ApPENDIX TABLE OF CONSEQUENTIALIST PRINCIPLES In Chapters 6, 7, and 9, a number of normative principles were discussed and criticized. I have claimed that a principle purporting to give a criterion of obligatoriness, in the 'fundamental' moral sense, should satisfy NI and SNI (in 'normal' cases), as well as CSIP. It should also make S-optimality necessary for obligatoriness. (This requirement is abbreviated as 'SNO' in Table 2.) If such a principle is supplemented with a principle giving a criterion of wrongness, the two principles should together also satisfy NH. In Table 2 I have listed the principles we have encountered, and for each (set of) princi­ ple(s) indicated which of these five requirements that are satisfied. C'J&Pl' refers to Jackson's and Pargetter's first principle, concerning whether or not a given action ought to be done. 'J&P2' refers to their second principle, concerning what an agent ought to do during a certain time-interval.) Table 2 Author Principle Section Requirements satisfied NI SNI NH CSIP SNO Bergstriim V 6.1 Yes No - No No Prawitz Tl 6.4 Yes Yes - No No " T, 6.4 Yes Yes - No No Aqvist I*-III* 6.5 No No Yes No No " IV*-VI* 6.5 No No Yes No No Bjiirnsson VO-UW 6.6 Yes No No Yes No Smith 4 7.2 Yes Yes - Yes No Jackson & J&Pl 7.3 Yes No - No No Pargetter J&P2 7.3 Yes No - No No Sobel S 7.4 Yes No - Yes No ! Feldman MO 7.5 Yes Yes - Yes No , McKinsey L 7.6 Yes No - No No Carlson KO-KW 6.3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes " KO*-KW* 6.3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes " PO-PW 7.7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No " IO-IW 7.7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No " KOG-KWG 9.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes " POG-PWG 9.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No " IOG-IWG 9.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 162 REFERENCES ANSCOMBE(l): G.E.M. 'Modern Moral Philosophy', Philosophy 33,1958, pp. 1-19. ANSCOMBE(2): G.E.M. 'Soft Determinism', in G. Ryle (ed.), Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy, Stocksfield 1976, pp. 148-160. BALES(l): RE. 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