DOCSLIB.ORG

A Problem for Actualism About Possible Worlds Author(S): Alan Mcmichael Source: the Philosophical Review, Vol

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Problem for Actualism About Possible Worlds Author(S): Alan Mcmichael Source: the Philosophical Review, Vol Philosophical Review A Problem for Actualism About Possible Worlds Author(s): Alan McMichael Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 49-66 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184521 Accessed: 09-02-2017 14:56 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184521?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms Philosophical Review, Duke University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Philosophical Review This content downloaded from 128.195.69.222 on Thu, 09 Feb 2017 14:56:26 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Philosophical Review, XCII, No. 1 (January 1983) A PROBLEM FOR ACTUALISM ABOUT POSSIBLE WORLDS Alan McMichael I. INTRODUCTION T he notion of a possible world has many uses in the formal philosophy of language. Its primary use, of course, is in the interpretation of sentences about necessity and possibility. A prop- osition is necessary if and only if it is true in all possible worlds; possible if and only if true in some possible world. One advantage of the possible worlds interpretation is its extensionality. The inten- sional notions of necessity and possibility are replaced by quan- tifiers over possible worlds. The language in which these quan- tifiers appear, sometimes called "world theory," can be given an ordinary Tarski semantics. A second advantage of the possible worlds interpretation is purely heuristic. It just seems to help our modal thinking to imagine other possible worlds. However, the nature of possible worlds is the subject of a familiar controversy, the dispute between actualism and possibilism. One common position in this controversy, which I shall call atomistic actualism, seems to me the most plausible. Nevertheless, I shall show that it is open to serious objection. It fails to provide an adequate interpretation for certain modal sentences, assuming that we adopt standard rules of interpretation. Thus we must either reject atom- istic actualism, even though, as I shall argue in the next section, the alternatives are not attractive, or reject the standard semantics, despite its practical successes. II. POSSIBILISM AND ACTUALISM' According to the possibilists, possible worlds are concrete en- tities. In this respect, they are like the concrete universe which we 'The possibilism-actualism distinction should not be confused with the possibilism-modalism distinction. A possibilist in the sense of the second distinction is a person who believes that necessity and possibility are ana- lyzable in terms of quantification over some kind of entities. Whether he or she is a possibilist in the first sense depends on whether those entities are taken to be actually existing or merely possible. 49 This content downloaded from 128.195.69.222 on Thu, 09 Feb 2017 14:56:26 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms ALAN MCMICHAEL inhabit. For the possibilist, this concrete universe is the actual world. (In saying that possible worlds are concrete, the possibilist is not saying that they are made of actual concrete things. Many worlds contain nonactual concrete things, such as individual dragons and unicorns.) According to the possibilism of David Lewis, this world's actuality is a merely relative matter.2 This world is indeed actual with re- spect to itself, but every other world is actual with respect to itself. So all worlds are on an ontological par. This postulation of on- tological parity, while perhaps it can be consistently maintained, is prima facie absurd. The apparent absurdity may not be sufficient reason for dropping Lewis' theory altogether, but it is enough reason to prefer a consistent alternative. A second form of possibilism takes the notion of actuality to be absolute. Thus this world is distinguished from others by the non- relative property of actuality. In the most plausible version of this view, the property of actuality is taken to be simple and irreduci- ble.3 Another-way to put the view is to say that all possible worlds have being, but only this world has existence or actuality. Many phi- losophers have found this two-tiered Meinongian ontology quite incomprehensible. I am inclined to reject it also, provided that some actualist alternative can be found. Actualists who believe in possible worlds view them as existing abstract entities. The actual world is not actual merely in the sense that it exists-all possible worlds exist-but rather in the sense that this concrete universe corresponds to it. Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who gives serious consideration to the view that possible worlds are irreducible abstract entities.4 He suggests that the term 'world' is in fact misleading: there is only one world, this one. However, there are many 'ways the world 2Lewis, Counterfactuals (Harvard University Press, 1973), 84-91. 3This second form of possibilism is usually adopted as a view about all possible objects, rather than merely about all possible worlds. See, for example, the theory of possibles contained in Terence Parson's Nonexistent Objects (Yale University Press, 1980). Meinong, and possibly Leibniz, held similar views. 4Stalnaker, "Possible Worlds," Nous 10 (1976), 65-75. Stalnaker does not explicitly endorse this view, but he does defend it against objections. I am grateful for his comments on this matter, in which he points out that his main theses are (a) that actualism does not require a reduction of possible worlds and (b) that reduction of propositions to possible worlds has certain advantages over the reverse reduction of possible worlds to propositions. 50 This content downloaded from 128.195.69.222 on Thu, 09 Feb 2017 14:56:26 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms A PROBLEM FOR ACTUALISM ABOUT POSSIBLE WORLDS might have been' or 'world-states,' and they are what we mean by the term 'possible worlds.' These world-states are abstract entities distinct from this concrete universe. We might think of them as specially determinate properties. One of the world-states is actual in the sense that it is exemplified by our concrete world. This world state is 'the way the world is.' None of the other world-states is exemplified. Thus the notion of actuality does not remain unex- plained, as it does in the absolutist form of possibilism, because in construing worlds as a kind of property, the actuality-nonactuality distinction collapses into the exemplification-nonexemplification distinction. On the view in question, possible worlds are basic properties. They are not properties that might be reduced to simpler proper- ties, or to properties and relations. This particular aspect of the view is one I find unattractive. The decision to treat possible worlds as basic clashes with all commonly accepted patterns of reduction. Reduction proceeds from tables and chairs to atoms, not vice versa. Since this world contains tables and chairs as parts, it too is com- plex. But since the state of this world, the way the world is, must somehow encode the complex interrelations of this world's parts, it also is complex, a complex of properties and relations. Finally, just as the state of this world is complex, so too are the other world- states. Alvin Plantinga is an actualist who takes worlds to be complex states-of-affairs.5 A state-of-affairs is a proposition-like entity. Exam- ples are Karpov's being world chess champion and Plantinga's having climbed Mount Everest. The former state-of-affairs obtains, the latter does not. Both states-of-affairs, however, are possible. That is, each is such that it could have obtained. Not every possible state-of- affairs is a world, only those that are maximal. A state-of-affairs S is maximal if and only if for any state-of-affairs S', either it is impossi- ble for S to obtain and S' not to obtain, or it is impossible for both S and S' to obtain. That is, S is maximal if and only if for any state-of- affairs S', S either includes S', or S precludes S'. Speaking loosely, a maximal state-of-affairs is one which is completely determinate.6 A 5Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford University Press, 1974), IV. 1. 6This is only loosely correct because a maximal possible state-of-affairs may include a state-of-affairs of something being F without including, for any individual X, the state-of-affairs of X's being F. The importance of this point will become clear in the next section. 51 This content downloaded from 128.195.69.222 on Thu, 09 Feb 2017 14:56:26 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms ALAN MCMICHAEL possible world is a state-of-affairs which is both maximal and possi- ble. Although all these worlds exist, just one of them is actual in the sense that it obtains. Thus the distinction between actuality and nonactuality is merely the distinction between obtaining and not obtaining. As in Stalnaker's theory, worlds, being abstract objects, exhibit a duality which accounts for the distinction. There are two other actualist theories which are very similar to Plantinga's.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • In Defense of the New Actualism: Dispositional Modal Truthmakers and the Branching Conception of Possibility
    IN DEFENSE OF THE NEW ACTUALISM: DISPOSITIONAL MODAL TRUTHMAKERS AND THE BRANCHING CONCEPTION OF POSSIBILITY by CHAD VANCE B.S., University of Florida, 1999 M.A., Southern Evangelical Seminary, 2006 M.A., University of Colorado Boulder, 2008 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy 2013 This thesis entitled: In Defense of the New Actualism: Dispositional Modal Truthmakers and the Branching Conception of Possibility written by Chad Vance has been approved by the Department of Philosophy ______________________________ Graeme Forbes, committee chair ______________________________ Robert Rupert, committee member Date ________________ The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline. Vance, Chad (Ph.D., Philosophy) In Defense of the New Actualism: Dispositional Modal Truthmakers and the Branching Conception of Possibility Thesis directed by Professor Graeme Forbes Abstract: You could be going for a walk right now. This seems true—but what makes it true? Here is a popular answer : It is true that you could be going for a walk right now because there exists some possible world (beyond the actual world) where you are going for a walk now; or else, because there is some abstract, representational entity which represents you as going for a walk now. I think this is mistaken. I take a more common-sense approach, arguing instead that the modal truths (i.e., truths about metaphysical possibility and necessity) are made true by the capabilities, or dispositional properties, of actual objects.
    [Show full text]
  • Haecceitism, Chance
    HAECCEITISM, CHANCE, AND COUNTERFACTUALS Boris Kment Abstract. Anti-haecceitists believe that all facts about specific individuals—such as the fact that Fred exists, or that Katie is tall—globally supervene on purely qualitative facts. Haecceitists deny that. The issue is not only of interest in itself, but receives additional importance from its intimate connection to the question of whether all fundamental facts are qualitative or whether they include facts about which specific individuals there are and how qualitative properties and relations are distributed over them. Those who think that all fundamental facts are qualitative are arguably committed to anti-haecceitism. The goal of this paper is to point out some problems for anti-haecceitism (and therefore for the thesis that all fundamental facts are qualitative). The article focuses on two common assumptions about possible worlds: (i) Sets of possible worlds are the bearers of objective physical chance. (ii) Counterfactual conditionals can be defined by appeal to a relation of closeness between possible worlds. The essay tries to show that absurd consequences ensue if either of these assumptions is combined with anti-haecceitism. Then it considers a natural response by the anti-haecceitist, which is to deny that worlds play the role described in (i) and (ii). Instead, the reply continues, we can introduce a new set of entities that are defined in terms of worlds and that behave the way worlds do on the haecceitist position. That allows the anti-haecceitist to formulate anti-haecceitist friendly versions of (i) and (ii) by replacing the appeal to possible worlds with reference to the newly introduced entities.
    [Show full text]
  • In Chapters 6, 7, and 9, a Number of Normative Principles Were Discussed and Criticized
    ApPENDIX TABLE OF CONSEQUENTIALIST PRINCIPLES In Chapters 6, 7, and 9, a number of normative principles were discussed and criticized. I have claimed that a principle purporting to give a criterion of obligatoriness, in the 'fundamental' moral sense, should satisfy NI and SNI (in 'normal' cases), as well as CSIP. It should also make S-optimality necessary for obligatoriness. (This requirement is abbreviated as 'SNO' in Table 2.) If such a principle is supplemented with a principle giving a criterion of wrongness, the two principles should together also satisfy NH. In Table 2 I have listed the principles we have encountered, and for each (set of) princi­ ple(s) indicated which of these five requirements that are satisfied. C'J&Pl' refers to Jackson's and Pargetter's first principle, concerning whether or not a given action ought to be done. 'J&P2' refers to their second principle, concerning what an agent ought to do during a certain time-interval.) Table 2 Author Principle Section Requirements satisfied NI SNI NH CSIP SNO Bergstriim V 6.1 Yes No - No No Prawitz Tl 6.4 Yes Yes - No No " T, 6.4 Yes Yes - No No Aqvist I*-III* 6.5 No No Yes No No " IV*-VI* 6.5 No No Yes No No Bjiirnsson VO-UW 6.6 Yes No No Yes No Smith 4 7.2 Yes Yes - Yes No Jackson & J&Pl 7.3 Yes No - No No Pargetter J&P2 7.3 Yes No - No No Sobel S 7.4 Yes No - Yes No ! Feldman MO 7.5 Yes Yes - Yes No , McKinsey L 7.6 Yes No - No No Carlson KO-KW 6.3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes " KO*-KW* 6.3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes " PO-PW 7.7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No " IO-IW 7.7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No " KOG-KWG 9.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes " POG-PWG 9.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No " IOG-IWG 9.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 162 REFERENCES ANSCOMBE(l): G.E.M.
    [Show full text]
  • Frick, Johann David
    'Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People': A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Frick, Johann David. 2014. 'Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People': A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13064981 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA ʹMaking People Happy, Not Making Happy Peopleʹ: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics A dissertation presented by Johann David Anand Frick to The Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Philosophy Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts September 2014 © 2014 Johann Frick All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisors: Professor T.M. Scanlon Author: Johann Frick Professor Frances Kamm ʹMaking People Happy, Not Making Happy Peopleʹ: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics Abstract This dissertation provides a defense of the normative intuition known as the Procreation Asymmetry, according to which there is a strong moral reason not to create a life that will foreseeably not be worth living, but there is no moral reason to create a life just because it would foreseeably be worth living. Chapter 1 investigates how to reconcile the Procreation Asymmetry with our intuitions about another recalcitrant problem case in population ethics: Derek Parfit’s Non‑Identity Problem.
    [Show full text]
  • LIBRARIES 2 0 2002 ARCHIVES4 Actualism, Singular Propositions, and Possible Worlds: Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality
    Actualism, Singular Propositions, and Possible Worlds: Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality by Aviv Hoffmann BA Philosophy The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1993 SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY SEPTEMBER 2002 C 2002 Aviv Hoffmann. All rights reserved. The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part. Signature of Author: Department of Linguistics and Philosophy September 6, 2002 Certified by: - - 0 - Robert C. Stalnaker Professor and Chair Thesis Supervisor Accepted by: M ST Vann McGee Professor -MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE Chairman, Committee on Graduate Students OF TECHNOLOGY SEPLIBRARIES 2 0 2002 ARCHIVES4 Actualism, Singular Propositions, and Possible Worlds: Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality by Aviv Hoffmann Submitted to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy on September 6, 2002 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy ABSTRACT My dissertation consists of three essays in the Metaphysics of Modality: In "A Puzzle about Truth and Singular Propositions," I consider two theses that seem to be true and then an argument for the conclusion that they form an inconsistent pair. One thesis is that a proposition that is singular with respect to a given object implies that the object exists. This is so because the proposition predicates something of the object. The other thesis is that some propositions are true with respect to possible worlds in which they do not exist.
    [Show full text]
  • Actualism and Higher-Order Worlds”
    Hayaki, Reina (2003). “Actualism and Higher-Order Worlds”. Philosophical Studies 115 (2), 149-178. Actualism and Higher-Order Worlds Actualism is the ontological thesis that everything that exists is actual. Although it seems so common-sensical as to be platitudinous, it has been attacked as being inadequate on various counts. In particular, opponents have alleged that actualism is incompatible with the standard semantics for quantified modal logic, because it cannot handle iterated modality. I shall argue that an honest actualist can accommodate both iterate modality and quantified modal logic generally by adopting a revised semantics. First, a point of terminology: there are at least two distinct theses that sometimes go by the name of ‘actualism’. As I shall use the term, actualism is contrasted with possibilism, according to which there exist (in some broad sense) objects which are strictly non-actual. They do not inhabit this world, but they do inhabit others, so they exist outright by virtue of existing somewhere in modal space. The most famous proponent of possibilism is, of course, David Lewis, especially in Lewis (1986). This issue is distinct from the issue of whether every possible object is in fact (identical to) an actual object, i.e., whether all possible worlds contain exactly the same inhabitants. A positive view on this latter issue is occasionally called ‘actualism’ as well. Actualism2 (fixed domains across worlds) implies actualism1 (no non-actual objects), but not vice versa. In this paper I shall use the term ‘actualism’ to refer only to actualism1. Interestingly, the problems that confront the actualist1 are easily dissolved if one also adopts actualism2.
    [Show full text]
  • Christopher Menzel
    Christopher Menzel Department of Philosophy 410 YMCA Texas A&M University (979) 845-8764 College Station, TX 77843-4237 [email protected] Education Ph.D., philosophy, University of Notre Dame, May 1984 B.A. magna cum laude, philosophy, Pacific Lutheran University, May 1979 Employment History Texas A&M University: Professor of philosophy; associate professor (1991-2014); assistant professor (1986-1991) Stanford University: Acting assistant professor of philosophy and postdoctoral fellow, Center for the Study of Language and Information (1984-1986) Areas of Specialization Metaphysics, logic, philosophy of logic and mathematics Other Areas of Interest and Research Philosophy of religion, history of modern logic, knowledge representation Grants/Fellowships/Awards/Visiting Appointments 2016-17 Alvin Plantinga Fellowship, Center for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame Faculty Development Grant, TAMU, 2011-12 Visiting Research Fellow, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians- Universität, Munich, Germany, 2011-12 TAMU Association of Former Students Distinguished Achievement Award for Teaching, June 2011 Faculty Development Grant, TAMU, fall 2004 Visiting Research Scientist, Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science (IFOMIS), Universität Saarlandes, Saarbrücken, Germany, 1 Aug – 31 Dec 2004 Computerized Logic Instruction Center at Texas A&M University, TAMU, 2001 Faculty Development Grant, TAMU, fall 1996 Visiting Research Scientist, CSIRO, Melbourne, Australia, 1 July – 31 Dec 1996 National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship for College Teachers, 1991-92 Summer Research Grant, College of Liberal Arts, TAMU, summer 1988 Research Fellow, Center for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, spring 1988 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend, summer 1987 Postdoctoral Fellow, CSLI, Stanford University, 1984-86 Publications 58.
    [Show full text]
  • Your Actual Eternalism, Without Metaphysics∗
    Your Actual Eternalism, Without Metaphysics∗ Huw Price December , Introduction Is there a genuine disagreement between presentists and eternalists? The skeptic, in Sider’s terminology, is the person who argues that there is not. Sider suggests that the ‘skeptic’s challenge is a special case of a more general challenge to ontology’, a challenge he describes as follows: The core of ontology is disagreement over what there is, over whether there exist numbers, events, sets, physical objects, fusions, past and future objects, and so on. Skeptics say this disagreement is merely verbal since apparently disagreeing ontolo- gists use ‘exists’ in different ways. Each theorist is right given her own use of ‘exists’; there is nothing to fight over. On one meaning for ‘exist’, numbers “exist”, on an- other they do not; fusions “exist” under one meaning but not another, and so on. No one of these meanings is “better” than the rest; no one is a more genuine sort of existence than the rest. One might sensibly disagree over which is meant by ‘exists’ in a given linguistic community, or over which would be most useful to mean for a given purpose. But the ontologists’ debate concerns neither meaning nor utility, and cannot survive this proliferation of meanings for ‘exists’. Sider cites a number of sources for the skeptical view just described, including Carnap’s classic paper, ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. I have two concerns about this description of the skeptical position. First, I think that many people would want to maintain that there is a merely verbal dispute in this case, without committing themselves to Carnap’s radical metaphysical deflationism.
    [Show full text]
  • European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
    European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy III-2 | 2011 Pragmatism and the Social Sciences. A Century of Influences and Interactions, vol. 1 J. R. SHOOK and J. A. GOOD (eds.), John Dewey’s Philosophy of Spirit, with the 1897 Lecture on Hegel Fordham University Press, New York 2010, 197 pages Roberto Gronda Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/980 DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.980 ISSN: 2036-4091 Publisher Associazione Pragma Electronic reference Roberto Gronda, « J. R. SHOOK and J. A. GOOD (eds.), John Dewey’s Philosophy of Spirit, with the 1897 Lecture on Hegel », European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], III-2 | 2011, Online since 29 December 2011, connection on 24 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ ejpap/980 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.980 This text was automatically generated on 24 September 2020. Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. J. R. Shook and J. A. Good (eds.), John Dewey’s Philosophy of Spirit, with th... 1 J. R. SHOOK and J. A. GOOD (eds.), John Dewey’s Philosophy of Spirit, with the 1897 Lecture on Hegel Fordham University Press, New York 2010, 197 pages Roberto Gronda REFERENCES J. R. SHOOK and J. A. GOOD (eds.) John Dewey’s Philosophy of Spirit, with the 1897 Lecture on Hegel, Fordham University Press, New York 2010, 197 pages 1 The book reviewed here makes available an important lecture on Hegel’s philosophy of spirit that Dewey delivered at the University of Chicago in 1897.
    [Show full text]
  • On What Matters DEREK PARFIT
    ON WHAT MATTERS DEREK PARFIT Draft of 23 January 2009 CONTENTS VOLUME ONE 205,000 525 pages INTRODUCTION Samuel Scheffler 5,000 PREFACE 4,500 SUMMARY 13,500 PART ONE REASONS 50,000 CHAPTER 1 NORMATIVE CONCEPTS 1 Sufficient and Decisive Reasons 2 Reason-Involving Goodness CHAPTER 2 OBJECTIVE THEORIES 3 Two Kinds of Theory 4 Responding to Reasons 5 State-given Reasons 6 Hedonic Reasons 2 7 Irrational Preferences CHAPTER 3 SUBJECTIVE THEORIES 8 Subjectivism about Reasons 9 Why People Accept Subjective Theories 10 Analytical Subjectivism 11 The Agony Argument CHAPTER 4 FURTHER ARGUMENTS 12 The All or Nothing Argument 13 The Incoherence Argument 14 Reasons, Motives, and Well-Being 15 Arguments for Subjectivism CHAPTER 5 RATIONALITY 16 Practical and Epistemic Rationality 17 Beliefs about Reasons 18 Other Views about Rationality CHAPTER 6 MORALITY 19 Sidgwick’s Dualism 20 The Profoundest Problem CHAPTER 7 MORAL CONCEPTS 21 Acting in Ignorance or with False Beliefs 22 Other Kinds of Wrongness PART TWO PRINCIPLES 34,000 CHAPTER 8 POSSIBLE CONSENT 3 23 Coercion and Deception 24 The Consent Principle 25 Reasons to Give Consent 26 A Superfluous Principle? 27 Actual Consent 28 Deontic Beliefs 29 Extreme Demands CHAPTER 9 MERELY AS A MEANS 30 The Mere Means Principle 31 As a Means and Merely as a Means 32 Harming as a Means CHAPTER 10 RESPECT AND VALUE 33 Respect for Persons 34 Two Kinds of Value 35 Kantian Dignity 36 The Right and the Good 37 Promoting the Good CHAPTER 11 FREE WILL AND DESERT 38 The Freedom that Morality Requires 39 Why We Cannot
    [Show full text]
  • Annotations to Bhaskar's Realist Theory of Science
    Annotations to Bhaskar’s Realist Theory of Science Hans G. Ehrbar May 12, 2005 Contents Prefaces i 0.1 Bibliographical Remark .......................... i 0.2 Preface to the First Edition ........................ ii 0.3 Preface to the 2nd edition ......................... xiii 0.4 Footnotes to the Preface .......................... xiii Introduction xv 2 CONTENTS 3 1 Philosophy and Scientific Realism 1 1.1 Two Sides of ‘Knowledge’ ......................... 1 1.2 Three Traditions in the Philosophy of Science .............. 8 1.3 The Transcendental Analysis of Experiences ............... 19 1.3.A The Analysis of Perception .................... 21 1.3.B Analysis of Experimental Activity ................ 25 1.4 Status of Ontology and its Dissolution in Classical Philosophy ..... 31 1.5 Ontology Vindicated and the Real Basis of Causal Laws ........ 47 1.6 A sketch of a critique of empirical realism ................ 68 1.7 Footnotes to Chapter 1 .......................... 76 2 Actualism and the Concept of a Closure 82 2.1 Introduction: On the Actuality of the Causal Connection ....... 82 2.2 Regularity Determinism and the Quest for a Closure .......... 90 2.3 The Classical Paradigm of Action ..................... 103 2.4 Actualism and Transcendental Realism: the Interpretation of Normic Statements ................................. 120 2.5 Autonomy and Reduction ......................... 140 2.6 Explanation in Open Systems ....................... 158 4 CONTENTS 2.7 Footnotes to Chapter 2 .......................... 169 2.8 Appendix: Orthodox Philosophy of Science and the Implications of Open Systems ................................ 173 3 The Logic of Scientific Discovery 196 3.1 Introduction: On the Contingency of the Causal Connection ...... 196 3.2 The Surplus-element in the Analysis of Law-like Statements: A Cri- tique of the Theory of Models ......................
    [Show full text]
  • Inflationary Truth-Theoretic Semantics
    University of Kentucky UKnowledge Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy Philosophy 2012 INFLATIONARY TRUTH-THEORETIC SEMANTICS Michael Brady Horton University of Kentucky, [email protected] Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Horton, Michael Brady, "INFLATIONARY TRUTH-THEORETIC SEMANTICS" (2012). Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy. 1. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/1 This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. STUDENT AGREEMENT: I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained and attached hereto needed written permission statements(s) from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine). I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made available immediately for worldwide access unless a preapproved embargo applies. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work.
    [Show full text]