In Chapters 6, 7, and 9, a Number of Normative Principles Were Discussed and Criticized

ApPENDIX TABLE OF CONSEQUENTIALIST PRINCIPLES

In Chapters 6, 7, and 9, a number of normative principles were discussed and criticized. I have claimed that a principle purporting to give a criterion of obligatoriness, in the 'fundamental' moral sense, should satisfy NI and SNI (in 'normal' cases), as well as CSIP. It should also make S-optimality necessary for obligatoriness. (This requirement is abbreviated as 'SNO' in Table 2.) If such a principle is supplemented with a principle giving a criterion of wrongness, the two principles should together also satisfy NH. In Table 2 I have listed the principles we have encountered, and for each (set of) princi ple(s) indicated which of these five requirements that are satisfied. C'J&Pl' refers to Jackson's and Pargetter's first principle, concerning whether or not a given action ought to be done. 'J&P2' refers to their second principle, concerning what an agent ought to do during a certain time-interval.)

Table 2

Author Principle Section Requirements satisfied NI SNI NH CSIP SNO

Bergstriim V 6.1 Yes No - No No Prawitz Tl 6.4 Yes Yes - No No " T, 6.4 Yes Yes - No No Aqvist I*-III* 6.5 No No Yes No No " IV*-VI* 6.5 No No Yes No No Bjiirnsson VO-UW 6.6 Yes No No Yes No Smith 4 7.2 Yes Yes - Yes No Jackson & J&Pl 7.3 Yes No - No No Pargetter J&P2 7.3 Yes No - No No Sobel S 7.4 Yes No - Yes No ! Feldman MO 7.5 Yes Yes - Yes No , McKinsey L 7.6 Yes No - No No Carlson KO-KW 6.3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes " KO*-KW* 6.3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes " PO-PW 7.7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No " IO-IW 7.7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No " KOG-KWG 9.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes " POG-PWG 9.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No

" IOG-IWG 9.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No

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abstractism 145-153 C-consistency 92, 120 accessibility 134 C-inconsistency 92, 94 action 5-8, 145-153 CA5 84-87, 151, 156-157 abstract 145-153 CA7 87-88, 106, 133, 156-157 compound 6-7,52,82,85- 88, 91, 93, 97, CA8 89, 144, 157 105-106, 115, 118, 136 CAG2 156-157 concrete 145-153 CAG3 157-158 generic 5-6, 40-42, 72-73, 81 CAG4 157 negative 6, 94, 98 causal consequence 2,11,48,58 particular 6,71,75,91,99, 113, 145, 154 causal theory of action, the 145, 147 actualism 119-120,123-124,128,131,137-138 causalism 149 ADD (the principle of Additivity) 53-54,57 CEM (the law ofCounterfactual Excluded agent neutrality 28 Middle) 12, 20, 50, 53 agent relativity 28, 38-40 CJS (Causal Joint Satisfiability) 37 agglomerative condition 50 CO (the principle of Causal Outcomes) 11-12, Alt-optimality 114 48, 50, 55-57 alternati ve 90-118 common belief 156 B-alternative 100, 120, 148 compatibilism 81 K-alternative 53-55, 100, 102, 107, 158-160 concretism 145-153 P-alternative 110-112 consequentialism 5-28 relevant 36,90,92,95,99, 109, 113, 119, act- 5 153 conceptual 9, 43 A-alternative 113-115 direct 5 O-alternative 116-117 indirect 5 alternative-set 91-100,109,112-113,120,148 contained in (an action) 110-112, 120, 130-132, relevant 90-99, 113 134, 137, 139, 141, 143-144, 160 Anscombe, G,E.M. 74-77,163 CSIP (the principle of Compatibility of AX (the principle ofAxiologism) 9, 57 Situation-Identical Prescriptions) 95, 101, axiological equivalence 50-51,53-54,56-57 114-115,128-129,139,143-144,162 axiological neutrality 27 CWJP (Causal Weak Joint Performability) 39 axiologism 8-9, 13,29,40,42,45 Danielsson, S. 43, 66-68, 70, 164 Bergstrom, L. 3, 11,58,66,90-100, 109-114, DC (distributivity of 'ought' over 119-120,133,145-147,149,162-163 conjunctions) 97-98, 142-143 bias towards the future, the 2,48, 58-65, 68, 70 decision-making procedure 22-24, 26, 101 Bjomsson, G. 3,90,116-118,162-163 deliberation 10 1 restricted 10 I C 25-29,43,45-48,56,59,65,71,90-96,120, unrestricted 101 142, 154 deontic logic 113, 142 168 Index

deontic ordering 29-30. 41 JP (Joint Performability) 38 deontologica1 morality 28. 38. 40-43. 45-46 J&P1 162 determinism 36.81.147-149 J&P2 162 discriminating morality 57 JS (Joint Satisfiability) 37. 39 ethical egoism 38. 40 K (the assumption of Knowability) 20-21 expansion (of alternative-set) 92- 94. 120 Kagan. S. 24. 164 KO-KW 103-\05, \07. \09. 113. 116. factualism 9. 20-24. 29. 42. 45 119-120,138.142-143.158.162 Factualistic Representation Thesis. the 31.33. KO*-KW* 108.162 40 KOG-KWG 158.162 Feldman. F. 120.122. 134. 162. 164 FO (the principle of Future-state Outcomes) 10- L 139-141, 162 12.27.48.51-59.61.64-69.96.100 Lehrer, K. 73-74,78-79, 164 freely performable action 7 levels of obligation 139-141

Goldman. A.!, 78.85. 164 MA (the Principle of Maximizing Axio1ogism) group 154 13,19,25,29,40. \09.113.152 group action 4. 27. 154-160 maximal conjunctive act 121-123 group agent 157 maximal sequence of acts 121-123 group life 157-158.160 McKinsey, M. 120.139-140.162,164 Milne. P. 2.29-30.33-39, 164 Hare. R.M. 47. 164 minimal action 83,130-133 hedonism 15.65.69 fully specific 130-131 historical axiology 65-70 MO 134-135.162 Hurka. T. 14. 17. 164 Moore, G.E. 2,9-11.29,43-46,65- 69, 74-75. 164-165 I*-III* 114-115. 162 moral autonomy 13.17-19 ideal notion of 'ought'. the 112.143-144.160 moral content 2.29,47 incompatibi1ism 36. 81 moral excuse argument, the 136-138 indeterminism 149-150. 152 moral value 44 individual action 4.154-156.159 most relevantly specific action 123-124. 128- 'inside'-perspective. the 63-64 129 integrity 13. 18 intrinsic value 1.2.7.14-15.18.20.23.27-30. NH (the principle of Normative Harmony) 103, 32-33. 44-45. 57 118.143-144.162 IO-IW 144. 160. 162 NI (the principle of Normative Invariance) 100. IOG-IWG 160. 162 114-115.162 IV*-VI* 115. 162 non-discriminating morality 57 normative equivalence 11-12.29-30.41-43.47. Jackson. F. 5. 22-24. 119. 122-124, 126, 128- 50.65,70 129. 162. 164 joint exhaustiveness 91,95 objective probability 21. 33-36 Index 169

Oddie, G. 2,29-30,33-39, 165 Representation Thesis, the 29-31,33-35, 37-40 optimal life argument, the 135 requirement of avoidability, the 51 organic unity 66, 69 right-making characteristic 26, 101 temporal 66, 69 outcome 8,48-70 S 130-131,133-137,162 comparability of 25 S-optimal action 93-95,100-108,114,116, complete 149-153 132, 143-144, 152-153, 158, 160 factual 20-24 invariably 102-103,107-108,143, 158 'outside'-perspective, the 63-64 minimally specific invariably 103 overriding moral principle 27 minimally specific quasi-invariably 107, 143, 158, 160 pairwise incompatibility 91,95-97,99 quasi-invariably 107-108, 143, 158, 160 Parfit, D. 58,60-61,63, 138, 165 S-optimific action 93-94,100, 107, 117, 152 Pargetter, R. 119,122-124,126,128-129,162, S-suboptimal action 93,102-103,105,107- 165 108,117,123,128,135,139,158 performability 2-4,7,38,71-74,77,83-85,88- invariably 103, 107, 117, 158 91,118,121-122,133,144,151,154-157 satisficing consequentialism 5, 13-18 conditional analyses of 2, 71-75 absolute-level 14-16 immediate 77,89,144,157 comparative 14-15,17 non-immediate 88-89, 144, 157 Scheffler, S. 13,25, 165 personal identity 138 securable action 133-134 PL 89,157 securable life 130-131,132-134 PLG 158 self-defeatingness 67-68 PO-PW 142-143, 144, 160, 162 situation 90 POG-PWG 160, 162 situation-identity 53,92,95,99, 104, 106, 110, possibilism 68,96,119-120,124,127,134- 114-115,118,130,158 135, 138, 143 Slote, M. 5,13-14,17,165 possible life 88, 135, 143 Smith, H. 104, 119-122, 162, 165 Postow, B.C. 159, 165 SNI (the principle of Strong Normative Prawitz, D. 3,90, 109-114, 122, 143, 162, 165 Invariance) 101,116,128,130,134,139, prerequisite-sense of 'ought', the 142 143-144,162 Principle 4 121-123 SNO 162 private morality 26 Sobel, l.H. 83,93-94,119,122,130-133,135, probabilism 9,20-24 137, 162, 165 subjective ('subjectivism') 22-24 state of affairs 7,8,9,20-21,38,49-57,65, 134 objective 21 independent 49, 52-53, 55-56 most inclusive 50-53, 55 Rabinowicz, W. 61-62,165 part of 49-55 reciprocity argument, the 135, 138 simple 49 relativized notions of 'ought' 112,115 simply conjunctive 49 relevantly incompatible state 81-87, 106, subjunctivism 149 156-157,159 supererogation 13-14,16-19,29,31 representation of moral theories 29-31, 40-42 170 Index

Tl 110,122,143,162 trivial 95 T3 112, 162 version (of an action) 148-149 TDC ('temporal' version of DC) 68 von Wright, G.H. 145, 166 temporal neutrality 59-60, 62, 64 Thomason, R.H. 137, 166 want 71,73,77-87, 107, 122-123, 151, 155- time-identity 91,95-97,99,110,113-115,148 157 totalism 10, 15,29, 97 occurrent 78, 85, 157 Tannsjo, T. 4, 145-153, 166 standing 78 WDC ('weak' version of DC) 98 V 93-94,120,131-132,134-136,162 Williams, B. 25, 166 unavoidable, the 53 WJP (Weak Joint Performability) 39 VO-UW 116-117,118,162 WO (the principle of World Outcomes) 10-12, utilitarianism 1, 47 48,51-59,64-70,96,100 van Inwagen, P. 78-80, 166 Aqvist, L. 3,90,109,113-115,162,166 variant (of an action) 91-92,93-100, 103-104, 107,114-118,129,144,148,158,160 Osterberg, J. 28,37-38, 166 THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY

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