Mitchell V. Felker, No

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT MITCHELL, et al., No. 2:08-CV-01196 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 14 MATTHEW CATE, et al., MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants Cate, Kernan, McDonald, 18 Giurbino, Tilton, Felker, Wright, Foulk, Vanderville, Owen and Hellwig’s (collectively 19 hereinafter referred to as “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 253.) 20 Plaintiffs Mitchell, Abdullah, Quezada and Trujillo (collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”) 21 oppose Defendants’ motion. (See ECF No. 280.) The Court has carefully considered the 22 arguments raised by both parties. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for 23 Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 24 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff Robert Mitchell (“Mitchell”) initiated this case pro se on May 30, 2008, to 26 challenge, among other things, a series of allegedly race-based lockdowns to which he was 27 subjected to while imprisoned at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”) beginning on September 12, 28 1 1 2006. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 12−14.)1 In his complaint, Mitchell alleges that he filed 2 administrative appeals concerning the lockdown policy as it was applied to him and, in response 3 to his appeals, the prison staff informed Mitchell that it was the policy of the California 4 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) that “when there is an incident 5 involving any race, all inmates of that race are locked up.” (ECF No. 1 at 15.) Mitchell further 6 alleged that the CDCR policy utilized ethnic groups as a classification in segmenting the inmate 7 population during the process of establishing a regular program following an incident. (ECF No. 8 1 at 15.) Mitchell alleged that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 9 his Eighth Amendment rights as a result of the lockdowns and that the lockdowns violated his 10 rights to equal protection and due process. (ECF No. 1 at 17, 30−31, 38−44.) Mitchell further 11 alleged that prison officials took adverse actions against him in response to his filing of 12 grievances and lawsuits, constituting unlawful retaliation, obstruction of justice, denial of access 13 to the courts, thereby violating his due process and equal protection rights. (ECF No. 1 at 17−27, 14 32−37, 45−48.) Lastly, Mitchell asserted state-law claims of negligence and intentional infliction 15 of emotional distress. (ECF No. 1 at 48−51.) 16 The case was originally assigned to District Court Judge John A. Mendez, but was 17 reassigned to visiting Judge Richard A. Jones of the Western District of Washington in January 18 2009. (ECF No. 7.) During pretrial proceedings, the court appointed counsel for Mitchell for the 19 limited purpose of assisting him in settlement negotiations with Defendants. (ECF No. 60.) 20 Counsel for Mitchell subsequently agreed to provide continuing representation to Mitchell and 21 sought to amend the complaint in order to transform the case into a class action challenging 22 allegedly race-based lockdowns throughout California’s men’s prisons. (ECF Nos. 70, 74.) 23 Judge Jones directed the transfer of the case back to a judge within the Eastern District of 24 California, concluding that it was “far from ideal for a judge sitting in the Western District of 25 Washington to consider presiding over an action challenging policies at all of California’s 26 prisons.” (ECF No. 82 at 1.) The case accordingly was reassigned to Judge John A. Mendez and 27 1 Page numbers cited herein refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing system and not those 28 assigned by the parties. 2 1 Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan, who granted the motion to amend on September 22, 2011. 2 (ECF No. 83.) Mitchell filed the second amended complaint (“SAC”) on September 23, 2011. 3 (ECF No. 84.) 4 The SAC changed the case in the following ways: 5 (1) Adding three plaintiffs to the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief 6 regarding CDCR’s lockdown policies who seek to act, along with plaintiff, as representatives of a 7 class of “all prisoners who are now or will in the future be housed in a men’s prison under the 8 jurisdiction of CDCR and who are now or will in the future be subject to CDCR’s policy and 9 practice of implementing race-based lockdowns” and a similar class of prisoners who are or will 10 be “subject to CDCR’s policy and practice of implementing excessively lengthy lockdowns.” 11 (ECF No. 84 at 6); 12 (2) Adding Defendants CDCR Secretary Matthew Cate, CDCR Undersecretary of 13 Operations Scott Kernan, CDCR Chief Deputy Secretary for Adult Operations Terri McDonald, 14 and CDCR Director of the Division of Adult Institutions George Giurbino in their official 15 capacities to the injunctive and declaratory relief claims. (ECF No. 84 at 4−5); 16 (3) Deleting the claims for retaliation, denial of access to courts, and obstruction of 17 justice; 18 (4) and deleting Defendants T. Barnard, R. Beamon, R. Blanthorn, C. Buckley, D. 19 Cade, T. Kimzey, D. Leiber, T. Lockwood, A. Masuret, J. Mayfield, J. McClure, and J. Walker. 20 (ECF No. 84) 21 The case was further narrowed on Defendants’ November 2, 2011, motion to 22 dismiss. (ECF No. 92.) The court dismissed Mitchell’s Eighth and 14th Amendment claims 23 based on lockdowns that occurred before September 12, 2006 as unexhausted and limited his state 24 law damages claims to the period from February 28, 2007 through December 5, 2007. (ECF Nos. 25 107, 114.) 26 On March 5, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class as well as a motion for 27 preliminary injunction. (ECF Nos. 155, 156.) On April 3, 2013, this case was assigned to the 28 undersigned. (ECF No. 178.) Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a request for the district court to hear 3 1 its pending motions for class certification and injunctive relief pursuant to Eastern District of 2 California Local Rule 302(d). (ECF No. 182.) Before the Court had an opportunity to rule on 3 Plaintiffs’ request, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 253.) 4 On August 5, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiffs request stating that “because 5 Plaintiffs’ class certification and preliminary injunction motion, as well as Defendants’ summary 6 judgment motion, are likely to require de novo review, this Court finds that judicial economy 7 would be best served by this Court retaining all future motions associated with this case.” (ECF 8 No. 278.) Thus, this Court retained all matters associated with this case going forward and 9 addresses Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment below, prior to deciding Plaintiffs’ motion 10 for class certification. See Saeger v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 305 F. App’x 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2008) 11 (“We have previously held that, ‘[u]nder the proper circumstances—where it is more practicable 12 to do so and where the parties will not suffer significant prejudice—the district court has 13 discretion to rule on a motion for summary judgment before it decides the certification issue.’”) 14 (quoting Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 543–44 (9th Cir. 1984)). 15 II. STANDARD OF LAW 16 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates no 17 genuine issue as to any material fact exists, and therefore, the moving party is entitled to 18 judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 19 157 (1970). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial 20 responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those 21 portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together 22 with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 23 material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party 24 will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may 25 properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 26 admissions on file.” Id. at 324 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, summary judgment should 27 be entered against a party who does not make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 28 element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 4 1 trial. Id. at 322. 2 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 3 opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 4 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585−87 (1986); First Nat’l 5 Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288−289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence 6 of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is 7 required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery 8 material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing 9 party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the 10 outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v.

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