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LA SENTENCIA MARBURY V. MADISON Aa LA SENTENCIA MARBURY V. MADISON FRANCISCO FERNÁNDEZ SEGADO (*) SUMARIO: 1. EL SUPUESTO DE HECHO DESENCADENAN ­ TE DEL CASO .—2. LA ARGU M ENTACIÓN J URÍ ­ DICA DE CHARLES LEE , EL A B OGADO DE LOS DE M ANDANTES .—3. LOS PROLEGÓ M ENOS DEL J UICIO .—4. EL DESARROLLO DE LA VISTA .—5. LA SENTENCIA MARBURY V. MADISON .—A) Su enfo- que sistemático.—B) Su significativo apar- tamiento del orden procesal normal.—6. EL ITER ARGU M ENTAL DE LA SENTENCIA .—A) El derecho de William Marbury a la entrega de su nombramiento.—B) La legitimidad de la reacción jurídica frente a la violación del derecho.—C) La pertinencia del ins- trumento del writ of mandamus.—D) La imposibilidad de emisión del writ of man- damus por la Corte.—a) La inconstituciona- lidad de la Sección 13 de la Judiciary Act de 1789.—b) La doctrina de la judicial review. Su fundamentación.—aʼ) Los argumentos de carácter general.—aʼʼ) La Constitución como «paramount law» y la nulidad de todo acto le- gislativo en contradicción con ella.—bʼʼ) La teoría de la judicial function.—bʼ) Los ar- gumentos entresacados del texto literal de la Constitución.—aʼʼ) La cláusula sobre la (*) Catedrático de Derecho Constitucional. Facultad de Derecho. Universidad Com- plutense de Madrid. extensión del poder judicial (arising-under clause).—bʼʼ) La supremacy clause.—cʼʼ) La cláusula del juramento (oath clause).—cʼ) La ausencia de toda referencia a los precedentes jurisprudenciales y a la posición de los Framers ante la judicial review.—dʼ) Recapitulación sobre la argumentación de Marshall.—7. LOS RASGOS CON F IGURADORES DE LA PRI M ERA DOCTRI ­ NA SO B RE LA JUDICIAL REVIEW . LA SENTENCIA MARBURY v. MADISON 9 1. EL SUPUESTO DE HECHO DESENCADENANTE DEL CASO I. Cuando se lee la Marbury opinion puede suceder (y así ha acontecido en ocasiones incluso entre la doctrina norteamericana) que, al centrarse en los entresijos de la argumentación jurídica, se soslayen los hechos en los que la litis se enmarca, y no nos referimos ya tan sólo a aquéllos que son recogidos en la propia sentencia (en el caso en cuestión, de todo punto insuficientes para la adecuada compren- sión de los argumentos jurídicos de Marshall), sino a los que se han llamado (1) hechos exteriores («outside facts»), derivados del conoci- miento que uno ha de tener no sólo de las circunstancias próximas que rodean el caso, sino también de la historia de la controversia que lo provoca (2). Desde esta perspectiva, a veces se olvida la intensidad de la batalla política que rodeó el caso, olvido que se explica porque, con frecuencia, Marbury se lee desde la perspectiva un tanto anacrónica de un consolidado rule of law en el que los tribunales federales (y aún más la Supreme Court) desempeñan un rol central. Pero ese rol será en gran parte una de las consecuencias de la propia sentencia del caso Marbury, porque en los inicios del siglo XIX , los tribunales federales se presentaban en bastantes supuestos tan sólo como «another forum for the pursuit of political action» (3), algo que, a nuestro entender, no era sino la resultante del sistema de nombramiento de los jueces federales (similar al de los restantes funcionarios de la Administración federal), el spoils system, por el que el partido en el poder distribuía, a modo de prebendas, los cargos públicos entre sus fieles. Los llamados midnight Judges, nombrados por el Presidente Adams en el último minuto de su mandato (4), ejemplifican paradigmáticamente ese perverso sistema. (1) Sanford LEVINSON and Jack M. BALKIN, «What Are the Facts of Marbury v. Ma- dison?», en Constitutional Commentary (Const. Comment.), vol. 20, 2003-2004, pp. 255 y ss.; en concreto, p. 264. (2) No hay —escriben Levinson y Balkin, desde una óptica general— un punto natural de división («natural dividing point») que delimite los «hechos del caso» de los que uno podría desear descartar como «factual irrelevancies», esto es, como observaciones basadas en hechos fuera de lugar. Antes bien, la articulación de los «facts of the case» es siempre pragmática y provisional. Sanford LEVINSON y Jack BALKIN, «What Are the Facts...?», op. cit., p. 265. (3) Paul W. KAHN, The Reign of Law (Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America), Yale University Press, New Haven y Londres, 1997, p. 11. (4) Cfr. al respecto, Francisco FERNÁNDEZ SEGADO, «El trasfondo político y jurídico de la Marbury v. Madison decision», en Anuario Iberoamericano de Justicia Constitucional (AIbJC), núm. 15, 2011, pp. 139 y ss. 10 REVISTA DE LAS CORTES GENERALES Frente a la mencionada lectura de la sentencia, el Marbury v. Ma- dison case se ha visualizado como el escenario de una batalla entre dos diferentes concepciones del orden político (5). Y así, mientras Jefferson tildaba el cambio en la Administración que se había de producir en marzo de 1801 como la segunda Revolución america- na, el federal judiciary se aprestaba a actuar como un freno contra- revolucionario, en defensa de las ideas Federalistas. Piénsese que la elección de noviembre de 1800 planteó una crisis real para una democracia aún en ciernes, pues no estuvo de ningún modo claro que la transferencia de poder del viejo partido revolucionario, los Federalistas, a los advenedizos republicanos («the upstart Republi- cans») pudiera alcanzarse pacíficamente (6). El caso del pobre Mar- bury, pobre por haber estado actuando tan sólo como una «comparsa federalista» («as a Federalist stooge»), —ha escrito Lerner (7)— fue atizado por los fuegos cruzados de Federalistas y Republicanos, con- virtiéndose en un Machtpolitik. Por todo ello, se puede estar ple- namente de acuerdo con Newmyer cuando aduce (8), que Marbury, apriorísticamente, no era uno de esos casos que estuviera hecho para la grandeza («for greatness»). Bien al contrario, si algo presagiaba era el desastre («if it promised anything, it was disaster»), pues los hechos parecían conducir a la Corte hacia una fatídica («fateful») confrontación con el poder Republicano. La enorme habilidad del Chief Justice evitaría esa debacle en ciernes. II. El supuesto de hecho desencadenante del Marbury case cree- mos que es notoriamente conocido; ello no obstante, vale la pena alu- dir al mismo y, en particular, al contexto político en el que se fraguan los hechos, pues todo ello puede ofrecer pistas válidas para ayudar a comprender ciertos aspectos peculiares de la propia sentencia. El 13 de febrero de 1801, la Administración federalista saliente de John Adams lograba que el Congreso, aún con mayoría federalis- (5) Paul W. KAHN, The Reign of Law, op. cit., p. 15. (6) Sanford LEVINSON y Jack M. BALKIN, «What Are the Facts...?», op. cit., p. 257. (7) Max LERNER, «John Marshall and the Campaign of History», en Columbia Law Review (Colum. L. Rev.), vol. XXXIX, 1939, pp. 396 y ss.; en concreto, p. 406. (8) R. Kent NEWMYER, The Supreme Court under Marshall and Taney, Harlan David- son, Inc., Arlington Heights (Illinois), 1968, p. 29. LA SENTENCIA MARBURY v. MADISON 11 ta, aunque ya por un período de tiempo inferior a las tres semanas, aprobase la Judiciary Act, «to provide for the more convenient or- ganization of the Courts of the United States». Se admite generali- zadamente, que el texto legal combinó el tratamiento de relevantes cuestiones para el poder judicial federal con asuntos de interés es- trictamente partidista. La Judiciary Act incidió notablemente sobre la organización judicial, propiciando, en lo que ahora interesa, la creación de 16 nuevos jueces de circuito para los seis Circuit Courts, pasando con ello el número total de jueces federales de circuito de 7 a 23. Los nuevos cargos judiciales fueron rápidamente ocupados por Federalistas de la plena confianza del Presidente Adams, siendo por cierto uno de ellos un hermano de John Marshall, James Markham Marshall, aunque éste iba a ocuparlo en el Circuit Court del Distrito de Columbia. Dos semanas más tarde, el 27 de febrero, a cinco días de la toma de posesión como nuevo Presidente de Thomas Jefferson, el Con- greso aprobaba otro nuevo texto legal, la Organic Act of the District of Columbia, de conformidad con la cual se creaban 42 Juzgados de paz en ese distrito, que nuevamente Adams se afanaría por cubrir con Federalistas leales, uno de ellos justamente William Marbury. El contexto político era ya de por sí problemático, al venir con- notado por el brutal enfrentamiento producido en los últimos años de la década final del siglo entre Federalistas y Republicanos, que en- contraría sus momentos álgidos en la aprobación por el Congreso, en 1798, de las Alien and Sedition Acts, consideradas por muchos como un instrumento de persecución política de los Republicanos críticos con la Administración de Adams (9), y en la fulminante reacción de (9) Piénsese que la Sección segunda de la Sedition Act castigaba cualquier crítica hacia el Presidente o el Congreso con una multa de 2000 dólares y con prisión de hasta dos años. Aunque Newmyer recuerda que los Federalistas argumentaron, y los historiadores han hecho otro tanto con posterioridad, que la Sección tercera de esta ley suponía realmente una liberalización del escrito difamatorio del common law, ya que, a diferencia del Derecho inglés, se permitía algo parecido al derecho de defensa y al enjuiciamiento por jurados para dictar veredictos, lo cierto es que la disposición fue radicalmente rechazada por los Repu- blicanos, en base al hecho de que los casos concernientes a los supuestos escritos sediciosos iban a ser juzgados en tribunales federales por jurados federalmente constituidos, que serían en su enorme mayoría instruídos por jueces Federalistas y, en bastantes casos, muy poco 12 REVISTA DE LAS CORTES GENERALES las Legislaturas de Virginia y de Kentucky, al aprobar las llamadas Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, concebidas primariamente, como en su día interpretó Corwin (10), con el propósito de ruptura directa («with the design of breaking through») del sutil control que entra- ñaba la intervención del poder judicial federal, tal y como se venía constatando por sus, en ocasiones, muy controvertidas aplicaciones de las Alien and Sedition Acts (11).
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