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Israeli Control of the Golan Heights: High Strategic and Moral Ground for Israel

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Israeli Control of the Golan Heights: High Strategic and Moral Ground for Israel THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 90 Israeli Control of the Golan Heights: High Strategic and Moral Ground for Israel Efraim Inbar © The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900, Israel www.besacenter.org ISSN 0793-1042 September 2011 The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies The BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University was founded by Dr. Thomas O. Hecht, a Canadian Jewish community leader. The Center is dedicated to the memory of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who concluded the first Arab-Israel peace agreement. The Center, a non-partisan and independent institute, seeks to contribute to the advancement of Middle East peace and security by conducting policy-relevant research on strategic subjects, particularly as they relate to the national security and foreign policy of Israel. Mideast Security and Policy Studies serve as a forum for publication or re-publication of research conducted by BESA associates. Publication of a work by BESA signifies that it is deemed worthy of public consideration but does not imply endorsement of the author's views or conclusions. BESA Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy summarizes the papers delivered at conferences and seminars held by the Center, for the academic, military, official and general publics. In sponsoring these discussions, the BESA Center aims to stimulate public debate on, and consideration of, contending approaches to problems of peace and war in the Middle East. The BESA Memorandum series consist of policy-oriented papers. The content of the publications reflects the views of the authors only. A listing of recent BESA Center publications can be found at the end of this booklet. International Advisory Board Founder of the Center and Chairman of the Advisory Board: Dr. Thomas O. Hecht Vice Chairman: Mr. Saul Koschitzky Members: Prof. Moshe Arens, Ms. Judy Ann Hecht, Ms. Marion Hecht, Mr. Robert Hecht, Prof. Riva Heft-Hecht, Hon. Shlomo Hillel, Mr. Isi Leibler, Amb. Yitzhak Levanon, Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Mr. Robert K. Lifton, Maj. Gen. (res.) Daniel Matt, Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, Maj. Gen. (res.) Ori Orr, Mr. Seymour D. Reich, Amb. Meir Rosenne, Mr. Greg Rosshandler, Amb. Zalman Shoval, Amb. Norman Spector, Mr. Muzi Wertheim International Academic Advisory Board Desmond Ball Australian National University , Ian Beckett University of Kent , Eliot A. Cohen Johns Hopkins University , Irwin Cotler McGill University , Steven R. David Johns Hopkins University , Yehezkel Dror Hebrew University, Lawrence Freedman King's College, Patrick James University of Southern California , Efraim Karsh King's College , Robert J. Lieber Georgetown University , Barry Posen Massachusetts Institute of Technology , Jasjit Singh Centre for Strategic and International Studies Research Staff BESA Center Director : Prof. Efraim Inbar Research Associates: Dr. Efrat Aviv, Dr. Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, Prof. Stuart A. Cohen, Dr. Gil Feiler, Prof. Jonathan Fox, Prof. Hillel Frisch, Prof. Eytan Gilboa, Col. (res.) Aby Har-Even, Dr. Tsilla Hershco, Dr. Mordechai Kedar, Prof. Avi Kober, Dr. Yaakov Lifshitz, Prof. Ze'ev Maghen, Prof. Amikam Nachmani, Mr. Amir Rapaport, Dr. Jonathan Rynhold, Maj. Gen. (res.) Emanuel Sakal, Prof. Shmuel Sandler, Dr. Danny Shoham, Dr. Shlomo Shpiro, Dr. Max Singer, Prof. Gerald Steinberg Director of Public Affairs: David M. Weinberg Program Coordinator : Hava Waxman Koen Publication Editor (English) : Ilana Hart Publication Editor (Hebrew) : Alona Briner Rozenman Israeli Control of the Golan Heights: High Strategic and Moral Ground for Israel Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................1 THE PRICE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ...................3 Security Needs.................................................................................3 Protecting Natural Resources ........................................................12 Economic Considerations..............................................................12 A National Trauma? ......................................................................13 THE MEAGERNESS OF A SYRIAN QUID PRO QUO ...............................14 THE VIABILITY OF THE STATUS QUO .................................................19 POLITICAL HISTORY ............................................................................23 LEGAL STATUS ....................................................................................26 CONCLUSIONS .....................................................................................28 This research paper was supported by the B. L. Manger Foundation The B. L. Manger Foundation Inc. is a charitable foundation established by Bernard L. Manger z"l for Jewish charitable, philanthropic, religious and educational purposes. Longtime residents of Stamford, Connecticut, USA, Ben Manger, together with his wife, Faye, support numerous worthwhile Jewish causes and the growth and development of the State of Israel. Israeli Control of the Golan Heights: High Strategic and Moral Ground for Israel Efraim Inbar * INTRODUCTION Ever since Syria’s loss of the Golan Heights to Israel in the June 1967 Six Day War, the strategic plateau has been a matter of contention between the two states. Immediately after the war, Israel offered to withdraw from the Heights in exchange for a peace treaty, but was rebuffed. Subsequently, Israel established a civilian presence on the plateau and in December 1981 decided to extend Israeli law to the area – a de facto annexation. Since 1992, when Yitzhak Rabin became Prime Minister, almost all Israeli governments have negotiated directly or indirectly with Syria in an attempt to secure a peace treaty between the two states. 1 The “Land for Peace” formula guided these negotiations. Each of these leaders have evinced a willingness to withdraw from all or parts of the Golan Heights in exchange for a peace treaty, accompanied by security arrangements, alongside American political and/or military involvement and incentives. Yet, none of these efforts has succeeded due to the reluctance of both sides to sign a deal. Israeli diplomatic efforts since the 1990s have oscillated between the so-called “Syrian track” and “Palestinian track.” The current difficulties in restarting direct negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian track, a reflection of deep structural problems, 2 might renew Israeli interest, and/or that of the international community, in pursuing “progress” in the Israeli-Syrian track. Peace negotiations with Syria *The author is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. Part of this paper was published as “The Status Quo with Syria is Best for Israel,” MERIA Journal , Vol. 15 No. 3 (September 2011). I thank Avi Bell, Hillel Frisch, Avi Kober, Saul Koschitzky, Yedidia Koschitzky, Barry Rubin, Shmuel Sandler and David Weinberg for their useful comments. Diana Gross and Timothy McKinley deserve my gratitude for their research assistance. MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES are at present unlikely due to the ongoing turmoil. But if the situation in Syria calms down, and if no Islamist regime has taken the reins in Damascus, calls for a return to negotiations are likely. Israel’s acceptance of the “Land for Peace” formula with Syria is a mistake, however, and the policies pursued by Jerusalem toward Damascus have only reinforced the flawed assertion that peace between the two states – perceived as an important step in stabilizing the Arab-Israeli arena – requires ceding the Golan Heights to Syria. In contrast, this study argues that the “Land for Peace” paradigm with Syria entails great military risk and may invite aggression, while the potential political dividends of a peace treaty are limited. The status quo situation is both sustainable and preferable to any alternative. Even without taking into consideration current political volatility in the region, retaining the Golan Heights and maintaining secure borders is more important than a peace treaty. The political turmoil in the Arab world, 3 as highlighted by the summer 2011 civil uprising in Syria, only reinforces Israel’s need for long-term defensible borders. The prospective empowerment of liberal elements in Syria in the near future is quite uncertain. Moreover, such Arab liberal circles will not necessarily be more conciliatory toward Israel. Domestic challenges within the Arab regimes come primarily from Islamist opposition groups that are hostile to the Jewish state. The Alawite regime is facing growing domestic opposition, comprised largely by the Muslim Brotherhood. 4 Even if the Assad regime survives, the potential military risk toward Israel cannot be discounted, making imperative a defensible border with Syria. The first part of this study sums up the strategic advantages of Israel’s control over the Golan Heights, which would be forfeited by a withdrawal from this area. The second part of this study explores the limited value to Israel of a peace treaty with Syria, emphasizing that the security disadvantages of transferring the Golan Heights to Syria in the framework of a peace treaty far outweigh the limited political advantages. The third part of this study analyzes the long-term viability of the status quo and suggests that Israeli military superiority and determination to keep the Golan Heights is important
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