Liberal Hegemony and US Foreign Policy Under Barack Obama Peter Rudolf SWP Comments

Home , Liberal internationalism, Obama Doctrine

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Liberal Hegemony and US Foreign Policy under Barack Obama Peter Rudolf SWP Comments

Looking back at the US foreign policy discourse since the end of the Cold War, it is striking how entrenched and dominant one basic assumption has been: the idea that the United States must remain the leading power in the international system. According to this conception, the United States is and should remain the guarantor of international stability. Despite all the debates that have taken place between liberal and conservative internationalists, US foreign policy ideology is still defined by an understanding of the US as “benign hegemon”, even though the term itself is hardly used. America’s leadership is believed to be benevolent in the sense that it is in the best interests not only of the US but also of most states worldwide. Yet in the current presidential race, for the first time since America’s rise to global leadership, a candi- date is running under the slogan of “America First”— an attitude that marks a significant break with the dominant hegemonic role conception.

At the level of foreign policy discourse, wedded to versions of the traditional hege- “realists” in academia and in libertarian monic role conception and to a “strategy think tanks (notably the Cato Institute) of primacy” (Mastanduno 1997), apparently have long advocated a grand strategy of fearing the risks of retrenchment more selective engagement—but so far with little than the costs of continued “deep engage- political resonance. At the political level, ment” (Brooks/Ikenberry/Wohlforth the populist Tea Party wing of the Republi- 2012/13). can Party and, more importantly, Donald Here, two variants of a hegemonic for- Trump as the party’s presidential candi- eign policy have been competing with each date, tend toward instinctive semi-isola- another. On the one hand, there is the tionism—or to use a term coined by Walter unilateral, occasionally almost imperial Russell Mead, toward a “Jacksonian” foreign foreign policy approach that finally took policy view, mixing the preference for a shape in the wake of September 11, 2001, strong military with opposition to anything but that had its roots in the debates of the smacking of international liberalism in the 1990s. On the other hand, there is the pre- Wilsonian tradition (Rathbun 2013). But the dominantly liberal internationalist, multi- foreign policy “establishment” remains lateral approach to foreign policy. Both

Dr. Peter Rudolf is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s The Americas Division. SWP Comments 40 August 2016

1 approaches agree on maintaining American the sense of liberal hegemony. Unlike later dominance in terms of material power re- under President George W. Bush, this ten- sources. Also, both approaches display a dency was not the product of the adminis- pronounced disposition toward the use of tration’s strategic orientation. Rather, it military force in the pursuit of a number of arose structurally through the strength- goals. Both are united in their perception ened role of Congress after the end of the of threats from illiberal regimes and failed Cold War. Congress turned out to be open states as well as from Islamist extremism. to resistance from particularistic social and Both approaches share a globalist view of bureaucratic actors to increased multilat- American interests and the conviction that eral integration of American power (Thimm the US should remain committed to and 2016). And ideologically, Republicans in involved in all strategically important Congress were drawn toward a policy world regions. The two approaches differ, focused more on narrow national “great however, in the importance they ascribe power” interests than on the imperatives to international legitimacy and, thus, to of hegemonic leadership (Skidmore 2005). the role of multilateral institutions. Yet the concept of the liberal hegemonic There are three key functional precon- role remains present as a regulative ideal in ditions for the role of a liberal hegemon the American self-image, and as such, also (Ikenberry 2001): functions as a critical yardstick in assessing  First, a preference for multilateral mech- US foreign policy. Does this self-conception anisms, giving other states the oppor- correspond with current political realities? tunity to bring in their own interests and Do operational policies live up to the stra- perspectives, and a willingness to obey tegic imperatives resulting from this role the rules governing all members of mul- conception? These are the questions that tilateral institutions and to constructive- guide the following analysis. As this can ly build and develop such institutions. only be a brief attempt at addressing them,  Second, the provision of public goods the analysis is confined to the level of what from which other states can benefit. may be called the “grand strategic orienta- This essentially legitimizes the hege- tion.” This notion refers to the guiding mon’s leadership role and increases the principles of foreign policy, which are chances that other states will accept its sometimes formulated explicitly in de- role and the special responsibilities and claratory strategies, and sometimes only privileges that are associated with it. recognizable implicitly in operational Leadership in providing public goods policies. entails the willingness to intervene militarily for the sake of the international order even if vital national interests are Obama’s grand strategic orientation not directly affected. The grand strategic orientation of the  Third, maintaining cooperative relations Obama administration can be interpreted with other major powers, whose inter- as an attempt to reformulate and re-legiti- ests must be taken into account in order mize US leadership by adapting it to a to reduce any incentives they might have changing international system with a to challenge the American-led interna- shifting distribution of power and influ- tional order and alter the balance of ence among the major powers (Quinn power. 2011). It is a strategic orientation sensitive Obviously, actual US foreign policy has to the costs of foreign interventions and to never fully corresponded to this ideal type. the difficulties of translating power into Unilateral tendencies could already be real influence through the use of military observed during the Clinton administra- force in particular, which has proven to tion, which understood US leadership in be both expensive and of limited value in

SWP Comments 40 August 2016

2 asymmetric conflicts. The guiding assump- namo ran into bipartisan Congressional tion seems to be that the United States is opposition, which Obama did not dare to less hampered by a lack of material re- bypass through unilateral executive action. sources than by the continuing challenge The Obama administration jettisoned the of re-legitimizing US leadership (Buzan term “global war on terror”, but has not 2008). Indeed, in spite of its relative decline, abandoned the war paradigm. The war the US position within the international against al-Qaida and so-called “associated system continues to be characterized by forces” has continued, with the meaning clear superiority in terms of the unique of the term “associated forces” stretched combination of hard—military, economic, to include almost any violent extremist and technological—power resources (Cox Islamist group. The administration has 2012). But a hegemonic role transcends the argued that this “armed conflict” is not use of brute power; it requires that other geographically confined, an assertion that states accept the hegemonic leadership as is highly contentious under international legitimate. Clearly, at the declaratory level, law and not shared by many allies of the but less so at the operational level, foreign United States (McCrisken 2011). policy under Obama has reflected the func- With these legitimizations as the context tional logic of the hegemonic role concep- for US military operations, long-range, re- tion (Ikenberry 2014; Rapkin/Braaten 2009). mote-controlled, highly accurate combat drones have enabled a largely opaque institutionalized practice of more or less Restoring moral authority targeted killings to unfold within a grey By distancing his administration from zone of asymmetric conflicts. Drone war- the worst excesses of the “war on terror,” fare became the hallmark of Obama’s ver- Obama tried to restore a common basis of sion of the war on terror, which—despite shared interests and values between the US murmurings even among US allies—has not and those countries that are expected to received much public criticism and has also follow American leadership, especially not significantly changed the overall posi- the traditional US allies. The expectation tive international perception of Obama and seemed to be that a new, positive percep- his foreign policy (Wike/Stokes/Poushter tion of the US would make it easier to mobi- 2015). lize international support for US objectives. When he took office, Obama stated that over the course of the “global war on ter- Multilateralism (if possible) ror,” the US had undermined the values President Obama promised to further that had made the US strong. But his pledge develop institutional procedures embed- to restore the moral authority of the US and ding the US in multilateral frameworks thus one source of “soft power” was more and allowing other states to have some difficult to translate into operational poli- influence on US policies. In Obama’s policies. There is no doubt that since that time, tical program, a stronger multilateral as Obama promised, interrogation methods orientation—the term “multilateralism” is have been limited to those outlined in the rarely used—has also meant calling allies to Army Field Manual and therefore within the take on more responsibility and passing on limits set by the Geneva Conventions. Secret costs to other states. In contrast to what prisons have been shut down, with the ex- initial pronouncements seemed to indicate, ception of those where detainees were held the Obama administration has not under- temporarily on transition to other facilities. taken any vigorous effort at adapting for- Rendition, a practice dating back to the mal institutions in order to anchor and Clinton years, has not been fully aban- socialize rising powers. Instead it prefers doned. And the promise to close Guantá- to use informal ad-hoc institutions, most

SWP Comments 40 August 2016

3 notably the Nuclear Security Summit held Providing collective goods in April 2010 (Vezirgiannidou 2013). Pre- The role of a global leader comes with both serving freedom of action has remained a benefits and obligations: other states allow key feature of US foreign policy even under the leader to exercise greater influence, but President Obama. With a Congress that is expect it to provide collective goods. But a institutionally inclined towards unilateral- global leader can use its material resources ism and, particularly among Republicans, to pursue national interests unilaterally deeply averse to anything smacking of (Cronin 2001). If it behaves as the US did multilateralism, only a minimal instru- under President George W. Bush, the mental multilateralism has been politically foundations of its leadership role and the feasible (Skidmore 2012). As the Obama institutions through which it can legiti- years have again shown: in US foreign poli- mately act as a leader will be undermined. cy, multilateralism is hardly more than US leadership under President Bush was instrumental, meaning that international strongly focused on, or indeed almost re- institutions are useful as long as they help duced to the “war on terror” (Kagan 2008). to reduce costs and lend legitimacy to US President Obama’s idea of leadership has foreign policy actions, and as long as these transcended this conception. By trying to institutions do not impose constraints on take on a leadership role in climate policy the United States. and in nuclear disarmament and non- In the economic sphere, traditional proliferation policies, the Obama admin- multilateralism has given way to a form of istration has sent a clear and positive signal what the administration calls “pragmatic to the international community. multilateralism” (Froman 2015). With the Assuming a leadership role in contribut- Doha round of global trade talks having ing to climate stability was a major chal- reached a standstill, the priority shifted to- lenge for Obama. The US Congress, con- ward regional trade pacts. It is hard to say cerned about the costs, was opposed to any whether this shift was originally inspired comprehensive climate change bill and by a geopolitical rationale or whether it any binding international agreement on was rather framed this way to shore up reducing greenhouse gases. By resorting to domestic support in light of the uncertain politically controversial executive action, welfare gains and overall employment especially the new regulations based upon effects resulting from regional trade pacts. the Clean Air Act, Obama circumvented In effect, it meant a “return of geopolitics” domestic opposition and proved that he and the prospect of competing trading was serious about changing the US position blocs (Dieter 2014). For the United States, from blocking to leading. And by persuad- the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) is seen ing China to agree to reduce its emissions, as a way of countering Chinese hegemonic the Obama administration paved the way aspirations in Asia by denying China the for the Paris Climate Agreement in Decem- political leverage over other Asian count- ber 2015. As a set of non-binding commit- ries in case they become too economically ments, the Paris agreement did not directly dependent on China. Together with the involve Congress. The agreement may fall Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part- short of the actions needed to effectively nership (TTIP), it offers the US the prospect tackle climate change, but it represents the of preserving its leadership role in setting culmination of a long evolution in the US the ground rules of the international role in climate policy: a transformation trading system (Green/Goodman 2016; from spoiler to leader (Sussman 2015). Hamilton 2014). No less controversial domestically was Obama’s vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) remained the modest

SWP Comments 40 August 2016

4 first—and last—step toward this utopian acceptance of “spheres of influence” (Hast goal. Reviving nuclear arms control with 2014). But in the US discourse, “spheres of Russia undoubtedly had some value: Al- influence” are rarely seen as a model for though the relationship between the two regional order that reduces the risk of countries soon began to deteriorate again, war and acts as a precondition for global the treaty was implemented smoothly, with cooperation (Shapiro 2015). Rather, in the the transparency and verification measures dominant narrative, granting a “sphere of probably acting as an antidote to potential influence” to another power is generally miscalculation and worst-case assumptions condemned as appeasement (Kagan 2015). in a climate of growing mistrust (Pifer Thus Russia’s and China’s claim to “spheres 2016). With Russia uninterested in further of influence” has posed a serious challenge strategic nuclear cuts and with the role of to US foreign policy and has raised the nuclear forces in US security policy still not question of whether the US should tacitly substantially reduced, as became clear in accept such spheres or deny them at high the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the costs (Etzioni 2015). prospect of further, more ambitious nucle- From the start, the Obama administra- ar disarmament looked bleak. In 2013, a tion has placed a clear priority on “reset- follow-up study to the NPR concluded that ting” relations with Russia that had dete- deployed strategic nuclear forces could be riorated over the last years of the Bush further reduced by no more than one-third administration and on establishing co- in a new arms control treaty. Unilateral operation on security issues. It hoped that cuts were not envisioned by the Obama by developing a comprehensive agenda for administration (Woolf 2015). Whether or cooperation, Russia might be more forth- not the US nuclear weapons modernization coming on issues of utmost importance for program launched by the administration the US foreign, especially nuclear arms con- actually undermined the administration’s trol and nuclear nonproliferation (Deyer- 2010 pledge not to develop or deploy new mond 2013). Even as US-Russian relations nuclear warheads remained the subject of reached their low point in the wake of the controversy, even among former Obama Ukraine conflict, the Obama administra- administration officials. tion did not resort to a confrontational containment policy. Instead, it tried to walk a fine line: On the one hand, it reacted to Cooperative relations with major powers the Russian annexation of Crimea by sup- If the United States wants to use interna- porting the Ukraine (but without lethal tional institutions, especially the United weapons), by imposing targeted economic Nations, in an instrumental way, then it sanctions, and by militarily reassuring must necessarily maintain a cooperative NATO’s Eastern members; on the other relationship with major powers that are hand, it tried to maintain the basis for co- not US allies. This holds true especially if operation on global issues (Charap/Shapiro US leadership is understood as akin to 2015). directing a “concert” of major powers, a Whereas Russia is perceived as a region- conception that was implicit in the stra- al power ready to reassert its claim of a tegic vision of the early Obama administra- “sphere of influence” in the former Soviet tion. But the logic of a global “concert” space, managing the economic and military implies that regional geopolitical rivalries rise of the People’s Republic of China is can be managed and that they will not seen as the major geopolitical challenge of spin out of control as a result of regional the coming decades. The relationship counterbalancing (Kurth 2009). The classic between the US and China contains the instrument of mitigating geopolitical ingredients for a geopolitical power rivalry: competition between major powers is the China has been expanding its economic

SWP Comments 40 August 2016

5 and military power, and its regional and dens of direct military involvement and at global influence is growing, while the US avoiding new commitments of this kind. is determined to remain an Asian-Pacific Drones, bombs, Special Forces and proxy power and not to accept China’s regional fighters (such as the Kurds in the fight hegemony. The Obama administration was against ISIS) would take the place of “boots able to build on the strategic framework for on the ground,” counterinsurgency, and dealing with China that was established by nation-building. In a nutshell, that is the the Bush administration with the aim of line President Obama has maintained, even further integrating China into the inter- in the case of Syria, unfazed by the chorus national system and incorporating it as a of critics demanding more involvement, constructive actor into a concert of great either to demonstrate greater resolve or for powers under US leadership. This strategy humanitarian reasons (Krieg 2016). With does not, however, assume that China’s rise the exceptions of several failed efforts at will occur peacefully. Rather, it allows for reviving the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks the possibility that an antagonistic rivalry and of the successful Iranian nuclear talks, for hegemony will emerge. Political coop- the Obama administration has basically eration and economic integration were refrained from playing a leadership role in therefore pursued under the Bush admin- the Middle East, remaining primarily re- istration through a notable increase in active and avoiding costly commitments strategic hedging. Maintaining American (Gerges 2013). Although wedded to the military supremacy and expanding security hegemonic role, the Obama administration relationships with states in the Asia-Pacific has distinguished clearly between what it region had become central elements of this sees as core regions and issues on the one hedging by the end of the Bush administra- hand and more peripheral regions and tion. The Obama administration intensified issues on the other (Rose 2015). The next these elements of the strategy, while at the US administration, if led by Hillary Clinton, same time trying to continue cooperative might have a less differentiated view—but relations with China (Wolf 2014). at the risk of overestimating the potential influence and leverage the US can exert on a number of developments. Regional rebalancing Strengthening the US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region, deepening relationships Conclusions with rising powers in that area, becoming Obama’s strategic orientation has reflected more involved in regional organizations, the functional logic of liberal hegemony and, as already mentioned, deepening eco- to a large extent, perhaps as much as was nomic integration through the TPP became possible given the domestic constraints and the central features of the policy of re- structural bias of US foreign policy towards balancing towards the Pacific under Obama unilateralism. The US Congress is skeptical (Paul 2015). Over more than a decade, the of and often opposed to any embedding of arc of crisis in the broader Middle East, foreign policy decisions into multilateral from North Africa to Pakistan, was the cen- institutions that could diminish its influ- tral focus of US foreign policy, consuming ence. Congress not only sets severe limits significant attention and resources—too on US multilateralism; it has indeed be- much attention and too many resources, come a driving force of unilateralism. If as the Obama administration concluded in there is one major issue on which Congress a very “realist” calculation of US interests. acts in a bipartisan spirit, it is on economic Thus, the basic thrust of Obama’s poli- sanctions (Tama 2014). Congress has been cies for that region soon became clear: They the main driver of US sanctions policy, of- would aim at reducing the costs and bur- ten trying to bind the hands of presidents.

SWP Comments 40 August 2016

6 The result is a certain amount of unilateral- Deyermond, Ruth, “Assessing the Reset: ism resulting from the extraterritorial Successes and Failures in the Obama reach of major sanction laws. Administration’s Russia Policy, 2009– But this unilateral temptation is not con- 2012”, European Security, 22 (2013) 4, fined to Congress. The Treasury Depart- pp. 500–523. ment has intensified and refined the use Dieter, Heribert, The Return of Geopolitics. of so-called secondary sanctions, especially Trade Policy in the Era of TTIP and TPP financial sanctions based on the central (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Decem- role of the US dollar in the international ber 2014). financial system (Lohmann 2014). The Etzioni, Amitai, “Spheres of Influence: question of unilateral US sanctions could a Reconceptualization”, The Fletcher Forum emerge as a highly controversial issue of World Affairs, 39 (2015) 2, pp. 117–132. under the next administration if the US Gerges, Fawaz A., “The Obama Approach to embraced a full-fledged containment policy the Middle East: The End of America’s against Russia or if the Western world Moment?”, International Affairs, became divided over efforts to manage 89 (2013) 2, pp. 299–323. China’s rise. With the re-emergence of great Green, Michael J./Goodman, Matthew P., power rivalries, US foreign policy is con- “After TPP: The Geopolitics of Asia and fronted with new challenges. Future histo- the Pacific”, The Washington Quarterly, rians might look back at the Obama era as 38 (2016) 4, pp. 19–34. the zenith of liberal internationalism and Hamilton, Daniel S. (Ed.), The Geopolitics of its vision of benign hegemony. TTIP. Repositioning the Transatlantic Relation- ship for a Changing World (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, References 2014). Brooks, Stephen/Ikenberry, G. John/ Hast, Susanna, Spheres of Influence in Inter- Wohlforth, William C., “Don’t Come national Relations. History, Theory and Politics Home, America: The Case against Re- (Farnham, 2014). trenchment”, International Security, Ikenberry, G. John, After Victory. Institutions, 37 (2012/13) 3, pp. 7–51. Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Buzan, Barry, “A Leader without Followers? Order after Major Wars (Princeton/Oxford: The United States in World Politics after Princeton University Press, 2001). Bush”, International Politics, 45 (2008) 5, Ikenberry, G. John, “Obama’s Pragmatic pp. 554–570. Internationalism”, The American Interest, Charap, Samuel/Shapiro, Jeremy, “Conse- 9 (2014) 5. quences of a New Cold War”, Survival, 57 Kagan, Robert, “The September 12 Para- (2015) 2, pp. 37–46. digm. America, the World, and George Cox, Michael, “Power Shifts, Economic W. Bush”, Foreign Affairs, 87 (2008), Change and the Decline of the West?”, pp. 25–39. International Relations, 26 (2012) 4, Kagan, Robert, “The United States Must pp. 369–388. Resist a Return to Spheres of Interest in Cronin, Bruce, “The Paradox of Hegemony: the International System”, Order from America’s Ambiguous Relationship with Chaos (Blog), Feb. 19, 2015. the United Nations”, European Journal of Krieg, Andreas, “Externalizing the Burden International Relations, 7 (2001) 1, pp. 103– of War: The Obama Doctrine and US 130. Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, International Affairs, 92 (2016) 1, pp. 97– 113.

SWP Comments 40 August 2016

7 Kurth, James, “Pillars of the Next American Tama, Jordan, “Bipartisanship in a Polar- Century”, The American Interest, 5 (2009) 2, ized Age: The U.S. Congress and Foreign pp. 4–13. Policy”, Prepared for delivery at the 2014 Lohmann, Sascha, Minenfelder der US-Außen- Annual Meeting of the American Politi- wirtschaftspolitik. Unilaterale Finanzsanktio- cal Science Association, Aug. 28-31, 2014. nen im Dienst nationaler Sicherheit, SWP- Thimm, Johannes, The United States and Aktuell 71/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen- Multilateral Treaties. A Policy Puzzle schaft und Politik, November 2014). (Boulder/London, 2016). Mastanduno, Michael, “Preserving the Vezirgiannidou, Sevasti-Eleni, “The United Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and States and Rising Powers in a Post- Grand Strategy after the Cold War”, hegemonic Global Order”, International International Security 21(1997) 4, pp. 49-88. Affairs, 89 (2013) 3, pp. 635–651. McCrisken, Trevor, “Ten Years on: Obama’s Wike, Richard/Stokes, Bruce/Poushter, Jacob, War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Prac- Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und tice”, International Affairs, 87 (2011) 4, Are Critical of Post-9/11 Torture (Washington, Politik, 2016 pp. 781–801. DC: Pew Research Center), June 23, 2015. All rights reserved Paul, Michael, Die amerikanische Schwerpunkt- Wolf, Reinhard, “The U.S. as a Pacific These Comments reflect verlagerung nach Asien, SWP-Studie 5/2015 Power? Chinas Aufstieg und die Zukunft the author’s views. (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und der amerikanischen Weltführungs- SWP Politik, March 2015). politik”, Steffen Hagemann/Wolfgang Stiftung Wissenschaft und Pifer, Steven, “New START Turns Five”, Order Tönnesmann/Jürgen Wilzewski (Ed.), Politik German Institute for from Chaos (Blog), Feb. 4, 2016. Weltmacht vor neuen Herausforderungen. International and Quinn, Adam, “The Art of Declining Politely: Die Außenpolitik der USA in der Ära Obama Security Affairs Obama’s Prudent Presidency and the (Trier, 2014), pp. 87–113. Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 Waning of American Power”, International Woolf, Amy F., U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: 10719 Berlin Affairs, 87 (2011) 4, pp. 803–824. Background, Developments, and Issues (Wash- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Rapkin, David P./Braaten, Dan, “Concep- ington, DC: Congressional Research www.swp-berlin.org tualising Hegemonic Legitimacy”, Review Service, Nov. 3, 2015). [email protected] of International Studies, 35 (2009) 1, ISSN 1861-1761 pp. 113–149. (English version of Rathbun, Brian, “Steeped in International SWP-Aktuell 56/2016) Affairs? The Foreign Policy Views of the Tea Party”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 9 (2013) 1, pp. 21–37. Rose, Gideon, “What Obama Gets Right: Keep Calm and Carry the Liberal Order on”, Foreign Affairs, 94 (2015) 5, pp. 2–12. Shapiro, Jeremy, “Defending the Defensible: the Values of Spheres of Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Order from Chaos (Blog), March 11, 2015. Skidmore, David, “The Obama Presidency and US Foreign Policy: Where’s the Multilateralism?”, International Studies Perspectives, 13 (2012) 1, pp. 43–64. Sussman, Bob, “The U.S. Finds Its Voice on Climate Change after Two Decades of Failed Diplomacy”, PlanetPolicy (Blog), Nov. 24, 2015.

SWP Comments 40 August 2016