WESTERN NEPAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT INTRODUCTION In March 2003, the international non-governmental organization Mercy Corps engaged the author to conduct an independent field-based assessment of the civil conflict in rural Nepal. Based in Portland, Oregon and Edinburgh, Scotland, one of Mercy Corps’ principal objectives is to assist war-torn societies with emergency relief, rehabilitation and post-conflict reconstruction. The assessment was financed by a grant from the United States Agency for International Development and was overseen by USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios. Since a relatively modest beginning in early 1996, an armed insurgency against the government by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (hereinafter ‘the Maoists’) has, to varying degrees, gradually affected most of the country. The assessment focused on Nepal’s most acutely affected mid-western region, including the districts of Rolpa and Rukum, which are considered the Maoist insurgency’s heartland, and included field work in four other nearby districts. This area is sometimes called the Rapti River Valley after the river which flows along its southern border (see Map D) and its tributaries. The assessment’s mandate was to address: ! the root causes of the conflict; ! why the insurgency had taken root specifically in Rolpa and Rukum; ! the intersection of development programs (including a major USAID effort in the mid-western region in the 1980s and 1990s) with the conflict’s origins; ! the conduct of the insurgency by the Maoist movement, including its administration of areas under various degrees of its influence or control; ! the attitude of local residents toward the insurgency; ! the degree to which Maoist policies and administration are similar to those of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge – either before or after its accession to power in April 1975; and comparisons which can be drawn with the Maoists’ Peruvian counterpart, the Sendero Luminoso; ! the conduct of the counter-insurgency campaign by the Government and local attitudes toward its policies and actions; and ! the intersection of the role of local democratically-elected officials with evolving events. The author conducted the assessment during March/June 2003, provided briefings on its findings and conclusions between July and October, and completed this final report in October 2003. 2 Assessment procedures In all, 250 persons were individually consulted in the course of the assessment. Research began with the gathering of background information and individual consultations with fifty officials of the sponsoring organizations and Nepal specialists in Washington, D.C., Boston, Geneva and elsewhere. In Kathmandu the author consulted individually with an additional fifty experts from international and local non-governmental organizations and diplomatic missions and with others. These consultations had an average duration of about an hour. For over six weeks between April and June 2003, the author traveled more than 3,200 kilometers by vehicle through six districts of Nepal’s mid-western region, supplemented by local flights. Field research was conducted principally in the headquarters of the following six districts: Rolpa Surkhet Banke Rukum Salyan Bardiya These districts were selected for study after wide consultation in Kathmandu. The dynamics of Rolpa and Rukum, which contain the area considered the Maoist heartland, are essential for an understanding of the conflict. Surkhet and Salyan are Hill districts, and Banke and Bardiya are Terai districts, which have been affected to varying degrees. Elements of the United Nations office in Kathmandu consider these six among the most conflict-affected districts of the country. According to Nepal’s most authoritative human rights organization, these six districts (8% of Nepal’s 75 districts) accounted for close to one-third of all conflict deaths up to mid-February 2003.* In the field, the author consulted with about 150 individuals. The discussions were almost always conducted on a 1:1 individual basis, in a private environment, for an average of between two to three hours each, although some had durations of up to seven hours (except with Government officials, which were usually of about an hour’s length). Of the 150 individuals, all but three were Nepalis. Roughly 70 (47%) of the interviewees were either residents of 66 different villages dispersed throughout the six districts or individuals who had been temporarily displaced by the conflict from those villages, while 80 (53%), including government officials, resided in district headquarters. Local interviewees ! 42 (28%) of the interviewees were field staff and coordinators of local advocacy, social and economic development, and human rights non-governmental organizations; ! 35 (23%) were current or former locally-elected ward, village, district and Parliamentary representatives. They were associated with three mainstream political parties, the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist)(UML), Nepali Congress (NC) Party and Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), in descending proportion; ________________________________________________________________ * Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) data cited in Crises of Governance and Armed Conflict in Nepal, 2001-03, USAID, June 2003, Annex 3.5 3 ! 29 (19%) were ordinary local residents, including victims of both parties to the conflict, and respected elders; ! 7 (5%) were local staff members of international humanitarian organizations; ! 7 (5%) were businessmen and commercial traders. The caste or ethnic origin of the foregoing interviewees was: Brahmin 17% Newar 10% Chhetri 24% Terai 5% Dalit 11% Thakuri 3% Magar 16% Tharu 7% Other 7% (including Muslim, Thakali, Gurung, Rai and Sanyasi) 84% of these 120 interviewees were men; 16% were women. Central government officials The remaining 30 (20%) of the 150 field interviewees were civil service administrators and technicians appointed by the central Government in Kathmandu. These included the Chief District Officers (CDOs) and Local Development Officers (LDOs) of each district and a variety of technical officers. They were all male, 60% Brahmin, 20% Chhetri, Thakuri and Newar, and 20% Terai, Tharu and Sanyasi. Interview venues Although close to half the interviewees were from the small village development committee (VDC) areas which comprise the districts, almost all of the interviews were conducted in district headquarters. No interviews were conducted in rural villages, because: ! the amount of time which would have been consumed walking out to villages would have limited the number of interviews which could be conducted; ! arrival of a foreigner in small villages would attract a level of attention inconsistent with the objective of conducting discreet, private consultations; ! it would be difficult to find a venue sufficiently private to assure the interviewee of some anonymity; ! village residents who met privately with a foreigner would be exposed to questions, if not harassment or reprisals, principally from the Maoists and possibly from Government forces; ! the atmosphere of the areas remained tense, despite the cease-fire. Security is not assured for outside visitors, who are discouraged by the Maoists. During the same period, several multi-lateral missions assessing infrastructure rehabilitation needs were intercepted and refused entry to rural villages by Maoist forces or so closely monitored as to create an uncomfortable environment for both visitors and local residents. 4 Briefings Upon conclusion of the assessment, the author provided about twenty oral briefings, each of about three hours duration, to a total of 300 individuals including staff of the sponsoring NGO and the U. S. Government which financed the study, and in Kathmandu to officials of the Government of Nepal and its armed forces; diplomatic, donor and United Nations representatives; staff of non-governmental organizations and to a small number of Nepali journalists. Feedback from these briefings helped the author to sharpen the presentation of issues and to insure that all the relevant findings of the study were included in the final report. LimitAtions Given the breadth of its terms of reference, this assessment was carried out in a relatively brief period. It was conducted principally in the field. The bulk of its findings are based on the information, views and perceptions provided by the 150 individuals consulted in the six assessment districts. Their views are supplemented in the report by excerpts from reports and publications which, in the author’s view, help to illuminate them. The author visited only six (less than 10%) of Nepal’s 75 districts. Nonetheless, the districts visited included the two in which the Maoist insurgency had its rural origins as well as four others which have been affected to varying degrees in a way which seemed representative of the conflict’s impact in many other districts of the country. The author’s decision to not conduct interviews in rural villages, explained earlier, limited the proportion of ordinary residents who participated. The author did not consult directly with Maoist representatives nor did he visit Maoist- controlled areas. On April 30, 2003, the United States Government, which financed this assessment, placed the Maoists, together with 37 other groups, on its international terrorist watch list, which means its actions will be scrutinized to determine whether the group will in future be designated as an international terrorist organization. Weeks later the Maoists responded with