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THE - OF 5 PRINCIPIA ETHICA j] to discover the relative that charity is a must attempt merits of every different form of charity. forms,

: Ethics cannot be therefore, part of the of ethical science not defects complete without it. The defects of Casuistry are BY be taken to its aim and of principle; no objection can . difficult to be GEORGE EDWARD MOORE It has failed only because it is far too a subject treated adequately in our present state of knowledge. The casuist has been unable to distinguish, in the cases which he treats, those elements upon which their depends. Hence he often thinks two cases to be alike in respect of value, when in It is to in they are alike only some other respect. mistakes of this kind that the pernicious influence of such of investigations has been due. For Casuistry is the goal at the ethical investigation. It cannot be safely attempted beginning of our studies, but only at the end. "Everything is what it is, 5. But our What is have still another and not another thing" question ? may BISHOP BUTLEB . We may, in the third place, mean to ask, not what thing or things are good, but how good is to be defined. This is an enquiry which belongs only to Ethics, not to Casuistry; and this is the enquiry which will occupy us first. It is an enquiry to which most special attention should be

since hr&gt; is to be is the directed; thiq^jripstio", W pood defined,

most jfnjirhmrnt"il qiirntinixjrinll Ethics. That which is meant

is, in fact, itsconverSe^ bad, the &gt;y good except only simple object of which is peculiar to Ethics. Its definition is, therefore, the most essential point in the definition of Ethics; and moreover a mistake with regard to it entails a far larger number of erroneous ethical judgments than any other. Unless this first question be fully understood, and its true answer clearly recognised, the rest of Ethics is as good as useless from the point of view of systematic knowledge. True ethical judgments, of the two kinds last dealt with, may indeed be made by those who do not know the answer to this question as well as by those who do; and it goes without saying that the two classes of people may lead equally good lives. But it is extremely CAMBRIDGE unlikely that the most general ethical judgments will be equally valid, in AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS the absence of a true answer to this question: I shall presently 1959 try to shew that the gravest errors have been largely due to THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS 7 6 [CHAP. jj

that amount to this: That beliefs in a false answer. And, in any case, it is impossible that, portance by saying they propositions and never till the answer to this question be known, any one should know about the good are ail of them synthetic analytic; trivial matter. And the same what is the evidence for any ethical judgment whatsoever. But and that is plainly no thing may more if I am then the main object of Ethics, as a systematic science, is to give be expressed popularly, by saying that, right, can foist us such an as that Pleasure is the correct reasons for thinking that this or that is good; and, nobody upon or that The is the desired on the unless this question be answered, such reasons cannot be given. only good good pretence * that this is the of the word/ Even, therefore, apart from the fact that a false answer leads to very meaning 7. Let then, consider this is that false conclusions, the present enquiry is a most necessary and us, position. My point is a , as yellow is a simple notion; important part of the science of Ethics. good simple just as cannot, manner of means, to 6. What, then, is good? How is good to be defined? Now, that, just you by any explain any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you it may be thought that this is a verbal question. A definition cannot explain what good is. Definitions of the kind that I does indeed often mean the expressing of one word s meaning was for, definitions which describe of the in other words. But this is not the sort of definition I am asking object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely asking for. Such a definition can never be of ultimate impor tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when tance in any study except lexicography. If I wanted that kind the object or notion in question is something complex. You of definition I should have to consider in the first place how can give a definition of a horse, because a horse has many used the word but business is not people generally good ; my different properties and qualities, all of which you can enume with its proper usage, as established by custom. I should, in rate. But when you have enumerated them all, when you have deed, be foolish, if I tried to use it for something which it did reduced a horse to his simplest terms, then you can no longer not usually denote: if, for instance, I were to announce that, define those terms. They are simply something which you whenever I used the word good/ I must be understood to be think of or perceive, and to any one who cannot think of or thinking of that object which is usually denoted by the word perceive them, you can never, by any definition, make their table. I shall, therefore, use the word in the sense in which nature known. It may perhaps be objected to this that we are I think it is ordinarily used; but at the same I am not able to describe to others, objects which they have never seen anxious to discuss whether I am in that it is right thinking or thought of. We can, for instance, make a man understand so used. business is with that or , which My solely object what a chimaera is, although he has never heard of one or seen I or that the word is used to hold, rightly wrongly, generally one. You can tell him that it is an animal with a lioness s stand for. What I want to discover is the nature of that object head and body, with a goat s head growing from the middle or and about this I am anxious to arrive at an idea, extremely of its back, and with a snake in place of a tail. But here the agreement. object which you are describing is a complex object; it is if we understand the in this sense, answer of with But, question my entirely composed parts, which we are all perfectly it a one. If I to may seem very disappointing am asked What familiar a snake, a goat, a lioness; and we know, too, the is good? my answer is that good is good, and that is the end manner in which those parts are to be put together, because of the matter. Or if I am asked How is good to be defined? we know what is meant by the middle of a lioness s back, and is it where her tail is wont to so my answer that cannot be defined, and that is all I have to grow. And it is with all objects, not which say about it. But disappointing as these answers may appear, previously known, we are able to define: they are all they are of the very last importance. To readers who are complex; all composed of parts, which may themselves, in the familiar with philosophic terminology, I can express their im- 8 THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS [CHAP. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS 9 j] first be of similar definition, but which must instance, capable be writing on Ethics, for my main object is to help towards in the end be reducible to which can no simplest parts, longer discovering that definition. It is ju^t because I think there be defined. But yellow and good, we say, are not complex: will be less risk of error in our search for a definition of the are notions of that out of which definitions they simple kind, good/ that I am now insisting that good is indefinable. I must are and with which the of further difference between these two. I it composed power defining try to explain the suppose ceases. may be granted that good is an adjective. Well the good,

&lt;r 8. When we say, as Webster says, The definition of horse that which is good, must therefore be the substantive to which is "A of the will it must be the whole of that to hoofed quadruped genus Equus," we may, in fact, the adjective good apply: mean three different things. (1) We may mean merely: When which the adjective will apply, and the adjective must always I are to understand that I to it. But if it is that to which the will say "horse," you am talking about truly apply adjective it must be different from that a hoofed quadruped of the genus Equus. This might be called apply, something adjective itself;

and the whole of that whatever it "will the arbitrary verbal definition: and I do not mean that good is something different, rs, be our definition of the Now it be that this some indefinable in that sense. (2) We may mean, as Webster oughr, good. may to most mear thing will have other adjectives, beside good, that will apply mean: When English people say "horse," they to it. It be full of for it be a hoofed quadruped of the genus Equus. This may be called may pleasure, example; may and if these two are of its the verbal definition proper, and I do not say that good is intelligent: adjectives really part definition, then it will certainly be true, that pleasure and in indefinable in this sense either; for it is certainly possible to telligence are good. And many people appear to think that, discover how people use a word: otherwise, we could never if we say Pleasure and are good, or if we have known that good may be translated by gut in German say Only pleasure and intelligence are good, we are defining good. and by bon in French. But (3) we may, when we define Well, I cannot deny that propositions of this nature may some horse, mean something much more important. We may mean be called definitions; I do not know well enough how that a certain object, which we all of us know, is composed in the word is generally used to decide upon this point. I only a certain manner: that it has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, wish it to be understood that that is not what I mean when etc., etc., all of them arranged in definite to one I say there is no possible definition of good, and that I shall another. It is in this sense that I deny good to be definable. not mean this if I use the word again. I do most fully believe I say that it is not composed of any parts, which we can sub that some true proposition of the form Intelligence is good stitute for it in our when we are thinking of it. We and intelligence alone is good can be found; if none could be might think just as clearly and correctly about a horse, if we found, our definition of the good would be impossible. As it is, thought of all its parts and their arrangement instead of thinking I believe the good to be definable; and yet I still say that good of the whole: we I think how a horse differed from could, say, itself is indefinable. in this as a just as well, as truly, way, now we do, if donkey just 10. Good, then, we mean by it that which we not so but there is whatsoever which we only easily; nothing assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, could so substitute for and that is whab I when good; mean, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of \J I that is indefinable. say good that word. The most important sense of definition is that in 9. But I am afraid I have still not removed the chief which a definition states what are the parts which invariably which of the that difficulty may prevent acceptance proposition compose a certain whole; and in this sense good has no is indefinable. I do not mean co that the that good say good, definition because it is simple and has no parts. It is one of which is good, is thus indefinable; if I did think so, I should not 10 I THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS [CHAP. SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS 11 I] THE those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves not that are as to what good is, but incapable of definition, because they are the ultimate terms by They only say they right endeavour to that other who that it is reference to which whatever is capable of definition must be they prove people say are for will affirm that defined. That there must be an indefinite number of such something else, wrong. One, instance, is another, that good is that which is terms is obvious, on reflection; since we cannot define anything good pleasure, perhaps, and each of these will to that the desired ; argue eagerly prove except by an analysis, which, when carried as far as it will go, other is wrong. But how is that possible? One of them says refers us to something, which is simply different from anything that good is nothing but the object of desire, and at the same else, and which by that ultimate difference explains the pecu time tries to prove that it is not pleasure. But from his first liarity of the whole which we are defining: for every whole assertion, that good just means the object of desire, one of two contains some parts which are common to other wholes also. things must follow as regards his proof: There is, therefore, no intrinsic difficulty in the contention that of desire is (1) He may be trying to prove that the object good denotes a simple and indefinable quality. There are not if this be where is his Ethics? The j pleasure. But, all, &lt; many other instances of such qualities. one. I position he is maintaining is merely a psychological Desire for Consider yellow, example. We may try to define it, by is something which occurs in our minds, and pleasure is some- describing its physical equivalent; we may state what kind of T thing else which so occurs; and our would-be ethical philosopher light-vibrations must stimulate the normal eye, in order tha; is merely holding that the latter is not the object of the former. we may perceive it. But a moment s reflection is sufficient to But what has that to do with the question in dispute? His shew that those light-vibrations are not themselves what we opponent held the ethical proposition that pleasure was the mean by yellow. They are not what we perceive. Indeed we good, and although he should prove a million times over the should never have been able to discover their , unless psychological proposition that pleasure is not the object of desire, we had first been struck the difference of by patent quality he is no nearer proving his opponent to be wrong. The position between the different colours. The most we can be entitled is like this. One man says a triangle is a circle: another replies to of those vibrations is that are what in say they corresponds A triangle is a straight line, and I will prove to you that I am to the which we space yellow actually perceive. right: for (this is the only argument) a straight line is not a Yet a mistake of this kind has been made simple commonly circle. That is quite true, the other may reply; but never about It be true that all which are good. may things good theless a triangle is a circle, and you have said nothing whatever are also as it is true that all which something else, just things to prove the contrary. What is proved is that one of us is are a certain kind of vibration in the yellow produce light. wrong, for we agree that a triangle cannot be both a straight it is a that Ethics aims at what are those And fact, discovering line and a circle: but which is wrong, there can be no earthly other properties belonging to all things which are good. But means of proving, since you define triangle as straight line and

far too many philosophers have thought that when they named I define it as circle . Well^that is one alternative jyyhin.h any those other properties they were actually defining good; that t.r&gt; fn,p,ejjif ood is is either to these properties, in fact, were simply not other/ but absolutely else,_it then impossible prove that anj_other definition is or uvun to such and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to wrong deny definition. other alternative will call the naturali^Uc_faljacy and of it I shall now endeavour (2) The scarcely be more welcome. It is that the discussion is after all a verbal one. When A to dispose" says Good means and B Good means 11. Let us consider what it is such philosophers say. And pleasant says desired, they wish to assert that most have used the word first it is to be noticed that they do not agree among themselves. may merely people 12 THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS [CHAP. 13 jl THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS for what is pleasant and for what is desired respectively. And some one that one definite thing, absolutely indefinable, thing this is for quite an interesting subject discussion: it is not and in ail the various only is the same in all the various degrees a whit more an ethical discussion than the last was. Nor do I kinds of it that there may be. We may be able to say how it is think that of naturalistic Ethics would be it is in the any exponent willing related to other things: that, for example, , to allow that this was all he meant. are all so anxious to They that it causes desire, that we are conscious of it, etc., etc. We us that what call the is what we its relations to other but define it we persuade they good really can, I say, describe things, to do. Do, act sq^ because the word is if tried to define for us asi\ ought pray, "good" can not. And anybody pleasure

used nature : on this if were to for generally to_jiej^te_^.tiojQS_of _thi_s such, any other natural object; anybody say, would be the substance of their were to / view, teaching. And in so far instance, that pleasure means the sensation of red, and as tell us how we to their is that that is a we should \ they ought act, teaching truly proceed to deduce from pleasure colour, ethical, as they mean it to be. But how perfectly absurd is the be entitled to laugh at him and to distrust his future statements / for it! the same which I / t reason they would give You are to do this, because about pleasure. Well, that would be fallacy 1" most people use a certain word to denote conduct such as this. have called the naturalistic fallacy. That pleased does not S or else You are to say the thing which is not, because most people mean having the sensation of red/ anything whatever, / not us from what it does mean. It call it lying. That is an argument just as good! My dear does prevent understanding for us to know that does mean the sirs, what we want to know from you as ethical teachers, is not is enough pleased having use a it is sensation of and is in- how people word; not even, what kind of actions pleasure, though pleasure absolutely r is and else whatever, they approve, which the use of this word good may certainly definable, though pleasure pleasure nothing we feel no in that we are The imply: what we want to know is simply what is good. Wn yet difficulty saying pleased. reason is, of course, that when I I am I do not may indeed agree that what most people do think good, is say pleased, mean that I am the same thing as having pleasure. And actually so; we shall at all events be glad to know their no difficulty need be found in saying that pleasure opinions: but when we say their opinions about what is good, similarly my is and yet not meaning that pleasure is the same thing we do mean what we say; we do not care whether they call good as that pleasure means good, and that good means that thing which they mean horse or table or chair, gut good, If I were to that when I said I am or bon or we want to know what it is that so pleasure. imagine pleased, dyaOos ; they I meant that I was exactly the same thing as pleased, I should call. When they say Pleasure is good, we cannot believe not indeed call that a naturalistic fallacy, although it would be that they merely mean Pleasure is pleasure and nothing more the same fallacy as I have called naturalistic with reference to than that. Ethics. The reason of this is obvious enough. When a man 12. a man I am and that Suppose says pleased ; suppose confuses two natural objects with one ano^ejr^_dc_fininffjjie one is not a lie or a mistake but the . Well, if it is true, what by tfrpJlffiE llLfpT instn.np.ft, hi^r.onfnses hirr)S^lf. who ig_one does that mean ? It means that his mind, a certain definite natural with or with object, piejisejiL pleasure wjbjcji_jire mind, distinguished by certain definite marks from all others, others, then there is no reason to call the fallacy naturalistic. has at this moment a certain definite feeling called pleasure. But if he confuses *good^ which is not in the same sense a Pleased means but pleasure, and though we nothing having natural object, with arfyjaatural object whatever, then there is be more pleased or less pleased, and even, we may admit may a reason for calling that a naturalistic fallacy; its being made for or kind of in so the present, have one another pleasure; yet to it with regard good marks as something quite specific, and far as it is we have, whether there be more or less pleasure this specific mistake deserves a name because it is so common. of it, and whether it be of one kind or another, what we have is 14 THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETEICS [CHAP. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS 15 j]

As for the reasons is not to be considered a natural of why good tries to do, that increase of pleasure coincides with increase be reserved for discussion in another different from either life or object, they may place. life, unless good means something But, for the it is sufficient to notice this: Even if it as well to that an is present, pleasure. He might just try prove orange were a natural that would not alter the nature of the that it is in object, yellow by shewing always wrapped up paper. its fallacy nor diminish importance one whit. All that I have 13. In fact, if it is not the case that good denotes some said about it would remain true: alternatives are quite equally only the name thing simple and indefinable, only two possible: which I have called it would not be so appropriate as I think it either it is a complex, a given whole, about the correct analysis is. And I do not care about the name: what I do care about of which there may be disagreement; or else it means nothing as Ethics. In how is the fallacy. It does not matter what we call it, provided we at all, and there is no such subject general, without recognise it when we meet with it. It is to be met with in ever, ethical philosophers have attempted to define good, such an must mean. almost every book on Ethics; and yet it is not recognised: and recognising what attempt They actually it to use which involve one or both of the absurdities that is why is necessary multiply illustrations of it, and arguments considered in 11. We therefore, in convenient to give it a name. It is a very simple fallacy indeed. are, justified concluding that the to define is due to want of clear When we say that an orange is yellow, we do not think our attempt good chiefly ness as to the nature of definition. There in statement binds us to hold that orange means nothing else possible are, fact, two serious alternatives to be considered, in order to than yellow, or that nothing can be yellow but an orange. only a is establish the conclusion that does denote simple and Supposing the orange also sweet! Does that bind us to say- good indefinable notion. It might possibly denote a complex, as that sweet is exactly the same thing as yellow, that sweet horse does; or it might have no meaning at all. Neither of must be defined as yellow ? And supposing it be recognised these possibilities has, however, been clearly conceived and that yellow just means yellow and nothing else whatever, seriously maintained, as such, by those who presume to define does that make it any more difficult to hold that oranges are good; and both may be dismissed by a simple appeal to facts. yellow? Most certainly it does not: on the contrary, it would (1) The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning be absolutely meaningless to say that oranges were yellow, of good is disagreement with regard to the correct analysis of a unless yellow did in the end mean just yellow and nothing- given whole, may be most plainly seen to be incorrect by con else whatever unless it was absolutely indefinable. We shoulc sideration of the fact that, whatever definition be offered, it may not get any very clear notion about things, which are yellow be always asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, we should not get very far with our science, if we were bounc whether it is itself good. To take, for instance, one of the more to hold that everything which was yellow, meant exactly the plausible, because one of the more complicated, of such proposed same thing as yellow. We should find we had to hold that an definitions, it may easily be thought, at first sight, that to be orange was exactly the same thing as a stool, a piece of paper, good may mean to be that which we desire to desire. Thus a like. We could number oi lemon, anything you prove any if we this definition to a apply particular instance and say absurdities; but should we be the nearer to the truth? Why, When we think that A is good, we are thinking that A is one then, should it be different with good ? Why, if good is good of the things which we desire to desire/ our proposition may and indefinable, should I be held to deny that pleasure is good? seem quite plausible. But, if we carry the investigation further, Is there in both to be true at once? On any difficulty holding and ask ourselves Is it good to desire to desire A? it is the there is no in that is contrary, meaning saying pleasure good, apparent, on a little reflection, that this question is itself as unless is different from It is good something pleasure. absolutely intelligible, as the original question Is A good? that we are, useless, so far as Ethics is concerned, to prove, as Mr Spencer THE OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS 17 16 SUBJECT-MATTER ETHICS [CHAP. I]

in fact, now asking for exactly the same about the one does in fact understand the question Is this good? When of his state of mind is different from what it would desire to desire A for which we formerly asked with regard to A he thinks it, he asked Is this or or itself. But it is also apparent that the meaning of this second be, were pleasant, desired, approved? It has a distinct for even he not question cannot be correctly analysed into Is the desire to meaning him, though may in what it is distinct. Whenever he thinks of desire A one of the things which we desire to desire? : we have recognise respect intrinsic value/ or intrinsic worth, or that a not before our minds anything so complicated as the question says thing ought to exist, he has before his mind the the Do we desire to desire to desire to desire A? Moreover any unique object unique of things which I mean by good. Everybody is one can easily convince himself by inspection that the predicate constantly aware of this notion, although he may never become of this proposition good is positively different from the aware at all that it is different from other notions of which he notion of desiring to desire which enters into its subject: is also aware. But, for correct ethical reasoning, it is extremely That we should desire to desire A is good is not merely important that he should become aware of this fact; and, as equivalent to That A should be good is good. It may indeed soon as the nature of the problem is clearly understood, there be true that what we desire to desire is always also good; should be little difficulty in advancing so far in analysis. perhaps, even the converse may be true: but it is very doubtful 14. Good, then, is indefinable; and yet, so far as I know, whether this is the case, and the mere fact that we understand there is only one ethical writer, Prof. , who has very well what is meant by doubting it, shews clearly that we clearly recognised and stated this fact. We shall see, indeed, have two different notions before our minds. how far many of the most reputed ethical systems fall short of (2) And the same consideration is sufficient to dismiss the drawing the conclusions which follow from such a recognition. hypothesis that good has no meaning whatsoever. It is very At present I will only quote one instance, which will serve to natural to make the mistake of supposing that what is uni illustrate the meaning and importance of this principle that versally true is of such a nature that its would bo negation good is i?ulefinable, or, as Prof. Sidgwick says, an unanalysable the which has been to self-contradictory: importance assigned notion. It is an instance to which Prof. Sidgwick himself in the of shews hov r analytic propositions history philosophy refers in a note on the passage, in which he argues that ought such a mistake is. And thus it is to conclude 1 easy very easy is unanalysable . that what seems to be a ethical is in fact ait principle Bentham, says Sidgwick, explains that his fundamental identical for whatever is called proposition; that, if, example, principle "states the greatest of all those whose good seems to be pleasant, the proposition Pleasure is the interest is in question as being the right and proper end of does not assert a connection between two different notions, human action and his in other of the good "; yet language passages but involves only one, that of pleasure, which is easily recognised same chapter would seem to imply that he means by the word as a distinct But whoever will consider with "conducive to the Prof. entity. attentively "right" general happiness." Sidgwick sees if take these two statements himself what is actually before his mind when he asks the that, you together, you get the absurd result that is the end of question Is pleasure (or whatever it maybe) after all good? greatest happiness human action, which is conducive to the and so can easily satisfy himself that he is not merely wondering general happiness ; absurd does it seem to him to call this as Bentham calls whether pleasure is pleasant. And if he will try this experiment result, it, the fundamental of a moral that he with each suggested definition in succession, he may become principle system, sug that Bentham cannot have meant it. Yet Prof. expert enough to recognise that in every case he has before his gests Sidgwick 1 Methods Bk. 1 mind a unique object, with regard to the connection of which of Ethics, i, Chap, iii, (6th edition). it. 2 with any other object, a distinct question may be asked. Every