1 El Salvador in the Age of Financial Capitalism

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El Salvador in the Age of Financial Capitalism: Democracy, Biocapitalism and the Reduction to Bare Life

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By Stephanie Aubry

Graduate Program in Spanish and Portuguese

The Ohio State University

2016

Dissertation Committee:

Ana Del Sarto, Advisor Katherine Borland Maurice Stevens Abril Trigo Fernando Unzueta

Copyrighted by

Stephanie Aubry

2016

Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the interrelated dynamics that have developed since the end of the civil war, and which are linked to the crisis of insecurity in

El Salvador. This investigation examines discourses, and written and visual representations related to the processes of financial capitalism as they are manifest in contemporary El Salvador (including the expansion of free trade and economic scarcity), and related to current insecurity and the expansion of zero tolerance policing. In addition, it provides statistical data to contextualize these analyses. Further, it documents several rumors related to insecurity that have circulated in El Salvador in recent years. From there, this dissertation discusses the loss of basic constitutional and human rights post- democratization. This loss of rights is the result of a state of exception, in that it simultaneously violates the law, and is ordered and authorized by the state. In tracing the interconnected dimensions between financial capitalism, economic scarcity and violence, this research contributes to ongoing conversations among journalists and academics regarding the epidemic of insecurity, and the agents that benefit. This dissertation does not point to a singular origin or point of unity that has produced the epidemic. Rather, the discourses and representations documented seek to contribute to a mapping of the political, economic and social transformations that have developed since 1992.

For Lisa Dupin and Scott Aubry

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the many people and institutions that have helped me complete this project, and have given me the opportunity to study the conditions in El Salvador following the civil war. This project would not have been possible without the support of my family, my parents, and Scott, Paden and Zoelie, who have shared the work of graduate studies with me. I am grateful to my grandparents, Maria Teresa and Santos

Julián, who were my reason for traveling to El Salvador as a child and adult.

Along with my family, I am also endebted to my dissertation committee, without whom this dissertation would not have been possible. I am grateful to the members of my committee for my foundations in colonial and contemporary Latin American studies, critical trauma and performance theories, folklore, and studies on solidarity activism and international volunteer tourism. Above all, my committee has trained me to be critical and self-reflexive in my analyses, and to articulate my arguments responsibly and ethically.

I am grateful to my advisor, Ana Del Sarto, who is the guiding compass of this dissertation. Thank you for teaching me how to write a dissertation, and for sharing some of the most important milestones of my life with me. Thank you for many years of advice, support, encouragement and patience. I am grateful to my committee members,

Katherine Borland, Maurice Stevens, Abril Trigo, and Fernando Unzueta, who have

inspired me and have been fundamental in my academic and professional development. I am thankful to the Department of Spanish and Portuguese at the Ohio State University, particularly to our former chair, Fernando Unzueta, for creating an environment in which students, employees and parents could thrive. I am thankful to Katherine Borland,

Dorothy Noyes, Cassie Patterson and the Center for Folklore Studies at the Ohio State

University, for welcoming me, introducing me to Folklore, and giving me a second home on campus. I am also thankful to Katherine Borland for introducing me to a new area of

Salvadoran studies, and for providing me with transformative research and travel opportunities. Both the Department of Spanish and Portuguese and the Center for

Folklore Studies have provided generous financial support that has made this project a reality. I would also like to thank Flor de María J.A., Doug Bush, Mirela Butnaru and

Laura Navarro Morón for your trust, friendship and support.

I am thankful to Salvadoranist scholars Hector Lindo Fuentes, Erik Ching, Ellen

Moodie and Molly Todd for your inspiration, and for the opportunity to be part of important work in El Salvador. I am also thankful to Raúl Moreno, Carl Lindahl, and

Rose J. Spalding, who have had a great influence on this research. Many thanks to the

Center for Latin American Studies, the Mershon Center for International Security

Studies, and the College of Arts and Sciences at the Ohio State University, and to the

Latin American Studies Association for providing generous research and travel funding.

Vita

December 1998…………………………B.A. Anthropology University of Central Florida

December 2000…………………....……B.A. Foreign Languages and Literatures,

Southern Illinois University

December 2002……………………...….M.A. Spanish, Southern Illinois University

August 2003 to Present…………………Graduate Student, Department of Spanish and Portuguese, Ohio State University

Fields of Study

Major Field: Spanish and Portuguese

Folklore Studies

Table of Contents

Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………. ii

Dedication ………………………………………………………………………………. iii

Acknowledgments ……………………………………………………………………… iv

Vita ……………………………………………………………………………………... vi

Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………………. vii

List of Tables ……………………………..……………………………………………... x

List of Images ………………………………….………………………………………...xi

Chapter 1: Introduction ………………………………………………………………...1

Chapter 2: The Socialization of Risk and the Privatization of Profit: Biocapitalism and Transformations in Valorization Processes in contemporary El Salvador ……………………………………………………………………………..42

Biocapitalism and Bare Life …………………………………………………………….44

The Partnership for Growth – Continuing the Network of Free Trade ………………….51

Deep Integration …………………………………………………………………………62

Free Trade, Insecurity and Bare Life ……………………………………………………82

Chapter 3: Zones of Indistinction after Democratization: Financial Capitalism, the Criminalization of the Poor, and the Reduction to Bare Life …………………..89

Roberto Espósito’s (Auto)immunity Paradigm …………………………………………93

Adjusting to Neoliberal Restructuring ………………………………………...... 97

Criminalizing Poverty in Democratic El Salvador …………………………………….105

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Adaptive Strategies …………………………………………………………………….112

Offender Management …………………………………………………………………115

‘The Living and Threatening Incarnation of Generalized Insecurity’ …………………123

‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism:’ The Case of El Salvador ………………………….128

‘Yo Cambio’ and the Philosophy of Moral Behaviorism ……………………………...131

The GSS Recommendations …………………………………………………………...133

Desegregating Prisons ………………………………………………………………….139

Constructing and Containing the Dependent Poor ……………………………………..142

Chapter 4: Acentered Multiplicity: Mapping Discourses and Representations of Economic Scarcity in Democratic El Salvador …………………………………..148

Rhizome ………………………………………………………………………………..151

“Actually Existing Neoliberalism:” Alisa Garni and L. Frank Weyher on Crime and Estrangement in Masahuat and Yucuaiquín ………………………….…….159

Representations of Free Trade and Economic Scarcity ………………………………..166

“We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” CAMTEX on the Benefits of the Apparel and Free Trade Zone Industries ………………………………………..166

Mapping the Costs and Benefits of the Maquiladora Industry ………………………...172

Hoons Apparel International …………………………………………………………..178

“Uno para todos” ……………………………………………………………………...188

Imbalances in Funding for Citizens’ Most Basic Needs ……………………………….193

Chapter 5: Mapping Discourses and Representations of Insecurity Post-Democratization ………………………………………………………………...195

Precarity among the PNC ………………………………………………………………198

The Expansion of Private Security in the Post-War Era ……………………………….202

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Imbalances in Security …………………………………………………………………212

Challenging Linear Logics ……………………………………………………………..219

Chapter 6: Rumors of Insecurity Post-Democratization …………………………..222

Rumors as a Collective Search for Meaning …………………………………………...224

Foundational Rumors …………………………………………………………………..227

“The Right to be Wrong” ………………………………………………………………229

Rumors of a Curfew in San Salvador – October 19, 2009 ……………………………..231

Rumors of Social Cleansing ……………………………………………………………238

A Curfew in Chalchuapa, Santa Ana – August 19, 2007 ………………………………238

Will Salgado, Mayor of San Miguel (2000 – 2015)…………………………………….240

Massacres in Suchitoto and Tonacatepeque, 2010 …………………………………….243

Rearranging Reality? Official Discourses on Insecurity ………………………………245

Government Involvement in the Gang Truce (2012 – 2014) …………………………..245

Official Discourses on Social Cleansing ………………………………………………248

Official Discourses and Rumor ………………………………………………………...250

Chapter 7: Conclusion ………………………………………………………………..252

References ……………………………………………………………………………..280

List of Tables

Table 1: Foreign Currency Inflow to El Salvador in % …………….………………….101

Table 2: Prison Population Rate in El Salvador ………………………………………..122

Table 3: The Data Included in a Table on PROSEA’s Website ……………………….173

Table 4: Number of Private Security Firms in El Salvador ……………………………196

Table 5: Annual State Expenditures for Private Security since 2012 ………………….202

Table 6: Homicide Rates in El Salvador by Year ……………………………………...248

List of Images

Image 1: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison ……………………………...37

Image 2: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison ………...……………………38

Image 3: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison …………...…………………38

Image 4: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison ……………...………………39

Image 5: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison ………………...……………39

Image 6: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison …………………..………….40

Image 7: Map of the International Network of Mesoamerican Highways, the Central American System of Electric Interconnection, and the Mesoamerican Information Superhighway …………………………………..…79

Image 8: “Pan de Esperanza” …………………………………………………………..133

Image 9: Salvador Sánchez Cerén and Rudy Giuliani in San Salvador before ENADE 2015 …………………………………………………………...………139

Image 10: Programming for ENADE XV ……………………………………………..149

Image 11: Slide from the series, “El Gobierno no necesita más ingresos sino ser más eficiente” ………………………………………………..………151

Image 12: Screenshot from the video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” …………………………………………..168

Image 13: Screenshot from the video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” …………………………………………..169

Image 14: Screenshot from the video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” …………………………………………..169

Image 15: Screenshot from the video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” …………………………………………..170 xi

Image 16: Screenshot from the video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” …………………………………………..170

Image 17: Screenshot from the video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” …………………………………………..171

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Chapter 1: Introduction

On March 23, 1980, one week before Palm Sunday, Archbishop of San Salvador

Óscar Romero directed his homily to the soldiers and police officers of his country:

Yo quisiera hacer un llamamiento de manera especial a los hombres del ejército, y en concreto a las bases de la Guardia Nacional, de la policía - -- de los cuarteles. Hermanos: son de nuestro mismo pueblo, matan a sus mismos hermanos campesinos, y ante una orden de matar que dé un hombre, debe de prevalecer la Ley de Dios que dice: ¡No matar! Ningún soldado está obligado a obedecer una orden contra la Ley de Dios. Una ley inmoral, nadie tiene que cumplirla. Ya es tiempo de que recuperen su conciencia y que obedezcan antes a su conciencia que a la orden del pecado. La Iglesia, defensora de los derechos de Dios, de la Ley de Dios, de la dignidad humana, de la persona, no puede quedarse callada ante tanta abominación. Queremos que el Gobierno tome en serio que de nada sirven las reformas si van teñidas con tanta sangre. En nombre de Dios, pues, y en nombre de este sufrido pueblo cuyos lamentos suben hasta el cielo cada día más tumultuosos, les suplico, les ruego, les ordeno en nombre de Dios: ¡Cese la represión! (I would like to appeal in a special way to the army’s enlisted men, and in particular to the ranks of the Guardia Nacional and the police --- those in the barracks. Brothers: you are of part of our own people. You kill your own campesino brothers and sisters. Before an order to kill that a man may give, God’s law must prevail: Thou shalt not kill! No soldier is obliged to obey an order against the law of God. No one has to fulfill an immoral law. It is time to take back your consciences and to obey your consciences rather than the orders of sin. The Church, defender of the rights of God, of the law of God, of human dignity, of the person, cannot remain silent before such abominations. We want the government to understand seriously that reforms are worth nothing if they are stained with so much blood. In the name of God, and in the name of this suffering people, whose laments rise to heaven each day more tumultuous, I beg you, I beseech you, I order you in the name of God: Stop the repression!) (Romero y Galdámez).

The next day Romero was killed by a sniper while celebrating mass in the Capilla

Divina Providencia in San Salvador. The assassination was ordered by Roberto d’Aubuisson, a dark figure in Salvadoran history whose powerful influence is still felt today. D’Aubuisson was an army major and the founder of El Salvador’s leading conservative political party, the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA). He was known for his association with death squads, and had a reputation for torturing political prisoners with a blowtorch during interrogations. His son, Roberto d’Aubuisson

Munguía, is the current mayor of Santa Tecla, a wealthy municipality located 15 kilometers southwest of San Salvador. In 2015, d’Aubuisson Munguía attended the beatification of Óscar Romero in San Salvador as an invited governmental official

(Redacción ContraPunto, “Roberto D’Aubuisson llega…”).

Romero’s funeral was held on March 30, 1980 in the Plaza Barrios, in front of the

Metropolitan Cathedral in the historic center of San Salvador. Jesuit priest James L.

Connor attended the funeral, and reported that tens of thousands of mourners filled the plaza and the cathedral, and spilled over into the streets and sidewalks nearby (Connor).1

Connor states that although the mass began peacefully, during the homily a bomb exploded at the far end of the plaza. For the next hour and a half bombs shook the cathedral, and snipers opened fire onto the plaza. The massacre was captured on film, and as shots were fired into the plaza, the crowd took to the ground, and fled in confusion and fear. Forty people were killed (Walsh).

11 While the National Catholic News Service calculated that 200,000 people attended Romero’s funeral, the government of El Salvador estimated that 30,000 attended (Jijón). 2

The next day, on March 31, 1980, the government announced via national radio broadcast that a left-wing organization, the Revolutionary Coordination of Masses, was responsible for this act of violence (Jijón 44-45). The government claimed that the

Revolutionary Coordination of Masses was a group of atheists that did not respect

Romero’s memory or the religious beliefs of the Salvadoran people. As Isabel Jijón explains, the government therefore positioned itself as allied with Romero, and as setting the record straight. The government further united itself with Romero in envisioning him as a martyr (Jijón 45). However, twenty-two church representatives that witnessed the event, including James L. Connor, signed a testimony on March 31 that contradicted the official account, and affirmed that the government’s claims were a fabrication (Connor).

Romero’s assassination and the turmoil on the day of his funeral thus represented a culmination of civil unrest that had been developing since the seventies.

Romero’s assassination did not start the civil war in El Salvador. However, it was a turning point, and a highly symbolic event that brought international attention to a growing conflict. Mike Allison explains that, as with any civil war, the events leading up to the war in El Salvador were complex (Allison, “El Salvador’s Brutal Civil War…”).

Before Romero’s assassination there was political instability and conflict between the military and armed resistance groups, as well as political and economic intervention by the U.S. About seven months after Romero’s assassination, a number of resistance groups joined together to form a single coalition, the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN).

The FMLN became the armed insurgency that opposed the government throughout the

12-year civil war. Today the FMLN and ARENA are the two principal political parties in

El Salvador, and they are the only two parties that have held the presidency since El

Salvador democratized in 1992.

The war ended in 1992 with the signing of the U.N.-mediated Chapultepec Peace

Accords. During the twelve-year civil war, some 75,000 people were killed, and hundreds of thousands fled (Allison, “El Salvador’s Brutal Civil War…;” Terrazas). This began a pattern of emigration, and in fact an exodus from El Salvador that continues into 2016.

Virtually every citizen that is old enough to remember these years was affected, since the violence that occurred during the civil war was particularly heinous. As part of its involvement in El Salvador during the Cold War, the U.S. provided over $4 billion in economic and military aid, and trained Salvadoran soldiers at the School of the Americas in Ft. Benning, Georgia. Because of these interventions, the Salvadoran military became exceptionally efficient, and was trained to intimidate communities by committing clandestine, brutal and debasing acts of violence. This was the legacy, and the history of violence that Salvadoran citizens carried with them as their country transitioned to an electoral democracy in 1992. As it democratized, El Salvador also became a productive opportunity for foreign investment, given its natural resources, and the labor opportunities made available with this small, densely populated country. However, in the two and a half decades following democratization, El Salvador has not experienced peace. Today, insecurity is citizens’ fundamental concern. Extortion and violent crime are epidemics, and El Salvador currently has the highest homicide rate in the world.

In the decades that have passed since the end of the civil war and the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords, El Salvador has experienced substantial changes, many

positive, in the political and economic spheres. In an article published in 1993, one year after the signing of the Peace Accords, Knut Walter and Philip J. Williams document the nation’s transformation from a militarized regime to a democratic system of government

(Walter and Williams). Time has shown that these large-scale transformations have in many ways been successful, and have remained in place. In compliance with the Peace

Accords, domestic security forces and the national intelligence agency were taken out of the hands of the military and placed under civilian control. Additionally, the military’s officer corps was purged, and its doctrine was re-written to stress the primacy of human rights. Further, over the past twenty-four years multiple political parties have developed, and presidential elections have been fair and transparent. There is also greater freedom of expression in the post-war era. It is now safe to strike and to hold public meetings to discuss social and political issues, and journalists are no longer subject to State-sponsored censorship (Wolf 108). Therefore, to a degree, political authority in El Salvador has acquired more legitimacy since the signing of the Peace Accords.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the interrelated dynamics that have been developing since the end of the civil war, and which are linked to the current crisis of insecurity in El Salvador. This investigation examines discourses, and written and visual representations related to the processes of financial capitalism (e.g., free trade and resultant economic scarcity), insecurity, and the expansion of zero tolerance policing. In addition, it provides statistical data to contextualize these analyses. Further, it documents several rumors related to insecurity and violence that have circulated in El Salvador in recent years. From there, this dissertation discusses the loss of basic constitutional and

human rights that has occurred since democratization. This loss of rights is the result of a state of exception (Agamben dixit), in that it simultaneously violates the law, and is ordered and authorized by the state. In tracing the interconnected dimensions between economic scarcity and violence, this research seeks to contribute to ongoing conversations among journalists and academics regarding the epidemic of insecurity, and the agents that benefit. This dissertation does not point to a singular origin or point of unity that has produced the epidemic. Rather, the discourses and representations that are documented in this investigation seek to contribute to a mapping of the political, economic and social transformations that have developed since 1992.

As Alejandro Portes and Kelly Hoffman explain, there is no one-to-one correlation between poverty and violence. With the case of El Salvador post- democratization, it is therefore not possible to draw simple correlations between the economic shifts generated by the expansion of free trade and the escalation in homicide rates following the civil war. Nevertheless, these phenomena are interrelated. Since the connections between free trade, economic scarcity and violent crime are multiple and complex, simultaneously operating in a number of public and private spheres of experience (e.g., the social, political and economic), it is often impossible to quantitatively measure these connections. As a result, the connections can escape categorization. As discussed throughout this dissertation, the dominant discourses circulated by the governments of the U.S. and El Salvador, and by the proponents of offender management strategies and free trade (e.g., the Asociación Nacional de Empresa

Privada and Giuliani Security & Safety) trace the epidemic of insecurity to a linear logic

of a corrupt and inefficient state. These agents therefore consistently employ both failed state and international development theories when determining the solutions for confronting the epidemic of violent crime. As explained in this dissertation, these solutions include the construction of the Central American logistical corridor, which is facilitating the expansion of free trade throughout the region, and the implementation of a series coercive and efficient policing strategies. Given the difficulties in quantifying the relationships between free trade and insecurity, and the narrative of a failed state which is widely circulated in the public sphere, this dissertation seeks to demonstrate the connections between free trade and insecurity through the analysis of a number of discourses and representations. From there, this dissertation shows that, in order to confront the epidemic of violent crime, the state has implemented a succession of policies that allow for the militarization of the civilian police force and the penetration of a market logic into the criminal justice system. A tragic consequence of these policies has been the loss of basic constitutional and human rights among ordinary citizens. The interconnected nature of these phenomena which have developed simultaneously post- democratization –the expansion of free trade, increases in economic scarcity and violent crime, and the widespread violation of basic rights– is demonstrated in this dissertation through a mapping of discourses and representations. As discussed below, mapping these complex phenomena is key, in that it allows the situation to be examined from a number of entry points, and it allows for a tracing of a multiplicity of connections.

In analyzing the ways in which written and visual representations shape personal experience and relations of power in contemporary El Salvador, this investigation

employs an interdisciplinary approach that is informed by the Cultural Studies. As sociologist Eva Illouz explains, in the Post-Industrial Age, new relations of power and exploitation have developed. The processes of capitalism no longer involve just the means of production, but rather, they now enter into the private sphere, as aspects of one’s personal and emotional life are commodified (231). Illouz states that, “…capitalism has now become a large-scale, anonymous and fragmented cultural force shaping our sexuality, body, eating habits and everyday pleasures” (231). In this way, life itself is now a site of commodification and exploitation. In addition, Illouz explains that more and more in Digital Age perception and experience are shaped by representations, as access to knowledge and communication becomes increasingly electronic. As Illouz discusses, representations are often diffuse and difficult to capture, in large part because individuals interact affectively with them. As such, they are interpreted subjectively, and perceptions of representations thus emerge directly from individual experience (223). For this reason, representations at times escape simple categorization.

Nevertheless, in the Post-Industrial Age, relations of power and the very fabric of society are largely shaped by written, spoken and visual representations. As Illouz states,

“Representations are at the heart of systematically distorted relationships between social groups… These distorted relationships in turn produce a surplus value for those who control the means of representation and real suffering for those who don’t” (224).

Cultural Studies allows for interdisciplinary analyses of representations, and provides insight into which agents have easier access to the means of representation, and which groups are misrepresented or dispossessed of the ability to represent themselves. Cultural

Studies can therefore provide new knowledge regarding situations of injustice that cannot be measured or otherwise accessed through quantitative means. This framework is pertinent to the case of El Salvador post-democratization, given the difficulties in quantifying the relationships between free trade and insecurity, and the dominance of a failed state narrative in public and official discourses. Illouz explains the gravity of this type of analysis, since it deals with real relations of exploitation (225). She explains:

…in the realm of social relations, reality, as we frequently experience it and live in it, is the result of a fragile negotiation that depends on how we label the situations we live in. Metaphors have real consequences for our lives in opening or shutting off our field of vision. By relabeling situations and by showing how such relabeling might affect in turn the self- perception and behavior of others, [Cultural Studies] shows that our perception of reality is very much shaped by how our culture defines worth and value …, that how we strategically name our or others’ behavior will make that behavior acquire a different social meaning. (225)

Therefore, Illouz explains that the renaming of a situation can allow it to be thought about differently. In this way, symbolic categories can be translated into real resources, and this can lead to real political change (225). This can be seen with the case of sexual harassment in the U.S. While public discourses surrounding sexual harassment were virtually non-existent in the first half of the twentieth century, today there is legislation that protects individuals from these types of rights violations. In this vein, a principal objective of this dissertation is to interrogate the failed state and development theories that are consistently employed by agents such as the Asociación Nacional de

Empresa Privada (ANEP) and the Washington Office on Latin American Affaris

(WOLA), in an effort to revisit and redefine these categorizations. As such, this

dissertation seeks to reorient public conversations regarding insecurity in El Salvador, and shift the focus to the damages produced by the expansion of free trade.

In her discussion of representation, Illouz refers to both the semiotic and political meanings of the term –representation as a metaphor, or something symbolic (e.g., green as a symbol of youth), and representation as an act of speaking and making a decision on behalf of a particular group (e.g., the U.S. Congress representing the will of the people)

(222-223). This distinction is similar to that made by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in her essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in which she distinguishes between ‘darstellen’ (an aesthetic representation; a portrait) and ‘Vertretung’ (a political representation; speaking for or on behalf of someone) (Chakravorty Spivak 71). Illouz explains that, as agents represent and speak on behalf of others, issues of misrepresentation and non- representation arise, as occurs within asymmetrical relations of power. She adds that misrepresentation and non-representation can constitute a form of injustice and a source of suffering, and that in the present period a principal role of Cultural Studies is to reveal the ways in which injustice is legitimized through representations, and to then denounce these forms of injustice. Illouz states:

[Cultural Studies] has a (relatively) simple purpose: to identify the process by which certain conventions are systematically chosen to represent the social world and hence to understand the ways in which these representations in turn represent the point of view of some and misrepresent the point of view of others. The central assumption of [Cultural Studies] is that ‘misrepresentation’ or ‘non-representation’ constitute a form of injustice which must appear in our empirical descriptions of society and in our struggle for justice. (222)

The circumstances surrounding Romero’s assassination –both his last homily, and the official account of Romero’s funeral broadcast by the National Radio of El Salvador– provide a concrete example of how symbolic representations shape lived experience.

These representations played a decisive role in the government’s decision to assassinate

Romero and to open fire on the mourners in front of the Metropolitan Cathedral, and in the escalation of instabilities that led the official start of the civil war. In the Digital Age, political struggles and subjective experiences are played out even more in the arena of representation, as the internet increasingly becomes the principal means of accessing knowledge and communication. In 2016 the government of El Salvador has declared a state of emergency due to recent escalation in homicides. For this reason, the study of representations is all the more crucial at the present moment, given the citizenry’s need to understand and respond to the state of insecurity, and given the powerful forces that are advancing the objectives of financial capitalism and coercive policing strategies.

In order to approach new knowledge regarding the current epidemic of insecurity, this dissertation analyzes a number of representations which provide evidence of multiple connections that link the expansion of free trade in El Salvador post-democratization with escalations in violent crime. From there, this investigation demonstrates that the state’s response to violence has been the progressive militarization of the civilian police force and the penetration of a market logic into the criminal justice system –strategies which have resulted in the widespread violation of human and constitutional rights. As noted above, the connections between free trade and violent crime are often difficult or impossible to quantify. Further, the effects of this network of connections reach

effectively all aspects of Salvadoran society. Given this complexity, this investigation examines the epidemic of violence in contemporary El Salvador by way of a mapping of representations of economic scarcity and insecurity post-democratization. This dissertation benefits from various sets of statistical data related to the social and economic shifts that have developed since 1992 (e.g., macroeconomic transformations, increases in incarceration rates and the expansion of private security) which contextualize the analyses. However, the mapping of representations enables this investigation to go beyond quantitative analyses, to approach new understandings of the current epidemic of insecurity from a number of diverse entry points. As Illouz explains, since representations at times cannot be grasped by available language and therefore escape forms of categorization, they can provide insight into knowledge that may otherwise be inaccessible. For this reason, the representations analyzed in this dissertation provide an important counterpart to the quantitative analyses. Having mapped a portion of the multiplicity of connections between free trade and insecurity, this dissertation finds that the solutions being implemented by the state to confront poverty and the epidemic of violent crime (e.g., the construction of the Central American logistical corridor and the

Plan El Salvador Seguro) will not improve the standard of living for ordinary citizens, and they will not reduce the homicide rate in El Salvador. In 2015, El Salvador had the highest homicide rate in the world. While the average number of daily homicides was approximately 18.3 in 2015, the daily average reached 19 in the first three months of

2016 (Luna; Valencia, “Dos mil cadavers…”). Given this increase in early 2016, coupled with issues of economic scarcity and the coercive methods of the Plan El Salvador

Seguro (which closely coincide with the GSS recommendations), this dissertation projects that the homicide rate for 2016 will either reach or surpass the rate for 2015.

To map connections between free trade and insecurity from a number of diverse entry points, this dissertation engages sources from a range of disciplines including economics, sociology, political science and anthropology, and it examines official discourses published by the governments of the U.S. and El Salvador.2 These sources document the massive economic transformations that have occurred post- democratization, the U.S. government’s powerful involvement in expanding the free trade zone sector in El Salvador, and the implementation of a risk management logic in the country’s criminal justice system. From there, this dissertation documents discourses and representations circulated by the advocates of economic liberalism and coercive policing strategies in El Salvador, including the Asociación Nacional de Empresa Privada

(ANEP) and Giuliani Security & Safety (GSS). ANEP and GSS claim that these strategies are the key solution for confronting poverty and violent crime, and for creating a better future for Salvadoran citizens. This dissertation also analyzes the work of a number of journalists and activists working in El Salvador, which challenges the logics advanced by agents such as ANEP and GSS. The specific cases documented by these journalists and activists demonstrate the ways in which economic liberalization affects the lives of ordinary citizens. They provide evidence, for example, of severe

22 With respect to the expansion of free trade post-democratization, this investigation follows the work of Raúl Moreno and Rose J. Spalding. It employs the work of Alejandro Portes and Kelly Hoffman to discuss social adaptations to economic liberalization (which include both migration and violent crime). To discuss connections between free trade and violence in rural communities, it follows to the research of Alisa Garni and L. Frank Weyher. To provide evidence of the implementation of coercive policing and offender management strategies in El Salvador during the period of economic liberalization, this dissertation engages the work of Loïc Wacquant and Emma Bell. 13

constitutional and human rights violations that have resulted from the implementation of economic development and coercive policing strategies. These include violations of suspects’ rights and severe prison overcrowding under the Mano Dura laws and the Plan

El Salvador Seguro, severe labor violations in the free trade zone and private security sectors, and a lack of access in marginalized communities to potable water and secondary education. Following Illouz, one sees that violations of rights under economic liberalization are experienced affectively and subjectively by the individual. These experiences therefore are often diffuse and difficult to capture. Therefore, the analysis of representations not only provides insight into how perceptions are shaped, but it also allows social injustices that often escape categorization to be identified and articulated.

In addition to official discourses, and the work of journalists, activists and scholars in the social sciences (e.g., Moreno, Spalding, Portes and Hoffman, Garni and

Weyher, Wacquant, and Bell), this dissertation also engages the theoretical works of

Giorgio Agamben, Christian Marazzi and Roberto Espósito to further map the connections between the liberalization of the economy, escalations in violence, and the loss of basic rights in El Salvador post-democratization. Their work is pertinent to the case of El Salvador, given that corporate investors and the state routinely externalize costs in sectors such as textiles and private security in order to guarantee the continuous growth of capital (as discussed in this dissertation, there are asymmetrical power relations at play which enable investors to do so).3 However, the externalization of costs has also

3 Externalities are the costs of production that are not fully accounted for in the price of an item or in the market system. An example can be seen with apparel sold cheaply in the U.S. In order to reduce the costs of manufacturing, costs are externalized: factories pay low wages and violate labor regulations. Air and water pollution are another consequence of manufacturing. These costs are not fully reflected in the price of 14

resulted in the loss of basic rights, and it is connected to current conditions of insecurity.

The works of Agamben, Marazzi and Espósito provide insight into the nature of rights violations in the neoliberal era. They are therefore engaged in this investigation to arrive at new knowledge regarding the connections between the transformation in value orientations in El Salvador (i.e., the massive economic transformations post- democratization) and the expansion of insecurity, and the negative effects that these phenomena have for ordinary citizens.4

Marazzi explains that in order to guarantee the continuous expansion of profit it is necessary to appropriate and commodify individuals’ very lives. Here, Marazzi employs the work of Giorgio Agamben on homo sacer and bare life. For Agamben, the concept of bare life involves the intervention of power in the lives of individuals. As a consequence, a human being is reduced to mere life, and is stripped of basic rights, and of cultural, political and social memory and significance (Ziarek 2). This is the notion of the banned man, or homo sacer, who is exposed to violence, and can be killed with impunity. Neither citizen nor martyr, this individual resides in a liminal space. The individual can be killed without following regular juridical processes, and therefore, this killing exceeds the force of law and no one is held responsible. Still, the death of the individual is authorized by the same law (2-3). In this way, acts of physical and structural violence enacted against the banned man lie neither clearly inside nor outside of the law, but in a zone of

garments, and are therefore externalized. These consequences are the social costs of producing apparel, and they are not accounted for in the price at which the apparel is sold to consumers. 4 Value orientation refers to the ways in which monetary value is produced and realized within an economy. Whereas value was largely based in the production of goods in the Fordist era, under neoliberalism, value is increasingly produced and realized via financial speculation and commercial banking. 15

indistinction. Bare life is that which remains after this reduction, and this destruction of social significance. The concept of the banned man provides insight into current conditions in El Salvador, since the lives of those who lack the means to resist the intervention of power are appropriated as costs are externalized. The disposable human tool is the perfect commodity, and in democratic El Salvador bios or life itself is now transformed into an opportunity for the extraction of profit across multiple dimensions of the social fabric (Ziarek 7-8, citing Orlando Patterson).

Given its reach into many spheres of Salvadoran society, the externalization of costs can often be difficult to categorize or quantify. For example, the externalization of costs produces severe rights violations for private security guards workers in apparel factories. To provide more nuanced examples, the allocation of foreign aid under free trade agreements (which is directed toward the construction of Central American logistical corridor, and not toward social services) is connected to the current shortage of potable water in Greater San Salvador and the lack of funding for the civilian police.

Therefore, the effects of the externalization of costs can be seen in many different areas of individual and community life. As explained above, since these effects at times escape categorization, the analysis of representations can provide new information that cannot be accessed through quantitative analyses. The concept of bare life, which is engaged in this dissertation in the analysis of representations of economic scarcity and insecurity, allows one to conceptualize how transformations in value orientations post-democratization affect ordinary citizens and strip individuals of their social significance.

As discussed throughout this dissertation there are a multiplicity of connections that link the transformation in value orientations to escalations in homicide. While

Agamben’s and Marazzi’s works provide insight into the externalization of costs and the commodification of individual life, Roberto Espósito’s work on autoimmunity allows one to approach new knowledge regarding the penetration of a market logic into El

Salvador’s criminal justice system. Espósito understands modern political, juridical, and philosophical categories as denoting an attempt to immunize the social body from the dangers posed by the community (e.g., the dangers posed by violence or disease)

(Campbell, “Interview” 50). Forms of immunization (e.g., zero tolerance policing strategies) therefore serve as a counter weight and a preventive measure that rejects contamination (Campbell, “Interview” 55). Thus, the opposition between community and immunity becomes clear, as immunization attempts to protect a community from dangers posed by members of this same community. Therefore, Espósito explains, there is a preoccupation, and a demand for self-protection in the community. In this way, an immunitary relationship develops between politics and the defense of life. While in the modern age this relationship was mediated, “…by a paradigm of order that was articulated in the concepts of sovereignty, representation, and individual rights,” in the neoliberal era, one sees that this relationship is increasingly mediated by a paradigm of coercive policing and offender management strategies (Campbell, “Interview” 55).

Therefore, the response to the threat of contamination has been very different throughout history, and Espósito points out that “…we are no longer inside the immunitary semantics of the classical modern period” (Campbell, “Interview” 54). He

states that, “…immunity, which is necessary to protect life, when brought beyond a certain threshold, winds up negating it” (Campbell, “Interview” 51). Therefore, self- protection becomes self-destruction, as the immunitary mechanism, in an excess of defense, turns in on itself, to the point that it risks destroying the political and individual bodies it seeks to protect (Campbell, “Translator’s Introduction” xv; Campbell,

“Interview” 53, 55). This enclosure of the body in on itself, in an attempt to annihilate the infected part, marks a transition from immunity to autoimmunity (Campbell, “Interview”

55). Espósito states that more and more this is the case in our own period, as immunity is intensified to the point in which, “…the cure is given in the form of a lethal poison”

(Campbell, “Interview” 51). This is an immunity destined to destroy itself, along with the contaminated other (Campbell, “Interview” 55). Espósito’s work on autoimmunity is engaged in this dissertation in analyzing both statistical data and representations related to economic scarcity and insecurity in contemporary El Salvador. This analysis provides evidence that current strategies to confront the homicide epidemic are destructive in nature, and it leads this investigation to conclude that these strategies will not reduce homicide rates or insecurity in the foreseeable future.

As noted above, the objective of this dissertation is to carry out a mapping that will contribute to ongoing conversations among journalists and scholars regarding economic scarcity and insecurity in El Salvador post-democratization. This investigation does not point to a singular origin or to discrete causes that have produced these phenomena. Rather, its purpose it to map some of the interconnected dynamics that link the social and economic shifts that have developed since 1992. That is, the purpose of

this mapping is to identify, articulate, and produce new knowledge regarding the multiplicity of connections that exist between transformation in value orientations, escalations in homicide, and the loss of basic rights. Because these connections traverse many dimensions of the social fabric, they are often difficult to measure and escape simple categorization. For this reason, in addition to presenting statistical data, this investigation also analyzes a number of discourses and representations in order to map the multiplicity of connections. This mapping of interconnected dimensions is conceptualized through three specific frameworks related to biopower, those of: biocapitalism (Marazzi), autoimmunity (Espósito) and bare life (Agamben). These frameworks enable this dissertation to provide new insight into the ways in which the transformations in value orientations reach virtually all areas and dynamics of the social fabric of El Salvador (e.g., labor, residency and migration patterns, agriculture, community life, education and public security). As this dissertation shows, these value transformations involve the intervention of power into the very lives of individuals who lack the means to resist. As these lives are appropriated, they are stripped of, and are disassociated from their cultural, political and social memory and significance (Ziarek 2).

Of course, this dissertation maps merely a small portion of the interconnected dynamics linking economic scarcity and insecurity in El Salvador, and as such its objective is to contribute to ongoing conversations, and to an ongoing mapping that is being carried out by contemporary Salvadoranists and journalists. However, this cartography differs from others in that is specifically calls for public and official discourses, inside and outside of academia, to reorient their focus from conversations on

development theories and the notion of a failed state, to discussions of the negative consequences of the transformations in value orientations and the expansion of free trade.

As discussed in this dissertation, international development theories advanced by the U.S. government determine current economic policy in El Salvador. Rose J. Spalding explains that there are profound asymmetries that are inherent the series of free trade agreements implemented in Central America since the Reagan administration. Therefore, the details of these development strategies must be articulated in order to determine whether they will genuinely raise the standard of living and reduce insecurity in El Salvador, or whether there are primarily intended to privilege the interests of large corporate investors operating in the region. Likewise, public and official discourses must be reoriented to shift the focus away from the notion of a failed state. This is not to deny that corruption and clientalism persist post-democratization. Indeed, these are critical issues in El

Salvador that must be documented and confronted. However, the origin of insecurity in

El Salvador is not a corrupt and inefficient state, and in fact the notion of a failed state is being used as a distraction (e.g., by the Asociación Nacional de Empresa Privada (ANEP) and the Washington Office on Latin American Affairs) to direct conversations away from the damages caused by the massive shifts in El Salvador’s economy. For this reason, the present research posits that, if critiques of the Salvadoran State are to be carried out, these investigations should originate principally in El Salvador, and should be directed by

Salvadoran citizens and residents. With respect to research originating in, and/or funded by organizations in the United States or Europe, a critique of corruption and other

‘failures of the state’ may run the risk of overlooking the damaging effects of the

economic and free trade policies that have been imposed on El Salvador in recent decades. In this way, these types of investigations have the potential to determine the conversation, positioning domestic ‘failures’ as the impetus that generates violent crime.

Therefore, the research presented in this dissertation supports the assertion that international development and failed state theories must be carefully examined and redefined. Only then will it be possible to approach viable solutions that will address issues of economic scarcity and insecurity post-democratization.

“The Socialization of Risk and the Privatization of Profit: Biocapitalism and

Transformations in Valorization Processes in contemporary El Salvador,” Chapter 2 of this dissertation, begins tracing connections between free trade, economic scarcity and insecurity by examining the immense economic transformations that have occurred since democratization. It explains that, under several free trade agreements with the U.S., El

Salvador rapidly shifted from an agro-export economy to one sustained in large part by remittances. As part of this shift, the country’s economy was liberalized. The liberalization of the economy after the civil war, coupled with the new dependence on remittances, in turn prompted the expansion of large commercial banking. Chapter 2 also notes that, in 2000, El Salvador adopted the U.S. dollar as its currency. A common complaint heard among citizens is that, with dollarization the prices of goods and services have risen, but wages have not kept up. Therefore, for hundreds of thousands of

Salvadorans, their salaries are not enough to pay for the basic food basket. The drastic economic transformation has changed the ways citizens earn a living, and it has changed

residence patterns, including the places to which people must move and commute in order to find employment and sustain their households.

As a result of the decline in the agricultural economy following the civil war, employment opportunities in much of rural El Salvador ceased to exist. It is therefore often necessary to either relocate or to commute to urban areas, where employment is available. As a further consequence of the massive economic and social transformations, millions of Salvadorans have also been driven to emigrate. Approximately one quarter of the population now lives abroad. These citizens send home billions of dollars in remittances every year, and these remittances now account for about 17% of the country’s GDP. In the decades following the civil war, El Salvador is therefore relying on high-risk, undocumented emigration and on remittances in order to sustain its economy.

In order to discuss the activities connected to the changes in the economic structure and residency patterns, Chapter 2 examines several free trade initiatives and agreements that have been initiated by the U.S. and implemented in El Salvador since the

Reagan administration. Although this chapter discusses both the Caribbean Basin

Initiative (CBI) and the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement

(CAFTA-DR), it focuses most specifically on the Partnership for Growth (PFG). The

Partnership for Growth is a free trade initiative implemented under the Obama administration in 2012. It centers on constructing state of the art transportation networks throughout El Salvador, and on opening the country to increased foreign investment.

Following Raúl Moreno and Rose J. Spalding, Chapter 2 discusses the asymmetrical nature of free trade agreements in Central America, and the concessions that countries in

the region must make, due to the vulnerability of their economies. Further, it notes the lasting effects that these free trade agreements have on the economic and legal structures of El Salvador. In this way, Chapter 2 examines the sweeping transformations in value orientations that have occurred in El Salvador since the early nineties. These transformations are linked to the conditions of economic precarity that exist in the country today, and to the homicide epidemic that has developed post-democratization.

A key aspect of Chapter 2 is an examination of the Mesoamerican Integration and

Development Project (MIDP), which involves the construction of a logistical grid that will connect central Mexico with the southern border of Panama. This logistical corridor will therefore form a component of larger grid connecting the U.S. with South America, which will facilitate the movement of goods throughout the Americas. The governments of the U.S. and El Salvador are providing hundreds of millions of dollars to help fund the development of this grid, under CAFTA-DR and the Partnership for Growth. The

Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project includes the construction of state of the art highways, and electricity and telecommunications grids. It also includes the construction and improvement of bridges, ports and airports, and the construction of a dry canal that will traverse El Salvador and Honduras and connect the Pacific Ocean with the

Caribbean. The dry canal will provide an economical alternative to the Panama Canal, and will facilitate the movement of goods from China into the Western Hemisphere.

Another aspect of the logistical corridor is the expansion of free trade zones, which are strategically located along these networks. The businesses operating within the free trade zones are exempt from many federal taxes, and they enjoy a degree of autonomy, since

they are not subject to all of the laws of El Salvador. The free trade zones therefore form an additional component of this connective grid, which economist Raúl Moreno refers to as the Central American logistical corridor.

Finally, Chapter 2 discusses the work of Christian Marazzi on biocapitalism, in relation to contemporary El Salvador. Since the Ronald Reagan administration, there has been a global shift in value orientations which has taken place at diverse times and speeds in the different regions of the world. With this shift there is a movement from a focus on the production of manufactured and agricultural goods, to a focus on financial capitalism, which involves large-scale banking and speculative investment. As noted above, with the processes of biocapitalism, in order for capital to continuously expand, costs must be externalized and new forms of capital accumulation must tap into and commodify life itself. In El Salvador a shift in value orientations began in the early 1990s, and with this transformation, those who are left most vulnerable are socially and economically excluded citizens. Chapter 2 therefore provides a foundation for the analyses in this dissertation which demonstrate the ways in which the processes of biocapitalism penetrate the lives of ordinary citizens.

“Zones of Indistinction after Democratization: Financial Capitalism, the

Criminalization of the Poor, and the Reduction to Bare Life,” Chapter 3 of this dissertation, follows sociologist Loïc Wacquant and demonstrates that, since democratization, El Salvador has simultaneously experienced economic liberalization and steep escalations in homicide rates. In the years following the Peace Accords, homicide rates reached epidemic levels, and have remained an epidemic every year since the mid-

nineties. To put homicide rates in El Salvador into perspective, a rate of 10 homicides per

100,000 inhabitants is considered an epidemic. In the United States the rate is 4 per

100,000, and in the United Kingdom and France the rate is currently 1 per 100,000 (Word

Bank, “Intentional Homicides…”). The U.S. State Department reports that in 2014 the homicide rate for El Salvador was 68.6 per 100,000 (United States Department of State

Bureau of Diplomatic Security). Citing data from the World Bank, USA Today reports that the homicide rate for 2015 was 104 per 100,000, which represents a 70% increase in one year (Gómez; Alvarado).5 The rate for 2015 was higher than the daily average during the civil war, and El Salvador now has the highest homicide rate in the world (Gómez).

The escalation in social violence in the post-war era is attributed to gangs, the most powerful of which are the Mara Salvatrucha (or MS-13) and the Barrio 18 (or M-

18). Following the Peace Accords, two key factors that contributed to the evolution of the

MS-13 and the M-18 were mass deportations and issues with domestic security. During the civil war, hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans fled to the U.S., with more than half settling in California and Texas (Terrazas). Many men became socialized into gang culture in Los Angeles, and became gang members. As Susan Bibler-Coutin explains, under the Clinton administration thousands of Salvadorans were deported from the U.S. to El Salvador, many due to criminal charges. Between 1992 and 2001 a total of 32,100

Salvadorans were deported (Bibler-Coutin 24). Therefore, thousands of men that had been socialized into gang culture and had formed their own gangs while living in Los

Angeles were deported back to El Salvador at a time when the country was undergoing

5 At the time of writing, the homicide rates for 2015 were still being finalized, and were only available via a limited number of sources. 25

massive political and economic transformations. These gangs that were formed in Los

Angeles, and which were brought into El Salvador after the Peace Accords, are now commonly referred to as the mara. The mara are known for carrying out vicious acts of violence in everyday settings (e.g., in markets and parks, and on neighborhood streets and busses) and for the widespread usurpation of homes. Further, their extortion of small businesses has swept across the country and is now woven into the very fabric of society.

Since the 1990s, the mara have expanded and become powerful. They now dominate entire urban and rural neighborhoods across El Salvador, including the historic center of the capital, and they pose a genuine challenge to the police, the military, and the state.

An unintended consequence of the mass out-migration from El Salvador that has been occurring over the past decades has been the fracturing of families and communities, a factor which has contributed to the expansion of the mara. In his ethnography of the MS-13, T.W. Ward explains that, for young Salvadorans who are disconnected from their immediate families and communities, the gangs serve as a type of surrogate family, and can provide, “…a sense of self-worth, and a sense of belonging to a group that cares about their welfare and survival” (Ward 4). Additional factors that have contributed to the expansion of the mara have been the forced recruitment of adolescents in schools and neighborhoods (i.e., the gangs threaten the lives of adolescents and their families if they resist joining), and the implementation of Mano Dura policies – which involve zero tolerance, iron fist policing strategies– beginning in 2003. Given the public’s concern for the escalation of violent crime, these hardline policies have received broad support for over a decade. However, they have also prompted the militarization of

the civilian police force, and violations of suspects’ rights (Call, “Assessing El

Salvador’s…” 571-72). These policies have also resulted in sharp increases in incarceration, severe prison overcrowding, and lengthy pre-trial detentions. Heidrun

Zinecker explains that young Salvadorans that are either incarcerated or held in pre-trial detention are at risk of joining gangs, given the strong influence that the mara have over the prisons (Zinecker 32). Therefore, the expansion of efficient, zero tolerance policing has only exacerbated the homicide epidemic.

The work of Loïc Wacquant provides insight into how massive economic shifts develop simultaneously and are interconnected with escalations in violent crime.

Wacquant explains that increases in violent crime following periods of economic liberalization are part of the fallout from social dislocations caused by these transformations. This has been the case in El Salvador, where changes in employment and migration have developed simultaneously alongside the homicide epidemic. Given the expansion of widespread insecurity, the country is also experiencing intense public fear of violent crime, and a deep political concern for the containment and management of problem neighborhoods and towns (Wacquant, “Global Firestorm” 77). Wacquant explains that the state’s solution for the rise of insecurity during periods of economic liberalization is to manage poverty and violence through punitive measures. Chapter 3 documents some of the coercive strategies that have been implemented post- democratization, specifically the Plan El Salvador Seguro (2015) and the Giuliani

Security & Safety recommendations (2015), which continue the work of earlier Mano

Dura policies (2003-2004), and are resulting in the suspension of basic rights.

Similar to Wacquant, Emma Bell and Robert Reiner explain that one of the consequences of economic liberalization is the contraction of the social safety net. In this context, it becomes difficult for political leaders to address issues of social and economic exclusion through education and integration. As seen in El Salvador, leaders are constrained in their ability to protect citizens through labor regulations and social services, and therefore must find alternative means of seeking legitimacy and restoring confidence in the government amidst social upheavals (Bell 7). Given the intense public fear of violent crime, coercive security strategies and zero tolerance policing have received broad public support, and have been implemented by four consecutive presidential administrations –those of Francisco Flores, Antonio Saca, Mauricio Funes, and Salvador Sánchez Cerén. With the implementation of coercive security strategies under democratization, there is not a focus on reintegrating at-risk citizens through social services programs. Rather, these individuals are increasingly subject to the criminal justice system. As a result, over the past twenty-five years incarceration rates in El

Salvador have increased by approximately 600%, and there has been an exceptionally sharp increase since 2000 (United Nations Statistics Division).

Both Wacquant and Bell and Reiner explain that the expansion of coercive security strategies is coupled with a focus on self-regulation and individual responsibility

–what Wacquant refers to as the “philosophy of moral behaviorism” (Wacquant, “Global

Firestorm” 83; Bell 2-3). Bell and Reiner also note the widespread focus on offender management strategies, which seek to efficiently control the undesirable populations that result from the contraction of the social safety net and pose a potential threat to the social

norm. In this way, concurrent with global shifts in value orientations, penality has taken on a risk management logic (Bell 3-6, 10). The policies and initiatives implemented in El

Salvador since 2003 are intended to do just this –to efficiently manage and control the risks posed by poverty and criminality through surveillance, streamlined data reporting, and increased incarceration.

“Acentered Multiplicity: Mapping Discourses and Representations of Economic

Scarcity in Democratic El Salvador,” Chapter 4 of this dissertation, demonstrates the ways in which the shift in value orientations following the civil war and the expansion of free trade directly intervenes in the lives of ordinary citizens. Chapters 4 engages the concept of the rhizome developed by Gilles Deleuze and Féliz Guattari, which allows events and activities to be approached in many different ways, and provides a way of seeing how diverse dynamics are multiple and interconnected. In botany, a rhizome is a self-propagating underground stem that produces both shoots and the root systems of new plants from its nodes. Bamboo is an example of a plant that is propagated in this way. A rhizome differs from the root structure of a tree, which is vertical and originates from a point of origin. While a tree is genealogical, with rings that can be traced chronologically, a rhizome does not have a patterned structure. It has no top or bottom, and no beginning or end, but only a middle from which it grows (Deleuze and Guattari 8). Unlike a tree, a rhizome is not the product of reproduction, but is an acentered multiplicity that is not produced by, and is not reducible to, an origin or point of unity. Rhizomes are therefore neither subject nor object, but are, in their very substance dimensions, intensities, directions in motion, and lines of flight that cannot change in size without changing in

quality. Deleuze and Guattari explain that a rhizome can be broken or ruptured at any point, but will start up again through old or new lines of flight. With no fixed order, the lines of a rhizome can be connected to any other of its lines, regardless of the similarities or differences. In this way, multiple connections can be made between signifying lines

(e.g., rhetoric and discourses) and asignifying intensities (affect). The internet exists and functions as a rhizome, as do colonies of insects. Deleuze and Guattari state that one can never get rid of a rhizome, since it can rebound again and again after most of it has been destroyed (Deleuze and Guattari 9).

Given the multiplicity of dimensions related to the epidemic of insecurity in El

Salvador (e.g., the transition from civil war to democratization, massive economic restructuring, steep increases in emigration and remittances flows, the implementation of offender management strategies and the penetration of a market ideology into the criminal justice system), the concept of the rhizome is key, in that it allows for a mapping of multiple interrelated factors (Bell 4-5, 10). As a continuation of the mapping began in

Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 analyzes several discourses and representations related to free trade and economic scarcity, such as legal cases and an advertisement video representation, which demonstrate the ways in which the processes of biocapitalism are penetrating the very lives of ordinary citizens. They include a suspected case of labor violations in the Hoons Apparel Factory in the Olocuilta free trade zone, a case of severe funding shortages in some of El Salvador’s rural public schools, and a video produced by the Chamber of Textile, Clothing and Free Trade Zone Industries of El Salvador

(CAMTEX) that promotes the benefits of free trade for ordinary citizens. Therefore,

Chapter 4 challenges the strategies that are being advanced by the U.S. government and the Asociación Nacional de Empresa Privada (ANEP), which claim that the expansion of free trade is the solution for economic development in El Salvador. It does so by documenting specific cases and providing evidence which proves that the development strategies imposed on El Salvador by the U.S government and the advocates of free trade are not serving to raise the standard of living or reduce insecurity in El Salvador. Rather, these strategies are primarily intended to protect the interests of large corporate investors operating in the region.

“Mapping Discourses and Representations of Insecurity Post-Democratization,”

Chapter 5 of this dissertation, continues the work of Chapter 4 by engaging the concept of the rhizome to analyze discourses and representations related to insecurity. Chapter 5 documents specific cases of funding shortages for rank and file police officers, and of the usurpation of homes by gangs, and it also provides information regarding the proliferation of private security since democratization. This expansion of private security indexes a critical imbalance, given that basic security and protection is only guaranteed for those who can afford to pay for it. In addition, it is important to note that, while

Chapter 4 points out that the maquiladora industry has the worst record of labor violations with regard to female workers, Chapter 5 explains that the private security industry has the worst record with regard to males. That is, the externalization of costs is resulting in labor violations for both men and women, albeit in different ways and in different sectors of the economy. The imbalance in security post-democratization therefore intervenes in the lives of citizens in multiple ways –from labor violations in the

free trade zone and private security sectors, to the violations of suspects’ rights and severe prison overcrowding under the Plan El Salvador Seguro, to a lack of access in marginalized communities to potable water and a secondary education. Given the multiplicity of interventions, and their reach into many overlapping dimensions of the social fabric, a mapping of representations enables this dissertation to articulate relationships between economic scarcity and insecurity.

Currently, agents including the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the

Asociación Nacional de Empresa Privada (ANEP), and Giuliani Safety & Security (GSS) are advancing claims that trace economic scarcity and current escalations in homicide rates to inefficiency, incompetency, and corruption on the part of the current FMLN administration. These claims also position free trade and offender management strategies as the solution for issues of poverty and insecurity in El Salvador. Yet, they fail to acknowledge the critical shortages in funding for citizens’ most basic needs (e.g., health care, education, access to clean water, public sanitation, safe workplaces, public security, and adequate nutrition), and the human rights violations that are resulting from efficient and coercive policing strategies. In addition, they fail to question why widespread poverty and rights violations persist, despite recent influxes in aid from the U.S. that are allocated to state of the art networks of connectivity. These claims are therefore based in linear and hierarchical logics –in aborescent logics, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s term– in that they trace problems of violence and poverty to simplified causes. This dissertation documents just a small portion of the mapping of the interrelated dynamics related to insecurity in El Salvador, and as such seeks to contribute to a mapping that has been

carried out by a number of journalists and Salvadoranists since the implementation of the

Peace Accords. At this moment, it is critical for the public to understand that this mapping both defies and contradicts the logics being advanced by the MCC, ANEP, GSS, and CAMTEX. That is to say, this mapping reveals that the Central American logistical corridor will not improve the standard of living for ordinary citizens. And, it affirms that iron fist policing strategies are merely contributing to escalations in homicide rates.

Further, the logics advanced by these agents are dangerous, in that they are determining the solutions and policies being implemented by the state. In addition, these logics determine the policies that are imposed on El Salvador by the government of the United

States, which are producing long-term and irreversible changes to the country’s economic and legal structures.

Chapter 6 of this dissertation, “Rumors of Insecurity Post-Democratization,” continues the mapping carried out in previous chapters, and provides an additional entry point for tracing insecurity post-democratization. Chapter 6 examines the situation from a distinct vantage point, and documents rumors related to insecurity that have circulated in

El Salvador in recent years. Rumors are unverified accounts that can provide insight into a community’s fears, biases and prejudices. They therefore can reveal the things that a community finds important, and can provide crucial perspectives during times of crisis.

With respect to rumor content, the accounts documented in Chapter 6 relate to two types of events seen post-democratization: clandestine acts of social cleansing, and the imposition of curfews under the threat of violence. These phenomena are familiar within the country’s historical context, since both curfews and social cleansing occurred under

authoritarian regimes and during the civil war. These activities have persisted post- democratization, although the perpetrators of violence and the social context have changed. Whereas military and paramilitary soldiers were the perpetrators of violence prior to, and during the civil war, the mara and the less-publicized death squads (e.g.

Sombra Negra) are the perpetrators post-democratization. The rumors documented in

Chapter 6, which circulated via e-mail, social media, leaflets, and in the news media, provide an entry point for examining insecurity, since they were generated within the context of current imbalances in public security, and of the dangers posed by the militarization of the civilian police force. Thus, the rumors documented in Chapter 6 provide insight into the ways in which insecurity is experienced by everyday citizens.

Chapter 6 begins with a review of the theories of rumor developed by Gary Alan

Fine, Linda Dégh, Ralph L. Rosnow, Nicholas DiFonzo, Prashant Bordia, and Sudhir

Kakar. It also discusses Carl Lindahl’s more recent work on rumor and legend during

Hurricane Katrina. The chapter then documents four rumors that have circulated in El

Salvador post-democratization, and closes with a brief discussion of the official responses to insecurity. The accounts documented in Chapter 6 include: rumors of curfews that circulated in greater San Salvador in 2009, and in Chalchuapa, Santa Ana in 2007, and which were attributed to mara and to a death squad, respectively; rumors surrounding a prominent mayor’s involvement in the Sombra Negra death squad; and uncertainty surrounding two massacres that occurred in the towns of Suchitoto and Tonacatepeque in

2010. The chapter then closes with an examination of official discourses related to social cleansing, and of the government’s alleged involvement in a truce negotiated between the

MS-13 and the M-18. While government involvement in the gang truce was still unverified in 2012 and 2013, and was therefore at that time a rumor, Chapter 6 explains that this rumor has since been verified, and evidence has been published proving the state’s involvement in the negotiation of the truce. Therefore, this dissertation demonstrates that, while rumors related to gang violence gain widespread circulation, rumors related to death squads and to the government’s involvement in the gang truce are typically downplayed or suppressed. Given that the rumors that a curfew to be imposed by the mara turned out to be false, and the rumors related to the state’s involvement in truce were eventually verified, it is clear that there is no correlation between the veracity of a rumor and the magnitude of its circulation. Further, the examination of rumors related to insecurity in contemporary El Salvador provides insight into the ways in which rumors can be manipulated in order to shape public perceptions.

In 2013, photojournalist Giles Clarke published a series of photographs documenting a specific case of the expansion of efficient and coercive policing strategies, and resultant violations of human rights. This series provides an intense and horrifying example of how the state’s efforts to manage economic scarcity and violence are penetrating the lives of ordinary citizens, and as such it serves as a sobering introduction to the discourses and representations analyzed in the chapters of this dissertation. The photographs document what Clarke refers to as ‘the gang cages’ in the Quezaltepeque prison, located about 15 kilometers north of San Salvador, and they demonstrate a case of severe prison overcrowding and lengthy pre-trial detention (Clarke, “El Salvador ‘gang cage’”; Clarke, Prison Pit). While the small holding cells photographed by Clarke (15 ft.

x 12 ft.) are designed for the initial 72 hour processing period following an arrest, men spend months in the cells without being charged, with no legal representation. These cells are five times over capacity with no running water or sanitation, and the men inside weave hammocks out of plastic shopping bags in order to create enough space to lie down. The Christian Science Monitor, McClatchy, and La Prensa Gráfica also released reports in 2013 documenting conditions in police holding cells in El Salvador (Johnson,

“Overcrowding Pushes Some…;” Johnson, “El Salvador Prison Overcrowding…”). The

Christian Science Monitor and McClatchy describe once cell measuring 9 ft. by 9 ft., and holding twenty-three men. Godofredo García Funes, an inmate interviewed for the articles, states that he spent twenty-two months in a holding cell waiting to be transferred to a prison. The Christian Science Monitor and McClatchy also reference an article published by La Prensa Gráfica in September 2013, which quotes former Minister of

Justice and Public Security Ricardo Perdomo. Perdomo told Salvadoran legislators that some prisoners had spent more than five years in holding cells. In addition, a report released by the U.S. State Department in 2013 states that prisons and detention centers in

El Salvador remain life threatening, and that “…some detainees were incarcerated longer than the maximum legal sentences for their alleged crimes” (Bureau of Democracy,

Human Rights and Labor). Despite the popularity of the different variations of Mano

Dura policies that have been implemented since 2003 (e.g., the Plan Mano Dura and

Súper Mano Dura, the Anti-Gang Laws, and the Plan El Salvador Seguro), these hardline approaches to confronting violence have only intensified the homicide epidemic.

Although these policies have been deemed necessary by four consecutive presidential

administrations (i.e., those of Francisco Flores, Antonio Saca, Mauricio Funes, and

Salvador Sánchez Cerén) given the state of exception in El Salvador, and have received broad public support, they have resulted in severe violations of basic human and constitutional rights for economically and socially excluded young citizens.

Image 1: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison. Image credit: Giles Clarke

Image 2: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison. Image credit: Giles Clarke

Image 3: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison. Image credit: Giles Clarke

Image 4: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison. Image credit: Giles Clarke

Image 5: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison. Image credit: Giles Clarke

Image 6: Police holding cell at the Quetzaltepeque prison. Image credit: Giles Clarke

Despite the political advances following democratization, since 1992 El Salvador has simultaneously experienced the sharp decline of the agricultural economy, the expansion of undignified, low-wage jobs in the free trade zone sector, and steep escalations in homicide rates. These factors combined have contributed to the massive migration of Salvadoran citizens to the U.S., and to the influx of remittances into the national economy. The events and activities connected to insecurity and the economic transformations that have occurred since 1992 are diverse and complex, and they are situated within a long legacy of violence and U.S. intervention. There are no simple correlations between free trade and violent crime, but there are multiple connections.

Together, the chapters of this dissertation map a number of connections between the

implementation of free trade agreements, escalations in violent crime, an efficient model of zero tolerance policing, and the violation of basic human and constitutional rights.

These dynamics now form part of a vicious cycle in El Salvador, given the intense public fear of violent crime, and the deep political concern for the containment and management of problem communities (Wacquant, “Global Firestorm” 77). In documenting the rumors, discourses, representations, and statistical data in the chapters that follow, this dissertation produces a distinct cartography that challenges the linear logics advanced by the advocates of free trade and offender management strategies, and engages in conversations regarding the ways in which power penetrates the very lives of ordinary citizens. A principal objective of this dissertation is to shift conversations away from international development and failed state theories, and towards discussions on the effects of the processes financial capitalism in El Salvador. From there, this dissertation seeks to identify agents that benefit from current insecurity, and the communities and individuals that are misrepresented or lack representation. Only by mapping the nuanced connections that exist between the transformations in value orientations and escalations in violent crime, and by identifying the agents that have privileged access to the means of representation and the groups that are dispossessed of the ability to represent themselves will it be possible to address issues of economic scarcity and insecurity post- democratization.

Chapter 2: The Socialization of Risk and the Privatization of Profit: Biocapitalism and Transformations in Valorization Processes in contemporary El Salvador

In San Salvador in March 2011, Mauricio Funes and Barack Obama announced the implementation of the new Partnership for Growth (Asocio para el Crecimiento), an initiative which, according to official U.S. discourses, aims to stimulate the domestic economy and strengthen national security in El Salvador. In the U.S. news media, reports on the Partnership for Growth do not exist. They are completely absent from public discourse, and therefore there are no debates or conversations regarding the validity or efficiency of the initiative. Nevertheless, in El Salvador there are critics who question the objectives of the partnership, its ability to stimulate economic growth, and its ability to reduce income inequality and homicide rates.6 Economist Raúl Moreno of the University of El Salvador, for example, discusses the concessions that El Salvador must make in order to receive funding through the partnership. The present study understands the economic and free trade initiatives that have been developed by the United States since the civil war and implemented in El Salvador (i.e., the Partnership for Growth and the

Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement, or CAFTA-DR) as not only a component of financial capitalism, but also as a driving force behind the current epidemic of social violence.

6 See: Flores; Leahy; Meléndez; Morales; “Rechazo a propuesta…;” Serrano; Velásquez and Marroquín 42

In examining systemic issues underlying the violence epidemic, this study rejects a failed state theory.7 It does not center on cases of corruption among members of the

Salvadoran government, nor is an analysis or a critique of the National Civilian Police

(PNC) or the judiciary. In other words, it does not detail inadequacies in these areas of government. It is, of course, important to document cases of clientelism and governmental corruption. However, the present research posits that, if critiques of the

Salvadoran State are to be carried out, these investigations should originate principally in

El Salvador, and should be directed by Salvadoran citizens and residents. With respect to research originating in, and/or funded by organizations in the United States, Canada or

Western Europe, a critique of corruption and other ‘failures of the state’ may run the risk of overlooking the damaging effects of the economic and free trade policies that have been imposed on El Salvador since the democratic transition. In this way, these types of investigations have the potential to determine the conversation, positioning domestic

‘failures’ as the impetus that generates social violence.

Corruption is not the origin of insecurity in El Salvador. Rather, it is a symptom, in part, of past U.S. interventions in El Salvador, and of the new processes of valorization that have developed globally since the Ronald Reagan administration. In light of this, the present chapter closely examines the initiatives implemented under the Partnership for

Growth in order to identify actual costs and benefits that they generate for ordinary citizens. While public and official discourses produced by advocates of free trade and by the governments of the United States and El Salvador praise the partnership, positioning

7 For discussions related to the development of failed state theories, see: Morton; Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State’: Toward Conceptual Alternatives;” and “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State.’” 43

free trade as the solution for generating economic growth and creating a safe society, an examination of the details of the PFG raises questions regarding these claims.8 In pinpointing the specific goals of the PFG and the allocation of funding, this chapter provides a foundation for discussions in the chapters that follow regarding the lack of funding for the most basic needs of the citizenry (e.g., the right to an education, to move safely through society, and to pursue a life above poverty levels), economic precarity, and social violence. From there, this dissertation questions whether the Partnership for

Growth and related free trade agreements genuinely serve to combat poverty and insecurity in El Salvador, or whether they primarily serve to expand free trade in the region. Following the work of Raúl Moreno, Rose J. Spalding, and Paulette L. Stenzel, another critical issue that is raised is El Salvador’s lack of autonomy in determining the terms of free trade within its own borders –a key factor influencing current insecurity and economic precarity. In sum, by closely examining the objectives of, and the allocation of funding under free trade agreements and initiatives in El Salvador, this investigation demonstrates how free trade is one of the interconnected dynamics affecting economic scarcity and insecurity in post-war El Salvador.

Biocapitalism and Bare Life

In analyzing the Partnership for Growth –a program directed by the United States and implemented in El Salvador– and its relation to the current social violence epidemic, it is useful to employ the concept of biocapitalism developed by Maurizio Lazzarato and

8 For discussion on discourses produced by ANEP and CAMTEX, strong advocates of free trade, see Chapter 4. 44

Christian Marazzi, which refers to the new processes of accumulation that have developed post-Fordism (Lazzarato; Marazzi; García Augustín and Ydesen).9 In The

Violence of Financial Capitalism, Marazzi explains how, since the 1970s, a transformation has occurred on a global scale in both the processes of value production and the forms of capital accumulation. This transformation can be seen in the development of financial capitalism over the past decades, and the subsequent sub-prime mortgage crisis and Great Recession that began in the United States in 2007 and 2008.

Unlike Fordist capitalism, in which value was centered on material production –on the laborer who produces goods during the working hours– with financial capitalism, value is largely based on speculation, an immaterial form of production. Therefore, the new forms of capital accumulation that have developed in the present era denote immense global transformations in the ways value itself exists.

According to Marazzi, financial capitalism functions by way of profound structural inequalities. In order for profit to continually expand, it is necessary to reduce and externalize costs. This is accomplished, in part, through the marginalization of the labor force, and through the socialization of losses and the privatization of profits –what is referred to by David Harvey in The New Imperialism as, ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey; Marazzi 45). An example of the socialization of losses and the privatization of profits can be seen with the 2008 global economic crisis, when some of

9 In August 2011, closed door negotiations regarding the Partnership for Growth were carried out in San Salvador. The Embassy of the United States in El Salvador states that, among the individuals present at these discussions were, “…representatives from USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury and Commerce, along with a Salvadoran delegation headed by Technical Secretary Dr. Alexander Segovia in Washington” (Embassy of the United States San Salvador, “El Salvador and United States Advance…”). 45

the largest financial institutions were rescued by the U. S. government using public funds.

Ran Duchin and Denis Sosyura argue that the bailouts created a moral hazard, giving banks the incentive to be even more reckless in the future and to increase their risk- taking, having become ‘too big to fail’ (Duchin and Sosyura). Another example of the externalization of costs and the expansion of capital can be seen in recent debates surrounding industrial mining in El Salvador. In July 2012, the Salvadoran Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos

Naturales, or MARN) published a report on the toxicity levels found in a section of the

San Sebastián River, where industrial gold and silver mining operations were carried out during the first half of the twentieth century. MARN’s analysis found that in 2012 – decades after the mining operations had ended— the highest cyanide levels detected were more than nine times the maximum limit established by federal law (i.e., as established by la Norma Salvadoreña Obligatoria de Agua para Consumo Humano), and iron concentrations were more than 1,000 times the maximum limit (Mendoza; Rivas;

Redacción ContraPunto, “Presencia de Cianuro…;” Redacción Diario Co Latino;

Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales). Ultimately, those who suffer the consequences of this contamination are the residents of the region. Currently, industrial mining continues to pose a threat to Salvadoran citizens. In 2013, the Oceana

Gold/Pacific Rim Mining Corporation launched a $301 million lawsuit against the government of El Salvador in a World Bank Arbitration Tribunal ("Mining Company

Sues El Salvador for $315 Million;” Belloso). Oceana Gold/Pacific Rim Mining claims that El Salvador is in violation of CAFTA-DR, in refusing to issue the corporation a

permit for gold mining operations. The permit was denied because Oceana Gold/Pacific

Rim Mining failed to meet El Salvador’s federal environmental regulations. Oceana

Gold/Pacific Rim is therefore seeking compensation from the government of El Salvador for potential lost profits. Given the dangers that industrial mining poses to human health and the environment, some of the risks and losses associated with mining have been externalized and socialized in El Salvador, allowing for the expansion and privatization of profit. As discussed below, the initiatives set forth under the Partnership for Growth point to these same processes.

Alongside financial capitalism, Marazzi also discusses biocapitalism, which involves a transformation in the processes of valorization and capital accumulation post-

Fordism. With biocapitalsim, what occurs is the extraction of profit from previously unproductive areas. In large part, technology is what makes these processes possible.

Unlike the Fordist era, when value was based in the laborer who produces materials during the working hours, with biocapitalism, every moment and every aspect of one’s life is transformed into an opportunity for the extraction of value. In this way, the body is commodified, and not only the body as laborer. Rather, one’s emotions, health and social relations –bios or life itself– are all transformed into opportunities for the extraction of value.

An example of this transformation in the processes of extracting profit can be seen with digital surveillance carried out via smart phones, search engines, and social networking sites. These methods of surveillance are utilized to reduce and externalize the costs of market research by monitoring and recording information about the user (e.g.,

information regarding one’s health, emotions, social relations, and geolocation). This information is produced, sold, bought and consumed, and in this way we, the public, are transformed into a commodity (Fuchs; Toffler). We therefore produce value without being compensated, and in exchange, we gain free access to search engines and social networking sites and to the conveniences of a smart phone. As a result, emotions, social relations, and the body itself are commodified. Further, the body is able to produce value at all hours and in all places, and not only during the working hours. Thus, the social and the emotional are used for value extraction. Since the consumer is also producing economic value, the consumer becomes a co-producer of that which is consumed

(Marazzi utilizes the term ‘coproduction’ for this process) (51-52, 58). In this way, the line of separation between producer and consumer becomes diffuse and blurred, and consumption itself has become productive (Fuchs; Toffler).

The processes of biocapitalism have become a determining factor in lives of upper and middle class members of societies. Information regarding the lives of those who have the resources to consume and are able to have constant access to technology is transmitted digitally, and is transformed into a commodity. The processes of biocapitalism are also a determining factor in the lives of the most marginalized members of societies. With respect to the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis, Marazzi states:

The expansion of subprime loans shows that in order to raise and make profits, finance needs to involve the poor, in addition to the middle class. In order to function, this capitalism must invest in the bare life of people who cannot provide any guarantee, who offer nothing apart from themselves. It is a capitalism that turns bare life into a direct source of profit. (40)

The form of financial capitalism that has developed since the Ronald Reagan administration is founded, in large part, on speculation, and not on the production of materials –this was made clear after the 2008 economic crisis. Given the instabilities inherent to this form of capitalism and its preference for speculation, Marazzi argues that, in order to generate earnings and guarantee the continuous expansion of capital, it is necessary to appropriate the bare life of individuals. Here, Marazzi employs the work of

Girogio Agamben on homo sacer and bare life. For Agamben, the concept of bare life involves the intervention of power in the lives of individuals. As a consequence, a human being is reduced to mere life, and is stripped of basic rights, and of cultural, political and social memory and significance (Ziarek 2). This is the notion of the banned man, or homo sacer, who is exposed to violence, and who can be killed with impunity. Neither citizen nor martyr, the individual reduced to bare life resides in a zone of indistinction –a liminal space. This is because the individual can be killed without following regular juridical processes, and, therefore, this killing exceeds the force of law and no one is held responsible. Still, the individual’s death is nonetheless authorized by the same law (2-3).

In this way, killing or acts of violence enacted against the banned man lie neither clearly inside nor outside of the law, but in a zone of indistinction. Bare life is that which remains after this reduction, and this destruction of social significance. The disposable human tool is the perfect commodity and therefore, bios or life itself becomes commodified and is transformed into an opportunity for the extraction of profit (Ziarek 7-

8, citing Orlando Patterson). This occurs under any number of circumstances, however, one can look to the case of mining to illustrate the point. If an individual is exposed to

water that has been contaminated by metal extraction, and then suffers illness or death, this person has been excluded and economically exploited, and the externalization of costs has resulted in the reduction of a human being to bare life. These losses are typically never quantified or debated in the public sphere.

To allow for the continuous expansion of capital, it is also necessary to create artificial scarcities, which, in turn, generate situations of precarity. Although it seems counterintuitive that an artificial scarcity could generate earnings, the record growth of corporate profits since the 2008 financial crisis confirms this point (42-43, 62). While unemployment has grown in the United States and private pension savings have diminished, corporate wealth has grown. One reason that figures into the equation is that, when there are high levels of unemployment, corporations lack the motivation to raise salaries or to contract more employees (54). In this way, it is possible to maintain the same levels of production while decreasing labor costs. The case of agricultural trade in

El Salvador since the implementation of CAFTA is another example of artificial scarcity.

Moreno states that, because of the free trade agreement (FTA), El Salvador now imports corn, rice and basic grains from the United States –products that had traditionally been domestic crops (Moreno, “Los impactos del CAFTA-DR en la vida de las personas…”).

He adds that this has had a negative impact on rural economies and the nation’s food sovereignty. As discussed below, the decline of agricultural production in El Salvador has been followed by consolidated growth in the textile and garment, or maquila industry

(Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA…,” 167). With this in mind, the remainder of this chapter will focus on transformations in valorization processes as they

are evident in free trade agreements and initiatives, including the Partnership for Growth.

This examination highlights the asymmetries inherent in free trade agreements and initiatives in El Salvador. Further, it provides a foundation for the discussions in the chapters that follow regarding discourses and representations of economic scarcity and insecurity. Together, the chapters of this dissertation demonstrate how these asymmetries are connected to current issues of social violence, and how free trade is an influential dynamic affecting economic scarcity and insecurity post-democratization.

The Partnership for Growth – Continuing the Network of Free Trade

Whereas CAFTA-DR is a free trade agreement, and therefore considered a treaty under international law, the Partnership for Growth (PFG) is a high-level, presidential initiative developed by the U.S. government and implemented in select countries. The

White House describes the PFG as a, “…whole of government effort,” and as bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and partnering nations, to address constraints to growth in these smaller, low-performing economies (White House Office of the Press Secretary;

Embassy of the United States San Salvador). The U.S. chose four countries for the partnership, stating they were selected based on their commitment to good governance.

The countries are: El Salvador, Ghana, Philippines and Tanzania (White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Philippines Partnership for Growth”). The goal of the PFG is to develop joint action plans that address constraints to economic growth in partnering countries, thereby, “…putting into practice the principles of President

Obama’s September 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development” (United

States Department of State Office of the Spokesperson). On the day the 2010 policy directive was signed, the White House published the following official press release:

The directive recognizes that development is vital to U.S. national security and is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United States. It calls for the elevation of development as a core pillar of American power and charts a course for development, diplomacy and defense to mutually reinforce and complement one another in an integrated comprehensive approach to national security. It provides clear policy guidance to all U.S. Government agencies and enumerates our core objectives, our operational model, and the modern architecture we need to implement this policy. (White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy”)

As Raúl Moreno has pointed out, and as is demonstrated in the statement above, the White House draws a direct connection between economic growth in developing countries, and U.S. national defense and security (Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements,

CAFTA and FTAA…;” Moreno, “Impacto de las Transnacionales en Centroamérica;”

Moreno, personal interview; “El economist Raúl Moreno…”). This press release echoes the statement given by Colin Powell at the World Economic Forum in February 2002, in which he argued that in order to fight the war on terrorism, it was necessary to increase trade in developing countries, thereby stimulating their economic growth. Powell added that the Bush administration was determined to, “…pursue free trade at every opportunity,” to improve the quality of life in these regions (Toedtman). As Paulette L.

Stenzel affirms, there has been a concerted effort under the George W. Bush and Obama administrations to implement a network of economic development plans and trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere that promote legislation and legal frameworks that are favorable to foreign corporate investment in developing countries

(e.g., NAFTA, FTAA, Plan Puebla Panama/Mesoamerican Project, CAFTA-DR, PFG)

(558). Further, the U.S. government identifies the liberalization of low-performing economies as a necessary step in guaranteeing national defense and security in the United

States.

As mentioned above, the PFG grew out of the 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development. The initiative originates in the United States, and the U.S. government selects the partnering countries. Official discourses highlight the fact that many of the partnership’s defining characteristics involve innovate approaches to stimulating economic growth in partnering countries. To begin, there is interagency involvement. Over a dozen U.S. government agencies participate in and coordinate PFG activities within partnering countries, including: the Millennium Challenge Corporation

(MCC), the U.S. State Department, and USAID (Millennium Challenge Corporation,

“Partnership for Growth”). There is also a singular focus on economic growth (Dunning).

Under the PFG, the vast majority of funds given to the government of El Salvador by the

U.S. government are allocated for transportation, including funding for highways, bridges, ports and airport infrastructure. Finally, a defining characteristic of the PFG is its focus on increasing private capital flows, or private sector investment, alongside the allocation of assistance provided by the U.S. government (Jensen; Atencio). In this way, under CAFTA, and now the PFG, the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have implemented plans that profoundly link trade with aid in El Salvador (Stenzel 579, citing

IPP Digital).

The PFG does not specify the amount of foreign assistance that will be allocated to El Salvador, and no funds are attached to, or distributed directly through the initiative itself. Rather, for each of the partnering countries, the PFG identifies the constraints to economic growth that should be addressed. The two countries (the United States and the partnering country) then develop a joint action plan to address these obstacles, and funding for certain projects is allocated through a Millennium Challenge Corporation

(MCC) compact. Under CAFTA and the PFG, assistance provided to El Salvador through

MCC compacts has been termed the Fondo del Milenio (Fomilenio). Under Fomilenio I

(approved 2006), a $461 million grant was given to El Salvador, and under Fomilenio II

(approved 2014), $277 million has been provided (Millennium Challenge Corporation,

“El Salvador Compact;” Embassy of the United States San Salvador, “MCC Will Sign

Second Compact with El Salvador”). The bulk the Fomilenio I funds have been allocated for transportation construction, in order to tie El Salvador into the connective grid being developed under the Mesoamerican Project. The allocation of Fomilenio II funds is still being determined. However, in October 2014, La Prensa Gráfica reported that these funds will be used to develop the Pacific Coastal zone (Cabrera). In this way, the funding allocated during the PFG is a continuation of an earlier MCC compact. Further, it appears that the transportation construction and infrastructural projects to be carried out under

Fomilenio II are a continuation of those begun under Fomilenio I.

Once the PFG was announced in March 2011, the process moved quickly: the constraints analysis was completed in July 2011, and the Joint Country Action Plan was released in November 2011 (Joint USG-GOES Technical Team; USG-GOES, “Joint

Statement of Principals;” USG-GOES, “Joint Country Action Plan”).10 The joint action plan identifies two binding constraints to economic growth, and establishes a number of goals that should be met by the U.S. government and the government of El Salvador in order to address these obstacles. The two constraints to economic growth are (in the order listed): crime and insecurity, and low productivity in the tradables sector (USG-GOES,

“Six Month Score Card”).11 The goals established to address crime and insecurity are:

1. strengthen justice sector institutions 2. improve criminal justice procedures 3. reduce impact of crime on businesses 4. reduce impact of crime on commuters/public transportation 5. remove assets from criminal organizations 6. strengthen El Salvador’s civil service 7. promote a national dialogue to improve security 8. assist at-risk youth through economic opportunities 9. strengthen the National Civilian Police (PNC) 10. improve education opportunities for youth in high-risk municipalities 11. prevent crime and violence in key municipalities and support reforms 12. reduce overcrowding in prisons 13. enhance security of prisons 14. promote extradition to combat crime (USG-GOES, “Joint Country Action Plan”)

The goals established to address low productivity in the tradables sector are:

1. establishment of a growth council 2. reduce firms’ cost to improve their competitiveness 3. strengthen labor force to match labor market demand 4. raise (net) tax revenue by 2015 5. support a strategy for attracting and promoting foreign direct investment 6. surmount low productivity in tradables (USG-GOES, “Joint Country Action Plan”)

10The technical team consisted of: officials from the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, members of Mauricio Funes’ economic cabinet, economists from the U.N. Development Program (UNDP-El Salvador), and economists from USAID, the U.S. Department of State, and the MCC (Joint USG-GOES Technical Team). 11 Tradables are goods and services that can be traded internationally. 55

Official discourses position these two sets of goals as mutually beneficial, arguing that, while it is important to address low productivity in tradables in order to create jobs, it is also crucial to address crime and insecurity to create a favorable atmosphere for foreign investment. Together, these two sets of goals make up the action plan for overcoming constraints to economic growth in El Salvador. Nevertheless, critics such as

Raúl Moreno, Rose J. Spalding and Paulette L. Stenzel argue that the network of development plans and trade agreements enacted over the past decades has resulted in a loss of sovereignty for Central American countries, as they become increasingly dependent on their continuation in order to retain preferential market access and sustain their own economies (Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA…;” Stenzel;

Spalding). As Spalding confirms, this dependence on the continuation of development plans and free trade agreements creates, “…a new area of vulnerability and risk,” which drives Central American countries to advance towards these agreements and plans, despite the economic asymmetries (61, 63).

In their analyses, Moreno, Spalding and Stenzel all emphasize this important point: that a pronounced asymmetrical relationship lies at the heart of these regional and bilateral development plans and trade agreements, and this asymmetry eliminates the possibility for small economies to advance towards a sustainable national development strategy (Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA…” 168). In his chapter on CAFTA-DR and Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA), Moreno discusses the prime motivations behind these agreements. Much of Moreno’s findings can be extended to an analysis of the PFG since, as noted below, CAFTA-DR, FTAA, and the PFG form part of

a series of complimentary and mutually supportive initiatives –each one laying the foundation for the next (Spalding 62). As Moreno explains, the fundamental objectives of

CAFTA-DR and FTAA are to limit the functions of the state in national economies, thereby promoting ideal terms for foreign trade and investment, and guaranteeing the greatest benefit for private enterprise (Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and

FTAA…” 167, 170). Moreno goes on to discuss what he terms, “the myth of an insurmountable contradiction between the state and the market,” that is, the understanding that state involvement in the market limits competition and discourages private initiatives, and therefore is a source of macroeconomic instability (170). To ensure continuous corporate growth, this instability must be reduced through the extensive deregulation of the economy and the privatization of public assets and services, given the understanding that the private allocation of resources is always more effective than public investment. As noted below, the push to limit state interference in the market is evident in PFG initiatives, as occurred in 2014, when the release of Fomilenio II funds became contingent upon the passage of reforms to the Public Private Partnership Law

(Meléndez and Morán).

As mentioned above, Spalding discusses the details of recent trade agreements in

Central America, and explains how, together, they form a network of plans that share a vision and strategies for removing obstacles to free trade in the hemisphere (62). The

PFG, which is proceeded by CAFTA-DR, forms part of this network that seeks to liberalize low-performing economies, and promotes legislation that is favorable to foreign corporate investment. Following Raúl Moreno, we see that with the PFG the

economic model set into motion with earlier free trade agreements “remains intact” (“El economist Raúl Moreno…”). That is, the PFG and CAFTA-DR have shared strategies for promoting free trade in Central America. With regard to CAFTA, Spalding documents how the U.S. government and international financial institutions defined the terms of the treaty from its earliest phases. To begin, Spalding shows how these external actors – members of the U.S. government and of international financial institutions– intersected with cooperative local officials and business interests in Central America in order to push for the regional agreement (68). Further, she discusses the ways in which Central

American interests (including civil society representatives) were excluded from the negotiation table, and how government officials were pressed or required to accept concessions that would be damaging to national development (82). Spalding also points out the highly specialized language used in the agreement, which at times was unclear even for experts. Finally, she discusses the lack of transparency involved, in documenting the ways in which U.S. agencies carefully orchestrated public support for CAFTA, noting that, “to promote public approval, CAFTA negotiating was accompanied by CAFTA selling” (88). Mass media campaigns were launched by government officials and local business elites, sometimes with funding from USAID, in order to frame CAFTA in a positive and hopeful light (91). Spalding describes the powerful themes that were promoted in these discourses, including increased flows in international aid, and almost endless opportunities for growth in trade and foreign investment, which would boost employment (93). CAFTA defenders also emphasized the dangers of not signing, pointing out the risk of losing textile jobs to China, or to neighboring countries –to

Mexico which had signed NAFTA, or to other Central American countries entering into free trade agreements. In this way, Spalding demonstrates that public support of CAFTA was not a spontaneous development, but rather was carefully cultivated and maintained by key actors.

Spalding’s work employs a “rule maker/rule taker” framework to analyze the

CAFTA negotiations (63). By examining the roles that different countries played in the negotiation process –the United States as rule maker, and Central American countries as rule takers– Spalding documents the power imbalances of the negotiations, both in setting the agenda and in controlling the content of the treaty (63). She adds that Central

American leaders were not only pressured into signing, but also actively pursued and embraced free trade agreements, despite the power imbalances.

George W. Bush announced his interest in pursuing a free trade agreement with

Central America on January 16, 2002, a time when he received bipartisan congressional support in the wake of September 11th. CAFTA would build upon Bill Clinton’s earlier pursuit in the mid-nineties of free trade in the hemisphere. Bush’s bid for congressional approval of the treaty was successful, and the pre-negotiation process, including six technical workshops for negotiator teams, began even before the Senate approved reauthorization of trade promotion authority (Spalding 63-65). During the Clinton administration, there was resistance in Latin America –particularly in Brazil– to the proposed hemisphere-wide Free Trade of the Americas agreement (FTAA), and FTAA eventually failed (64). Therefore, the Bush administration decided to pursue smaller regional and bilateral free trade agreements including CAFTA, which would allow the

United States to negotiate even more concessions than the hemisphere-wide FTAA would have allowed. In pursuing these agreements, the United States, via U.S. Trade

Representative Robert Zoellick, adopted a “competitive liberalization” strategy, which sought to expand free trade in the hemisphere by encouraging competition among aspiring partners, by raising the threat of losing opportunities to other “can do” countries

(Spalding 64).

When the competitive liberalization strategy was being pursued, Central

American leaders were pressured to seek and accept free trade agreements with the

United States, despite their constrained bargaining powers. As Spalding shows, in the early 2000s there were parts of free trade arrangements and agreements (which had been negotiated in previous years between Central America, the United States, and other countries) that were set to expire. Spalding explains that among the most important of these arrangements was the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI),12 which was designed as a temporary measure, “susceptible to timing out or revocation without compensation” (63).

Additionally, in the early 2000s, the Multifibre Arrangement was coming to an end.13 As

Spalding explains, Central American economies “…had spent over a decade reorganizing production around the market openings created by the CBI” (66). This is evident in the

12The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is a unilateral free trade agreement between the U.S. and Caribbean/Central American countries implemented by Ronald Reagan in 1982. It sought to promote economic development in the region, as a means of combatting the revolutionary uprisings in Central America during the Cold War. It is a one-way agreement, providing U.S. market openings for exporters in the region. Partnering countries are not required to reciprocate (Spalding 38). For Central American countries, CAFTA replaced the CBI. However, the CBI is still in effect in the Caribbean, and there are currently 17 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) beneficiary countries (Office of the United States Trade Representative). 13 From 1974-1994, global textile and clothing imports and exports were governed by the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA). 60

shift that occurred in the mid-nineties in El Salvador, when the country transitioned from an agricultural-based to a maquila- and service-based economy. Therefore, as free trade arrangements and agreements were timing out, Central American countries found themselves dependent on the continuation of these market openings with the U.S. in order to sustain their economies.

Spalding shows that continued dependence on the U.S. economy created a situation of vulnerability for Central America. Leaders were aware of the threat of lost opportunities –of losing investors to China, which provides cheaper labor in textiles and garments, to Mexico, which had signed NAFTA, and to neighboring Central American countries, which were also being pursued by the U.S. for CAFTA. As Spalding shows,

Central American leaders were therefore pressured to accept the new FTA, and were constrained in their ability to negotiate the content or the agenda (63). She adds that if any officials objected to CAFTA, they would have had a difficult time resisting the agreement (65).

Spalding’s arguments are echoed by Raúl Moreno, who states that, although there is a certain correlation between free trade and growth in GDP, “…economic and social development in its relation with activities carried out by transnational corporations is highly questioned” (Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA…” 166).

Moreno explains that, “…the concessions obtained by transnational corporations through arrangements with governments exert control and dominate local markets thus limiting the expansion of national enterprises since competition is limited” (166). Moreno adds that foreign direct investment is, “…a tool and not an end in itself,” as increases in

foreign direct investment are not a panacea for underdevelopment (166). Moreno affirms that the importance of instruments of trade and investment, “…lies in the role they have to play within national development projects so that they might contribute to the attainment of a sustainable and equitable development objective” (180). In order to attain sustainable and equitable development, a country must maintain autonomy, and it must have the ability to determine how foreign direct investment will be used in national development projects. In this way, state regulatory practices must be maintained, and

Central American countries must play a decisive role in determining the negotiation and content of free trade policies, in order to protect national sovereignty, and to guarantee citizenship and human rights.

Deep Integration

Both Spalding and Moreno analyze how international trade negotiations have shifted since the 1980s. Spalding describes this shift as having moved from “shallow integration” to “deep integration” (62). Whereas shallow integration concentrated on tariffs and market access, deep integration goes beyond these, to incorporate,

“…regulatory and institutional reform covering services, government procurement policy, investment protections, and intellectual property rules” (62). Spalding adds that regional trade agreements between industrial and developing countries –like CAFTA– have become more frequent over the past decades.

As noted above, when CAFTA negotiations were underway, parts of the

Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Multifibre Arrangement were set to time out. In the early stages of the negotiations, U.S. trade representatives made it clear that CAFTA

would not serve as a mere option or alternative to the CBI, but rather it would replace the

CBI altogether (Spalding 82). Since Central American countries had spent over a decade reorganizing production around the market openings provided via the CBI (e.g., in the post-civil war era, El Salvador shifted from an agricultural-based economy, to one sustained by maquiladoras, service industries and remittances), they needed to negotiate a new free trade agreement with the United States in order to retain preferential market access (Spalding 63, 66). Because of this dependency on the part of Central American countries, the U.S. Government was in a privileged position to impose its interests, and to dictate the terms of the negotiations –again, what Spalding describes as the Unites States as “role-maker” in the CAFTA negotiations (Spalding 63; Moreno, “Free Trade

Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA…” 172). In keeping with this role, the U.S. excluded issues that were of great importance to Central American countries from the agenda from the start, including those related to agricultural subsidies and immigration (Spalding 82).

The U.S. also promoted the principle of confidentiality in the negotiations, which opposed stated goals of transparency and inclusion. Furthermore, with CAFTA a requirement of reciprocity has been put into place, which means the loss of special and differential treatment and trade preferences for these developing countries (Spalding 62;

Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA…” 174).14 Moreno states that the

14 In the Doha Declaration (adopted 2001), World Trade Organization member governments agreed to provide special rights, or “special and differential” treatment provisions for developing countries. These provisions are intended to treat developing countries more favorably than other WTO Members, in an effort to promote development. According to the WTO, these special provisions include: “longer time periods for implementing Agreements and commitments, measures to increase trading opportunities for developing countries, provisions requiring all WTO members to safeguard the trade interests of developing countries, support to help developing countries build the capacity to carry out WTO work, handle disputes, and implement technical standards, and provisions related to least-developed country (LDC) Members.” (World Trade Organization) 63

loss of special and differential treatment neglects the massive economic gaps that exist between the U.S. and its Central American partners, while Spalding confirms that it undermines development prospects for developing countries (Moreno, “Free Trade

Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA…” 175; Spalding 62). Still, the process of deep integration discussed by Spalding goes beyond the asymmetries of the trade negotiations and the loss of special and differential treatment, to incorporate regulatory and institutional reforms, as mentioned above. The remainder of this section will discuss some examples of deep integration, focusing specifically on areas of reform implemented in El Salvador since the 1980s. These are: international arbitration for corporate investors via the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); the role of the United States in influencing Salvadoran legislation; and the connection between the

PFG and the construction of the Central American logistical corridor. Current problems of insecurity in El Salvador are closely linked to the economic restructuring that has taken place post-democratization. Therefore, in seeking to understand how the epidemic of violence has developed, it is essential to examine the processes of deep integration and the resultant lack of autonomy for the Salvadoran State, in order to articulate connections between new valorization processes and current insecurity. A discussion of the processes of deep integration reveals the asymmetries inherent to free trade, and the issues of economic precarity that have followed. As discussed in the chapters that follow, the economic shifts seen post-democratization have had devastating effects on the lives of everyday citizens, and have been a key factor in the escalation of homicide rates since the

Peace Accords. For this reason, an examination of the processes of deep integration

provides a necessary foundation for the discussions in the chapters that follow of discourses and representations surrounding free trade, economic scarcity, and insecurity.

El Salvador became a contracting state to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in the early 1980s. The Salvadoran government has signed many bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements that afford investors access to international arbitration, in order to settle disputes between the investor and the Salvadoran state (Hamilton, García-Bolívar and Otero). For example,

Chapter 10 of CAFTA provides a dispute mechanism for investors who claim that state entities have violated the investment protections guaranteed by the treaty (Hamilton,

García-Bolívar and Otero). The stated objective of these provisions is to afford substantive protections and guarantees to investors, which in turn will encourage foreign direct investment and economic development. Moreno states that this mechanism for settling disputes between investors and the state paves the way for many disadvantages for developing economies, in that it limits state involvement in negotiating the terms of foreign investment (Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA…” 167). He argues that these processes of deep integration not only favor corporate investors, but also subordinate Salvadoran law to the norms of the treaty, and preclude any possibility for a sustainable national development strategy (168). As mentioned above, El Salvador is currently in arbitration with the Oceana Gold/Pacific Rim Mining Co., which claims that

El Salvador is in violation of CAFTA, in refusing to grant environmental permits for mineral extraction. The Salvadoran government claims that Pacific Rim has failed to meet federal environmental regulations. Pacific Rim is seeking $301 million from the

Salvadoran state to compensate for potential lost profits, which is more than the total amount allocated under Fomilenio II. It is worth mentioning that Oceana Gold/Pacific

Rim is not a U.S. corporation, but is Australian and Canadian owned. Australia and

Canada are not signatories to CAFTA, and therefore the corporation did not qualify as a party under the treaty (United States Department of State, “2014 Investment Climate

Report…”). To circumvent this obstacle, the corporation created a U.S. subsidiary in

2009, and was able to bring its claim to international arbitration citing Salvadoran investment law. At the time of writing, the case is ongoing.

Another area in which the shift from shallow integration to deep integration is evident is in the influence that the United States has exerted over the past decades over

Salvadoran legislation related to free trade and foreign investment. According to Moreno, the strategic objective of U.S. involvement in these reforms is to limit state functions in the economy in order to mold policy to meet the needs of foreign corporate investment

(Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA…” 170, 172, 176). Moreno’s investigation demonstrates how the content of, and the negotiations surrounding free trade partnerships and agreements silently consolidate these reforms and adjust the legal framework of El Salvador. Not only do these processes erode public authority, but they also subordinate the Salvadoran constitution to the terms of free trade partnerships and agreements. Moreno argues that this focus on privatizing reforms since the 1990s allows for the loss of labor rights, and the mercantilization of public assets and services (172). In this framework, plans for economic development are founded on cheap labor, and on an over-dependence on migration and remittances.

The move since the 1990s to promote free trade zones, or zonas francas, in El

Salvador provides a clear example of how the shift to deep integration serves to meet the needs of foreign corporate investment. At the same time, this shift eliminates the possibility of creating a sustainable national development strategy (Moreno, “Free Trade

Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA…” 167-68). There are seventeen free trade zones in El

Salvador (Organismo Promotor de Exportaciones e Inversiones de El Salvador,

“Competitive Infrastructure”). Textile and apparel firms including Fruit of the Loom and

Hanesbrands have a strong presence, and call centers have recently experienced substantial growth within the free trade zones (United States Department of State, “2014

Investment Climate Report…”). Additionally, the manufacturing of medical devices, and food processing and packaging are currently expanding. Again, the objective is to encourage foreign direct investment by providing a favorable climate for transnational corporations. These firms receive full and indefinite exemptions from income and municipal taxes, and are also exempt from certain customs duties. They have access to public services and infrastructure funded by the state, including water, sanitation, and customs services. They are strategically located on major highways, and are tied into advanced electricity and telecommunications grids –that is, they are tied into the Central

American logistical corridor described by Moreno (i.e., the Plan Puebla Panama, or the

Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project). The industries hosted in the free trade zones also benefit from a cheap labor force. The Export and Investment Promotion

Agency of El Salvador (el Organismo Promotor de Exportaciones e Inversiones de El

Salvador, or PROESA), a governmental agency created in April 2014 to promote and

attract private investment, advertises this fact on its website, stating, “Investors certify that Salvadoran labor force is world-famous for its industriousness, efficiency and work ethic. Approximately 60% of the labor force is 39 years or younger, making it a predominantly young and highly productive country” (López; Organismo Promotor de

Exportaciones e Inversiones de El Salvador, “Productive Labor”). In other areas of its website, PRESA advertises that: “Regionally, El Salvador is one of the most competitive countries regarding labor costs;” that, “The level of unionization is low;” and that the country ranks first in the Central American region in “flexibility of wage determination”

(Organismo Promotor de Exportaciones e Inversiones de El Salvador, “Competitive

Costs;” “Productive Labor”). In a section of the PROESA website titled Competitive

Costs, the agency provides a table detailing the low labor costs (Organismo Promotor de

Exportaciones e Inversiones de El Salvador, “Competitive Costs”). It shows that in the textile and maquila sector, hourly wages are $0.78, daily wages are $6.25, and monthly wages are $187.50. In the agro-industry sector wages are even lower: $0.44 hourly, $3.50 daily, and $105 monthly.15 In the website portal, there are banners praising this cost- effectiveness for investors which read, “El Salvador: A Cost Efficient Export Platform” and “El Salvador: Highly Productive Human Resources” (Organismo Promotor de

Exportaciones e Inversiones de El Salvador).

Despite all of the opportunities that the free trade zones provide for foreign direct investment, there are many who criticize this model, and question whether it is a viable development strategy for El Salvador. In 2012, the Foundation for the Study of Applied

15 In 2015, minimum wages have increased: the minimum wage in the textile and apparel sector is $210.90, and the minimum wage for the agricultural sector is $118.20 (Alas and Castillo). 68

Law (la Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho or FESPAD, an NGO based in San Salvador) published a report of the state of workers’ rights and labor unions in El Salvador titled, Informe sobre la situación de los derechos laborales y sindicales.

The report was published during the time in which reforms to the Free Trade Zones Law

(Ley de Zonas Francas) were being negotiated. Reforms to the law were approved in

February 2013, after the implementation of the PFG. The FESPAD report cites a number of labor and human rights violations that occur in the free trade zones, and states that female workers in textile and apparel maquilas suffer some of the worst conditions of labor exploitation in El Salvador.

It is important to note that 70% of the employees working in free trade zones are women (Asamblea Legislativa, “Asamblea aprueba…”). When there are high quotas, employees work up to 12 hours per day, and must sometimes work through the lunch hour in order to meet these goals. The majority of worker complaints include: forced work, unpaid overtime, verbal abuse, sexual harassment, unjustified pay deductions, discrimination based on pregnancy, not allowing workers to leave their posts to drink water or to use the restroom, and not granting permission for medical appointments

(Guillén, Carrillo, and Baños 84). Additionally, maquilas in the free trade zones do not comply with several security and occupational health regulations. FESPAD states that the majority of the factories do not have adequate lighting or ventilation, and do not provide separate restrooms or break areas for women. It therefore becomes apparent that, although free trade zones provide incentives for foreign corporations to invest in El

Salvador, there is doubt as to whether the jobs created are genuinely improving the

standard of living for Salvadoran citizens. Given that the corporations hosted in free trade zones must keep product prices competitive, the costs of production are externalized, and, as a result, workers are subject to labor exploitation.

In 2013 FESPAD released a report titled, Impactos de la evasión y elusión fiscal en el derecho a la alimentación adecuada, which also questions whether the push for the free trade zone model is a sustainable development strategy. The report argues that, in El

Salvador, the tax incentives granted to many large corporations –including those hosted within free trade zones– reduce the amount of funds available for critical social services.

Citing a report from the Finance Committee of the National Legislative Assembly,

FESPAD points out that there are twenty-six laws, including the Free Trade Zones Law

(Ley de Zonas Francas) that allow large corporations to not pay taxes (Villalona 33-34).

In 2011, companies in El Salvador saved $1.2 billion through tax exemptions (34). In the free trade zones alone, corporations saved $206.5 million in 2011, which is the equivalent of 0.9% of GDP. The FESPAD report stresses that these tax exemptions for medium and large corporations hinder the state’s ability to fund and provide crucial social services, including those related to health, education, and public water utilities. In an essay titled,”

“A propósito de la nueva Ley de Zonas Francas,” Luís Ernesto Romano Martínez, citing the United Nations International Labor Organization, argues that free trade zones are a mixed blessing, or “una bendición a medias” (Romano Martínez). Like the FESPAD report, Romano Martínez points out that, although the industries within El Salvador’s free trade zones are job creators, they offer low salaries and dreadful working conditions.

Further, he adds that these industries do not develop strong connections with the national industries surrounding them, and therefore add little value beyond the actual jobs created.

As mentioned above, reforms to the Free Trade Zones Law were approved by the

Salvadoran legislature in February 2013, after the implementation of the PFG. According to the National Legislature, the purpose of these reforms is to protect workers’ rights,

“…to generate greater certainty and legal protection” for the industries hosted in the free trade zones, and to offer stability for investors (Asamblea Legislativa, “Asamblea aprueba…”). The reforms provide total tax exemption on rents for industries operating within the free trade zones for a period of fifteen years, and they also allow products produced inside free trade zones to be sold domestically. Prior to the 2013 reforms, items produced inside the free trade zone could only be exported and sold abroad, in an effort to reduce competition and to protect domestic businesses. However, the 2013 reforms allow these products –which are produced tax-free, with low labor costs– to enter into competition with items produced domestically. Although the PFG is a U.S. Presidential

Initiative, and not an international treaty like CAFTA-DR, and although the government of El Salvador cannot be brought to trial via the ICSID for violating the terms of the partnership as can be done under CAFTA, with the PFG, the U.S. government still has the ability to force the hands of the Salvadoran president and legislature, and to transform the legal framework of El Salvador. This point is made clear by the reforms to the Free

Trade Zones Law passed in 2013, and also by the circumstances surrounding the passage of reforms to the Public Private Partnership Law in 2013-2014, as discussed below.

Going beyond mere tariffs and market access, these policy reforms are part of the

processes of deep integration described by Spalding. Given that they have been implemented since the signing of the PFG, they also show how the partnership is a continuation of the network of free trade agreements, arrangements and initiatives set into place over the past decades. El Salvador cannot be brought to trial for violating the initiative, however the country is bound by the partnership to follow through with the recommendations of the PFG Joint Action Plan. Perhaps most importantly, El Salvador must fulfill the demands of the U.S. government in order to continue to receive U.S. foreign aid (i.e., Fomilenio funds).

There is not a standard, international definition for public private partnerships.

However, the U.S. government defines them as partnerships between public and private entities, including businesses, foundations, academic institutions, and individuals. The public and private partners enter into a commercial agreement in order to achieve a common objective, and also to carry out each partner’s objectives (Matthews and Stahl

14). There is a wide range of possible public-private partnerships, for example, a private entity may enter into agreement with the state to construct and operate transportation infrastructure, or to take over certain concessions, such as airport security or parking. In

2013-14, controversy arose in the Salvadoran media surrounding the United States’ involvement in the passage of reforms to the Public Private Partnership (PPP) Law. When it became clear that members of the Legislative Assembly would not approve the reforms, the United States used its embassy in El Salvador as a mouthpiece, in order to pressure then-president Funes to exert his influence over the Legislative Assembly. In

November 2013, U.S. Ambassador Mari Carmen Aponte reminded the nation that the

approval of the reforms was a requirement for the release of the Fomilenio II funds, stating:

Cuando el FOMILENIO se aprobó, cuando el proyecto fue aprobado por la junta de directores de la MCC, la junta expuso que tenía una expectativa de hacer progreso, de que El Salvador debía hacer procesos en áreas de clima de inversión, de combatir la corrupción y el Estado de Derecho” (When the FOMILENIO was approved, when the project was approved by the Board of Directors of the MCC, the board explained that it had an expectation to make progress, that El Salvador should advance in areas of investment climate, in combatting corruption, and in Rule of Law). (Meléndez and Morán)

The President of the Legislative Assembly, Sigfrido Reyes, asserted in November

2013 that the reforms to the Public Private Partnership Law would not be passed if they sought to privatize public assets (Meléndez and Morán). In the 1990s, several large government entities were privatized –specifically, the national pension system, telecommunications, and electricity. In 2013, when reforms to the Public Private

Partnership Law were brought to the Legislative Assembly, several more public entities were put on the table, and were made candidates for privatization. These included: public water utilities, social security, the national health care system, public security (including the penitentiary system), and higher education (including the University of El Salvador – the most prestigious university in El Salvador, which has a long-standing socialist and revolutionary tradition). In the end, these sectors were spared, and they remain public.

However, the reforms to the Public Private Partnership Law were passed in 2014, and critics argue that they will be detrimental to national economic stability.

To begin, the push for public-private partnerships lays the groundwork to lower wages. As Hillary Goodfriend, a former board member of the Committee in Solidarity 73

with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) notes, public and unionized employees in El

Salvador earn higher salaries than their counterparts working in the private sector

(Goodfriend). In an interview conducted by CISPES with Maruicio Paniagua of the

International Airport Workers’ Union (SITEAIES), Paniagua states that he and his colleagues earn $520/month, which is the minimum salary for public airport employees.

He adds that, in the sectors of the airport that have been privatized (including security and cleaning services), these employees now earn $240/month, which is just $78 above the basic food basket (CISPES; Alas and Castillo). In the same interview produced by

CISPES, José Alberto Cartagena Tobias, also of SITEAIES, points out that the push towards privatization threatens existing laws that protect workers’ rights –laws which are already quite fragile. Therefore, at the micro level, the reforms to the Public Private

Partnership Law set the stage to lower monthly salaries for average workers, who already live in situations of economic precarity.

Reforms to the Public Private Partnership Law also pose problems at the marco- level. Critics argue that there are several aspects of the reforms which will place an excessive burden on the state, endangering its liquid capital (which is limited due to stagnant population growth caused by migration, and a stagnant economy), and paving the way for the state to incur great risk (Matthews and Stahl). Goodfriend notes that, while in the past all privatizations required legislative approval, the reforms to the Public

Private Partnership Law create a body within the executive which serves to approve partnerships. Because of this, many contracts will bypass the legislature completely

(Goodfriend). Both Goodfriend and FESPAD highlight the reserves that are required by

the reforms. As Goodfriend states, “…for larger concessions requiring legislative approval, a bidding corporation would be guaranteed a 1% return on bid value if debate extends past 45 days, or if the bid is rejected” (Goodfriend). That is, if a bid is delayed or rejected, the government of El Salvador must still pay the bidder 1% of the amount of rejected or delayed contract. FESPAD goes on to note that for each concession, the government of El Salvador must establish a liquid fund dedicated exclusively for the contractor (Matthews and Stahl 13). This fund must equal 5-10% of the amount of the contract, and is for exclusive use of the Public Private Partnership. FESPAD argues that this reserve poses great risk to the state’s little liquid capital. Compounding these problems caused by reserves is the fact that large, transnational corporations typically hold more capital than Salvadoran businesses, and are often better-equipped to offer a lower bid. Since CAFTA prohibits preferential treatment for domestic businesses, and because the government of El Salvador is obligated to accept the lowest bid, the Public

Private Partnership Law reforms do not serve to strengthen Salvadoran businesses.

FESPAD also raises concerns surrounding the length of contracts, as prescribed by the reforms. Corporations are now offered partnerships for up to 40 years –the idea being to attract investors by offering stable and long-term investments (Matthews and

Stahl 12). However, FESPAD emphasizes that these terms make it difficult or impossible for the state to request adjustments to the contract, or to impose sanctions on the corporation if the project turns out to be costly, inefficient, or if it causes unforeseen social or economic damage. Further, if economic or political conditions change over the

40 years, again, the state has no authority to make changes. FESPAD argues that these

conditions create a wide gap, in which the corporation may operate without government supervision or regulation (Matthews and Stahl 12-13). In raising these points, this dissertation does not intend to make an argument for protectionism, or for the abandonment of a capitalist system. Rather, it intends to point out that, historically, successful capitalist economies (e.g., the emerging BRICS economies) have employed protections during the developing stages (e.g., agricultural subsidies, import tariffs, protections for domestic businesses, special and differential treatment, and labor and environmental regulations), in order to ensure sustained economic growth and stability.

El Salvador, on the other hand, is a small, stagnant, and vulnerable economy that is dependent on the market openings made available by the U.S. Over the past decades, the free trade policies that have been implemented in El Salvador have not spurred development, and have essentially resulted in a relationship of exploitation based on resource extraction and cheap labor.

The final area to be discussed relating to the shift from shallow to deep integration is the development of the Central American logistical corridor, as described by Moreno.

The logistical corridor was originally termed the Puebla-Panama Plan, and is now known as the Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project (MIDP), or simply, the

Mesoamerican Project. It is a multi-billion dollar development plan first announced in

2001 that seeks to promote economic development within the ten participating countries:

Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama,

Colombia, and the Dominican Republic (Proyecto Mesoamérica). In the area of economic development, the initiative is focused on developing transportation, energy and

telecommunications infrastructure, and on trade facilitation and competitiveness. In the area of social development, the initiative is focused on projects related to health, the environment, risk management, and housing. Currently in El Salvador, hundreds of millions of dollars are being invested in megaprojects related to transportation, energy, and telecommunications connectivity. With the Fomilenio I and II (which were disbursed under CAFTA and the PFG, respectively), the U.S. government, via the Millennium

Challenge Corporation (MCC), has pledged $738 million to the government of El

Salvador, the bulk of which is allocated for transportation and logistical connectivity

(Millennium Challenge Corporation, “El Salvador Compact”). The government of El

Salvador is also obtaining loans in order to contribute funds to these projects.

Currently, there are major highway development projects underway in El

Salvador, which will tie the country’s highways into the International Network of

Mesoamerican Highways (la Red Internacional de Carreteras Mesoamericanas, or

RICAM). These projects include the Northern Transnational Highway (la Carretera

Longitudinal del Norte), which was completed in 2012 and continues to undergo improvements, and the coastal highway, which will tie El Salvador into the Pacific

Corridor of RICAM. A dry canal is also under construction, made up of a highway 371 km in length, which will traverse the interior of El Salvador and Honduras (Moreno,

“Impacto de las Transnacionales en Centroamérica”). It will connect the La Unión Port on the Pacific coast of El Salvador with the Cortés Port on the Caribbean Sea in

Honduras. In September 2014, El Diario de Hoy reported that Honduras expects to complete its section of the dry canal in 2018 (“Canal seco en Honduras…”). This report

also states that the dry canal will serve to bring Salvadoran exports to the Atlantic Ocean.

Moreno notes that the international highway will serve as a less expensive alternative to the Panama Canal (Moreno, “Impacto de las Transnacionales en Centroamérica;” “El economist Raúl Moreno…”). There are also major projects underway to construct or improve customs services, border protection, bridges, ports, hydroelectric dams, the international airport, and electricity telecommunications grids. Another area that continues to be explored is geothermal energy production. In this way, El Salvador will also be tied into the Central American System of Electric Interconnection (el Sistema de

Interconexión Eléctrica de los Países de América Central, or SIEPAC), and the

Mesoamerican Information Superhighway (la Autopista Mesoamericana de la

Información, or AMI).

The goal of these projects is to allow El Salvador to fully realize its trade potential. Official discourses claim that this will, in turn, stimulate economic growth, and will result in widespread poverty reduction –one of the United Nations’ Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs) (United Nations, “Millennium Development Goals”).

Currently, there are many bottlenecks in the transportation networks in El Salvador. For example, between Santa Tecla and San Salvador there is heavy congestion, and it is difficult to traverse just a few miles of the Pan-American Highway. This congestion is being alleviated with the construction of a wider stretch of the Pan-American Highway in

2015 (El Salvador Presidencia de la República). Indeed, in order for economic growth to occur the transportation of people and goods must be safe and efficient. However, transportation infrastructure is only a tool for economic development, and is not a

remedy, or a solution in itself. That is, questions must be raised as to who serves to benefit from the development of the logistical corridor, and as to whether the corridor will genuinely improve the standard of living. That is, do these logistical projects originate out of a concern for mass poverty reduction, as official discourses claim? Or, are they being implemented to carry out other objectives?

Image 7: Map of the International Network of Mesoamerican Highways (Red Internacional de Carreteras Mesoamericanas, or RICAM), the Central American System of Electric Interconnection (Sistema de Interconexión Eléctrica de los Países de América Central, or SIEPAC), and the Mesoamerican Information Superhighway (Autopista Mesoamericana de la Información, or AMI). Together, these networks make up the Central American logistical corridor discussed by Moreno. Data source: Proyecto Mesoamérica.

In addressing these questions, there are several factors to consider. To begin, El

Salvador’s megaprojects pose serious social and environmental risks. As Moreno emphasizes, the Northern Transnational Highway traverses precisely through the region of the upper basin of the Rio Lempa, the principal source of fresh water for the country

(Moreno, “Impacto de las Transnacionales en Centroamérica;” “El economista Raúl

Moreno…”). There are four hydroelectric dams on the Rio Lempa, and two more have been proposed. Moreno argues that the construction of the Northern Highway and the additional dams will lead to water contamination, will threaten the health and survival of the Rio Lempa, and will have devastating effects on the area’s ecosystem, and on availability of fresh water for El Salvador. The Northern Highway also traverses the area in which Pacific Rim Mining operated, and Moreno states that there is currently a

Canadian firm conducting uranium exploration in the area. As mentioned above, mineral extraction poses serious risks of water contamination. Further, as Óscar Martínez and

Efren Lemus of El Faro explain, the Northern Highway is bringing drug trafficking into the region, allowing cartels to efficiently move cocaine from South America to the United

States (Martínez and Lemus). Just as the highways provide alternative routes that will enable the expansion of free trade, they are also providing opportunities for Central

American cartels. In the south, the proposed coastal highway will cross through a fragile ecosystem of mangrove swamps, where locals earn a living through small-scale fishing.

Although the highways will facilitate the efficient movement of goods and resources from the interior of El Salvador to ports, airports, and other Central American countries, these highways, together with various types of resource extraction, also pose significant threats to the livelihood of citizens.

Another factor to consider is what purposes does the logistical corridor serve – who and what will be transported via the highways, and who will benefit from the energy and telecommunications networks? The strategic locations of mining operations and of

the new Northern Highway were mentioned above. El Salvador’s seventeen free trade zones also benefit from this connectivity. As the Export and Investment Promotion

Agency of El Salvador (PROESA) advertises on its website, the free trade zones,

“…stand out due to their strategic location and ease of access to competitive infrastructure: they are near the capital and other major cities, and close to high level highways, airports and ports” (Organismo Promotor de Exportaciones e Inversiones de El

Salvador, “Competitive Infrastructure”). Many of the goods produced inside of the free trade zones are not domestic products. They are produced by foreign corporations, tax free, with the advantage of competitive labor costs. These goods are then transported along the logistical corridor, and exported for sale abroad. The logistical corridor also facilitates laborers who must commute from other cities or from rural areas to the free trade zones and urban centers, where low-wage employment opportunities are available.

Private energy firms profit from the development of the electricity grid, which is in large part publicly funded (i.e., with Fomilenio I and II, and with loans obtained by the government of El Salvador). As mentioned above, electricity generation and distribution were privatized in El Salvador in the mid-1990s. Moreno notes that the American companies COASTAL and Duke Energy have substantial interests in electricity generation in El Salvador (Moreno, “Impacto de las Transnacionales en Centroamérica”).

For example, Duke Energy operates four large electricity plants inside El Salvador (Duke

Energy). Therefore, much of the profit earned by electricity generation and production remains with private, foreign firms.

Despite the push to privatize public assets and to lower or eliminate taxes and tariffs for foreign corporations, minimum salaries and GDP in El Salvador are not improving. Moreno notes that GDP has steadily declined since the liberalizations of the early 1990s, and also under CAFTA (Moreno, “Impacto de las Transnacionales en

Centroamérica;” see also Index Mundi for GDP real growth rate by year, 1999-2011).

The World Bank reports that, in 2012, GDP growth in El Salvador was just 1.9%, and in

2013 it was just 1.7% (World Bank, “El Salvador Global…”). Likewise, the CIA World

Factbook states that GDP growth averaged just 2% from 2010-2014, and that in 2013 remittances accounted for 16% of GDP (Central Intelligence Agency). Furthermore,

FESPAD states that the economy of El Salvador is stagnant, and that the Salvadoran population has not grown since 1992, due to emigration (Matthews and Stahl 47).

Although El Salvador has made great political advances since the war and has now been a successful democracy for over 20 years, its economy is over-dependent on remittances, and foreign direct investment is largely focused on developing the maquila and service industries. The reforms that have been passed since the implementation of the PFG, including reforms to the Free Trade Zones Law and the Public Private Partnership Law, further support the push to liberalize the economy. Meanwhile, the standard of living is not improving for ordinary citizens, and violent crime is an epidemic with no end in sight.

Free Trade, Insecurity and Bare Life

In examining recent free trade policy in El Salvador, it is important to consider the disbursement of the Fomilenio II funds (allocation began in December 2014), in light

of the goals set out by the PFG Joint Action Plan (developed jointly by the United States and El Salvador, and published in November 2011), to question whether these goals and the allocation of funds will correspond with one another. With the Fomilenio II, the

United States will disburse $277 million to El Salvador over the course of five years. In

October 2014, La Prensa Gráfica reported that the exact projects to be funded by this grant are still being determined, but that overall, the Fomilenio II will be used to develop the Pacific Coastal zone (Cabrera; Flores and Pastrán; see also: Edmee Velásquez). As mentioned above, Moreno states that the coastal zone projects will include a state of the art highway that will tie El Salvador into the Pacific Corridor of RICAM, and a dry canal that will connect the La Unión Port in El Salvador with the Cortés Port in Honduras

(Moreno, “Impacto de las Transnacionales en Centroamérica”). Having said this, it is important to note that at the time of writing the author has not been able to obtain detailed

Fomilenio budgets. The Millennium Challenge Corporation published budget estimates for the different MCC compact projects in El Salvador (Millennium Challenge

Corporation, “El Salvador Compact”). However, the MCC emphasizes that these are only overall impact estimates listing benefits, and are not detailed beneficiary analyses. In

September 2014, the author submitted Freedom of Information Act requests to USAID and the U.S. State Department requesting either detailed Fomilenio budgets, or a confirmation that this information is not publically available. In November 2015 USAID responded, stating that none of the agency’s records were responsive to the request, and recommended that the MCC be contacted. In January 2016 the author submitted an additional Freedom of Information Act request to the MCC, and is awaiting a response.

The PFG Joint Action Plan identifies the two major constraints to economic growth in El Salvador, and establishes a number of goals to overcome these obstacles. In the plan, Constraint #1 is identified as “Crime and Insecurity,” and Constraint #2 as “Low

Productivity in the Tradables Sector” (USG-GOES, “Joint Country Action Plan” 2). In entering into the PFG, both the United States and El Salvador have agreed to collaborate on these joint development efforts (United States Department of State Bureau of Western

Hemisphere Affairs). Clearly, the United States is contributing significant funds to infrastructural projects that tie into the Central American logistical corridor. This focus on projects related to the Mesoamerican Initiative corresponds with the goals of

Constraint #2. With respect to Constraint #1, Crime and Insecurity, there are a number of goals that are not being addressed. According to the limited information that is available regarding the Fomilenio budgets, it appears that the U.S. government is not allocating funds to overcome these obstacles. Some of the goals listed under Constraint #1 that are in desperate need of funding and attention fall under the heading, “Crime and Violence

Prevention.” These include:

Goal # 8: Assist at-risk youth between ages 16-25 through efforts to afford them economic opportunities and engage them in productive activities…

Goal # 9: Support the PNC to strengthen its service orientation as a means for violence prevention and effective crime control with a focus on building leadership skills within the police force and on improved relationships between police and communities…

Goal # 10: Improve educational opportunities for in school and out of school youth in targeted high risk municipalities with high crime rates. The USG [U.S. government] is dedicated to supporting the Ministry of Education in implementation of their “Social Education Plan” and the GOES’ [government of El Salvador’s] “Five Year Plan” by focusing efforts on the four areas of concern described in the plan…

Goal # 11: Prevent crime and violence in key municipalities of El Salvador and support reforms…

Goal # 12: Reduce overcrowding in prisons, thereby allowing the Salvadoran prison system to safely, securely, and humanely manage an increasing population…

Goal # 13: Enhance the security of the prisons for their improvement as correctional facilities, prevent them from perpetuating and magnifying criminal activity in El Salvador, and help former offenders become full, contributing members of society. (USG-GOES, “Joint Country Action Plan” 13-17)

To address these goals, the Joint Action Plan states that the United States intends to provide “technical assistance” (Goals 9-12), “training” (Goals 9, 10, 12 and 13), and

“mentoring” (Goal 12). Nevertheless there are a number of credible news reports that point to severe funding shortages for education and national security (including the prison system). This raises concerns as to whether the United States is genuinely committed to overcoming these social constraints to economic growth, or whether there is merely a singular focus on removing all barriers to free trade. That is, in implementing the PFG, is the U.S. government bound to follow through with the recommendations of the Joint

Action Plan? Or, in practice, is El Salvador the only partner that is bound to fulfill the terms of the agreement? Is El Salvador the only partner that will incur great losses if it does not comply with the economic terms of the agreement? Chapter 4 will discuss news reports that document a lack of funding for social programs including education and national security, in an effort to investigate these concerns. Chapter 4 will also discuss the hazards that maquila employees and private security guards face due to the lack of labor protections.

In identifying the interconnected dynamics of insecurity post-democratization, an examination of the free trade agreements and initiatives implemented in El Salvador is essential. It is necessary to map the details of the massive shift in valorization processes since the Peace Accords in order to understand the nature of current economic precarity.

In an effort to understand the ways in which economic precarity affects the lives of ordinary citizens, Chapter 3 follows Alejandro Portes and Kelly Hoffman in discussing the links between deprivation and deviance, or rather economic restructuring and violent crime (68). Portes and Hoffman point out the consequences of value transformations, all of which are seen in El Salvador post-democratization. These include exploitative wages, an expanding informal sector, and increased levels of poverty (67). They explain that, although there is not a direct correlation between poverty and violent crime, there is a visible pattern and a consistent association between large and increasing levels of inequality and escalations in violence (68). They add that the research on the determinants of violent crime in Latin America identifies income inequality as the single most important factor. Portes and Hoffman therefore demonstrate the relationship between the deregulated, low-wage labor markets that have developed since the nineties, and current insecurity. Following Loïc Wacquant, Emma Bell and Robert Reiner, Chapter

3 also explains that the official solution for confronting insecurity is the expansion of punitive policies and steep increases in incarceration. The changes can be seen in the

Mano Dura, or ‘iron fist’ laws enacted by earlier administrations, in the recent recommendations that Giuliani Safety & Security presented to El Salvador, and in

Sánchez Cerén’s new Plan El Salvador Seguro. The Giuliani Safety & Security

recommendations and the Plan El Salvador Seguro will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 also shows that, although these strategies are positioned as the solution for confronting insecurity, in practice they are a new form of militarization with a risk management methodology that is tied to the expansion of free trade.

The singular focus on expanding free trade can be seen in the construction of the

Central American logistical corridor, which to a large extent is being carried out under the radar. In El Salvador, the transportation projects are promoted by the Ministry of

Public Works (MOP), but there is a lack of conversation regarding the consequences they bring for Salvadoran society. In the United States, debates surrounding these consequences are non-existent. There is essentially no discussion surrounding the Central

American logistical corridor in U.S. public and official discourses, despite the nearly three million Central Americans living in the U.S. As discussed later in this investigation, the economic shifts since democratization have forced citizens to migrate within borders, and to emigrate. With the millions that have emigrated to the North, one sees the separation of families and young people at risk, and an over-dependence on remittances to sustain El Salvador’s economy. It is within this context that gang violence and the homicide epidemic have developed. This epidemic forces El Salvador into vicious cycle of violence and poverty, and has created a situation in which citizens are not safe to move throughout society. In this situation of poverty, labor exploitation and the expansion of the punitive state, it is certain that the homicide epidemic will persist and worsen in the years to come.

In order to approach understandings of how insecurity has developed since democratization, it is critical to map the details of the social and economic shifts from as many different entrance points as possible. The only way to identify the relationship between violence and the value transformations –between the vulnerabilities of ordinary citizens and the asymmetries of free trade— is by tracing the multiplicity of details. The value transformations that have occurred since 1992 and the expansion of free trade demand the externalization of costs, which is producing vulnerabilities for laborers, and mass emigration. These processes, of course, are most damaging for the poor. For those whose salaries are mere dollars above the basic food basket, increases in the costs of everyday needs (generated, for example, by dollarization), and the scarcity of basic resources including clean water, sanitation, access to secondary education, and police protection, have life-threatening consequences. As Marazzi points out in his work on biocapitalism, those who do not have the means to consume, and who offer no other guarantee than their very lives must still produce value. Therefore, their very lives (bios) are transformed into an opportunity for the extraction of profit, and are thus commodified. The remainder of this investigation will document cases of these biopolitical processes –the commodification of ordinary lives. It will also discuss the devastating solutions that officials have been implementing, that is, an expansion of the punitive management of poverty which is driven by a risk management philosophy. In articulating these discussions and analyses, this investigation hopes to contribute to a mapping of current insecurity, and from there to conversations regarding potential points of rupture.

Chapter 3: Zones of Indistinction after Democratization: Financial Capitalism, the Criminalization of the Poor, and the Reduction to Bare Life

In his extensive body of work, Loïc Wacquant analyzes the development and expansion of the punitive management of poverty under economic liberalization.

Following the global recession and debt crisis, which occurred in the 1970s and early

1980s respectively, neoliberal ideology gradually began to take hold. In response to these crises, economic programs of restructuring were implemented globally, through the efforts of the United States and other G-7 states. As Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore explain in their work on “actually existing neoliberalism,” since the 1980s, these efforts have mobilized unregulated markets, and have fostered international capital mobility

(350). Additionally, they have promoted the privatization of public services and reductions in corporate taxes, and have led to increasingly flexible labor relations. These programs were implemented in North America and Western Europe in the 1980s, at differing levels of intensity. In the 1980s and 1990s, the United States and other G-7 states also worked to extend them to peripheral and semi-peripheral states, in order to subject these economies to the discipline of the market. This has been the case in El

Salvador, where a massive restructuring of the economy took place during the time of the

Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992.16 As discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, the

16 For more on these economic adjustments, see Gammage 79. 89

processes of deep integration are still going strong, as the lion’s share of Fomilenio funds granted under CAFTA and the Partnership for Growth have been allocated for the completion of the Central American logistical corridor.

Both Wacquant, and Brenner and Theodore point out the negative social effects that result from the restructuring of global markets, including large-scale market failures, uneven development, inequality, social polarization, insecurity, and urban disorders

(Brenner and Theodore 352; Wacquant, “Global Firestorm” 77, 83). Wacquant’s work specifically focuses on the relationship between neoliberal restructuring, and the expansion of the coercive prison state. He explains that over the past three decades, alongside massive global economic transformations, there has also been a concurrent shift from the social management to the punitive management of urban marginality

(“Global Firestorm” 72-73, 81, 83). Further, Wacquant shows that the rise and expansion of the punitive state is not just a consequence of failing economies, but rather, is an integral component of neoliberal ideology (“Global Firestorm” 79). He states that this expansion is a necessary counterpart to the deregulation of low-wage labor markets, and the spread of social insecurity. He adds that the rise of ‘zero tolerance’ policing serves to legitimize political leaders during economic and social upheavals. His investigations highlight the key role that the “broken windows” theory has played in the rise of the penal state – an aggressive and inflexible approach to law enforcement first championed by Rudy Giuliani and former New York City Police Chief William Bratton. The theory proposes that, by targeting petty offenses such as vandalism and loitering, an atmosphere of order can be created, which will in turn prevent the incidence of more violent crimes

(Wacquant, “Global Firestorm” 72-73). However, as Monifa Bandele of Communities

United for Police Reform argued after the 2014 events in Ferguson, Missouri, the hyper- aggressive tactics inherent to broken windows policing disproportionately target low- income communities (Bellafante). This strategy, therefore, stigmatizes residents of low- income communities, which in turn reinforces and perpetuates their marginalization.

Wacquant shows that, over the past decade, the United States has made efforts to export the broken windows approach abroad (“Global Firestorm” 76-77). The expansion of zero tolerance policing is evident in the practices of several democratic Latin

American countries including El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile and Brazil (Wacquant,

“Global Firestorm” 76-77; Allison, “Guatemalan President…”; Ruiz Caballero;

Archibold). In El Salvador, the implementation of Mano Dura, the plan Casa Segura, and the ley antipandillas have resulted in the militarized occupation and collective punishment of entire neighborhoods (Wacquant, “Global Firestorm” 78).17 This punitive approach to crime control has also resulted in expansive incarceration and extralegal detention, prison warehousing, and more generally, “… the normalization of ‘emergency penality’” (Wacquant, “Global Firestorm” 77). Neoliberal restructuring and the expansion of coercive policing are particularly damaging in countries like El Salvador, where these transformations have occurred within the context of a legacy of authoritarianism and mass poverty (Brenner and Theodore 351). Since the signing of the

Peace Accords in 1992, alongside democratization, El Salvador has also experienced the

17 The Ley de Proscripción de Maras, Pandillas, Agrupaciones, Asociaciones y Organizaciones de Naturaleza Criminal is popularly known in El Salvador as the ley antimaras or the ley antipandillas (El Salvador, Asamblea Legislativa, Decreto No. 458). Different versions of the law were passed in 2003, 2010 and 2012. 91

social disengagement of the state, steep escalations in homicide rates, intense public fear of violent crime, and deep political concern for the containment and management of problem neighborhoods and towns (Wacquant, “Global Firestorm” 77).

Chapter 2 of this dissertation addresses the massive transformations in El

Salvador’s economy since democratization, and the processes of deep integration associated with free trade agreements and the Mesoamerican Initiative. Chapter 2 also explains that, in order for this economic restructuring to function, the lives of citizens must be commodified. Within this context, impoverished communities become vulnerable. Those who have no guarantee, and nothing to offer apart from themselves are exploited and stripped of their social significance as costs are externalized (Marazzi 40).

This is a reduction to bare life. In discussing the work of Michel Foucault, Giorgio

Agamben notes that biopower operates by penetrating the bodies of individuals. The members of societies that are economically and socially excluded have no power within this context to counterbalance the processes of biopower. These communities therefore become the most vulnerable when biological life becomes what is at stake in political calculations (Homo Sacer 10-11). Agamben examines these mediations in his work on homo sacer, or the banned man, “…who may be killed and yet not sacrificed” (Homo

Sacer 12). He explains that marginalized citizens are at once protected by the law, and excluded by it, residing in a zone of indistinction. In this way, civil and human rights that are guaranteed to all citizens are at times suspended, and certain members of society are denied their legal right to these protections. The lack of autonomy of the Salvadoran state that has been generated through the asymmetries of free trade further intensifies the loss

of basic rights for ordinary citizens. This loss of basic rights is evident in the exploitation of laborers in the free trade zones, and in the social and environmental threats posed by the Central American logistical corridor. It is also evident in the 2012-2015 legislature’s failure to ratify a constitutional reform that would have guaranteed access to water and food as human rights (“Right-Wing Parties Block Ratification). As Kevin Young affirms, all of these processes reinforce the institutionalization of neoliberal economic policies, and they insulate these policies from future democratic input (Young). These processes are directly connected to the processes of deep integration discussed by Spalding.

The objective of the present chapter is to extend this analysis of a reduction to bare life to a discussion of the epidemic of violent crime that has developed since democratization. Chapter 2 of this dissertation discusses El Salvador’s transformation from an agro-export economy to one centered on remittances, and on maquiladoras and service industries housed largely within free trade zones. As Kevin Young points out, although the Partnership for Growth and the Fomilenio funds are marketed as a solution for poverty and violence, upon close examination it becomes clear that the development projects underway cater to the needs of corporate business interests, and not the interests of small-scale producers or the working class (Young). The situations of economic precarity that follow are a catalyst for violent crime. The present chapter aims to draw out the relationship between the programs of economic restructuring implemented since the end of the civil war, and the state’s deepening concern with the punitive containment of social insecurity.

Roberto Espósito’s (Auto)immunity Paradigm

In analyzing the relationship between neoliberal programs of economic restructuring and the nature of the coercive state in El Salvador post-democratization, it is useful to engage the (auto)immunity paradigm, as theorized by Roberto Espósito.

Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, Espósito develops an understanding of biopolitics and biopower that is based on the concept of immunity. He notes the two different meanings of the term: in biomedical language, immunity refers to the protection of the body from a disease; while in juridical language, it refers to an official exemption from legal requirements (Campbell, “Interview” 50). He states that, in both cases,

“…immunity or immunization alludes to a particular situation that protects [mette in salvo] someone from a risk, a risk to which an entire community is exposed” (Campbell,

“Interview” 50). Espósito understands modern political, juridical, and philosophical categories as denoting an attempt to immunize the social body from the dangers posed by the community (Campbell, “Interview” 50). Immunization therefore serves as a counter weight and a preventive measure that rejects contamination (Campbell, “Interview” 55).

In this way, the opposition between community and immunity becomes evident, as immunization is an attempt to protect a community from dangers posed by some of the members of this same community. Therefore, Espósito explains, there is a preoccupation, and a demand for self-protection in the community. In this way, an immunitary relationship develops between politics and the defense of life, and in the modern age this relationship was mediated, “…by a paradigm of order that was articulated in the concepts of sovereignty, representation, and individual rights” (Campbell, “Interview” 55).

Among the most prominent figures who have written on biopolitics, including

Foucault, Agamben, and Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, there is disagreement as to the emergence of biopower. Whereas Foucault understands biopower as emerging in the late nineteenth century, Agamben theorizes a less radical rupture (Campbell,

“Translator’s Introduction” xxii). Agamben understands biopower as intensifying over time, eventually reaching the point in which the Nazi concentration camps were created in the twentieth century. Espósito, on the other hand, conceptualizes the emergence of biopower within the immunity paradigm. He explains that the preoccupation with self- protection is not unique to our period, but has existed in all societies throughout history

(Campbell, “Interview” 51). Further, he does not understand modernity as marking the emergence of biopower or the problem of immunization. Rather, Espósito argues that it is immunization that brings modernity into existence, stating that immunization,

…invents modernity as a complex of categories able to solve the problem of safeguarding life. What we call modernity, generally speaking, is nothing other than that language that allowed for more effective responses to be given to a series of requests for self-preservation originating deeply within life itself.” (Campbell, “Interview” 54)

Espósito explains that, in the classical modern age, the immunitary relationship between politics and the defense of life was mediated by a paradigm of order, which was articulated in the concepts of representation, sovereignty, and citizenship rights

(Campbell, “Interview” 55). He points to the social contract as an example of an immunitary dispositif –a salvific mechanism bound to protect human life from risks posed by the outside (Campbell, “Interview” 54). At the same time, modern subjects sacrifice their natural rights to the sovereign, in exchange for protection from the risk of

death implicit in the community (Campbell, “Interview” 54). In this way, the immunitary self-preservation of life lies at the center of modern political theory and practice.

Yet, the response to the threat of contamination has been very different throughout history, and Espósito points out that, “…we are no longer inside the immunitary semantics of the classical modern period” (Campbell, “Interview” 54). He states that, “…immunity, which is necessary to protect life, when brought beyond a certain threshold, winds up negating it” (Campbell, “Interview” 51). Therefore, self- protection becomes self-destruction as the immunitary mechanism, in an excess of defense, turns in on itself to the point that it risks destroying the political and individual bodies it seeks to protect (Campbell, “Translator’s Introduction” xv; Campbell,

“Interview” 53, 55). This enclosure of the body in on itself, in an attempt to annihilate the infected part, marks a transition from immunity to autoimmunity (Campbell, “Interview”

55). More and more, Espósito says, this is the case in our own period, as immunity is intensified to the point in which, “…the cure is given in the form of a lethal poison”

(Campbell, “Interview” 51). This is an immunity destined to destroy itself, along with the contaminated other (Campbell, “Interview” 55).

Espósito theorizes that, today, immunity has moved beyond this threshold, and the demand for self-protection has reached its maximum intensification and its apex in precisely our own period (Campbell, “Interview” 51). He states that, “…such protection, when pushed beyond a certain limit, forces life into a sort of prison or armory in which what we lose is not only freedom, but also the real sense of individual and collective existence” (Campbell, “Interview” 51). This negative immunization is evident in the

expansion and intensification of the punitive management of poverty, as described by

Wacquant. Coercive policing as an autoimmunitary dispositif has been the trajectory for

El Salvador post-democratization, and again, following Wacquant, is an integral component of the economic restructuring implemented since the Peace Accords

(Campbell, “Interview” 79). Espósito argues that the mediations of the classical modern period are now diminishing, and are being replaced with a more immediate superimposition of politics over life (Campbell, “Interview” 55). As immunization is given in continuingly higher doses and biopower intervenes more intensively, individual lives are subject to zones of indistinction, where they may be reduced to their, “…simple biological layer” (Campbell, “Interview” 51). Life, therefore, is immunized through the production of death (Campbell, “Translator’s Introduction” xxiv).

Adjusting to Neoliberal Restructuring

Chapter 2 of this dissertation documents examples of how the transformations in valorization processes have unfolded in El Salvador, as the country has reoriented its markets under free trade agreements and initiatives (e.g., the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Central American Free Trade Agreement and the Partnership for Growth). As seen with Ambassador Aponte’s statement in November 2013 regarding the reforms to the

Public Private Partnership Law and the release of Fomilenio II, it is clear that the United

States Government has pressured the leaders of El Salvador to exert their influence over the Legislative Assembly (Meléndez and Morán)18. The Government of El Salvador must

18 On November 21, 2013, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Mari Carmen Aponte stated in reference to the passage of the Public Private Partnership Law and the disbursement of Fomilenio II funding: 97

therefore make damaging concessions in order to maintain the market openings granted under earlier free trade agreements. Given this situation of vulnerability, these leaders are not only required to accept the concessions, but often embrace them, despite the asymmetries (Spalding 61, 63). Furthermore, these moves by the U.S. Government guarantee the continued implementation of free trade initiatives in El Salvador, regardless of the political orientation of future presidential administrations. In this way, legal precedents can be established which prioritize the needs of large corporations over those of the citizenry, and which undermine the sovereignty of the Government of El

Salvador.19 Kevin Young explains this in his discussion of the United States-El Salvador

Partnership for Growth, in which he states:

The “Partnership” exemplifies a more general U.S. strategy in Latin America. Since 1998 the region has elected roughly a dozen left-of-center presidents who explicitly reject U.S. intervention and neoliberal economics. In response, the United States has tried to institutionalize neoliberal policies that can constrain future governments regardless of political affiliation. In effect, Washington has sought to mitigate the danger of elections by insulating economic policy from democratic input.

“Cuando el FOMILENIO se aprobó, cuando el proyecto fue aprobado por la junta de directores de la MCC [the Millennium Challenge Corporation], la junta expuso que tenía una expectativa de hacer progreso, de que El Salvador debía hacer procesos en áreas de clima de inversión, de combatir la corrupción y el Estado de Derecho” … “El FOMILENIO se firmará cuando las condiciones estén correctas para que el convenio florezca. Sí es importante que se den señales claras a los inversionistas, que son los que en última instancia van a invertir en el país y van a desencadenar un desarrollo económico sostenible, que es en realidad lo que el FOMILENIO busca.” (Meléndez and Morán) On the same day, President Maurico Funes stated the following: “Mientras no se aprueben esas reformas, estoy convencido de que no se va a firmar el contrato. Por eso es que yo he exhortado a los diputados, se los he pedido en público y en privado” … “Claramente lo han dicho ellos: si no se aprueban las reformas, no hay firma. Si no hay firma, no hay desembolso. Así de sencillo. Ahora, ellos están en la propiedad de poner esas condiciones porque son la institución donante” … “La junta directiva de la Corporación del Reto del Milenio representa no solo al Gobierno de Estados Unidos, sino que también a entidades privadas. Esos son fondos de cooperación no reembolsables y los cooperantes están en todo el derecho de poner las condiciones que estimen pertinentes. Lamentablemente, a algunas de esas condiciones el Ejecutivo no puede garantizar su cumplimiento.” (Meléndez and Morán) 19 For further discussion on legislative interventions and the threat to El Salvador’s democratic institutions, see: Rodríguez-Domínguez. 98

As the FMLN’s experience in El Salvador suggests, these left-of-center governments are heavily constrained by forces opposed to progressive change. However, both government choices and popular struggle also help to shape policies on the ground. (Young)

These processes of deep integration index the transformations in value orientations over the past decades, and they have produced precarious living conditions.

Both Sarah Gammage, and Alisa Garni and L. Frank Weyher’s work discusses the relationship between economic restructuring in El Salvador (i.e., the transformation from an agro-export economy to one based on finance, remittances, and maquila industries) and steep escalations in emigration and remittances. The dependence on emigration and remittances to sustain the economy, in turn, have devastating consequences for

Salvadoran society. Garni and Weyher explain that the economic precarities generated by this restructuring, “… [alienate] many Salvadorans from their own society and state and from their ability to sustain life and make history at home” (Garni and Weyher “Dollars,

Free Trade” 68). That is, the decline in the agricultural economy, which began during the civil war in 1980, and has advanced since democratization, has made rural living unattainable for most (Garni and Weyher, “Dollars, Free Trade” 65; Gammage 78-79).

Garni and Weyher state that most citizens are now, “…unable to use land as a life- sustaining means of production,” as grains from the United States flood the Salvadoran market under CAFTA, and domestic grain prices have plummeted (Garni and Weyher,

“Dollars, Free Trade” 68). As a result, Salvadoran farmers, who make up half of the nation’s population, now struggle to produce beyond subsistence. As mentioned below, the manufacturing jobs created under free trade agreements account for only a fraction of

the agricultural jobs that have been lost due to tariff reductions (Garni and Weyher,

“Dollars, Free Trade” 73). As Gammage explains, this decline in domestic productivity is linked to sharp decreases in agricultural wages and high levels of underemployment

(78-79). Garni and Weyher note that almost one-third of the labor force of El Salvador is now underemployed, and that nearly half of the employment in urban areas is unpaid

(e.g., they explain that it is common to work for a relative’s business without pay) (Garni and Weyher “Dollars, Free Trade” 66). Further, nearly half of the population lives under the poverty line, and many citizens are driven to migrate because salaries at home are not enough to provide for basic food and housing (Garni and Weyher, “Dollars, Free Trade”

71; Gammage 79). Many move or commute to urban areas within El Salvador, while others leave for the United States. Approximately one-quarter of the population has emigrated, and remittances now account for about 17% of the country’s GDP (United

States Department of State, “U.S. Relations…”). Therefore, El Salvador depends on high- risk, undocumented emigration, and on wages sent back from abroad in order to sustain its economy. This clearly is not a viable strategy for economic growth and development

(Gammage 96; Garni and Weyher, “Dollars, Free Trade” 67).

Gammage, and Garni and Weyher further discuss the connections between free trade agreements, agriculture and migration noting that, following the Peace Accords, economic policy shifted away from agricultural production and towards finance and industry (Gammage 84-86; Garni and Weyher “Dollars, Free Trade” 65). This shift in policy has been further solidified by changes in agricultural subsidies under CAFTA.

Garni and Weyher add that grains today are worth only 27% of their value in 1978, and

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that coffee production, which used to dominate the national economy, has declined.

Further, they note that Salvadoran households currently obtain just 5% of their income from grain sales, despite the fact that 90% of households produce grains (Garni and

Weyher, “Dollars, Free Trade” 65). This massive shift away from agriculture is highlighted in the United Nations Development Program’s 2004 Human Development

Report for El Salvador. It states that, in 1978, 81% of the foreign currency inflow into El

Salvador came from traditional agrarian exports (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo; Garni and Weyher, “Dollars, Free Trade” 65; Zinecker 14). In 2004, 70% of foreign currency inflow came from remittances, and only 5% came from agrarian exports. This absence of productive relations developed quickly, and it is the impetus behind widespread unemployment and underemployment, as well as the “sustained rural exodus” and the steep escalations in out-migration described by Gammage (78).

Non-trad

Maquila

Remittances

Agrarian

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

2010 1978

Table 1: Foreign Currency Inflow to El Salvador in %. Data source: Zinecker.

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Gammge, and Garni and Weyher show that, while the expansion of textile manufacturing has been rhetorically promoted as a key strategy for job creation and economic development, this strategy has essentially failed (Gammage 80; Garni and

Weyher “Dollars, Free Trade” 71). Under free trade policies, El Salvador is required to reduce tariffs on grains and provide tax incentives for corporations operating in free trade zones. As shown in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, public and official discourses claim that this opening of the markets will allow El Salvador’s economy to grow, yet, so much of the value gained through these openings is going elsewhere –it is not ‘trickling down’ to ordinary citizens, and the economy is not expanding. As Gammage explains, the textile assembly sector adds little more value than labor, since most cloth and thread are imported, and in 2003 the sector accounted for just 3% of GDP (80). In addition, the economic restructuring that has occurred under democratization has resulted in undignified work environments and serious labor violations. Following Paul Almeida,

Garni and Weyher state that in contemporary El Salvador, “…working conditions are extremely exploitative and oppressive, wages abysmal, and opportunities for labor organizing severely limited (“Dollars, Free Trade” 73). In May 2015, the Vice President of the Inter-American Development Bank, Santiago Levy, reported that 70% of the labor force in El Salvador was employed in the informal sector, where individuals lack the protections of minimum wage laws, and labor contracts and regulations (Quintanilla,

Teos and Orellana; Garni and Weyher, “Dollars, Free Trade” 68; Portes and Hoffman

53). Levya reported that, although the average number of years of schooling is increasing in El Salvador, individuals are not able to incorporate themselves into the formal sector.

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Further, the Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (the

Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development, or FUSADES) reports that, while 8,369 jobs were created between 2014 and 2015, El Salvador needs to create

60,000 jobs annually in order to achieve growth (Quintanilla, Teos and Orellana). It therefore becomes apparent that the profits gained by large industries operating in El

Salvador are extracted in part through the marginalization of labor, and that labor exploitation is a necessary component for sustaining the new model. Garni and Weyher state that while, “[t]ariff reductions under CAFTA threatened an estimated 646,500 jobs in agriculture,” a maximum of 134,000 jobs were provided in assembly manufacturing

(Garni and Weyher “Dollars, Free Trade” 73). Maquila jobs, they add, make up less than

10% of total employment. In this way, “[t]otal employment in the maquilas is thus remarkably small given the immense rhetorical weight given to this sector” (“Dollars,

Free Trade” 73). Looking to the future, the arguments put forth by Gammage, and Garni and Weyher can be extended to the Partnership for Growth and the Mesoamerican

Initiative. Promoted as solutions for expanding El Salvador’s economy, the mega- infrastructure projects implemented under these plans are not designed to improve the standard of living for ordinary citizens. Rather, their primary purpose is to facilitate the movement of goods, and to extract profit from telecommunications and the private production and distribution of energy.

Because it is impossible for many citizens to earn a living wage and provide for basic needs, a large percentage of the population has been compelled to emigrate. In

2013, El Salvador received $4.2 billion in personal remittances, which makes up 16.4%

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of the national GDP (Cohn, Gonzalez-Barrera and Cuddington; World Bank, “Personal

Remittances”). The amount of remittances sent to El Salvador in 2013 alone is almost six times the total amount of Fomilenio I and II funds ($738 million), which were dispersed to El Salvador over the course of eight years.20 Garni and Weyher state that 22% of

Salvadorans receive remittances on a regular basis, and that, on average, receiving households utilize them to pay for 84% of expenses (“Dollars, Free Trade” 65). As

Gammage explains, the flood of remittances contributes to inequality, since it contributes to rising prices, land speculation, and the consumption of imported goods, the consequences of which are compounded for poor families that do not receive remittances

(81, 93). Gammage, and Garni and Weyher are therefore critical of discourses that promote remittances as a strategy for reducing unemployment and developing the national economy (Gammage 96; Garni and Weyher “Dollars, Free Trade” 66). While

Gammage points out that these discourses fail to explore the connection between economic liberalization policies and mass out-migration, Garni and Weyher argue that their circulation serves the interests of financial elites, who benefit from the “absence of productive relations” in El Salvador (Gammage 96; Garni and Weyher, “Dollars, Free

Trade” 67). Remittances provide capital for the expanding financial sector, since individuals pay fees to send them, and because, when these funds are deposited in national banks, they provide foreign exchange reserves that allow financial elites to seek international loans (Garni and Weyher, “Dollars, Free Trade” 66). Gammage further

20 Under Fomilenio I (approved 2006), a $461 million grant was provided to El Salvador, and under Fomilenio II (approved 2014), $277 million has been provided (Millennium Challenge Corporation, “El Salvador Compact;” Embassy of the United States San Salvador, “MCC Will Sign Second Compact with El Salvador”). 104

explains that following democratization, the flood of remittances has contributed to the expansion of large commercial banks and financial institutions, which offer banking products and services that are tied to remittances (84-86). Given this absence of productive relations and the shift away from agriculture and towards finance following the Peace Accords, Garni and Weyher note the emergence since democratization (ca.

1992) of a “transnational capitalist class,” that resembles a “finance aristocracy,” as discussed by Marx (Garni and Weyher “Dollars, Free Trade” 66). This class accumulates profit though the hiring of wage labor and the movement of capital. In El Salvador and elsewhere, these actors position themselves as important benefactors for society who create jobs and promote economic growth. Yet, Garni and Weyher argue that, in El

Salvador, they are a parasitic faction of society that benefits from the “indebtedness and bankruptcy…of the nation’s people” (Garni and Weyher “Dollars, Free Trade” 67).

Given the asymmetries generated by economic restructuring, and the cycle of unemployment, labor exploitation, and high risk emigration, public and official discourses promoting the benefits of remittances must be challenged.21

Criminalizing Poverty in Democratic El Salvador

Public and official discourses circulating in El Salvador that promote infrastructure development and the expansion of free trade make strong claims and promises regarding the sustainability and success of the new model. For example, a

21 For an example of a discourse promoting remittances as a model for development, see IFAD’s article on lowering transaction fees for remittances, which states: “While remittances are certainly not a substitute for foreign assistance or sound economic policies at home, they are an increasingly important tool through which poor rural people can pull themselves out of poverty and take charge of their lives” (International Fund for Agricultural Development). 105

promotional video released by the Cámara de la Industria Textil, Confección y Zonas

Francas de El Salvador (The Chamber of Textile, Clothing and Free Trade Zone

Industries of El Salvador, or CAMTEX) claims that the textile, apparel and free zone sector is, “a major source of employment and currency,” that promotes economic and social development, and corporate social responsibility (Camtex2012). The video highlights the number of permanent jobs created by the sector, and provides the testimony of an employee who has purchased her own home and advanced her education because of her job in a textile factory. Nevertheless, there is documentation of widespread labor exploitation in the free trade zones resulting from the absence of regulations, as discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Additionally, as Garni and

Weyher point out, maquila jobs make up less than 10% of total employment in El

Salvador (“Dollars, Free Trade” 73). It is therefore critical to examine the promises and predictions that are advanced by the advocates of free trade to verify their accuracy, much like Portes and Hoffman question the promise for Latin America that, “a rising tide will lift all boats” (75). It is essential that the discourses promoting CAFTA, the

Partnership for Growth, and other free trade initiatives be examined, and that the connections between economic restructuring, inequality and violent crime be traced.

During the first half of 2015, there were claims circulating that a war was ensuing between the gangs and the state, as police were taking an increasingly aggressive stance against gangs, and the number of military and police officers killed by civilians was increasing (Meléndez, Rivas and García; Calderón and Funes; Valencia Caravantes;

Iraheta; Santos, “Comisionado…;” Calderón, Medina and Alemán; Gagne, “Director de

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Policía;” Daugherty, “Estamos en Guerra;” Daugherty, “MS13 Ordena Asesinar;” La

Prensa Gráfica, “Sánchez Cerén Confirma”). In January 2015, the Director of the

National Civil Police declared that officers should use their firearms against criminals in total confidence and conviction, and should shoot without fear of suffering consequences for doing so (Valencia Caravantes). Further, it is becoming more common in recent years to see families that are forced to flee their homes in a matter of hours, under threat of death by the gangs. In October 2012, Daniel Valencia Cervantes and Óscar Cabezas reported that hundreds of homes had been abandoned in the suburbs of El Salvador. They explain that usurped homes are sometimes used as casas destroyer by the maras, or places in which gang members carry out illicit activities. Valencia Cervantes and Cabezas add that, once homes are abandoned, they are often looted and fall into disrepair

(Valencia Cervantes, Daniel, Óscar Cabezas and Pau Coll). It is typical to find several cases of usurpation reported each month in the major newspapers. For example, in July

2014, a gang gave fourteen families 24 hours to abandon their homes at the Cristo Negro apartment complex in Mejicanos, and in January 2015, twelve families were given 24 hours to abandon the San Valentín apartment complex in Mejicanos (Sánchez;

“Abandonan apartamentos;” “Familias abandonan sus viviendas”). In October 2015, residents of the Guatemala neighborhood in San Salvador were given just ninety minutes to abandon their homes (Beltrán and García). Although police officers were present to help protect residents as they removed their belongings, they did not attempt to stop the usurpation. In addition, in May 2015, the Mara Salvatrucha closed the school in the small town of Tunamil, Sonsonate (“Familias abandonan casas”). They also forced more than

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thirty families (a total of more than 150 people) to abandon their homes. Therefore, in addition to usurping entire apartment complexes and neighborhoods, the maras have also usurped entire hamlets. As scholars such as Gammage, Garni and Weyher, Moodie,

Moreno, Spalding, Stenzel, and Zilberg have shown, under the new economic model we are not witnessing the absorption of labor, the alleviation of poverty, or economic growth in El Salvador, but rather, a society in crisis, whose citizens are fleeing because of economic concerns and security threats. For this reason, free trade policies must be scrutinized, and the negative social consequences of the new model must be identified.

In their investigation on changes in the composition of class structure in Latin

America during the neoliberal era, Alejandro Portes and Kelly Hoffman examine the negative consequences of the new economic model. Like Gammage, Moreno, Spalding,

Stenzel, and others, Portes and Hoffman discuss different areas of neoliberal restructuring that have brought about the marginalization of labor and social instability (41, 55, 76).

These include the end of import substitution, the creation of special economic zones

(including free trade zones, and Zones for Employment and Economic Development, or

ZEDEs), and the contraction of the public sector, all of which have occurred in El

Salvador since the 1990s. Portes and Hoffman also discuss the consequences of restructuring, including exploitative wages, an expanding informal sector, and the impossibility of lifting oneself out of poverty, noting that, in Latin America, the vast majority of the working population lives below poverty lines (67). There are also less peaceful adaptations to economic precarity, including violent crime and the proliferation of private security (Portes and Hoffman 67). Indeed, these less peaceful adaptations to

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economic restructuring have been written on landscape of urban El Salvador, which has been transformed since democratization. In San Salvador and Santa Tecla, in addition to commercial development, it is now common to enclose neighborhood streets with large, guarded gates, a phenomena that did not occur during and prior to the civil war.

Portes and Hoffman state that, “[t]here is no one-to-one relationship between levels of income inequality and rates of violent crime” (68). However, they add that there is a visible pattern in which countries with large and increasing levels of inequality generally experience significant increases in violent crime and victimization. They go on to state that that rising inequality has been consistently associated with crime, and that the research on the determinants of violent crime in Latin America identifies income inequality as the single most important factor. Further, they cite sociological theory in pointing out, “…the role of relative deprivation in the onset of deviance” (Portes and

Hoffman 68). Given the high levels of underemployment and poverty in El Salvador, and given the fact that the transformation of the economy occurred rather rapidly following the civil war, it is not surprising that correlations exist between the scope and timing of economic restructuring, the escalations in violent crime, and the steep increases in incarceration rates. Again, following Wacquant, it becomes evident that the expansion of the punitive state is an integral component of neoliberal ideology (“Global Firestorm”

79). It is the solution, under the new model, for the spread of social insecurity generated by the deregulation of low-wage labor markets. In addition, ‘iron fist’ laws and ‘zero- tolerance’ policing serve to legitimize leaders amid social upheavals.

Measuring Poverty in El Salvador

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According to the Gini Coefficient, levels of income inequality in El Salvador, although still very high, have improved since democratization (Quandal). This measure shows that over the past twenty years there has been a general trend towards improvement, and in 2012 the Gini Coefficient for El Salvador was 41.8. However, there are different considerations to be made when measuring income inequality, and the Gini

Coefficient alone does not provide an accurate representation of poverty in El Salvador.

To begin, it is critical to note that remittances factor into the Gini Coefficient. As stated above, personal remittances account for 16.4% of GDP. This overreliance has been a relatively new phenomena, and citizens have had to rapidly adjust to this economic shift.

While in 1978, remittances accounted for just 8% of foreign currency inflow, in 2004 they accounted for 70%. Therefore, wages earned abroad are a determining factor in the

Gini Coefficient. Further, while poverty in El Salvador declined by 5% in 2013, the vulnerable population (i.e., the population that is at risk of falling into poverty) increased by 6.2% (El Salvador. Dirección General de Estadística y Census; Molina and García; El

Diario de Hoy, “Pobreza Se Redujo”). In other words, while the number of Salvadorans earning less than $4 a day has decreased by 5%, the number earning between $4 and $10 a day has increased by 6.2% (United Nations Development Program, “One Third of Latin

Americans…”). The 2014 United Nations Development Program Regional Human

Development Report for Latin America, released in San Salvador in August of that year, reports that one third of Latin Americans are at risk of falling into poverty (United

Nations Development Programme, “2014 Regional Human Development Report…”).

This means that, although poverty in the region has decreased, it is becoming

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increasingly more difficult to enter into the middle class. This is to be expected, given the decline of social and labor protections, and the expansion of the informal sector. Finally, the Ministry of Economy of El Salvador (MINEC), and the Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (FUSADES, a think tank based in San Salvador), both use the basic food basket (la canasta básica) in determining poverty lines.22 In 2013, both agencies reported that between 2006 and 2011 the number of Salvadorans that were unable to acquire the basic food basket increased. Although the two agencies provided different data (MINEC reported an increase of 300,000 individuals, while FUSADES reported an increase of 640,000), and there was public disagreement regarding this discrepancy, both agencies did report an increase in the number of impoverished citizens

(Molina and García). In 2015, the cost of the basic food basket for El Salvador was

$161.90. The average minimum salary of $162.16 is therefore not sufficient to provide for costs above the basic food basket, including housing, transportation, utilities, and medical care (Alas and Castillo).

The World Bank states that the basic food basket is often a more relevant measurement of poverty for developing countries since large percentages of the population survive on the basic minimum or less (World Bank. “Poverty Reduction and

Equity”). Garni and Weyher’s research in Masahut and Yucuaiquín reinforces the relevance of the basic food basket as a measurement of poverty in El Salvador, stating that, “[f]or the many Salvadorans who are living on US$5 or less per day, even a few

22 According to the World Bank, the basic food basket is a country’s estimated cost for the minimal basket needed to ensure the healthy survival of a typical family. It includes both food and non-food needs (World Bank. “Poverty Reduction and Equity”).

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cents can make a great difference” (“Dollars, Free Trade” 71). With regard to dollarization, which occurred in 2001, they add that in Masahut and Yucuaiquín residents, “…overwhelmingly argued that dollars diminished their spending power while the prices of privatized utilities, services, and imported consumer goods were rising (from

33 to 221% since 1998)” (Garni and Weyher, “Dollars, Free Trade” 71). Although the

Gini Coefficient has improved for El Salvador since democratization, levels of inequality are still high, and the vulnerable population is expanding. According to some indices, the number of individuals following below the poverty line is increasing, as earnings are not sufficient to provide for basic necessities. Again, as Portes and Hoffman assert, income inequality is the single most important determinant of violent crime in Latin America

(68). It is therefore essential to trace the links between the decline of the agricultural economy, the social disengagement of the state, expanding unemployment and new forms of labor exploitation, and escalations in social violence, all of which have developed concurrently in El Salvador since democratization.

Adaptive Strategies

Portes and Hoffman explain that, in the absence of regular jobs, families adjust to situations of poverty with different adaptive strategies. As noted above, 70% of the population engages in alternative income-earning activities and invented self- employment in the informal sector, where individuals lack legal protections. In the informal sector there is both own-account work, such a small-scale street vending, and work in medium and large firms, such as temporary workers hired off the books without contracts (50). Garni and Weyher document cases of unpaid labor, as their informants

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complain of having to work additional hours without extra pay, and of having to babysit and clean the houses of their employers, in addition to their paid duties (“Dollars, Free

Trade” 69). Portes and Hoffman argue that the increasingly flexible labor relations have been far more successful than outright military oppression in squashing unions and weakening the working class (76). In El Salvador, this is due, in part, to the invisibility of the major financial powers.

Another adaptive strategy for adjusting to the new economy is what Portes and

Hoffman refer to as the “exit strategy,” and what Gammage refers to as “exporting people” (Portes and Hoffman 74; Gammage 75). This is the reliance on out-migration and remittances to provide wages domestically. Portes and Hoffman point out that the amount of remittances sent to Latin America, “…is more than the sum total of foreign aid for the entire region” (Portes and Hoffman 74). Additionally, the International Fund for

Agricultural Development (IFAD) states that remittances sent to Latin America “…are worth more than direct foreign investment, official development assistance and foreign aid combined” (International Fund for Agricultural Development; see also Gammage 76).

As mentioned above, the $4.2 billion sent to El Salvador in personal remittances in 2013 alone is almost six times the total amount of Fomilenio I and II funds, which were dispersed over the course of eight years (Cohn, Gonzalez-Barrera and Cuddington; World

Bank, “Personal Remittances”). Therefore, emigration and remittances are the citizenry’s most powerful strategy for adapting to the new economy.

In addition to own-account work and emigration, Portes and Hoffman discuss crime, which serves in part as an entrepreneurial opportunity, and as a less peaceful

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strategy for adapting to the removal of social and domestic economic protections (e.g., subsidies for food, energy, transportation, agriculture, health care, and education) (66-

70). As mentioned above, Portes and Hoffman state that, “[i]t cannot be demonstrated empirically that the implementation of the neoliberal model is the direct cause of the rise in urban crime,” and that other factors including narcotrafficking and political instability also play a role in the context of Latin America (69). In El Salvador specifically, legacies of authoritarianism, instability after the Peace Accords, and the deportations under the

Clinton administration have all been contributing factors in the escalations in social violence. Yet, Portes and Hoffman highlight the temporal coincidence between four factors, which are also relevant to the case of El Salvador: neoliberal restructuring, increasing inequality, escalations in violent crime, and the rise of coercive policing

(which involves increased incarceration rates). In addition, they argue that there is an obvious connection between the spirit of neoliberal ideology, which promotes self- reliance and individual initiative in the midst of increasing inequality and generalized poverty, and the decision of some marginalized citizens to survive by ignoring the normative framework and taking matters “into their own hands” (69). In reference to

Latin America, they state that, “…the bulk of perpetrators and often victims of urban crime are young males from impoverished families, themselves unemployed or informally employed” (67). They add that, these young men are of the, “… classes that have suffered the most from employment contraction and the disappearance of compensatory policies” (69). Indeed, this has been the case in El Salvador with the growth of the Mara Salvatrucha and the Barrio 18, in that their members are primarily

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men who joined the gang at a young age, have been exposed to violence and face unemployment. Further, increases in homicide rates since the mid-nineties are attributed, in large part, to inter-gang violence, and victims are often the residents of impoverished areas. Both Wacquant, and Portes and Hoffman explain the social and political reactions to insecurity, which include an intense concern for the containment of criminal others, support for coercive policing, and the expansion of private security (Wacquant, “Global

Firestorm 77; Portes and Hoffman 67). Again, these findings are relevant to the case of El

Salvador, where ‘zero tolerance’ policing maintains wide support, and private security is now omnipresent in wealthy and middle-class neighborhoods.

Offender Management

Emma Bell and Robert Reiner also discuss the affinity between the ideology and processes of neoliberalism –which promote deregulated finance and labor markets, an ethic of self-reliance, a lack of concern for the socially excluded, and risk-based governmental mentalities– and the decision of some to pursue crime as an adaptive strategy (Reiner ix). They add that violent crime is part of the fallout from the social and economic dislocations caused by neoliberal restructuring, and that the state responds to these consequences with coercive security strategies. Building on the work of Loïc

Wacquant, Robert Reiner, and Mick Cavadino and Jim Dignan (and diverging from this scholarship in several important ways), Bell analyzes the connections between neoliberalism and punitive penal practices in contemporary Britain. Her research can be extended to discuss the transformations in penalty seen in democratic countries across the globe since the Reagan and Thatcher administrations. Two of the major arguments that

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she advances, which will be discussed below, are that the practices of neoliberalism actually run counter to neoliberal theory in certain ways, and that, during the neoliberal period, penality has taken on a risk management logic (Bell 3-4). Unlike Wacquant’s research, which maintains that coercive policing is an integral component of neoliberal ideology (the present research supports this argument), Bell proposes that penal severity is not the inevitable result of neoliberalism, and that programs of punitive crime control have developed within specific political, historical and cultural contexts (Bell 6;

Wacquant, “Global Firestorm” 79). Still, like Wacquant, Bell asserts that, “…penal policy represents an attempt by the Neoliberal State to manage and control certain

‘undesirable’ populations,” and she adds that this attempt has largely been a failure (6). In

Britain, as in El Salvador, poverty remains highly visible, public feelings of insecurity remain high, and trust in the criminal justice system is low. Given the social disengagement of the state under neoliberalism, Bell explains that political leaders are highly constrained in their ability to protect the population through employment programs, labor regulations, and social services (7). They must therefore find alternative means of seeking legitimacy and restoring confidence in the government. She states,

Despite the apparent failure of tough crime policy to restore conﬁdence in the government, the question of law and order is one which tends to appeal to voters across traditional class lines. There are few other issues which enable the government to do so and it is almost certain that ignoring the question of law and order, once it has become so highly mediatised and politicised, is no longer a realistic option for modern government. Adopting tough penal policies may thus be regarded as just one way in which states may still attempt to seek legitimacy in a neoliberal world which has stripped them of their former role as service providers and fundamentally transformed how they function. Consequently, the link between neoliberalism and punitiveness is an indirect one. (7)

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Therefore, similar to Wacquant, Bell traces the relationship between the need for political leaders to seek legitimacy amidst social upheavals, and the expansion of coercive security strategies in many countries, including Britain and the United States. As mentioned above, the Bratton-style policing strategies that were implemented in New

York under Rudy Giuliani have been exported to Latin America. The ‘zero tolerance’ model for coercive policing has maintained popular support in El Salvador for over a decade, and Giuliani’s recommendations for eliminating gang violence in El Salvador, which were presented in San Salvador in May 2015, were well received by private business leaders and the Sánchez Cerén administration (Rauda Zablah, “El Salvador ya

Importó…;” Lohmuller; Portillo; Renteira; Avelar, “Así Pretende Giuliani”). Giuliani’s recommendations for El Salvador are discussed below.

One of the principal arguments advanced by Bell is that the practices of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ run counter to neoliberal theory, with respect to state intervention and expenditures (4). Whereas the ideology and theories of free market capitalism advanced by Milton Friedman, and the Reagan and Thatcher administrations promote minimal state intervention and fiscal austerity, in many regions of the world, including the United States, Britain, and El Salvador, there have been extensions of state intervention and expenditures in recent years. For example, following the 2008 global economic crisis, national governments intervened in order to rescue large banks and key industries from financial collapse. There have also been recent extensions of welfarist programs, which Bell explains are in response to the social and economic dislocations produced by the first phase of neoliberalism (i.e., the period of Reaganism and

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Thatcherism) (8). In the United States, the extension of long-term unemployment benefits and the Making Home Affordable program served as safety nets for the middle class following the 2008 mortgage crisis. In El Salvador, the Paquete Escolar and the Pensión

Básica Universal Programs, both implemented under the Funes administration, provide citizens with basic necessities. The Paquete Escolar provides uniforms, shoes and school supplies to over one million children each year, and the Pensión Básica Universal provides $50 per month to citizens over 70 years of age who live in some of the most impoverished municipalities in the country and have no other form of pension.23

Bell also points out that, contrary to neoliberal ideology, penal severity requires an enormous level of state intervention into the lives of individuals, as well as massive state expenditures (3-4). These processes are seen in El Salvador, with the expansion of the punitive state since democratization. For example, the plan Casa Segura allows the

National Civil Police to inspect hundreds of residences at a time without a warrant, which represents a suspension of constitutional rights. There have also been intensive efforts in recent years to militarize the National Civilian Police, in an attempt to suppress gang violence. Most recently, in 2015, the Sánchez Cerén administration announced the creation of the Fuerza Móvil Nacional, a special battalion within the National Civilian

Police. At one point, the Presidential Commissioner for Security, Hato Hasbún, referred to this battalion as a special cleansing battalion, or a “batallón especial de limpieza”

(Avelar, “Anuncian Nuevo ‘Batallón;’” Avelar, “FESPAD”). Hasbún later retracted this term, stating that it was in fact a battalion for immediate action, although he would not

23 The Pensión Básica Universal is disbursed to senior citizens every four months. That is, every four months, qualifying senior citizens receive a payment of $200 (Beltrán Luna). 118

specify its exact mission (Calderón, “Hato Hasbún Aclara”). Therefore, as Bell shows, some of the current practices of neoliberalism actually run counter to neoliberal ideology, in that there has been an extension, rather than a displacement of state intervention and expenditure (3). In El Salvador, there has been some expansion of social programs in recent years, as well as increased state expenditures for special police forces that intervene primarily in impoverished communities. As noted in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, there have also been massive state expenditures for the construction of the

Central American logistical corridor, which has been funded by Fomilenio grants and by loans obtained by the government of El Salvador.

As mentioned above, Bell diverges from Wacquant’s assertion that punitiveness is intrinsic to neoliberalism. She states that although, “…neoliberalism can generate a punitive climate conducive to punitive penal policy … the most important link between neoliberalism and punitiveness lies in the transformation of the Capitalist State” (4). She adds that, “…the most significant transformation that the State has undergone as a result of neoliberalism is the move from its role as provider of public services to that of facilitator of market solutions” (4). Although state intervention and expenditures have expanded during the second phase of neoliberalism, the state is limited in its ability to assert its power, and must consistently act to advance the processes of commodification.24

24 Following Jamie Peck and Adam Ticekll, Bell makes a distinction between two phases of neoliberalism: ‘roll back’ and ‘roll out’ liberalism (8). While the former refers to the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, which sought to apply the neoliberal model by dismantling fundamental institutions of the Keynesian welfare state, the latter refers to the New Democrats in the United States (beginning with the Clinton administration) and New Labour in Britain. These administrations have created new programs and policies that respond to the economic and social dislocations generated by the first phase of neoliberalism. Bell states, “[i]t is in this phase that neoliberalism became more of a social project, promoting increased state intervention in order to regulate problems of immigration, welfare reform, crime and the degeneration of inner cities” (8). Although the Clinton, Obama, Funes and Sánchez Cerén administrations have taken 119

That is to say, the expansion of state expenditures and intervention in many democratic countries over recent years serves to advance these processes. Governmental efforts are focused on liberating the market from restrictive regulations, and on reorganizing public services in order to create new markets and expand capital (5). Likewise, transformations in the criminal justice system must be understood within this context of public service reform, which involves the privatization of fundamental state functions and the imposition of a free market logic onto areas that had previously been protected from such influences.

Bell asserts that in recent years the impetus behind the expansion of coercive policing has been the extension of state intervention and expenditure, coupled with a focus on self-regulation and individual responsibility (2-3). That is, under the new model conceptions of crime have shifted, and the emphasis now lies on individual rather than state responsibility for controlling criminality. Those who have been socially excluded as a result of shifts in value orientations, and who therefore pose a potential threat to the social norm, must be managed and controlled, and become subject to the criminal justice system. For this reason, incarcerations rates are swelling, both in the United States and in

El Salvador. Over the past twenty-five years, incarceration rates in El Salvador have increased by approximately 600%, and there has been an exceptionally sharp increase since 2000 (United Nations Statistics Division). Bell lists several factors that contribute to this “widening of the penal net,” which are relevant to the case of El Salvador (10). To

progressive stances on social issues, they have also strongly supported neoliberal restructuring (as seen with CAFTA and the PFG), and emergency security measures that violate the civil and human rights of marginalized sectors of society (e.g., the Patriot Act, Mano Dura policies, the plan Casa Segura, and the mass deportations under the Clinton and Obama administrations). 120

begin, harsh laws such as Mano Dura and lengthy pre-trial detentions contribute to increases in prison populations and overcrowding. The plan Casa Segura and the anti- gang laws also contribute by criminalizing minor infractions and nuisance behavior, including anti-social activities and the possession of tattoos. Under the plan Casa Segura, in addition to inspecting residences for usurpation, police also verify utility bills to check for illegal electric and cable connections. This appears to function as a mechanism that authorizes police to arrest individuals when there is a lack of evidence for gang affiliation. As mentioned above, the criminalization of nuisance behavior is a key component of Bratton-style broken windows policing. Further contributing to the expansion of prison populations is the targeting of children and adolescents. With harsher sentencing under Mano Dura and anti-gang laws, minors who should be integrated into society through education and social services programs are instead subject to the criminal justice system. Therefore, rather than addressing issues of crime through citizen integration, there is a focus on controlling the risks posed by poverty and criminality, and on managing offenders through surveillance and incarceration (Bell 4-5, 10). In this way, over the past years, concurrent with the development of neoliberalization, a risk management logic and a market ideology have penetrated the criminal justice system.

121

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Table 2: Prison Population Rate in El Salvador (per 100,000 of national population). Data source: International Centre for Prison Studies.

As noted above, prior to democratization, the majority of Salvadoran citizens were integrated into society via agriculture, and this economic system functioned under the rule of oppressive authoritarian regimes. Today, because of CAFTA, agriculture is no longer a viable means of earning a living for the majority of the population. As a consequence, much of the middle class is un- or underemployed, and the informal sector is immense. As Portes and Hoffman discuss, some members of society resort to crime as a means of adapting to the removal of social and economic protections and increasingly flexible labor relations (66-70).25 Following the lead of the United States, the Salvadoran state has responded to insecurity by adopting Bratton-style policing and offender

25In El Salvador, crime is often not a decision, but a necessity, since gangs routinely force young people to become members under threat of death. If the individual refuses to join, his or her life may be threatened, in addition to the lives of family members. 122

management strategies, which involve sharp increases in incarceration. Given that violent crime has only worsened over the past decade, it is clear that these strategies have not been effective. Businesses and private citizens have responded to the problem of violent crime by contracting private security, and the private security industry in El Salvador is rapidly expanding. Between 2006 and 2011, the number of private security agents doubled, and private security agents now outnumber police by almost 2 to 1 (López). The proliferation of private security favors those who have the ability to pay for it, and private security is therefore a highly unequal means of protection. Following Espósito, the present research asserts that public and private efforts to protect the citizenry from insecurity are in fact folding in on themselves, in an excess of protection. The expansion of coercive policing is not only swelling prison populations, but it is also denying

Salvadorans their basic rights and a sense of community existence (Campbell,

“Interview” 51, 53, 55). In this way, efforts to protect the citizenry are passing beyond certain threshold, and are developing into a type of negative, or auto-immunity. That which is proposed as a solution for El Salvador is, in reality, a form of lethal poison and that which is most damaging.

‘The Living and Threatening Incarnation of Generalized Insecurity’

Currently in El Salvador, there are expressions of nostalgia that are circulating for the relative order and stability that existed before the Peace Accords, under the authoritarian regimes. The Facebook community, “Fotografías de El Salvador,” is a testament to this. It is a forum for sharing photographs of the customs and landscape of the country, which includes images from the early and mid-twentieth century (Fotografías

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de El Salvador). The leading newspaper La Prensa Gráfica has also republished photographs from the mid-twentieth century in its digital edition and via social media that demonstrate a particular order and structure in El Salvador that no longer remains.

Another exceptional collection is the series published in El Faro titled, “Un paseo en el tiempo por el centro de San Salvador,” in which Mauro Arias and Emely Navarro, in collaboration with Carlos Quintanilla, superimpose historic postcards of locations downtown over contemporary images of these same spaces. In this placement of one photograph over the other, both time periods are evident, and the elements of globalization in the contemporary landscape are brought to the forefront. Among these elements are a modern highway, informal vendors, a mortgage bank, and an internet café.

Arias, Navarro and Quintanilla’s work also highlights the deterioration of the historic center. Before democratization, downtown San Salvador was a center of commerce for the capital. Today, the historic center is controlled by the gangs. As Ellen Moodie discusses in El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peace, the monument El Salvador del

Mundo serves as a symbolic dividing point for the capital, representing a separation between wealthier neighborhoods (including Santa Tecla) located to the west and southwest, or ‘above’ El Salvador del Mundo, and poorer neighborhoods (including the historic center) located to the east and northeast, or ‘below’ El Salvador del Mundo (117-

118). Although this symbolic division has existed for decades, before democratization downtown San Salvador was a popular center of commerce in which upper-middle class citizens had freedom of movement. As Ellen Moodie notes, for many middle- and upper- middle class residents of Santa Tecla (the municipality ‘above’ El Salvador del Mundo) it

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has now become too dangerous to make the “descent” downtown (117). There is a now a generation of residents of Santa Tecla that were born around the time of the Peace

Accords who rarely, if ever, travel the historic center, despite the fact that it is the center of government, and is just a few miles away. As such, for middle- and upper-class citizens of the capital the centers of commerce today are located ‘above’ El Salvador del

Mundo, and include the massive shopping malls: La Gran Vía, Multiplaza, Galerías,

Plaza Merliot and Las Cascadas.

This presence of nostalgia does not indicate that collective memories of the atrocities of the civil war and the authoritarian regimes are disappearing. To the contrary, in 2015 there were widespread expressions of solidarity around the time of the beatification of Óscar Romero. In addition, institutions like the Museo de la Palabra y la

Imagen, the Centro Monseñor Romero, the Human Rights Institute at the Universidad

Centroamericana (IDHUCA), and the Museo Telceño are dedicated to educating the next generation about the human rights abuses of the past. Yet, this nostalgia may index widespread feelings of confusion and ‘unsettledness,’ to employ Ellen Moodie’s term, in facing an evasive or invisible enemy that threatens the citizenry (Moodie 131). Violence is no longer attributed to the political leaders of the dictatorships, who were clear, identifiable enemies, but rather to an unpredictable criminal other that emerged somewhat enigmatically after the civil war. Additionally, the agents behind current economic insecurity are obscured, as local and international elites exert influence over national

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legislation outside of the public eye.26 As Garni and Weyher point out in their discussion of crime and estrangement in Yucuaiquín:

The transnational, financial elite who enacted the structural reforms that have left nearly half of the Salvadoran population un- or underemployed … remain invisible. But the sense of powerlessness that derives from the broader situation is apparent, even if its roots are often obscured. (“Neoliberal Mystification” 634-635)

Herein lie some of the interconnected dimensions of insecurity in contemporary

El Salvador. The links between the elusive perpetrators of crime on the one hand, and the invisible agents behind structural economic reforms on the other, are complex and difficult to articulate. Yet, in seeking out and tracing these connections, the present research aims to contribute to discussions of how insecurity in El Salvador is productive, and of the agents that benefit.

Wacquant’s work centers specifically on the relationship between the desocialization of labor (i.e., the dissolution of labor protections that were normalized during the Fordist era, as employers reduce their legal obligations to employees; these protections include: labor regulations, job security, the expectation of a living wage, pension benefits, and the ability to unionize), increased inequality and precarious living conditions, and the escalation of coercive policing under neoliberalism. He argues that the recent expansion and intensification of the security apparatus in democratic states across the globe is, “…a reaction to, a diversion from and a denegation of, the generalization of the social and mental insecurity…” produced by the contraction of social services and the desocialization of wage labor in the post-Fordist era (Wacquant,

26 For more on closed-door free trade negotiations, see Spalding in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 126

“Ordering Insecurity” 13). The normalization of desocialized labor he adds, feeds into a powerful stream of anxiety felt by the middle- and working-class that mixes fears of the future, of unemployment, and of the loss of social status and cultural capital for oneself and one’s family (Wacquant, “Ordering Insecurity” 12). Like Bell, Wacquant argues that the new economic and moral order celebrate individual responsibility, while at the same time eroding formal and stable employment, and devastating working-class neighborhoods. As a consequence, disenfranchised populations swell and become a target

–they become offenders who must be managed, as attention is diverted away from the systemic issues underlying inequality and insecurity. These populations become the

“castaway categories” –unemployed youth, minorities, immigrants, the homeless and drug addicts– whose presence is undesirable and intolerable because, “…they are the living and threatening incarnation of the generalized social insecurity” produced by the new model (Wacquant, “Ordering Insecurity” 12). Society’s gaze then fixes on these categories, positioning them not as excluded members of society who must be reintegrated, but as the perpetrators responsible for violent crime. In this way, the diffuse anxiety that has been created by the social transformations of the past decades is channeled towards the marginalized and the poor (Wacquant, “Ordering Insecurity” 11).

As both Wacquant and Bell explain, the harsh punitive policies aimed at controlling problem populations receive broad public support across class lines, and therefore benefit those in power. José Miguel Cruz shows that this has been the case in El Salvador, where approximately 80% of the population supported Mano Dura policies in the first year of implementation (“Government Responses and the Dark Side of Gang Suppression” 149).

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When put into practice, Wacquant adds, punitive policies simultaneously act to enforce social hierarchies and control problem populations on one level, and to communicate norms and form collective representations and subjectivities, on the other (Wacquant,

“Ordering Insecurity” 13). The state is thus able to manage and produce marginalized identities via the security apparatus. As master narratives of insecurity are then developed and disseminated by the media, the lines between poverty and crime become blurred in the public imagination. This blurring serves to justify and foment the expansion of the criminal justice apparatus, the contraction of reintegration programs, and sharp increases incarceration rates, with no serious debate regarding the financial costs of this intensification, or the dangers posed to civil liberties and to society (Wacquant, “Ordering

Insecurity” 11).

‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism:’ The Case of El Salvador

As Brenner and Theodore assert in their research on “actually existing neoliberalism,” and as Bell shows in Criminal Justice and Neoliberalism, both economic restructuring and the rise of the coercive state have developed in very distinct ways in different democracies across the globe, according to each country’s specific political and historical context. Though the threat of violent crime is exaggerated in the U.S. media in order to elicit alarmist public responses, in El Salvador violent crime is a daily reality.

While the 2013 homicide rates for the United States and the United Kingdom were 4.7 per 100,000 and 1 per 100,000 inhabitants respectively, the 2014 homicide rate for El

Salvador was 61.6 per 100,000, and 2015 is on track to be even deadlier (United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime; Ávalos, “El Salvador con Menos;" Gagne, “Resumen de

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Insight”). At the time of investigation, May 2015 has been the most violent month since the civil war, with a total of 641 homicides (Mendoza and Menjívar). In addition, robbery and extortion are common, everyday occurrences in El Salvador, and gang rape –which often goes unreported– is a method used by the maras to terrorize women and families

(Gurney). Although media outlets may take advantage of these conditions of insecurity in order to carry out certain agendas, the reporting of violent crime in El Salvador occurs within an entirely different context than that of the United States, given that homicide rates in the United States are well below epidemic levels, while rates in El Salvador are among the highest in the world. Notwithstanding the variations in levels of violence and media reporting across political and geographical space, Wacquant’s findings are relevant and applicable to the case of El Salvador, just as they are to the United States and

Western Europe. This will be discussed in detail below.

The current epidemic of violence and insecurity developed within El Salvador’s specific political and historical context, and was born out of legacies of war, authoritarianism, and long-term intervention by the United States. In his work on El

Salvador’s transition from civil war to peace, Charles T. Call details some key factors that played a role in the escalation of social violence after the Peace Accords, including: vast and rapid reductions in the number of deployable security forces, political deadlock, resistance and corruption on the part of the military tied to a lack of specificity in the

Accords, and a lack of preparedness and vetting in the new National Civilian Police

(PNC) (Call, “Assessing El Salvador’s…” 560-72). 27 Because of these instabilities,

27 As Call notes, after the civil war, total armed forces ranks were reduced by half: “…from a claimed 63,170 soldiers in early 1992 to some 30,500 by 1994…” (Call, “Assessing El Salvador’s…” 561). 129

elements of military reform mandated by the Accords were not enacted clearly and fully, which threatened the transition to peace (565). In 1994 for example, former members of the military that had secured positions in the new National Civil Police were implicated in human rights abuses, and in politically motivated killings and their cover-ups (570).

Along with issues of domestic security, deportation was a key factor in the escalation of violence. During the civil war, hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans fled to the United States, with more than half settling in California and Texas (Terrazas). Many men became socialized into gang culture in Los Angeles, and became members of the maras. Under the Clinton administration, thousands of Salvadorans were deported back to

El Salvador due to criminal charges. Between 1992 and 2001, a total of 32,100

Salvadorans were deported from the United States, several thousand of whom were removed because of criminal activities (Bibler-Coutin 24). Therefore, during the implementation of the Peace Accords, when public concern for economic and political stability was high, and domestic security forces were not prepared to manage a surge in crime, Los Angeles gang culture was introduced into El Salvador. These factors combined –the deportation of Los Angeles gang members, and a security gap during the implementation of the Accords– led to escalations in social violence during the transition to peace and democracy. The Chapultepec Peace Accords were signed in January 1992.

By 1993, violent crime was the public’s top concern, and in 1996, the homicide rate was

138 per 100,000 inhabitants (Call, Assessing El Salvador’s…” 571-72). Between 2005

Strikingly, during the implementation phase of the Accords, the total number of coercive forces available for deployment was cut from 60,000 to 6,000 in just a few weeks (568). In addition, annual U.S. military assistance to El Salvador, which totaled $81 million in 1990, was reduced to $12 million, and then to $1.2 million in 1993 and 1996, respectively (561). 130

and 2014, the homicide rate leveled out, and averaged 62 per 100,000 inhabitants (the

World Health Organization considers a rate of 10 per 100,000 to be an epidemic)

(Ladutke 133; Gagne, “Resumen de Insight;” United Nations Statistics Division; United

States Department of State, “El Salvador 2013…;” United States Department of State,

“El Salvador 2014…;” United Nations Development Programme, “2014 Regional Human

Development Report…” 1). Therefore, the initial spike in homicide rates that occurred during the implementation of the Peace Accords later evened out at epidemic levels, and the epidemic has been consistent and has persisted for over twenty years. Violent crime has remained an epidemic every year since the end of the civil war, and today it is the principal problem facing the citizenry. In the early nineties, concern for the initial spike in crime prompted increases in police deployments and a relaxing of suspect’s rights

(Call, “Assessing El Salvador’s…” 571-72). A state of exception and strategies for coercive force continue into the present.

‘Yo Cambio’ and the Philosophy of Moral Behaviorism

Whereas Wacquant maintains that the punitive management of poverty is an intrinsic component of neoliberal restructuring, Bell finds penality to be more of a strategy that has developed in recent years, in order to manage the social and economic upheavals caused by neoliberal policies. The present research supports Wacquant’s arguments, yet, regardless of the position one takes in this debate, it is irrefutable that in

El Salvador neoliberal restructuring, escalations in social violence, and the implementation of new strategies of penalization developed simultaneously following the signing of the Peace Accords. Following Wacquant and Bell, one finds that, in El

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Salvador, these strategies involve a risk-based, offender management mentality that aims to surveil the poor, and which is justified by a philosophy of self-reliance and moral behaviorism (Wacquant, “Global Firestorm” 83). Despite claims made by the Funes and

Sánchez Cerén administrations, current strategies for controlling crime are not centered on reintegration programs or the expansion of formal employment. The program Yo

Cambio demonstrates this fact. It is a reintegration program supported by the U.S. government and USAID, and tied to the Partnership for Growth, which provides job training and productive work inside penitentiaries (e.g., cooking, construction, plumbing, artisan work, and fish and poultry farming) (Flores and Rauda). Official discourses praise

Yo Cambio, stating that the program teaches prisoners valuable vocational skills that will facilitate their reintegration into society upon release. However, Yo Cambio does not address the fact that prisons remain approximately 350% over capacity, or the fact that prisoners will face an acute shortage of jobs in the formal sector upon release.

Additionally, although prisoners are taught vocational skills, the program does not provide job placement services. This raises the question as to whether Yo Cambio subjects prisoners to a philosophy of self-reliance, by placing the responsibility of reintegration on the individual, despite the fact that prisoners face a violent society and severe job scarcities upon release. Considering the systemic issues that have destroyed the agricultural economy and have marginalized labor rights, a program like Yo Cambio appears to be a mere bandage that supports and upholds neoliberal restructuring, in seeking to remedy in a fragmented way the issues of violence and inequality that have been generated by these very same neoliberal policies. In this way, fragmented programs

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of reintegration may serve as a dangerous distraction from the societal damage caused by free trade policies and initiatives.

Image 8: “Pan de Esperanza,” a bakery in the La Esperanza Prison, in Mariona that is part of the “Yo Cambio” program. Image credit: United States Embassy in El Salvador Blog.

The GSS Recommendations

The relevance of Wacquant’s findings regarding the desocialization of labor and the intensification of the security apparatus to the specific case of El Salvador is demonstrated by Rudy Giuliani’s recommendations for the country, which he presented at the Encuentro Nacional de la Empresa Privada (the National Meeting of Private

Enterprise, or ENADE) in San Salvador in May, 2015. Giuliani Security and Safety

(GSS) was contracted by the Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada (National 133

Association of Private Enterprise, or ANEP) to send a team of advisors to El Salvador in

January, 2015 to analyze crime and security, and to then present recommendations to the

Sánchez Cerén administration, in a clear effort to export a Bratton-style policing model to a peripheral state (Wacquant “Global Firestorm” 76-77; Mancía; Lohmuller; Magaña,

“Sentencias Extraordinarias;” Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada,

“Estrategia…”).28 It is reported that, in 2015, the GSS team submitted a document to

ANEP with 47 recommendations for confronting crime in El Salvador, which has not been made available to the public (Lohmuller). The only information that is publically available is a summary of the GSS document published in the 2015 ENADE Report titled

Estrategia Integral de Seguridad Ciudadana (Comprehensive Citizen Security Strategy).

The ENADE report justifies the concealment of the GSS document, stating:

Este apartado contiene solamente lo publicable del documento elaborado y entregado a ANEP por parte de GIULIANI SECURITY AND SAFETY. El resto de información es conﬁdencial. Su uso es restringido, y sólo será compartido con las autoridades responsables de la persecución al delito, para quienes se han impreso 30 ejemplares numerados. … La razón por la que se excluye publicar estas recomendaciones es para garantizar la efectividad de las instituciones de seguridad y evitar que el crimen organizado se aproveche de las debilidades del sistema. (This section contains only the publishable parts of the longer document that was submitted to ANEP by GIULIANI SECURITY AND SAFETY. The rest of the information is confidential. Its use is restricted, and it will only be shared wth the authorities that are in charge of persecuting crimes, for whom 30 numbered copies have been printed… The reason for which the publication of these recommendations is excluded is to guarantee the effectiveness of the security institutions, and to prevent organized crime from taking advantage of the weaknesses of the system). (Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada, “Estrategia…” 119)

28 Rudy Giuliani is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Giuliani Partners, a company which he formed in 2002. Giuliani Security and Safety is a subsidiary of Giuliani Partners. Rudy Giuliani holds one of two major leadership positions in Giuliani Security and Safety. 134

The ENADE Report further states that the elements that have been omitted from publication are specific recommendations for the General Inspectorate (Inspectoría

General), the Instituto Medicina Legal, the prison system, and the National Civil Police

(PNC), including the anti-extortion unit of the PNC and the 911 system (Asociación

Nacional de la Empresa Privada, “Estrategia…” 199). What ENADE and GSS have made publicly available is a three-page summary of the recommendations made by GSS for confronting crime in El Salvador. These abridged recommendations include:

 the restructuring of prisons, and the elimination of cell phone communication from within prisons, in order to gain greater control over inmates;  improved relations and increased collaboration among the PNC and the Attorney General’s office, to facilitate in criminal investigations and convictions;  an evaluation of Article 35 of the Constitution of El Salvador, and of Decree 863 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (titled, Ley Penal Juvenil), in order to ‘deal with the issue’ of serious crimes committed by minors (“…para ayudar a lidiar con el tema de los crímenes cometidos por menores”);  the development of a streamlined and homogenized program for recording crime statistics similar to the COMPSTAT Program used in the United States;  the expansion and intensification of video surveillance throughout the country and the creation of a DNA data bank, to reduce the need for witnesses to testify;  the expansion and fortification of the Anti-Extortion Unit of the PNC;  improved police response times, and increased police presence in schools;  the development of a program enabling the state to take back the historic center of San Salvador, which is now controlled by maras;29  anti-corruption measures and increased drug testing within the PNC; and,

29 For information on the Mara Salvatrucha and the Barrio 18’s control of the historic center of San Salvador, see Óscar Martínez’s article, “Los Bichos Gobiernan el Centro.” 135

 the creation of a “Career Criminal” program, similar to the three strikes laws implemented in much of the United States, which would allow for harsh and ‘extraordinary’ sentences for prior and persistent offenders. (Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada, “Estrategia…” 124-126)30

According to the published summary, the GSS recommendations are focused on developing efficient strategies for managing and containing criminals, which correspond to the risk-management and offender management strategies discussed by Emma Bell (3-

5, 10).31 The GSS recommendations involve the heightened use of technology and surveillance, the expansion of coercive force, and severe sentencing for repeat offenders.

Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the summary is the recommendation that Article 35 of the Constitution of El Salvador and Decree 863 of the Convention of the Rights of the

Child be evaluated, in order to confront the issue of serious crimes committed by minors.

Both Article 35 and Decree 863 protect the rights of minors, and Decree 863 requires that certain measures be followed by the criminal justice system, in order to guarantee the human rights of adolescents.32 David Marroquín of El Diario de Hoy states that

30 In the United States, sentences under three strikes laws can range from 25 years to life, and in California, offenders have been sentenced to life for harmless, non-violent misdemeanors. In a brief article titled, “Three Strikes Basics,” the Stanford Law School Three Strikes Project states that, in California, these laws disproportionately affect African Americans, the mentally ill, and the disabled. The article further states that issuing life sentences for non-violent, persistent offenders, “…does nothing to improve public safety” (“Three Strikes Basics”). For more on Giuliani’s recommendation for “extraordinary sentences” for repeat offenders, see Yolanda Magaña’s article, “‘Sentencias Extraordinarias para Criminales de Carrera:’ Giuliani.” 31 Bell’s description of the risk-management and offender management strategies being implemented in democracies across the globe is echoed in various aspects of the GSS summary. For example, one of the recommendations published in the ENADE Report requests that the state create, “…un sistema de libertad condicional para personas que están siendo reintegradas a la sociedad, y mantener una vigilancia cercana de ellos, para que no regresen a una vida de crimen” (126). 32 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most widely and rapidly ratified international human rights treaty in history (United Nations Children’s Fund). Decree 863, titled la Ley Penal Juvenil, was presented to the United Nations by El Salvador in 1994, in fulfillment of the treaty. The 136

Giuliani’s team is requesting this evaluation, “…in order to establish if it is possible to try minors who commit serious crimes as adults” (“…para establecer si es posible juzgar como adultos a menores que cometan delitos graves”) (Marroquín).33 If this recommendation is implemented, the amendment of Article 35 and Decree 863 could have enduring and irreversible consequences that would endanger the rights of minors.

Giuliani’s push for the intensification of coercive force is echoed by his remarks at

ENADE, in which he used language of extermination in reference to the maras.

According to the simultaneous Spanish-language translation of his speech, Giuliani stated, “The biggest problem in New York was the mafia and then drug traffickers, but here it's two major gangs, and these two gangs need to be annihilated” (Renteira).

Although the published summary of the GSS recommendations briefly mentions reintegration and probation programs for gang members, it is clear that the document is fundamentally centered on the continuation and further development of the disciplinary state as a means of containing poverty and insecurity. Underlying these strategies of punitive containment is a philosophy of moral behaviorism and individual responsibility.

introductory outline of Decree 863 states, “La protección integral del menor, su interés superior, el respeto a sus derechos humanos, su formación integral y la reinserción en su familia y en la sociedad, son los principios rectores de la presente Ley” (El Salvador, Asamblea Legislativa, Decreto No. 863). Artículo 35 of the Constitution of El Salvador, which provides for social rights for families, states, “El Estado protegerá la salud física, mental y moral de los menores, y garantizará el derecho de éstos a la educación y a la asistencia. La conducta antisocial de los menores que constituya delito o falta estará sujeta a un régimen jurídico especial” (El Salvador, Constitución de la República). 33 In summarizing the GSS recommendation regarding the laws and sentencing for minors who have committed serious crimes, the ENADE Report is ambiguous. According to this brief summary, it is not possible to discern whether GSS recommends amending Article 35 of the Constitution and Decree 863 of the UN Treaty, in order to allow for harsher laws and sentencing for minors. The ENADE Report states: “Existe la necesidad de una evaluación de las leyes contra crímenes serios (homicidios, robos, extorsiones) cometidos por individuos menores de edad. Así como también una revisión del Artículo 35 de la Constitución de la República de El Salvador y el Decreto 863 del Tratado de las Naciones Unidas para ayudar a lidiar con el tema de los crímenes cometidos por menores” (Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada 124). 137

At no point do Giuliani or the GSS recommendations refer to the economic restructuring or the free trade initiatives that lie at the center of the current violence epidemic.

Follwing Giuliani’s presentation at ENADE, Vice President of El Salvador Óscar

Ortiz affirmed that the Sánchez Cerén administration was receptive to the GSS recommendations, and that it would take them into consideration as an additional component of the President’s plan to combat insecurity. Ortiz stated:

Tal y como lo dijo el presidente…, habrá una apertura total a procesar esas recomendaciones y a tomarlas en cuenta para complementar todo este gran proyecto de El Salvador Seguro. Nuestro Gobierno ha estado abierto a escuchar a todos los sectores. (Just as the president said…, we are completely open to processing these recommendations, and to take them into consideration in order to complement the entire great project of El Salvador Seguro. Our government has been open to listening to all sectors). (Portillo)

The administration is not obligated to accept the Giuliani Safety and Security recommendations, however, Sánchez Cerén has acknowledged that they represent an important contribution to the larger solutions that the government has been developing to combat violence (Quintanilla, Martínez, Pastrán and Portillo; Magaña, “Sánchez

Anunció”). That is, while the administration is open to the recommendations and the in- country analysis performed by GSS, it also emphasizes its decisiveness and autonomy in developing laws and strategies to reduce crime. Nevertheless, recent actions under the new Plan El Salvador Seguro (released in January 2015) coincide with Giuliani’s recommendations regarding the restructuring of prisons, and the need to dismantle the powerful structural networks of the maras (Castellanos).34 This raises the question of the

34 The Plan El Salvador Seguro was released seven months after Sánches Cerén took office. It was developed by the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad y Convivencia Ciudadana (the National Council for 138

degree of Giuliani’s interventions in, and his influence over El Salvador’s national security policies, and from there, of the extent to which Bratton-style policing strategies are being imposed on this young democracy and this small, vulnerable economy.

Image 9: Salvador Sánchez Cerén and Rudy Giuliani in San Salvador before ENADE 2015. Image credit: Casa Presidencial de El Salvador.

Desegregating Prisons

One of the strategies of Plan El Salvador Seguro that was rapidly put into action in 2015 is the desegregation of gang members in the nation’s prisons. In 2004, the state began separating members of the Mara Salvatrucha and the Barrio 18 into different

Citizen Security and Coexistence, or CNSCC), a council made up of public officials and members of the private sector, from both El Salvador and abroad. The plan consists of 120 proposed actions involving both coercive force, and programs for prevention and reintegration (El Salvador, Consejo Nacional de la Seguridad Ciudadana y Convivencia). The council estimates that the plan will require $1.85 billion to be implemented in its entirety (Ávalos, “Plan El Salvador Seguro”). 139

facilities, in order to prevent violence and massacres among rivals, and to maintain control over prisons. However, this segregation has had unintended consequences. As

Roberto Valencia explains, researchers have found that the gathering of hundreds, and even thousands, of fellow gang members under the same roof has served to strengthen the leadership, solidarity and structure of the maras, as well as the rivalries between the Mara

Salvatrucha and the Barrio 18 (Valencia, “El País que Entregó”). The segregation has also allowed the maras to gain a significant measure of control over these facilities and the towns in which they are located, and has enabled incarcerated gang leaders to issue orders for extortion and homicide to occur outside the prisons. Wim Savenije’s statement that, “La organización de las pandillas transnacionales empezó a reforzarse principalmente desde los centros penales,” is echoed by Jeannette Aguilar, who explains that,

La política gubernamental carcelaria ha cohesionado y consolidado la identidad de las pandillas, ha incrementado el sentido de lealtad, ha fortalecido los liderazgos y ha fomentado el odio hacia la pandilla rival… El propio Estado ha legitimado las cárceles como un espacio y territorio bajo control pandillero, desde el cual estos grupos operan. (Governmental prison policies have consolidated the identity of the gangs and made them cohesive, it has increased feelings of loyalty, has strengthened the leaderships, and has fomented hatred towards the rival gang… The very State itself has legitimized the prisons as a spce and a territory under the control of gangs, from which these groups operate). (Valencia, “El País que Entregó”)

Roberto Valencia further notes that this consolidation generated by the segregation of prisoners has fundamentally changed the nature of the maras. He states:

…las maras no son lo que eran. Los números y las letras no han cambiado, pero poco tienen que ver la Mara Salvatrucha y el Barrio 18 de la década de los noventa con esas mismas agrupaciones en 2003; y mucho

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menos con las estructuras del crimen organizado que mantienen en jaque al país en 2014. (…the maras are not what they were. The numbers and letters have not changed, but the Mara Salvatrucha and the Barrio 18 of the nineties have little to do with these same groups in 2003; and much less with the organized crime structures that keep the country under siege in 2014.) (Valencia, “El País que Entregó”)

That is, the laws and policies of the past decades, including prisoner segregation and Mano Dura, have served to strengthen the structures and the influence of the maras.

The epidemic of violence has since spiraled out of control, and the state continues to confront insecurity with punitive containment strategies.

The Plan El Salvador Seguro recommends that 2,500 prisoners be relocated over the course of two years, in order to desegregate the maras, to dismantle their organizational structures, and to disrupt their communications with gang members outside the prisons (Calderón, “Nuevo Traslado;” Avelar, “Traslado de Reos;” “Traslado de Reos Cambia Mapa”). Therefore, the prisons that, for over a decade, were designated for members of the Mara Salvatrucha, or of the Barrio 18, will now be mixed. Although the Plan El Salvador Seguro recommends the relocation of 2,500 prisoners over the course of two years, approximately 2,000 of these transfers were carried out in April,

2015 alone. In fact, a massive relocation took place on a single day –April 21, 2015– when approximately 1,100 prisoners were moved to different facilities.35 Therefore, this strategy for dismantling the organizational structure of the maras, which coincides with the GSS recommendations, is being carried out swiftly.

35 It is difficult to determine the exact number of prisoners that were relocated in April, 2015, due to discrepancies in the numbers published by La Prensa Gráfica, El Diario de Hoy, ContraPunto, and La Página (Calderón, “Nuevo Traslado;” Avelar, “Traslado de Reos;” “Traslado de Reos Cambia Mapa;” “Realizan Nuevos Traslados de Reos”). 141

Constructing and Containing the Dependent Poor

Despite the Sánchez Cerén administration’s rhetorical emphasis on programs of prevention and reintegration via the news media and in the Plan El Salvador Seguro, the question must be raised as to whether the state is turning to a new round of iron fist, zero tolerance strategies in order to contain the social upheavals produced by the economic restructuring of a war-torn society. There are profound differences in how the relationship between the desocialization of labor and the intensification of the security apparatus has developed across political and geographical space. In El Salvador and the

United States, these processes unfolded in distinct ways. With the New Deal, and Lyndon

Johnson’s war on poverty (ca. 1964), the United States experienced an expansion of welfare programs and social advances that allowed for increased equality, a higher standard of living, and economic recovery following crises. However, as Wacquant explains, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996

(PRWORA), championed by Bill Clinton, “…essentially abolished the right to assistance for the country’s most destitute children, which had required a half-century of struggles to fully establish, and replaced it with the obligation of unskilled and under-paid wage labor…” (Wacquant, “Punishing the Poor” 78).36 While PRWORA spared the two largest items in the social spending budget –Medicare and Social Security, which benefit the middle and upper class– it reduced or dismantled Aid to Families with Dependent

Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), programs reserved for the

36 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services states that PRWORA contains strong work requirements in exchange for time-limited assistance (United States, Department of Health and Human Services). 142

disabled, the indigent, and the dispossessed, categories consisting largely of children and the elderly (Wacquant, “Punishing the Poor…” 78, 80). Official discourses positioned

PRWORA as benefitting the poor, since the shift from welfare to ‘workfare’ would reaffirm the U.S. work ethic by reducing families’ dependency on public aid. The discursive promotion and support of this model has unequivocally been founded on a philosophy of individualism, moral behaviorism, private property and capital protection.

Wacquant argues that the positioning of individual responsibility as the solution for society’s ills has been recycled straight out of the colonial era, in that U.S. welfare reform draws, “…a sharp demarcation between the “worthy” and the “unworthy” poor so as to force the latter into the inferior segments of the job market…” (Wacquant,

“Punishing the Poor” 79). While this demarcation is drawn along racial lines in the

United States, in El Salvador it is located along lines of class. In drawing these boundaries and penalizing the “unworthy” poor, the workfare remedy seeks to correct,

“…the supposedly deviant and devious behaviors believed to cause persistent poverty in the first place” (Wacquant, “Punishing the Poor…” 79). Wacquant adds that the passage of PRWORA in the U.S. prompted the gradual replacement of a protective semi-welfare state with a vigilant disciplinary state, in which, “…the close monitoring and the punitive containment of derelict categories stand in for social policy toward the dispossessed”

(Wacquant, “Punishing the Poor 79). This is evident in Bratton-style policing strategies, and more generally, in the evolution of the U.S. security apparatus over the past decades.

According to the NAACP, the incarceration rate in the United States quadrupled between

1980 and 2008 (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People). Today,

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the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world, and houses approximately 25% of the world’s prisoners (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Collier 56). African Americans are incarcerated at approximately six times the rate of whites, and in 2008, African Americans and Hispanics made up 58% of the prison population, even though they comprised approximately 25% of the total U.S. population (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People). Wacquant asserts that the revamping of welfare in the United States not only treats, but also constructs, “…the dependent poor as a troublesome population to be subdued and

“corrected” through stern behavioral controls and paternalistic sanctions, thus fostering a programmatic convergence with penal policy” (Wacquant, “Punishing the Poor” 79). It is here that Wacquant traces the relationship between the fragmentation of wage labor, the contraction of the social state, and the intensification of punitive strategies targeting problem populations –the shift toward politics and policies promoting a ‘workfare’ and

‘prisonfare’ state. In El Salvador, as in the United States, individual responsibility and a vigilant security apparatus are the solutions pursued by the state for containing the poverty and insecurity generated by transformations in valorization processes. Like free trade, the expansion and intensification of punitive strategies are promoted as benefitting the poor and the working class in El Salvador, and as a virtuous cycle that will reduce violence, create jobs, and allow families to be prosperous and independent.

In El Salvador, poverty was widespread under the dictatorships throughout the twentieth century. The country’s experience was, of course, distinct from that of the

United States, in that it is a small economy, and it did not experience a decades-long

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expansion of the social safety net followed by a dismantling of welfare programs. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, a transformation in valorization processes did occur following the Peace Accords, and the policies imposed by the Caribbean Basin

Initiative, CAFTA, and the Partnership for Growth support a model of flexible, desocialized labor. Although the processes of economic restructuring in El Salvador differ greatly from those carried out in the United States, policy developments since the

Accords have promoted both the fragmentation of wage labor and a punitive turn in penal policy. As noted in Chapter 2, the implementation of free trade initiatives has created artificial scarcities of basic grains and traditional crops, and has dismantled the agro- export economy. Further, efforts to guarantee the reduction and externalization of corporate costs generate, and also require, profound structural inequalities. This is evident in the practices of El Salvador’s free trade zones, which provide corporations with access to public logistical infrastructure and exemptions from taxes and customs duties, while at the same time providing access to a cheap, vulnerable labor force that lacks access to unions. Despite rhetorical praise for the free trade zones as a solution for attracting foreign investment, creating jobs and stimulating growth, in practice, they are a model for business development based on flexible wages and labor exploitation.

Alongside economic restructuring, policies have also been developed since the

Accords that support, “…the punitive containment and disciplinary supervision of problem populations dwelling at the margins of the class and cultural order” (Wacquant,

“Punishing the Poor” xx). That is, rather than treat the individual distress and systemic issues underlying poverty and violence, penalization functions as a technique for making

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social problems invisible (Wacquant, “Punishing the Poor” xxi-xxii). As large sectors of the population are subject to increasingly militarized policing, individuals are reduced to noncitizens, and to a condition of bare life. The Asociación Nacional de la Empresa

Privada (ANEP) celebrates the Giuliani Safety and Security recommendations as a means for generating a safe and fertile environment for investment (Asociación Nacional de la

Empresa Privada, “Estrategia…” 11). The GSS recommendations, like the free trade zones, therefore form an essential component of ANEP’s vision for a virtuous cycle that will create a modern, competitive and developed economy.37 The ENADE report does not, however, address the dismantling of the agricultural economy after CAFTA, or issues of labor exploitation in the free trade zones. In terms of security, the report does not question the potential for the GSS recommendations to open up zones of indistinction in which civil and human rights may be violated. Put simply, there are those who benefit

37 The ENADE Report details its support of Zones for Employment and Economic Development (ZEDEs), stating: Las Zonas de Empleo y Desarrollo Económico ZEDE, son espacios territoriales altamente atractivos para la inversión nacional y extranjera, cuentan con personalidad jurídica propia y están autorizadas para establecer sus propias políticas económicas, tributarias, comerciales y laborales orientadas al libre mercado y a facilitar la inserción a los mercados mundiales del país que los adopta. Esto las provista de un alto grado de autonomía, dado que cuentan con un sistema político propio, tanto a nivel administrativo y económico; como también a nivel judicial, a través del padrinazgos de países con instituciones más desarrolladas, como es el caso de las apelaciones de Hong Kong y Singapur en las cortes de Londres, o como es la jurisprudencia del CAFTA-DR donde a través de convenios internacionales los inversiones pueden acudir a sistemas de arbitraje internacional. El objetivo de las ZEDE es establecer un marco legal, económico, administrativo y político, distinto que el resto del territorio donde se asientan, con lo cual se incentive inversiones en industrias de alto valor agregado, a través de reglas del juego claras y estables, bajo un ambiente transparente y competitivo que incentive un rápido crecimiento económico y potencialice la generación de empleos necesario para reducir las desigualdades sociales del país en donde se desarrollan, dotando a la población de estas zonas con servicios de educación de la mejor calidad posible, salud y nutrición infantil, seguridad pública efectiva y una infraestructura que inyecte competitividad a las empresas y permitan una mejora real en las condiciones de vida de la población donde operan (Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada 100-101). 146

from economic restructuring and the punitive containment of poverty, and there are those who pay for this benefit with their own exploitation and suffering. An unintended consequence of these transformations is the epidemic of violence, and generations of young citizens who choose, or who are forced, to disregard political and moral authority.

Giuliani states that this is a problem that must be annihilated. Following Espósito, the question must be raised as to whether, in El Salvador, immunity, or the need to protect society and individual life, has passed beyond a critical threshold, and in an attempt to eliminate the contaminated other, basic human rights are lost and society itself is being destroyed (Campbell, “Interview” 51, 55). It is at this point that the political categories of liberty, equality, justice and democracy are pushed to a limit and begin to fold in on themselves, as their intended meanings are reversed (Campbell, “Interview” 54).

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Chapter 4: Acentered Multiplicity: Mapping Discourses and Representations of Economic Scarcity in Democratic El Salvador

On July 6, 2015, the Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada (the National

Association of Private Enterprise, or ANEP) published a series of slides via social media titled, “El Gobierno no necesita más ingresos sino ser más eficiente” (“The Government does not need more revenue, rather, it needs to be more efficient”) (Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada, “El Gobierno no necesita”). The slides argue that, “el problema del país no es falta de recursos sino falta de un gobierno eficiente” (“the country’s problem is not a lack of resources, rather the lack of an efficient government”), and point out that the Sánchez Cerén administration has had the highest tax revenues, the highest public debt, and the highest recurrent expenditures in the history of El Salvador. The series then asks, “¿Qué ha logrado el gobierno con los ingresos más altos en la historia del país?” (What has the government achieved with the highest revenues in the history of the country?”). This question is followed by a series of graphs that demonstrate that, under the Sánchez Cerén administration, El Salvador is experiencing the worst economic performance in the region, political clientelism, increased homicide, decreased quality in education, the lowest level of private investment in the last twenty-five years, and the worst investment environment in the history of the country. The series closes by tying these factors to job creation, stating, “un gobierno que ataca a los inversionistas, destruye empleos” (“a government that attacks investors destroys jobs”).

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These arguments are clearly intended as a harsh criticism of the FMLN and the

Sánchez Cerén administration. ANEP asserts that, despite the largest influx of government spending in the country’s history, the economy is failing and violence is rampant due to corruption, inefficiency, and the misuse of funds. These claims form part of ANEP’s larger vision of a virtuous cycle for economic growth that embraces both the development of free trade zones and the Giuliani Safety & Security recommendations. In the 2015 ENADE Report (el Encuentro Nacional de la Empresa Privada, or the National

Meeting of Private Enterprise), ANEP affirms that its vision for El Salvador is the solution for reducing violence, and creating a modern, competitive and developed economy. This vision is captured by the image of a lighthouse illuminating the slogan,

“El Salvador SÍ tiene futuro” (“El Salvador DOES Have a Future”), which was featured in the programming and publicity for ENADE XV (held in San Salvador on May, 2015).

Image 10: Programming for ENADE XV. Image credit: “Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada.”

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Partisan politics aside, ANEP’s claims reflect understandings that are widely held by the citizenry – by members of the right and the left in El Salvador – regarding economic growth, rule of law, and the problem of insecurity. For example, in 2013,

Latinobarómetro reported that nearly 65% of Salvadorans had little or no confidence in the State, and that approximately 73% of the population believed that most, or nearly all national government officials were corrupt (“Latinobarómetro Análisis de Datos”).

Although political clientelism does persist in the post-war era, widely held beliefs regarding corruption, inefficiency, and other failures of the state reduce issues of violence and poverty to a linear logic that places corrupt officials at the origin, and which does not take the magnitude and complexities inherent to these issues into account. In addition,

ANEP’s arguments regarding inefficiency simplify recent influxes of government spending. In the series of slides, ANEP does not indicate how recent influxes of funding are being allocated or the funding sources (e.g., the U.S. Government, the Millennium

Challenge Corporation, Inter-American Development Bank loans), nor does it mention the influence of the United States in determining the scope and allocation of these funds.

As noted in Chapter 2, this information is difficult to obtain. In September 2014, the author submitted Freedom of Information Act requests to US AID and the U.S. State

Department requesting either detailed Fomilenio budgets for El Salvador, or a confirmation that this information is not available for public access. To date, neither agency has provided this information. Nevertheless, recent news reports, government publicity, and observations on the ground do provide evidence indicating influxes of funding for transportation, video surveillance in the capital, and military equipment for

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law enforcement. As discussed below, there is also evidence published by mainstream and alternative news media, and by solidarity organizations, which indicates severe funding shortages for clean water, public education, and the needs of the rank and file of the National Civilian Police (PNC).

Image 11: Slide from the series, “El Gobierno no necesita más ingresos sino ser más eficiente,” which reads, “The government continues spending excessively.” Image credit: Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada, “El Gobierno no necesita.”

Rhizome

Given the narratives circulating post-democratization (i.e., after the signing of the

Peace Accords in 1992) that advance the notion of a failed state, and the widely held

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beliefs among Salvadorans regarding government corruption and inefficiency, it is important to raise questions regarding recent influxes of government spending. Is the economy failing and does violence continue to escalate because of corruption, waste, and the misappropriation of funds? Or, are other factors involved? To address these questions, it is critical that the net economic and social benefits of the projects funded by these influxes be analyzed. Do the social benefits of these projects outweigh the externalities imposed on the citizenry? What are the net economic benefits, and, in the end, who are the agents that will profit? Further, how do these influxes of government spending relate to violence and insecurity? Following the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 regarding the transformation in valorization processes after the signing of the Peace Accords, and the concurrent expansion and intensification of the punitive management of social insecurity

(i.e., a form of autoimmunity), the objective of the present chapter is to document and analyze public discourses and representations related to insecurity, militarization, and economic scarcity in contemporary El Salvador, in order to identify the connections that exist between the economic transformations that have occurred since the early 1990s and escalations in violent crime. In doing so, this project does not seek to obtain a representative sample that measures the circulation of semantic and semiotic elements in news media and other public discourses. Instead, in approaching issues of violence and economic scarcity, this project engages the concept of the rhizome, developed by Gilles

Deleuze and Féliz Guattari. Because the rhizome provides a way of seeing how events and activities are multiple and interconnected, and allows them to be approached in many different ways, it is a concept that defies binary logic, and linear and hierarchical

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epistemes and categorizations. The concept of the rhizome is therefore engaged in this investigation in order to articulate some of the varied factors related to the escalation in homicide rates post-democratization, and to identify reasons why insecurity has persisted for almost a quarter-century, despite political advances. In doing so, this investigation approaches clearer understandings of how insecurity has developed within the complex network of events and activities that developed following the Peace Accords. It also reveals some of the ways in which insecurity in El Salvador is productive, and the agents for whom it is beneficial. Finally, in articulating some of the connections between economic liberalization in El Salvador and escalations in violent crime, this dissertation questions the failed state, good governance, and development theories advanced by entities including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, ANEP, and Giuliani Safety &

Security, and seeks alternatives to these linear logics.

In botany, a rhizome is a horizontal, self-propagating underground stem that produces both shoots and the root systems of new plants from its nodes. Plants that are propagated in this way include ginger, sugarcane, bamboo and irises. A rhizome differs from the root structure of a tree, which, by contrast, is vertical, and originates from a point of genesis. While the concept of a tree is genealogical, with ‘rings,’ or an ancestry that can be traced chronologically, a rhizome does not have a patterned structure. It has no top or bottom, and no beginning or end, but only a middle, “… from which it grows and overspills” (Deleuze and Guattari 8). Unlike a tree, a rhizome is not the product of reproduction, but is an acentered multiplicity that is not produced by, and is not reducible to, an origin or point of unity. Rhizomes are therefore neither subject nor object, but are,

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in their very substance, magnitudes, dimensions, intensities, directions in motion, and lines of flight that cannot change in size without changing in quality. According to

Deleuze and Guattari’s principle of asignifying rupture, a rhizome can be broken or ruptured at any point, but will start up again through old or new lines of flight. With no fixed order, a rhizome is heterogeneous: its lines can be connected to any other of its lines, regardless of the similarities or differences. In this way, multiple connections can be made between signifying lines (e.g., rhetoric and discourses; political and economic semiotic chains) and asignifying intensities (affect). The internet exists and functions as a rhizome, as do colonies of insects. As Deleuze and Guattari state, one, “… can never get rid of ants because they form an animal rhizome that can rebound time and again after most of it has been destroyed” (9).

Unlike the genealogical root structure of a tree, “… the rhizome is an anti- genealogy,” and, as such, it is a, “…map and not a tracing” (Deleuze and Guattari 11,

12). As Deleuze and Guattari explain with the principle of cartography and decalcomania, the map itself is part of the rhizome, and is not merely a navigational tool:

The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation. Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways… (11)

The concept of the rhizome allows events, activities and phenomena to be thought of, approached and represented in multiple ways, thereby challenging hierarchical and binary logics (“Three Minute Theory: What is the Rhizome?”). Further, in opening up

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possibilities for rupture, the rhizome opens up possibilities for acts of resistance that seek alternatives to dominant power-knowledge systems. The theories and strategies advanced by entities such as ANEP, Giuliani Safety & Security, and the Millennium Challenge

Corporation reduce issues of economic growth and insecurity in El Salvador to

‘arborescent,’ or hierarchical logics that trace problems of violence and poverty to simplified causes, which determine the solutions they propose for economic development and crime reduction. This is not to say that corruption is not a negative force within local and national politics that affects the stability of the country and the lives of everyday citizens. However, narratives that trace issues of poverty and violence to inefficiency and incompetence on the part of Salvadoran officials do not account for the interventions of the IMF and the U.S. government over the past decades, the transformation in value orientations following the Peace Accords, or the dangers that Bratton-style policing strategies pose for a nation in crisis. These linear narratives therefore mislead and misinform, and they determine conversations regarding contemporary El Salvador. These hierarchical logics operate domestically and internationally, in the media, the public sphere, and in academia. In this way, public attention is redirected, and issues such as labor regulations in special economic zones, and the net economic and social benefits of the Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project (MIDP) are not the center of media discourses or public debates in El Salvador or abroad. Similarly, conversations in the United States regarding Central American migrants are not centered on the social impacts of CAFTA, or the relationship between free trade and remittances. Instead, conversations in the United States are focused on border enforcement and protection, and

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more recently on Sanctuary City designations. With the exception of those working in solidarity with Central American citizens (e.g., within solidarity organizations and academia), public and official discourses are not asking, for example, why cell phones and the internet are more readily accessible in areas of Central America than clean water and trash collection services. Instead, discourses supporting free trade have a linear focus.

While official and many media discourses within El Salvador make no reference to the societal shifts that occurred with the collapse of the agricultural economy, they claim that deregulation of the apparel, services and free trade zone sectors will create jobs and increase domestic productivity, and will provide skills for workers and bring innovative technologies to the region. Because these linear logics dominate public and private discourses, and therefore determine public opinion and policy shifts, the concepts of free trade, foreign aid, and international development must be reconceived and redefined. In this way, debates can be generated regarding the concessions that marginalized countries must make in order to sustain their economies. Questions can also be raised as to whether the economic and political systems at work in democratic countries of the global South genuinely improve the lives of ordinary citizens, or primarily serve the needs of corporate investors.

Issues of gang violence and poverty in El Salvador were not produced by, and cannot be traced to singular points of unity. These crises are an acentered multiplicity, with interconnected dimensions that include displacement and deportation, political instability following the Accords, dollarization, decades of political, economic and military intervention by the United States, and the training of Salvadoran military and law

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enforcement at the School of the Americas and the International Law Enforcement

Academy of San Salvador (ILEA). The objective of this research, therefore, is to contribute to a mapping of this rhizome that includes both discourses and representations, and quantitative and qualitative data that demonstrate the shifts in value orientations and the escalation of homicides since the nineties.38 In doing so, this project not only seeks to challenge the linear logics of international development strategies (e.g., those advanced by entities including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, USAID, and the Inter-

American Development Bank) and failed state theories (e.g., those advanced by entities such as the Washington Office on Latin America and the Asociación Nacional de la

Empresa Privada, or ANEP), but also to pursue potential points of rupture and new lines of flight.

As the civil war came to an end in El Salvador, there was a rupture, as new events and activities developed (what Deleuze and Guattari would refer to as ‘movements,’

‘dynamics’ and ‘intensities’), and massive political, economic and societal shifts unfolded. El Salvador is a far different place in 2015 than it was in 1991. The currency, the landscape, occupations, daily routines, and the social standing of much of the middle class have changed, as has the perpetrator of violence. While the military soldier – the agent of the state – was a perpetrator of violence prior to the Accords, today it is an individual – the gang member – and the words ‘mara’ and ‘pandillero’ now form part of the daily lexicon of citizens, and of all forms of media. While it was safe in 1991 to travel

3838 Following Wacquant, this research understands the punitive management of poverty and offender management as dimensions of the transformation in value orientations that has occurred following the Peace Accords. 157

by bus from Santa Tecla to the Mercado Cuartel in the Centro Histórico, today busses are a center for robbery and extortion, and, for many, downtown San Salvador is an area that is avoided. In his 2015 article, “Los bichos gobiernan el Centro,” Óscar Martínez explains the dynamics of the historic center of San Salvador:

En esas 250 cuadras a las que llamamos Centro de San Salvador, quienes deciden dónde venderá un vendedor, cuánto pagará y cuándo deberá irse, son las pandillas. Cinco clicas de la Mara Salvatrucha y una tribu del ala Revolucionaria del Barrio 18 son el gobierno del Centro. Incluso el ex alcalde Norman Quijano acepta que para entrar a ciertas zonas tenía que pedir permiso a los pandilleros dueños del lugar. Se disputan cuadra por cuadra y, con diferentes modalidades, cobran a los más de 40 mil vendedores que cada día se mueven en el corazón de la capital. (In these 250 blocks which we call the Centro de San Salvador, those who decide where a vendor will sell, how much he will pay, and when he must leave, are the gangs. Five clicks of the Mara Salvatrucha and one tribe of the Revolucionaria wing of the Barrio 18 are the government of downtown. Even the mayor Norman Quijano accepts that in order to enter certain zones he had to ask permission from the gang members that controlled the area). (Martínez)

Considering these movements and the qualitative changes in the social fabric since the close of the civil war, a question that this research advances is, in 2015, where are potential points of rupture that can challenge dominant power-knowledge systems at work in El Salvador? Where, within the rhizome, are opportunities for resistance, and for movement towards a new intensive state (i.e. towards a new plateau)? Where are there potential lines of flight that can move towards transformations that will have positive effects in the lives of everyday citizens? Clearly, this research does not claim to have a remedy, or the last word regarding solutions for the crises of poverty and violence.

However, by mapping some of the forces and dynamics of free trade, economic scarcity, insecurity and militarization, this project hopes to contribute to rehabilitative discussions

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that seek to reorient conversations regarding violence and poverty both domestically and abroad.

As noted above, in documenting public discourses and representations related to insecurity, militarization, and economic scarcity, this research does not seek to obtain a representative sample of the material currently circulating in El Salvador. Rather, it is intended as a map of events and phenomena that form part of the social fabric in the post- war era –what Deleuze and Guattari would think of as a mapping of an intensive state, or a plateau. Generally organized, Chapter 4 begins by analyzing representations and discourses related to economic scarcity. This is followed by analyses in Chapter 5 of discourses and representations related to the punitive management of poverty. They include accounts published by various news media, photojournalists, solidarity organizations, and private organizations. Together with the material presented in

Chapters 2 and 3 regarding the Partnership for Growth, the Central American logistical corridor, and the penetration of market ideology in the criminal justice system, the representations documented in this chapter are entry points for examining the interconnectedness of different dimensions, and for seeking potential transformative lines of resistance.

“Actually Existing Neoliberalism:” Alisa Garni and L. Frank Weyher on Crime and Estrangement in Masahuat and Yucuaiquín

As noted in Chapter 3, Neil Brenner, Nik Theodore, and Emma Bell explain that, since the 1980s, neoliberal restructuring has developed in very distinct ways in different democracies across the globe, according to each country’s specific political and historical

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context. Brenner and Theodore refer to this as ‘actually existing neoliberalism,’ and they emphasize the fact that there are differences between the theories and ideologies of neoliberalism, on the one hand, and the practices of neoliberalism, on the other. These country-specific differences can be seen in El Salvador, where the political, economic, and societal transformations that occurred following the Peace Accords not only differ from the experiences of other emergent democracies across the globe, but also from those of neighboring Central American countries that, like El Salvador, faced war and state- sponsored violence during the Cold War. While Nicaragua, for example, has higher levels of poverty than El Salvador and the lowest GDP in Central America, it is also the least violent country in Central America, with a homicide rate of just 8.7 per 100,000

(Gagne; "GDP Per Capita (PPP) Central America & the Caribbean;” “Poverty & Equity,

Regional Dashboard: Latin America & Caribbean”). That is, despite issues of poverty,

Nicaragua’s homicide rate is not far from that of the United States (approximately 5 per

100,000), and is just a fraction of the current rate in El Salvador (over 60 per 100,000, and rising) (“Intentional Homicides per 100,000 People”). These low levels of violence have been produced, in part, by differences in governance and migration patterns during the Sandinista Revolution, and this, in turn, has led to low levels of undocumented immigration from Nicaragua to the United States in recent decades (Stone; Nowrasteh).

As Alex Nowrasteh points out, while there are approximately 1.3 million Salvadoran immigrants currently living in the United States, there are only about 260,000 immigrants from Nicaragua (Nowrasteh; “Place of Birth for the Foreign Born Population in the

United States”). Thus, an examination of the distinct ways in which neoliberal

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restructuring has developed in practice in emergent democracies over the past decades allows for a better understanding of the specificities of each country’s transformations in value orientations, and the effects that these transformations have on the lives of ordinary citizens. For this reason, the present research seeks to map some of the forces and dynamics of free trade, economic scarcity, insecurity and militarization that are particular to El Salvador, in an effort to contribute to discussions that will reorient conversations regarding national issues of violence and poverty.

In their investigation, “Neoliberal Mystification: Crime and Estrangement in El

Salvador,” Alisa Garni and L. Frank Weyher document how neoliberal restructuring and free trade agreements have transformed lived experiences in two traditionally agricultural communities in El Salvador. They discuss the connections between economic restructuring and the emergence of gang violence, as well as the effects that shifts in value orientations have on community understandings of violence. Given that their investigation draws out connections between neoliberal restructuring, escalations in violent crime, and the differences produced in community experiences of violence, a brief overview of Garni and Wayher’s work provides a valuable introduction to the discussion of discourses and representations economic scarcity that follows.

Through months of field research and over one hundred in-depth interviews,

Garni and Weyher examine perceptions of social violence in two rural municipalities –

Masahuat, in the Department of Santa Ana, and Yucuaiquín, in the Department of La

Unión. They explain that these two traditionally agricultural communities have been profoundly transformed by the neoliberal restructuring which began in the 1980s, and

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accelerated following the signing of the Peace Accords. As in the rest of El Salvador, this restructuring has produced fundamental forms of estrangement (e.g., the deterioration of the agricultural economy, unemployment, and the expansion of low-wage, highly exploitative jobs), and changes in occupational patterns, belief systems, and social relations (624, 626). As noted in Chapter 3, this restructuring has also affected migration and residency patterns, as millions are driven to migrate within or across borders, due to issues of economic precarity and violence. Garni and Weyher’s investigation is key because, unlike the broad and reductionist claims advanced by ANEP, Giuliani Security

& Safety, and the Cámara de la Industria Textil, Confección y Zonas Francas de El

Salvador (The Chamber of Textile, Clothing and Free Trade Zone Industries of El

Salvador, or CAMTEX), it reveals the particular ways in which shifts in value orientations are experienced at the levels of the individual and the community. Further, their investigation demonstrates the multiplicity of connections between free trade agreements, massive economic shifts, and escalations of violent crime.

The municipalities of Masahuat and Yucuaiquín are quite similar, with respect to population size and emigration trends, and both are located approximately 35 to 40 kilometers away from major cities (Santa Ana, and San Miguel, respectively). At the time of Garni and Weyher’s fieldwork (ca. 2006), Masahuat had a population of 7,425 residents, and Yucuaiquín of 8,694, and in both municipalities approximately 40% of households received remittances regularly from relatives living in North America

(primarily in the United States) (631, 632-633). Despite these similarities, Garni and

Weyher find that residents’ experiences and understandings of violent crime varied

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greatly from one municipality to the next. While the residents of Yucuaiquín reported widespread drug use and delinquency among young Yucuaiquenses, residents of

Masahuat reported low levels of violent crime within their municipality. This is striking, given Masahuat’s proximity to “El Caminito,” or “The Little Pathway,” a known drug trafficking route in northern El Salvador used by the Texis Cartel to transport cocaine en route from Colombia to the United States (Garni and Weyher 631-632; Martínez and

Lenus; Wilkinson; Corcoran; “El Caminito”). Therefore, Garni and Weyher find that, while Yucuaiquenses experience violent crime locally, Masahueños feel a sense of distance, and understand gang-related crime to be more of an urban and national problem, rather than a local one (Garni and Weyher 633).

Garni and Weyher explain that, although there was no direct violence in

Yucuaiquín during the civil war, fighting in neighboring municipalities prevented

Yucuaiquenses from reaching the regional haciendas on the outskirts of town where they farmed independently. This obstacle, coupled with changes to the agricultural economy that later developed due to CAFTA, resulted in shifts in occupational patterns that had profound economic effects for Yucuaiquenses. In Masahuat, on the other hand, fighting was very violent during the civil war. Yet, the war had a very different effect in

Masahuat, as it provided residents with new opportunities to purchase land. As a result, established farming traditions were not disrupted (Garni and Weyher 632). Although it is no longer possible to sustain a household in Masahuat with the profits earned from small- scale agriculture due to the effects of CAFTA, subsistence farming nevertheless continues. And, despite the fact that many parents emigrate, the children left at home in

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Masahuat must contribute to family farming. This requires cooperation among community members. According to Garni and Weyher, this cooperation among

Masahueños has led to greater family and community cohesion, to stronger inter- generational ties, and to the production of a more collective frame (637-638). Because of this community cohesion, Garni and Weyher find that the residents of Masahuat tend to understand problems of violence as social and systemic in nature, and they tend not to attribute delinquency to an individual’s selfishness, laziness, or lack of character.

Since farming has diminished in Yucuaiquín in the post-war era, residents have been separated from productive work on the land, and there is now a greater emphasis on consumption driven by remittances (Garni and Weyher 634). Unlike Masahuat, in

Yucuaiquín, residents report having more direct experience with gang-related crime, including homicide and extortion, within their municipality (633). Garni and Weyher state that, “In interviews, themes of escapism and a sense of powerlessness emerge more clearly among informants in Yucuaiquín than in Masahuat. Yucuaiquenses also seem more focused on the perceived fact of social disintegration, for which individual blame was often placed on “selfish,” “lazy,” or otherwise “corrupted” youth” (633). They further note that, in 2006, La Prensa Gráfica referred to Yucuaiquín as “El Pueblo de los

Suicidios,”due to the fact that eight young Yucuaiquenses took their lives between 2003 and 2006 (637). Although the foundations of these feelings are often concealed, Garni and Weyher attribute community perceptions of, and escalations in violent crime to the struggles that Yucuaiquenses face as the hostile market economy penetrates more deeply into their community (633-35).

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As noted above, Masahueños tend to understand crime as social and systemic issues, attributing escalations in violence to the failed agricultural economy, and to unemployment (Garni and Weyher 633). Garni and Weyher find that this social form of accounting is linked to the fact that Masahueños are generally focused on the challenges of subsistence farming, and regularly complain about these challenges. By contrast, the residents of Yucuaiquín have more individualized understandings of violence, and tend not to connect issues of violent crime with the absence of dignified employment opportunities for young Yucuaiquenses (635). Garni and Weyher find this individualizing of crime, and the “us vs. them” logic, to be linked to the neoliberal ethic of risk management and individual responsibility. They add that this individually based form of accounting appears to direct attention away from underlying social issues, including the effects that CAFTA has had on the livelihood of small-scale farmers (626, 635-636).

A brief overview of Garni and Weyher’s findings provides a valuable introduction to the discussion of representations of insecurity and economic scarcity that follows, as their work documents not only issues of crime and estrangement in contemporary El

Salvador, but also variations in perceptions of crime across local contexts (Garni and

Weyher 623). In documenting the particular ways in which neoliberal restructuring has transformed the lived experiences of ordinary citizens in Masahuat and Yucuaiquín, their investigation demonstrates how, “…the structured responses to the challenges posed by dollarization and the decline of the agricultural economy vary according to local social and historical conditions…” (633). Further, their work demonstrates how free trade agreements, including CAFTA, have diminished the value of grains produced in El

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Salvador. As a consequence, small-scale farmers are unable to compete on the market, and must seek alternative forms of employment and subsistence (626). This has resulted in disruptions in local labor and residential patterns, and in community relationships.

Garni and Weyher’s findings are critical, as they challenge the linear narratives advanced by ANEP, CAMTEX and Giuliani Security & Safety that claim that inefficiency, incompetency, and corruption on the part of the current FMLN administration lie at the heart of the homicide epidemic. As noted above, these hierarchical logics are especially dangerous, in that they obscure the global economic forces behind the emergence of gang violence in Central America, while at the same time promoting a logic of individual responsibility. Citing Jonathan Friedman, Garni and Weyher note that the practices of neoliberalism are forces that penetrate the basic social fabric of communities and dissolve family solidarities, and from there, produce, “…a population of youths who are expelled from a larger context of sociality, of social integration, and of life cycle expectations”

(Garni and Weyher 636, quoting Friedman 20). Indeed, one only needs to consider the fracturing of families evident in the 2014 Central American child refugee crisis to observe how shifts in value orientations are forces that are tearing apart the social fabric of Salvadoran communities in the post-war era.

Representations of Free Trade and Economic Scarcity

“We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” CAMTEX on the Benefits of the Apparel and Free Trade Zone Industries

In October 2011, the Cámara de la Industria Textil, Confección y Zonas Francas de El Salvador (The Chamber of Textile, Clothing and Free Trade Zone Industries of El

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Salvador, or CAMTEX) published a promotional video on YouTube titled “We

Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” The brief eight minute video celebrates the economic and social development generated by the apparel and free trade zone industries of El Salvador since the Peace Accords, and it boasts the industries’ strong record of corporate social responsibility. In addition, the video highlights the number of permanent jobs created by the sector, and provides the testimony of an employee who has advanced educationally and achieved home ownership because of her job in a textile factory. Like the rhetoric advanced by ANEP and Giuliani Safety & Security, discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 3, the narrative advanced by CAMTEX reflects understandings of economic growth and rule of law that are widely circulated, and widely held by conservative and progressive sectors of the citizenry. The following quotations and images taken from the video demonstrate these understandings advanced by CAMTEX:

In 1992, following the peace agreements, El Salvador undertook the challenge of diversifying exports and generating stable and permanent jobs. In response to a strategic bet, the textile, apparel and free zone sector was strongly promoted as a major source of employment and currency. Nineteen years later, we proudly recognize that we have won the bet, becoming one of the most important strategic sectors for our country. We have HONORED El Salvador! … For each dollar the government decides to invest in our sector, El Salvador receives five, which are reflected in: 1. Employment, 2. Exports, 3. Corporate Social Responsibility, 4. Economic and Social Development, 5. Contributions to the area of health, retirement funds, and to the national income. We have multiplied El Salvador’s benefits by five!” … We are leaders promoting several corporate social responsibility programs that favor communities, workers and the environment. Many companies have medical assistance clinics, provide transportation to employees, and foster important activities, such as health fairs, agricultural projects, provision of school supplies and food, cleaning campaigns, educational and counseling programs for the youth, water treatment plants, and industrial waste disposal programs” …

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We quintuplicate El Salvador’s benefits! For every dollar the government decides to invest in our sector, the country, in return, receives five. How does the country receive these benefits? We invigorate, intensify and strengthen local economies, as they become providers of goods and services, including public transportation, food services, educational and recreational activities, to mention a few. Who would not want to quintuplicate benefits? Let’s work together to improve what we already have! We are El Salvador’s largest permanent employer. We are the best business for the country. We are also the largest and the strongest. We quintuplicate El Salvador’s benefits!” (“We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!”).

Image 12: Screenshot from the video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” Image credit: “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!”

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Image 13: Screenshot from the Video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” Image credit: “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!”

Image 14: Screenshot from the Video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” Image credit: “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!”

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Image 15: Screenshot from the Video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” Image credit: “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!”

Image 16: Screenshot from the Video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” Image credit: “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!”

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Image 17: Screenshot from the Video “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!” Image credit: “We Quintuplicate El Salvador’s Benefits!”

Although the CAMTEX video promotes the great successes that the apparel and free trade industries have achieved since 1992, it lacks detail and specificity. In this way, the narrative constructed by CAMTEX regarding free trade and economic growth obscures the labor violations and lack of regulation found in the industries, and the oppressive nature of the factories and free trade zones. The CAMTEX narrative further obscures the excessively low wages paid in the industries. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the minimum wage in the apparel sector, which is currently $210.90 per month, is not much more than the current monthly cost of the basic food basket (canasta básica), which is $161.90 (Alas and Castillo). That is, each month, the industry minimum wage provides employees with just $49 above the basic food basket to pay for housing, transportation, utilities, medical care, educational expenses and clothing. This wage

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therefore does nothing to lower poverty levels in El Salvador. For this reason, the broad claims advanced by CAMTEX pose dangers for Salvadoran society, and the circulation of this narrative must be closely examined and challenged. The present research maintains that the claims advanced in the promotional video stand in stark contrast to the experiences documented by Garni and Weyher, and by the solidarity organizations cited later in this chapter.

Mapping the Costs and Benefits of the Maquiladora Industry

As noted in Chapter 2, the governmental agency, el Organismo Promotor de

Exportaciones e Inversiones de El Salvador (the Export and Investment Promotion

Agency of El Salvador, or PROESA), promotes the country’s low and flexible labor costs to potential corporate investors. Inherent to the agency’s promotional material on its website is a tone of racism, and a reduction that equates human labor to a potential for positive profit margins. For example, as stated in Chapter 2, PROSEA’s website banners read, “El Salvador: A Cost Efficient Export Platform” and “El Salvador: Highly

Productive Human Resources” (Organismo Promotor de Exportaciones e Inversiones de

El Salvador). The website further claims that El Salvador is a, “…young and highly productive country,” and that, “Investors certify that Salvadoran labor force is world- famous for its industriousness, efficiency and work ethic.” These claims regarding the productivity of Salvadoran laborers feed into racist notions held in the United States that imagine Mexican and Central American citizens as being intrinsically hardworking.

PROESA also promotes the cost effectiveness of El Salvador’s labor force, stating that

“The level of unionization is low,” and that the country ranks first in the Central

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American region in “flexibility of wage determination” (Organismo Promotor de

Exportaciones e Inversiones de El Salvador). These statements are accompanied by a table that highlights the low wages in the apparel industry.

Agro-Industry Service Sector Textile / Apparel Hour $0.49 $1.05 $0.88 Day $3.94 $8.39 $7.03 Month $118.20 $251.70 $210.90

Table 3: The Data Included in a Table on PROSEA’s Website. All amounts are in U.S. dollars (note that monthly minimum wages have increased slightly since the time these data were published by PROSEA). Data source: Organismo Promotor de Exportaciones e Inversiones de El Salvador.

As noted above and in Chapters 2 and 3, the minimum monthly wage of $210.90 is just $49 more than the monthly cost of the basic food basket, which is currently

$161.90 (Alas and Castillo). Also noted in Chapter 2, corporations operating in the free trade zones of El Salvador benefit from tax exemptions, in addition to flexible labor. In a

2013 report, the Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD) explains that there are twenty-six laws, including the Free Trade Zones Law (la Ley de

Zonas Francas) that allow large corporations to not pay taxes, and that in 2011, companies in El Salvador saved $1.2 billion through tax exemptions (Villalona 33-34).

Therefore, as Luis Ernesto Romano Martínez affirms, although the textile factories in the free trade zones are publicized as job creators, in practice, the jobs created do not offer a living wage, and add little value to the economy and communities of El Salvador

(Romano Martínez).

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The vast majority of employees working in the apparel industry in El Salvador are women. Women may be a more cost-efficient workforce for the industry, as they are at times more easily controlled and accepting of a lower wage scale, especially in cases where they are heads of household and therefore dependent on their jobs to sustain their families. In 2015, the solidarity organization Mujeres Transformando released a report that demonstrates that, in El Salvador, the apparel industry has the worst record of labor violations against women. These violations, which will be discussed in greater detail below, include forced and unpaid labor, sexual harassment, and mandatory pregnancy tests. Yet, Mujeres Transformando, the periodical Revista Pueblos, and the Pennsylvania

State Center for Global Worker’s Rights all emphasize the difficulties that women face in filing complaints. Mujeres Transformando explains that they only receive complaints from the women that dare to report the violations, and that a great number of employees remain silent out of fear of losing their jobs, or because they lack confidence in governmental institutions (“Maquilas son las que más violan”). Here, it is evident that the mistrust in State institutions that was prevalent during the military regimes is still a valid concern post-democratization. María Cruz Tornay of Revista Pueblos reiterates the dangers of reporting labor violations in pointing out the oppressive nature of El

Salvador’s maquilas:

Las zonas francas son territorios prácticamente impenetrables rodeados por alambres de espino y vigilados por cámaras de seguridad y guardias armados. Nadie entra ni sale del área sin identificación o sin haber recibido autorización previa por parte de alguna de las empresas. Sólo el testimonio de las trabajadoras arroja luz sobre las condiciones que sufren miles de personas a las que no se les respetan las más mínimas garantías en sus derechos laborales. (The free trade zones are practically

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impenetrable, surrounded by barbed wire and surveilled by security cameras and armed guards. No one enters nor exits the area without identification or without having received previous authorization from one of the companies. Only the testimony of the workers sheds light on the conditions that thousands of people suffer, for whom no one resepcts the most minimal guarantees of their labor rights.) (Cruz Tornay)

Cruz Tornay goes on to report complaints of threats issued by supervisors at the

Ocean Sky factory, as a means of pressuring women to reach their quotas, as well as an incident in which six female employees were fired from this same factory after reporting other vicious labor violations.39 Cruz Tornay points out the humiliation that female employees in the industry endure, due to the exceptionally low salaries coupled with hazardous and threatening work environments. She adds that, within the apparel industry in El Salvador, there exists the worst conditions of exploitation and precarity, along with the worst impunity, as no factory has been fiscally sanctioned for labor violations, as prescribed by Article 29 of the Ley de Zonas Francas (Cruz Tornay; Asamblea

Legislativa, “Ley de Zonas Francas…”).

The labor rights violations reported by FESPAD, which are listed in Chapter 2, are reiterated in reports published by Mujeres Transformando, the Pennsylvania State

University Center for Global Worker’s Rights (CGWR), and Revista Pueblos. Mujeres

Transformando states that a high percentage of employees in the maquilas experience labor rights violations (“Mujeres organizadas”). While the CGWR report focuses on violations related to labor unions, Mujeres Transformando and Revista Pueblos report

39 Ocean Sky is a Singapore-based apparel manufacturer that has a facility in the Olocuilta free trade zone in El Salvador (“Cotton USA Sourcing;” “Ocean Sky Sweatshop”). The Ocean Sky factory in El Salvador produces knit apparel for Gap, Old Navy, Talbots, Puma, Reebok, and Columbia Sportswear. 175

additional violations in the workplace, including: salaries lower than the legal minimum; shifts longer than the legal maximum; failure to enroll in Social Security; failure to provide medical leave, vacation time, overtime, and pay for extra hours; docking pay for medical appointments, late arrivals, and failure to meet quotas; mandatory pregnancy and

HIV testing; discouraging women from becoming pregnant; sexual harassment from supervisors; restricting employees from using the restroom and prohibiting talking during shifts; humiliating searches to prevent company theft; and lack of contracts, in an effort to constantly renew the work force with young, cheap and poorly qualified employees

(Cruz Tornay; “Mujeres organizadas”). In addition, FESPAD reports the lack of adequate light and ventilation in the majority of maquilas, and the absence of separate restrooms and break areas for women (Cruz Tornay; Guillén, Carrillo, and Baños 84). Revista

Pueblos notes that often there are no break rooms, and women must eat their lunches on the sidewalks in front to the factories. Cruz Tornay discusses another, particularly sinister labor violation related to quotas:

Uno de los casos más alarmantes por el peligro que supone para la salud de las trabajadoras es la imposición de metas “exageradas y engañosas”, como ellas mismas las denominan. Los supervisores obligan al cumplimiento de objetivos para el cobro del bono extra que, de forma habitual, se pierde a falta de tres o cuatro piezas. Una de las estrategias de los supervisores es la realización de metas en equipos de trabajadoras que supuestamente permite el cobro del bono a todas ellas. En caso de que alguna trabajadora no finalice su parte, la empresa se encarga de hacer saber al resto del equipo quién ha fallado con la colocación de un banderín rojo en su puesto. El resto de trabajadoras ya saben que, a pesar de que ellas han cumplido con su meta, han perdido el bono por culpa de la compañera que no pudo acabar su tarea. (One of the cases that is most alarming for the danger that it poses to the health of workers is the imposition of “exagerated and deceitful” quotas, as the workers themselves call them. Supervisors require workers to fulfill quotas in order

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to receive a bonus, which routinely is lost due to being three or four pieces short of the quota. One of the strategies of the supervisors is to have the workers fulfill the quotas in teams, supposedly to allow all members of the team to receive the bonus. If one worker does not complete her portion, the company lets the rest of the team know by hanging a red flag at her post. In this way, the rest of the workers know that, despite the fact that they had fulfilled their part, they have lost their bonus because of the compañera who failed to finish her task.) (Cruz Tornay)

As seen in these different reports, many of the labor violations committed in the apparel industry are particularly damaging to women, affecting both their health and dignity. This is due, in part, to the medical needs associated with pregnancy and motherhood, and to gender inequalities in the workplace. Given these precarities, one can see how women may make up a more docile workforce that is easily manipulated and controlled, and therefore more cost-efficient. Adding to this vulnerability is the impossibility for many in the apparel industry to form or join unions. The CGWR published an extensive report detailing the causes of union suppression in El Salvador’s apparel industry, which include collusion with corrupt unions in exchange for suppressing activism and subduing workers’ claims to legally owed wages (Center for

Global Workers’ Rights and the Worker Rights Consortium 3). The CGWR also documents three cases that occurred between 2011 and 2013, in which factories allegedly contracted gang members to issue death threats to union activists, in an effort to eliminate union activities. The issuing of death threats and the suppression of unions were common practices under the militarized regimes, prior to 1992. Although circumstances have changed, the suppression of the right to free association persists post-democratization.

Further, since some of the violations documented by the CGWR report occurred after the

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passage of Article 29 of the Ley de Zonas Francas in February 2013, it appears that the written law is not being enforced in practice. Article 29 guarantees a number of labor rights, including minimum salaries, maximum work hours, the prohibition of forced work, occupational health and safety standards, and the right to join and form unions independent of employer influence (Asamblea Legislativa, “Ley de Zonas Francas…”).

According to reports published by the CGWR and Mujeres Transformando, many or all of these rights continue to be violated in the apparel industry on a regular basis. Having summarized the rights commonly violated in the apparel industry in El Salvador, this chapter will now document a specific case of labor violations that occurred in the

Olocuilta free trade zone in the Department of La Paz. It will document differences in the reporting of the event by the federal government, news media, and a Christian solidarity organization.

Hoons Apparel International

On July 5 and 8, 2002, hundreds of employees of the Hoons Apparel International factory, 20 of whom were pregnant, were admitted to medical facilities for complaints of nausea, vomiting and skin irritation. Most of the employees were women (Christians for

Peace in El Salvador; García Dueñas). While the organization Christians for Solidarity in

El Salvador (CRISPAZ) reports that 534 employees were hospitalized, the newspaper El

Faro states that, according to different medical facilities, at least 200 employees were treated. In addition to the symptoms above, which were reported by El Faro, CRISPAZ states that employees also suffered from dizziness and loss of consciousness. El Faro reports that Red Cross workers present at the scene stated that the symptoms could have

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been caused by a chlorine spill in the factory, or by the spill of another toxic substance.

However, CRISPAZ reports that the Red Cross gave more specific details, stating that they had found a chlorine leak in one of the factory’s tanks. Both El Faro and CRISPAZ report that several hours passed between the time employees began complaining of these symptoms, and the time the factory decided to report the incident to the police and evacuate employees. CRISPAZ specifies that the factory waited more than seven hours before evacuating employees, and that, by that time, several employees had fallen unconscious. This first incident on July 5 was followed by a second evacuation that took place on July 8, immediately after employees complained of the same symptoms.

CRISPAZ reports that, on July 8, investigators from the Ministry of the Environment that arrived at the scene were illegally prohibited from entering the building by the factory’s private security. The El Faro article, which is less detailed than the CRISPAZ report, makes no mention of this detail.

Both El Faro and CRISPAZ discuss the official responses to the alleged chemical spill, and the CIRSPAZ report notes several articles about the incidents that were published by the two major daily newspapers in El Salvador, La Prensa Gráfica and El

Diario de Hoy. However, it appears that these articles are no longer electronically accessible. Internet searches for articles released by La Prensa Gráfica produced no results. While information on several articles published by El Diario de Hoy were found in internet searches, the links to these articles have been disabled. Further investigation is therefore warranted in the physical archives of La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy.

For this reason, information regarding official responses to the incidents, the factory’s

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response, and the reporting of the incidents by major news media is derived solely from an article published by El Faro, and from the CRISPAZ report. While this limitation does produce challenges in understanding what actually occurred on July 5 and 8, 2002 in the

Hoon’s Apparel factory, it also points to the layers of interpretation and influence at work at that time, and to movements in the social and political fabric of El Salvador ten years after the signing of the Peace Accords.

The different discourses surrounding these incidents hinge upon one central question: was there a chemical leak inside of the factory, or was there another explanation for the employees’ complaints of nausea and disorientation? If, indeed, there was a leak that originated inside of the building, the factory owners and the Ministry of

Labor could be at fault for failure to enforce, or for neglect of occupational safety standards. This would raise questions regarding the practices of a transnational corporation operating inside of one of the free trade zones. Yet, the accounts of what occurred at the Hoons Apparel factory differ greatly, and there were disagreements regarding both the source of the chemical spill, and the veracity of the employees’ complaints. Several national and international solidarity and labor organizations, including CRISPAZ, Mujeres Transformando, el Sindicato de Trabajadores de Industrias

Textiles (the Salvadoran Textile Workers Union, or STIT), and the International Textile,

Garment, and Leather Workers Federation (ITGLWF), supported the employees’ claims that they were poisoned by a chemical leak that originated inside of the factory. However,

El Faro and CRISPAZ report that the factory owners and members of the federal government, including President Francisco Flores, denied the workers’ claims, stating

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that this was an act of sabotage or terrorism directed against the free trade zone or the apparel industry. In addition, CRISPAZ reports that factory owners and the National

Emergency Committee claimed that the incidents were merely a case of collective hysteria among the employees. Not only does the claim of hysteria have a misogynistic tone, but if false, it serves to cast blame on the employees. Given these discrepancies in the accounts of what occurred in July, 2002 at Hoons Apparel International, the discourses surrounding these incidents point to both movements in the political fabric, and to the influences at work within the free trade zones and the apparel industry in the decade following the Peace Accords.

El Faro’s reporting of these events summarizes the official responses to the employees’ claims that they were poisoned by a chemical spill originating inside of the factory. In the article, journalist Lauri García Dueñas states that the comisión interinstitucional del gobierno (the inter-institutional governmental commission) concluded the poisonings were not due to a chlorine leak, or a leak of other substances used within the apparel industry, but to chemicals originating outside of the facilities. The commission’s investigation did not clarify the manner in which these chemicals were introduced into the factory, or the agents responsible, and therefore requested that the

Attorney General investigate further. The Attorney General, in turn, assembled an investigative team made up of representatives from the Instituto de Medicina Legal (the

Forensic Medicine Institute), the Instituto Salvadoreño de Seguro Social (the Social

Security Institute, or ISSS), and the Ministries of Health, Labor, and the Environment.

Minister of Labor Jorge Nieto, speaking on behalf of the investigative team, stated that

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lab tests performed by the Hospital Zacamil and Medicina Legal showed that chemicals present in tear gas were found in the employees’ bodies.

Up to this point, García Dueñas only summarizes the official findings. She then, however, incorporates elements of interpretation when discussing President Flores’ response to the employees’ claims. At a press conference held on July 11, 2002, before the investigative team’s results were made public, Flores stated that the poisonings were caused by a small tube of tear gas that was introduced into the free trade zone. Unlike the inter-institutional commission, García Dueñas adds, Flores did point to the agents responsible, asserting that the tear gas may have been introduced by union members from the United States that were fearful of a free trade agreement with El Salvador. Because

Flores made these claims prior to the release of the investigative team’s report, García

Dueñas claims that the president was ‘predicting’ the results of the report, as indicated by the article’s subheading, “¿Vaticinio presidencial?” (“Presidential Forecast?”) (García

Dueñas). With these brief elements of interpretation, García Dueñas does not overtly support the employees’ claims, nor does she take up a sustained criticism of the government’s response. However, by pointing out the fact that Flores correctly

‘predicted’ the investigative team’s conclusion that the employees’ symptoms were caused by tear gas, García Dueñas infers that Flores exerted influence over the investigative team. This suggests that Flores ultimately determined the findings of the investigation, thereby guaranteeing impunity for the factory owners and the Ministry of

Labor.

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Compared to the El Faro article, the CRISPAZ report provides more specific details about the July, 2002 incidents at Hoons Apparel. It includes information regarding the responses from government officials and the apparel industry, and regarding the reports published by La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy. While the El Faro article maintains a journalistic tone, the CRISPAZ report conveys a sense of urgency and outrage, and it accuses the federal government and the apparel industry of spreading false and slanderous information about the factory workers and a local union. The urgent tone of the report is set in the opening statements:

Last week, in a shameless campaign to slander a local union and shift attention from themselves, the Salvadoran government and maquila owners’ association blamed a large-scale industrial health emergency on terrorism and sabotage. When 500 workers suffered mass poisoning, those legally responsible to answer for the disaster, the factory owners and the governmental institutions who have industrial oversight, scrambled to place the blame somewhere else. Independent of any testing or investigation, the first response suggested that the workers, mostly women, suffered from collective hysteria and that there had been no toxins in the plants. The Red Cross, the public hospitals, and the attorney general’s office later proved the presence of toxins in the factories and in the workers’ bodies. In response the maquila owners’ association, backed up by President Francisco Flores, proceeded to spread rash allegations of terrorism and a criminal act by groups who want to attack the maquila sector. With no evidence to back them up, they repeatedly insinuated involvement by local union leaders. (Christians for Peace in El Salvador)

The report goes on to detail how, across the board, members of the federal government, representatives from the apparel industry, and mainstream news media consistently refuted the factory workers’ claims, alleging or inferring that the incidents were a case of mass hysteria, sabotage, or an employee boycott of the Hoons Apparel factory. CRISPAZ states that, before the Attorney General’s investigation had been

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conducted, the Maquila owner’s association claimed the incidents were either mass hysteria or an act of sabotage. Citing a lack of evidence for the presence of toxins, the

Comité de Emergencia Nacional (the National Emergency Committee, or COEN) claimed it was mass hysteria. CRISPAZ adds that COEN later refused to retract these claims, despite the fact that toxins were ultimately found in the employees’ lab tests.

CRISPAZ notes that the Asociación Salvadoreña de Industrias de la Confección (the

Salvadoran Clothing Industry Association, or ASIC) and President Flores both claimed that the incidents were an act of sabotage or terrorism, and that the Executive Director of the ASIC called them an attack against investment, against El Salvador, and against the health of the nation’s workers.40 CRISPAZ further points out that, “The Minister of

Labor refused to rule out the possibility that the workers were boycotting the factory,” and that, after visiting the factory, he warned that the temporary closing of the facilities put the employees at risk of losing their jobs (Christians for Peace in El Salvador).

CRISPAZ also states that, as the controversy escalated in the media, political parties began to accuse their opponents of some degree of involvement in the disaster.

In addition to the positions taken by the federal government and the apparel sector regarding the events at Hoons Apparel, CRISPAZ states that reports published by La

40 In 2005, the Asociación Salvadoreña de Industrias de la Confección (ASIC) joined together with the Unión de Industrias Textiles (UNITEX) and the Asociación de Zonas Francas de El Salvador (AFES) to form the Cámara de la Industria Textil, Confección y Zonas Francas de El Salvador (CAMTEX). According to CAMTEX’s website: La Cámara de la Industria Textil, Confección y Zonas Francas de El Salvador (CAMTEX), surge como resultado de la iniciativa de los empresarios de los sectores Textil, Confección y Zonas Francas de El Salvador, para enfrentar con una estrategia de negocios agresiva, el nuevo orden internacional de la industria textil y del vestuario, así como los sectores involucrados y afines a los mismos (“Quienes Somos”).

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Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy also suggest that the employees’ symptoms were not caused by a chemical leak originating inside the factory. As noted above, the internet links to these articles have been disabled. For this reason, the present work only considers the accounts released by El Faro and CRISPAZ, and further investigation at the archives of La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy in San Salvador is warranted. CRISPAZ does not indicate the exact number of articles published by La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy regarding the incidents at Hoons Apparel, and its summary of the news reports is brief. Nevertheless, CRISPAZ is definite in stating that, like the federal government and the apparel sector, these major news outlets did imply that the incidents were acts of sabotage. CRISPAZ first states that an article published by La Prensa Gráfica strongly suggests that the Sindicato de la Industria Textil de El Salvador (the Textile Workers’

Union of El Salvador, or STIT) was involved in the toxic poisoning. CRISPAZ states that, under the headline, “Maquila Owners Denounce Sabotage,” La Prensa Gráfica published a letter from the Secretary General of STIT, Joaquin Alas Siguero, requesting an audience with the Ministry of Labor. CRISPAZ concludes that the pairing of this headline with Siguero’s letter implies a connection between STIT and the alleged act of sabotage.

CRISPAZ then states that, “Both daily papers published inaccurate and inflammatory statements regarding the presence of international union and solidarity workers who came [to El Salvador] to support the STIT” (Christians for Peace in El

Salvador). CRISPAZ specifically notes the arrival of the leader of the International

Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers Federation (ITGLWF), Neil Kearney, who was in

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El Salvador from July 8-12, 2002, for negotiations regarding a different factory (Anner).

As Mark S. Anner explains, Kearney came to El Salvador for major negotiations regarding a factory owned by the Taiwanese firm Tainan Enterprises. In 2001 and 2002, when employees unionized in one of Tainan’s textile factories in El Salvador and began demanding collective contract negotiations, Tainan permanently closed the factory.

CRISPAZ states that, with Kearney’s arrival, La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy made several overt suggestions that his presence was connected to the alleged acts of sabotage. CRISPAZ adds that, at one point, Kearney was asked if it was not too much of a coincidence that the incident at Hoons Apparel occurred just one day before his arrival.

Apart from members of labor and solidarity organizations, the only individual that

CRISPAZ mentions that did not deny the employee’s claims of a chemical spill was the

National Ombudswoman for Human Rights, Beatrice de Carrillo. According to

CRISPAZ, de Carrillo stated this was not hysteria, and that the workers had, in fact, been poisoned. She further criticized the Ministry of Labor for neglecting occupational safety standards, and criticized the weakness of the programs and controls in place to protect laborers. De Carillo requested that the Attorney General fully investigate the incidents.

Following this summary of de Carrillo’s assessment of the incidents at Hoons Apparel,

CRISPAZ adds that, “The President warned the Attorney General to ‘use prudence’ in the investigation” (Christians for Peace in El Salvador). Although the exact context and timing of Flores’ comments in not included in the CRISPAZ report, the use of the term warn, and the positioning of this information, following the summary of de Carrillo’s

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request to the Attorney General, further implies that Flores exerted influence over officials investigating these incidents, in an effort to determine their findings.

In considering the solutions advanced by entities including ANEP and Giuliani

Safety & Security for reducing violence, and creating a modern, developed economy in

El Salvador (e.g., the expansion of free trade zones and the intensification of Bratton- style policing strategies), it is critical to examine the interconnectedness of these solutions and the daily realities of ordinary citizens. Observing the particularities of labor relations in El Salvador’s apparel industry, and of the public education system in rural areas of the country (discussed below), allows problems of violence and economic precarity to be approached and thought of in multiple ways. ANEP’s arguments that increased homicide, poor economic growth, failures in the education system, and political clientelism can be traced to an inefficient government with the highest levels of spending in the history of the country reflects a simplified, binary logic that positions an ineffective and corrupt administration at the one end, and a risk management logic at the other. As noted in the opening of this chapter, issues of gang violence and poverty in El Salvador were not produced by, and cannot be traced to singular cause or origin. Simplified arguments regarding government waste distract attention away from the complex movements and dimensions of the contemporary social and political fabric. These distractions can be damaging, as they can direct the discourses and conversations surrounding the epidemic of violence, and from there, can determine enduring shifts in public policy.

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“Uno para todos”

In September, 2014, journalist Sigfredo Ramírez published a report in La Prensa

Gráfica titled, “Uno para todos,” which chronicles the experiences of the Centro Escolar la Montaña, a rural escuela unidocente, or single-teacher school, near the municipality of

Tacuba, in the Department of Ahuachapán (Ramírez, “Uno para todos”). Ahuachapán borders Guatemala in Western El Salvador, and has historically been a center of coffee cultivation and production. However, the decline of the coffee economy in El Salvador since the end of the civil war has resulted in increased poverty, and problems of malnutrition and food insecurity for rural families (Barrientos). Since 2010, an outbreak of a fungus called coffee rust, or la roya, has intensified these issues. As Elizabeth

Malkin of the New York Times states, the fungus slashed production across Central

America, “…reducing mountainside rows of coffee trees to lattices of gray twigs”

(Malkin). In 2014, Carrie Kahn of National Public Radio reported that, in Central

America, coffee rust caused more than $1 billion in crop losses, and left hundreds of thousands unemployed (Kahn). Since salaries in the agricultural sector are so low, and because many have become under- or unemployed due to coffee rust, these environmental and occupational shifts have deeply affected the residents of

Ahuachapán.41 The 2011 United Nations World Food Programme Hunger Map shows that 41.3% of the residents of Tacuba suffer from hunger and malnutrition, which is one of the highest rates in El Salvador (Sosa).42 Further, a September 2015 report published

41 As noted in Chapter 2, in the agricultural sector, the minimum monthly salary is $118.20 (Alas and Castillo). 42 The World Food Programme defines malnutrition as follows: “A malnourished person finds that their body has difficulty doing normal things such as growing and resisting disease. Physical work becomes 188

by the International Organization of Migration and the United Nations World Food

Programme states that hunger and violent crime are the single biggest factors driving the immigration crisis in El Salvador (World Food Program and International Organization for Migration). Since Ramírez’s report on the Centro Escolar la Montaña documents both the lack of educational funding for the nation’s poorest children, and the particularities of lived experience for the residents of the region, it serves as a valuable counterpoint to the rhetorics circulated by ANEP, CAMTEX, GSS, and the U.S. and Salvadoran governments regarding influxes of government spending, the economic benefits of the free trade zone industry, promises of prosperity.

Ramírez reports that there are 465 escuelas unidocentes, or single-teacher schools in El Salvador, which are located in some of the most remote and inaccessible areas of the country. Nationwide, there are approximately 12,600 students enrolled in single- teacher schools. It is important to note that, to arrive at these numbers, it was necessary for Ramírez to count the cases one by one, as these data are not readily available by the

Ministry of Education (MINED). Carlos Mauricio Canjura, the Minister of Education, has stated that, in addition to the single-teacher schools, there are 834 schools in El

Salvador that have a single classroom for grades one through six, that there are 3,300 schools that have more grades than classrooms, and that an impressive number of schools have outhouses. In July 2015, Jimena Aguilar of La Prensa Gráfica reported that there are 1,138 schools in El Salvador serving 159,908 students that do not have access to

problematic and even learning abilities can be diminished. For women, pregnancy becomes risky and they cannot be sure of producing nourishing breast milk” (“What is Malnutrition?”).

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clean water. In these schools, teachers must collect water from a variety of sources, including rivers, lakes, rain cisterns, public spigots, and wells (Aguilar). In the single- teacher schools specifically, teachers have no administrative or instructional support.

They are responsible for instructing all students from preschool through grade six in all subjects, including physical education, and serve as the school director, carrying out all administrative duties.

In the article “Uno para todos,” Ramírez explains that the single-teacher schools are the result of a post-civil war initiative. In 1991, with the support of the World Bank and the IDB, the Ministry of Education launched EDUCO, the national Community-

Managed Schools Program (Educación con Participación de la Comunidad), in an effort to bring preschool and primary education to the most remote areas of the country, and to increase school enrollments and graduation rates following the civil war. According to

The World Bank Development Research Group, EDUCO implemented an expansive decentralized and self-managed model for education, to address coverage and quality issues in remote areas (Jimenez and Sawada). However, since the 1990s, the agricultural economy has declined and the economy of El Salvador has transformed. As a result, millions of Salvadorans have been driven to move to urban areas or to emigrate, and enrollments in rural schools have fallen. In some hamlets, the majority of people have emigrated, and the communities are left with few children. The Ministry of Education has therefore had to reduce funding and support for the remote schools initiated under

EDUCO, and in 465 of these schools, the Ministry has decided that there will be only one teacher.

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Although enrollments in the single-teacher schools are low, Ramírez’s article

“Uno para todos” demonstrates how instruction for the nation’s poorest children suffers under this model, as teachers attempt to divide their time and attend to multiple grade levels at once. He observes how Lubia Aroche, the teacher at La Montaña, writes the lesson for one grade level on one side of the chalkboard, and the lesson for another grade level on the other, and spends time teaching the young children reading, while older children study a black and white encyclopedia from 1964. He adds that La Montaña does have electricity, but only because a solar panel was donated by the European Union.

Ramírez’s article further documents severe funding shortages at the single-teacher schools that further compound these issues related to instruction.

The most urgent funding issue is related to food rations. As noted above, the parents of the La Montaña students are agricultural workers, and earn a salary of approximately $118 per month. With the spread of coffee rust, salaries have gone down, and many in the region have become under- or unemployed (Kahn). The children of La

Montaña do not have electricity, running water, radios or television at home, and many had never seen a cartoon until they had the chance to watch one at school. The Ministry of Education provides daily breakfast at school, which families depend on to feed their children. However, the rations are irregular. At the time of Ramírez’s report, the school had been without food rations for two days, and it was not clear when the next one would arrive. When there is no breakfast, the children have two options: they can either make the two hour walk to school and go hungry, or they can stay home. Because of this irregularity with rations, student attendance suffers. After completing the sixth grade,

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education becomes all the more inaccessible for the students at La Montaña, due to the cost of transportation. The closest middle school is located in Concepción, seven kilometers away. Since families typically cannot afford the cost of bus fare, many La

Montaña students end their education after primary school, and follow their parents in working in a shrinking agricultural economy.

Alongside student attendance, school operating hours are also irregular in the single-teacher schools. In order to complete the administrative duties of the director, teachers must often close their building for the day, and therefore cannot meet official requirements for the minimum number of school days. Ramírez reports that the Secretary of the Teachers’ Union for the Community Managed Schools Program (el Sindicato de

Maestros con Participación de las Comunidades, or SIMEDUCO), Francisco Zelada, notes the excessive workload for teachers and the low quality of education provided for children living in remote areas. Zelada states that there are teachers who are paid for just one shift, but work two, and he adds that the rural stipend paid is just $44 per month.

Since these teachers commute to their remote locations and live at their schools during the week, they must rely on this small stipend to pay for food and transportation. Given this lack of federal funding and support, and the resulting irregularities in instruction and attendance, children are not only denied the right to a quality education, but their physical, cognitive and emotional development are negatively affected. For these children, education is not a means for escaping hunger and poverty, or for attaining a better quality of life. For these reasons, Zelada affirms that “The education system is not responding to the needs of Salvadoran society” (“El sistema educativo ya no responde a

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las necesidades de la sociedad salvadoreña”) (Ramírez, “Uno para todos”). Paz Zetino, the General Secretary of the union for rank and file educators (la gremial Bases

Magisteriales), echoes this fact, as he qualifies the single-teacher schools of El Salvador as an “educational fraud” (“un fraude educativo”) (Ramírez, “Uno para todos”).

Imbalances in Funding for Citizens’ Most Basic Needs

Ramírez’s report on single-teacher schools provides just one example of how publicly funded programs are not meeting the basic needs of Salvadoran society. Severe funding shortages are apparent in other critical areas – in the lack of public access to clean water, the steep cuts to the public pension system outlined in the new Plan Cáceres, and in the dire conditions of the nation’s most important public hospital, Hospital Rosales

(Aguilar; Cañas; Ortiz; Ramírez, “Como pez fuera del agua”). In a separate article released in 2011, Ramírez reports that Rosales has just a fraction of the beds needed, and that, due to a shortage of mechanical ventilators, it relies on technicians to manually pump air into patients’ lungs for days and weeks at a time (“Como pez fuera del agua”).

Given the arguments advanced by ANEP, CAMTEX and GSS that promise growth, prosperity and security, and given the lack of transparency surrounding the allocation of

Fomilenio funds, it is critical to examine accounts that demonstrate how the transformation in value orientations is affecting the lived experience of ordinary citizens.

Only then will a more complete understanding emerge of ANEP’s claims of government corruption and inefficiency, of CAMTEX’s promises of employee advancement and corporate social responsibility, and of the GSS strategies for annihilating gangs and eliminating violent crime (Renteira). Although the full Fomilenio budgets have not been

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accessible, it is clear that massive amounts of funding have been allocated for the construction of state of the art electricity and transportation networks. These are imbalances in funding. On the one hand there is a powerful and streamlined focus on expanding free trade industries, and on becoming entirely integrated into the

Mesoamerican Project. On the other, there are severe shortages in funding for the most basic needs of the citizenry, there is a severe shortage of safe and dignified work opportunities, and there is an over-reliance on remittances to sustain the GDP. These imbalances raise questions regarding the net economic and social benefits of free trade zone industries, the costs of these industries for citizens, and the possibility of reducing homicides and creating a safe society. It also raises questions regarding the dangers of imposing Bratton-style policing in a country with a small, vulnerable economy. For these reasons it is crucial to shift national and international discussions regarding violence and emigration in El Salvador, and to develop a powerful and streamlined focus on the imbalances in Fomilenio funding, and the resultant impossibilities for addressing gang violence and reducing homicide rates. Having discussed Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome in relation to evidence of economic scarcity, this dissertation will now continue to employ the concept. In the next chapter, this investigation will trace connections between the transformation in value orientations and escalations in violent crime by analyzing varied discourses and representations related to insecurity post- democratization.

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Chapter 5: Mapping Discourses and Representations of Insecurity Post-Democratization

A central question of this dissertation is whether the Fomilenio funds allocated via

CAFTA and the PFG are benefitting the citizenry, and whether the development of the

Central American logistical corridor will ultimately reduce insecurity and raise the standard of living in the region. As noted in Chapter 2, Fomilenio budgets are not publically accessible at the time of writing, and it is therefore difficult to document how the funds are being allocated. However, in personal observations, the author has witnessed sweeping changes on the ground in areas of transportation, residency patterns employment and telecommunications. There is also documented evidence of human rights violations committed by state institutions. Given the violations of rights and the lack of transparency surrounding the funding of initiatives tied to free trade, the rhizome is a useful concept for approaching issues of violence. By mapping cases of economic scarcity and insecurity since democratization, these issues may be approached in multiple ways. This provides a more complete picture of the issues facing the citizenry, and challenges to the linear logics advanced by entities such as the Millennium Challenge

Corporation, ANEP, CAMTEX, and Giuliani Security and Safety.

In addition to labor rights and education, another area in which imbalances in funding and a lack of regulation are apparent is the evolution of public and private security following the Peace Accords. Since the end of the civil war, there has been a

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surge in the number of private security firms, coupled with an apparent lack of funding and support for the rank and file of the National Civilian Police (PNC). As a result, protection often is only available to those who can afford to pay for it. In contrast to the findings and recommendations given to the Sánchez Cerén administration by Giuliani

Security and Safety, it is clear that there is not a focus on, or sufficient funding allocated for strategies that will genuinely reduce homicide rates.

Year Number of Firms 1980 3 1994 100 2001 200 2015 321

Table 4: Number of Private Security Firms in El Salvador. Data source: Ávalos and Chacón.

As shown above, El Salvador has experienced a sharp increase in the number of private security firms since the implementation of the Peace Accords. While they were virtually non-existent in 1980, today there are 321 registered firms, and private security guards now outnumber the National Civilian Police. As Ávalos and Chacón note, after the signing of the Peace Accords, the protection of state infrastructure passed from the military to private firms. During this first expansion, 100 firms were established. The second expansion began in 2000, with the signing of the Ley de los Servicios Privados de

Seguridad, and has continued into the present, with 321 firms currently registered. With respect to the ratio between police officers and private security guards, in 2015 there were 21,500 police officers. In contrast, there were 23,546 registered private security

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guards, and an additional 5,000 security guards working without permits (Ávalos, “El emporio…;” Ávalos and Chacón). Despite this imbalance, Giuliani Security and Safety recommends and emphasizes that no additional police officers should be added at this time. One of the GSS recommendations published in the ENADE Report states:

***No hay una necesidad inmediata de agregar más agentes a la PNC. Es importante ver cuán eﬁciente es el programa estadístico (CompStat) en su funcionamiento, antes de hacerle cambio alguno a la PNC como existe en este momento*** (***There is not an immediate need to add more agents to the Civilian Police Force. It is important to see how efficient the statistical program (CompStat) is in its functioning, before making any change to the Civilian Police Force as it exists at this momento.) (Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada, “Estrategia Integral” 125).

As Charles T. Call discusses, at the end of the civil war, the Peace Accords

(mediated by the United Nations) stipulated significant reductions in the military. Call notes that, “…the creation of a new National Civilian Police (PNC) with a doctrine of protecting citizen rights rather than state interests was crucial for consolidating peace and democracy in El Salvador” (567). During the implementation phase of the Accords, the military was to hand over all internal security functions to the new National Civilian

Police. Further, the three state security forces –the old National Police, the National

Guard, and the Treasury Police– were dissolved (Call, “Assessing El Salvador’s…” 533).

With the dissolution of these security forces and the demobilization of the FMLN, the coercive forces available for deployment in El Salvador were cut from approximately

60,000 to just 6,000 in a matter of weeks (568). Given this rapid reduction in deployable forces, the provision of public security was an urgent and immediate need in the early nineties. Nevertheless, during the implementation phase, the creation and deployment of

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the PNC suffered from logistical setbacks, a lack of funding and equipment, and from active resistance from the military (571). This security gap created at the end of the war, along with the extensive deportations under the Clinton administration and the introduction of Los Angeles gang culture into El Salvador in the 1990s, led levels of violent crime to spiral out of control. In 1998, the homicide rate reached 138 per 100,000

–more than twice the rate for 2014 (571). In 2015, there still is an apparent lack of funding for the rank and file of the PNC, as salaries are low and officers often lack equipment and support. Given the considerable expansion of private security firms in the post-war era, and the lack of support for the vast majority of police officers, it is crucial to bring Plan El Salvador Seguro and the Giuliani Security and Safety recommendations into question, to examine whether these types of risk-management strategies (e.g., three strikes laws, harsh sentences for minor offenders, the desegregation of prisons, video surveillance, streamlined statistical programs, the expansion of special forces) are viable solutions for reducing homicide rates.

Precarity among the PNC

Although there are indications of increased funding in particular areas of public security (e.g., video surveillance, armored vehicles and equipment for special police forces), there is also evidence of a lack of support for the rank and file of the PNC. These officers must therefore develop strategies to protect themselves as they patrol the most dangerous gang-controlled territories of the country in pickup trucks, on bicycles and on foot. While a detailed analysis of the funding and support provided to these officers is

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warranted, the news media in El Salvador have documented several cases that shed light on the precarious working conditions of the rank and file of the PNC.

One such case concerns the municipality of San Juan Villanueva, in the

Department of La Libertad. In March 2015, Nelson Rauda Zablah of La Prensa Gráfica reported that, in the municipality, there was only one police officer for every 1,250 inhabitants, and just two functioning pickup trucks to patrol an area of 34.4 km² (Rauda

Zablah, “PNC no da abasto…”). Although much of the municipality is rural, there is still a high incidence of violence, since gangs set up encampments in these remote areas.

Zablah documents one incident in which an officer from San Juan Villanueva requested to drive to the capital to retrieve three motorcycles that were being provided by central headquarters. However, the shift supervisor could not allow the officer to go. Due to the shortage of patrol vehicles and a recent shootout with police in which eight gang members were killed, both the officer’s absence and the absence of one vehicle would have left the unit in a vulnerable position.

The alternative digital newspaper El Faro has also documented cases of precarity among the rank and file of the PNC, in articles, photographs and video reports. For example, El Faro published photographs in June and July 2014 that document police outposts constructed of scraps of plywood, sticks, plastic tarps and fabric (Navarro;

Ramos). Police are stationed at these posts for hours (four hours at one post; 48 hours at the other), without access to a bathroom or protection from the elements. In addition, a video titled Las ruinas de Lourdes published by El Faro in 2012 documents images of a police station in the municipality of Colón, in the Department of La Libertad (which, the

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video notes, is the territory of the Barrio 18 gang). The police station documented in these images is in disrepair, and is equipped with old, makeshift furniture (Zamora). In a written account, Roberto Valencia of El Faro describes a strategy that officers have developed to protect themselves during their lunch hours:

…salí a buscar almuerzo este Sábado Santo a la calle, en Antiguo Cuscatlán, y entré en un comedor en el que no suelo entrar; lo hice solo porque llamó mi atención lo que sucedía en la entrada. Parqueado enfrente había un envejecido pick-up Nissan Frontier de la PNC, nada anormal hasta ahí, pero en la puerta del negocio estaban de guardia dos alumnos de la Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública, con lentes oscuras y ajustados chalecos antibalas sobre sus uniformes grises e impecables. Como supuse, adentro almorzaban policías, tres, fáciles de diferenciar de los compañeros no graduados de afuera, por sus uniformes oscuros y por su sobrepeso. Uno de ellos tenía su fusil plegado sobre las piernas, como quien pone una servilleta para no ensuciarse. Ninguno de los tres era un oficial. El comedor, popular, $1.90 pagué por unas chilaquilas, arroz, un pedazo de queso y una Coca-cola en botella de vidrio. Infiero que, por la ola de violencia que afecta al país en general –y a la PNC en particular–, en la institución han girado algún tipo de instructivo para que los tiempos de comida sean así: con custodia propia en la puerta del negocio. Y si esto se ve en Antiguo, una de las ciudades más tranquilas del país, ni quiero imaginar lo tensos que serán los almuerzos policiales en San Martín, Nahuizalco, Santa Cruz Michapa o Concepción Batres. (…I went out on the street to get lunch this Holy Saturday, in Antiguo Cuscatlán, and I entered a diner which I usually don’t enter; I did it because what was happening at the entrance called my attention. Parked in front was an old Nissan Frontier pick-up, nothing unusual around here, but in the doorway of the business were two students from the National Academy of Public Security standing guard, with dark glasses and bulletproof vests adjusted on their impeccable grey uniforms. As I imagined, inside police officers were having lunch, three of them, easily differentiated from their compañeros who still had not graduated outside, because of their dark uniforms and excess weight. One of them had a firearm on his legs, as someone would place a napkin in order to not make a mess. None of the three was an official. The diner, popular, I paid $1.90 for some chilaquilas, rice, a piece of cheese and a Coca-cola in a glass bottle. In infer that, for the wave of violence affecting the country in general –and the Civilian Police Force in particular—, in the institution some type of instructions have gone around so that meals would be this way: with their own protection in the doorway of the business. And if this

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is seen in Antiguo, one of the most calm cities in the country, I don’t want to imagine the how tense police lunchhours would be in San Martín, Nahuizalco, Santa Cruz Michapa o Concepción Batres.) ¿Una anécdota aislada de la que resulta aventurado extraer conclusiones? No lo creo. Vivo en un pasaje en el que, para ingresar, hay que pasar frente a un pequeño puesto policial. Hace unos días colocaron conos y barriles para que la pasada tenga que hacerse en primera o segunda, y en zig-zag. Junto a los conos ahora hay al menos un agente con un AR-15 en sus manos. En once años no había visto un dispositivo de seguridad así. Algo temen. La PNC sabe lo que a este país se le viene encima. (An isolated anecdote that results from venturing to extract conclusions? I don’t believe so. In live in a landscape in which, in order to enter, it’s necessary to pass in front of a little police post. A few years ago they put cones and barrels down, so that one had to pass two entry points, in a zig-zag. Now next to the cones there is at least one agent with an AR- 15 in his hands. In eleven years I have not seen a security apparatus like this. They are afraid of something. The police know what is coming down on this country). (Valencia, “La PNC sabe…”)

In the article, Valencia states that those who are killed are often the down and out, who live in the underworld –the maras, police officers, soldiers, domestic workers, private security guards, and informal vendors (Valencia, “La PNC sabe…”). Valencia adds that these individuals, “Son muertos que esta sociedad ha aprendido a digerir sin problemas,” and that, “Dicen que la muerte a todos empareja, pero en El Salvador no; hasta la muerte es clasista” (Valencia, “La PNC sabe…”). Valencia thus demonstrates how imbalances in public security affect both ordinary citizens and the rank and file of the PNC. The accounts and images documented by El Faro demonstrate the precarious working conditions of the PNC. They raise questions as to whether Fomilenio funding will be allocated to the rank and file of the PNC, and regarding the sustainability of the public security strategies in place to reduce insecurity in contemporary El Salvador.

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The Expansion of Private Security in the Post-War Era

In 2015, Jessica Ávalos and Olga Chacón released a video report titled, El gran negocio de cuidar al Estado, which examines the expansion of private security firms in the post-war era. The report originally aired on the program Miradas, a production of the

Universidad Centroamericana. The video report is also published via Conectas, a non- profit platform supporting journalism in the Americas, and an accompanying written report was published by La Prensa Gráfica in March, 2015 (Ávalos, “El emporio…;”

Ávalos and Chacón). Ávalos and Chacón’s report is key, since it provides insight into imbalances in security in El Salvador, and the consequences of these imbalances.

18,000,000

16,000,000

14,000,000

12,000,000

10,000,000

8,000,000

6,000,000

4,000,000

2,000,000

0 2012 2013 2014 2015

Expenditures in dollars

Table 5: Annual State Expenditures for Private Security since 2012. State expenditures for private security almost doubled between 2012 and 2014. Expenditures totaled $8,354,403 in 2012, and they reached $16,156, 758 in 2015. Data Source: Ávalos and Chacón. 202

Ávalos and Chacón document the clear ties that the two largest private security firms operating in El Salvador have with members of the FMLN and ARENA, and the apparent advantages that these firms have in securing government contracts. The firm

SERCONSE was founded by former ARENA party leader Alfredo Tórrez. During the five years in which Antonio Saca was president, SERCONSE was paid $38 million in government contracts (Ávalos, “El emporio…”). According to Ávalos and Chacón, an internal audit found that, of this $38 million, SERCONSE was paid $5.9 million for 481 non-existent private security positions at the Social Security Administration (ISSS)

(Ávalos and Chacón). In 2009, after Tórrez passed away and the FMLN took the presidency, the COSASE firm began to expand. COSASE is owned by Miguel

Menéndez, one of the patrons of Mauricio Funes’ presidential campaign. Between 2004 and 2014, the state paid a total of over $135 million to private security firms for the protection of state infrastructure. Of this $135 million, a total of $76.6 million was paid to

SERCONSE and COSASE, which represents 56.6% of the funds paid out by the state for private security over the past ten years.

There is also a newcomer among the major firms of the private security industry:

Alternativa Privada de Protección para el Dessarrollo (ALPRODESA). According to official records, ALPRODESA was founded by Benedicto Castro Rancho, an FMLN party leader in Chalaltenango who began the firm with just $12,000 when he was 29 years old (Ávalos, “El emporio…;” Ávalos and Chacón). Despite these humble beginnings, ALPRODESA currently holds the private security contract for the National

Council of the Judiciary (CNJ), and for all of the ALBA Petróleos gas stations in El

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Salvador. In 2013, ALBA Petróleos paid $143,499 to ALPRODESA for these contracts.

As Diana Villiers Negroponte of the Brookings Institute reports, ALBA Petróleos is funded by the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, in a joint venture with

24 Salvadoran mayors from the FMLN. In 2014, at the time of Negroponte’s report,

ALBA held $800 million in assets in El Salvador (Villiers Negroponte). Given the ties between ALBA and the FMLN, and an apparent lack of transparency surrounding the founding of ALPRODESA, questions emerge surrounding possibilities for corruption, and the capability of SERCONSE, COSASE, and ALRPODESA to dominate the major private security contracts in El Salvador.

As noted above, over the past decade the state has paid a total of $135.2 million to private security firms for the protection of public facilities and infrastructure. Although this would not seem like a particularly large expenditure within the context of the United

States, within the context of El Salvador’s small economy, it is significant. As Ávalos and Chacón point out, this amount is the equivalent of ten years’ salaries for 2,000 basic police officers (Ávalos and Chacón). Or, to think of it in other terms, it is the equivalent of the Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública’s (ANSP) operating budget for ten years.

There are 29 public agencies in El Salvador that contract private security for the protection of their installations. Among these 29, the agencies that have spent the most between 2004 and 2014 include: the Ministry of Finance (MH), the Social Security

Administration (ISSS), the Ministry of Health (MINSAL), the Río Lempa Hydroelectric

Commission (CEL), the Ministry of Education (MINED), the Agricultural Development

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Bank (BFA), and the National Center of Registries (CNR). Together, these agencies have spent over $70.6 million on private security during the past ten years.43

Ávalos and Chacón explain that, of the 321 registered private security firms in El

Salvador, only 20% are capable of bidding on government contracts, since 80% of firms do not have the resources to compete. Not only do these firms lack the technical capacity to take on a large government contract, but they also lack the financial cushion needed to stay afloat when government agencies experience budgetary issues and delay payments

(Ávalos and Chacón). Therefore, the conditions are such that a minority of the private security agencies maintain the same government contracts year after year. As mentioned above, the three dominant firms –SERCONSE, COSASE, and ALRPODESA– have clear ties with ARENA and the FMLN.

Alongside this clear political involvement in the country’s leading private security firms, another issue contributing to insecurity is the lack of oversight and regulation over the industry. Ávalos and Chacón explain that, according to the law, all private security agencies are under the purview of the Division of Private Security Services of the PNC

(División de Servicios Privados de Seguridad de la PNC), and this division is responsible for inspecting and authorizing all private security firms in El Salvador (Ávalos and

Chacón).44 However, as Ávalos and Chacón note, the division is both understaffed with just 21 agents, and it is constrained by the ambiguities of the law. Article 47 of the

43 Additional state institutions that contract private security for the protection of their facilities include: the Attorney General (FGR), the Ministry of the Economy (MINEC), the Central Reserve Bank (BCR), the Ministry of the Environment (MARN), the Ministry of Public Works (MOP), the National Administration of Drinking Water and Sanitation (ANDA), and the General Superintendent for Electricity and Telecommunication (SIGNET), among others (Ávalos and Chacón). 44 Ávalos and Chacón note that it takes three to four days for the Division of Private Security Services to inspect one private security agency (Ávalos and Chacón). 205

Private Security Services Law (Ley de Servicios Privados) states that the maximum fine for minor infractions shall be equal to ten minimum agent salaries, and that for major infractions it shall be equal to sixty minimum salaries. However, the law does not indicate how fines are to be calculated, in that it does not specify the rubric that should be used in determining the minimum and maximum salaries on which fines should be based.

Ávalos and Chacón report that three private security firms took advantage of this loophole, and presented a case before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court

(Sala de lo Constitutional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Given the ambiguity of the law as it is written, the Court ruled these sanctions (i.e., fines equaling up to ten or sixty minimum salaries) to be invalid. As Marco Mariona, the Chief of the Division of Private

Security Services, remarks, “Ya con esta nueva situación que la Corte ha resuelto podemos verificar, supervisar, establecer si hay algún incumplimiento, pero no podemos sancionar” (“Now with this new situation that the Court has resolved we can verify, supervise, establish if there is any breach, but we cannot sanction”) (Ávalos and Chacón).

That is, if a private security firm does not comply with the law –for example, if the firm fails to pay overtime, vacation time, or if it does not pay into social security; if its licensing has expired, if guards are not trained and certified, or if stolen firearms are not registered– the Division of Private Security Services can document the infractions, but it lacks the ability under the law to impose sanctions and collect fines. Mariona also notes that there are some firms that refuse to allow the Division of Private Security Services to enter their facilities for inspection (Ávalos and Chacón).

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Ávalos and Chacón cite a document published by the National Public Security

Academy (Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública, or ANSP) titled, “Estudio de la seguridad privada en El Salvador,” which notes the lack of oversight over the private security industry in stating, “No obstante la situación actual de inseguridad, el Estado no centra su vigilancia de esta industria ni le asigna la verdadera importancia en la agenda política” (Despite the current situation of insecurity, the Stae is not watching this industry closely, nor is it assigning it genuine importance in the political agenda”) (Ávalos and

Chacón). Indeed, the lack of regulation and controls over the private security industry pose significant risks for domestic security, not only because of the clear political involvement in three of the major security firms and the possibilities for corruption, but also due to the expanding power and increased technical capabilities of the gangs. Given these increased capabilities and the possibilities for gang infiltration into private security firms, it is crucial that the industry be closely monitored and regulated. This lack of oversight creates risks not only for ordinary citizens, but also for private security guards.

The National Union of Private Security Agencies reports that, in 2014, forty-eight private security guards were assassinated (“Seguridad privada. Custodios del Estado II”). In

2015, an alarming number of reports have been published by La Prensa Gráfica documenting the assassination of private security guards, and in several of these reports

La Prensa Gráfica notes the involvement of gang members in the homicides (Barrera and

Monroy; Barrera and Peñate; Beltrán and Alas; Calderón and Ortiz; Corvera; Letona and

Pineda; Melara and Pérez; Mendoza; “Matan a un vendedor;” “Triple homicidio”).

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In June 2015, La Prensa Gráfica published a report regarding an extensive arms trafficking ring run by the Mara Salvatrucha, and organized in large part by an inmate of the Ciudad Barrios penitentiary in San Miguel (Chávez). Suchit Chávez reports that, with this case, 108 people were arrested for, or accused of crimes involving arms trafficking, the extortion of micro and small businesses in the markets of San Salvador, and six homicides. In addition, while the case was carried out, more than 20 planned homicides were prevented. The materials recovered included money, arms of different caliber, M-67 industrial grenades, rifle scopes, radio communication equipment, and boxes of ammunition. Ammunition for M-16s, AK-47s, pistols, and assault rifles was seized, and some of the equipment recovered had been issued for the exclusive use of the Armed

Forces of El Salvador (Fuerza Armada de El Salvador, or FAES). Two of the subjects arrested in this case were employees of private security firm COSASE, who took advantage of their positions as arms purchasers in order to traffic 40, 45 and 380 caliber ammunition. Although the investigation found no connections between directors or proprietors of the firm and the arms trafficking ring, the involvement of their employees in trafficking arms for the Mara Salvatrucha is unsettling, given COSASE’s influence, and its central role in protecting state infrastructure.45 In addition, the trafficking of arms issued for the exclusive use of the Armed Forces is indicative of the increased technical capabilities of the gangs.

45As noted above, COSASE holds major government security contracts. Over the past ten years, $76.6 million – or 56.6% of the funds paid out by the state for private security – has been paid to COSASE and SERCONSE (Ávalos).

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An additional area of concern that Ávalos and Chacón raise regarding the private security industry is the issue of labor violations. In their report, the Director of

Inspections for the Ministry of Labor, Jorge Bolaños, states that there are two sectors that are of utmost importance, with respect to the investigations carried out by his department.

With regard to women, there is the apparel, or maquila sector, and for men, the counterpart to the maquila industry is the private security sector (“Seguridad privada.

Custodios del Estado II”). Both the maquila and the private security industries are among the three sectors that receive the most complaints of labor violations in El Salvador

(Ávalos, “El emporio…”). Between 1997 and 2014, the National Academy of Private

Security (la Academia Nacional de Seguridad Privada, or ANSP) interviewed 260 agents, in order to develop a sample that reflected working conditions in the industry. The majority of guards interviewed reported that they earned the minimum salary (currently

$242.14/month) – a mere $80 above the basic food basket. Further, guards reported that, in addition to protecting people and property, they were required to clean bathrooms, sweep sidewalks, water gardens, wash cars, replace water bottles, deliver food, cash checks, and care for pets. In this way, many of the guards working in the industry are subjected to precarious working conditions in which their rights are not honored or guaranteed.

Ávalos and Chacón report that, in 2014, fifty-two guards were fired from the private security firm Grupo los Seis, because they had joined a union in an effort to claim unpaid overtime, vacation time, and pension contributions (Ahorro para Pensiones, or

AFP). Further, one of the guards interviewed for their report states that he knows guards

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who are obligated to work without contracts, and are issued faulty weapons. Francisco

Oviedo of the Union of Agents of the Private Security Industry (Sindicato de Agentes

Trabajadoras y Trabajadores de la Industris de Seguridad Privada, or SATISPES) adds that, across the country, many private security firms, including ALPRODESA, do not pay into Social Security, and do not adhere to the maximum number of work hours legally allowed per week (Ávalos and Chacón). In addition, he reports that there are proprietors that pass employees from one of their firms to another, to prevent them from obtaining the rights and benefits that are acquired through consecutive years of service. Once an employee is required to sign a new contract with a different firm, he or she loses all of the years of service that have been acquired. This occurs despite the fact that the employee continues to work for the same proprietor, albeit under a different name. Oviedo notes that the firm SEGURSA, which later founded SEGURINTER, and then SEGUSAL, is guilty of this abuse. SEGURINTER and SEGUSAL currently hold private security contracts with the National Institute of Sports, the Central Reserve Bank, the National

Center of Registries, the Attorney General, and the Bank of Agricultural Advancement

(Banco de Fomento Agropecuario) (Ávalos and Chacón; Bernal). That is to say, the largest and most influential security firms in El Salvador are involved in serious labor violations.

An additional labor abuse reported by Ávalos and Chacón concerns the 40-hour training course that all private security guards are legally required to complete at the

National Academy of Private Security (la Academia Nacional de Seguridad Privada, or

ANSP). Guards pay $50 to complete the course, and are required to attend for one week,

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from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. However, as Álvaro Vejarano, an investigator and researcher at ANSP, notes, many firms require guards to work 12-hour night shifts (e.g., from 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.) during the week in which they complete the ANSP course. Many guards are therefore deprived of sleep while completing their training. It appears that a federal regulation prohibiting security guards from working during the week in which they complete the ANSP course could prevent this labor abuse from occurring.

Between 2012 and 2014, the three firms with the highest number of labor violations were Grupo los Seis, Magnum Security and Research, and COSASE (Ávalos and Chacón). During this time, sixty complaints were filed against Grupo los Seis, thirty- three against Magnum Security, and twenty against COSASE. However, just as in the free trade zone sector, these only represent those who dare to file a complaint. Ávalos and

Chacón point out the clear political ties within COSASE (see above) and Grupo los Seis.

They report that one of the associates of Grupo los Seis is Sigifredo Ochoa Gómez, the former Viceminister for Public Works under the Saca administration. In 2013, Ochoa

Gómez was required to pay $20,000 for charges of fraud and embezzlement related to the construction of Diego de Holguín Boulevard (Ávalos, “El emporio…;” Lemus, Arauz and Valencia; “Exviceministro Ochoa Gómez). Another associate of Grupo los Seis is

Carolina Graciela d’Aubuisson, who is not only the sister of the current mayor of Santa

Tecla, Roberto d’Aubuisson Jr., but also the daughter of Roberto d’Aubuisson, the person responsible for ordering the assassination of Archbishop Óscar Romero. It is indeed unsettling that some of the largest and most influential private security firms in El

Salvador are involved in serious labor violations within this largely unregulated industry.

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While the industry is providing jobs in the post-war economy, just as in the free trade zone sector, the salaries place employees below the poverty line, labor rights are not guaranteed or respected, and security guards lack protection under the law. In addition, many private security guards are at risk of losing their lives due to gang violence. For this reason, questions must be raised regarding the social costs and benefits of the private security industry in El Salvador.

Imbalances in Security

In a study titled, “Private security agencies in El Salvador: State of public-private sector partnerships for crime prevention in the public security system,” Juan Ricardo

Gómez Hecht of the Colegio de Altos Estudios Estratégicos of El Salvador analyzes the public/private sector partnership between the PNC and private security services. He views this partnership in crime prevention as a new alternative, and “a promising option” for solving or managing high levels of insecurity and criminality (106). In his report,

Gómez Hecht points out the high success rates that private security initiatives have had in the large shopping malls of San Salvador (e.g., Gran Vía, Multiplaza and Galerías), and in upper middle class neighborhoods. He discusses the plan, “Centros Comericales

Seguros” (“Safe Shopping Malls”), which has involved the training of approximately 200 private security technicians and guards, and the development of a network of radio communication that rapidly alerts the PNC of any suspicious activity (137). The plan has been highly successful, and has reduced vehicle theft by 27%. Further, in 2013, the number of vehicle break-ins into was reduced from 10 per month to 1 per month. This

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success has prompted the plan to be duplicated in shopping malls in Santa Tecla, a wealthy municipality that is adjacent to San Salvador.

In analyzing the success of this public-private partnership, Gómez Hecht goes on to highlight the benefits of private security in upper middle class neighborhoods. He explains that private security is a factor of prevention and dissuasion in these neighborhoods when he states:

Las colonias clase media-alta que son resguardadas por APS [agencias privadas de seguridad] y en las cuales se restringe y controla el acceso a las mismas, se configuran en “islotes” de tranquilidad y seguridad en medio de zonas urbanas turbulentas. Según residentes de dos colonias de este tipo en Santa Tecla, departamento de La Libertad, la incidencia de hurto y robo dentro de ellas es mínima y en ambos casos manifestaron que sentían total seguridad de transitar por los pasajes internos de la colonia a cualquier hora del día. Similar situación se vive en los pasajes urbanos en que se han puesto portones para limitar su acceso y se han utilizado agentes o vigilantes de seguridad privada. (The upper-middle class neighborhoods that are protected by PSA [private secutiy agents], and in which entry is controlled and restricted, make up “little islands” of tranquility and security in the middle of turbulent urban zones. According to residents of the neighborhoods of this type in Santa Tecla, [in the] department of La Libertad, the incidence of robbery and theft within them is minimal, and in both cases they affirmed that they felt total security to move about inside of the neighborhood at any time of the day. The situation is similar in the urban neighborhoods in which they have installed large gates to limit access, and have used private security agents or guards.) Igualmente, aquellos negocios que utilizan servicios privados de seguridad se tornan menos vulnerables a ser objetos de asalto o robo… (Likewise, those businesses that use private security services have become less vulnerable to being subjected to robbery or assault…) (Gómez Hecht 135).

Yet, the problem with the high levels of success of the partnership between the

PNC and private security firms is that, in practice, the constitutional right to security is

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only made available to those who can afford to pay for it, and, at the same time, gang violence continues to spiral out of control. When on the ground in San Salvador, it is clear that upper middle class neighborhoods such as San Benito in San Salvador and

Jardines de Merliot in Santa Tecla are generally safe, and in the Zona Rosa it is not dangerous for a female to walk to stores and restaurants at night. Likewise, the large and elegant shopping malls in the capital are a safe place to go in the evening with friends, family and children. In all of these areas, which are ‘above El Salvador del Mundo,’ citizens have a good deal of mobility, and, for the most part, are capable of carrying out daily errands and activities. Many municipal markets, on the other hand, are now under the control of the gangs, and have high incidences of violence and extortion. There are several of these markets in downtown San Salvador, ‘below El Salvador del Mundo,’ and in other cities and towns across the country. While the municipal markets were important centers of commerce before and during the civil war, and were popular places for everyday shopping, many in the middle class now avoid them, and tourists are warned to stay away. In 2015, with so many formal and informal vendors in the capital being extorted, it appears that the large chains are becoming the only businesses that are immune to this threat.

In his article, “Los bichos gobiernan el Centro,” Óscar Martínez discusses the high incidence of violence and homicide in downtown San Salvador, and chronicles the daily reality of those who work downtown, under the control of gangs (Martínez). After interviewing a number of people involved in the daily activities of the Centro Histórico de San Salvador, Martínez remarks that he now understands that this area of the capital is

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not chaotic, but rather is under the strict order of the gangs (“Después de hablar con todos ellos, entiendo que el Centro no es un caos. Su orden es estricto”) (Martínez). In his investigation of La Peatonal, an area near the Metrocentro shopping mall where over

100 vendors set up stands on the sidewalks during the day, he shows how extortion by gangs has become deeply integrated in this informal business community. Martínez reports that La Peatonal is controlled by a click of the Mara Salvatrucha called los

Peatonales Locos Salvatrucha, and that this click has involved both the leadership and the vendors of La Peatonal in their acts of extortion. He explains that, at this market, the gang members do not collect the “rent” (la renta), but rather, the vendors themselves must collect it on behalf of the gang. Each month, the market leadership of La Peatonal designates one vending stand to collect la renta, which is then handed over to the gang.

In this way, the click forces both the leadership and the vendors to become implicated in the act of extortion, and to thereby participate in a criminal activity. In this way, the gang has been able to thoroughly integrate the crime of extortion into the fabric of the business community.

In his investigation, Martínez also interviews Norman Quijano, the former mayor of San Salvador, and the candidate for ARENA in the 2013 presidential elections.

Quijano states that the Historic Center of San Salvador lends itself to extortion because it is overcrowded with informal vendors and pedestrian zones, and has a high rate of foot traffic. He also confirms that downtown San Salvador is distinct from other areas of the capital, with respect to the control that the gangs maintain over the area. He admits that, as mayor, there were many communities that he was not able to enter unless he had the

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authorization of the gang in power. He adds that there were times in which he had to cancel inaugurations because he did not have permission to enter the community. Quijano also discusses the threats that vendors face in the capital, and their inability to change marketplaces, or to leave the marketplaces in which they work. He states:

Cuando yo hablé con algunos vendedores y les dije que ya estábamos en proceso de construir el mercado San Vicente de Paúl, cercano al Mercado Central, ellos dijeron que no podían aceptar ese ofrecimiento. Me dijeron: “No, porque la pandilla que domina esa zona no es la que domina allá.” Había amenazas. En otra ocasión, para el comercio de temporada de Navidad, fui rechazado cuando ofrecí la Plaza Libertad. Me dijeron: “Ahí no nos podemos ir, es de la otra pandilla”. Hay un control territorial de las pandillas. Ningún gobierno en los últimos años le ha podido dar una respuesta satisfactoria. (When I spoke with some vendors and told them that we were in the process of building a market in San Vicente de Paúl, close to the Central Market, they said that they couldn’t accept this offer. They told me: “No, because the gang that controls this zone is not the one that is in control there.” There were threats. On another occasion, during the Christmas shopping season, I was rejected when I offered the Plaza Libertad. They told me: “We can’t go there, it belongs to the other gang.” The gangs have territorial control. No government in the past years has been able to respond satisfactorily.) (Martínez)

Quijano also tells Martínez that vendors from two markets in the capital contacted him and asked that he evict them. They sent messages to the mayor requesting that he launch an operative to evict the vendors from their markets, in order to remove them from these areas and to free them from the gangs. Quijano notes that this was the only way in which the vendors could leave (“Era la única manera de poder irse”) (Martínez).

Martínez goes on to quote a post that Quijano published on his Facebook page on April 9,

2015, which further demonstrates the control that the gangs have over the capital.

Quijano writes:

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Esta noche hemos recibido informes de que las pandillas han decretado "toque de queda" en el Centro Histórico. Normalmente, no hemos prestado mayor atención a estas advertencias; sin embargo, ciertos indicios hacen más creíbles las amenazas en esta ocasión. Por lo tanto, queremos pedir disculpas a los vecinos del Centro Histórico porque hemos suspendido el turno de recolección nocturno en esa zona de la capital. Son aproximadamente 60 toneladas de desechos que no serán retiradas durante la noche, porque no expondremos la vida del personal de la institución. Entendemos que las autoridades ya están tomando cartas en el asunto, por lo que esperamos retomar, lo más pronto posible, la prestación de los servicios con normalidad. (Tonight we have received information that the gangs have ordered a curfew in the Historic Center. Normally, we have not paid much attention to these warnings; nevertheless, certain indicators make the threats more credible on this occasion. As such, we want to apologize to our neighbors in the Historic Center because we have suspended the nighttime trash collection in this zone of the capital. There are approximately 60 tons of garbage that will not be picked up during the night, because we will not risk the lives of the employees of this institution.) (Martínez)

Another Facebook post that Martínez quotes is that of Israel Ticas, the only forensic investigator employed by the government of El Salvador, and the subject of Juan

Passarelli and Matthew Charles’ 2013 documentary, The Engineer. In his post, Ticas refers to the dangers that adolescents and young adults face in downtown San Salvador when he states:

A todos los padres de familia que tengan hijos de 14 a 25 años y que vivan fuera de San Salvador, les daré este consejo, no los manden solos ni los dejen venir solos al Centro… Se exponen a ser privados de libertad, asesinados y enterrados. Que sus vestimentas sean normales, sin cachuchas rectas ni pantalones flojos ni tenis Nike ni Adidas Domba. Que no caminen solos por el área de Catedral, por el mercado Sagrado Corazón, el mercado Central, el Zurita, el parque Bolívar, la Avenida, la Tiendona y por la terminal de Oriente… Se me han acercado muchas personas buscando a sus hijos desaparecidos en el Centro y he desenterrado cadáveres que fueron traídos desde el Centro y enterrados en predios baldíos en los alrededores de la ciudad… (To all the parents that have children between 14 and 25 years old who live outside of San Salvador, I give you this advice, do not send them alone, nor allow them

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to come alone downtown… They are exposed to being kidnapped, killed and buried. Make sure that their clothing is normal, without stiff, tall baseball caps, nor baggy pants, nor Nike or Adidas Domba tennis shoes. Make sure they do not walk alone around the area of the Cathedral, around the Sagrado Corazón market, the Central market, el Zurita, Bolívar Park, the Avenida, the Tiendona, and around the Oriente bus terminal… Many people have come to me looking for their chidren who went missing downtown, and I have exhumed cadavers that were brought from downtown and buried in vacant lots in the outskirts of the city…) (Martínez)

Ticas’ words are haunting, as he is undoubtedly a credible source. Given his experience in searching for and unearthing victims, he has a first-hand understanding of the patterns of gang violence in El Salvador. As he shows in the documentary, many of the victims he recovers were very young, show signs of torture, and have been dismembered. The dangers that Ticas refers to in the above post stand in stark contrast to the ways of live in the Historic Center in the twentieth century, when the area was a center of daily activities and nightlife. Downtown San Salvador is still a center of commerce and activity, however, patterns of life have changed. While Salvadoran society was under the strict control of the authoritarian regimes prior to the civil war, many areas of El Salvador are now under the control of the mara, and many citizens in the capital are now unwilling or unable to travel to the Historic Center.

An imbalance in security has developed in the post-war era. While the expansion of private security and the focus on connecting private security guards and technicians with the PNC have had great success in the large shopping malls in the capital and in the neighborhoods of Santa Tecla, the majority of citizens across the country are denied basic freedoms. Many are not safe while traveling to work or attending school, many lack

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mobility as they cannot cross into rival gang territory, and as Norman Quijano explains, many are not able to choose where they live and work. That is, while the expansion of private security has had a positive effect for the communities ‘above El Salvador del

Mundo,’ in other areas of the capital, and across the country, the gangs have attained unprecedented control over markets, towns and municipalities. The public-private partnership between the PNC and private security firms described by Gómez Hecht is therefore a promising new alternative for protecting only a specific minority of

Salvadoran citizens –those who are wealthy and can afford the cost of private security.

Challenging Linear Logics

More than twenty years have passed since democratization. Following the signing of the Peace Accords, the Constitution of El Salvador was rewritten, the authoritarian regime was dismantled, and the country has been successful in holding free and fair elections. Yet, ordinary citizens are no more secure today than they were under the authoritarian regimes. The perpetrators of violence have changed, and the dangers that citizens now face are different from those that were present during the twentieth century.

What has not changed is the fact that the majority of Salvadorans lack the ability to avoid or escape poverty, to seek a better life for their children, and to choose their own destiny.

Because the issues facing Salvadoran society have only worsened since democratization, and the implementation of CAFTA and the Partnership for Growth, at this moment in history it is crucial that public discourses examine and question the linear and hierarchical logics advanced by entities such as ANEP, CAMTEX, Giuliani Safety &

Security, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Is the economy of El Salvador

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failing and does violence continue to escalate because of corruption, waste, and the misappropriation of funds on the part of the Sánchez Cerén administration? Or, are there other factors involved? Are failed state, good governance and development theories the answer for reducing poverty and insecurity in El Salvador? Or, has the time come for the public to now reconceive and redefine these models?

Although the full Fomilenio budgets are not accessible, it is clear that massive amounts of funding have been allocated for the construction of state of the art electricity and transportation networks, and that there is a powerful and streamlined focus on expanding free trade industries and on becoming fully integrated into the Mesoamerican

Project. Following Raúl Moreno, it is clear that although ordinary citizens do benefit from modern and efficient highways, and reliable electricity and telecommunications services, these state of the art networks are not a panacea for social and economic issues facing El Salvador (Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and FTAA…” 166). That is, modern infrastructure is a tool for development, but given El Salvador’s lack of autonomy in determining the terms of free trade within its own borders, the construction of the logistical corridor does not guarantee that living conditions will improve for ordinary citizens.

There are agents inside the United States and El Salvador including the National

Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP) and the Washington Office on Latin America

(WOLA) that attribute violent crime to a weak, unaccountable and corrupt Salvadoran state. There are also agents in the United States that promote U.S.-driven development strategies, including the Fomilenio projects, as the solution for improving the standard of

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living in El Salvador. While these viewpoints and strategies may be expedient for some, and may advance particular political and economic objectives, they are specious logics.

There are heavy costs associated with the expansion of free trade in El Salvador which are externalized and absorbed by ordinary citizens. This externalization of costs is evident in cases of low and flexible wages, labor violations, environmental degradation, and the contraction of state’s ability to provide social services. With respect to the logic of a failed state, it is true that political corruption and clientalism are issues that must be documented and addressed in El Salvador. However, the root of current insecurity is not a weak and inefficient government. Further, a singular focus on the failed state and on

U.S.-driven development programs serves as a distraction from the ways in which transformations in value orientations are contributing to poverty and violent crime.

Further, these linear logics also serve as a means of laying the very groundwork for economic liberalization in the region. Since violent crime in El Salvador is often linked to a logic of a failed state in public and official conversations, discussions in El Salvador and the U.S. remain focused on this viewpoint, and fail to recognize the role that asymmetrical trade negotiations have played in transforming the social fabric. For this reason, these conversations do not consider the need for El Salvador to gain autonomy in its trade negotiations. Therefore, both failed state and U.S.-directed development theories serve as a distraction that is helping to advance the expansion of free trade throughout

Central America, and the liberalization of Central American economies.

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Chapter 6: Rumors of Insecurity Post-Democratization

The events and activities surrounding insecurity in democratized El Salvador are multiple and interconnected, and in searching for the root causes of the homicide epidemic, there is no singular origin or point of unity. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the linear logics developed by proponents of free trade as a means of confronting the issues facing the citizenry are a flawed approach. The epidemic of insecurity can only begin to be understood by approaching the issues at hand from multiple directions. For this reason, the present research seeks to contribute to a mapping of the interconnected dimensions. This map is already being traced by a number of journalists and academics working in El Salvador, and their work reveals that the linear logics advanced by proponents of free trade in Central America are misleading and specious. In an effort to continue this mapping, the present chapter documents a series of rumors related to the epidemic of violence. The accounts examined in this chapter relate to rumors of social cleansing, and rumors of curfews that were to be imposed different cities in El Salvador, under the threat of violence. In total, twelve news reports were analyzed from newspapers that vary in circulation volume and ideological orientation. These news reports document a variety of rumors that circulated via e-mail, social media, leaflets, and word of mouth.

Just as the rumors themselves varied from one account to the next, journalistic reporting of the rumors varied, as well. Because rumors provide insight into the fears, biases, and

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perceptions of a community, they provide an important entry point for mapping the violent crime epidemic. The hope is that, alongside the documentation of statistical data and representations of economic precarity and insecurity presented in the proceeding chapters, the documentation of rumors circulating post-democratization will provide additional perspectives regarding the ways in which ordinary citizens perceive and experience violent crime. As such, the rumors in this chapter serve as an additional entry point for tracing the dimensions connected to the violence epidemic.

Rumors, which are unverified accounts, provide a distinct entry point for approaching situations of instability, given the insight they provide into affected communities. This is because rumors index the perceptions, preoccupations and biases of a community, and as such, can reveal which events a community finds important. With respect to rumor content, the accounts documented in this chapter relate to two types of events seen since democratization: clandestine acts of social cleansing, and the imposition of curfews under the threat of violence. These phenomena are familiar within the historical context of El Salvador, since both curfews and social cleansing occurred under authoritarianism and during the civil war. These activities have persisted post- democratization, although the perpetrators of violence and the social context have changed. Therefore, these rumors, which circulated in daily conversations and via media reports, are an entry point for examining insecurity, as they were generated within the context of current imbalances in public security, and of the dangers posed by the militarized strategies imposed to confront the homicide epidemic (e.g., Mano Dura, Plan

El Salvador Segura, and the GSS Recommendations). As such, the rumors surrounding

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social cleansing and the threat of curfew provide insight into the ways in which violence and insecurity are experienced by citizens. This chapter begins with a review of the theories of rumor developed by Gary Alan Fine, Linda Dégh, Ralph L. Rosnow, Nicholas

DiFonzo, Prashant Bordia, Sudhir Kakar, and most recently, Carl Lindahl. The chapter then documents four rumors that have circulated in El Salvador post-democratization, and closes with a brief discussion of official responses to insecurity.

Rumors as a Collective Search for Meaning

In their 2007 article, “Rumor, Gossip and Urban Legends,” Nicholas DiFonzo and

Prashant Bordia define rumor as, “unverified and instrumentally relevant information statements in circulation that arise in contexts of ambiguity, danger or potential threat, and that function to help people make sense and manage risk” (19-20). They explain that rumors relate to, and can be understood via the three facets of social discourse – content, context, and function. In terms of content, the information circulated by rumors is always unverified. The details of a rumor may eventually be found to be true or false, but when this information is being circulated in the rumor stage it is unsubstantiated, and is based on weak and insecure standards of evidence (Bordia and DiFonzo 24; Rosnow and Fine

11). Ralph L. Rosnow and Gary Alan Fine explain that in times of crisis, when situations are understood to be highly important and ambiguous, people tend to have a low critical sensibility (52). In this context, communities may rely on types of evidence that are not firm or reliable, such as one’s hopes and feelings, the opinions of one’s peers, or how well the information accords with other ideas or statements in which one has confidence.

That is, the information may seem to concur with one’s rudimentary notions or

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understandings of a situation, and for this reason, that individual may lend the rumor some credence (Bordia and DiFonzo 24). Therefore, in times of crisis or uncertainty, people may develop a degree of confidence in or act upon information that is founded on weak evidential bases. With respect to context, rumors often emerge in situations that are ambiguous, threatening or potentially threatening, including times of crisis (Bordia and

DiFonzo 20; Rosnow and Fine 19-20). At these times, information regarding the situation may not be readily apparent, and information sources, such as broadcast media and official political discourse, may be unreliable and untrustworthy. This can lead to feelings of uncertainty within communities, as well as to a sense of a heightened need for security.

Rosnow and Fine note that humans have a core psychological need to make sense of their environment (50-57). In times of uncertainty, when security is questionable and the truth is not directly forthcoming, people piece together information as best they can.

When situations are undefined, we begin to rationalize and to search for meaning, in an effort to relieve tension and anxiety. This effort to understand and define our environments relates to the third facet of social discourse – function. Rumors emerge within ambiguous, uncertain and confusing contexts, which lead people to feel the need to understand and manage their situation. This is the function of rumor. When the context is unclear, and people sense a need for understanding, accounts based on weak standards of evidence can enter into circulation. Communities may then begin a discussion and evaluation of these informal hypotheses, in an act of collective sense-making and information seeking, thereby developing group interpretations. As Bordia and DiFonzo state, “…these collective hypotheses and the associated discussions are rumor” (21). This

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activity helps communities to manage real or perceived threats, and to gain a sense control over their environment, as they work to avoid or neutralize potential dangers. For example, if the residents of San Salvador are told that gangs have imposed a curfew over a number of municipalities, they may take the opportunity to actively control their environments. Individuals may leave work early, take their children out of school, and stay indoors until morning. Because there is a high level of ambiguity in this potentially threatening situation, and because there is a history of violence in El Salvador and of unreliability within media and official discourses, in this situation an individual’s verification norms may be relaxed (Bordia and DiFonzo 21; Rosnow and Fine 52). One may construct knowledge based on feelings, opinions and prior experiences, given that credible evidence is not readily available. In this way, communities can work to find meaning and make sense of the situation within a socially and historically determined frame of reference (Rosnow and Fine 18).

It is important to note two additional aspects of rumor that relate to the different areas of social discourse. First, by nature, rumors are communicative activities. As

Rosnow and Fine note, they are social exchanges and communication processes by which, “…a loosely bound collectivity arrives at a collectively sanctioned solution to a problem” (56). They are group efforts to define what is occurring, they are discussed and spread through community networks, and they serve to relieve collective social anxieties

(Rosnow and Fine 22, 54). A rumor would not be a rumor if it were not a communicative social activity. The second aspect that should be noted is that rumors are perceived as being useful and important to the communities in which they circulate. Because they

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relate to moments of uncertainty and potential danger, rumors are important. As they serve to find meaning and to manage threat, they are understood as being useful, helping people to determine, “what is so, and how to act in case it is so” (Bordia and DiFonzo

24). Rosnow and Fine explain that rumor is a social transaction (4-6, 45, 62). When a rumor is unverified, and when it relates to an important and ambiguous event, it is valued, and the information circulated by the rumor is highly sought after. When a rumor is discredited, or when it ceases to be interesting or important, it loses its relevance and

‘dies,’ falling out of circulation (Rosnow and Fine 42, 44, 48). In this way, rumors can be understood as social transactions that serve to construct interpretations of important situations and events.

Foundational Rumors

To analyze how the conversation on violence is being represented in public discourses in El Salvador, I examine rumors relating curfews and social violence. Several stories of curfews have circulated over the past decade, which threatened violence if individuals were found outdoors after dark. The fear of a curfew resonates in El Salvador, as curfews were common prior to democratization. This fear continues into the present – in 2010 and 2012, the federal government, backed by anti-gang legislation, declared a state of exception and imposed curfews in neighborhoods with the highest incidence of violence (El Diario de Hoy, “Ex Director”). Thus, the rumors analyzed by this project which have circulated in recent years, and have emerged from a context of instability and violence that has persisted in El Salvador for almost a century.

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Sudhir Kakar writes about rumor circulation in northwest India, near the border with Pakistan, and has found essentially the same rumors circulating within different cultural contexts. The details of these rumors vary according to the technologies and practices that are unique to each area, but the core content remains the same. Also, the identity of the perpetrator gets transposed, according to the ideologies and positionality of the narrator (Kakar 55; Bordia and DiFonzo 95). For example, with the rumors circulating in Hindu communities, it is Muslims that are the perpetrators of violence. In

Muslim communities, Hindus are the perpetrators. This may also be the case with the rumors documented in El Salvador. Among the accounts examined, the rumor that gained widest circulation, and was discussed in La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy, positioned gangs as the perpetrators of violence. Two years earlier, another rumor of a curfew circulated in a small town via leaflets. It was only marginally reported by the major and secondary news outlets, and it positions a death squad as the perpetrator of violence.

The stories warning of a curfew can be categorized as what Kakar terms

“fundamental rumors,” in that they reach our sense of “background safety,” and attack our sense of basic trust in society (55). Fundamental rumors often attribute danger to normally safe activities carried out in public spaces – necessary activities, such as commuting to work by bus (Kakar 56). The rumors of a curfew, threatening violence, prohibit residents from being outside after dusk – a time when many are commuting and running errands. Kakar argues that, because fundamental rumors tap into our deepest fears and anxieties, they can work to release, “…our paranoid potential and its

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accompanying persecutory anxiety” (56). Since they tap into our fear strangers, and the potentially malevolent acts they might carry out against us, these rumors can help us to identify and maintain relationships with our own in-group, through derogation of the out- group (Bordia and DiFonzo 94). It has been well-documented that negative rumors regarding a specific group can instigate hostile reactions and incite violence, and can also serve as justification for preemptive or retaliatory attacks against an out-group (Bordia and DiFonzo, 96).46

“The Right to be Wrong”

In his work on Hurricaine Katrina legendry, Carl Lindahl discusses the visceral nature of rumor. He notes that a rumor must be felt, and must engage personal belief

(Lindahl 141). If it does not affect one personally, it is taken in as just another story, and does not ‘stick.’ Therefore, he argues that rumors express a community’s convictions regarding what is possible, what is plausible, and what is right (Lindahl 140, following:

Dégh 2001; Dégh and Vázsonyi 1973; Dégh and Vázsonyi 1995). In this way, they can reflect a community’s deep-seated beliefs, its biases, its fears, and its racial or class prejudices. One question that is central to Lindahl’s research is, Who has the right to be wrong? In the wake of Katrina, false rumors that conformed with dominant racial stereotypes – e.g., that African American gangs were rioting and committing rape and murder in the Super Dome, and that snipers had fired at a Red Cross helicopter – were broadcast via every major U.S. news network, and by at least 150 news outlets worldwide

(Lindahl 145, 148; Welch). Despite the fact that these rumors were later discredited by

46 See also: Lindahal; Fine and Turner; Fine and Ellis. 229

Coast Guard officials, FEMA and the New York Times (Lindahl notes that press lagged in reporting this correction), Rebecca Solnit shows that they are still broadly accepted as fact in the United States (Lindahl 145-146; Welch; Solnit 2010). Furthermore, immediately following Katrina, these stories prevented volunteers from reaching storm survivors, as officials deemed the situation to be too dangerous, and denied volunteers access to the affected areas (Lindahl 148). Thus, the media made these false rumors psychologically true, and these stories resulted in real suffering (149). Lindahl points out that this “worn script of ‘criminal minorities,’” or “master script of chaos,” has infected stories of urban disorder for all of history, adding that, “It was through the media that we got the details, but the fears came directly from us” (146). That is, if white Middle

America does not want to acknowledge structural inequalities in the United States, it is much easier for us to excuse our own failures, and cast blame on others. From there, news media appropriates and supports our negative fantasies to serve each outlet’s particular interests (148).

On the other hand, the stories relating to the fears of those who survived the flood

(e.g., that the U.S. military had blown up the levees to save wealthier neighborhoods) were rejected, and were never reported by mainstream media. Still, these rumors have their foundations in real experience: in 1927 the levees were dynamited and St. Bernard

Parish was flooded to save New Orleans, and in the wake of Hurricane Katrina the United

States was abandoning its own citizens (Lindahl 150-151). In addition, Lindahl learned of a number of first-hand accounts of storm victims that risked their own safety in order to rescue strangers (147, 163). Yet, these African American heroes were not celebrated by

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the U.S. news media, and these are not the accounts of Katrina that live on in the collective memories of white Middle America (163). This brings us back to Lindahl’s central argument – in times of uncertainty, who has the right to be wrong, and who is denied the right to claim experience? In this vein, it is important to note that major news outlets have the power to enable certain foundationless rumors to circulate and thrive, while suppressing and rejecting stories that do not correspond with their objectives or interests (171).

In documenting the rumors that follow, this research does not carry out a detailed analysis of the objectives, alliances or biases of media outlets in El Salvador, although further research in this area is warranted and some aspects of media coverage are discussed. Rather, this chapter considers rumors as manifestations of current insecurity, and as entry points for mapping the interconnected dimensions of economic precarity and insecurity that have developed since the Peace Accords. In this way, this research aims to contribute to a reorientation of conversations regarding instability since democratization.

The discussion will begin by documenting rumors of a curfew was to be imposed on

Grater San Salvador in October 2009.

Rumors of a Curfew in San Salvador – October 19, 2009

On the days leading up to October 19, 2009, mass e-mails began circulating in

Greater San Salvador. They warned that maras were threatening to impose a curfew over a number of municipalities in the capital. One version of these e-mails stated the following:

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Ojalá que todo esto sea una mentira de lo contrario tenemos nuestra debida precaución… Avisen a sus familiares para que no nos agarren desprevenidos, con esta gente nunca se sabe con qué saldrán. Un investigador de policía advirtió que el próximo lunes, [el] 19 [de] Octubre los mareros van a lanzar una ofensiva contra la ciudadanía por todos lados. Así que hay que tener mucho cuidado!!! Van a estar todas las calles súper peligrosas!!! Hay que hacer énfasis en Lourdes, Opico, Soya y Apopa!! Así que tengan cuidado!!! (Hopefully all of this is a lie, in case it isn’t we must take precautions… Warn the people you know so that they won’t catch us unprepared, with these people you never know what they’ll come up with. A police investigator has warned that next Monday, October 19, the maras will launch a widespread offensive against the citizenry. So, be very careful!!! All of the streets will be super dangerous!!! Emphasis must be placed on Lourdes, Opico, Soya and Apopa!! So, be very careful!!!). (Equipo Psicoloquio)

The e-mails went viral. The rumor also spread by word of mouth, and news of the curfew was picked up by broadcast media. The details varied from one account to the next. On October 19, the day of the supposed curfew, the rumor was altered and elaborated even further, as it circulated among communities. However, the basic story stayed the same. Maras had imposed a curfew on the city. At a certain time (ranging from

5:00 to 8:00 p.m., according to different versions), everyone was to be indoors. Schools and businesses were to close, and taxis and busses were not to circulate. Anyone found outside after the designated hour would be killed. Many people would be murdered.

According to some accounts, this offensive was being launched by maras in order to protest violations against their human rights, and the harsh anti-gang laws that had recently passed in the Salvadoran legislature (Baires Quezada; González). Some accounts claimed that the gangs were demanding negotiations with the Minister of Defense and of the Interior, or with other members of the government (González). Nothing could be verified, and the press released a flurry of reports. President Funes and the National

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Police (PNC) immediately set out to control the rumor, and discredited the e-mails.

Officials assured the nation that any news regarding a curfew was untrue, and they urged the press not to circulate false information. Under these circumstances, the president said, the press should always defer to the police, the only agency that is authorized to confirm or deny such claims (Grimaldi, “PNC Desmiente”). The rumor turned out to be false – no curfew was imposed upon the city, and no one was killed as a result of circulating outdoors at night. After October 19, some news outlets reported that on the night of the supposed curfew, citizens in the affected areas had been in a panic, closing themselves up in their homes, and that evening busses and taxis had suspended their routes. Other news outlets reported that that there had been nothing out of the ordinary – that most businesses had remained open, the city center had been filled with people, and that there had not been a heightened police presence. Just as the rumor itself had varied from one account to the next, the media’s reporting of the rumor varied, as well.

The e-mails that gave life to the rumor of a curfew began circulating about one week prior to October 19, and were written by anonymous authors (Baires Quezada). As mentioned above, the details varied from one account to the next, and when the news began circulating via word of mouth, the rumor evolved even further (Baires Quezada).

Local newspapers reported the information that follows. Some of the subject lines of the messages read, “AVISEN, TENGAN MUCHÍSIMO CUIDADO,” “POR SI ACASO,”

“PARA TENER PRECAUCIÓN,” and “OFENSIVA DE MAREROS” (“WARNING, BE

VERY CAREFUL,” “JUST IN CASE,” “TAKE PRECAUTION,” and “MARA

OFFENSIVE”) (Baires Quezada). The anonymous authors stated that they had received

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news of the curfew from a friend, neighbor, or co-worker, according to different accounts, and that this acquaintance was the relative of either a police investigator or a government official. Some of the e-mails warned that the curfew would be imposed on the poorer suburbs and areas of the capital, including Lourdes, Soyapango, San Marcos,

Ilopango, San Juan Opico, Quezaltepeque, Apopa, and the historic center of San

Salvador. Other e-mails stated that middle and upper class neighborhoods would also be affected, including San Luis, Escalón, Satélite, Miravalle and Merliot (Baires Quezada).

The time of the curfew was unclear, some messages stated 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m., or even later, and it was not certain whether the e-mails were sent by the Mara Salvatrucha, the Mara 18, by both, or by neither of the two (Equipo Psicoloquio). All versions warned of a potential offensive against the citizenry that was to be launched by mareros all over the capital, and they all warned that many people would be killed (Baires Quezada). The similarities and variations reported by local newspapers, as different versions of the rumor entered into circulation, coincide with Rosnow and Fine’s discussion on the anatomy of a rumor. They state that rumors develop from a basic core, and then add, “… numerous variants, deviations, and new explanations as each person in the group

[attempts] to make sense of the ‘evidence’ at hand” (17). Indeed, as news of the curfew began circulating among communities, details were added and subtracted, and the rumor was elaborated and refined, according to the needs, habits, perceptions and reference points of the intermediaries transmitting the messages (Rosnow and Fine 41-42).

In order to examine variations in the journalistic reporting of the rumor, twelve print news reports were surveyed. Ten were published in El Salvador, one in Mexico and

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one in Uruguay. Some of these reports were released on October 19, while others were released on the days following. As mentioned above, just as the details of the rumor had varied from one e-mail to the next, the media’s reporting of the rumor varied, as well.

While some newspapers reported that on October 19 it was business as usual, others reported that there was hysteria in the capital. This coincides with Rosnow and Fine’s theories regarding the relationship between the ideological slants of newspapers and the contents of the rumors printed:

Few reporters or editors would tamper with information coming from authoritative sources. However, that does not preclude their patterning the news reports to their own viewpoints and value orientations. … [A well- known study in mass communications research conducted by Allport and Faden] found that, for the majority of papers surveyed, news items favoring the editorial policy of the paper received more space. Supportive facts and opinions were placed at the beginning of a news article, opposing facts and opinions were placed at the end. Allport and Postman later noted that, “This sly editorial device served to level out in the reader’s mind the disfavored view and to sharpen the favored.” (103)

Three of the articles published on October 19 focus on the efforts of President

Funes and the National Police (PNC) to discredit the rumor, stating that it was merely a strategy to instill fear in the population, and that no crimes relating to the curfew had been committed (Abarca; Grimaldi “PNC Desmiente”). La Prensa Gráfica, one of the two major daily newspapers in El Salvador, reports that in Soyapango, Lourdes and

Apopa nothing was out of the ordinary: at 5:30 p.m., most businesses remained open, the town centers were filled with people, and there was not a heightened police presence

(Abarca).

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Two articles published on October 19 (at 7:30 p.m. and 9:30 p.m.) by La Página, a conservative digital newspaper, depict an entirely different situation. In these same areas – Soyapango, Lourdes and Apopa – La Página reports that early in the evening taxis and buses had suspended their routes, many businesses had closed out of fear, residents were indoors, and few people were circulating in the streets (Redacción de la

Página 2009). The language in La Página appears to focus on fear: “Este incidente generó que el pánico se acrecentara…;” “…el pánico ha obligado a las personas a encerrarse en las colonias…;” “…muchos negocios cerraron desde temprano por temor”

(“This incident has caused panic to grow...,” “...panic has obligated people to stay indoors in the neighborhoods…,” “…many businesses closed early out of fear…”) (Redacción de la Página 2009). The PNC’s negation of the rumor is not inserted until the end of the article, and this information is stated in just two sentences. These articles published by La

Página add two new variations to the rumor. The first is that, in addition to the circulation of e-mails, the gangs had spread news of the curfew with flyers. However, the article notes that it has no evidence of the flyers. The second variation is that maras had raised the extortion rate for taxis and busses from $10 to $20 in Los Ángeles and Apopa.

La Página reported that the doubled rent, added to the threat of the curfew, caused taxis and busses to suspend their routes in these neighborhoods (Grimaldi, “Pandillas amenazan”). The other publications analyzed make no reference to the flyers or the increased extortion rate. In La Página, the photographs published alongside the news articles were not taken on October 19, but are taken from the archives. They depict sinister-looking gang members covered in tattoos, gesturing gang signals. It appears that

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the reports in La Página contradict Funes’ request not propagate rumors of the curfew, and to defer to the authority of the PNC.

As mentioned above, in the end, the rumor of a curfew was discredited. On

October 19, the number of homicides committed in El Salvador was sixteen, one more than what was committed on the same day in 2008, and two more than the daily average for October, 2009 (Baires Quezada). According to some publications, state authorities confirmed that the e-mails did not originate with the maras. La Vanguardia reports that the PNC attributed the e-mails to people who intended to instill psychological fear in the population, while the Uruguayan publication La Red 21 attributed them to the ultra-right and to narco-traffickers, who had wished to destabilize the Funes administration

(González; Monzón de León, “Pandillas se desligan”). El Faro reported that the Minister of Justice and Security deemed the rumor an operation of psychological warfare, and attributed its origins to groups that feared President Funes’ 80% approval rating, to organized crime, or to people that wanted to divert attention from the internal problems of the opposing party, ARENA (Baires Quezada). Interestingly, supposed members of the

Mara Salvatrucha and the Mara 18 released a statement disconnecting themselves from the rumor of a curfew:

Nosotros en ningún momento hemos decretado atentar contra la ciudadanía, ni el sector transporte mucho menos a la población. Creemos que este es un acto irresponsable de personas ajenas a las pandillas que lo único que buscan es seguir lucrándose de la inseguridad. ... Queremos hacer un llamado al gobierno para que se escuchen nuestras peticiones, ya que nosotros, como pandilleros por mucho tiempo hemos sido señalados como culpables de toda la criminalidad del país. (At no time have we ordered a threat against the citizenry, nor the transportation sector, and much less against the populace. We believe that this is the irresponsible act of people who are not affiliated with the gangs, and who

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only seek to benefit from this insecurity… We want to call on the government to listen to our petitions, given that we, as gang members, have been blamed for all of the crime in the country for a long time.). (Monzón de León, “Pandillas se desligan”)

In a commentary released by El Faro on November 9, 2009, Rodrigo Baires

Quezada states that the rumor of a curfew was only a trigger, un detonante, to reconfirm the sense of insecurity that the majority of the population feels on a daily basis. He further states that, if the only part of the e-mails that came into fruition were a large number of homicides, this would be nothing out of the ordinary with respect to daily experience. In this way, Baires Quezada argues that the rumor of the curfew, or the toque de queda, is just another reference point of uncertainty and insecurity, which forms part of the collective memory of violence in contemporary El Salvador.

Rumors of Social Cleansing

A Curfew in Chalchuapa, Santa Ana – August 19, 2007

ComUnica is a digital newspaper published by graduate students in Social

Communications at the Universidad Centroamericana of El Salvador. It reports that, in

August 2007, rumors of a curfew circulated in the town of Chalchuapa, immediately following the assassination of several alleged gang members. On August 19, 2007, seven alleged mareros were murdered in Chalchuapa. The following day, a leaflet signed by a suspected death squad was distributed throughout the town. It stated that a campaign would begin at 10:00 p.m. to cleanse Chalchuapa of the delinquents that were robbing the town of its tranquility, and it warned citizens to stay indoors:

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Atención chalchuapanecos, por su propio bienestar les aconsejamos no andar en las calles a partir de las diez de la noche, ya que estaremos iniciando una campaña de limpieza de tantos maleantes que andan quitándonos la tranquilidad… (Attention Chalchuapanecos, for your own well-being we advise you not to circulate in the streets after 10:00 p.m., given that we will be initiating a cleansing campaign against all of the criminals who go around robbing us of our peace…). (Macal)

According to ComUnica, police reported that beginning at 9:00 p.m., the streets were empty and silent, and remained that way on subsequent nights. Among those killed on August 19 was six year old Wilber Geovanni Cruz, the son of an alleged former member of the Mara 18 (Macal). In police reports, witnesses state that two unknown men approached Wilber and his parents as they were walking down the street, and without speaking, began to shot at Wilber’s father, Alexander. At this time, Alexander started to flee. He was shot in the leg, but managed to escape. While Alexander was being pursued, the boy got loose from his mother’s hand and ran after the gunmen, asking them not to shoot his father. Wilber was then shot in the head. He died two hours later, while

Alexander survived. El Diario de Hoy reports that in 2007, a general fear had overcome

Chalchuapa, due to a spike in homicides. In the town, seventeen people had been killed between August 1 and August 27, 2007, ten had been killed in July, and nine in June. The mayor, Mario Ramos, stated, “ha sido raro el día que no ha habido muertes violentas”

(“it has been rare to have a day without violent deaths”) (Macal). In contrast to the rumor of a curfew that circulated on October 19, 2009, the curfew in Chalchuapa does not appear to have received widespread media attention. This investigation was able to locate just one report of the incident in a mainstream publication, El Diario de Hoy.

Additionally, it located the report ComUnica, and discussions in two blogs published by

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Juan José Dalton (Macal; Dalton, “Chalchuapa;” Dalton “El Salvador”). No mention of

Wilber Geovanni Cruz or of the curfew in Chalchuapa were found in La Prensa Gráfica,

La Página, or in any other news outlet.

Will Salgado, Mayor of San Miguel (2000 – 2015)

Will Salgado, a retired military sergeant and well-known member of GANA (a conservative political party that split in 2010 from the nation’s principal right-wing party,

ARENA), served as the mayor of San Miguel from 2000 to 2015. Despite his involvement in controversies – for example, since 2000 Salgado has been a member of four different political parties– he maintained strong support in the nation’s third largest city, due in part to his hardline approach towards combating gang violence. Salgado’s rise to prominence as a politician was a result of the attention he received in the

Salvadoran media, when in 1995 he was tried and convicted of homicide.

In that year, Salgado was convicted and imprisoned for participating in the assassination of thirty individuals. Along with five others, he was charged with illicit association, weapons possession, and criminal homicide (Soriano). In June 1996, all six men, including Salgado, were cleared of their charges and released from prison. One of the principal witnesses in the trial, Sgt. Mabel Quintanilla, pointed out that Salgado was one of the kingpins in the Sombra Negra death squad, which supposedly had assassinated criminals in one of the most populous neighborhoods of San Miguel. Since 1995, rumors have circulated regarding Salgado’s affiliation with the Sombra Negra. In 2003, the

British foreign affairs program Unreported World released a documentary on social violence in El Salvador, in which journalist Sandra Jordan interviewed Salgado. In the

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interview, Salgado acknowledges his homicide conviction, and does not deny his involvement in the Sombra Negra:

Jordan: “Is it true the Black Shadow killed gang members?”

Salgado: Sí existió, e incluso yo estuve acusado de treinta homicidos. ... Entonces, la gente busca, quiere, pide, por decir así, que se haga justicia de cualquier forma. ... Bueno, la epidemia sí se terminó...” (Yes, it existed, and even I was accused of thirty homicides. … So, the people seek, they want, they ask, so to speak, that justice be carried out in any way possible. … Well, the epidemic has ended…). (“Killing to Belong”)

Despite this indirect admission, a 2010 interview published by the digital newspaper La Página contradicts the rumor that Salgado was involved with the death squad. The interview is carried out with an anonymous man living in Houston called

J.M., who claims to be a former member of the Sombra Negra. Interestingly, the article states that during the civil war, J.M. was a high ranking officer in the Third Infantry

Brigade – the same brigade in which Salgado had served in the 1980s (Cortéz; Soriano).

J.M. begins by describing the small-scaled nature of the Sombra Negra, and its lack of widespread influence (the report refers to the name ‘Comando antidelincuencial,’ which

J.M. states was the initial name of the Sombra Negra):

Reporter: ¿Cuántos eran los del Comando Antidelincuencial? (How many people made up the Comando Antidelincuencial?)

J.M.: No eramos más de diez personas. Nos movíamos en grupos de tres o cuatro y en la noche salíamos a buscar a los delincuentes que ya teníamos identificados. Nunca matamos a indigentes o a personas sospechosas, solo a delincuentes reconfirmados. Nunca capturaron a uno de nosotros. ... (We were not more than ten people. We used to move in groups of three of four, and at night we would go out and search for criminals that we had already identified. We never killed indigents or suspicious people, only confirmed criminals. None of us were ever captured. …)

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Reporter: ... ¿Cuántos años se mantuvo vigente la Sombra Negra? (How many years did the Sombra Negra remain in force?)

J.M.: En realidad menos de dos. Cuando terminamos con los delincuentes en La Curruncha, ya sea porque los matamos o se fueron huyendo, nos calmamos. (In reality, less than two. When we put an end to the criminals in La Curruncha, either because we killed them, or because they had fled, we calmed down.). (Cortéz)

With regard to Salgado, J.M. goes on to state that any allegations of his involvement in the Sombra Negra are false:

Reporter: ¿A ustedes quien los protegía, quienes eran sus patrocinadores? (Who protected you, who were your sponsors?)

J.M.: Nadie nos protegía. Teníamos contactos en la PNC que nos indicaban en que zonas no había presencia policial. Patrocinadores, pues habían dos o tres empresarios que nos daban los recursos, como vehículos, dinero y hasta armas y municiones. (Nobody protected us. We had contacts in the National Police Force that informed us of the areas in which there was no police presence. Sponsors, well there were two or three business owners that provided us with resources, like vehicles, money, and even arms and ammunition.)

Reporter: ¿Esos empresarios fueron detenidos? (Were these business owners arrested?)

J.M.: Eso nos daba risa porque capturaron al ahora alcalde Wil Salgado y a otros comerciantes, pero ellos no tenían nada que ver con nosotros. Quizá ayudaban a los empresarios que nos daban la colaboración, pero en realidad no estaban vinculados con nosotros. Todos decían que Salgado estaba involucrado porque él tenía motivos, ya que había sido víctima de los delincuentes en varias ocasiones, pero en realidad él no era parte de la estructura. ... (This made us laugh because they captured the current mayor of San Miguel and other businesspeople, but they had nothing to do with us. Perhaps they helped the business owners that were collaborating with us, but in reality they did not have ties with us. Everyone said that Salgado was involved because he had motive, since he had been a victim of criminals on various occasions, but in reality he was not part of the structure. …)

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Reporter: ... ¿De las personas detenidas, alguno tuvo relación con la Sombra Negra? (Of those who were detained, did any of them have ties with the Sombra Negra?)

J.M.: Si, efectivamente, dos de los procesados sí nos apoyaban. Por supuesto no puedo decir quienes, pero sí había dos. Lo que pasa es que todo apuntaba a Salgado y hasta ahora no creo que él se haya involucrado, talvez alguna vez dio dinero a quienes nos patrocinaban, pero la verdad no estoy seguro. Salgado tenía fama de hablador y quizá por eso lo involucraron. Por supuesto yo no pongo las manos al fuego por nadie, porque es posible que los que ejecutábamos no conocieran a todos los que nos apoyaban. (Yes, for sure, two of the accused had helped us. Of course I cannot say who, but yes there were two. What happened was that everything pointed to Salgado and still today I don’t believe he was involved, perhaps at one point he gave money to those who were sponsoring us, but the truth is that I am not sure. Salgado was known to brag and perhaps for that reason they involved him. Of course I won’t put my hands to the fire for anyone [i.e., I can’t guarantee anything], because it is possible that those of us in charge did not know everyone who was helping us). (Cortéz)

Therefore, the circumstances surrounding both the existence of the Sombra Negra and Salgado’s involvement remain unclear, as competing rumors tell contradicting versions of the story. Still, J.M.’s claims appear to corroborate the official position of the government, which maintains that, if death squads do in fact exist in El Salvador, they are small in scale and operate in an isolated manner. Nevertheless, to date there are no official statistics of the number of homicides committed by death squads in El Salvador, nor have official prosecution rates for death squad members been made available.

Massacres in Suchitoto and Tonacatepeque, 2010

In early February 2010, two massacres occurred within three days of each other, one in the northern town Suchitoto, and the other in the outskirts of the capital, in

Tonacatepeque. On February 3, seven men were killed and three injured near a river in

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Suchitoto. The attack was carried out at about 2:00 p.m. by three men wearing ski masks.

On February 3, Carlos Ascencio, the Director of the PNC at that time, stated that no arrests had been made in the case, and that some of the men killed had prison records linking them to the M-18 (“Reportan massacre”). Newspapers report that high caliber military weapons were used in the attack, and that the shell casings found at the site were from an M-16, an M-22 and 9 millimeter guns. All of the bodies were left lying around a rock on which the number 18 had been written in blood. The Sub-director of the PNC,

Howard Cotto, stated that the blood may have been from a chicken that the men had been preparing to cook (“Sigue grave”). Still, the news reports do not indicate whether the blood was being tested for evidence.

Just three days later, on February 6, 2010, five men were killed and at least six injured at a roadside restaurant in Tonacatepeque (Redacción ContraPunto, “Nueva massacre…”). The attack was carried out around 11:50 p.m. by men wearing ski masks.

The shell casings found at the site were from an M-16 and 9 millimeter handgun. During the incident, men and women were separated into different rooms. The gunmen then inspected the men’s bodies for gang tattoos, asked if they were gang members, and opened fire.

Authorities report that they cannot determine whether the two incidents are related, since the shell casings found at the two sites were not from the same weapons.

However, the newspaper ContraPunto states that the characteristics of these massacres appear similar, in terms of the military arms used, and the number of victims (Redacción

ContraPunto, “Nueva massacre…”). Given that small groups of men were able to

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efficiently target larger groups of individuals, it appears that the perpetrators may have had training in police or military tactics. Newspapers report that three hypotheses were circulating following the massacres: that this was a ‘settling of scores’ carried out by a rival gang; that the homicides were committed by a hired assassin; or that death squads were responsible. These massacres generated a conversation in the media regarding a resurgence of death squads in the post-war era. However, then President Funes, stated that there was no evidence to prove that these were cases of social cleansing ("Gobierno sin elementos).

In February, 2010, the month in which these two massacres occurred, the average number of homicides was fifteen per day. On February 5, 2010, two days after the

Suchitoto massacre, and one day before the massacre in Tonacatepeque, Funes announced his intention to implement a national anti-crime plan. On September 1, 2010, this plan was realized, when the Ley Anti Maras was signed into law. The Anti-Gang

Law prohibits the existence of gangs, and makes it illegal to be a gang member, and to provide financial resources for gangs. Nevertheless, death squads were not included in the Anti-Gang law, because the legislature could not prove their existence (Mejía).

Rearranging Reality? Official Discourses on Insecurity

Government Involvement in the Gang Truce (2012 – 2014)

In March, 2012, a truce was negotiated between the two most powerful gangs in

El Salvador, the Mara Salvatrucha (or the MS-13), and the Barrio 18 (or the M-18). The truce was negotiated and mediated by Catholic Bishop Fabio Colindres, and former guerrilla leader Raúl Mijango. Over the course of 2012-2013, while the truce remained in

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force, homicide rates dropped by more than 40%. According to the terms of the truce, both gangs agreed to concessions. They pledged to reduce the number of homicides, and to regard schools as peace zones where they would not carry out forced recruitment. As a result, homicide rates improved dramatically, and some municipalities were declared

‘free of violence.’ In exchange for these concessions, several gang leaders were transferred to low security prisons where they had access to mobile phones. Perhaps more importantly, the negotiations enabled gang leaders to have an audience with powerful national figures.

The truce was a complicated, unconventional solution for an apparently unsolvable epidemic, in that it established negotiations between the Catholic Church, governmental officials and designated terrorists. In El Salvador, the truce was polarizing, and with the February 2014 elections in sight, analysts criticized then president Funes because he was reluctant to acknowledge his participation in the negotiations (Romero,

Guitérrez and Menjívar). While he initially denied his involvement, Funes later stated on

Mundo Fox that the government had served as a mere facilitator. In July, 2013, El Faro cited evidence of the government’s direct involvement in the truce (Sanz and Martínez).

José Luis Sanz and Carlos Martínez of El Faro report that former Minister of Defense

David Munguía Payés, former Vice Minister of Security, Douglas Moreno, the former

Director of the Ministry and Justice and Public Security, Santiago Flores, and the Mayor of Ilopongo were present during negotiations with gang leaders, and that one of these meetings took place at the Federal Department of Justice and Security. The newspaper published a photograph of a meeting between gang leaders and government officials that

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took place in Ilopango City Hall (in the outskirts of San Salvador), and the report states that a journalist from El Faro was present at this meeting.

During the truce, analysts were critical of Funes’ hesitancy to acknowledge his involvement, arguing that the government was seeking refuge in ambiguity (Romero,

Guitérrez and Menjívar). On May 28, 2013, La Prensa Gráfica held a political forum in which David Escobar Galindo (a novelist and legal scholar), José María Tojeira (a Jesuit priest) and Rafael Castellanos (a political activist) shared their opinions on the issue. The panelists agreed that, in order for the truce to remain successful and advance, transparency was needed, and clear objectives had to be established. They added that, in order for this to occur, the government needed to acknowledge its active role in the negotiations. Despite the El Faro report which discredits Funes’ claims that the government was not involved, Funes never acknowledged the federal government’s direct participation in the truce negotiations. By September and October of 2013, homicide rates were once again on the uptick. By 2014 the truce had collapsed, and homicide rates spiked.

While the homicide rate was 43.7 per 100,000 during the last year of the truce in

2013, it rose to 68.6 per 100,000 in 2014 (Gurney). Citing data from the World Bank,

USA Today reports that the homicide rate for 2015 was 104 per 100,000, which represents a 70% increase in one year (Gómez; Alvarado). The homicide rate for 2015 was therefore higher than the daily average during the Civil War. Although the data from

2015 are still being finalized, it appears that El Salvador now has the highest homicide rate in the world (Gómez).

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120

100

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Number of Homicides per 100,000 People

Table 6: Homicide Rates in El Salvador by Year. Data sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (for 2000-2012); Gurney (for 2013-2014); Gómez (for 2015).

Official Discourses on Social Cleansing

In June, 2012, three months after truce negotiations had begun, Raúl Mijango, one of the key negotiators of the truce, stated that death squads were operating in

Chalatenango, in northwestern El Salvador (Flores). He stated that these groups were made up of ex-military and ex-agents of the PNC who sought to bring an end to the truce:

“Estamos empezando a evidenciar, en algunas regiones del país, grupos de exterminio que están asesinando a miembros de pandilla con propósito de provocarlos y hacer que ellos rompan este proceso” (We are beginning to find evidence, in some regions of the country, of death squads that are assassinating gang members with the purpose of provoking them and making it so that they will destroy this process). (“Testigo criteriado”)

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Mijango added that it was the responsibility of the PNC to identify these groups and their funding sources, to put an end to the violence. Five days after Mijango made these statements, Ex-Minister of Defense David Munguía Payés stated that sufficient evidence was not available to prove the existence of death squads, nor of any patrons funding such groups (López; “Testigo criteriado;” “Munguía reconoce”). Munguía Payés added that the existence of death squads was suspected, however he toned down this supposition, stating that these cases had only occurred,“…un par de veces de forma aislada y no hemos podido determinar el origen y los responsables” (López). He noted that these groups were small, made up of only seven or eight people, and that they were not permanent organizations, but only carried out isolated activities (López). Munguía

Payés provided no information regarding the estimated number of homicides committed by death squads. Alluding to an earlier statement made by Raúl Mijango that a death squad was operating in Eastern El Salvador, in San Miguel, Munguía Payés stated that in this case the homicides were the result of inter-gang violence: “Solo es una pandilla más, nada más es una pandilla pequeña que controla cierto territorio en el municipio de San

Miguel” (“Munguía reconoce”). Munguía Payés’ position echoes earlier official statements regarding death squads, including Funes’ response to the 2010 massacres in

Suchitoto and Tonacatepeque, in which he affirmed that there was not enough evidence to prove that the acts were committed by death squads (“Gobierno sin elementos;”

Arbaiza). To date, the government has not released any statistics regarding the estimated number of homicides committed by death squads, or the number of groups operating in

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El Salvador. Accounts of social cleansing carried out by these groups are rarely reported by the news media.

Official Discourses and Rumor

Although Sánchez Cerén supported the gang truce during his presidential candidacy in 2013, after taking office in January 2014 he declared an official end to the truce (Meléndez and Aguilar; Chandler). Since then, he has stated on different occasions that his administration would not negotiate with members of organized crime (Meléndez and Aguilar; Guillén and Marroquín). In January 2014 Sánchez Cerén also announced the implementation of the new, five-year Plan El Salvador Seguro, which, as noted in

Chapter 3, closely coincides with the recommendations of Giuliani Security & Safety

(Lakhani).

The examination of current insecurity within the context of rumor provides a valuable entry point for mapping the issues facing El Salvador post-democratization.

While official discourses point to the objectives of each presidential administration, rumors provide insight into how insecurity is talked about and experienced among everyday citizens. Further, rumors demonstrate how unverified accounts of violence are represented in the news media. When rumors of insecurity and official responses to insecurity are examined side by side, discrepancies are revealed. Given the absence of media reporting on social cleansing and death squads, and the lack of information provided by the state, rumors of social cleansing may prove particularly important.

Since the implementation of Mano Dura policies post-democratization, and now the Plan El Salvador Seguro, homicide rates, incarceration rates, and the number of

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private security have all sharply increased. These increases coincide temporally with the implementation of free trade agreements and initiatives, and the advancement of

Mesoamerican Project. Together, these economic and social developments are causing irreparable damage for citizens post-democratization. Although clientelism and corruption do persist in the post-war era, these practices are not the linear origin of insecurity. Rather, they are a consequence of decades of foreign involvement in El

Salvador, and of El Salvador’s great lack of political autonomy. As such, political conversations surrounding insecurity in El Salvador (and surrounding Central American migration) must be reoriented to focus on the simultaneous advancement of neoliberal economic policies and militarized policing.

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Chapter 7: Conclusion

On April 19, 2016, Sergio Ramírez, the former Vice President of Nicaragua

(1986-1990) published an editorial in El Faro titled “Una guerra del siglo veintiuno” (“A

Twenty-First Century War”), in which he discusses a veritable war that is now being waged between the Salvadoran state and the region’s most powerful gangs. Journalists and scholars working in El Salvador regularly find that this conflict, which developed after the end of the civil war and the democratic transition, is in so many respects both enigmatic and incomprehensible. As discussed throughout this dissertation, the epidemic of violence in El Salvador forms part of a complex network of connections that involves economic liberalization and mass migration, and to date none of the solutions implemented by the state to confront violent crime have been successful in reducing homicide rates. Ramírez opens his editorial referring to this unprecedented and unusual state of exception in El Salvador, and to the absence of solutions that could bring the situation to a peaceful resolution:

Ninguna conversación pasa de tres minutos en San Salvador sin que vaya a dar al tema de las pandillas, y nadie, al final de las múltiples vueltas y revueltas que se le da al tema, se atreve decir que la paz llegará a corto plazo. Porque esta es una guerra, distinta en su naturaleza a la que el país vivió en los años ochenta, pero una guerra al fin y al cabo, con miles de muertos, y que si tiene por teatro los barrios de la capital, amenaza con extenderse a las áreas rurales; una guerra singular, porque los estados mayores de las bandas en conflicto dirigen las operaciones desde las cárceles, en guerra entre ellas, y en guerra con el estado. (No conversation lasts for three minutes in San Salvador without turning to the

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issue of the gangs, and nobody, after the multiple twists and turns surrounding the issue, dares to say that peace will arrive in the near future. Because this is a war, distinct in nature from the war which the country experienced in the eighties, but in the end a war, with thousands of deaths, and which if it has as its theatre the neighborhoods of the capital, it threatens to extend to the rural areas; a singular war, because the high commands of the groups in conflict direct their operations from the prisons, at war with each other, and at war with the state.) (Ramírez)

Ramírez explains that for the boys and young men that either choose or are forced to become gang members, the mara provide prestige and power, and serve as a substitute family. He adds that the mara have also come to serve as a substitute for the state, given that they now control large territories, charge taxes and impose force throughout El

Salvador, and have taken on a language that has become both political and revolutionary

(Ramírez). Ramírez refers to a study published by the Ministry of Security in 2013 when he notes that, in a country with a population of approximately 6.3 million, there are nearly half a million people that have some connection to the gangs (e.g., through gang membership, family ties or extortion). In this same study, the Ministry of Security found that there is now an average of one click (a smaller, local gang unit) per neighborhood in

El Salvador (Santos, “470,264 personas…”). Ramírez points to the gangs’ extensive control over citizens and the state when he adds that, in 2014, Salvadorans paid $30 million in extortion to the mara. He further points to their sophisticated organizational structures in noting that in July 2015, under the threat of violence, the mara were able to stop the majority of busses and taxis from operating in Greater San Salvador for a period of three days. In personal observations, the author found that during these days it was necessary for citizens to make alternative plans. Many left for work several hours early,

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and pick-up trucks began circulating and charging riders, in an improvised form of mass transportation. This paro de transporte, as it was commonly called in the media and by citizens, publically demonstrated the mara’s ability to challenge the authority of the state.

In 2016, Sánchez Cerén’s new Plan El Salvador Seguro is responding to the substantial political force that the mara have acquired. As part of the plan, the new Fuerzas de

Intervención de Territorios (FIRT) were deployed in 37 zones of Greater San Salvador in

April 2016. This militarized operation is made up of 200 police officers and 600 members of the Armed Forces, and its mission is to recover territory in the areas of the capital where the gangs maintain the strongest influence (Redacción multimedia).

Therefore, following Ramírez it becomes clear that a new type of war is indeed being waged in democratic El Salvador. This war is not acknowledged by the state, and in official discourses its significance is routinely diminished. Further, both the scope of this war and the actors involved are diffuse. On the one side are clandestine gangs, and it is difficult for the state to penetrate and articulate their complex structures. On the other side is a militarized operation masked as a police intervention, in which the state is waging war against its own citizens. This is the war of the twenty-first century in El

Salvador, and as this dissertation explains, it has developed alongside the transformation in value orientations post-democratization.

Ramírez also highlights an important class division that is inherent to the violence epidemic when he discusses the geography of violent crime. He explains that in wealthier urban areas (e.g., the San Benito suburb of San Salvador and the municipality of Santa

Tecla, both located ‘above’ the monument El Salvador del Mundo), while residents are

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informed of violent crimes, the sound of gunshots is absent. This is not the case, however, in economically excluded areas, where large expanses of territory and the very lives of residents remain under the control of the mara. Ramírez explains:

En San Salvador … en las áreas urbanas seguras no se oyen sonar los tiros, como si ese otro mundo de la violencia solo existiera en las crónicas policiales y en los noticieros de televisión; pero la guerra se libra a pocos centenares de metros en ese otro mundo donde nadie en su sano juicio entra por voluntad. (In San Salvador … in the safe urban areas gunshots are not heard, as if that other world of violence only existed in police reports and in the television news; but the war is being waged a few hundred meters away in that other world into which no one in their right mind enters of their own will). (Ramírez)

The geographical and class divisions that mark violent crime in El Salvador form part of a multiplicity of connections linking transformations in value orientations, economic scarcity, escalations in homicide, and the violation of basic rights. As discussed throughout this dissertation, these phenomena are all the more alarming given that they have developed simultaneously during the new democratic era. With the signing of the

Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992, El Salvador, a country that had historically been governed by a series of oppressive military dictatorships, began its successful transition to an electoral democracy. Despite this transition, personal observations have shown that is common for Salvadorans to say that conditions are worse today than they were during the civil war. There is a sense among citizens that while one knew what to expect during the war, the violence today is often arbitrary and erratic. Orders for extortion and assassination are handed down by invisible gang leaders to their subordinates on the ground. Death threats and demands for extortion (commonly referred to as la renta)

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sometimes arrive in the form of a note that is delivered to victims by an unknown adolescent or preteen.

The homicide epidemic has fundamentally transformed the social fabric of democratic El Salvador. As many of the journalists and scholars cited throughout this dissertation explain, the interconnected dimensions related to current insecurity reach virtually all areas of Salvadoran society, including education, labor, migration and the agricultural economy, to name only a few. Given this broad reach, the dynamics related to violent crime are often impossible to quantify, and as such they can escape simple categorization. Despite the linear logics advanced by agents including the Asociación

Nacional de la Empresa Privada (ANEP), Giuliani Security and Safety, and the

Washington Office on Latin American Affairs, the epidemic of insecurity in El Salvador cannot be easily traced to the singular cause of a corrupt and inefficient state. Corruption and clientalism do persist post-democratization, however these phenomena are not the origin of violent crime. Not only do these specious logics serve as a distraction from the underlying economic issues related to violent crime, but they are also by their very nature colonizing suppositions.

While former president Mauricio Funes campaigned and was elected as a member of the FMLN political party, Salvador Sánchez Cerén is considered by Salvadorans to be the first ‘pure’ member of the FMLN to serve as president. This is because Sánchez

Cerén served as a commander for the armed resistance during the civil war, and, unlike his predecessor, he has a radical ideological background, and is known for his simplicity and austerity. Raised in a working class family, Sánchez Cerén was a teacher by

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profession, and was affected by the poverty he witnessed while teaching in rural public schools in the 1960s and 1970s (Pérez Salazar). As a young adult, he was inspired by

Marxism and liberation theology, and in 1972 he joined the FMLN. Some four decades later, Sánchez Cerén still advances a socialist and anti-imperialist ideology –albeit rhetorically. In 2012, while serving as the Vice President of El Salvador, he expressed his respect and admiration for then Uruguayan president José Mujica, stating that he was a humble, sensible and kindhearted person, and that, as a president, he was a model to follow (Valencia and Vilches). Similar to Mujica, Sánchez Cerén chose not to live in the presidential residence upon taking office, and has instead remained in his family home in

Layco, a modest neighborhood near the University of El Salvador, ‘below’ the monument

El Salvador del Mundo. Given his service to the armed resistance during the civil war, and his gestures of austerity as president, Sánchez Cerén stands apart from Mauricio

Funes, who is a former television news journalist that campaigned a moderate liberal and a centrist.

Yet, as any investigation of the current issues facing El Salvador will reveal,

Sánchez Cerén is working within a difficult socio-political context. Despite his revolutionary background, during the first year of his presidency his administration has largely maintained the status quo. He has supported U.S.-backed development strategies tied to the expansion of free trade and the Partnership for Growth, and has consistently implemented efficient and coercive policing strategies. These strategies follow the same trajectory as the iron fist policies introduced by previous administrations (i.e., those of

Mauricio Funes, Antonio Saca, and Francisco Flores). The Mano Dura and Anti-Gang

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laws implemented by Funes, Saca and Flores, and the new Plan El Salvador Seguro introduced by Sánchez Cerén in 2015 all involve the militarization of the civilian police force and the loss of basic rights for large sectors of the population. These policies not only violate the spirit of the Peace Accords, which mandate the separation of the military and the civilian police force and stress the primacy of human rights, but they also recall the oppressive nature of the authoritarian regimes. This is the context within which

Sánchez Cerén now governs. The FMLN is no longer an armed insurgency; it has become one of the country’s two principal political parties. As discussed in this dissertation, the current generation of FMLN politicians is constrained by the asymmetries inherent to the free trade agreements imposed on El Salvador by the U.S. government. Further, the social and economic policies implemented by Sánchez Cerén have been just as conservative as those introduced by every other presidential administration since 1992. Thus, the former ideals of the resistance have dissolved, and the ideologies that separated the FMLN from ARENA during the civil war have effectively disappeared. In following current events in El Salvador in 2016, one finds that it is often difficult to distinguish the policies of the FMLN administrations from those of

ARENA.

In examining the strategies Sánchez Cerén is pursuing in order to confront the socio-economic issues facing El Salvador and the reasons for which he is compelled to maintain the status quo, it is necessary to understand the nature of the relationship between the U.S. and El Salvador. Chapter 2 of this dissertation, “The Socialization of

Risk and the Privatization of Profit: Biocapitalism and Transformations in Valorization

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Processes in contemporary El Salvador,” articulates some of the ways in which the U.S. has exerted influence over El Salvador during the past decades, and how the processes of deep integration are changing the country’s legal framework and limiting the state’s functions in the Salvadoran economy (Moreno, “Free Trade Agreements, CAFTA and

FTAA…” 170, 172, 176; Spalding 62). For decades, El Salvador has remained one of the most faithful allies of the U.S. Given its small and vulnerable economy, the country also depends on the U.S. to maintain market openings that were created through previous free trade agreements (e.g., the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Multifibre Agreement). As these earlier trade agreements time out and expire, El Salvador is continuously pressed to sign new free trade agreements and initiatives with the U.S. in order to maintain these market openings (e.g., as was the case of CAFTA). In this way, the U.S. has created a dependency on particular market openings in El Salvador over the past decades (e.g., textiles and apparel). In addition to this economic dependency based on trade, researchers including Rose J. Spalding, Raúl Moreno and Kevin Young explain how the processes of deep integration not only compel the government of El Salvador to embrace the expansion of free trade, but also insulate economic policies from future democratic input

(Young). Kevin Young explains these processes of deep integration in his discussion of the United States-El Salvador Partnership for Growth, in which he states:

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governments are heavily constrained by forces opposed to progressive change. (Young)

That is to say, by forcing the hand of politicians and lawmakers in El Salvador, the U.S. has been able to alter the country’s legal structure. In this way, the U.S. guarantees the institutionalization of structures that support and advance free trade. These structures are then difficult or impossible to alter, and therefore will determine the terms of economic policy in El Salvador for years to come, regardless of the objectives of future presidential administrations.

Similarly, Rose J. Spalding explains how El Salvador has been constrained in its ability to negotiate the terms of free trade with the U.S., and has therefore agreed to damaging concessions. This is evident, for example, in the sharp decline in the agricultural economy under CAFTA, and in the weak labor regulations in El Salvador, particularly in the free trade zone sector. In addition, the terms of the free trade agreements with the U.S. have resulted in still further damages to El Salvador’s autonomy and sovereignty. As noted in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, when it became clear in 2013 that the Legislative Assembly would not pass reforms to the Public Private

Partnership Law, U.S. Ambassador Mari Carmen Aponte warned political leaders that the disbursement of Fomilineo II funds was contingent upon the approval of these reforms

(Meléndez and Morán). In this way, the Obama administration threatened to hold this second round of foreign aid hostage if the Legislative Assembly did not comply and pass the Public Private Partnership reforms. Indeed, as Raúl Moreno emphasizes, the processes of deep integration create lasting damages for the Salvadoran state, given that

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they not only erode public authority, but also subordinate the laws of El Salvador to the terms of the free trade agreements with the U.S.

In addition to the profound economic relationship that the U.S. has advanced with

El Salvador over the past decades, it is important to note the deep social connections that many Salvadoran citizens maintain with family in the U.S. due to migration. These ties are an additional factor in El Salvador’s historic tendency to maintain a strong relationship with the U.S., despite the asymmetries inherent to this relationship. Since the end of the civil war there have been great spikes in emigration rates, as nearly a quarter of the population of El Salvador has been driven North due to economic and security issues.

The hermanos lejanos, as the government refers to its citizens living abroad, send billions of dollars home in remittances every year, and for this reason many Salvadorans feel a measure of economic dependency on relatives in the U.S. Therefore, these factors –the transnational social ties produced by migration, and the longstanding political relationship between El Salvador and the U.S. which constrains Salvadoran political leaders and determines legislation– are deeply woven into the social fabric of El

Salvador, and they in large part determine the context within which Sánchez Cerén governs. Further, they have been powerful factors throughout the post-war era, and following democratization they have constrained every president’s ability to negotiate the terms of free trade and foreign corporate investment within the borders of El Salvador.

During the first year of his administration, Sánchez Cerén has upheld the status quo with respect to U.S.-backed development strategies. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, “Zones of Indistinction after Democratization: Financial Capitalism, the

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Criminalization of the Poor, and the Reduction to Bare Life,” Sánchez Cerén is also following in the footsteps of the three previous administrations with respect to national security. The Plan El Salvador Seguro, introduced by Sánchez Cerén in 2015, continues along the same trajectory as the earlier the iron fist and offender management strategies implemented by the Mauricio Funes (2009-2014), Antonio Saca (2004-2009), and

Francisco Flores (1999-2004) administrations. The Plan El Salvador Seguro has involved increases in incarceration and the rapid desegregation of prisons. In addition, it has enabled police to search hundreds of homes at a time without a warrant, in the surprise searches carried out under the related Plan Casa Segura. The state of exception that was declared in El Salvador in 2016 provides yet another example of a militarized strategy that has been implemented by Sánchez Cerén, which is masked as a mere civilian police intervention.

Following the massacre of eleven individuals in the municipality of San Juan

Opico in March 2016, Sánchez Cerén declared a state of emergency in El Salvador. Prior to doing so, there was a great deal of conversation in the Salvadoran news media regarding the possibility of a state of exception (Sánchez Cerén). However, in a press conference on held March 14, 2016, Sánchez Cerén emphasized that his administration was in no way declaring a state of exception, but rather only a state of emergency. He added that as part of the state of emergency, certain constitutional rights would be limited. As part of this plan, 544 members of the armed forces immediately prepared for deployment. At the time of writing, these soldiers are assisting the civilian police force in controlling the 81 areas of the country with the highest incidences of violence. Further,

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with this plan Sánchez Cerén intends to reduce prison overcrowding. He is seeking legislative approval to release thousands of prisoners on conditional probation, including elderly individuals, those suffering from terminal illnesses, and certain individuals that have been incarcerated for non-violent crimes. If approved, this reduction could result in positive social changes, as it would help relieve severe prison overcrowding, and would open up space for inmates to be moved from small jail holding cells, like those photographed by Giles Clarke, into the prisons. Sánchez Cerén noted that the reduction would also allow the police officers that currently monitor jail holding cells to focus on other security tasks. In addition, if this reduction is achieved, it could help to confront the problem of gang recruitment within holding cells and prisons, and could address issues of human rights violations resulting from severe overcrowding.

The state of emergency therefore encompasses two different strategies –the deployment of military force to confront domestic security issues, and a reduction in the number of incarcerations. It is important to note that, while Sánchez Cerén asserts that he has declared a state of emergency and not a state of exception, some analysists in El

Salvador question whether this is accurate. In an interview with Carlos Toledo of Canal

33 on March 14, 2016, former Supreme Court Justice René Hernández Valiente argues that a state of emergency arises during times of natural disasters, and is implemented to meet the needs of the people during these emergencies (“¿Conviene o no conviene…”).

Hernández Valiente explains that a state of exception, on the other hand, arises out of a governmental crisis, and that during this time rights are suspended in order to prevent chaos. He adds that a state of exception involves a separation from the constitutional

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rights and values held by a country, and the rule of law is then substituted by an almost de facto regimen. In the same interview, political scientist Álvaro Artiga points out the rhetorical inconsistencies surrounding the state of emergency. Artiga notes that in the communications released by Sánchez Cerén and Vice President Óscar Ortiz there has been a confusion of words. While Ortiz first began speaking of a state of exception, he later changed his wording and used the term exceptional measures. Afterwards, on March

14, 2016, Sánchez Cerén asserted that he was implementing a state of emergency. Artiga asks what the political objectives may be behind this confusion of words. Given the ambiguities involved in the declaration of a state of emergency, questions arise regarding how the state of emergency will actually develop in practice, and what the outcomes will be for economically disadvantaged areas.

The strategies that Sánchez Cerén is pursuing to address issues of economic development and violent crime illustrate the contradictions that El Salvador faces post- democratization. As a commander of the FMLN, Sánchez Cerén fought to dismantle the militarized regime. However, the current state of affairs in El Salvador have led his administration to declare a state of emergency and to limit constitutional rights. Despite the great political advances following the Peace Accords, the country has not experienced peace in the post-war era. In 2015, El Salvador had the highest homicide rate in the world, and in early 2016, homicide rates remain exceptionally high. While the average daily homicide rate was about 18 individuals per day in 2015, during the first three months of 2016, the daily rate was 23 (Planas; S. Meléndez). This is the context within which Sánchez Cerén governs. Although rhetorically he has stressed the need to develop

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youth reintegration programs in order to reduce the incidence of violent crime, in practice

Sánchez Cerén has helped advance the construction of the Central American logistical corridor, and has continued to implement the coercive policing strategies begun his predecessors. Although the strategies implemented under the Plan El Salvador Seguro have been deemed necessary given the state of exception, they involve the militarization of the civilian police force and severe violations of basic rights, both of which directly contradict the spirit of the Peace Accords. Therefore, following the autoimmunity paradigm developed by Roberto Espósito, it becomes clear that the state’s efforts to protect society are resulting in violations of constitutional and human rights. In this way, the militarization of this young democracy is destroying factions of the very society that it is also seeking to protect.

The development theories advanced by the proponents of free trade (e.g., the U.S. government, and the Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada) claim that the construction of the Central American logistical corridor and the expansion of free trade will create jobs and improve the standard of living in El Salvador. These agents further claim that this economic growth, coupled with coercive policing and offender management strategies (e.g., those recommended by Giuliani Security & Safety) are the solution for creating a more prosperous and secure future for El Salvador. In light of these claims, a key objective of this investigation is to articulate the costs and benefits of free trade in order to determine whether these development strategies will genuinely benefit Salvadoran citizens. Chapter 4 of this dissertation, “Acentered Multiplicity:

Mapping Discourses and Representations of Economic Scarcity in Democratic El

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Salvador,” maps the effects of economic development post-democratization through the analysis of varied representations.

As Eva Illouz explains, since individuals interact affectively with representations, they are interpreted subjectively, thus perceptions of representations emerge directly from individual experience (223). As such, representations often cannot be grasped by available language and escape forms of categorization, and therefore they are diffuse and difficult to capture. For this reason, representations can provide an important entry point for analyzing information that would otherwise be inaccessible, and can provide new knowledge regarding situations of injustice that cannot be measured quantitatively. Given the difficulties in quantifying the connections between free trade and insecurity, and the dominance of a failed state narrative in public and official discourses, the analysis of representations is pertinent to the case of El Salvador post-democratization.

As discussed throughout this dissertation, the Central American logistical corridor is a massive project tied to both CAFTA and the Partnership for Growth. It involves the development of transportation, electricity and telecommunications networks that will facilitate the movement of goods throughout the Americas. Both the U.S. government and the government of El Salvador claim that this infrastructure is key to increasing trade and foreign investment in the region, which will in turn create jobs and spur development. It is true that transportation has been an obstacle to development in El

Salvador. But, in examining the logistical corridor and its relationship with free trade, the question arises as to whether the corridor will truly benefit ordinary citizens.

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Undoubtedly, modern transportation, electricity and telecommunications infrastructure are key factors for development, and transportation has historically been an obstacle in El Salvador. For example, until recently traffic congestion in San Salvador made travel excessively slow and difficult. With the recent construction of state of the art overpasses, congestion is improving in in the capital, and the construction of new highways has made travel to other areas of the country faster and easier, as well. Not only does modern infrastructure facilitate trade and encourage foreign investment, but it also allows citizens to travel efficiently to work, and provides them with access to reliable electric and telecommunications services. However, following Raúl Moreno, it is evident that the construction of the Central American logistical corridor is not a panacea for the economic issues facing El Salvador. Modern infrastructure is a tool for generating economic development, but the construction of the logistical corridor does not guarantee that living conditions will improve for the majority of Salvadorans. Poverty levels, homicide rates, and trends of out-migration have not improved alongside the construction of the logistical corridor. In addition, the country experienced periods of severe drought in 2014 and 2015, and in April 2016 a state of emergency was declared for all of El

Salvador due to a scarcity of drinking water (Joma). Further, as discussed in Chapter 4, the apparel factories in the free trade zones, which are an integral component of the logistical corridor, have the worst record of labor rights violations in the country. This widespread and severe violation of labor rights is the result of a lack of regulation and oversight within the free trade zones. Further, as documented in Chapter 4, apparel factory workers are denied the right to unionize. If citizens continue to be affected by

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scarcities of the most basic necessities, and subjected to a loss of rights and representation, what purpose does the logistical corridor serve?

With the decline of the agricultural economy under CAFTA, the free trade zone sector offers alternative employment opportunities, particularly for females. Agents including the Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada have celebrated the sector as a miracle for job creation. However, when the costs and benefits that the sector brings for ordinary citizens are articulated, it becomes clear that the Central American logistical corridor is not serving to improve the standard of living in the region. For this reason, the objective of Chapter 4 of this dissertation is to articulate the costs and benefits of the free trade zone sector through the analysis of representations related to economic scarcity and labor violations. In doing so, this chapter provides insight into the agents that genuinely stand to profit from the expansion of free trade.

Chapter 5 of this dissertation, “Mapping Discourses and Representations of

Insecurity Post-Democratization,” continues the work of Chapter 4 by articulating connections between the transformation of value orientations, economic scarcity and the escalations in violent crime post-democratization. Chapter 5 maps these connections through the analysis of discourses and representations related to insecurity. Specifically, this chapter documents cases of funding shortages for rank and file police officers, and of the usurpation of homes by gangs, and it provides information regarding the proliferation of private security since democratization. The expansion of private security demonstrates a critical imbalance, given that basic security and protection are only guaranteed for those citizens that have the means to pay for it. In addition, while Chapter 4 explains that the

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maquiladora industry has the worst record of labor violations with regard to female workers, Chapter 5 demonstrates that the private security industry has the worst record with regard to males. That is, one of the costs linked to the transformation in value orientations and the expansion of free trade has been the severe violation of labor rights for both men and women, in two different sectors of the economy. Therefore, when weighing the costs and benefits of the value transformations after the civil war, the violation of basic rights is a key component in the equation. Again, given that imbalances in public security are at times difficult to quantify, and given that connections between these security imbalances and economic liberalization often escape categorization, the analysis of representations provides an important entry point for mapping current insecurity.

The objective of Chapter 5 is to provide knowledge regarding both imbalances in security post-democratization, and the consequences of these imbalances, which include the violation of basic rights. As Chapter 5 shows, these issues are multifaceted, and simultaneously involve the proliferation of private security, precarity among the rank and file of the civilian police force, and the absence of public security for ordinary citizens.

Two of the cases documented in Chapter 5, when juxtaposed, clearly demonstrate imbalances in security. These cases involve the great success of private security in the upscale shopping malls and upper-middle class neighborhoods of the capital, and the control that the gangs hold over the areas of the San Salvador located ‘below’ El

Salvador del Mundo, as described by former mayor Norman Quijano.

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In a study titled, “Private security agencies in El Salvador: State of public-private sector partnerships for crime prevention in the public security system,” Juan Ricardo

Gómez Hecht analyzes the public/private partnership between the civilian police force and private security services. He views this partnership as a “a promising option” for managing high levels of insecurity, and points out the high success rates that private security initiatives have had in the large shopping malls and upper-middle class neighborhoods of the capital. (106). Gómez Hecht discusses the plan, “Centros

Comerciales Seguros” (“Safe Shopping Malls”), which has involved the training of some

200 private security technicians and guards, and the development of a network of radio communication that rapidly alerts the police of any suspicious activity (137). The plan has been successful, and has significantly reduced criminal activity in these areas. Gómez

Hecht also notes the success of the strong presence of private security in the upper- middle class neighborhoods of Santa Tecla. He states that the incidence of theft and robbery are minimal, and that residents report feeling completely secure when circulating in these neighborhoods at any hour of the day. For this reason, Gómez Hecht remarks that these neighborhoods make up, “‘little islands’ of tranquility and security amidst turbulent urban zones” (“…se configuran en “islotes” de tranquilidad y seguridad en medio de zonas urbanas turbulentas”) (Gómez Hecht 135).

While the proliferation of private security has had great success in the wealthier neighborhoods of Greater San Salvador, it also signals a critical imbalance in public security. This is due to the fact that the citizens that can afford to pay for private security enjoy consistent protection and greater freedom of movement. Another troubling point

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that surfaces in Gómez Hecht’s discussion of the “Centros Comerciales Seguros” is that police maintain constant contact with the security firms operating in the large shopping malls of the capital, and respond rapidly to their calls. By contrast, in conversations with citizens in the capital the author has found that the police often will not respond to 911 calls for assistance in marginalized neighborhoods. Further, in the many neighborhoods, towns and hamlets across the country that are under the control of the gangs, the most basic aspects of residents’ lives, including their employment options and their very movements, are restricted.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the tranquility and security found in the wealthier neighborhoods of Santa Tecla stand in stark contrast to conditions in the neighborhoods

‘below’ El Salvador del Mundo. In an interview with El Faro’s Óscar Martínez, former mayor of San Salvador Norman Quijano discusses the control that the mara maintain over informal vendors and even the local government. Quijano admits that, as mayor, there were communities that he was not able to enter without the authorization of the mara.

Quijano also describes the control that the gangs maintain over informal vendors, which he states not even the government has been able to surmount. He recounts a time in which vendors from two markets in the capital sent messages requesting that he launch an operative to evict the vendors from their markets, in order to remove them from these areas and to free them from the gangs. Quijano notes that this was the only way in which the vendors could leave (“Era la única manera de poder irse”) (Martínez). Further, in

2015 Quijano posted a warning on Facebook that stated that the mara had declared a curfew in the Historic Center. While he noted that his administration normally did not

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pay attention to this type of rumor, he stated that in this case there was reason to believe that the threat was credible. For this reason, Quijano declared that it was necessary to suspend trash collection in the capital during the period of the curfew (Martínez).

The profound security imbalances in El Salvador, and the lack of access that the majority of Salvadorans have to police protection beg the question as to whether the strategies being implemented by the Sánchez Cerén administration will genuinely improve conditions of insecurity. These imbalances raise further questions as to precisely how Fomilenio funds are being allocated to address insecurity. There is substantive evidence that proves that there are severe funding shortages for the rank and file of the civilian police force, and that these officers do not have the resources needed to protect marginalized communities. At the same time, coercive policing and offender management strategies have been implemented in recent years to confront growing insecurity. As explained in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, it is important to note that these strategies closely coincide with the Giuliani Security & Safety recommendations presented in Sánchez Cerén in 2015. The imbalances in security, together with the increased militarization of the civilian police force signal the urgent need for transparency on the part of the U.S. government, and for the need to release detailed

Fomilenio budgets, so that funding shortages related to public security can be identified.

In order to produce public conversations and debate regarding potential strategies to improve insecurity, it is crucial for journalists and researchers to have access to the complete Fomilenio budgets.

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Chapter 6 of this dissertation, “Rumors of Insecurity Post-Democratization,” continues the mapping carried out in previous chapters, and provides an additional entry point for tracing the events and activities related to insecurity post-democratization.

Specifically, Chapter 6 analyzes issues of insecurity through the vantage point of rumors related to violence that have circulated in El Salvador in recent years. Rumors are unverified accounts that can provide insight into a community’s fears and biases.

Therefore, rumors can reveal the things that a community finds important, and can provide key perspectives during times of crisis. The rumors analyzed in Chapter 6 relate to two types of activities seen post-democratization: clandestine acts of social cleansing, and the imposition of curfews under the threat of violence. Since both curfews and social cleansing occurred under the authoritarian regimes and during the civil war, these phenomena are familiar within the historical context of El Salvador. These activities still occur post-democratization, although the political context and the perpetrators of violence have changed. The military and paramilitary soldiers that were the perpetrators of violence during the civil war have now been replaced by the mara. Therefore, violence against the citizenry is no longer attributed to the state, but rather to the obscure and elusive gang member. The rumors documented in Chapter 6, which circulated via social media, e-mail, leaflets, and news outlets, provide an important entry point for examining insecurity, since they were generated within the context of current imbalances in public security, and of the dangers posed by the militarization of the civilian police force. In addition, they provide a valuable entry point because they provide access to knowledge regarding insecurity that is not available via official discourses. Whereas official

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discourses give a rhetorical account of the state of insecurity in El Salvador, the rumors reveal the ways in which violence occurs and is experienced in practice. The truce that was negotiated between the MS-13 and the M-18 in 2012 demonstrates this point, given the discrepancies between official responses to the gang truce and the rumors surrounding government involvement in the negotiations. As discussed in Chapter 6, these rumors were ultimately verified. In this way, the rumors provide access to knowledge regarding the truce that was not made available by the state.

Chapter 6 explains that in March 2012 Catholic Bishop Fabio Colindres and former guerrilla leader Raúl Mijango negotiated a truce between the two most powerful gangs in El Salvador, the MS-13 and the M-18. During the year in which the truce remained in effect, homicide rates were reduced by nearly half. In exchange for this calming of hostilities, gang members were granted a number of concessions, including access to mobile phones in prison, and the transfer of inmates to low security facilities.

Perhaps most importantly, the truce negotiations enabled gang leaders to have an audience with powerful political figures, including the Minister of Defense, the Director of Justice and Public Security, the Vice Minister of Security, and the Mayor of Ilopongo.

As José Luis Sanz and Carlos Martínez of El Faro document, one of the negotiation meetings between gang leaders and members of the state took place at the Federal

Department of Justice and Security (Sanz and Martínez).

For more than a year rumors circulated regarding the government’s involvement in the truce. However, the rumors were not verified until the publication of Sanz and

Martínez’s article in El Faro in July 2013. Throughout the period of the truce, Preisdent

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Funes was reluctant to acknowledge his role, and at times categorically denied his involvement (Romero, Guitérrez and Menjívar). At that time, analysts including David

Escobar Galindo, José María Tojeira and Rafael Castellanos criticized his lack of clarity and transparency, arguing that the government was seeking refuge in ambiguity (Romero,

Guitérrez and Menjívar). Despite the criticism, and despite the eventual verification of the rumors of government involvement, Funes never acknowledged the state’s direct participation in the truce negotiations.

By 2014, the truce had collapsed, and homicide rates once again escalated. In

2015, homicide rates surpassed pre-truce levels. Although Sánchez Cerén supported the truce during his presidential candidacy in 2013, after taking office in January 2014 he declared its official end (Meléndez and Aguilar; Chandler). Since then, he has firmly declared time and again that his administration will not negotiate with members of organized crime (Meléndez and Aguilar; Guillén and Marroquín). As explained above,

Sánchez Cerén has adopted coercive policing and offender management strategies as the solution for confronting violent crime, and the new, five-year Plan El Salvador Seguro closely coincides with the Giuliani Security & Safety recommendations (Lakhani). Given the gap between violence as it is explained rhetorically by the state, and violence as it occurs and is experienced in practice, one sees that rumors can provide important knowledge that cannot be accessed by other means. This information includes the ways in which violence is experienced on the ground, and the ways in which information can be rearranged in order to shape public perceptions.

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The discourses, representations and statistical data analyzed in the chapters of this dissertation do not make up a representative sample. They are not a measure or an estimate of the semantic and semiotic chains currently circulating in the Salvadoran media and in the public sphere. Further, these analyses do not arrive at simple correlations between free trade, poverty and violent crime. Rather, they contribute to an ongoing mapping of the varied factors connected to the epidemic of insecurity in El

Salvador post-democratization. Homicide rates in El Salvador escalated in the early nineties, immediately following the civil war. Over the past twenty-four years, this escalation has now become a consistency, and a defining factor of Salvadoran society.

Extortion and homicide have fundamentally transformed the social fabric. There are agents inside the United States and El Salvador including the National Association of

Private Enterprise (ANEP) and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) that attribute violent crime to a weak, unaccountable and corrupt Salvadoran state. While this viewpoint may provide a convenient explanation for some, and a means of advancing particular political and economic objectives, these are specious logics. It is true that political corruption and clientalism in El Salvador are issues which must be documented and addressed. However, a singular focus on failed state and development theories originating in the U.S. serve not only as a distraction from the ways in which transformations in value orientations are contributing to economic scarcity and violent crime in El Salvador, but also as a means of laying the very groundwork for advancing the processes of financial capitalism (including the expansion of free trade and economic liberalization) throughout Central America. That is to say, the positioning of El Salvador

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as a corrupt and incompetent state, and the advancement of development projects which originate in the U.S. and are imposed on El Salvador, both advance the processed of financial capitalism throughout Central America. As a result of linking violent crime in

El Salvador to a theory of a failed state, conversations in the public and political spheres do recognize the ways in which the country is excluded from negotiating the terms of free trade within its own borders, or how the terms of these agreements are damaging the fabric of Salvadoran society.

Moving forward, there are several dynamics related to both insecurity and the processes of financial capitalism as they are realized in El Salvador that warrant further study. Given the lack of information publicly available regarding the Fomilenio budgets, further investigation of the work of the Millennium Challenge Corporation and USAID in

El Salvador is needed. In addition, the passage of the Public Private Partnership law reforms must be detailed, in order to understand the effects the law has on wages and labor exploitation. Another area that warrants documentation is labor conditions among the rank and file of the PNC, private security guards, and inside the free trade zones.

Given that entry into the free trade zones is highly restricted, solidarity organizations and labor unions in El Salvador would be invaluable resources for documenting these conditions. Public support for Mano Dura-type laws also warrants further study, as this will provide insight into how insecurity is experienced subjectively among citizens.

Finally, the adjustments that the coffee oligarchy have made since the onset of financial capitalism is another dynamic of insecurity that must be further documented. While some members of the old financial elite successfully adjusted and reoriented their investments

277

following the civil war and are now important actors in the Salvadoran economy, others did not. The activities of those that have successfully adjusted under financial capitalism are important dynamics of the national economy.

There is no singular cause or origin of the epidemic of insecurity in El Salvador.

The epidemic cannot be traced solely to increases in migration, to the loss of agricultural jobs under CAFTA, to the legacy of violence following the civil war, or to any other isolated factor. Rather, escalations in violent crime in El Salvador have developed within a complex network of interrelated events and activities. In order to approach clearer understandings of how insecurity has developed within the dynamics of this network, it is critical to examine it from as many different entry points as possible, and to then map the interconnected events and activities. A mapping of this network provides a means of articulating the factors that are related to the escalation in homicide rates post- democratization, and of identifying the reasons why insecurity has persisted for almost a quarter-century, despite political advances. Further, this mapping can reveal the ways in which insecurity in El Salvador is productive, and the agents for whom it is beneficial. As such, the discourses, representations and statistical data analyzed in this dissertation contribute to an ongoing mapping that is being carried out by a number of journalists and researchers working in El Salvador. The factors analyzed in this investigation include information related to the Central American logistical corridor, the implementation of offender management strategies, and the proliferation of private security. Additionally, this dissertation provides evidence of economic scarcity, and severe labor and human rights violations that have occurred since the enactment of CAFTA and the Partnership

278

for Growth. A principal objective of this research is to articulate exactly what this mapping reveals, how values transformations and violent crime are connected, and the effects that this instability generates for ordinary citizens.

Public and official discourses in El Salvador and the U.S. are failing to acknowledge the heavy costs of economic liberalization, which are being absorbed by

Salvadoran citizens. Instead, conversations are centered on the failures of the Salvadoran state, and on models of economic development that are dictated by the U.S. and imposed on the region. Within this context, those who are most at risk are economically excluded citizens that lack the resources to resist the intervention of power, and also the country’s youth, who are subject to the dangers of gang violence. In order to confront the current epidemic of insecurity, El Salvador must have autonomy in determining how economic and social development will unfold within the country’s borders, and the citizens of El

Salvador must have a voice in this process. To achieve this, it is critical to articulate connections between the transformation in value orientations and escalations in violent crime, and to then bring this information into public and official conversations regarding the issues facing El Salvador. Only by articulating these connections, and shifting the public conversations regarding the epidemic of violence will it be possible to discover the sustainable solutions that can be implemented to confront insecurity in democratic El

Salvador.

279

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