MASTER'S THESIS M-1486

SNOW, Jr., Hugh Bain UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE 1953 PHILIPPINES PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

The American University, M.A., 1968 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

Copyright by

Hugh Bain Snow, Jr.

1968 UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE 1953 PHILIPPINES PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

By

Hugh Bain Snow, Jr.

Submitted to the

Faculty of The School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

of

MASTER OF ARTS in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Signature of Committee: ^

Chairman :

D a t e : z. y / 7 Dean of Vcfé School

Pate

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY MAY 13 1968 WASHINGTON. 0 . t. ? 7 C/7 TABLE OP CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE ...... 1

CHAPTER

I. THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES IN THE

POST-WAR PERIOD ...... 1

Political Considerations ...... 3

Strategic-Military Considerations ...... 8

Economic Considerations ...... l4

II. THE UNITED STATES TAKES THE OFFENSIVE...... 22

Chinese Communist Victory ...... 23

The Korean W a r ...... 24

The Hukbalahap Movement ...... 26

The Bell M i s s i o n ...... 32

III. EARLY AMERICAN INTEREST IN MAGSAYSAY ...... 37

The 1948 Trip to the United S t a t e s ...... 4l

The 1950 Visit to the United S t a t e s ...... 43

American Support of Magsaysay for the

Defense Secretary Post ...... 46

Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense . . 49

IV. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

IN 1953 E L E C T I O N S ...... 60

Resume of Election Preparations ...... 6l

The Nature of the C a m p a i g n ...... 69 PAGE

Official United States Position During

the Election ...... 76

United States Participation Contrary to

Official Policy ...... 82

The Role of the American P r e s s ...... 90

V. THE PHILIPPINES REACHES POLITICAL MATURITY . . . 94

Results of the E l e c t i o n ...... 94

Significance of the Election

to Philippine Politics ...... 95

Rationale of United States Policy ...... 98

Significance of the Election to United

States Asian Policy ...... 104

Weaknesses of United States Policy ...... 109

Strengths of United States Policy ...... II5

Concluding Remarks ...... 120

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 122 PREFACE

A cardinal principle of American foreign policy has been the traditional United States reluctance to interfere in another state's internal matters. A comprehensive look at American diplomatic history, however, vividly shows that while the United States has been hesitant to take part in the domestic affairs or another nation, it certainly has not refrained from making its own views known, and openly inter­ vening when the situation required extreme measures to protect American interests.

The 1953 Philippine presidential election is a good case in point to show how the United States exerted influence in a skillful and effective way in order to achieve desired objectives, but avoid if possible the charge of internal meddling. Although the official strategy strictly adhered to a "hands off" policy during the campaign and at the polls, American representatives in the Philip­ pines impressed upon Philippine leaders that the United

States would not tolerate a repeat performance of the 19^9 presidential election— an event that became dubiously known in the islands as the "dirty" election.

This paper seeks to determine and discuss the United

States policy with respect to the 1953 Philippines election.

In so doing the broad outlines of post-war Philippines- American relations are traced; particular emphasis is placed on the impact that international and domestic Filipino developments in the early 1950's had on United States' intentions and courses of action, and vice-versa. Only by setting this election against the backdrop of the Cold War can the United States ' interests in the proceedings and results be understood. The following objectives served as research guidelines: l) to determine the nature and extent of American involvement in the 1953 election, 2) to analyze the basic assumptions underlying United States policy and

3) to evaluate the significance of this election with subsequent United States Asian policy.

The decision to write on this topic was indeed a fortunate one. Faced with the distinct possibility that the subject would be too sensitive to adequately research,

it came as a pleasant surprise to find that information was readily available and plentiful but hard to assess in terms

of veracity. Aside from any deficiencies that may be present in its contents, writing this paper has given the author the opportunity to discover what could be called

the "stuff" of international politics. A greater appre­

ciation for the scope of international issues has been gained. Having to deal with the problems associated with

the search for information, and the chance to discuss the

event with some of the participants has made this a very

ii worthwhile exercise.

Assistance rendered by Professors William Y. Elliott and Millidge P. Waiker of the American University and

H. Bradford Westerfield of Yale University has been greatly appreciated. A personal interview with former Deputy

Director of Mission to the Philippines, William S. B. Lacy, was an invaluable source of first-hand information.

Correspondence with former Ambassador to the Philippines,

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, provided another excellent primary source.

Although many holes remain in the obtainable information thus far uncovered on this topic, it is believed that sufficient evidence has been accumulated to make possible a reasonable reconstruction of United States policy with regards to this election, and an accurate appraisal of the policy in light of the circumstances present at the time and those likely to have developed in the future.

iii CHAPTER I

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES

IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The United States faced many problems of catastrophic proportions following World War II. Half the world lay in ruins. Traditional political and economic patterns had been severely altered during the war. Perhaps most significantly tne old balance of power system in Europe had been destroyed.

Two non-European powers, the United States and the Soviet

Union, emerged from the rubble. Both were destined to con­ trol the international system by virtue of their superior power status around the world.

The United States, a new and inexperienced leader in great-power international politics and essentially satisfied with its post-war standing, embarked on a status quo policy based on objectives of world order, stability, and internal security. It can be said that American diplomats assumed the awesome job of maintaining tne relative power positions in the world under an umbrella of peaceful change.

That Soviet-American interests were bound to clash after 19^5 can be attributed to Soviet moves in Eastern

Europe immediately after the war, and to the slowly formu­ lated American contention that the Soviet Union had expan­ sionist objectives that could not be tolerated. What 2 followed will not be dealt with here. This confrontation, nonetheless, was not limited to Europe.

American interests in Asia reflect the same general pattern that was followed elsewhere in the world. Political stability and economic viability were the goals. China was looked upon to fill the power vacuum created by Japan's de­ feat, and to redress the balance in the Par East. Korea, a rehabilitated Japan and the Philippines would provide a measure of local dominance over Soviet intentions. To bolster all these countries and to protect our own interests in the Pacific, American military forces remained in the

Par East at widely-scattered points.

But as time progressed it became evident that internal problems in China had reduced her ability to carry on a role of leadership in the Far East. Accordingly the United

States, faced with growing area instability, coupled with the decline in British strength and the rise of Soviet in­ fluence, found itself with the choice of either withdrawing to a more tenable position, or digging in to meet the Soviet threat. An assessment of our post-war Asian interests and the legacy of our past achievements there actually left us with no alternative but to embrace the latter. In this respect, particular reference is made to our colonial admin­ istration in the Philippines and the belief that political, strategic and economic considerations toward that country 3 made our continued presence in East Asia imperative. The political implications will be discussed first, followed by an analysis of the strategic and economic matters.

Political Considerations

It is generally conceded by most historians that

United States colonial rule in the Philippines was truly unique in many ways. Following the brutal defeat of the

Filipino patriot Aquinaldo in 1901, a civilian colonial government was established. From the beginning of its admin­ istration the United States made it clear to the Filipinos that as soon as they had reached a sufficient level of po­ litical and social maturity they would be granted independ­ ence. In the meantime, however, the occupation was charac­ terized by a desire to make this island nation into a

"little America." American aims were essentially dual in nature: 1) to secure the rights of human freedom to the

Filipinos, and 2) to prepare them for self-government and complete independence. Methods and techniques employed were for all practical purposes democratic and secular.

The Filipinos at first were not at all interested “in foreign control. After Admiral Dewey defeated the Spanish

^Robert A. Smith, Philippine Freedom: 1946-1958 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 40. 4 fleet In Manila Bay in I898, he quickly discovered this in the bloody campaigns that followed for the next three years while putting down Aquinaldo's rebellion. Eventually the natives came to accept American tutelage, but the drive for independence never diminished. Nationalism continued to be forceful, but also constructive in that it remained lawful.

The Filipinos were quick to learn, and grew to appreciate the overall good intentions of the Americans.

The Philippines never really was a colony in the

European sense of the term. The inhabitants remained citizens of their own land, subject only to adherence to the United States Constitution and laws. As Salvador P.

Lopez, Philippine Representative to the United Nations, once said, "The Philippines was foreign to the United States for 2 domestic purposes, but domestic for foreign purposes."

In 1934, the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed by

Congress, setting the stage for Philippine independence on

July 4, 1946. Although the war years intervened to upset tne schedule of development, designed to put the new state on strong footing by independence day, the United States, against strong secret opposition by post-war Filipino leaders, went ahead after the war to make good its

^American Assembly, The United States and the Philip­ pines (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 196677 p. 8. 5 1934 promise.

Looking back over forty-seven years of colonial

administration, Americans could take pride in their achieve­ ments. In spite of weaknesses on the local level, the

political system that had developed was strong and workable.

'Die Filipinos had been given wide leeway in handling

domestic problems. They were hard-working and aware of

their political responsibilities. Only in the area of 3 economic policy did the United States falter.

The meager results in agrarian reform and economic

development can be blamed on American investors and

developers interested in promoting their own schemes with

little or no regard for Filipino interests. Powerful

American businessmen retained control, exploiting natural

resources and manpower for personal gain, ignoring the

effect that they were having on the Philippine economy.

This attitude left a series of problems after independence, which in some respects remain to this day.

Unlike many of the colonial independence movements

that followed, the United States willingly relinquished its

control, thereby acquiring a tremendous investment in

Filipino good will, due in no small degree to our benevolent

policies and unbending promise or independence. Granting

^Ibid., p. 21 6 the Philippines their sovereignty, however, did not bring

American interests in the archipelago to a close. On the contrary, our stake in East Asia, particularly in light of subsequent international events, significantly raised the importance of the new republic with respect to United

States objectives in the Pacific area.

Politically, the Philippines assumed crucial im­ portance . Nowhere else in Asia were American ideals and institutions so openly on display. Continued political stability there was closely linked to American prestige and success in all Asia. The following detailed analysis of the measures taken by the United States in the immediate post-war period to ensure this equilibrium substantiates the degree of concern that was accorded to the Philippines by leaders in this country.

The new republic had truly become the "show-case for democracy" in the Par East. As a result, the example which was set there would be thoroughly observed by other Asian states interested in the benefits of a democratic form of government. In a statement written for delivery before

Congress, former Ambassador to the Philippines, Emmett

O'Neal, said that the developing Asian states "are watching with extreme interest the programs of democracy in the

Philippines." He goes to say that "to them it is a demon­ stration of tne democratic way of life in the Orient, and 7 it carries with it implications as to the value of American 4 friendship and cooperation."

In effect, America's record in the Philippines was open to inspection. A chaotic, weak country would directly reflect on United States ability to achieve a similar task elsewhere, as it was called upon to do in South Korea and later in Taiwan. Writing a decade later (but appropriate also to the early 1950's), a noted authority on United

States-Philippine relations made the following observation:

Because we made an open commitment to prepare an Asian people in the ways or democracy, and because the Filipinos tnemselves have proclaimed their adherence to democratic institutions, the United States is involved in their success or failure. Not to succeed here would reflect adversely on us much more than would failure in other parts of Asia. It would be a serious matter if the Filipinos made a mockery of democratic institutions; it would be disastrous if they were lost to communism.5

Therefore, it was imperative that the Philippines remain strong and viable. As part of the effort to realize this goal, the United States took extensive steps to insure that the islands were protected from external attack.

4 U. S. Congress, Congressional Record, Vol. 96, part 13, February 2, 1950, p. A769*

^George E. Taylor, The Philippines and The United States; Problems of Partnership (New York; Frederick A. Praegor, 1964), p. 5. 8

Strategic-Military Considerations

In general American policy-makers after the war formulated strategic-military programs on the assumption that Soviet expansion on the European continent must be checked. In East Asia this meant strengthening existing military strongholds, securing access to strategic raw materials, entering into mutual defense arrangements and providing military assistance to allies interested in bolstering their own capacity to withstand threats against their security.^ It is interesting to note that all four measures were taxen with respect to the Philippines.

By studying a map, one is impressed with the strategic position of the Philippine Islands off the coast of East Asia. This sprawling archipelago, consisting of

7107 islands and approximating the land area of Italy, stretches some 1100 miles on a general north-south axis 7 from Formosa to Indonesia. Vietnam is directly west, the

American trust territories (Marshall, Caroline and Mariana

Islands) to the east. Not only are they centrally located at an important junction for world trade and shipping and

Brookings Institution, Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1951-1952 (Menascha; George Banta Pub. Co., 1952), p. 149.

^S. H. Steinburg (ed.) The Statesman *s Yearbook (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1953)j pp. 1297-1298. aviation routes, but they also represent an excellent location from which to launch a major land, sea and air offensive against the Asian mainland. Once thought of during the early part or the twentieth century as a major weakness, the islands became a critically strategic military asset after the war— the only secure, dependable area capable of supporting American military forces in the Far

East.

That this was the case illustrates the about-face that American foreign policy thinking underwent in the immediate post-war period. Prior to the bombing of Pearl

Harbor, the United States showed little interest in main­ taining a strong military posture in the Philippines.

The Filipinos concurred with this view. The Tydings-

McDuffie Act incorporated this attitude with its provisions to withdraw American troops after independence had been 8 declared in 1946. But the war and its aftermath brought about a complete revision of opinion in the United States as well as in the Philippines.

Three bi-lateral treaties signed by both countries between 194? and 1951 form the crux of the Filipino-

American defense alliance system. The first, the

Philippines Military Assistance Act, was passed by Congress

®48 United States Statutes at Large (1934), p. l4g. 10 and signed into law by President Truman in early 1946, in order to provide for the extension of United States military equipment and training facilities to the Philippines as the 9 President saw fit. The following year an agreement was

signed making the assistance pact effective as of July 4,

1946, for a period of five years, renewable upon Filipino request. The Joint United States Military Advisory Group

(JUSMAG) was formed to administer American funds and coordinate Joint military planning with the Philippine 10 Republic.

Closely associated with this provision was the

Military Bases Agreement signed on March l4, 194?, formal­

izing agreements entered into the previous year authorizing the United States to lease-hold several bases maintained during the war. The 194? Executive Agreement, applicable for 97 years, listed sixteen sites for retention, seven operational in nature (three of the combined army-air force variety and four navy), and nine miscellaneous facilities 11 scattered throughout the islands. Of these sixteen sites, the most important ones were the air base at Clark Field,

^60 United States Statutes at Large (1946), pp. 141-159.

^^Republic of the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affairs, Treaty Series, Vol. I (December, 1948), pp. I6l-l67«

l^Ibid., pp. 144-160. 11 north of Manila, the naval base at Subic Bay and a new naval air station built at Cubi Point. Pour years separate these two measures from the third and final agreement, the

Military Defense Treaty, signed by both states on

August 30, 1951*

It is important to understand the reasons why the

1951 pact came into being. The altered power configuration caused by the Chinese Communist takeover and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 had revived American concern for improved security measures in the Pacific. The “Philippines also had reasons for a strong military pact with the United

States. Although American military aid had increased substantially in the late 1940's and early 1950's,

Philippine politicians voiced strong reservations about

United States intentions and its ability to effectively defend the islands.

Their main concern until 1951 had been the expansion of communism in Asia, but when steps were taken by the

Americans to conclude a peace treaty and defense alliance with the Japanese, the Filipinos saw a new potential threat in a resurgent Japan. To "allay" these fears, the United

States entered into the bilateral defense treaty with the 12 Philippines.

^^Milton W. Meyers, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Èress, 1965), p . 1Ô6: 12

This pact, which was to serve as the basis for the

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization three years later, stipulated that an armed attack on either party in the

Pacific area would be deemed dangerous to the other's security and that each "would act to meet the common dangers 13 in accordance with its constitutional processes." Doubts arose over the meaning of this last phrase. Several

Filipino leaders argued that it could be used as an American escape device to nullify the provisions of the treaty, but such arguments overlooked one important fact. The location of American bases precluded any thoughts that the United

States would not live up to its commitment. Any attack on the islands would surely bring American military power to bear to defend its own interests there, and in the process protect the Philippines as well.

Generally speaking, however, Philippine statesmen realized the importance of the American military presence

in their country. They understood that the uns cable

international situation and the potentially troublesome

internal developments made it essential to Philippine national security. Men like President Manuel Roxas, first

President of the Philippine Republic, and his successor.

^u. S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 3, part 3> 1§52 (Washington: U. 6. Government Printing Office, 1955)^ pp. 3947-3951. 13

Elpldio Quirlno, recognized the advantages as well as the disadvantages of foreign military protection. Both believed, but particularly President Roxas, that more could be gained from the American decision to underwrite Philippine security than would be lost by pouring money into defense spending when it could be more wisely invested in economic recovery measures. To cement this viewpoint, he skillfully and wisely introduced the Military Bases Agreement before the

Senate for its approval, in order to make its provisions treaty-like in importance and win the support of Congress 14 and the Philippine people.

The islands have always been known to have a wide variety of natural resources, but oddly enough, until 1954 only five per cent of the total land area had been explored 15 for minerals. Nonetheless, significant known quantities of gold, iron ore, chromite, copper, maganese, nickel, lead, mercury, coal, and a favorable political climate makes the

Philippines an important source of strategic raw materials for the United States in case of war.

According to a survey conducted by the Republic's

Bureau of Mines in 1950, the islands contained over 1 billion

^^Meyers, o£. cit., p. 4?.

^^U. S. Department of Commerce, Investment in the Philippines (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1 9 5 5 ) 7 p. 55. 14 tons of Iron ore (much of which was nickeliferous in nature),

11 million tons of chromite, 200,000 tons of manganese, 16 1.6 million tons or copper, and 60 tons or low-grade coal.

The mere presence of strategic minerals in an allied country is not enough. Knowing where these resources are

located and getting the opportunity to exploit them raises another set of factors.

Economic Considerations

The United States post-war economic policies were closely allied with the search for strategic raw materials.

The major objective was to strengthen economically around the world those states that possessed these resources, not

only to directly enhance America's own power position, but also indirectly by making them more able to counter the 17 Communist threat in their own countries. The Philippines

represent an excellent case study to show the extent that

the United States was willing tu use economic assistance to maximize its objectives.

World War II had devastated much of the Philippines.

After four years of Japanese occupation, intensive guerrilla

^Republic of The Philippines, Bureau of Mines, The Philippine Mining Industry and Mineral Resources (Manila, 1950), p. 1. ■ ^^Brookings Institution, Major Problems 1951-1952, op. cit., p. 108. 15 warfare and unfortunate Allied bombings, the island economy hau come to a virtual standstill. A special investigating

commission, headed by Senator Millard Tydings, was sent to

the Philippines in May 1945• After spending only six days

in Manila, the mission was terminated somewhat prematurely

(the visit was intended to be a month) in order to return home as soon as possible to recommend to President Truman

thau immediate large-scale assistance be rendered to tne 19 struggling Commonwealth.

After emergency funds were appropriated by Congress

in answer to Tydings* pleas, more elaborate plans were

developed and incorporated into what became known as the

Philippine Rehabilitation Act. Passed by Congress and

signed by President Truman on April 30, 1946, this bill

created the Philippine War Damage Commission to administer

$400 million to cover private property war damage claims of

Filipino citizens; to effect the transfer of approximately

$100 million worth of surplus war equipment left behind by

18 During this visit several leading Philippine leaders, who had been publicly advocating independence, came under cover of darkness to see several members of the mission (among them Professor William Y. Elliott). They urged that the date of independence be delayed until the country had regained a degree of political and economic stability. (W. Y. Elliott interview, October 27, 1967).

^^Senator Millard E. Tydings, The Philippine Islands, Remarks in the U. S . Senate, Senate Documents 53, 79th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1945). 16

American troops; and to make available $120 million to reconstruct public works facilities and help defray the cost 20 of Filipino technical training programs.

The Act was designed to stimulate economic and social recovery. It did just that. Representatives from both countries worked closely to process and act upon claims.

Philippine officials were given most of the responsibilities for reconstruction planning. Philippine contractors per­ formed much of the building. All the original money au- 21 thorized by Congress was appropriated as specified. On the whole the programs were highly successful as far as they went. Unfortunately the problems were greater than hao been originally realized.

Coupled with the Rehabilitation Act, and one which was destined to cause Filipino misgivings, was the Philip­ pines Trade Act. Commonly known as the Bell Trade Act, this bill became linked with tne Rehabilitation Act in the Senate, since one would not pass without the other. Both were signed into law on the same day.

The Philippine Trade Act established the pattern for future United States economic policies. Based on the assumption that Philippine economic revival depended on the

^ 6 0 U. S . Statutes at Large (1946), pp. l28-l4o. Pi Meyers, 0£. cit., p. 88. 17 restoration of American trade and investment, the Act provided for reciprocal free trade until 1954. Prom then until July 3, 1974, gradually increasing duties would be specified for imports into each country from the other.

In addition, absolute annual quotas were continued on the most important Philippine exports to the United

States to protect American producers; sugar, 850,000 long tons; cordage, 6 million pounds; rice, 1.1 million pounds; 22 cigars, 200 million; and coconut oil, 200,000 long tons.

These restrictions were not well received by Philippine businessmen interested in improving their economy.

Philippine nationalists, moreover, had another reason for concern. The Act introduced a parity clause that required an amendment to the Philippine Constitution in order to allow Americans an equal opportunity to use and develop the islands' natural resources and public utilities.

Many opponents of the Act argued that this provision reduced the newly independent state's economy to its former colonial 23 status. Actually it was intended primarily to give the

United States the benefit or a preferred position with

pp Shirley Jenkins, American Economic Policy Towards the Philippines (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 23 New York Times, September 19, 1946, p. 10. 18 respect to other trading nations, and not exploit Philippine resources.

President Roxas sympathized with the opposition, but

stressed the critical importance of maintaining close ties with the American economy. The Philippine Congress responded by adopting by a slim margin a proposed amendment on September l8, 1946. Requiring a three-fourths majority to pass, the amendment secured a 68 to l8 vote in the House, 24 and a 16 to 5 approval in the Senate. Referred to the

Philippine people for final acceptance in a referendum vote,

it passed by an 8 to 1 margin; not because they wanted it, 25 but because they knew Roxas was right.

While these two measures went far to correct the

seemingly insurmountable economic problems facing the new republic after the war, serious deficiencies remained. The very nature of the Philippine post-war economy showed many weaknesses, some of which were created by the provisions

of these two Acts. Before the war, two separate economies were present. One was essentially domestic in nature, in which simple goods and services were produced, supplying most of the population's needs. The other sector contained

24 Meyers, 0£. cit., p. 53* 25ibid. 19 the more highly developed export-import trade, chiefly with 26 the United States, encompassing modern manufactured goods and natural resource extraction, and supporting the more 27 well-to-do segment of the population.

American interest in the Philippine economy can be readily seen by examining the nature of the investments just before World War II. Although amounting to only

$258 million, these funds accounted for 60 per cent of all the total foreign investment in the islands, and were concentrated in public utilities, mining and other industries pertaining primarily to the export trade to the 28 United States.

This arrangement worked reasonably well until first the war and then independence upset the balance. Post-war economic recovery measures emphasized the restoration of the export-iraport system as might be expected, but neglected the domestic areas, making recovery superficial at best.

Sixto K. Roxas, writing in the Manila Sunday Times Magazine, points out that while Imports rose markedly between

^^In 1940 the United States accounted for 755^ of all Philippine trade (Jenkins, 0£. cit., p. 32} • 27 Horacio de la Costa (ed.). Readings in Philippine History (Manila; Book Mark, Inc., 1965}> p. 28T.

^Jenkins, o£. cit., pp. 38-39* 20

1945 and 1950, exports never reached the pre-war level, 29 creating a serious balance of payments problem.

By 1950 the domestic economy had finally returned to the 1941 production stage, but little had been accomplished in improving tne means of transporting these goods to market. Enlarged agricultural production was due to expanded acreage under cultivation, not to improved efficiency. To make matters worse, manufacturers were not taking advantage of the availability of abundant raw materials to expand domestic production of finished goods.

For instance, the presence of abaca offered ample oppor­ tunities for the manufacturing of rope. Textile yarns, traditionally the leading import commodity, were available 30 domestically for use in making fabrics.

While it appears that these problems were known to

American officials in the Philippines, their scope and the overriding political implications both at home and in the

islands made them extremely difficult and sensitive to

solve. A more opportune time and more favorable cir­ cumstances seemed to be what was needed. Events around the world in 1950, but particularly in East Asia, provided a

OQ Sixto K. Roxas, "Struggle for Economic Restora­ tion, " Sunday Times Magazine (May 20, 1956), p. 9* 30 U. S. Department of Commerce, 0£. cit., p. 10. ' 21 stimulus. In that year the Chinese Communists consolidated their position in China after a bitter civil war against the Konmintang, and established their own government on the mainland. To the east, a war broke out in Korea that brought in United Nations forces. The impact of these two events can readily be seen in United States policy towards the Philippines. CHAPTER II

THE UNITED STATES TAKES THE OFFENSIVE

Prior to 1950, the Soviet Union was the primary concern of the United States in international politics.

By 1950 the cold war was well underway. The strategic lines of battle had been drawn. But 1950 also marks an important shift in the cold war, for the Chinese Commun­ ist victory over the Kuomintang raised a new and poten­ tially more dangerous menace to East Asian stability.

Keeping in mind also the North Korean invasion of South

Korea on June 25, 1950, one can begin to appreciate the disturbing truth in the following statement: "After 1950,

United States policy called for cooperative action from the free nations for the specific purpose of countering

Soviet-Communist expansion wherever and in whatever form it occurred.

In order to understand how these and internal events going on in the Philippines at the same time affected United States-Philippine policy, the Chinese and

Korean situations, as well as the growing threat of the

1 William Reitzal et al.. United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955 (Menaska: George Baxita Co., Inc., 1956), p. 354. 23 internal Hukbalahap rebellion in progress in the Philippines since 1945, will be examined. Only then does it become clear why the United States, in light of these contingencies, moved quickly and effectively to protect its interests in the Philippines.

Chinese Communist Victory

Due to its central position in East Asia, and the belief that the government would align itself with common strategic and political objectives held by the United

States, China, it was hoped, would assume a leading role in post-war Asian affairs. Internal difficulties unfortunately maae this impossible. At first the United States felt that the squabble taking place between the Communists and tne

Nationalists was nothing more than a political argument.

United States policy sued for a resolution of these differences, and pushed for a coalition government to bring about the desired political stability.

These efforts soon proved futiie. Although a strong, unified and democratic China remained the objective, support was extended more noticeably to the Nationalists beginning in mid-1948, but never to the proportions that

Chiang Kai-shek pleaded for. During the next two years, however, the entire Nationalist position deteriorated rapidly. By the end of 1949 Chiang and his forces had 24 retreated to Formosa, and the Communists were moving in to gain complete control of the mainland. Meanwhile, United

States policy had reached a dead end.

The Chinese Communist victory delivered a serious blow to American interests in the Pacific; erasing in many ways the military gains made in East Asia during World

War II. Another potentially expansionist power had been created to supplement tne Soviet threat in the Far East.

While thepe was considerable doubt whether Chinese and

Soviet interests were in common, one fact was painfully clear. American security considerations must now taxe precedent over all others in Asia. The Philippines, Japan and later Taiwan assumed major importance in American efforts to reconstruct their Far East defenses. When the

Korean War broke out, a sense of panic and impending doom swept through the United States. The time had come once again to act boldly.

The Korean War

Cold war politics made it extremely difficult to settle the problem of Korean unification after the war.

Basic disagreements over ends and means between the United

Stai.es and the Soviet Union reduced the question to a stalemate. Failure to agree on a United Nations' spon­ sored national election in 1948 brought about the formation 25 of a permanent government in South Korea In January 1949*

At the same time a similar process was also taking place in

North Korea.

The North Korean attack on South Korea dramatically indicated to American leaders that the Soviet Union was willing to use the armed forces of another communist state to achieve its objectives in Asia. Writing in July 1951, one year after the outbreak of the war, the International

Studies Group at Brookings Institute assessed the influence of the Korean War on the American and Allied view of Soviet and Chinese expansion by saying:

There is now a firmer agreement among the free nations that a tireat exists than there was a year ago. A better basis for Joint action had been con­ structed than existed a year ago. And finally there is a firmer agreement within the United States that the threat must be met at almost any cost.2

The United States reacted to the North Korean attack by sending troops immediately to Korea to stop their advance.

Besides rapidly mobilizing its power, the United States took action to recover its own security losses suffered as a result of the Chinese Communist victory, by developing and strengthening a system of stable independent states willing to harmonize their interests with the United States through

^Brookings Institution, Major Problems 1951-1952, o£. cj^., p. 3. 26 additional defense alliances and increased military and 3 economic assistance. It is significant to note that both actions were taken with respect to the Philippines.

The position of the Philippines at this time is important for two reasons. First, the Philippine people had been from the day of independence an outspoken advocate of American foreign policy objectives in the Par East.

They were the first to join with the United States ana send troops to Korea, an act which symbolized a union of Asians fighting the common communist menace. Secondly and more notably, Filipinos were willing to send their fighting men to another country to fight, despite the fact that they too were still in a struggle for survival against the Hukbalahap rebellion, then at its height in 1950.

The Hukbalahap Movement

Internal developments in the Philippines have been referred to only in passing thus far, because it was be­ lieved that they would take on greater meaning when out­ lining the origins and growth of the Huk uprising in the post-war period. It is important to keep in mind the events that were taking place at the time to help make the

Huk insurrection possible.

^Ibid., p. 8 0 . 27

Following President Roxas' sudden death in April 1948,

Vice-President Epidio Quirino assumed office. Honest, experienced, and intelligent. President Quirino unfortu­ nately lacked Roxas' leadership ability and political wisdom, and soon found his administration inundated by hundreds of charges of corruption. "He was, at best, one of a group," writes one student of Philippine political affairs, "and tne group soon took the reins out of his hands." The writer goes on to say,

...No one suggested any lack of personal honesty on the part of the president. His own specific integrity was not challenged, but this could not be said of the men with whom he was surrounded, for he was virtually walled in by those who were far from scrupulous.4

Faced with opposition inside and outside his admin­ istration, Quirino seemed powerless to handle growing economic and political problems. The all-important tax structure broke down. By 1950 it was charged that no more 5 than 25 per cent of due taxes were being collected.

Quirino's "victory" in the hotly-contested and highly controversial 1949 presidential election was crippling to

Philippine democracy, and a glaring indication that future trouble of this kind would again arise if steps were not taken to prevent it. Faith in democracy had waned, in its

^Smith, 0£. cit., p. 136.

^Ibid., p. 138. 28 place more attention was being given to promises voiced by tne communist-lead Huks.

Political descendants of the Huks date back to 1925*

At that time an Indonesian communist. Tan Malaka, formed a small anti-government group in the sparcely populated sugar and rice regions of Central Luzon where agrarian unrest had been traditionally strong. From this body came several individuals, among them Crlsanto Evangelista and

Pedros Abad Santos, who inaugurated the Philippine Communist

Party on November 7, 1930, the thirteenth anniversary of the 6 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.

When in 1932 the party was outlawed in the islands,

Santos organized the Socialist Party. Evangelista, following a two year prison stay for sedition, obtained a pardon and fled to Moscow. With the establishment of the world-wide

United Fronu program in 1938, the Communists emerged to 7 join with the Socialists in a Popular Front. The party was never a political force of any importance until the outbreak of war in 19^1, acting as a catalyst, helped raise tne

Communists' hopes and expectations.

Underlying the early development of the Communist

Lt. Col. Tomas C. Tirona (PAF), "The Philippine Anti-Communist Campaign," Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. 7 (Summer, 1954), p. 42". 7 Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 11. 29

Party In the Philippines was peasant and labor unrest, caused by tenant farming and low wages. Although present throughout the islands, these conditions were most evident in urban and rural areas of Central Luzon where farm 8 tenancy rates were well over 50 per cent. In addition large landholdings and absentee landowners were common in this area— two factors usually attributed to farmer dis­ content .

Consequently, the Communists and Socialists concen­ trated their efforts to gain power during the 1930's by soliciting the support of the tenant farmers and urban workers. During the war, however, they changed their tactics from political opposition to open armed insurrection.

As the "Peoples ' Anti-Japanese Army," or in abbreviated

Tagalog, the Hukbalahaps, they fought bravely and with distinction as anti-Japanese guerilla bands during the

Japanese occupation. By refusing to come under the command of the American-led Filipino resistance forces (USAFFE), the Huks remained centrally organized, and independent of government supervision. In their area of operations they assumed control of the local governments, thereby strength­ ening their positions.

g Philippine Republic, Bureau of Census and Statistics, Summary Report on the 1948 Census of Agriculture (Manila, 1952), p. 11741 30

Despite the return of civilian government on

February 27, 1945, the Huks remained a strong, well- organized band of guerrilla fighters, led by a small nucleus of hard-core comm lists, intent on continuing their hos­ tilities even afte peace had been declared. Accurate figures on their strength vary substantially, but Philippine

Array Intelligence estimated that in early 1946 between

10 and 15,000 men were under arms, supported by a peasant 9 population of about 250,000 persons.

No longer able to ambush Japanese troops, the Huks turned instead to looting and pillaging the countryside as part of a larger plan designed to eventually overthrow the existing government, which Huk leader, Luis Taruc, now con­ sidered the puppet of American imperialism. This harsh policy created a split between those intent on overthrow, and the vast majority of followers who questioned the others' determination to gain power at the expense of the present government.

Unlike most communist upheavals, the one in the

Philippines was largely local in nature. Their greatest strength during and immediately after the war was limited

E. E. Conger, A. H. Peterson, G. C. Reinhardt (ed.). Symposium on the Role of Air Power in Counter-insurgency and Unconventional Warfare : The Philippine Huk Campaign (Santa Monica: The Raud Corporation, 1965), p. W. 31

primarily to the Central Luzon provinces of Tarlac, Nueva

Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan. This was due in part to

peasant unrest, but also because powerful landholders in

these areas fled to Manila during the war, allowing Huks to 10 establish their control in the villages.

Support from foreign governments was largely limited

to moral encouragement. Probably some financial support was extended, however, according to Lt. Col. J. M. Tinio,

high-ranking army intelligence officer during this period,

government officials failed to uncover any evidence of

foreign shipments of arms and ammunition. Nonetheless, it

is widely believed that Chinese Communist army officers

offered assistance in training Huks, and at least one former

American soldier, William Pomeroy, joined the resistance movement and even became their chief theoritician before 11 being captured in 1952.

Despite these gains as long as the Philippine

government remained energetic, the Huks made little progress

Francis L. Starner, Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), p. 16. 11 Lt. Dale Pontius, an American counter-intelligence officer in Manila following General MacArthur's return, also openly sympathized with Huk officials, hampering efforts to assimilate as many of the rank and file back into a useful role in society and capture the dedicated leaders (William Y. Elliott interview, October 10, 1967)• 32 toward their ultimate goal. But with Roxas ' death, they moved to expand their influence to all of Luzon. The United

States reacted to this development in much the same manner that it did in Korea and elsewhere.

The unique relationship of the Philippines to the

United States, however, made ultimate Pilipino-Araerican success mandatory. American representatives in the

Philippines realized that to defeat the Huks, more sweeping reform measures were now required to continue where the primarily relief and restoration recommendations of the

Tydings Mission had left off. In early 1950 American officials persuaded President Quirino to request a survey mission to investigate economic difficulties, which by this time were sending the fledgling republic into fiscal chaos.

The Bell Mission

In early July President Truman dispatched a group of

American economic experts, headed by a prominent Chicago banker and former Under Secretary of the Treasury, Daniel W.

Bell, to the Philippines to consider the economic and financial problems of that country and to recommend measures" that would "enable the Philippines to become and to remain ,12 self-supporting. Of particular interest to tne Mission

^^Daniel A. Bell, Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines (Washington: USÙPO, 1^50), P« 1. 33 were immediate steps that should be taken "to help raise production and living standards in the Philippines," which were thought to be the two basic economic dilemmas facing 13 them.

The Bell Report, publicized in October, made no attempt to hide what was painfully evident to most informed observers, but the wording was carefully chosen to avoid inflaming sensitive nationalist feeling in the Philippines.

Several economic and political weaknesses were noted: (l) that little had been done to diversify production and in­ crease productive efficiency; (2) that investments, although extensive, were going into commerce and real estate, but not toward developing new industry and agriculture; (3) that inequalities in income distribution had become more pro­ nounced, and inflation had caused real income ratios to be even greater; and (4) that inefficiency and corruption in 14 government circles prevented meaningful recovery.

The Mission's recommendations were equally concise and to the point. It urged that efforts be taken to curb the runaway inflation, by raising additional tax revenue with a graduated income tax; and liberalizing credit poli­ cies in order to encourage more investment in productive enterprises. Improving farm methods, making available

^^Ibid. l^Ibid., p. 2 . 34 undeveloped but fertile farm land and initiating a major land redistribution program were cited as means to increase agricultural production. A Philippine Development Corpora­ tion was suggested to coordinate all government activities, as a way to purposely diversify the economy and stimulate industrial expansion.

Other recommendations included (l) levying a heavy import tax on all but essential import items to create a more favorable balance of trade; (2 ) improving the poor standard of living through extensive health, education and labor programs; and (3) reorganizing the governmental framework to insure honesty and greater efficiency. Finally, the Report asked that $250 million be extended in loans and grants to help get these suggested reform measures underway, on the condition that the Philippine government take 15 positive steps to carry them out. Chairman Bell concluded his report by saying:

The aid from the United States will be more ef­ fective if the United States retains control of the funds and their use for development purposes in the Philippines. In the last analysis, the Philippine economy can benefit from the United States aid only if other policies, specifically budget and credit policy, are coordinated to assure that dollar resources are not dissipated through inflated demand for imports and large remittances abroad.lo

l^ibid., pp. 3-5. ^^Ibid., p. 105. 35

Gtenerally speaking the Bell Report was well received

In the Philippines. Although President Quirino voiced reservations about the American supervision of funds, he called the report fair and accurate. Together with

William C. Foster, the American Economic Cooperation

Administrator, Quirino signed an agreement on November l4,

1950, pledging the enactment or legislation required to implement the aid measures.

Carlos P. Romulo, then serving as Philippine Secre­ tary of Foreign Affairs, made the statement that his country^ 17 was in no danger of economic collapse in 1950. Assuming this analysis is correct, it is possible to conclude that the United States, concerned about its deteriorating position in Asia, regarded these economic difficulties as a compelling reason to increase its support to the

Philippine government, as a means to bolster the regime

(and therefore American interests), and at the same time deliver a severe blow to the Hukbalahaps. Frances Starner alludes to this when he writes:

Unquestionably, military and economic aid from the United States played an extremely significant role from 1950 on, in stemming the rebellion— a rebellion, which, it should be noted, was indige­ nous in origin and support. At the same time, the role of the United States in bringing about some

^^New York Times, June 16, 1950, p. 15* 36

of the basic social and economic reforms should not be overlooked. Specifically the pressure exerted by the United States on the Quirino gov­ ernment to effect such reforms as a condition for further aid was a significant.factor in checking the spread of the rebellion.

One element of United States involvement that

Starner does not mention in this passage is the increasing attention being given to a man whom many came to consider the only person capable of saving the Philippine Republic from a communist takeover. Chapter III will show how he rose from humble origins to become the savior or his country and in the process, receive the whole-hearted support of the United States government and the American people.

T A starner, o£. cit., p. 6. CHAPTER III

EARLY AMERICAN INTEREST IN MAGSAYSAY

Ramon Magsaysay was born In the small village of

Iba, Zambales Province in Central Luzon on August 31, 1907*^

The son of a poor but educated and dedicated school teacher,

Magsaysay at an early age was instilled with many of the qualities which in manhood would serve him well in public office. After growing up in typical peasant family sur­ roundings, Magsaysay enrolled in the University of the

Philippines at age 20, but was forced to drop out when he contracted tuberculosis. Having fought his way back to good health, he returned to his studies at the Jose Rizal

College, where he received a degree in Commerce in 1930.

Upon graduation from college, Magsaysay went to work for a large bus transportation company in Manila. After working his way up to the level of a district manager,

Magsaysay was seriously entertaining the idea of setting up his own transportation business. Then the war broke

Several excellent biographies have been written about Magsaysay, but two volumes stand out: Carlos P. Romulo and Marvin M. Gray, The Magsaysay Story (New York: The John Day Co., 1956), and Carlos Quirino, Magsaysay of the Philippines (Manila: Alemar's, 1958). 38 out. Almost overnight his thoughts turned to more Impor­ tant matters.

When the Japanese launched their invasion of the

Philippines, Magsaysay left his family to Join the USAFFE guerrilla forces in his native province of Zambales. There he was put in command of a company of men, and fought bravely against the Japanese. When a large price was put on his head, he was sent to Manila to hide, and to report on Japanese movements there to his friends in the hills.

About a year later. Colonel Gyles Merrill, an

American army officer, assumed command of the Zambales province group. He decided to appoint a native Filipino as leader of the guerrilla forces there. He chose

Magsaysay. Promoted to Captain, Magsaysay performed his new duties with distinction. Prior to the planned

American invasion of the islands, he was given the important task of preparing the beaches for the Luzon landing. So effective were his efforts that the Americans waded ashore practically without firing a shot.

With the liberation of the Philippines completed, military rule was temporarily imposed. Magsaysay was appointed military governor of Zambales on Colonel Merrill's recommendation, and served briefly at that post until

February 27, 1945, when civilian rule was resumed with tne 39 return of Commonwealth President Sergio Osmena to the islands. Longing to return to a normal family life and his business career after the war, Magsaysay found himself facing a troublesome dilemma.

His country lay in ruins. A great deal of work lay ahead to restore the damage and recover from the ravages of war. Independence would be declared within a year.

Close friends, who knew of his achievements during the war, urged him to go into politics. Congressional elections were nearing. At first reluctantly, and then with fierce determination, Magsaysay decided to run for Congress from his home province.

One can get an excellent preview of his future con­ tribution to Philippine democracy by analyzing his 1946 campaign techniques. First, he refused campaign donations.

Instead, he urged those who wished to help to donate their time and energy, something all Filipinos had more of than money. His place was among the people, and he never forgot this. He saw his job in 1946 as bringing the government to them; a belief that carried him into the Presidency in

1953' Carlos P. Romulo, in his stirring account of

Magsaysay's rise to power, asserts:

His greatest asset as a politician was the fact that he knew the lives and ambitions and the needs of tne people. They wanted fair prices for their crops, schools for their children, honest represen­ tation in the government. In their own simple speech Magsaysay promised to help them achieve 40

these things. His was the personal touch all the way.2

It is very difficult to pinpoint one quality that singles out Magsaysay as a man of incredible talents. To even attempt such a task does not do justice to his many other significant characteristics. With this in mind, however, it is believed that his ability to gain the trust of the people (at a time when words seldom meant anything), perhaps more than any of the others, made possible his election victory in 1946 and his stunning successes that followed. He soon became known as a man of his word. Not only did he have an appealing philosophy of action, but he embodied it in word and deed. Although he demanded a great deal from his people, no one could say that he did not demand also a great deal from himself.

Brave, sincere, honest, fair, energetic, warm, and sympathetic are only a few of many adjectives that have been used to describe him. Cynics might view this adoration with some skepticism, but Robert Smith offers a thoughtful explanation:

The life of Magsaysay has occasionally been over-dramatized. It is such perfect Horactio Alger material that the temptation to embellish has sometimes proved irresistable. Actually, the

p Romulo and Gray, o£. cit., p. 8 3 . 41

embellishment is unnecessary. The facts speak for themselves.3

Political prominence did not come immediately for

Magsaysay, although he distinguished himself early in the

House of Representatives as a hardworking, no-nonsense politician eager to represent his people and the Filipino veterans with whom he had fought during the war. His interest in their failures to acquire the same benefits extended to Americans after the war led President Roxas to send Magsaysay to Washington in 1948 to represent the

Filipino veteran during the congressional debates sur­ rounding passage of the Rogers Act.

The 1948 Trip to the United States

Independence had brought untold hardship to Fili­ pino veterans undergoing hospitalization in American mili­ tary hospitals in the islands. All were discharged because they were no longer under American jurisdiction. No apparent consideration was given to the new government's inability to care for these people, nor apparently to tneir invaluable contribution to the Pacific War cause. Because

Magsaysay was serving as Chairman of the House Committee on National Defense, and because of his war record, Roxas

^Smith, o£. cit., p. l48. 42 chose hlm to lead the mission that would try to Influence passage of the Rogers Bill, then before the 80th Congress.

The Rogers Act, only one of some 400 other similar bills pending approval at the time, was designed to pro­ vide funds to build hospitals and make available death and educational benefits to Philippine veterans, in much the same manner as the GI bill recently passed for 4 American World War II veterans and their families. To make matters worse, 1946 was an election year in tne

United States. In many respects, Magsaysay's relentless lobbying tactics carried the day for the Philippines.

Through the support rendered by House Speaker Joseph

Martin and timely assistance from American Ambassador to the Philippines, Emmet O'Neal, the bill passed Congress somewhat amended and was signed by President Truman in

July.

In his own words, Magsaysay explains his 1948 experience: "When they sent me to Mr. Truman, it is true

I did not know any English. So we conversed in Tagalog. 5 And I came home with twenty million dollars." Actually

2i U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Veterans Affairs, Benefits Relating to Service in the Philippines During World War II (Washington: u Sg p O, 1948), p. 7* 5 Quirino, o£. cit., p. 42. 43 he came home with $22.5 million authorized to build veterans ' hospitals and an annual appropriation of not more than $3.3 million for the next five years to cover operating 6 expenses.

While here in the United States, he made it a point to renew old war-time friendships with Americans, many of whom were now working in the State and Defense Departments.

These contacts cannot be underestimated, for they served an important function just two years later when the Huks were on the verge of a communist taxeover. Although news media coverage for Magsaysay was minimal during this visit, he was warmly received in Washington, and left a deep imprtssion on all Americans whom he met.

The 1950 Visit to the United States

Two years after Magsaysay returned from his first trip to the United States, he was again called upon, this time by President Quirino, to present the second install­ ment of the Philippine veterans' case before Congress.

Magsaysay had won an easy reelection victory the previous year and was again serving as Chairman of the Committee on

National Defense. His credentials spoke for themselves.

As has been so true about the American political

United States Statutes at Large, (1948), p. I210. 44 process, merely getting Congressional approval for an authorization of funds does not guarantee thau the money will be appropriated. Two years after the Rogers Bill had been passed, only $9*5 million had been granted to 7 build one hospital. Although it was impossible to deter­ mine from the report of the 1950 hearings why more had not been advanced, one could speculate that poor planning and a relatively complacent attitude displayed by Philippine government officials toward the allocation of American aid, together with growing American dissatisfaction for the deteriorating economic conditions in the islands, slowed up governmental action.

While the lack of hospital building funds was discussed, primary interest lay in a bill that would provide for veteran death and educational benefits (omitted from the

Rogers Act), and would authorize coverage for some 2000 guerrillas who had been excluded from the original law.

This had occurred, it was argued, because they were not officially under American jurisdiction during the war.

Magsaysay again called upon personal friends in the United

States to support his stand. He himself appeared to make his views known before the committee. Despite the fact

7 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcom­ mittee on Veteran Affairs, Burial and Educational Benefits for Philippine Veterans (Washington: USGPO, 1950), p. 16b6. 45

Congress passed a bill on April 25> 1951 granting up to $75 and a flag to help defray burial costs for each Philippine veteran, no progress was made toward further hospitalization 8 and educational benefits.

It is perhaps significant to note thau no known press coverage was made or Magsaysay's visit in 1950. This may reflect the low level that general Philippine prestige had reached by 1950 in the eyes of the American public.

If this is true it certainly did not include several promi­ nent State Department officials, who were becoming increas­ ingly concerned with the situation in the archipelago. One of these men was William Lacy, then Director, Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State. In my interview with him he pointed out that it was during this visit to the United Stares that he became personally acquainted with Magsaysay, and decided that he was the man needed to get the Philippines back on their feet and defeat 9 the Hukbalahaps. He made it clear, however, that he was not alone in that evaluation. Several others, among them 10 Colonel Edward Lansdale, had also seen Magsaysay's potential.

^65 United States Statutes at Large (1950), p. 32.

^Personal interview with William S. B. Lacy, former Deputy Director of Mission to the Philippines, April 8, 1967.

^^The role of Colonel Lansdale and other Americans in tne Philippines will be examined later in more detail. 46

No appreciation of this policy is possible until the

American role in promoting Magsaysay for the position as

Secretary of National Defense in President Quirino's cabinet is closely analyzed.

American Support of Magsaysay for Defense Secretary Post

Thus far, most of tne attention has been devoted to a series of discussions designed to give the reader a "feel" of the conditions present in the post-war international environment, and show how they affected United States policy objectives vis-a-vis the Philippines. Having almost com­ pleted this task, greater emphasis will be placed hereafter on an examination of the American-Philippines policy during the early 1950's, with particular interest centered on tne

1953 elections. Perhaps the single most significant political act by the United States during this period took place three years earlier when American officials promoted

Magsaysay for the Defense Secretary position.

A series of contradictions surround the events leading up to the appointment of Magsaysay as Secretary of

National Defense. No attempt will be made to resolve these differences because of their relative unimportance here.

There is one fact, however, over which no disagreement exists. By mid-1950 the Huks had gained sufficient strength on Luzon and in Manila itself so that a takeover appeared 47

Inevitable. President Quirino was all but a prisoner in his own palace. Terrorist bands roamed the streets at will.

Measures employed thus far by the army and local police had 11 failed miserably.

The United States had reacted on two fronts: the

Bell Mission, and a political campaign designed to show that it would not stand idly by and watch tne Huks take power. Considerable political and diplomatic pressure was exerted on Quirino by embassy officials. Threats of the withdrawal of American assistance were put forward to impress Quirino that the United States meant business.

Official American support of Magsaysay apparently remained in the background at first. Those Americans serving in the Philippines at this time (Colonel Lansdale and JUSMAG chief. Major General Leland Hobbs in particular) were among his staunchest backers. Romulo states that

General Hobbs, having personal knowledge of Magsaysay's success in guerrilla warfare, had urged Quirino to appoint 12 him to the recently vacated post. Not until Magsaysay himself decided to seek the position were United States policy aims disclosed.

^^Romulo and Gray, o£. cit., p. 103.

l^carlos P. Romulo, Crusade in Asia: Philippine Victory (New York: The John Day Company, 1955)# p. 123* 48

When he asked for support from his friends in

Washington, just prior to his meeting with Quirino to

officially request the post, the response was immediate and

open. His request touched several State and Defense

Department officers, who in turn made known their views to

the American ambassador to the Philippines and to General 13 Hobbs respectively. On August 31, 1950, President Quirino

invited Magsaysay to the presidential palace. Two days

later Magsaysay's appointment was made official.

In all fairness to President Quirino, it should be pointed out that he realized by this time the seriousness of

the Huk situation. A victim of his own weaknesses and

inabilities to cope with the mounting difficulties coming at him from all sides, he was naturally impressed with

Magsaysay's novel plans that he claimed would eliminate the

Huk threat. Quirino could not bargain on strong footing.

Too much was at stake. To perhaps take an extreme view, he had nothing to lose and everything to gain by making

Magsaysay his new Defense Secretary. Little did he (or anyone else for that matter) realize at this time the

critical importance that this decision had on the future of

the Philippine Republic and on United States foreign policy

objectives in Asia.

13 Quirino, o£. cit., p. 48. 49

Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense

Magsaysay's contribution to his country while serving in cabinet status cannot be overrated. A brief description of his methods and tactics used to defeat the Huks will serve as a basis for a later inquiry into the events sur­ rounding the 1953 elections and as an indication of the growing interest exhibited by Americans in Magsaysay during his tenure as Secretary of National Defense.

Magsaysay took office under appalling conditions.

But he had two factors working for him: (l) the undivided support of President Quirino, and (2 ) well thought-out, constructive ideas on how to defeat the Huks. His appoint­ ment was timely. Huk documents, later captured in a series of government raids, explicitly showed that last-minute 14 plans were being made to take over Manila.

Capturing almost the entire Huk politiburo, after less than four weeks in office, was a significant develop­ ment for two reasons. Not only did Magsaysay foil the planned coup, but he completely disorganized Huk unity in the process. What is equally important is how he did it.

^^The episode started as another Huk plot to assassi­ nate Magsaysay, but he avoided the trap by persuading the

14 Smith, 0£. cit., p. 159- 50 man sent to set it up to cooperate In return for a reward

for any supplied Information. Through subsequent meetings,

Magsaysay learned that politiburo members used a woman

delivering vegetables to transmit messages to one another.

After a period of surveillance, Magsaysay's men raided 15 suspected homes visited by the woman.

The results were spectacular. His political organi­

zation destroyed, Taiuc was forced to take the defensive

for the first time in two years. Although a great deal of

fighting and hard work lay ahead, this event marked the

turning point in Magsaysay's campaign against the Huks.

As might be expected, results came rapidly. But

it was necessary to have a positive program available to

take advantage of these few mistakes made by the Huks.

Magsaysay's plans were based primarily on a three-pronged

attack; (l) extensive army reorganization, (2) a reward

system for identifying Huks, and (3) a comprehensive re­

habilitation program for members of the Hukbalahaps and

their supporters. An analysis of these methods will help

to show how Magsaysay was able to put down the rebellion

and gain not only trie admiration of his fellow Filipinos,

but of Americans as well.

^^Ibid. 51 He attacked the Huk problem first by revamping the army organization, retiring "deadwood" from the officer corps, and instilling lost fighting spirit and self-respect in the ranks by promoting able officers and men into tne key positions. The army had become completely demoralized after years of carrying on futile campaigns against an enemy that continually outsmarted it. A similar process had taken place among the local police forces which were administratively separate from army control. The result of uncoordinated police and army efforts against the Huks was that more harm was being done to the local populace than to the Huks. Realizing this, Magsaysay took steps to correct the deplorable situation.

He put his army in the field, as opposed to being cooped up in barracks. He made his forces smaller and 16 more mobile, as a way of fighting the Huks on equal terras.

Moreover, he operated in the field himself, instead of behind a desk in Manila. Many stores are told of his surprise "inspections" during the middle of the night at remote army outposts to insure that his orders and pro­ cedures were being carried out by his men.

Armed with an effective fighting force, Magsaysay

Jesus V. Merritt, Our Presidents : Profiles in History (Manila; Filipino Publishing Company, Inc., 1^2), p. 36. 52

next turned to the Philippine people. He knew there was more to a lasting victory than just killing Huks. Granted

that the latter was necessary and a prerequisite, equally

important was the support and trust of the people. The Huks

had used this to their advantage since the end of the war.

Their small numbers required the assistance of the local population for their continued operations. Just as he was able to completely win the backing of his neighbors in

Zambales in 1946, he utilized the same approach to win over

to his side the natives of Luzon.

He gained their support by instilling confidence in

the government's ability to achieve what it, had set out to

do. He built garrisons in the most Huk-infested areas to

protect the local people, and tried to return normal,

stable conditions to these areas. Magsaysay believed thau much of the aid rendered by these people had been of a

forced nature. If they could be shown that they had nothing

to fear from the Huks, and everything to gain by helping the

government's troops, then the battle would be largely over.

As added incentive, Magsaysay initiated a system of

rewards. Anyone offering information useful in capturing

Huks was given a substantial sum of money. Slow in catching

on, this program was criticized at first, but when results

began to show, these grievances faded into the background.

Rewards were not limited to certain segments of the 53 population. Huks were as eligible as anyone else, which brings up his other scheme— the most emphatic and far- reaching one of all.

Magsaysay was a Philippine nationalist first and a

Huk-hater second. As Alvin H. Scaff, in his book dealing with this movement, says: "not content to pursue Huks and kill Huks, Magsaysay wished to win them back to the govern- 17 ment's side through a positive program of social reform."

It is here that he did more damage to his foes than if he personally annihilated each one of them. For through this program of rehabilitation, he exhibited a form of human compassion toward his avowed enemy. Consequently, he completely undercut, and did away with, the very conditions from which the Communists had been gaining strength. At the same time, he was also eliciting the support of tne people. By directly confronting the Huks with honest alternatives, Magsaysay was able to undermine their 18 grievances, and win over many of them without a fight.

To put his words into action, he established the

l^Alvin H. Scaff, 0£. cit., p. 119. 18 Many of Magsaysay's programs and tactics had worked earlier and with equal success in Malaya where a similar communist insurgency was in progress. Important to tne Malayan's success in achieving victory were their efforts to win the support of the people. (N. J. Ryan, The Making of Modern Malaya (London: Oxford University Press, 1963)7 p. 204) 54

Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) in 1951• This land reform program provided rehabilitated ex-Huks with a grant of land as a reward for laying down their arms. Since the

Huks were generally fighting for improved land reform measures, this offer more than satisfied tneir demands.

This plan also had an ameliorating effect elsewhere. EDCOR teams, composed primarily of army detachments, gave the army a constructive role to play in establishing order and prosperity in the islands. JUSMAG was active in this pro­ gram, advising and assisting government forces wherever possible.

United States participation, however, was not limited to the EDCOR program. General Hobbs placed his JUSMAG advisors at Magsaysay's disposal during his army and 19 constabulary reorganizing and retraining. Colonel

Lansdale, officially holding the billet of JUSMAG public relations officer, was detailed to advise the Philippine 20 array on effective psychological warfare techniques.

Activities of a political nature were also in evidence.

The United States was keenly interested in having

Magsaysay serve as Secretary of National Defense because from this position he would be able to command the anti-Huk

19 / William 0. Douglas, North From Malaya (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1953), p. 119» PO Romulo and Gray, o£. cit., p. 125* 55 21 campaign. Once Magsaysay was established in his new Job, the United States Embassy made sure that his programs were not hindered in any way by American policies. In fact the

United States made it evident in one instance that it was ready to exert diplomatic influence on his superior whenever

it was felt necessary. One such incident arose early in

Magsaysay's term in office. He had come to believe that his written orders were not being followed by some of the

top army officers, among them General Castaneda, army chief

of staff and a personal friend of the President. Magsaysay

decided that he must get Castaneda's resignation, but he needed Quirino's approval. As related in Carlos Quirino's book, when the President balked, Magsaysay

. . . contacted his friends in Washington, D. C., who contacted the American Ambassador and the JUSMAG in Manila, who in turn called at Malacanan Palace to tell flatly President Quirino that no further military or financial aid could be given the Filipinos until Castaneda was removed from office.22

President Quirino's role should not be ignored.

Without his support, Magsaysay would never have succeeded

in defeating the Huks. It must have been difficult for

Quirino to watch almost helplessly as his subordinate

grabbed most of the spotlight and the credit for a mission

^^Lacy interview, o£. cit. 22 Quirino, 0£. cit., p. 57 56 that generally would have been credited to him. His per­ sonal admiration for Magsaysay, and desire to perpetuate the Philippine Republic, overshadowed the bitter criticisms to which his "advisors" subjected him. When the break between the two men finally came in 1953, it did not involve questions of friendship, but opposite opinions on defense policies that each thought was right.

Mopping up operations continued against the Huks, but they had essentially been eliminated as a dangerous threat to the government by the end or 1951* In a sense

Magsaysay's program had reached a critical stage now because initial successes had to be followed up and kept up. His determination to insure a clean congressional election in

1951, helped to restore faith in Philippine democracy; but it also began the alienation process between himself and

President Quirino.

Detailed to oversee a fair campaign and honest bal­ loting, Magsaysay turned to his trusted organ— the army.

He emphasized that they would not act as "goon" squads in the way characterized by its humiliating display during the

1949 elections. Instead the army was ordered to insure that every citizen had free access to the ballot box, and had freedom to chose his own candidate. This was done with

President Quirino's full knowledge and approval, for he was eager to exonerate himself from any connection with the 57 tactics used two years earlier to sweep him into office.

The results were spectacular for several reasons.

First, the election was the most orderly in years; over two million voters freely went to the polls. Secondly, the results were quickly tabulated and released to the press within twenty-four hours. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, of the nine Senators in the running, the op- 23 position Nationalists won them all. The outcome was disastrous to the President's Liberal Party. Not only did it appear that the Liberals could not win without rigging the election, but they lost control of Congress to the

Nationalists for the first time since independence.

Despite the fact that President Quirino had ordered the running ox an honest election, the man who carried out those orders received all the credit. Following this political defeat, Quirino, now ill and less able to carry out his duties, saw himself declining rapidly in power as

Magsaysay rose in prestige. Personal ambitions seemed to overtake Quirino's judgment. From this time on, until

Magsaysay's resignation as Secretary of Defense on

February 28, 1953, President Quirino exhibited more and more opposition to his secretary's policies.

The issue which caused the final break had to do

23 Smith, op. cit., p. 1 6 1 . 58 with the question of amnesty for the Huks in 1953*

Magsaysay opposed the move because he believed the rehabili­ tation program dispensed with the need of amnesty. When

Quirino vetoed this view and ordered a cease-fire and negotiations with the Huks, Magsaysay sat down reluctantly to compose his resignation. What he wrote illustrates graphically what he was trying to accomplish and why recently he haa not been able to do so:

It would be useless for me to continue as Secretary of National Defense with the special duty of killing Huks as long as the adminis­ tration continues to foster and tolerate conditions which offer fertile soil for Communism and I have repeatedly and publicly said that merely killing dissidents will not solve the Communist problem. Its solution lies in the correction of social evils and injustices and in giving people a decent government free from dishonesty and graft.24

President Quirino accepted Magsaysay's resignation with regret. He suspected, however, that his battles with him were not over but only beginning. The presidential elections were Just months away. The party nominating conventions were merely weeks away, and rumors were wide­ spread that Magsaysay was being promoted as a potential candidate. That Magsaysay had shown little or no interest in running did not seem to be important. Interestingly

?4 Harold P. Gosnell, "An Interpretation of the Philippine Election of 1953," American Political Science Review, Vol. 48 (December, 195^), P* 1133* 59 enough, his own Liberal Party was not behind the rumors, but the opposition Nacionalists, looking for a winning candidate, were trying to woo Magsaysay to their side.

The above emphasis on the environmental factors

impinging on United States-Philippines post-war policies was done in order to adequately provide a meaningful setting from which one could then acquire an understanding of why the United States policy-makers acted the way they did in 1953 when faced with the perplexing situation in

the Philippines, and in all of East Asia. CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OP AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

IN 1953 ELECTIONS

The year 1953 opened In the United States with a new Republican administration in office, headed by Presi­ dent Dwight D. Eisenhower. Later in the year an armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, ending military hostilities in Korea. This seemed to be a year for change, but the United States had no such thoughts in mind with respect to its Philippines policy. All of the post-war efforts extended to that country were reaching a climax by 1953* The presidential elections scheduled for November 10, 1953, were viewed with intense interest in Washington and at the American embassy in Manila. The

United States firmly committed itself to an official policy of non-intervention in the campaign activities and later at the polling places. Although ample precautions were taiten to ensure against any valid charges of inter­ ference, there was also present noticeable American par­ ticipation appearing to the detached observer today to be contrary to the announced American intentions.

This chapter will outline the underlying issues surrounding the election; and indicate what will be referred to as the official and unofficial United States positions 61 throughout the entire campaign. Because of the sensitivity of this topic, it should be understood that no malicious intent is meant from the analysis that follows.

After inquiring into this event, it is quite evident that United States policy, as a whole, was predicated on a detailed and extensive evaluation of the Philippine situation and of American interests there, as well as in the rest of East Asia. The United States can take pride in the role that its citizens played during this election, whether or not they followed policy guidelines formulated in Washington, and carried out by the American Embassy in

Manila.

Resume of Election Preparations

During his extended trip through Southeast Asia after the 1952 presidential campaign, Adlai Stevenson stopped off in Manila for a few days to witness the pro­ gress of the campaign. Writing latex- in Look magazine,

Stevenson made known some of his impressions of Philippine politics. Of particular interest are the following words;

The Filipinos seemed obsessed with politics. Although the elections were seven months away, city people could scarcely talk of anything else. Politics is rougher here than anything I experienced last fall.l

^Adlai Stevenson, "Ballots and Bullets," Look, Vol. 17, June 1, 1953, p. 35- 62

Having recently endured an extremely gruelling campaign himself, Stevenson's words take on added meaning. It must be explained, however, that this election which he observed was no ordinary event in Philippine politics. What was happening in Manila, or in the remotest village in the uplands of Luzon, was truly unique in many ways.

The traditional elements of hotly-contested partisan politics, violence and death were present as usual. New to the scene were several other factors, lending a sense of intrigue and drama unknown to past Philippine elections.

They may explain in part the unusual degree of foreign interest in the election results. But the Philippine people were as concerned about how the campaign would be conducted as they were about the final balloting. In other words, the conduct of the campaign was just as 2 important as the final tabulations. As a result, it will be necessary to examine the way that the party strategies were employed, so that American initiatives can be more clearly understood.

Election preparations can easily be traced back to the fall of 1952, more than a year before the election actually took place. The incident that brought this into

^Notable in this respect is the fact that United States policy was designed to follow a similar path. 63 the open occurred on November l8 , 1952, when Jose P.

Laurel, leading Naclonalista Party presidential hopeful made his celebrated proposal to President Quirino, urging both parties to withdraw in favor of a non-partisan can- 3 didate. The man he had in mind was Magsaysay. Laurel's intentions are not wholly clear. It is true that he had been continually telling his party that he did not wish to run again in 1953, and take the chance of experiencing the same defeat as in 1949* He also was aware that cer­ tain actions taken by Liberal Party leaders and Quirino himself pointed to the distinct possibility, even at this early date, that the LP would stop at nothing to win in

1953* He apparently made the proposal with little assurance that either party would accept it.

Although both sides failed to act on his suggestion, the act did achieve other results. It helped to convince his party colleagues that they had better press the initiative (begun some three months earlier) to persuade

Magsaysay to accept the nomination. Magsaysay continued to politely decline, as he had done in the past, on the grounds that he already had an important job to do and that it was still far from completion. Laurel stepped in personally. Together with Senate President Eulogio Rodriguez,

3Daily Mirror, November l8, 1952, p. 1. 64 he continued to pressure the Secretary of National Defense to resign from his position and party, and join the NP.

The tenor of Laurel's pleas seems to have left a residual effect on Magsaysay. Laurel's position and political prestige, coupled with his frank approach, deeply impressed Magsaysay. Prom these talks between the two men, a secret agreement was reached in late 1952. It stipulated that, in the event of his resignation, the NP would endorse 4 him as their presidential candidate.

But this pact was not widely accepted by other members of the party. There was still a large segment who felt that Laurel was the only likely candidate capable of beating Quirino. Magsaysay, despite his ability fighting

Huks, was not even a member of the party. Then, there were those who also eyed the nomination for themselves. Two of tnem. Senator Carlo M. Recto and Camilo Osias, were serious contenders. Recto, however, fell in early with Laurel, but

Osias refused to back down. He argued against Magsaysay's nomination more than any other Nacionalist. Not only did he consider himself more qualified and deserving because of past service to the party, Osias also argued that Magsaysay was a political "turncoat ", betraying the very people who

il Jorge R. Coquia, The Philippine Presidential Elec­ tion of 1953 (Manila; University Publishing Company, 1955), pTTo. 65 5 put him in office. Osias fought hard for months, but with

Laurel's firm support behind Magsaysay, his labor proved futile. When the NP convention met on April 12, 1953,

Magsaysay won a resounding victory. When all the votes were counted, he had received 705, as opposed to only 49 for 6 Osias. Thus, the stage was set for the Liberal Party.

Although relatively new to Philippine politics, the

LP had the distinction of being able to say that it had been in control since its inception. Established in 1945 when several Nacionalist leaders, among them Manuel Roxas, broke from the party to contest the leadership of President

Osmena, the Liberal Party had been in power since inde­ pendence in 1946. While the NP dominance during the

Commonwealth period had essentially reduced the politi­ cal process to a one-party system, the Liberal victory in

1946 was hailed as a major victory for Philippine democracy.

Only seven years later the situation had become completely reversed, or so it seemed. Despite the fact that President Quirino would not be able to finish out 7 his whole term if re-elected in 1953, there was little

^Starner, 0£. cit., p. 29*

^Coquia, 0£. cit., p. 65*

^The Philippine Constitution forbids anyone from serving more than eight consecutive years as President. Since President Quirino had finished out the last two years 66 question within party ranks in late 1952 and the beginning of 1953 as to who would be chosen to run for president.

Quirino had made his opinions known at an early date.

Laurel's charges, dating as far back as October, 1952, that the 1953 election would again be rigged by the LP, prompted Quirino to declare his intentions to run again 8 in 1953 to clear his name and prove his opponent wrong.

With the national convention still several weeks away, a pre-convention meeting of the national party di­ rectorate met on February 25, 1953, to give Quirino the party's endorsement. This was not an overwhelmingly popular decision. By this time some Liberal leaders, aware of the possibility of Magsaysay being chosen by the NP, refused to acknowledge the endorsement, and began searching for someone who might have a better chance of beating him.

They centered their energies on Carlos P. Romulo, then serving concurrently as Ambassador to the United States and 9 Representative to the United Nations. His long and dis­ tinguished career in Philippine politics and international affairs made him a likely candidate.

of Roxas ' term, he would not be able to serve more than two years if elected in 1953* Q Coquia, 0£. cit., p. 73*

9Ibid.. p. 76. 67

President Quirino recalled Romulo to the Philippines in June. Much to both men's surprise, a Romulo-for-Presi- ient Movement erupted upon his arrival in Manila. Quirino's desire to use Romulo to strengthen the Liberal Party's position in the campaign resulted in a complete reversal.

He had failed to notice Romulo's growing disapproval of his party's illicit activities, ana his desire to see him defeated. The upshot was that the party split over both candidates. When the national convention finally met in late May, heated accusations and threats were levelled by both sides. As the meeting progressed, it became evident to Romulo that his success rested on his ability to secure a secret ballot. Only then, he reasoned, would Quirino's

"supporters" dare make their true feelings known and vote 10 for Romulo.

Chaos ensued during which the motion was put to a vote. The tally was at best inaccurate, but the motion was defeated. Romulo, disgusted with the display, walked

out, followed by his supporters, including Vice-President

Fernando Lopez. Quirino's nomination was assured, but the incident probably cost him the election.

Romulo did not give up. He and his followers in­ augurated the Democratic Party with the sole apparent

^^Smith, op. cit., p. 167. 68 reason of defeating Quirino. The party's efforts were impressive, but there were too many serious obstacles standing in its way, the most crucial of which was the lack of campaign funds. Romulo made a special trip to the

United States in late June, it was explained, to attend a series of public appearances earlier agreed to. It is generally believed, however, that he went to raise money 11 for his campaign. Bitterly disappointed to find that his

American friends were willing to support only one candidate

(contributions generally had already been extended to

Magsaysay), Romulo returned to the Philippines empty-handed.

Without money, his chances of beating Quirino were slim.

Rather than risk defeat for the divided Anti-Quirino groups, the Democratic Party approached the Nacionalists in late

August with a deal.

In exchange for Democratic Party representation in the event of a NP victory, the DP would agree to a coalition of the two parties. With the campaign more than half over, the NP was at first reluctant to accept the bargain. Early

Indications already pointed to a sweeping NP victory.

Additional support, conditional to political concessions did not seem necessary. Only Magsaysay's personal

^^Coquia, 0£. cit., p. 263* 69 12 intervention brought about the coalition. He favored tne move because he said tnat it was getting more and more difficult to refute accusations leveled at him by Romulo, a man whom he respected and admired for his accomplishments and beliefs. On August 21, 1953, the coalition took place when Romulo officially withdrew his candidacy in favor of 13 Magsaysay.

The Nature or the Campaign

Characteristic of past Philippine elections, both

parties embarked on extensive programs to publicize their

stand on several important issues at stake in the election.

The Liberal Party essentially followed a strategy designed

to emphasize the economic and social achievements that had

transpired over the past four years. The Nacionalists,

perhaps because they began earlier, actually set the pace.

They raised most of the issues, including the graft and

corruption in the government, the fraud and terrorism of

the 1947 and 19^9 elections, and the general incompetence

and inefficiency displayed by Quirino's administration.

The Liberals reacted by stressing the matter of foreign

1 p Carlo Recto, "Footnotes to Current Political Events," Manila Times, June 3, 1954, p. 5* 13 Philippine Free Press, August 29, 1953, P» 5* 70 intervention, and the belief that Magsaysay, if elected, would become a puppet in the hands of more experienced

Nacionalist leaders.

In the words of Jorge R. Coquia, prominent Philip­ pine political scientist and writer of the only complete, systematic account or the election, "The 1953 election was one of the most widespread and certainly most expensive l4 ever seen in the Philippines." That it was widespread can be attributed only to Magsaysay's Herculean efforts to meet and shake hands with as many of his fellow Filipinos as possible. His was truly a grass-roots affair, remi­ niscent of his 1946 election. But much had happened in the last nine years.

No longer was he a non-entity from Zamabales. He had soared to national prominence almost overnight. His name had become fixed in the minds of millions of Filipinos

Everywhere he went he was greeted as a hero by large, excited crowds, anxious to shake his hand and hear his reassuring words. It was not unusual for him to arrive in a town during the early morning hours, only to find that 15 an eager assembly had been waiting hours to see him.

It was not always that way. His trips into the

^^Coquia, 0£. cit., p. 217 l^ibid., p. 222. 71 hinterland especially subjected him to extreme danger. One story is told of Magsaysay's desire to hold a rally in

Kapatagan Valley, where one of his EDOOR projects was located. Warned of the possibility that he would encounter the notoriously dangerous Moro terrorist, Tawantawan,

Magsaysay went anyway. Not only did he succeed in per­ suading the rebel and his followers to lay down their arms and become law abiding citizens, but he also got Tawantawan 16 to campaign for him in his native Maranaw dialect.

While the Liberals concentrated on gaining the support of the powerful and influential businessmen and the educated groups, Magsaysay saw the value of the peasant vote, and went out to secure it. This was a new tactic in

Philippine politics. The lowly peasant had never been an important factor in the past. Despite his large numbers he had always remained outside the mainstream or Philippine 17 politics. Usually his vote was cast without any under­ standing of its value, if it was cast at all. But

Magsaysay made sure that everyone knew what he was voting for and why. When Romulo joined with Magsaysay, he was appointed overall campaign manager for the coalition. The choice was a fortuitous one. The combination was unbeatable.

^^Philippine Free Press, November 28, 1953, p. 5* 17 ‘Starner, o£. cit., p. 15. 72

Romulo's experience and eloquence effectively conveyed

Magsaysay's ideas to the large urban audiences, making it possible for Magsaysay to use his best talents in the 18 villages where he felt more at home.

An energetic man can accomplish a great deal in seven months of campaigning. Although he was able to canvas the islands as no other candidate had done before him, Magsaysay had his limitations. To assist him two groups— the MPM (Magsaysay-for-President Movement) and the

WMPM (Women's Magsaysay-for-President Movement)— were established. Representing over 12,000 clubs, scattered all over the archipelago, they helped to spread his name and ideas virtually everywhere. Formed originally to get

Magsaysay nominated, they continued to function, in spite of the fact that they never officially became an organ of the NP. They were civic-minded people who saw the merits in a man whom they thought should be president.

Partisan politics was of little or no interest to them.

Their goal was completely selfless— a Magsaysay victory.

The Liberal Party's experience was quite different.

Late in getting their campaign underway, the Liberals encountered an unexpected and damaging development. During much of June, following his nomination. President Quirino

^^Smith, 0£. cit., p. 1 68 . 73 was seldom seen outside the palace. It was widely known that his health had not been good for some time, but he haa never failed to carry out his public duties. Finally, it was announced that he was going to the United States to have an ulcer removed. He left Manila on June 27, 1953»

RumOxS immediately began to spread that his condition was more serious than reported. Confusion developed within the LP ranks, as it became apparent that the party's pro­ gram was suffering without the President to lead the way.

Meanwhile, Quirino, recovering from a series of operations, continued to run the government from his hospital bed at

Johns Hopkins, while his running-mate, Jose Yulo, tried desperately to carry the campaign load at home.

When Quirino returned to the Philippines on

September 7, 1953, after seventy-two days out of the country, he appeared fully recovered and anxious to join in the rigorous campaign activities. His absence, nonetheless, seriously hampered his party's work. Fellow party leaders were continually torn between their duty to support a man who might not live, and the desire to launch their own 19 campaign for president.

Quirino tried to project himself as the champion of Philippine sovereignty. He made the foreign intervention

^^Starner, o£. cit., p. 36. 74 issue the keystone of his campaign. Seizing upon a state­ ment made by Laurel that Americans in the Philippines should help to secure a free election, Quirino tried to appeal to 20 Philippine nationalism. He referred to himself as a

"candidate of the Filipinos," at the same time he accused

Magsaysay of acting as an American candidate, and the

United States of meddling in the internal affairs of another sovereign state.

Before a largely American audience at the Manila

Overseas Press Club on September 23, 1953, Quirino declared that at last his suspicions were confirmed. He later labeled Laurel's request for American assistance as

"treason," and attacked his opponent for selling away his 21 country's sovereignty to the United States. He failed to achieve his objective of bringing discredit on Magsaysay and his party. Instead, he only made matters worse for himself. He did not limit his attacks, moreover, merely to foreign intervention. He mistakenly took the National

Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) to task.

NAMFREL emerged from a proposai made by the Philip­ pine Veterans League in 1951 which was looking for a clean

William R. Elsbree, "The 1953 Philippines Presi­ dential Elections," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 27 (March, 1954), p. 8. 21 Manila Daily Bulletin, September 24, 1953, P* 1 « 75 and honest election that year. Persistent acts and reports of cheating, fraud and terrorism during the 1947 and 1949 elections had created distrust and despair for democratic institutions among the Philippine people. In hopes of limiting any reoccurrences, the Legion agreed to form the

NAMFREL. Resting solely on civic action, this movement was organized on a strict non-partisan, above-party basis.

Membership was free and voluntary. Its primary tasks in- pp volved working closely with the Commission on Elections, and educating the people of their rights and duties in the electoral process.

During the 1953 elections there were approximately sixty province chapters, and about 500 municipal chapters 23 with a membership of 5,000 persons. Through their pro­ grams of education, it was inevitable that they would be highly critical of recent LP corrupt and fraudulent tac­ tics. This brought forward Liberal Party charges of partiality, but evidence shows that NAMFREL maintained its avowed non-partisan stand by also criticizing (ad­ mittedly less often) suspect NP activities, such as its

^Empowered by the Philippine Constitution with the responsibility of supervising orderly elections, the Commission on Elections was the official government agency free of administration pressures capable of insuring an honest election. 23coquia, 0£. cit., p. 284. 76 attempts to gain open American support for Magsaysay during the campaign.

Official United States Position During the Election

The United States found it necessary to make its position public on the election at an early date. In answer to a request made by Laurel for United States inter­

vention in December, 1952 to insure an honest election, the American Embassy emphasized its official decision to remain outside of Philippine internal affairs. But in the same statement it urged both parties to work for an 24 honest election.

United States policy in late 1952 was based on a growing suspicion regarding reliable reports oi padded registration lists, shipments of ink erasers to distant provinces, employment of "goon" squads, bribes to pro­ vincial police officers, and threats to release prisoners to assist the "goon" squads— actions that seemed to indicate that a repeat of the 1949 election might take 25 place in 1953* After Magsaysay's resignation as

Secretary of National Defense in February, 1953, American

^^New York Times, March 13, 1953, p. 2.

25personal letter to the author from Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, United States Ambassador to the Philippines during the election proceedings. 77 officials believed thau the Array might possibly be used, as it was in 1949, as a political prop for the Quirino 26 forces.

As anxious as the United States was to maintain

Philippine democracy and a stable internal environment, it was not ready to exert any overt pressures that might be misinterpreted in any way by Quirino, the Huks or other foreign powers carefully watching the proceedings themselves. On March 13, 1953, four weeks before the first party convention. Ambassador Spruance issued a warning to the some 10-12,000 Americans living in the

Philippines to refrain from any action during the coming campaign that might be construed as foreign intervention. 27 The New York Times termed it a "precautionary measure."

Regardless of his motives, Spruance was making it clear to the Americans, the Philippine people and the world, that the United States government had no intention of interfering in this election.

Following Stevenson's visit to the Philippines in late March, during which Quirino attacked the American

Ambassador for favoring the invitation of Nacionalista candidates to a formal dinner for Stevenson, Spruance

^^Elsbree, 0£. cit., p. 4.

^^New York Times, March 13, 1953, P* 21. 78 made one of his rare public appearances to say with con­ viction,

I wish to state now that the United States Embassy will observe strict neutrality in the course of tne coming campaign and the election. For this reason I do not propose to comment upon, to confirm, or deny charges of the sort that have appeared in tne public press recently, as to do so would be tantamount to intervention in Philippine politics.28

Statements, similar to this one, would be issued from time to time by the embassy to reiterate the unchanging nature of United States policy. The ambassador's use of words and his approach is significant, for he implies that activities outside the embassy's control did not apply to his statement, and that silence was the best tact to take in answer to charges of intervention. This may be one reason why the State Department asked Admiral Spruance to come out of retirement and take the Philippine post in

January, 1952, because of his reputation for being a man of few words but extraordinary feats.

Notable during the campaign is the metamorphosis that takes place in the relations between President Quirino and the United States. Until this election Quirino had been regarded favorably in official and unofficial circles in the United States. He was generally portrayed in

p8 Quirino, 0£. cit., p. 122. 79

American newspapers as an adequate leader, doing his best to overcome the many problems facing his administration.

He was considered a strong supporter of American foreign policy objectives, having successfully defeated the staunch anti-American candidate, Jose Laurel, in the 19^9 election.

But as time passed, Americans became increasingly disillusioned with him. Revisions to the 1946 trade agree­ ment, imposing controls on imports, helped to adversely 29 affect future trade relations with the Republic. Failure to take a strong position against the Chinese Communist takeover became cause for concern among Americans who saw their Asian defenses crumbling. Inability to initiate measures to reduce widespread corruption within his government also damaged his image in the United States.

His predicament was further enlarged by Magsaysay's meteoric rise to political prominence. One can almost measure his climb in direct proportion to Quirino's descent.

Quirino was doing his best to alienate himself from the

United States. It was only natural that the increasing

"support" rendered to Magsaysay would result in a growing

"cold-shoulder" attitude toward Quirino. There was, however, no planned policy designed to weaken Quirino's image. He succeeded in doing that himself. The United States wanted

p Q ^Meyers, 0£. cit., p. 96. 80 a free, orderly election. Quirino had failed to provide for one in 19^9 , and appeared ready in 1953 to put on a repeat performance. The United States looked to Magsaysay 30 to help prevent it.

The apparent swing of American support, charged as deliberate by Quirino, can in large part be blamed on the President himself. Resentful that Magsaysay was stealing the limelight from him, Quirino made no positive attempt to get back in good graces with the United States.

He seemed intent instead in provoking American opposition to his campaign. At the same time, Magsaysay's reform ideas were in general agreement with United States recommendations. "Whether by accident or by design," writes

Prances L. Starner, "Magsaysay's emphasis on rural better­ ment coincided in 1953 with the emphasis of American advisors in foreign assistance, and gave him a significant 31 advantage in appealing for American support.

President Quirino's attacks on the United States reached a climax about six weeks before election day. They were apparently the direct result of a Saturday Evening Post article written by the American writer, Joseph Alsop, then in the Philippines covering the campaign, in which he stated

^^Lacy interview, o£. cit

31Starner, 0£. cit., p. 34. 81

openly that Magsaysay was favored by the American people, 32 and that he would win easily in a clean election.

Reprinted in serialized form in The Manila Daily

Bulletin, this essay infuriated Quirino and the Liberal

Party. They denounced it and others like it as openly

partisan and tantamount to intervention in the election.

It is interesting to note that shortly after these sharp

outbursts. Ambassador Spruance went to Wasnington on what was officially described at the time as a "routine con- 33 sultation." During his extended leave of absence

(October 4-October 20), he met with several top State

Department officials and with President Eisenhower.

Possibly as a result of one of these meetings, James

D. Bell, Philippines Desk Officer, made one of the few

State Department statements concerning the election when

he said, "Absolute impartiality with respect to internal

politics has been our policy, is our policy, aud will con­

tinue to be our policy. " But at the same time, he stated

that "as one of our major objectives is political stability, we cannot deny that we are concerned that the democratic

processes function so that the people may freely express

39 Manila Times, September 27, 1953, p. 2.

^^New York Times, October 5, 1953, P* 4. 82 34 their will." Upon his return to Manila, Spruance refused to comment on matters discussed in Washington, but echoed

Bell's remarks that the American government was "vitally" concerned with how the November 10 balloting would be conducted

When election day finally arrived, the United States embassy could begin to breathe more easily. A Magsaysay victory was assured. The American embassy could say with conviction and sincerity that it had maintained a neutral position from beginning to end. But the same cannot be said for the actions of all Americans in the Philippines at this time. Particular reference is made to the role of several JUSMAG individuals (especially Colonel Lansdale), the thousands of American citizens residing in the Philip­ pines, and some twenty-five newspaper correspondents who had come to the Philippines to cover the campaign.

United States Participation Contrary to Official Policy

It is difficult to isolate incidents in another country where American involvement is an important influence.

This is particularly true in the Philippines since the

3 James D. Bell, "Objectives of U.S. Policy in the Philippines," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 29 (October 29, 1953), p. 524.

^^Manila Times, October 22, 1953, P* 1» 83

United States has always been in the twentieth century a powerful and important factor in Philippine affairs even after independence. The large aid commitment to the island republic has only naturally made the presence and contrib­ utions of Americans there very noticeable. Add to this the high priority that the United States placed on the outcome of this election, and one can begin to perceive tne problems which faced American policy-makers.

On the one hand, it was imperative that the United

States exhibit a "hands-off" policy with respect to the campaign. But just as important, if not more so, was tne need to assure a clean and honest election and protect

American strategic and political interests. It is sub­ stantially impossible to determine today whether these

"unofficial" acts were ever tacitly approved by the embassy and the State Department. It is inconceivable that they went unnoticed. Greater concern over ends and less atten­ tion to the means employed appears to have been the official

American reaction to these activities.

The name of Colonel Edward G. Lansdale has been mentioned several times thus far without analyzing in any detail his role as JUSMAG public relations officer while stationed in the Philippines during much of the post-war Of. period. Detailed to advise the Philippine Army on

3^Little has been written about this intriguing American. One can get an appreciation of Lansdale from 84 effective psychological warfare against the Huks, Lansdale is aptly portrayed by Romulo when he wrote:

An indefatigable worker, a patriotic American, and a capable enemy of the Communists, Lansdale quickly sized up the new Defense Secretary and saw in him the hope of the Philippines to preserve its liberty. His share in building up Magsaysay's public relations and thus indirectly helping to pave the way for his ascendancy in politics was to be the consistent target of anti- American and anti-Magsaysay spokesmen as Magsaysay rose in power.37

As part of his JUSMAG duties, Lansdaie was respon­ sible for introducing Magsaysay to foreign newspaper correspondents. In this capacity, he arranged for many press meetings for visiting American newsmen, and accom­ panied Magsaysay on many of his trips to the provinces to observe the campaigns against the Huks. The two men became close, almost inseparable friends. Each came to greatly admire the other's abilities, coordinating their efforts perfectly in common ventures.

With his good newspaper background, Lansdale knew the importance of promoting Magsaysay's program and image wherever he could. He did not hesitate to call upon his

a favorable caricature in William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (New York: Norton Publishing Company, 1958)7 and a brief resume of his ideas in "Viet­ nam: Do We Understand Revolution," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43 (October, 1964), pp. 75-86.

^^Romulo and Gray, op. cit., p. 165* 85 numerous contacts in the fourth estate both in the Philip­ pines and abroad to help him. Lansdale's motives should not be misunderstood. He continually stressed one and only one reason to explain his activities— combatting 38 world communism in the defense of freedom. He knew

Magsaysay represented a source of great strength and inspiration not only to the Philippine people but also to the many other states around the world fighting communism in their countries. Magsaysay's success in putting down the Huk rebellion, Lansdale believed, should not be lost to history. He should, instead, be paraded before the world as a symbol of anti-communism. This viewpoint was substan­ tiated in mid-1952 when he actively participated in the preparations and arrangements associated with Magsaysay's famous trip to the United States and Mexico City.

Colonel Lansdaie and Dino Gonzales, long-time friend of Magsaysay and married to Quirino's only daughter, worked together to persuade Lions International Club

President, Edgar Elbert, visiting the Philippines in early

1952, to invite Magsaysay to be key speaker at the Inter­ national Lions Convention, scheduled to be held in June in

Mexico City. Elbert knew of Magsaysay's exploits. He

38 Personal letter to author from Professor H. Bradford Westerfield of Yale University. 86 needed very little convincing. The arrangements were com­ pleted by trans-Pacific telephone conversations within six hours. Lansdale and Gonzaues were elated; Lansdale because he knew the benefits that the trip would bring to his anti­ communism campaign, Gonzales because he realized that it would help to catapult Magsaysay into the 1953 campaign 39 spotlight.

Quirino, realizing the immense publicity that would come Magsaysay's way, at first refused to allow his Defense

Secretary to leave his post for such an extended period of time. But his daughter, Vicky, a strong admirer of

Magsaysay, is said to have persuaded her father to consent 40 to the trip. Lansdale reasoned to Quirino that any prestige that Magsaysay might acquire would be attributed ultimately to his administration, and consequently to

Quirino himself. The President backed down reluctantly and gave his permission. On June 7, 1952 Magsaysay left Manila, accompanied by Lansdaie, Gonzales and his wife for their first stop in Washington.

The trip to the United States was considered unof­ ficial . The pretext of a medical checkup at Waiter Reed

3Q ^Romulo implies that Lansdaie may have had the same thoughts as Gonzales. Only Quirino in his book explicitly states that Lansdale's objective was to promote Magsaysay into the presidency, (p. 94).

^^Romulo and Gray, 0£. cit., p. 165* 87

Hospital was used to make it possible for him to spend several days in Washington renewing old acquaintances and meeting with representatives in the White House, State and

Defense Departments. The list of people to whom he spoke is revealing. On June 11 he conferred with Army Secretary

Prank Pace, Navy Secretary David Kimball, General of the

Army and then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar

Bradley, before meeting with Secretary of Defense Robert 41 Lovett later in the day.

During Magsaysay's conference with Pentagon offi­ cials, interested in the progress of his Huk campaign, there is reliable evidence to show tnat a large sum of money (one-half million dollars) was transferred (without any accountability precautions taken) to JUSMAG head- 42 quarters in the Philippines. The money could be used as

Magsaysay saw fit; no strings were attached to the grant.

The move, kept secret at the time, apparently was designed to help Magsaysay where he needed it most— as campaign funds.

Magsaysay met with President Truman the next day to report on the status of his government's program to subdue the Huks. Before proceeding to New York City,

^^New York Times, June 12, 1952, p. 4. 2ip . ‘'^Romulo and Gray, o£. cit., p. 167• 88

Magsaysay received the Legion of Merit medal from Secretary

Pace for his "exceptionally meritorious service" as Secre- 43 tary of National Defense. During his four day stay he was the guest of former JUSMAG chief. Major General Hobbs, now Deputy Commanding General of the First Army. Hobbs escorted his friend around the city, introducing him to many of his influential and wealthy friends. Following his visit with Hobbs, he entered the hospital for treat­ ment. Meanwhile, Lansdale and Gonzales went on ahead, swinging through California on their way to Mexico City to arrange for Magsaysay's arrival.

Having acquired a favorable medical report, Magsay­ say travelled to Pordham University on June 22, to accept an honorary Doctor of Laws degree, an act of friendship that touched him deeply. By the time he arrived in Mexico

City, Magsaysay accomplishments were known by everyone at the Convention. His speech was termed a "sensational success" by those who heard it. Following a five-minute standing ovation, Lansdaie's and Gonzales' reason for going to California was made known, as they announced that the Nevada and California Staue Lions Clubs were donating large quantities of farm implements, clothing and money

(estimated to total about two million dollars) to help in

^^New York Times, June l4, 1952, p. 13* 89 44 the fight against the Huks.

This gesture landed like a bombshell. When Magsaysay finally returned to the Philippines on July 4, 1952, he was triumphantly received in Manila. Word of his success in the

United States and Mexico City had preceded him to Manixa.

The Philippine people were ready to show their enthusiasm and appreciation when he arrived home. President Quirino, realizing that he had been tricked again, sat brooding in his palace.

Although the events outlined above occurred several months before the 19r>3 campaign got underway, their tie-in with the election, and United States policy with respect to it, is self-evident. With the approach of the campaign, however, overt activities by American officiais in the

Philippines fell off noticeably. It was as if American policy-makers concluded that enough preliminary arrange­ ments had been carried out well enough in advance so that active participation during the actuai campaign was con­ sidered unnecessary. Nevertheless, little or no pressure was put on the American press coverage to remain neutral, giving rise to the belief that duai policies were at work _ before and during the campaign.

^^Romulo and Gray, 0£. cit., p. 168. 90

The Role of the American Press

If Lansdaie'3 activities diminished in 1953, it can be said confidently that the volume of press coverage increased immeasurably during the same period. Newspapermen and writers from all over the world, but mainly from the

United States, flocked to the Philippines for several reasons. Two stand out in particular. First, Magsaysay and his exploits had been followed closely since he became

Secretary of National Defense. Several nationally cir­ culated magazines, such as Colliers, Saturday Evening Post,

Reader's Digest, and Time, had all carried feature articles 45 on him. Second, following the Korean Armistice in July, several correspondents were urged to stop off in the

Philippines on their way home. This perhaps accounts for the unusual number and caliber of foreign reporters covering the election.

Liberal Party accusations against the American press, eventually became linked with the general charge of United

States intervention. The newsmen were accused of partial­

ity, of carrying on a deliberate plan to build up Magsaysay's

image while purposely smearing Quirino's reputation with

46 "^Time placed Magsaysay on its cover and ran a feature article on his success against the Huks (Time, Vol. 58 (November 26, 1951), PP» 32-38.) 91 false or inaccurate stories. The LP was partially correct in their interpretation of the articles. They were clearly pro-Magsaysay in tone and temper in almost every case, but that was all.

Even the usually neutral New York Times came out in favor of Magsaysay's election. In fact, whole-hearted support was extended to him by the paper. Of the almost

100 articles read, covering the years 1951-1953 inclusively, at no time was Magsaysay painted by Times reporters and editors in anything but glowing terms. The same could not be said of their treatment of Quirino.

In retaliation, the Liberals charged that Magsaysay was just an "American-made" candidate, as part of an attempt to reduce the Nacionalist candidate popularity.

But they failed to understand that his glamor was based on solid achievements, capable of standing the test of slander and still emerge untarnished. Instead of damaging their opponent's name, the Liberals only hurt their own chances 46 by using this tactic in the first place.

Feature articles in the widely circulated magazines were a constant source of tension. Alsop's work was only one of many. Another Post writer, Robert Sherrod, created controversy when he wrote, "Only two possibilities stand

46 Coquia, o£. cit., p. 237 92 between Magsaysay and the Presidency. An assassin's bullet and a crooked election. If both can be avoided the Philip- 47 pines stand a chance to gain a new lease on life. Time,

Life, and Newsweek, influential backers of Magsaysay, all predicted a Magsaysay sweep as long as "the election is honest." Added to these reports were two somewhat more sophisticated essays written by former United States 48 Ambassador William Bullitt and Supreme Court Justice 49 William 0. Douglas, based on their impressions and find­ ings from visits to the Philippines during this period.

The newspapers published in the islands cannot be overlooked, for several were edited by Americans. Most of the metropolitan newspapers remained relatively nonpartisan.

A few influential ones, however, took sides. If they did not come out openly to support Magsaysay, they were at least anti-Quirino in their views. These included the

Philippine Free Press and the Manila Daily Bulletin, both published and edited by Americans, and the Manila Times.

47 Robert Sherrod, "Is Democracy Dying in the Philip­ pines?", Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 226 (October 3, 1953), p. 2 9 . 48 William C. Bullitt, "No Peace in the Philippines," Reader's Digest, Vol. 60 (March, 1952).

^^William 0. Douglas, "Man Who Saved the Philippines," Look, Vol. 72 (November 4, 1952). 93

These papers served to relay American public opinion regarding the election to Filipino readers, and helped intensify Liberal charges of United States interference.

In spite of repeated Liberal charges of foreign intervention, not one was backed up by any clear-cut evidence. The United States found itself in a very delicate position during tne 1953 elections. The concluding chapter will describe the outcome of the election, analyze the basic assumptions underlying the role of the United

States, and show how the outcome significantly affected subsequent American policy objectives in East Asia. From this analysis conclusions will be drawn supporting the soundness of United States policy together with ways that might have made it more successful. CHAPTER V

THE PHILIPPINES REACHES POLITICAL MATURITY

Under ominous threats of violence and even rumors of armed revolution, the Filipino electorate made its way to the polls on November 10, 1953 to name their choices for President, Vice-President, the entire House of Repre­ sentatives and one-third of the Senate. The polling places opened promptly at ?:00 a.m. Election Commission officials, detachments of the Philippine Armed Forces, and NAMFREL personnel all turned out to watch the proceedings and main­ tain order. JUSMAG representatives and foreign news cor­ respondents were also present at some of the polls to

Observe the activity. Before the booths closed at 6:00 p.m.,

4 ,326,706 voters had submitted their ballots in what was termed the most peaceful and trouble-free election ever 1 staged by the Philippine Republic.

Results of the Election

The tenor of the affair was not the only item of interest. Far more significant was the nature ana scope of Magsaysay's landslide victory over President Quirino.

Republic of the Philippines, Commission on Elections, Report to the President on the 1953 Elections, (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 195^77 P* l34. 95

of tha 5 ,603,231 registered voters, more than 80 per cent

cast their ballots. Official totals showed that Magsaysay 2 captured 2,912,992 votes to Quirino's 1,313,991* Almost

70 per cent of the total vote went to the challenger. (The

President and Vice-President are directly elected.) One can gain a more discriminating appreciation of the results by

looking at some of the more detailed election statistics.

Magsaysay received a majority, in most cases an

overwhelming one, in 48 out of the 52 provinces in the 3 Philippines; 25 out of the 28 chartered cities. Anyone who

thought he would be defeated in the cities could only wince at these figures. Moreover, all eight Liberal

senators were defeated, while the Nacionalists gained con- 4 trol of the House of Representatives. Perhaps more impor­

tant to the future of the young republic and for American

interests was the ability of the Filipino people to salvage

the democratic process, and return it to a place of honor and respect.

Significance of the Election to Philippine Politics

The 1953 election distinguishes itself from those

2lbid., p. 142.

^Ibid.

^Elsbree, o£. cit., p. l4. 96 previously held for several reasons. First, the Nationalist

Party attained political prominence. Since the Philippines became independent in 1946, the Nacionalists had been unable to recover from the defection of several important NP leaders to form the Liberal Party. The NP had the momentum on its side in 1953, however, and exploited its opportunities wherever possible. The result was that the Nacionalists not only swept their presidential and vice-presidential candi­ dates into office, but enough representatives as well to gain control of the House.

Secondly, the Philippine people were able to cast their ballots without fear of reprisai or violence. This is not to say that murder and terrorism did not take place during the campaign and on election day, but it was obvious to all that no previous election had been nearly as orderly as this one, including the 1951 election. Filipinos every­ where could take credit for this achievement, for it was the individual voter who helped to lift the new republic from the ranks of the politically incompetent to the po­ litically mature in 1953 *

The many participating civic organizations set this election apart from the others. The scores of groups that actively contributed their time and energy in partisan and non-partisan ventures brought a large segment of the popu­ lation into direct contact with at least some of the 97 campaign activities. As one political scientist put it:

Perhaps the most important reason why the 1953 election will go down in Philippine political history as a highly significant event was the active participation of the citizens in achiev­ ing a clean and honest election. Never before was there a spontaneous and spirited desire of the people to talk of their rights and duties during elections and to help others exercise their rights properly to the end that the balloting would truly express the will of the people.5 6 NAMFREL forces were perhaps most responsible for this accomplishment, but the contributions made by the WMPM, 7 MPM and other smaller clubs as well as the crucial part played by the Commission on Elections should not be under­ estimated .

If the election was really honest and orderly, the

Commission must receive its share of the credit. As the official body responsible by law for the running of a candid campaign and a systematic election, the Commission was faced with many problems that would have remained unsolved but for two reasons: (l) a 1951 revision in the Election

Code, and (2) an improved, positive-approach designed to correct the 19^9 embarrassments. Of the two, the first was more material because it made possible the reformed

^Coquia, o£. cit., p. 282.

^Supra, p. 73*

?8upra, p. 7 0 . 98 attitude. Unlike in the past, the Commission in 1953 had the power to designate and supervise the polling places with officials capable of carrying out their assigned duties.

The third distinctive feature of the election pertains to the type of man and leader whom the Filipino people elected President. Magsaysay's victory was a victory for the masses, and for the democratic process. For the first time, a man of humble origins was elected to the presidency. Moreover, he would never forget during his term in office that he was still one of the people. He kept his promise to bring the government to them, thereby strengthening and popularizing it, at the same time that he was humanizing the office of the President. In short,

Magsaysay initiated a change in leadership from one that could be called parliamentary and deliberate to one reflecting action and initiative. The results of the election also had far reaching consequences outside the

Philippines, particularly in the United States.

Rationale of United States Policy

From a vantage point fourteen years removed from the period under discussion, it is somewhat easier to analyze the assumptions and actions underlying United States policy vis-a-vis the election, than for someone trying to perform the same task in 1953* To do such an operation years after 99

the event could be called an exercise in irrelevance. In

some respects this might be true. The factors present,

nonetheless, in the Philippines and around the world in the

early 1950's remain in other parts of the world today.

Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine closely the reasons why the United States chose to act as it did in the Philip­

pines in 1953*

Above all, a system of priorities must be constructed,

in much the same way as is done in the State Department when

policies are formulated, in order to develop a meaningful

framework. In this case, it is believed that American

policy-makers were operating under a detailed and realistic

examination of the issues involved both in the Philippines

and in the general international environment. As a result,

it is safe to say that strategic-military considerations

assumed primary importance. As outlined in Chapter I, the

deteriorating strategic posture of the United States in the

Par East had given policy-makers cause for grave concern.

The impact of the Chinese Communist takeover, and

the outbreak of the Korean War led the United States to

conclude, and rightly so, that the Soviet Union and China

were bent on filling any power vacuum left undefended by

the United States and her allies in East Asia. The events

going on in the Philippines at this time signalled an

extension of these activities on the mainland, which if 100 left to run their course, might mean the loss of the islands to communism.

The archipelago was too valuable to United States security interests to allow this to happen. Prom their strategic position off the heartland of East Asia, the

Philippines offered the only tenable position from which the United States could mount an invasion into Asia. Their military facilities were among the most developed in the

Par East. Add to this the availability of several strategic raw materials in large quantities, and the importance of tne Philippines to United States Asian policy in the early

1 9 5 0 ’s should become apparent.

For these reasons alone, based on the assumption of communist expansion in Asia, the United States had suf­ ficient cause to act in 1953 to protect its interests in the Philippines, but several other elements were also present to strengthen the American case. Economic factors affected policy decisions, but they were generally sub­ ordinated to overriding political ones. Business interests in the United States were not in favor of continued impor­ tation of Philippine goods under reduced tariff regula­ tions, but there does not seem to be any evidence that they influenced American policy objectives vis-a-vis tne election.

More apparent was the feeling that the large aid 101 program at work in the Philippines was finally beginning to show tangible results by 1952, and to have it Jeopar­ dized now could prove damaging to American policy goals.

Therefore, the aid program was viewed as serving political objectives or improved economic prosperity and internal political stability in the Philippines, and not tne pockets of American businessmen who might profit from these condi­ tions in the Philippines and in the United States.

The 1953 election was considered a crucial test for the Philippines as a young independent democratic state.

How it performed during this election would provide a good indication of its political future. State Department officials were convinced that if positive steps were not taken in 1953 to insure that an honest election took place, and that a candidate more in tune with American foreign policy objectives was elected President, United States interests in the Philippines and the whole of East Asia would suffer a serious setback.

The United States was extremely fortunate to have a man or Magsaysay's ability, popularity and pro-American attitude to whom it could turn. He filled American needs, first, in its drive to find the key to defeating the Huks, and then later in winning the 1953 election and saving democracy. Both tasks required an individual with exceptional skills or a particular nature. Magsaysay had 102 them, and used them effectively.

Apparently the United States did not have any serious long-term plans in mind when it promoted Magsaysay for the

Secretary of National Defense position in 1950. At that time there was insufficient cause to think in these terms.

President Quirino's administration still seemed to be moving ahead with the help of additional United States aid. The appointment of Magsaysay could only bring positive results against the Huks, and the President was lending him all his support. As the months passed, however, it became apparent to American officials that more could be done by a president willing and able to exert progressive leader­ ship. Quirino was so dominated by his advisors by this time that his effectiveness had been markedly reduced.

Meanwhile, Magsaysay underwent a different experience.

The United States, thinking in terms of his talents in guerrilla warfare, did not seriously consider him for any other task. American efforts to promote Magsaysay were at first based on this assumption. But growing disappoint­ ment over Quirino and the continued graft and inefficiency in government caused American representatives in the Philip­ pines (particularly Colonel Lansdale and William Lacy) to think more seriously about Magsaysay's presidential abilities.

Not until the United States realized the effect that 103 its promotion campaign was having on his relative position in Philippine politics did it step up its activities in 8 1952. The Mexico City trip is perhaps the first indica­ tion of this change in policy. An additional act of some significance took place a few months later.

Pactuai proof is missing, but there is evidence to show that the secret agreement between Laurel and Magsaysay, concerning the former's promise to make the latter the NP nominee for President in the event of the letter's resig­ nation, was placed in the custody of the American embassy. 9 Never confirmed nor denied by the embassy, this accusation is an intriguing one. If accurate it shows that the United

States was directly involved in the intricate pre-campaign maneuvers, and may have been instrumental in getting

Magsaysay nominated with essentially the same tactics employed in 1950.

Regardless of the implications of the last act, it is true that American policy-makers began to see the 1953 election as probably the last opportunity the new republic would have to save iuself from destroying its democratic traditions, and reverting to some other form of government.

0 H. Bradford Westerfield, Instruments of American Foreign Policy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1963), p. 411. Q Coquia, o£. cit., p. 126. 104

Many Filipinos agreed with this view, and did what they could to prevent such a retrogression. The United States also felt that it could not sit idly by, and watch its accom­ plishments be ruined by incompetence. American prestige was at stake, at a time when it was an extremely impor­ tant factor in the struggle against communism.

If the Philippines, which haa received almost fifty years of American tutelage, could not make democracy work, then how could other newly-independent Asian states ever hope to establish a democratic form of government in their country? In the words of a New York Times editorial :

. . . The Philippines is by far the most advanced country in Asia from a political point of view. It is, in effect, the show window of democracy in the Far East. As such its good name must be unsullied for in vindicating itself the Philippines will vin­ dicate us all.10

Therefore, it was imperative to American interests that democracy not fall in the Philippines. Beyond the issue of

American prestige, however, lay other considerations.

Significance of the Election to United States Asian Policy

Thus far several situations have been alluded to in passing to show the larger implications of this election to

United States policy objectives in general and particularly

^^New York Times, December 26, 1952, p. l4. 105

In East Asia. Although the outcome was Important to the

Philippine people, it also significantly influenced the

pattern of subsequent American policies.

There is little doubt that Magsaysay’s victory in

1953 greatly enhanced the position of American policy­ makers in Asia. Had President Quirino won, the picture would have been different. This is not to say that he had

not openly advocated and sought close American ties in his

early years in office. On the contrary, his pro-American

platform was instrumental in his 19^9 election victory over

Jose Laurel.

As the 1953 election campaign progressed, however,

his personal views became more anti-American in nature.

His attacks on United States intervention, and his warning

to the Philippine people in his last presidential radio

broadcast to guard against further encroachments of

American influence in the islands show the marked change 11 that had evolved in only four years. If President

Quirino had been re-elected, the United States would have been faced not only with a crisis in Philippine politics, but also with serious attacks on its Philippine and Asian policies.

In contrast, Magsaysay's victory provided the United

^^Manila Times, November 16, 1953, P* 7* 106

States with several advantages. First, he raised Philippine democracy to new heights of respectability and decency. He showed Asian and American people aiike that an unpopular administration could be defeated— not by revolution, palace coup, or rigged election— but by the freely expressed will of the Philippine people. Furthermore, his efforts to curb graft and corruption in the government and initiate needed economic and social reforms helped to show other newly

independent Asian states the benefits that honest, democratic government could offer to them.

Secondly, many of Magsaysay's Asian policies closely corresponded with United States objectives. This was no coincidence, nor was it a deliberate move by Magsaysay to court American favor. United States diplomats in the Philip­ pines were aware of his foreign policy views and knew that the two countries could work closely together toward common goals. This was especially true with respect to the two

China policies.

Magsaysay continued to withhold diplomatic recognition to Communist China and vote against its admission into the

United Nations. At the same time, he carried on friendly relations with Taipei. He recognized the need to band together to meet the threat of communist expansion by supporting President Eisenhower's decision to defend Formosa 107 12 against an attack from the mainland. But cooperation did

not end here.

Long an advocate of reducing tensions between Japan

and the other non-communist Asian states, the United States

could take pleasure in watching the Philippines and its

once arch enemy to the north make slow progress toward

ending the reparations issue that still separated the two

countries. Painstaking negotiations finally ended in 1955 when Japan agreed to pay a total of almost $750 million

(reduced from the original Philippines demand of $8 billion), 13 largely in the form of Japanese goods and services. This agreement paved the way for the ratification of a peace

treaty that resumed normal diplomatic relations between the

two countries.

Thirdly, the United States could now use the Philip­

pine achievement in defeating a communist insurgency and

restoring democracy to a respectable position as a source

of inspiration to other Asian countries. Magsaysay took

the initiative himself, realizing that where the Philippines had achieved success, others might also. He, therefore,

expanded diplomatic relations with a number of Southeast

Asian states. He quickly recognized Laos, Cambodia and

12 Meyers, 0 £. c i t ., p. 200.

^^Smith, 2 2 .. cit., p. 225' 108 the Republic of Vietnam when they became organized states.

Geographical closeness and cultural similarities made the Philippines and South Vietnam in particular natural allies. In the past Saigon supplied the islands with needed rice. Since the Geneva partition, the Philippines have shown its interest in supporting South Vietnam's cause by sending first medical teams, followed later by military advisory groups.

Lastly the United States could look to the Philippines as a country helping to bridge the gap between East and West.

As a nation composed of Asians reflecting western traditions and culture, the Philippines, directed by a highly-respected and strongly devoted leader, was destined to show how a small Asian country can prosper through western programs but still maintain freedom of action and national identity.

This became particularly evident during the December, 1954

Bandung Conference. Attended by some twenty-five Afrv-wsian states, this meeting was designed to consolidate unity among the non-Western countries. The Philippines, however, distinguished themselves by defending those Western tradi­ tions beneficial to all peoples, thereby maintaining a balanced perspective to the proceedings. Had Quirino remained in office, it is doubtful that the United States and its western allies could have reiied on strong Philip­ pine support of their traditions and policies. 109

Having discussed the techniques and methods used

by the United States to enhance its objectives in the

Philippines and elsewhere in Asia during this period, the

next step will be to evaluate the American strategy and

tactics in order to point out the strengths and weaknesses

of the policy. In that way, the strong points can be

isolated and used again under similar circumstances, while

at the same time the ineffective ones can be recognized

and prevented in future cases of this type. First the

weak points.

Weaknesses of United States Policy

A successful policy is hard to criticize. Never­

theless, there are several areas where the United States

could have been more effective. Perhaps the act (or more

correctly the word) that caused more damage than apparent

good was the American tendency to emphasize its "concern"

whenever making a policy statement. Cautious to refrain

from any words or deeds that might give rise to charges of

intervention, American officials in Washington and in Manila,

however, never failed to mention that the United States was very interested in the election outcome. "We cannot

deny that we are concerned that the democratic processes

function so that the people may freely express their

will," said James D. Bell in his statement quoted 110 14 earlier.

This word was used at other times in more glaring terms, accomplishing nothing more than intensifying foreign intervention charges by the Liberal Party. Certainly no positive good could possibly be derived from making this point over and over again during the campaign. Both parties were well aware of tne interests of the United States in this election. If it was intent on playing down the inter­ ference issue, then less emphasis should have been placed on American "concern" for the running of the campaign and the results of the election.

The report dealing with possible American involve­ ment in the Laurel-Magsaysay secret agreement cited earlier was one of several items appearing in a Freedom magazine article on April 27, 1953* Written by Congressman Dios- dado Macapagal, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Com­ mittee and a member of the Liberal Party, the article made known a report that an unnamed American official was present and may have offered suggestions when Magsaysay wrote his Defense Secretary resignation letter. It also stressed a Washington press report describing a detailed plan designed to promote Magsaysay by putting President 15 Quirino in an unfavorable light.

^^Bell, o£. cit., p. 524.

^^Coquia, 0£. cit., p. 126. Ill

What Is salient here is not that the events as related were true, but that the United States embassy made 16 no attempt to refute the accusations. The reports ap­ parently remained undenied. Not only was this omission a mistake, but it seems unnecessary as well. To remain silent was tantamount to admitting guilt. Regardless of the motives behind the decision to make them public, the

United States would have profited by making a reply, no matter how noncomraital it might be stated.

The next two points are mentioned because of the high risk factor that went with each decision— not because they failed. First, Colonel Lansdale's role must be ana­ lyzed carefully. If he was named to lead United States behind-the-scenes attempts to promote Magsaysay into the presidency, then every effort should have been made to conceal him from the public eye. Why it was necessary for him to accompany Magsaysay on his Mexico City trip is not clear, except to perform duties that others could have easily accomplished. As it turned out, of course, Lans­ dale 's performance was superb. However, had the plans suffered a setback, his role could have been most embar­ rassing if his activities were vouched for by the United

States.

^^Ibid. 112

Secondly, by coming out openly in support of Magsay­ say, the United States was taking the chance of having a

Magsaysay victory backfire. Liberal Party slurs that

Magsaysay would become a puppet of more experienced

Nacionalista Party leaders were not as far-fetched as might be believed at first glance. He was largely inexperienced in political refinements, and lacked an established political organization behind him. Added to this was the possibility that Magsaysay's strong, pro-American attitude might alienate growing Filipino nationalism, and render his programs useless. Admittedly more in the range of possibilities than probabilities, these situations were, nonetheless, serious considerations that could have affected

United States policy. In actuality, American embassy officials had correctly evaluated Magsaysay's ability to carry out his duties as President, to listen to and take advice. But Americans also knew that he exhibited a readi­ ness to act independently and forcefully when necessary.

One other weakness was not brought to light until after the polls had closed. Acting on behalf of President

Quirino, the Executive Secretary of the Liberal Party requested the Commission on Elections to investigate the 17 activities of JUSMAG officers on election day. The

^^Commission on Elections, 0£. cit., p. 102. 113

Executive Secretary was referring to a JUSMAG confidential, unnumbered memorandum issued on November 5, 1953 by JUSMAG

Chief Major General Robert M. Cannon. The instruction pertained to the official posture that all JUSMAG person­ nel would follow explicitly on election day. Many were assigned to "observe" at those places that were expecting trouble. Everyone was to refrain from any overt action.

Incidents were to be reported to JUSMAG headquarters, but under no circumstances, were Americans to participate actively in any of the disturbances that might arise during the course of the day.

An investigation, carried out by the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, uncovered no evidence to substan­ tiate the indictment that JUSMAG officers had meddled in the balloting. But the Commission refused to form any conclusion from the report of the Chief of Staff. Instead, it referred the issue to Congress for possible further examination.

Actually, the whole incident could have been avoided. A detailed analysis of the documents failed to leave any impression that JUSMAG officiais were ordered to intervene on election day. On the contrary, the oppo­ site assessment was reached. General Cannon's orders were plainly limited to observing the proceedings and reporting significant occurrences to headquarters. 114

But by classifying the documents, they appeared to harbor some sinister plot, when, in fact, they hid nothing that either party did not expect from the United States.

No issue would have been raised probably if American intentions had been quietly publicized beforehand. That these orders were declassified before election day shows that the United States knew it had nothing to hide, but it helped to raise an issue against itself by perhaps being somewhat too cautious. The conclusion to be drawn from this development is that embassy officials seemed to remain too silent at times, when a brief statement might have eased misunderstanding, and overly prudent, and se­ cretive, when conditions or factors involved did not warrant such measures.

Finally, one additional incident deserves to be mentioned. During election week, one United States carrier and a flotilla of destroyers anchored in Manila Bay. It was explained that the ships were there for liberty pur­ poses, but Quirino used their presence to illustrate that the United States was even ready to intervene with force if necessary to assure Magsaysay's victory. Assuming the ships were there for the reasons stated, it is unfortunate that their arrival could not have been changed to a date after the election. A simpler and more effective solution would have been to prevent the issue from arising at all 115 by sending the ships to another liberty port.

All of the above listed "weaknesses" are relatively insignificant in light of the election results and subse­ quent events during Magsaysay's term in office. More im­ portant is an examination of the policy's strong points.

There were many, but three stand out as most significant.

Strengths of United States Policy

Every successful foreign policy is based on exten­ sive planning, detailed formulation, accurate and precise implementation and constant evaluation in light of changing conditions. All of these processes were continually at work in the Philippines election policy. The official embassy position was stated before the campaign really got underway. Clear and precise words were carefully chosen to make the American stance as firm and distinct as possible. Furthermore, the United States never vacil- ated from this announced policy during the entire campaign.

To have done so would have only confused matters.

Efforts to promote Magsaysay into the presidency were generally carried out in a discreet and skillful manner to avoid offending Philippine nationalism. By limiting direct involvement to a minimum, the United States was able to work effectively to protect its interests and watch as

Magsaysay won the election largely on his own. American 116 representatives in the Philippines realized that little in the way of overt interference was required to achieve their objectives. As long as Magsaysay was able to par­ ticipate in an honest election, they knew he could win 18 without any significant heip from the United States. In other words, the policy-makers knew what their objectives were in this case. They were desirable, reasonable, and attainable. Therefore, a policy to secure them was com­ posed and implemented with anticipated success.

One can gain an impression of the importance that this election was given by the Truman and Eisenhower ad­ ministrations by looking at the leading officials who were chosen to carry out this policy. Reference has been made to Admirai Spruance's appointment. Because Spruance had never served in an ambassadorial post, his selection could have had serious repercussions, but for the second appoint­ ment of William S. B. Lacy to serve as Spruance's assistant 19 as Deputy Chief of Mission. The third individual to be sent to the Philippines during this period to join Colonel

Lansdale at JUSMAG headquarters was Major General Robert

M. Cannon, pulled out of Turkey to be Commanding Officer

2 Q Lacy interview, 0£. cit. 19 After reading an earlier draft of this manuscript, Mr. Lacy paid tribute to Ambassador Spruance by writing that he "would have been a splendid Ambassador whoever his Deputy might have been." (Personal letter to the author from William S. B. Lacy dated September 6 , 1967.) 117 of the Philippine advisory group.

Admiral Spruance replaced Ambassador Myron M. Cowen in January, 1952. Mr. Lacy, then a high-ranking foreign service officer acting as Director of the Philippines and

Southeast Asia section of the State Department, was sent to Manila in August, 1952. General Cannon arrived from

Turkey at about the same time. The reason for his presence is not clear. But the team of Spruance and Lacy proved to be an excellent working combination. When Lacy reached

Manila, Ambassador Spruance showed his naval background by telling his new assistant that he could always find him for consultation and assistance. Otherwise, Spruance expected

Lacy to run the embassy as a military chief of staff might d o . ^

Cooperation between these two men, as well as with all the other groups associated with the American mission

in the Philippines, was close and coordinated. To succeed with its policy, this was mandatory. Careless acts had to be avoided. The embassy needed to know not only what

its people were doing at all times, but had to be cogni­ zant also of the activities of the many other agencies spread throughout the islands. This perhaps explains the decision to send these two men to the Philippines at this

^ L a c y interview, 0£. cit 118 time: one with wide and distinguished experience in handling unwieldy administrative organizations; the other, well grounded in East Asian affairs, with the flair and

imagination to achieve the impossible.

All the plans and the assignment of superior personnel to carry them out would have been meaningless, if the United States did not have Ramon Magsaysay available to make them workable. This is not to say that Magsaysay became an instrument through which the United States admin­

istered its policy. No American official who had ever met this man could seriously believe that he could be manip­ ulated by them. What is important to understand is that the United States did not have to resort to such tactics.

Magsaysay once told Lacy that he would be a good President

if trusted Americans continued to advise him if and when 21 invited. This statement should not be interpreted to mean that the United States merely had to give him orders and he would obey. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

He did respect and trust his American friends. He did listen to their suggestions, but he was no puppet.

Magsaysay was a man of high moral character, capable and willing to be his own leader. He was even criticized later, by the very people who said he would be a tool in

^^Ibid. 119 the hands of Laurel and Recto, for his tendency to actively participate in, and in most cases supervise, too many projects.

The United States realized the magnetism that the

Magsaysay name held for the Philippine people, searching

for improvements in their well-being ana in the country's prestige and prosperity. Magsaysay had become a symbol

of moral and political honesty, decency, and integrity.

The United States, faced with a situation which it knew must be corrected, realized that the chances of success

rested on this Filipino's shoulders. More telling is the

fact that Magsaysay understood the role that he was called upon to play. He realized how critically essential his

victory was to the future of the Philippine Republic.

The selfless way that he conducted himself, first

as a guerrilla fighter, then as Secretary of National

Defense, and finally as President of his country, truly

cast Magsaysay in the role of a national epic hero— a title

that history will undoubtedly award to him in the future.

When his plane crashed mysteriously into a Philippine mountainside on the night of March 17, 1957, Filipinos

everywhere expressed shock and dismay over the news that

their leader had fallen. But with tne orderly swearing in

of Vice-President Carlos P. Garcia, the republic continued

to function without Magsaysay. For this reason, perhaps 120 more than any other, Magsaysay will be remembered as one

of the great Philippine patriots. For under his leadership, the Philippines reached the coveted goal of political maturity.

Concluding Remarks

Due to the nature of this topic and the limitations

of the paper, several themes could not be given greater attention. Their relevancy, nonetheless, makes them ex­

cellent research subjects in themselves. Four are of

particular interest: (l) the untimely and mysterious

deaths of Roxas and Magsaysay, (2) the charge that Roxas

collaborated with the Japanese during the war, (3) the

feasibility of a similar policy being used in other states

such as Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand to name Just a few,

and (4) the impact of Philippine independence on the post­ war independence movements.

These questions, together wi'tFThe~5ne explored

in this paper, deal with matters affecting wide areas in

human history. Therefore, any attempt to uncover the under­

lying reasons for their occurrence and to analyze their

impact on the course of history is indeed a worthwhile

endeavor. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to

study some events that occurred only recently, or are still

too sensitive to investigate in any depth. 121

Both elements were present to hamper the developmeno of this paper. The State Department has been reluctant to release any documentary materials pertaining to our activities in the Philippines during this period. There seems to be a determined effort to prevent the leakage of any information to the public (and rightly so) that might help to tarnish the image of Magsaysay, and bring discredit to the Philippine people. While no such intent has been concealed in this paper, it is possible to conclude that

United States involvement may have been more widespread than present evidence would suggest. Only when more documentary evidence becomes available should perhaps a more comprehensive review be written. Meanwhile, both countries can view with pride the contributions that each has given to the continued strength of the united, free, democratic nations of the world. BIBLIOGRAPHY

A . BIBLIOGRAPHIC MATERIAL

Hobbs, Cecil. Southeast Asia: Annotated Bibliography. Washington: Library of Congress Orientalia Division, 1964.

University of the Philippines. Ramon Magsaysay: A Biblio­ graphy . Manila: University of the Philippines, 1957* A detailed listing of books, and articles about Magsaysay, with particular emphasis given to newspaper articles appearing in Manila Times and Manila Daily Bulletin from 1953-1957 inclusively.**

B. BOOKS

American Assembly. The United States and the Philippines. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966. A series of essays by prominent American and Filipino scholars covering important aspects of past and present American-Philippine relations.*

Brookings Institution. Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1951-1952. Menascha: George Banta Pub. Co., 1952. An outline of major American foreign policy issues, designed for classroom instruction and written in a concise and analytical manner.*

Conger, E. E., A. H. Peterson, G. C. Reinhardt, (ed.). Symposium on the Role of Air Power in Counter- insurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Philippine Huk Campaign. Santa Monica : The Rand Corporation, m 3 : " Coquia, Jorge R. The Philippine Presidential Election of 1953« Manila: University Publishing Co., 1955' Only detailed scholarly account of the election. Indispensable for a clear understanding of tne issues involved in the campaign.** de la Costa, Horacio (ed.). Readings in Philippine History. Manila: Bookmark, Inc., I965. 123

Douglas, William 0. North From Malaya. Garden City; Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1953•

Jenkins, Shirley. American Economic Policy Towards the Philippines. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954. An excellent survey of post-war Philippine economic conditions and United States policy up through 1953* Lederer, William J. and Eugene Burdick. The Ugly American. New York: Norton Publishing Company, 1953*

Merritt, Jesus V. Our Presidents: Profiles in History. Manila: Filipino Publishing Co., Inc., 1962.

Meyers, Milton W. A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1965* The only comprehensive volume devoted to an analysis of the first four Presidents' foreign policies.**

Quirino, Carlos. Magsaysay of the Philippines. Manila: Alemar's, 195o. The most complete and, in most cases, the most objective biography of Magsaysay yet written. Composed shortly after Magsaysay's death, it is sympathetic but not eulogistic.**

Reitzal, William, et al.. United States Foreign Policy 1945- 1955. Menascha: George Banta Co., Inc., 1956.

Romulo, Carlos P. and Marvin M. Gray. The Magsaysay Story. New York: The John Day Company, 1956. A highly readable and enlightening, although very one-sided, biography of Magsaysay.**

Ryan, N. J. The Making of Modern Malaya. London: Oxford University Press, 1963^

Scaff, Alvin H. The Philippine Answer to Communism. Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1955* Based largely on interviews conducted by the author with ex-Huks, this book reveals the grievances that caused the rebellion, and shows how positive steps were taken to undercut the movement.*

Smith, Robert Aura. Philippine Freedom 1946-1958. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958* In a somewhat ideal­ istic manner, the events and trends in Philippine politics in its first decade of independence are traced.* 124

Starner, Prances L. Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. Correlates the relationship between the 1953 election and the agrarian problem associated with the Huk movements.*

Steinburg, S. H. (ed.). The Statesman's Yearbook. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1953•

Tarue, Luis. Born of the People. New York: International Publishers, 1953» The Communist side of the story as told by the Commander-in-Chief of the Huk forces. Unfortunately his account ends in 1949»

Taylor, George E. The Philippines and the U. S.: Problems of Partnership. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.

University of the East. The 1953 Issues. Manila; University of the East Publications, 1953* A collection of speeches given by the presidential candidates during the 1953 campaign.

Westerfield, H. Bradford. The Instruments of American Foreign Policy. New York: Thomas Y ."trowel Company, 1963* Only study dealing in depth with U.S. involve­ ment in the election.*

C . GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Bell, Daniel A. Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to tRe Philippines. Washington: USGPO, 1950. Report of Bell Mission.**

Republic of the Philippines. Bureau of Census and Statistics Summary Report on the 1948 Census of Agriculture. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 19^2.

Bureau of Mining. The Philippine Mining Industry and Mineral Resources. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1950. . Commission on Elections. Report to the President on the 1953 Election. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1954. Official report on the campaign activities and election results.** 125

Department of Foreign Affairs. Treaty Series. Manila: Bureau of Printing, Vol. 1, 1947-1952.

Tydings, Millard E. Report on the Philippine Islands. Senate Document 53, 79th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: USGPO, 1945.

United States Congress. Congressional Record. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, Vol. 96, February 2, 1950.

______. House Committee on Veterans Affairs. Benefits Relating to Service in the Philippines During World War II. Washington: USGPO, 1948.

______. House Committee on Veterans Affairs. Burial and Educational Benefits for Philippine Veterans. Hearing before subcommittee. Washington: USGPO, 1950.

. United States Statutes at Large. Volumes 60, 62, and 65* Washington: USùPO.

United States Department of Commerce. Investment in the Philippines. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955.

United States Department of State. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

D. PERIODICALS

Bell, James D. "Objectives of U.S. Policy in the Philip­ pines," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 29 (October 19, 1953), pp. 523-5*

Bullitt, William C. "No Peace in the Philippines," The Reader's Digest, Vol. 60 (March, 1952), pp. 95-98.

"Cleanup Man," Time, Vol. 58 (November 26, 1951), pp. 32-38.

Douglas, William 0. "Man Who Saved the Philippines," Look (November 4, 1952), pp. 43-47.

Elsbree, William H. "The 1953 Philippine Presidential Elections," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 27 (March, 1954), pp. 32-3 7 . 126

Gardner, M., (éd.). "Philippine Democracy in Asia," Colliers, Vol. 135 (January 7, 1955), pp. 28-30.

Gosnell, Harold F. "An Interpretation of the Philippine Election of 1953," American Political Science Review, Vol. 48 (December, 1954), pp. 1128-38.

Lansdale, Major General Edward G. "Vietnam: Do We Under­ stand Revolution," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43 (October, 1964), pp. 75-86.

Roxas, Sixto K. "Struggle for Economic Restoration," Manila Sunday Times Magazine, (May 20, 1956), pp. 9-13 . Sherrod, Robert L. "Is Democracy Dying in the Philippines?," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 226 (October 3, 1953), pp. 28-29.* Stevenson, Adlai. "Ballots and Bullets," Look, Vol. 17 (June 1, 1953), pp. 35-3 7 .

E . UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Personal interviews with Professor William Y. Elliott, The American University, Washington, D. C ., dated October 10, 1967 and October 27, 1967*

Personal interview with Mr. William S. B. Lacy, former Deputy Director of Mission to the Philippines, dated April 8, 1967.

Personal letter to the author from Mr. William S. B. Lacy, former Deputy Director of Mission to the Philip­ pines, dated September 6, 1967.

Personal letter to the author from Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, former U. S. Ambassador to the Philip­ pines, dated April 8, 1967.

Personal letter to the author from Professor H. Bradford Westerfield, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, dated April 8, 1967. 127 E. NEWSPAPERS

Manila Dally Bulletin, January, 1953-December, 1953

Manila Times, November, 1952-December, 1953*

New York Times, June, 1950-December, 1953*

Philippine Free Press, July, 1953-December, 1953*