Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Liberal Hegemony and US Foreign Policy under Barack Obama Peter Rudolf SWP Comments Looking back at the US foreign policy discourse since the end of the Cold War, it is striking how entrenched and dominant one basic assumption has been: the idea that the United States must remain the leading power in the international system. According to this conception, the United States is and should remain the guarantor of international stability. Despite all the debates that have taken place between liberal and conservative internationalists, US foreign policy ideology is still defined by an understanding of the US as “benign hegemon”, even though the term itself is hardly used. America’s leadership is believed to be benevolent in the sense that it is in the best interests not only of the US but also of most states worldwide. Yet in the current presidential race, for the first time since America’s rise to global leadership, a candi- date is running under the slogan of “America First”— an attitude that marks a signifi- cant break with the dominant hegemonic role conception. At the level of foreign policy discourse, wedded to versions of the traditional hege- “realists” in academia and in libertarian monic role conception and to a “strategy think tanks (notably the Cato Institute) of primacy” (Mastanduno 1997), apparently have long advocated a grand strategy of fearing the risks of retrenchment more selective engagement—but so far with little than the costs of continued “deep engage- political resonance. At the political level, ment” (Brooks/Ikenberry/Wohlforth the populist Tea Party wing of the Republi- 2012/13). can Party and, more importantly, Donald Here, two variants of a hegemonic for- Trump as the party’s presidential candi- eign policy have been competing with each date, tend toward instinctive semi-isola- another. On the one hand, there is the tionism—or to use a term coined by Walter unilateral, occasionally almost imperial Russell Mead, toward a “Jacksonian” foreign foreign policy approach that finally took policy view, mixing the preference for a shape in the wake of September 11, 2001, strong military with opposition to anything but that had its roots in the debates of the smacking of international liberalism in the 1990s. On the other hand, there is the pre- Wilsonian tradition (Rathbun 2013). But the dominantly liberal internationalist, multi- foreign policy “establishment” remains lateral approach to foreign policy. Both Dr. Peter Rudolf is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s The Americas Division. SWP Comments 40 August 2016 1 approaches agree on maintaining American the sense of liberal hegemony. Unlike later dominance in terms of material power re- under President George W. Bush, this ten- sources. Also, both approaches display a dency was not the product of the adminis- pronounced disposition toward the use of tration’s strategic orientation. Rather, it military force in the pursuit of a number of arose structurally through the strength- goals. Both are united in their perception ened role of Congress after the end of the of threats from illiberal regimes and failed Cold War. Congress turned out to be open states as well as from Islamist extremism. to resistance from particularistic social and Both approaches share a globalist view of bureaucratic actors to increased multilat- American interests and the conviction that eral integration of American power (Thimm the US should remain committed to and 2016). And ideologically, Republicans in involved in all strategically important Congress were drawn toward a policy world regions. The two approaches differ, focused more on narrow national “great however, in the importance they ascribe power” interests than on the imperatives to international legitimacy and, thus, to of hegemonic leadership (Skidmore 2005). the role of multilateral institutions. Yet the concept of the liberal hegemonic There are three key functional precon- role remains present as a regulative ideal in ditions for the role of a liberal hegemon the American self-image, and as such, also (Ikenberry 2001): functions as a critical yardstick in assessing First, a preference for multilateral mech- US foreign policy. Does this self-conception anisms, giving other states the oppor- correspond with current political realities? tunity to bring in their own interests and Do operational policies live up to the stra- perspectives, and a willingness to obey tegic imperatives resulting from this role the rules governing all members of mul- conception? These are the questions that tilateral institutions and to constructive- guide the following analysis. As this can ly build and develop such institutions. only be a brief attempt at addressing them, Second, the provision of public goods the analysis is confined to the level of what from which other states can benefit. may be called the “grand strategic orienta- This essentially legitimizes the hege- tion.” This notion refers to the guiding mon’s leadership role and increases the principles of foreign policy, which are chances that other states will accept its sometimes formulated explicitly in de- role and the special responsibilities and claratory strategies, and sometimes only privileges that are associated with it. recognizable implicitly in operational Leadership in providing public goods policies. entails the willingness to intervene mili- tarily for the sake of the international order even if vital national interests are Obama’s grand strategic orientation not directly affected. The grand strategic orientation of the Third, maintaining cooperative relations Obama administration can be interpreted with other major powers, whose inter- as an attempt to reformulate and re-legiti- ests must be taken into account in order mize US leadership by adapting it to a to reduce any incentives they might have changing international system with a to challenge the American-led interna- shifting distribution of power and influ- tional order and alter the balance of ence among the major powers (Quinn power. 2011). It is a strategic orientation sensitive Obviously, actual US foreign policy has to the costs of foreign interventions and to never fully corresponded to this ideal type. the difficulties of translating power into Unilateral tendencies could already be real influence through the use of military observed during the Clinton administra- force in particular, which has proven to tion, which understood US leadership in be both expensive and of limited value in SWP Comments 40 August 2016 2 asymmetric conflicts. The guiding assump- namo ran into bipartisan Congressional tion seems to be that the United States is opposition, which Obama did not dare to less hampered by a lack of material re- bypass through unilateral executive action. sources than by the continuing challenge The Obama administration jettisoned the of re-legitimizing US leadership (Buzan term “global war on terror”, but has not 2008). Indeed, in spite of its relative decline, abandoned the war paradigm. The war the US position within the international against al-Qaida and so-called “associated system continues to be characterized by forces” has continued, with the meaning clear superiority in terms of the unique of the term “associated forces” stretched combination of hard—military, economic, to include almost any violent extremist and technological—power resources (Cox Islamist group. The administration has 2012). But a hegemonic role transcends the argued that this “armed conflict” is not use of brute power; it requires that other geographically confined, an assertion that states accept the hegemonic leadership as is highly contentious under international legitimate. Clearly, at the declaratory level, law and not shared by many allies of the but less so at the operational level, foreign United States (McCrisken 2011). policy under Obama has reflected the func- With these legitimizations as the context tional logic of the hegemonic role concep- for US military operations, long-range, re- tion (Ikenberry 2014; Rapkin/Braaten 2009). mote-controlled, highly accurate combat drones have enabled a largely opaque institutionalized practice of more or less Restoring moral authority targeted killings to unfold within a grey By distancing his administration from zone of asymmetric conflicts. Drone war- the worst excesses of the “war on terror,” fare became the hallmark of Obama’s ver- Obama tried to restore a common basis of sion of the war on terror, which—despite shared interests and values between the US murmurings even among US allies—has not and those countries that are expected to received much public criticism and has also follow American leadership, especially not significantly changed the overall posi- the traditional US allies. The expectation tive international perception of Obama and seemed to be that a new, positive percep- his foreign policy (Wike/Stokes/Poushter tion of the US would make it easier to mobi- 2015). lize international support for US objectives. When he took office, Obama stated that over the course of the “global war on ter- Multilateralism (if possible) ror,” the US had undermined the values President Obama promised to further that had made the US strong. But his pledge develop institutional procedures embed- to restore the moral authority of the US and ding the US in multilateral frameworks thus one source of “soft power” was more and allowing other states to have some difficult to translate into operational poli- influence on US policies. In Obama’s poli- cies. There is no doubt that since that time, tical program, a stronger multilateral as Obama promised, interrogation methods orientation—the term “multilateralism” is have been limited to those outlined in the rarely used—has also meant calling allies to Army Field Manual and therefore within the take on more responsibility and passing on limits set by the Geneva Conventions. Secret costs to other states. In contrast to what prisons have been shut down, with the ex- initial pronouncements seemed to indicate, ception of those where detainees were held the Obama administration has not under- temporarily on transition to other facilities.