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People's Wars View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications Collection 1999 People's Wars McCormick, Gordon H. M.E. Sharpe Inc. Encyclopedia of conflicts since World War II. Volume 1: Afghanistan through Burundi. (1999). p. 23-34. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/49166 \IUn People's Wars What is meant by the term "people's war"? would be carried out by a popular' insurrec-: The concept can be defined both narrowly tion, the months and years leading up to the and broadly. Defined narrowly, the term is insurrection would be characterized by,'care': used to denote the body of strategic thought ful, behind-the-scenes political, work" de­ on "protracted war" developed by Mao Ze­ signed to place the revolutionary party in a dong in the 1930s and 1940s, during the pe­ position to catalyze a final uprising and seize riod of the Chinese Civil War and the power when the historical momenL:' was struggle against the Japanese. This definition deemed to be propitious. It would, not' be is firmly rooted in the larger Marxist-Leninist characterized by a period of revolutionary theory of class struggle. Defined broadly, the war, per se, in which the outcome of the concept of people's war is used generically struggle would be decided by a military in.:. to denote any form of guerrilla conflict or teraction. , " popular insurrection, regardless of its ideo­ Although the concept of people's war,' for logical roots. By this definition, the opening definitional purposes, can be usefully distin­ and middle stages of the Chinese Commu­ guished from the larger concept of guerrilla nist struggle against the Nationalist (Kuom­ warfare, we should not lose sight of the'fact intang) regime was an example of a people's that the first is merely an ideological sub~t war, as was the Afghan campaign against the of the second. The defining operational prob­ Marxist regime in Kabul. lem, in each case, is the same: overcoming The definition of people's war used in this the conventional military superiority of the entry takes a middle course. The term, on the state (or occupying power) through an asym­ one hand, will be used to describe a body of metrical campaign based on the support (and ideas on population-based conflict or insur­ resources) of a constituent population. While gency that goes beyond the specific concept the leadership of a people's war will attempt of operations developed by Mao. At the to draw support from among a revolutionary same time, we will retain the ideological class (classically, the peasantry), the non­ meaning of the term by referring to those Marxist insurgency will define its natural forms of "popular warfare" based on the constituency along different lines (e.g., eth­ concept of class struggle. Defining the con­ nicity, communal affiliation, or regional cept in this manner distinguishes it, on the identity). Where the first defines its popular one hand, from the type of conflict waged in base "horizontally" (according to class) Afghanistan, which would represent a more across national or ethnic lines, the second de­ generalized form of guerrilla warfare, as well fines its base of support "vertically" (accord­ as from the type of class-based revolutionary ing to some other group identifier) without conflict envisioned by Lenin, which was regard to its class affiliation: ,\ based primarily on political rather than mil­ The underlying organizational tasks facing itary forms of struggle. While the last act of the leadership of a people's war are similar revolutionary takeover, in Lenin's view, to those faced by that of any insurgency. We ---, 24 Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II can define these as (1) penetration, which veloped by Mao and the foco concept of speaks to the revolutionary organization's guerrilla warfare developed by Ernesto need to "get inside" targeted social groupings "Che" Guevara. Most revolutionary insur­ as a prelude to "turning" them to the service gencies since the end of World War II have of the organization's political and military ob­ sought to either directly apply or adapt and jectives, (2) transformation, which speaks to refine one or the other of these baseline con­ the insurgency's need to consolidate its con­ cepts of operation to local circumstances. trol over the targeted group and redirect Each of these models can be usefully defined some percentage of its resources to the orga­ in contrast to the other. The concept of pro­ nization's goals, and (3) application, which re­ tracted conflict developed by Mao is de­ fers to the ways in which these resources are signed to be prosecuted by a "low-profile" used to further develop an insurgent infra­ organization carrying out a "bottom-up" ap­ structure, undermine the competing infra­ proach to insurgency. By contrast, it can be structure of the state, and, ultimately, extend said that the theory of insurgency developed the insurgent's zone of control. Collectively, by Che Guevara is designed to be prosecuted these tasks define the process of social mobi­ by a "high-profile" organization from the lization. Every insurgent organization must "top down." In certain key respects, these address each of these operational tasks if it is two models represent operational opposites. to pose a viable challenge to the state. The In doing so, they bound the larger concept manner in which it does so will define its the­ of people's war. ory of victory. Revolutions and people's wars in the The Chinese Model of People's War twentieth century have virtually all imitated or tried to imitate earlier revolutions. These Mao's assessment of the operational problem successful cases of the past establish opera­ facing the Chinese Communist Party during tional models that are adopted by latter-day its early struggles in the 1920s and 1930s revolutionaries who hope to repeat the suc­ rested on two essential considerations that cess of those that preceded them by replicat­ bear on the general study of people's war. ing their experience. While such cases have The first of these was his assessment of the generally addressed the question of "why" standing government's overwhelming mate­ one should revolt, as well as what revolu­ rial advantage over the Communist party. tionary changes should be carried out in so­ The second was the government's equally ciety at such time as one actually wins, the apparent political weakness. Deposing the principal influence has been over how an old regime, in Mao's view, would require the armed revolt should be prosecuted in the party to overcome its material weaknesses by first place. For those who come to the prob­ exploiting the opportunities provided by its lem of overthrowing a standing regime with comparative political advantage. As Mao ob­ high ambition but little practical experience, served at the time, "All guerrilla units start a revolutionary paradigm offers an immedi­ from nothing and grow." At the outset of ate (if often stylized) recipe for action. this type of struggle, the standing regime The tradition of people's war, for its part, represents a force in being. The guerrilla, by has been dominated by two original para­ contrast, represents a force in development. digms: the model of protracted conflict de- The latter begins with little more than an _,.wrunnrrwf"j"rr:TI'SUtn People's Wars 25.- idea. The guerrilla's one opening under these Unlimited time, in this strategy, required circumstances, according to the theory of unlimited space. Space, in Mao's view, class conflict, is provided by the inherent would provide the guerrillas with the room frailty of the regime's political base and the for maneuvers to buy the time necessary to: corresponding weakness of its institutional win. All space, in this sense, is not created presence throughout the countryside. Ex­ equal. For practical purposes, a distinction ploiting this opening, Mao argued, will per­ was made between territory that, in the mit a guerrilla force to bridge the gap opening stages of the engagement, was-un":, between its grand ends and limited means der the effective control of the regime,and over the course of the struggle. that which was not. If the guerrillas' evalu­ ation of the political environment facing each:. Time, Space, and Initiative side was accurate, the regime's administr~-, tive control throughout the countryside The strategy designed by Mao to square the would be imperfect. To survive their weak circle between ends and means rested on the beginning, the guerrillas would open the calculated use of time and space. Buying struggle in those areas of the country. in time, Mao argued, was essential if the re­ which the regime was weak and avoid mak­ gime's strengths were to be turned into ing a stand in those areas of comparative re­ weaknesses and the guerrilla weaknesses gime strength. In pursuing such a strategy, were to be turned into strengths. The strug­ the insurgency would give itself the best op­ gle, in its most abstract form, was envisioned portunity to gain the time it requiredtoes­ to be an institutional contest between the de­ tablish an institutional counterweight to. the veloping architecture of the "new state" on state. Revolutionary organization, in turn, the one hand and the declining institutions would further extend the guerrillas' ability to of the "old state" on the other. Building the establish effective spatial control. new and dismantling the old, Mao recog­ These ideas formed the basis of Mao's con­ nized, would be a protracted undertaking.
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