Doxford and H&W engines achieved considerable sales, especially with British shipowners, but both engines went into decline during the 1960s. Although the Doxford remained in production until the 1980s it never regained the share of the available market it had enjoyed during the 1950s. Reasons for the failure of both of these engines were also investigated. The story of the British crosshead marine diesel engine proved to be more extensive than originally envisaged whilst the failure of the engines as a group owed as much to human aspects as it did to mechanical shortcomings. 6 Chapter 1. The Diesel Engine for Marine Purposes. Credit for introduction of the compression ignition internal combustion engine cycle generally goes to the individual after whom engines operating on such cycles are named, Dr Rudolf Diesel.