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PHOTOGRAPHIC SECTION II
THIRD FLEET OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF CENTRAL LUZON LANDINGS INCLUDING SOUTH CHINA SEA SWEEP (Chapter 80)
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CHAPTER 80 THI RD FLEET OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF CENTRAL LUZO N LAHDINGS - INCLUDI NG THE SOUTH CHI NA SEA SWEEP 30 DECEMBER 1944 - 23 JANUARY 1945
PREFACE SUMMARY The success or these opera lions conr 1ned the soundness or the concept upon which they were based; namely, that •oblllly or the striking and Task Force 38 cons1st1ng or Task Groups 38.1, covering forces should be aa1nta1ned while ex 38 .2 and 38.3 left ULITIH on 30 December to fur plo1t1ng ene•y •eaknesses and seizing eve ry oppor nish strategic support for the landing or South tunity offPred or created to destroy aaJor units west PACIFIC forces at LIM>AYEN GULF on UJZ 80-J m m m m n n -4 -4 '° '° II' II' ,. ,. 1·• 1·• ...,., ...,., I I ,,. ,,. 11• 11• _,. _,. .·i .·i . . , , , I I · · · - '•, '•, ·., ·., · · 30 30 ·, ·, · " '., '., ' ' ULITH ULITH 1'2.00 ' ' ~ l l · 1!(1 1!(1 ·. ·. lOOO __ __ ·31 ·31 ,,. ,,. , , . . . . · · . . . .. •!< •!< ·. ·. z~ z~ .. .. - llOO·Jt llOO·Jt ~0800 r-----l r-----l ._ ._ (-> (-> • • "'"'i-· "'"'i-· oeoo ...... (',., (',., _?OOO•JI _?OOO•JI ~t'~ ~t'~ .. .. 945 945 · · 1945 1945 ,1 , , , , ...... "\ 1,.0 1,.0 ...... I0 25 . . . . . . ~ ~ ~~ ~~ t."i' .,. 2 2 . _]_-~--~ _]_-~--~ IH" IH" " Jon Jon .,( .,( 1 1 ,,., ,,., 38 .. .. "" '2.000 '2.000 ' eoo eoo llo llo ...... j_ j_ n 4 ·- ...... CHART CHART . 0800 0800 - ll00 1-'ol 1-'ol and and . . •1001 •1001 ". ". ..L ..L GROUP GROUP . JIM/\ JIM/\ ""- 800 800 0 .,#~ .,#~ TRACK TRACK 11 11 30,1944 20,1945-0800 20,1945-0800 . TASK TASK . . 2000 2000 1 1 _1000 _1000 : O'O~ O'O~ ...... Dec c c Jon ltOO·at ltOO·at ~ OKINAWA OKINAWA I I • • ~~ ~~ !. !. ":; ":; 1100 1100 ' ' ·~'b" ·~'b" 1200 1200 ~.-1' 2000 2000 '1 '1 I I li1'0 li1'0 4 4 l l ia·t/" ia·t/" $i $i ...... ,& ,& ~l'tb s~o~o s~o~o ~d ~d \'11'1'1"'t' \'11'1'1"'t' STRAIT STRAIT r1~0 r1~0 .,. .,. . . I> I> .. .. u::P u::P ··- !1 !1 • 6Al\NlAtlG 6Al\NlAtlG 8Al~H 8Al~H lOOO~o lOOO~o ~ ~ !.. !.. · · 1;10 1;10 10 10 ...... ~ ~ 00 00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 -..;:; -..;:; :(p, :(p, I I 1 \ \ . . " " - • • . . '. '. - '_..J. '_..J. (, ' ' ~ I I 1945 1945 . ~ r-~ r-~ ISLANDS ISLANDS JAN PESCAOORES PESCAOORES : : ~·~ ~·~ ! ! 38.2 38.2 ,-- 20 20 , , ~-.L ~-.L ~I ~I ·--,- CHART CHART REEF REEF I" I" PRATAS PRATAS GROUP GROUP .! .! - OO• P~u,..~ P~u,..~ IZ ...... JAN.-1200 JAN.-1200 - T T TRACK TRACK L L 13 13 ~'Z ~'Z 10 10 TASK TASK ~ ~ SANK SANK '•_.·· '•_.·· l.000 l.000 L L ·, ·, MACCLESFIELD MACCLESFIELD . . 0800 0800 ~ ~ r"'""" r"'""" ~ ~ 0:; 0:; ~ ~ G G ~ ~ IS~ANDS IS~ANDS . . c c REEFS REEFS • • "'µ "'µ PARACEL PARACEL 0 0 :".t :".t . . ANO ANO ' ' .L___J .L___J ...... CMINA CMINA ....,., ....,., ' ' KAMRANtl KAMRANtl I I .. .. " " CHINA CHINA ·' ·' INOO INOO . . · · F~ENC: F~ENC: . r ~ ~ I I I I ': r r r r ' ' i' i' r r :,·' I I t t 11 11 , , ,. ,. , , ·t ·t .. .. l l ii ii 0 0 ' ' "' "' w w 0 0 MISSION (C()Tlt.) Cll.5HING L. K. SWENSOl'i COIAHAI\ COLLETT (a) to supoort the landing operations of the UHL\IANN MADDOX forces or Comr.ander-rn-Ch1e!, Southwest BENHAM BLUE Pactflc on WZON; YARNALL BRUSH 'l'liil'ilNG TAUSSIG (b) to destroy eneay naval forces If contacte,l. W'EDIJERBURN SAMl>l.'L N • >,()()RE De HAVEN STOCKHAM The secondary a1ss1on was the protection of air MANSnELD ana sea commun 1ca ti ons. In add1 t ion this Force was assigned, as a final mission, photographic strikes against Islands Jn the NANSEI SHC1l'O group. 12/30 STOCKHAM detached. 1/8 STOCKl!AM Joined. 1/11 FLI1'1'f, LAWS and P!IIO!ETI' Joined. The mission assigned this Task Force was to BALTIMORE, BOOTON. MAN.5FIELD, De HAVEN, prevent enemy naval and air forces interrer tng with L. K SWENS<»i, CXlLLITI' and TAUSSIG detached. the assualt on LU'lON by destroying enemy naval l/12 BALTIMORE, 8Cl5TOO, MANSFIELD, DeHAVEN, and air forces anct sh1pp1ng Jn the RYUKYU-FORMOOA L.K.SWENSON, COLLET'T and TAUSSIG JOlned. OIINA COAST-LU'l.ON area before the date of the land }LINT, LAWS and PRIO!ETT detached. ing at LINC"oAYEN; by neutrallztng enemy air and 1/17 BWE detached. BUCl!ANAN JOined. naval forces 1n the FORMOSA-CHINA COASf-LUZON area 1/19 BUCHANAN detached. tmmPdlately preceding the date or that landing; 1/21 MA!l)()X detached. and by str lklng ene y obJec t 1ves after the land mg as necessar} to support the operation. ti.SK 'JRO'IP 38.2 - R. 1.d. G. i'. BOGA,\', .!S/t c•o 18.1.2 l'onllar,..e.- Ba ~ti.ship SQ'!l£1d.-or. "•'OJ 12/29 LEX!NGT(t; (F) HAILE\' .... to.,..tr: HAl\COCK (FF) C1/iEN HOOM.'T 'HLLER As a part or Task Unit 38.1.2, Battleship D1v1- I NOE PENDE.'ICE TIIE SULL!VASS ston EIGIIT's prtoary lss Jon was to support and STEPHEN POTIER defend Tasi: Group 38.1 against enemy air and sur NEV. JERSF.\ (FFF) TI:\GE\ face attacks. secondary m1ss1ons were V.ISCONS!f\ Htll\T LE"o 80-4 COMPOSITION OF O'wlj FO RCES (Conr.1 Tl'iGE\', MARSHALL, HAI.SEY POWELL, \tA:.ISFIELD. C. K. BRC'.X'ISO~ PRICi.ETI OeHAVEN, L.li.S'llf,'iSO.". COLI.EM', TAUSSIC: detached. 1/8 HAl,.<;f'Y POllELL d~tached NEii' JERSE\, Wl~II\, PASADE.\A, ASTORIA, 1/11 FLI'.'.T, LA~S. PRICHFTT jetachcd. WILliES-BARRE, Oil'E.\, MILLER, TIIE SULLl\'Al\S, 1/12 t'Ll~T. :.AWS, PRICHETT ~otned. Sll:PHF.~ POTIER, Tl Mlf.Y, MARSHALL. HAI.SE\ 1/21 TJCO:-.IlfROG.\, BILOXI, Hl:'<.T, COG.Siil::U POllELL JOlned. detached. 1/21 HAI.SEY POWElL detached. 1/23 BILOXI, FLlloT Joined. l/2J SA\ JUA~ detached. TASK JROUP J 12/29 FSSEX en CO'ITES l/5 Formed: l:Jl<1EHPIHSE, INDU'WDE.NCE, \fcCOhD, T 1co-,;nrncx;A OORTCll 11\ATilEt\, HAZELWOOD, llACGArllJ, FkANKS, LANGL.F:\ GATLING WCHA...,AN SAi\' JACINTO HEALY l/17 llAILEY JO!ned. EIUOJANA\' detached. COGSWElL NORTIJ CAROLI NA CAP£1 DA/1AGE IHFLICTED OH THE ENE.MY :osrHIRDPlee; Repo-ts: EA'K,l{T AIRPbAli~S DESt/JOYF;D Shot Totftl enemy Shot down Destroyed Shot down near force down pl MOS- Date Loe at I on ftt target ------on ground by CJ.P ftnd se• rch---- by AA des t rayed 3·4 Jan. ronosa 29 81 0 l ll 6-7 Jan Luzon 18 93 0 0 11! 9 Jan. Formosa 1 42 0 H 10-11 Jan. China Sea 0 0 7 0 7 12 Jan. lndo·Chlna 14 97 0 !12 15 Jan. Formosa 10 18 6 0 34 16 Jan. China Coast 10 3 0 0 13 19-20 Jan. Luzon St rail 0 0 20 0 2C 21 Jan. t'ormosa ti 102 34 2 149 22 Jan. l':anse I Shoto 0 28 0 Cl 28 TOTAI.s 93 464 70 2 629 80-5 S!?CHET DAMAGE IN Fl I CTEO OH TII E ENEMY i Cr;,nt. J E~'E/>IY fKSSb'LS SU~'K • Oete ~7 Jan. 9 Jen. 12 Jan. ts Jan. 16 Jan. 2t Jan. 22 JlUI. Totals CL 2 DO l 2 DE 2 1 10 14 PG-PC 2 4 7 APO l AO(Ll 5 2 6 14 AP(L) l AK(L) l 3 8 AK(M) 2 ll 3 25 AK(S) 1 6 Al\ (C) 9 12 3 2 32 Tugs 2 2 Small Cr art ll 5 24 4 25 71 TOTALS 16 22 40 8 5 12 4 114 (excluding small craft) OWi! LOSSES ~H 0 DAMAGE C ~tailed report by number and tonnage of ship ping losses 1nfl1cted on enemy by Task rorce 38 lltr.\T (00 674) Jn for the support of Central LUZU~ landin~s. 30 The had ;h gun mount dl shed liecember 1944 l - 2 January 1945: and JaMmed in train, by ~\!&h $eas. There was some damage Lo center line long1tudtnal be Enemy ~arshJps sunk 24 (33,100 tons) neath main deck; stanchions were bent tn CPO Enemy ~arshlps prob quarters. ably sunk None Enemy warships damaged 26 (20.900 tons) Tne LEWIS llANOOLl\ (DD 675) suffered damage Enemy Merchant Ships su11ar to the IJUNl, except not so severe. Sunk 63 (250, 700 tons) fhe gun shield was stove in considerably and l::nemy \1erchant Ships the gun put out of com•isston. -r.o stanchions Prob ab 1 y Sunk 2 (18,200 tons) at fra111e 26 were bent. Enemy Merchant Shtps Damaged 68 (281.000 tons) IO Jar.tlilry Enemy Sllall craft sunk 68 DALI~TA.\~ Ene~y Small Craft At 01P6 Item, ~hile passing through Probably Sunk None C.llA.'.~EL, the NANTAHALA (AO 60) bad a gyrp Enemy smal I craft failure, resulting in a coll1s1on •1tn the Damaged 129 GUADALOlJ'PE (A032). 1ne /li,\;;TAHALA had a hole Total Vessels Sunk 155 (283 ,800 tons) 18 x It feet tn the port side plating steering 'Iota! Vessels Prob engine room. There were large holes In the ably Sunk 2 (18,200 tons) side plating laundry, boatswain storeroom and Total Vessels barbershop. Frames and deck were damaged in Damai:ed 223 (301,900 tons) those spaces and the poop deck. A 5• gun •as 'lotal Vessels sunk, wrecked, bltts lost and degaussing coils Probably Sunk, and severed. There was an 8 root hole in transo• L>amaged 380 (603,900 tons) tank under steering engine room. 80-6 SECH8'f' OWll LOSSES AllD DAMAGE (~ont.) !ire and moderate structural damage to flight and gallery decks, frames 83 to 100. Six 1be GU~.DALOUPE lost anchors and had a minor structural beams severed, 25 requ1r1ng renewal, leak in the rorepeak. 1be bow was stove In plus deck Ing. 12 reet; degaussing cable cut; hawse pipes dislocated. 13 Jar.uary NARRATIVE 1be U!Si!ING (!JU 797), S'EEI\\' (OD 697), lALJSSIG (ill> 746), and !LUE (DD 744) all received slight damage froa very ro~_g_h seas. l. A typhoon on 17- 18 l.Jecember caused exten sive damage and loss, but the 18 Jar.uary succeeding days were so well employed by the Service Force at uunn that the Fleet was repaired and replenished The NE : L'lfA i3AY (CVt: 74) surrered moderate by the evening of 29 December, ready to support daaage rrom sea conditions. The forward part the seiz ure o! LUZO~ by Southwest or the Clightdeck aft to frame Pacific Forces, target 14 was bent date 9 January 1945. downward until resting on the forecastle. Steel aeabers or the flight deck, between 2. Careful coordination of effort rraaes 14 and 20. buckled. between the The catapult was TillRD Fleet, Southwest Paci!lc Forces pqt out of co1aisslon. and the 14th Both forward lookout and 20th Air t·orces was required and attained. stations were deaollshed. All wiring and Air searches by all forces were lengthened and electrical fixtures forward or !raae 20 re intens1!ted. Air strikes or Southwest Pac1!1c quire renewal . f'orces and Task Force Wil 80-7 NARRATIVE Cont.) strate.:ic covering operations, otherwise, upon re results, although an additional 59 were estl•ated lease rr~" such mission but prior to return to danged. bnse. 9. tue11ng proceeded as planned on 5 January. 4. The complecent or certai~ carriers was !be arr1 val or the ENTEl\PHISE made possible the ch an ed ( ror support or the U:ZO'I operation only) formation or a night carrier group. Ibis task to better eet t~e operatlrg cond1t1ons expected. group was designated as 38. 5, during daylight It On the ~ASP and ESSEX the changed coEplement con re~atned a part or 1ask l>roup 38.2, but at night sisted or n1 rtgttcrs, 15 torpedo planes. 'l'io it operated Independently. arlne tighter squadrons were placed a.board the & 80-8 SKCRf!T NARRATIVE "Cont.} sllght opposition at LI!'.vAYm liULF. FORMOSA had Group 38.5, the night carrier group) was detached been chosen as the target !or the 'lHlkD Heet air and sent ahead toward the INDO-OiINA coast at high errort on 9 January after careful cons1derat1on or speed, the CAP !or Task Group 38.2 being provided Lt:~ as a substitute target. It appeared that by the other two task groups. The battle plan, striking an area or intensive enemy alr!1eld devel based on the expectation or !1nd1ng major enemy opment (FORMOSA), out of range or land- based air fleet units In the v1c1n1ty of CAMRA!'.1i BAY, called strikes, was more desirable than an air errort ex for a high speed run by Task Group 38.2 (re1n!orced pended in more or less direct support measures on by 2 CA and a destroyer d1vls1on), a pre-dawn LU7.0.~. •hlch still per11tted eneiy su1c1de planes search or the INDO-CHINA coast by Task Group 38.5 to operate !ro11 tOR.t,fQ.SA against StvP.YfH Fleet planes to locate the enemy, and a Joint destruction amphibious forces. The analysis and selection or or enemy forces by the gunfire or Task Group 34.5 targets proved wise; fOli.l"O.~A a1r reaction and ef and the an power of Task Force 38. forts were negligible. ~carclty or air oppos1t1on aade possible pro!ltable sh1pp1ng strikes, nettln~ 17. Task 15 Group 38.5 again proved 1ts value and ships sunk and 39 evaluated as damaged or prob versatlllty; ably Its early pre-dawn searches of the sunk, excluding ;4 small craft destroyed or INDO-CHINA coast damaged. aided 1n supplying precise 1n !or•at1on o! enemy locations, perm1tt1ng early full deck-load launchings o! Task Force 38. 13. Plans and preparations had been Task made pre Group 38.5 also participated In the destruction viously !or a thrust Lnto the SOl!lll o! OlINA SEA, enemy sh1pp1ng and 1nstallat1ons that followed. seeking destruction or Japanese •ajor fleet units, pr1nnly the ISi:. and 11\111.JO, with then supporting 18. Task Force 38 struck SAJGa'I, units. Such destruction CAP ST. JACQUES, or the only important CAMRANH BAY, QUINHON, TOURANE, and coastal convoys, eneay fleet units south of l:lllplre waters appeared starting at dawh• 12 January. Task Group 34.5 was to be the best way lo re~ove the aost dangerous orr CAMRANH BAY prepared to destroy enemy heavy and likely enemy threat to SE~ENTII Heet opera units expected there, but none were found although tions along the l.1':\'1!::-1.ilNIJOl 80-9 SKCRKT HARRATIVE (Cont.) left 10 the task group of fest oilers that had SURIGAO S'ffiAIT or LUZCl'> STRAIT. The SURIGAO come through the LUZON S'ffiA!T the night of 9-10 STRAIT had the advantage of sheltered waters, January. perm1tt1ng rue11ng and passage on a !1xed schedule, but was ut111zation or a strategically awkward 21. On 15 January FORMOSA was struc.k, with route, almost certain or detection. The LUZON secondary e!forts and searches directed at the STRAIT best fitted the overall strategy, afforded PESCAOORES AMOY, SllA10W, HOOG KONG, and the less chance or detection, but the currently llAlNAN area. The FORMOSA strikes were recalled stormy weather made passage on a f 1xed schedule early 1n the afternoon due to worsening weather problematical. rt was determined to atter.pt conditions at the target. l.tlch shlpp1ng was passage o! LUZON STIIAIT, and the night or 20-21 found 1n TAKAO, but effective attacks were January, the weather proving unexpectedly favor dl!f1cult due to very low ce111ngs; nevertheless, able, an expeditious but presumably snooped the final tally for the day showed 8 vessels passage was made, 81.LINTANG OiANNEL being used, sunk (21,000 tons) and 19 damaged (17,000 tons). Several unobservant and surprised enemy planes Air oppos1t1on was negligible; 16 enemy planes were shot down prior to and during the passage were shot down and 18 destroyed on the ground. of LUZDN STRAIT, but the operation was otherwise uneventful. 3800 miles had been covered l.n the 22. To complete Lhe devastation o! the OiINA O!INA SEA without battle da•age, - no ene-y plane coast, HONG KONG, CAN'JU'.I, and HAINAN were struck was able to approach Task Force 38 closer than In force 16 January. Other cond1t1ons were 20 m1les. The Oiler group did not acco1pany Task favorable, but anti-aircraft !1re was intense Force 38 through UJZON STRAIT, but used the and accurate in the HONG KONG area. However, re· SURIGAb S'ffiAIT route at a later date. suits were rair; 13,000 tons or shipping were sunk and 75,000 tons damaged; extensive destruc 26. Task Group 38 .8 (the oilers with escorts), tion was 1n!11cted on docks; huge 011 rues v.ere commanded by Captain Acurr, had performed excep started tn the CANTON area. The only air oppos1- ttonally well under hazardous and di!flcult con tlon was encountered at llAINAN; It was quickly ditions durrng the O!INA SEA period of operations, overcome. in keeping with the excellent reputation the task group had created in previous operations. Two 23. Enemy air strength 10 this area, as 10 01 lers, the NANTAl-IALA and ClJADALOUPE, col llded FRENO! JNDO-OiINA, proved v~ry weak; the CHINA du r mg the 'lies t"ard passage of BALINTANG O!M"NEL coast 1n January appeared as wide open and de the night or 9- 10 January, and the Nll!ENTA B.\\ fenseless from an air and naval standpoint as the suffered considerable storm damage during the MINDANAO and VISAYAS appeared tn October. Feverish rough weather in the O!INA SEA, but in spite or enemy efforts to remedy this easily recognized these handicaps, •he entire task group continued condition, now that his vulnerablllty had been to furnish indispensable services in a most com demonstrated, could be anticipated; any reinforce mendable manner. ments must run a submarine and air gauntlet and must be drawn Crom other strategic obJectives. 27. FORMOSA and southern NANSEI 511010 were It is believed the 1nd1rect strategic results or attacked with excellent results 21 January, under the attack or the O!INA coast will be quite as favorable weather conditions. Important da•age valuable as the tangible destruction tnfltcted. was Inflicted; the TAKAO docks and industrial area were particularly hard hit, with •any large 24. 17 January was spent In rough weather, fires started. Barrage balloons were shot down attempting to fuel uth 1ndi!!ere_nt success. over TAKAO harbor and the large amount of sh1pp1ng 18 January proved even worse from a Iuelrng present was attacked heavily. Damage assessment standpoint (the destroyer MAR.9-IALL at ~819 re is dif ficult in this harbor because o! Its ported rolls up to 60 degrees); a run to the sha l lowness, but 1t 1s believed most of the ton southward became necessary where at last a rea nage present ts resting on the bottom, !it only sonably calm area was round 19 January under the ror salvage. The destruction or enemy aircraft lee or LUZ(lll and rueltng completed; the O!INA and airfield facilities was extensive; the SF.A weather was running regrettably true to for• cu•ulative, favorable effects of heavy strikes on and !orecas ts. FOR~!OSA, a1dtng the Southwest Pac1flc operations on LUZON, has been evidenced by the •arked 25. Profitable targets 10 the O!INA SEA area lessening or the enemy's LUZ.a-I air e!!ort. had become scarce, and the sh1!t1ng of the THIRD Fleet to an area east Qf LUZON (undetected If 28. The 21 January operati ons cost us damage possible) seemed desirable strategically. There to four ships, the TICONDEROGA , HANCOCK, LANGLEY, were two possible exits !rom the CHINA SEA - via and MAOOOX. The TJCCtlDEROGA was hl t by two 80-10 S~CRi'i' NARRATIVE (Co~t.) 2. The LINGAYF.N landings point the problem. Here, thousands or men moving hundreds or m1Jes su1c1de dive bombers and suffered eXlfns1ve damage, 1n hundreds of ships were dependent ror their preventing further l11ghl operations. The HA.'>COCK success on the Fast Carriers gaining control o! suffered moderate damage when a bomb or one or the air in Non he rn LUW' and FOR\IOSA by a date her own planes exploded on deck; she was able to wh 1ch had been set weeks be !ore. 'Ille sett mg or resu5e flight operations with egergency repairs. "S-Day" had been cont rngent on long range weather The LANQ.Er was hit by a JOO-pound enem} bomb forecast. The success or the fast carriers 1n and suffered moderate da~age but ~as able to make ga1n1ng control was dependent on conditions 1m the necessary repairs to continue air operations. med1ately prior to S-Oay. The MAIJDOX was hit by a su1c1de 7~ke and damaged so that her return to ULITiil was necessary. 3. I! the weather between S- 6 and S-Oay had been such that the carriers could not have per 29. On 22 January, the NANSEI SHOTO was struck; formed their m1ss1on, radical changes of plan Important photographic coverage was secured, and would have been necessary. In this case it might the JOb of destruction of 10 October was sup have been necessary for the landing force to plemented and completed. Harbor rac111t1es and countermarch and delay the landing until the !ast inter-island craft were particularly hard hit; carriers experienced weather which permitted even partial recovery of errect1veness should their ef!ecc1ve operation. Actually the weather take considerable lime. There was no air oppos1- cond1t1ons between S-6 and s-oay were so poor t1on; planes on the ground were well strafed that the success o! our m1ss1on was in question and da•aged, although many would not burn. much or the time. As a result our pilots' abil i ty was stretched to Its 11m1t to operate 1n the 30. The 22nd of January saw the conclusion of ex1st1ng adverse conditions. our losses indi the current phase of TiiIRD Fleet operations. 23 cate that many pilots ~ent beyond this 11m1t. January 'ias used for fueling, and then all units The above is g1ven to emphasize the necessity o! routed directly to ULl'DH (save the SAJ\ JUA.\') having knowledge o! future and immediate weather for a •uch needed period of repa Ir and replen1sh conditions as accurately as is humanly possible. •ent. Al R OPERATI ONS 31. Fleet operauons 10 the period JUst con cluded had dec1s1ve strategical s1gn1r1cance; Clt 38 comments: the operations In the Oil~A SEA demonstrated how vulnerable and how weak were the Japanese defenses 1. AS never before, the offensive air strength or that vital area, - vital as a route !or trans or the Fast carriers has had to be spread to cover port of the essentials of war production. The the enemy 1n h1s large island systems and land mas~ outer defenses o! the Japanese Empire no longer dispersions. At the same time the !orce has found inc 1ude EllR'dA and the NE:lllERLANDS EAST INDHS; it necessary to concentr ate its defense to a degree those countries are now isolated outposts, and never before conside red necessary. Before the their products are no longer available to the innovation of su1c1de attacks by the ene~y. destruc Japanese war machine except with staggering and tion of 80 or 90:1: or his attackers was considered prohibitive losses enroute. an eminent success. Now 100:1; destruction o! the attackers IS necessary to preserve the safety of the Task Force. New developments, described below. the Jack Patrols, "Moosetrap" exercises, all night COMMENTS, LESSONS LEARNED CAP's, and Tomcats - are designed !or this 100~ de RECOMMENDATIONS, ANO CONCLUSIONS struction. These new o!!ens1ve and defensive re quirements inherently conflict and mak ing the cor rect compromise Is the continual task or the Force AERO LOG Y COuander. Ct!' 38 CO!l'lents and .-ec011J1ends: 2. The two cardinal principles which have evolved are: (1) defend the force with adequate 1. 'Ille recent operations or Task Force 38 were patrols (2) blanket the threatening enemy a!r involved in gaining and 1a1ntatn1ng control of the opposition day and ni ght •1th the most a1r power air either In support o! a•phlblous operations or available. When those two main tasks are prop to permit o!rens1ve action against ene•Y shipping er ly handled the force 1s sare . In the course or or ground Installations. The success or these a day's blanket the enemy fie Ids and a IC oppos 1- ope rations was greatly In fluenced by the state o! t 1on are reduced to such an extent that more em the weather. phasis can be placed on destruction or Important secondary objectives, instal lations, and shipping. 80- 11 s~ R Al R OPERATIONS (Con:.) This is the pattern or air operations which has (a) An approach Crom extreme altitude with a g I ven con tlnued success at smal I cos L. More long high-speed glide rrom about fifty miles spectacular results at a higher price are always on in. (It has not been determined whether available but ~ny operations which cons1stent!y they ~ere able to make the glide conform accept fast carrier dama~e cannot be continued to t~e nu!: areas of cert a in radars but 1t wlthout putting a definite end date on the oper appeared so). ations or the ~·1~t Carner Force. The balance between the carrier air strength used to (b) An approach traillllg our returning strikes Keep en•'mY air power subdued is a dellcate one. from a position above or below them. The enemy ust never be permitted to 11!t even one corner of the "blanket" over his i1r!1elds (c) An approach flat on the water which re or the sifety of the e~ttre Task Force 1s Jeop sulted in detection by radar on average or ar1ized. Regardless or the attracuveness of only uenty-one mi-I.es away and too close other targets, responsible commanders must not be !or interception by the normal processes lulled into diverting so much of their air or Fighter Direction. strength from the "blanket" that the enemy's air 1s ro lo~ger thoroughly held helpless ~h1Je J t 6. ,rack. Pa:roa.". Is bel"g systematically Jestroyed. The stake 1s too ~1~h to risk th1s contingency. As a de!ense against lo•-!ly1ng attack, two ant1snooper !lghters called "Jack" were stat1oned 3. These tactics, described below, have at each or the four cardinal points of the compass proved successful largely because or the 1ncreased around each task group and remained oithin visual complement or VF aboard the fast carriers. Only distance of the screen at an altitude of 3000 feet the assignment of a suitable single seater dive or be10111 ready for visual control by the screening bomber to the earner-based VB squadrons ls nec Jestroyers. The> may be alerted by any ship in essary to make these tactics applicable to con the Task Group by Voice or by two AA bursts 1n the certed and continuing attacks on the Japanese dtrect1on or an approaching bandit. They are homeland. requ1red to remain rigidly on station, and there fore do not clutter up the radar screen. Suicide attacks by the Japanese Kamikaze Special Attack Corps, rather than being or a It was round necessary to establish sa!ety last-ditch h)stcrical nature. show every indica Janes for returning strlke planes which included tion or being a carefully studied change 1n the a full turn around one of the advanced radar g~neral plan or air attacks against ships. It pickets (Tomcats). By this means the radar screen is evident that the pilots involved are well is kept clear 1n other sectors and an approaching trained In the best methods or avo1d1ng detection bandit can be detected by his d1st1nct1ve un by radar and o! avo1d1ng interception by deploy authorized track. Furthermore the orbit around ment and broken !leld running 1r detected. These the tomcat peruts an opportunlt} to inspect ror attacks 11ere first executed on a broad scale by trailing bandits. Any bog1e not complying •1th the enemy about the time of our landings on the return procedure for the day Is intercepted. LEYTF. In the PHILIPPINES. It became apparent, Any plane Wlth wounded aboard or dangerously low due to the rate at which our Fast Carriers were on gas is intercepted and escorted straight in. be1ng put out or action, that unless some success The Tomcats have 1n addition been invaluable tn ful counter action could be taken we would lose assisting lost pilots, in rescue 01 downed pilots. tne spearhead or our !orces 1n the Pacific. 1n early warning or low- Clyrng raids, and in actually controll1ng interceptions and shooting down enemy aHcraft. All available 1n!ormation on the subject was 8. Defanse in DPptl•• collected and analyz~d and lar~e-scale Task Force t ra 1ning exercises, known as "Moosetrap", were ca) To insure interception or bandits approach designed simulating enemy tactics and ,onducted ing in a glide or dispersed in altitude. with a view toward demonstrating the weak spots interceptors are vectored out In a stacked In our defense which 1t did effectively. It formation and other fighter divisions (fro• appeared that the enemy was successfully using a separate Task Group JC necessary) are three d1!ferent types or approach: vectored to a strategi c spot to back up the line of Interceptors. 80-12 Sf.CRET AIR OPERATIONS 1 Cor.~. 1 (b) D:!t'ense in depth for the whole Task Force such action. Often VF and ~'BF lllanket sas created from Urst. the standard CAP patrols have been d1rected to sink ships over each task group at rive, ten and nearby wh1ch they have done most success twenty thousand reet; second, the tour sec- ful J y enroute to station over enemy air t1 ons or Jack patrols surrounding each Task fields. It ls not always possible to re group; and third by the advanced radar lleve on station due to distance involved pickets domcars). each nth Its own righter and the !act that the recovery and launching CAP. In add1t1on, during the cr1r1cal dusk schedule aust be kept. However, 1 t has been per10 80-13 So CH Er AIR OPERATIONS !Con=.1 tion inherent in a force or this type, namely, speed and constant and unpredictable movement over 12. rig ht Ope ..at ior..s. a wide area, was neutrallzed largely by the re quirement or more or less stereotyped method of Tile forma tlon CVN of a group has made It pos employment or the Task Force sible to In numerous periodi provide a CAP over the Task Force all cal strikes agarnst the PHILIPPINES when night and at in support tne same time conduct strikes through or landing operations. out the night Launching points, routes in the !orD of torpedo plane attacks to launching potnts against snlppJng. and fuel 10g areas became and hecklers and lntruders standarized to the point where against alr!lelds. the element or sur prise was almost wholly lacking. The size of the Force Itself when several groups are operating 13. Ei>.tJers. JOlntly naturally may put the submarrne 1n posi tion to approach one Task Group If be misses the "Zippers" are night fighters who, using day opportunity on another. Air anti-submarine fighter tactics, proceed to the target in daylight patrols of fast carrier task forces, or question In time to relieve the last day "blanket" patrol able value at best due to the lack or rndoctrrna and thereby close the gap between departure o! the tlon, experience and training or carrier pilots day fl~bters and arrival or the r1rst night heck in this type or work and inadequate anti-submarine lers and Intruders at dusk. '!'hey put the war on equipped planes, must be practically eliminated a 24-hour basis and have been most successful during operations close aboard enemy territory. against the enemy who, accustomed to our previous This results from the necessity or set time or departure, keeping radar begins stirring soon after screens as free of friendly planes the last day strike departs. as possible in order to !actlitate the detection and intercep tion of e~emy aircraft which ls still the llaJOr threat. ANTI- SUBMARI HE WARFARE 5. It is felt that unless iamediate and ef fective ~easures are C!f 38 coa1>er.ts and ~ocosael'lds: adopted to counter the threat or enemy submarine attack, additional casualties to the fast carrle 1. At the begJnning or operations or Task r task forces may be expected. Force The following recommendations 'll!IR'li'-EIGHT during the perlOd from JO October are subaitted !or 1944 cons id era t 1on: to 26 January 1945 there was a decided increase In eneay submarine act1v1ty. This activity was evi (a) Increase the number of special AS~ dence., by the substantial number or contacts made groups (such as Task Group 'll!IR'IY POINT by the shtps or the TIURD and SEVENIH Fleets. The SEVEN) light cruiser RENO asstgned to conduct hunter-killer opera ns hit by a torpedo on the tions night or 2 November 1944. 1n the general area in which this task force operates. By intense and con tinuous sweeping ot the 2. Although this is the only time a submarine fueling areas and the waters through which is known to have launched a torpedo at ships of the Cast earner task force 1ust move Task Force 'll!IRTY EIGIIT. the RENO 10ctdent is con enroute to the target areas, these special groups can crete evidence that a fast carrier task force Is 1ake these waters untenable for enemy submarines and not Invulnerable to submarine attack. At the time increase the security or the force. of the torpedoing of this ship, near midnight, the Foret was dependent !or anti-submarine protection (b) Assign a specially upon visual lookouts, ships' trained ASW team or t•o radar equipment and or three destroyers the underwater sound detection to accompany the force devices of the !or hunter-killer screening destroyers. That this protection missions. It ts con was not sidered that h1gh speed DE's adequate is attested by the tact that the torpedo are not suit able ror this purpose largely because explosion on the RENO was the rtrst 1nd1cation the or Force had their limited speed, particularly under ad o! the presence of a submarine in the verse vicinity. weather conditions, whtch prevents the• from keeping pace with the !orce dur ing high speed run-ins and retire1ents. 3. The views or this command uth respect to The destroyers assigned should be In anti-submarine protective measures for the add1t1on fast to the full screen for each task group carrier task forces are repeated herein: tn the force to permit their detacb1ent on special hunter-killer 4. The defense missions without de or Task Force 'll!IR1Y-EIG!T tracting rro1 against enemy the defensive strength or any submarine attack ls considered a group. serious problem and one which may become increas ingly lllportant in future operations. The protec- 80-14 or any value rn elther spottrng or shooting down enemy planes. The use or a Low, controllable or pilots (c) ASsign to each Task Group a unit d1v1s1on or CAP 1s recommended instead and the trained in ant1-submar1ne warfare, specially value or such a defensive set-up 1s apparent on !uliY equipped w1th the latest with planes the record or enemy planes shot down. when enough anti-submarine weapons and most errect1ve channels are available and enough VF available devices. 1be primary mission VHF and detection without detracting from strike strength, use or pilots would be anti-submarine a1r or these two-plane sections v1suallycontrolled by a ship In patrols for the force and hunter-k1ller the screen might be worthwhile. missions tn conjunction with surface vessels. These pilots .-ould still be available for dusk "Jack" use in torpedo strikes agalnst enemy sur 4. The present employment or the face units and sh1pp1ng. The plan has the is perhaps the most inerrect1ve and actually at a criti advantage or providing the rorce with a dangerous practice which could be used runct1on which group or pilots fully quall!ied by trarning cal period or the day. There is no and experience to perform errecttvely anti these VF(N) can accomplish which cannot be better d1v1sion or section or CAP made up or submarine duty without con!licttng ~1th the handled by a present policy of Increasing the fighter VF(N) and launched forty minutes prior to sunset. plane complement of carriers to the maximum. That damage was not caused by enemy attacks during the period or tnl ight and the hour thereafter 1s (d) Train all carrier personnel responsible !or only due to the !act that no such attacks were or engaged in the conduct of air operations made. Each CIC in the entire Task Force was busy and AC! or r 1cers 10 at least the rud 111en ts keeping track ~f !nendly VF(N), checking 111th o! ant1-submar1ne warfare. This 1s con lookouts on their ident1f1cat1on, calling them on sidered essential 1r anti-submarine searches VHF channels and in other ways attempting to keep and patrols and hunter-killer operations are straight a confusion or planes which have proved to be lntell1gently planned and effectively to be ineffective even 1n daylight. The most executed. dangerous period commences after the dusk Jacks cannot see an approaching enemy plane, ror lights must necessarlly be turned on In the force for the1 landings. The s1tuat1on or friendly aircraft at ~OHBAT INFORHATIOH CEHTER twilight and the halt hour iamed1ately follow mg must be s11pl1!ied so that guns 11ay be brought to PJr:HtER DiliE'tIO~' bear with no quest ion upon approaching tari;e ts. IC sunset is a dangerous time, the CAP launched forty ;:<;G ~R.2 COl!mer:ts and -ecc:i:icnds: mrnutes earller may be used to intercept a raid and then the friendly planes stay clear until they 1. During this operating period the same gen can be taken aboard one carrier. eral rrport1ng and evaluating system was used as Jn previous operations. Task Group F.D.O. was 1n 5. 'The fact that VF pllots are less experienced U:XINGTQ.'i and all reports and control orders were than rn former days makes 1 t imperative that ships· on the Task Group 1,IAJll c1rcu1t while necessary com- FDO's work w1th and teach these pilots the many 1un1cat1ons with other Task Groups, picket de phases or air dlsc1pl1ne so important in making an stroyers and F.F.D.O. •ere handled on Force MAN operation succe·ssrul. Rad to discipline and the use or high !requency .-hen conditions permitted. nie of the aircraft ~llF radio to !ts full advantage arc evaluation or shots and situations was at all two specific thrngs 0 wh1ch the HlO must teach. The times most satisfactory .-ithln the task group, the unreasonable amount or use or emergency IFF ls at cooperation or all ships present being excellent. tributed to a lack of understanding on the part or The exe1plary performance or certain individual the pilots as to the con!uston It can cause when ships. or which wISOl-ISIN was most outstanding, unnecessarily used. •as again apparent and greatly valued. 6. Slmpli!icat1on or the radar and rad10 pic 2. 1be use or strike pickets 1s considered ture 1s the most pressing problem where large num •orth•h1le. Common sense in r1x1ng their posi bers or planes and carriers are working together t1ons and keeping them there and discipline or Any practice which necessitates an over-abundance pilots In adhering to their course rules with ob or defensive planes must be discarded as unsound. vious allo~able exceptions can make the radar pic ture on strike days much clearer than •hen they are not 1.sed. VER'( sour;o -- COMMA~O MU ST KNOW 3. The e1plo~111ent o! •Jacks• on strike days RADAR'S LIMITATIOllS AllD ~OT EXPECT seems useless They do not rnterrere w1 th the ra THE IMPOSSIBLE OF CIC. TRAINING dar picture when In pos1t1on, but neither are they LEADS TO SIHPLI Fl CATION. ~0-15 S8CH COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER (Cont., the activities engaged in by each or the other Task Groups. The size o! the Task Force called 1. It 1s again strongly recommended that the for•the institution of Task Group circu1ts which Force Fighter D1rector coordinate and not control. enabled each Group to have its own in!ormat1on The Force fl~htcr D1rector should not exercise channel uninterrupted by other Groups. With this direct contro. over any Combat Air Patrol. The done, the Group F'DOs then used a separate channel Task Group Fighter Director must be free to defend with the f'orce FOO to insure tnter-group tnror· his own Task Group by the employment of hls own mat ton. Co11.bat AH Patrol 1n the l!.Ost effective manner. 2. It is recommended that !ewer night fighters be launched. one ror each Task Group and one to ARE WE FORGETTI N3 nAT T'lf Fl RST PROB act as stand-by is surr1c1ent if there is no CV~ LEi1 IS 4 CLEAR AIR PICTUilE FOR 30TI' present to furnish the night patrol. Anythln~ FIGHTER DIRECTION A•lb TAR3ET l~DICA more than this confuses the radar screen and in Tl:JN? T~ERE IS NO DIVIDINu LINE ANO creases dif!1cuJt1es of night interception work. T'IEREFORE ROT~ MUST 3E CO'ISI DERED T03ETJlEP~ 3. All land-based patrol planes should be up on VHF channel "Charlie" when approaching. the fleet operatrng area. When planes can be tdentt· fled by VHF 1t saves despatching a d1vis1on or 2. 'Ille need for addtttonal VHF channels is CAP to Investigate It ts particularly important apparent. 1be supply or adequate equipment to the that night patro! planes guard ~'HF at night as fleet to maintain additional channels should have ~any show as bogey the highest priority. It 1s estimated that a CV Flagship (and all CV's are potential if not actual 4. It 1s bt>lleved that night !tghter dusk flagships) should have VHF equtpaent to handle at JACKS arc unnecPssary. 'Ille !ourth patrol or day least J 5 to 20 channels. This number is necessary JA(l(S can either be kept on station until dusk, or to maintain the large number or alrcra!t c1rcu1ts a better solution is to launch night fighters in and the message circuits that are becoming stead or day righters !or this patrol. more and more important. The inst1tut1on or the Mes· sage Center as a part or CIC ts i1perat1ve. The equipment plus trained operators and recorders set apart to properly handle all message trartic TOO MA~Y PLANES ARE AS OA~GEROUS AS TOO both from planes and ships should be made FEW. CASES OF MORE Tf1Atl 011£ GROUP avail OR able at the earliest opportunity. DERED TO DO HIE SAME JOB ARE TOO HANY. A PATROL THAT PREVEns I NTERCEPTIO~ Is DANGEROUS. ff FORTS ARE BEi ~1 MADE TO I ~CREASE '/HF C~A~NELS. UHTI L Tl!AT IS ACCOMPLISHED, PLA~~ MUST BE BASED ON AVAILABLE E~ IPflENT. l. Force Flghter Direction •as instituted In the act1\'e sense due to the need or coordination between the act1v1t1es or the several Task Groups. 3. (No attempt wi! l be made here These groups were tn themselves completed workable to specify channels or equ1pr:ient sucn as VHF·MAA·TB.S etc.) fighter dlrectio~ un!ts capable or putting an ade· The increase of message transm1ss1ons by voice quate defensive CAP into operation; a CAP which circuit has placed a ser1ous burden on CIC per would ~ave been capable or offering protection to sonnel; increased complement and training for this the Force as we 11 as the s 1ngl e Group. As each business have become necessary. 'Ille Jines or Group had these potentialities 1t was round neces responsibility between CIC and Comaunlcatlons De sar~ to coordinate the acth'tties or all grouos to partments •ust be defined to insure proper mainte prevent dupl1cat1on or e!Iort as well as to prop nance and proper monltor1ng of voice circuits. It erly allocate VF strength to Its proper operational is felt that the general di>1din& line should be uses leg.l allowing more VF !or strikes or sweeps that between er; and voice circuits, the roraer be· by ukl'lg a workable Force CAP properly propor 1ng the responsibility ~r Co1111unicat1ons Dept• and •ton~d rrom the several Task Groups. It was nec the latter, CIC. If such a dtv1s1on is made, ad es~ary that each Task Group be constantly and d1t1onal personnel will be required by CIC as well propnly 1nrormct1 or the Information obtained and as additional space a~d 'later1al. 80- lb SKCREf COMBAT INFORMATION CEllTER (Cont.) IS TllERE A DI VI DING LINE? IT'S THE training or the Force as a whole 1n acting as an SHIP'S TEAM, HOT A GROUP OF I HDI Vl DUAL integrated whole composed or groups. Use or these TEAMS. exercises at every available opportunity is Im portant. 4. Interior coaaunications or CIC must be con sollda ted and s tnpl lf 1ed as much as poss iblP by TEAM TRAINING IS ESSENTIAL. tbe use of au1t1-sw1tch panels. etc., ror talkers. CIC should present the information and those de parnents who need tbe inror111at1on, such as Gun nery, should have a competent talker or officer 6. fore< i'DO in CIC to obtain information needed: thus CIC will not give out 1nrormat1on but will make it avail The Force Fighter D1rect1on Officer coordi able for those who need to know. nated the activities or the Group Fighter Director Officers in such a way as to augment the poten tlal 1 tles or each group-without exerting direct control or functions performed by the GFUOs. The SEE USF IOA CHA~GE ~. All PANOS SllOULO GFDO must maintain the responsibilities of air FOLLOW T~E STA~DARO CIC DOCTRINE AHO craft control for his group both as to routine OilGAlll ZATIO~. patrols and as to Strikes, Searches, or sweeps. '!be Ff!IO must have the overall picture at all times without the details or group respons1bilit1es. 5. Erie ay rac ti.cs 7. f(l.Sk Grou.p i'tghte~ Di.rec ti.on (a) The basic tactics employed by the ene~y (a) Within the group each ship must be an ac have changed 11 ttle fro• expected aaneuvers. It tive part of the radar l1lformat1on c1rcu1t and has been noted that their technique or attack im each should be able to take over control or the proves rapidly when they are given the opportunity CAP at any Instant ln order to conduct an inter to strike our forces from one locality over a ception. period or time. Our in1t1al strikes on a new en emy territory alway~ bring a responsive effort fro• them •htch 1s usually poorly planned or exe cuted. However, If subsequent attacks on our CIC TRAINING IS !!EING ADJUSTED TO PRO forces are •ade from the same enemy bases those VIDE THIS. attacks show vastly improved tactics and careful planning. During the first strikes by the Task Force on LUZON. the enemy counter-attacks were eas II y 1 ntercepted a.~d stopped. 'Iii th repeated Attempts were made to bring all types into the strikes by the Force on LUZON and/or FORMOSA the fighter direction picture tor it is felt that the ene•y counter-attacks beca1e mucb more serious carriers alone should not be expected to carry threats even though or auch reduced size. The the entire burden or interceptions. The Group eneay round that a few raiders skillfully handled Fighter Director must be supplied with all possi 1n a well coordinated attack had much greater ble information from every ship within the chance group or in!llcttng damage on our forces than a so that he may properly evaluate, tdent1!y and large weighty raid. 1n1tiate action. It was noted that both the screen and supporting types engaged In active (bl No atteapt will be aade here to analyze the control or patrols, and in some instances were Kamikaze Special Attack Corp. Defense in depth called upon to conduct interceptions. The has dtvl been created by stationing or pickets with CAP, s1on or respons1b1I1t1es within the group and orrens1ve often counter-aeasures have been taken to resulted In the assignment or radar guards the best of our present being knowledge for combattlng placed ln the hands or the Support Commander. this, the most serious threat the Fleet has had to COllbat, (b) 'lilth units Intercommunicating within the groups and with GF'l)()s coamunlcatlng with (c) 1be institution the FFDO of Moosetrap exercises, for mutual 1nter-gro1'p iirormation, new circuits designed to imitate the Kamikaze methods and test or communications be•:ame necessary. Conditions Fighter Direction has done a great deal in the or radio sllence governed to a large extent the 80- 17 SFJCRA'T COMBAT I NFORHATION CEllTER (Cont.) circuits used. Where It was necessary to main (c) Great credit ts due the !ollonng ships !or tain radio silence, VHF channels were used exclu their invaluable aid in developing tbis hitherto sively. Where a lesser degree or silence was unused practice: posstble, "MAN" c1rcults were put lnto use. When strikes were underway, medtum frequency channels U.S.S. BRUSH were 1nc Luded. U.S.S. MADDOX U.S.S. PRIOIETI' 1'0/i-STRIKE DAYS U.S.S. COLAl!AN U.S.S. SULLIVA.~S Inter-mo Chan •c• U.S.S. T'lilNING Intra-FOO Chan •c• U.S.S. CASSI1' YOONG CAP Chan "A" Jacks Chan "C" (d) The use or pickets at times other than Strike Days was dependent on the situation. Night STRIKK DATS Pickets and Dusk Pickets and Day Pickets *ere all used extensively. Intra-mo "MAN" •Inter-FOO 2096 9. .•orce Di,.-e~ c ion CAP Chan "A" Jacks Olan "C" The Fmo acted as a clear mg house or infor mation rrom all groups. Pertinent reports •ere •Toacats and Picket destroyers included. i:I ven on the Inter- FOO circuit so that all GFDOs were constantly inror~ed or the act1v1ties or (c) Atte1pts were made to use MAI'< !or inter each other group. The GfllO reported the 1nst1- FDO when distances between the Task Groups was gat1on otany interception and the location or such as to allow reception or all stations by the target being tnvest1gated--other GFOO's were all stations. 3000 kc was used as a warning net thereby informed of the number of CAP div1s1ons c1rcu1t where TBS-I would not reach all ships. being used "away rro11 base" and 1ere thus ab!~ better to evaluate all friendlies seen on the radar screens--the Ff1lO attempted to coordinate the number or CAP divisions used 1n interception (a) Destroyers were tilted out wtth alrcrart to prevent interference or one Task Group CAP homing devices and used on St rt ke Days as ad with another. At times the Fmo requested GFDOs vanced radar pickets and ~ulde ships !or return: to strategically place a CAP div1s1on so as to 1ng strikes. The use of these ships was two "back up" the 1ntercept1on by another d1vis1on fold; to assist ln control of returning strike oc CAP. Investlgat1ons were ordered by the Frno aircraft and, secondly, to gtve advanced warning on!~ when not properly 1nit1ated by the GFDOs. to the force of approaching enemy aircraft. The positioning or VFN was under control o! t~e Special Fighter Director Teams were placed aboard FFOO, as was the assignment or control of the VFN these destroyers to assist the sh1p"s co11pany in when beyond controlling range or the parent base. handling the additional burden of aircraft con This assignment o! control or the Night Fighters trol. The Pickets and Tomcats were stationed to was Important during an actual interception. since meet the geographical situation and give advanced when Base "A" ceased to have complete 1nfor11ation radar coverage 1n the direction 01 expected at on the target and the friendly it •as iaperattve tack. These same destroyers also served as orbit that Base "B" ass.u11e control without any delay or points for returning strikes where the destroyer "loss or ground" by the VFN. It was round that as CAP was used to "1nsp~ct" for possible tra111ng many as three or four bases might control VFN dur bandits. The return or Lhe strtkes from the ing one intercept ton. pickets also served to define a friendly "lane" for planes approaching the Force. When properly complied with by returning pliots this procedure simplified to a remarkable degree the radar and (a) During a strike day in the v1c1n1ty or an ident1r1catlon picture ror all FUOs. active enemy area lt was necessary to invesugatc 11any planes with CAP because oC lack or complete (b) It was round that the destroyers operating ldentJ!1cat1on. It ..as round that FfllO had to as a Leam or two served the purpose better than evaluate to a sec~nd d•gree--!or although a •arget 1nd1v1dua11y: one serving as primary atrcratt being investigated required that investigation, control ship and the other as a rescue vessel as the J1kel1hood that 1t was friendly was possible. s 1st !ng aviators 1n distress. Hence the Ff1Xl designated as raius only those 80-18 COHBAT I NFO!f4ATION CENTER (Cont. bogey targets which appeared fro• the 1nttlal pick carefully calculated, is more accurate than from up as band1 ts. nus was any done to Insure to all one SM which may or may not be properly calibrated. that when the target had a raid number It could All ships must use their fade charts on every tar be considered most seriously. GFDOs further des get. All reports to the GFOO should include ignated those esti targets approaching their group mate or •Geep• Angels whenever possible. spec Ifically as ra 1ds but this be Ing done over an Intra-group c 1rcu1t did not unduly alarm other (d) Conditions or Radar Silence were Imposed groups. On a typical day orr enemy territory the when appropriate. In addtt1on to times of tactical FFDO designated eight raids, seven or which were importance, degrees of silence were imposed at bandits (all intercepted and identified visually other times to permit maintenance and upkeep or before being shot down) the eighth being a search equipment. Experiments were conducted wtth various plane (PB4Y). On this same day no other bandits equipment to test the posslb1lit1es or •homing on were seen, whereas over 30 additional intercep radar•. Reports have been forwarded. tions were run to pos1nve1y identity friendly groups. The large number or 1ntercept1ons re THE FORCE quired due to faulty !FF equipment, both airborne OR GROUP FOO IS HO MORE; HE IS NOW and shipboard, •as a s ituatton which required A FORCE OR JROUP Cl C OFFICER ~O IS RESPONSIBLE constant attention. The failure or pilots RJR All CIC FUNCTIOl'S AllO to NECESSARY adhere to closed return procedure on strike days CCORDINATIO~. and thereby draw o!! a d1V1ston o! CAP !or in vest1gat1on caused danger to the Task Force wb1cb 11. Radilr Countenoeasures could have been prevented through cooperation or all hands at all t1•es. Considering this type The increasing importance or ROt Interpretation or Investigation, and that o! the real bandit, as a factor in complete evaluation and ldent1r1ca said numbers were reserved !or the bandit. tton by the FOO ls an 1ndlcat1on for the need or this training tor all FDO's. It is felt that every FDO should have an Instruction course in POOR TRAINING l'I IFF IS COSTING TOO Rat at the ear lles t opportunity. It 1s !urther felt that 11.JCP A~D IS RE~ON SIBLE FOR SH IP DA'IAGE there should be a breakdown or ROA op erations s1m11ar A.~O LOSS OF PROTECTION. LET'S CORRECT to that or the radar operator, IT INSTEAD OF BLMING IT. radar aaintenance aan. The 1nterpretat100 or RCM 1nror1at1on should be a part o! the total CIC picture; and should be !1tted into that picture (b) The perronance or radars in general in rather than be given a separate evaluation or dicated the need ror consistent up-keep and main greater or less l•portance than other sources or tenance. Several ships reported subnor1al per in!ouatlon available to the FOO 10 CIC. The roraance due to lack or parts and/or time ror intercept or enemy radar signals ts not tn itself maintenance. It ls absolutely essential that a determining !actor ror action to be taken on the co•plete stocks or spare parts, competent elec part or our forces, but must be weighed with radar trical engineers, and •alntenance time be •ade in!oraat1on, 1ntell1gence reports, radio inter available to the rorce at all times possible. cept reports, all o! which must be available to the FOO. The use or RO.t by our forces to contuse or fool the ene•y must be a part of an over-all Is nus S.13110R1AL PERFO!f.IAllCE CliJSED operational plan and not a separate venture In BY NOT USI llG IHE TALE!IT ANO MATER I AL itself. Careful planning ts mandatory, especially AVAi LARLE? ARE THE MAINTEllAHCE PER In the light or Initial contacts or strikes a ~N~EL AHO SPARE PARTS HOARDED BY ONE gainst the enemy. DEPARTI1ENT OR ONE ~IP? ANOTHER CIC FUNCTION lfllCH MUST 8E COORDINATED WI TH THE OPERATIONS TEI.'!. The need for additional SM type radars is appar RADAR COUN1ERNKASORiS ent. The SP or s111Jar 11odels should be given the highest prtorlty and Installations expedited •Ith all posstble haste. These should be placed on as 1any types as •111 carry the weight. In view or the demonstrated success of Radar Countermeasures, laaedlate expansion or racl!ltles (c) The present tendency or the Task Groups to !or manufacture or •tndo' and related RO" Instal rely on the SM alone ror altitude •ust be changed. lations should be accomplished. Radar [VF equip Al tl tude tn!orntlon from the SK-SC radars. when ment !or both shipboard and airborne operation IHJ020 ·U-1 80-19 SEC RE: COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER (Cvn!. 1 ts needed as well as radar intercept receivers (!) Another use or intercept equ1pa:ent has been to cover the X board frequencies. D1scuss1on to provide a clue to tbe identity of an follo•s. approaching airplane. I! radar pulses showing enemy characteristics are inter cepted, the bog1e may pos1t1vely be 1den t1fled as enemy. (a) In order to detect the approach of enea,y aircraft at distances beyond the range or (g) All enemy airborne radars have been detect our radar. th ts Force has resorted to ed in the known 150 to 160 me. band with intercept ton or enemy radar. Frequently pulse lengths from three to ten micro 1ntercept1on has given warning or a bogte seconds and PRf' or 500 to 1000. ~ben three from 15 to 45 minutes before he was shown ot our R0.1 aircraft flew over LUZON with on our radar screens. once a snooper was receivers cov~ring the frequency range detected by interception three hours be from 40 to 1000 me., they intercepted nu fore our radar located him. When he closed merous signals rrom 95 to 300 me. The log to 35 miles his radar pulses saturated the showed only a few signals below 90 me. and intercept equipment. This indicates that none above 300. It appears that the Japa the enemy possesses new high-powered radar nese have no welt-defined bands tor their for aircraft. d1tcerent types or sets, as there was no more than a IO me. gap between any two intercepts In the range. (b) Interceptions or airborne enemy radar were frequent in the LUZCV\-FORAK>SA Area, but 2. Inte~cep!ion of f~ier.d.Ly Rada~. not one confirmed Intercept occurred while operating tn the s:JU1li OlI\A SEA. (a) Due to trequent ta11ures of IFF gear, in terception of radar on our own character- (c) D1rect1onal antennae accurate even w1th1n 1st1c wave lengths is also helpful in 30 degrees would be acceptable and extreme Identifying distant planes. In View ot search planes ly useful 1n locating enemy the increasing use of X band radar by our Knowledge or after radar interception. patrol forces, a receiver is needed to racUttate the approx111ate bearing would detect this baoo. No suitable receiver ts process or coaching the SM onto the target now available. Assembly or a receiver llm1t us when cond1tlons of radar silence composed or AN/APS 6 units whlcb would have to use or the SM type. Exper111ental ship a 11m1 ted tuning range in the X band was by the board D/f' Installations attempted begun by R0.1 officers of this Task Force have not proved RO.t start or this Task Force Staff, but the work was incomplete when entirely satisfactory. the Starr was re aeved. Details or the receiver will be passed to ComAirPac. (d) 01rectional antennae Installed with inter cept equipment 1n carrier-based aircraft, (b) It 1s common ror ships ne•lY ass Jgned to however, have given acceptably accurate this force to report as bogles aany radar bearings. Enemy night searchers using radar intercepts which prove to be friendly. may now be detected, located, and destroyed Prior to Joining the Pacitlc Fleet, ships betore they have even discovered the pres should stress training or operators In ence or our ships. recognizing the radar beams or fnendly (e) Five night" Avengers aboard the USS INDE forces. PEN»FJIOCE were equipped with radar-Jamming 3. Sii ipboo,~d Ja11ung Kqi;.ip.ent. apparatus. Tunnel guns were removed to lighten the •eight. ()) some or the planes (a) Only once ln the period covered by this re modified ASB radar antennae were installed port was Ja11111ng used by our ships. An en 1n the tunnel and extended below tbe fuse emy search plane had closed to :n miles •hen lage. Reports from tests indicate that the order to ju hls radar was given. A these antennae, designed ror the 150 me. barrage jamalng plan •lth spot Jamming on band, gave reasonably close bearings on an the Intercepted frequency was in effect. The enemy ground station at 150 me. as well as snooper closed several •Iles and then retired on our own radars on 200 me. Now all or Due to a lag in co11ence1ent or Jamming after these spec la! RCM pl an es are being equipped the order was given , It cannot be de!lniteJy with D/F antennae. stated whether the j llll•lng confused the ene1y 80- 20 SISCRET COH BAT I NFORMATION CENTER (Cor.t .) and thus caused hla to turn away, or that he curate anti-aircraft C1re they had ever •as retlrlng intentlonaJly after ga1n1ng the encountered. Its htgh degree or accuracy des I red in rorma ti on. even beyond the ranges or automatic wea (b) To overcoae this delay in execution or pons indicates that the Japanese Navy radar Ja1t11101;, a new plan was adopted. possesses a new , more precise !1re-control This calls ror jaaaing by outlying pickets radar. Most or the !ire came from ships when the snooper has closed the• to 45 rn the harbor. ailes. There has been no opportunity to test this plan. (C) In view or this evidence, it ls recommended that ja11111.ers oC !ire-control radar be given a high pr1or1ty for installation Jn day as well as night-specialized planes. (a) The first RCM equipaent to be installed In carrier-based planes ~h1le operating 1n the 5. i'i.r.dow. fleet was placed In six Avengers o! AG 7 aboard the USS HANCOCK. Two racks and (a) Use or window was authorized ror all raids. other necessary apparatus were installed in Type CAFJ 10271 (282) was recommended !or each plane, and a stub-type antenna was VT aircraft and CAFJ 10325 (014) !or VF aounted Jn the cowling. These planes con and VB aircraft. The quarter-wave length ducted exercises against rr1endly ships. 1s more easily dispensed !ro11 the latter Barrage Jamming or sh1ps' radar in the type planes and proved equally effective. 200 me. band was carried out. Ships with radars ln that band reported Ja.. 1ng was (b) In general,•tndo• 1s still effective when ercect1ve over sectors from 20 to 45 de cut ror 200 me., 1nd1cat1ng that the enemy grees and m1011u1 ranges !roa 15 to o all es. is not using newer rire control sets ashore. The testuony or returning pllots (b) Unfortunately, many observers based er has convinced a maJority o! the fleet air roneous conclustons as to the e!Cecttve groups that, when •properly used, window ness o! JaEm1ng upon the reports o! ships can be highly e rrectl ve as an a id 1 n pro whJch were not a!!ected because their tect ion against ant1-a1rcra!t fire. radars were out or the operating band. It 1s bel1eved they did not take 1nto ac (c) Dispensers ror nndow are urgently needed count the large number or radars In the ror VF and VFB atrcra!t, due to the d1C 200 ac. band, nor the wide frequency !1cu I ty of release in these types. Un spread made by all o! the same type radars dow was extensively used 1n the raids or a fleet. over HONG KONG and TAKAO Harbor, but lack of dispensers left many or our planes un (c) Jaaa1ng equipment has been placed in !Ive protected. Auto ma tic dispensers night have Avengers of the USS IN!EPENDENCE as been bullt by the USS INDEPENDENCE a counter while - measure to accurate radar-con in the combat area, but trolled the fleet lacks searchlights encountered by our proper racll1 ties and night personnel to pro hecklers C!y1ng over WZCX'I and FOR vide an adequate supply t.Kl.SA. or dispensers. Four lnstallatlons were completed Plans ror the dispensers 1n each plane. developed by the As described under Inter USS INDEPENDENCE have been ception, the forwarded to tunnel guns were removed, and ComA1rPac. It ts hoped that the space soon window made available was gtven over dispensers for VF may to D/F antenna. be manufactured at Pearl Harbor to meet immediate requue ments. The fleet 1s ready for RCM, but (d) The USS ENTERPRISE also equipped each or unfortunately its needs are not being met. rtve planes with !our racks tor RCM equtp aent. All RCM-equ1pped planes were authorized to Jam enemy radar-controlled searchlights. Slnce installations were In view or the demonstrated successes or radar completed, however, no night atsslons have countermeasures despite the hitherto small scale been flown by these planes over enemy or appl1cation and exper1ment, the following rec r le Ids. ommendations are submitted : (e) In recent raids over H()IG KONG and TAKAO (a) Immediate development and installation or Harbor our planes reported the aost ac- radar D/F equipment !or both shipboard and airborne operatlon. 80- 21 COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER (Cant.) !or the immediate operation and while TBS has limited range, 1t the enemy by known radio-at- 1osphere quirks had intercepted these plain YOUR RdCM INTERCEPT RECEIVER WI LL ~AVE A language messages and had pieced the tacts to DI RECTIO~AL ANTE!INAE (A D/F !IY ANOTllER gether with the areas h1t by the following day's NAl1E). strikes he would have a good start on his o•n edition or USF-38. (bl Assign1ent or 1ore personnel with more thorough training to the RCM program. USF-38 STATES T'IAT, "CODE NAMES AS ALL Cl C TEN·1S t1U ST KNOW RdCM. IT IS SIGHED TO LOCALITIES SPALL BE USED HOT A S'ECIALTY aJT JUST ANOTifER CIC ONLY IN SECRET CORRESPONDENCE, SECRET TASK AND lliE TEN·1 HUST KNOW IT. DESPATCHES AND 111 PROPERLY SAFE- GUARDED CONVERSATIONS------. " A TBS TRAN SM ISSI ON IS ~OT A PROPERLY (c) Manufacture or Ro.l intercept receivers to SAFE'.iUARDED CONVERSATION. cover the X Land frequencies which our patrols are using. 2. An equally important objection to the use UNDERWAY 0UT NOT 11-f.IEDIATELY A'AILA~LE. or USF-3B lies In the limited areas which are as signed code na•es. As it developed in this opera tion, USF-38 d1d not provide enough code names to (dl Expansion o! tactltties ror manufacturing handle even broad target designations witb1n a wtndow and related RQ.l installations, with given target area which resulted in many instances e1phas1s on simplicity or design, ease ot in the use of code names concurrently •1th speci replacement. fic geographical na•es. The current USF-38 code names !or the CHINA COAST and FCJlMOSA 1ay •ell be (e) Pro1ulgatlon or standard Jamming plans and coapro• 1sed. frequent exercises 1n their execution. Even a rew minutes delay in execution 11ay 3. It 1s recommended that so•e means be devel be enough for the approaching enemy planes oped which would serve the necessary purpose or to close within sight or the Force. concealing !ro• the enemy i11111ediate operational intentions but at the same time would not endanger an established and widely distributed list or code SEE USF IOA CHA'iGE II. IT'S lliERE. names such as USF-38. A simple cipher, easy enough to handle rapidly in TBS transmissions yet secure enough to muddle enemy cryptographers !or the Vital (!) Provision for acquainting responsible of rew hours necessary, probably would be the best ficers or the Fleet with the potentialities means or meeting this problem. A cipher that or RCM for defensive and o!!ens1ve tac would be changed daily similar to the shackle code tical e1ployment, especially when trained would serve the dual purpose or simplicity and se personnel and su!f1c1ent equipment shall curity. Such a cipher would obviate the necessity have been provided on an adequate scale. !or code words and at the same tine would present no l111tat1ons as to the target areas which might be designated. COHHUN I CATI ON S K/11.>ofY JA/of/oflD OUR AIR SIARCR PRl201NCY CODI IW.flS CTG 38.2 CO!l'lents and ~ec°""ends: CtG 38 .1 co,..,ents and recOlnlends: On 3 January the ene•y successfully Jammed our 1. In th~ course a! this operation a wide air search frequency (6420 kcs) to such an extent range or new targets were hit on a schedule which that search planes could not be ordered to return seldom could be planned In any detail mo.re th~n to Task Group. This frequency has been in use tor a few hours in advance. This necessitated the a long time and should be changed. It is sug frequent use or code names rrom USF-3B in TBS gested that four or !Ive channels be selected in primary and TBS secondary CW transmissions in the 6-9 me band !or use as search frequencies and designating target areas !or the following day's that they be used alternately tor relatively short strikes. While the code name provided securlty periods. 80- 22 SEC/181 CO,..UMICATIOMS (Conr.) !'LASH f/EPO!lfS (c) HF and VHF rad10 direction finders be im med1ately installed throughout the !ieec err 38 c°""'er.ts and rec00t-..er.ds: in sufficient numbers to Insure at least !our in each task group. 1. The expeditious handling o! strike and flash reports may deter•1ne the success or !allure (d) The location and design or antennae be or an operation. studied to improve theu eff1c1ency. 2. At thls time presenc methods are not ade (e) At least two destroyers or each division quate or su!f1c1ent to take care or Clash reports be equlpped with aircraft hom1ng sets. along with other vital trarr1c. (fl Aircraft carrier s1gnal bridges and signal 3. The present •ethOd is to have each carrier llalyards be redesigned !or better operations. report to tne TOC by visual, whereupon the TOC reports to the TFC by TBS-2, an MCI\ c1rcu1t. This (g) All shlps be equipped with NAN sets and bas resulted in !air success as long as groups their allowance or receivers be rncreased. stay 10 position and TGC's keep their v1sua1 chan Also chat the yardarm sets be installed nels available for the carr1ers or their groups. lHed ta te ly. However, the syste• lS st1ll not fast enough, pri •ar1ly because or the !a1lure or the visual ra (h) Tenders 1n the forward areas be equipped cil lt1es. with automatic relaying systems, so that they can relay the FOX schedules. 4. It ts recommended that a slular system to thac recommended for the 'IB.5-1 above be instigated, (1) Sufficient sets or VHF be furnished each using MCI\, i.e., each TG would have a circuit for ship to allow two task group frequencies its TGC's use and another circuit which would be and two force co•mon frequencies to re co••on to the •hole force but generally restricted place the present TB.5 systems, and that to the use or the TGC and TFC. one system be MCW operated. GK/IKllAL IDK~fil'IeAflO/I OP f/ELATIVKLl OBSCO!IK ISLA/IDS CTI' 38 co...ents and <"ecOll112nds: era 38. 2 c""'"ents and recoone71ds: 1. The field or co•mun1cat1ons races increased Many instances 1n the past have been noted in proble•s as the Pac!! Jc Fleet bu I lds up In size which enemy units or activities have been 1denti and scope or operations. Radio com1unicat1ons r1ed in despatches by the name or a relatively suffer from insur!icient operators, technicians obscure island, cape, town or city. In view of and equipment, notably antennae and direction the large numbers ot names used in present opera !1nders. V1sua1 coHunlcations, hampered by car tions, or the different names used on charts and rier Island construction, have been l•proved by maps held by reporting units and or the ever Installation o! NAN equip•ent and would bene!1t present possibility or garbles it is reco••ended further by 1nstallatlon or the British all-round that lt be made standard practice !or all services v1sual l1ght. Intercepts need bolstering by sucb to give the latJtude and longitude or all place 11provements as rebroadcasting facilities strate names not in common usage when including them in gically placed, errectlve assignment or frequen despatches. Obviously this should not apply where cies, and l••edlately available repair and mainte code words ror localities or places are used. nance facilities afloat. TBS, which lacks range for the present size or the fleet, should be sup I/l'!Kfll'KllKKeK planted by VHF equipment. Expediting or Flash Reports must be made possible. erG 38 .1 COll..ents and recQJmends: 2. rt is reco•mended that: I. During strikes at FORMOSA, LUZ.CW and on the Cl!INA COAST there was practically a complete Ca? The co•plement or co11un1catlon personnel, break-down in air-to-ship co•1un1cation on 4475 both operators and technicians, be increased. kcs., the Task Force 38 s tr Ike and l i!eguard fre quency. This was caused by high-powered stations (bl The allowance ot receivers and transmitters in the LUZON-MINDORO area using this frequency !or be increased on every ship. local administrative traffic. Transmissions ot 80- 23 S•CREr COMMUN I CATIONS (Co11r . ) this nature were heard by our planes while over have been caused. The add1t1onal circuits herein SAJGCX>I which completely blocked out inter-plane recommended would obviate such occurrences •hich traffic as well as blocking the channel for re happen 1n spite or all the emphasis placed on ports from the target to the Task Group and Tusk circuit discipline. Force Commander. Reception ot rescue transm1s s1ons was d1f!tcult to t~poss1bJe. 7. It ts aga 10 recommended that !u tu re plans include an increase tn VHF frequencies available 2. These transmissions, apparently made at full for surface ship maneuvertng suf!1c1ent to allow power, ranged from directing seaplanes to tle up a chatn or command assignment along the lines or to certarn buoys to, ln one case, "urgent" mes our present medium frequency plans. This has sages regarding the loading or several hundred been round to be necessary !rom long experience. cases or beer. These do not seem proper uses for No c1rcu1t can be operated err1c1ently with too a tactical circuit. In any case consideration many stations althougJl we are trying to do this certainly should be given to power used, 1! such WI th TB.S. an Important frequency or another fleet in the genera 1 area is to be useel for any purpose. 8. It 1s recommended that during daylight the Task Groups on either side or the center or guide 3. 4475 is a good aircraft frequency and, re Tusk Group tn Force formations use more visual stricted to tactical use and lifeguard, should be signals while gu1de group uses TBS to keep others adequate. As it is, however, after the morning o! tn!ormed or movements. To aid station keeping 12 January when Interference reached a peak this the gulde can allow 1ore time between his signal Task Group was having at least one bomber or tor and the execution. pedo plane ID each stnke briefed to duplicate all target reports on 6740 kcs. C1i' 38 C0111111ents and r-econmends: 4. In add1t1on, to obtain early full 1n!oraa 1. The U. s. NAVY Is now operating only a !ew tlon as to conditions 10 the target area, on two hunelred ules rrom Japanese home territory. Fre occasions two SB2C's with well trained radiomen quencies used by the Japanese stations Jn some accompanied the fHst fighter sweep 1n to the tar cases are the same as our own and since the power get area. They transmitted all reports, both their used by shore stations ts much greater, they block own and those Crom other aircraft on 6740 and 3065 out frequencies. For example, 6420 kcs used by us Both voice and MCW were used, and the reports got for search and attack is also used by several Jap through. anese shore stations rendering it useless to us. It bas been noted that the 6000 kcs band IS very 5. It ts recommended that each ship or each popular with the Japanese and we should therefore Task Group be provided "1th a WE 233A set, and sh1!t to another, prererably the 3000 kcs band. each Task Group be asslgned a Task Group frequency. This set would handle a great deal or the admln1s 2. At present most of our earner au pO'l'er ls trat1ve tra!!1c which, despite ~1rect1ves and the composed or righters, wh1cb can only use one btgh best will 10 the world, cannot help getting onto or medium frequency on one !light and cannot shift primary TE5. When the situation 1s cr1t1cal, to another ID the al r. It is recommended that the even tmponant tactical signals are delayed and 11!eguard and search frequencies be the same, and interfered with by ID Task Groups close proxta1ty that this frequency, ID turn, be 1ade the same as try1ng to get orders relayed and having to 'alt the force warning frequency, so that all stations their turn to get a tactical signal out. There will be or greater assistance both in rendering should be a large stock or WE 233A sets available, rescue and tn relaying vital Information. This and their range is ample !or traffic within a "ould also afford a greater chance or receiving a Task Group. Ten crystals are available with pres very weak contact report. ent sets and should allow a11ocat1on In addition to the frequencies now used. 3. The present Cast pace of the war demands that all ships remain tn the forward and combat 6. On at least two separate occasions, first area !or long periods of t11e without rece1v1ng when entering the China Sea through BABASHJ Chan any overhaul or yard assistance. There are many nel and again when leaving through BALINTANG small details or ma rntenance and repair which can Channel, the TBS prtmary circuit was made useless be done only by expert techn1c1ans not no~ avail for tactical purposes by one Task Group putting able a!loat. re ts recouended that each forward its air schedule for the fnllowtng day on that base be supplied with expert radio and radar tech circuJt. Tills was a most crttlcal pertod on each nicians to render advice and service when fleet or these two days and serious dlfftculty could unHs are ID port. f)Jrtheuore, tt "Would be a 80-24 SECl?ET COHHUH ICATI OHS " r,c. J very valuable asset to have one expert on some rorce. rr D/F had been available to coordinate ship at sea available ror transfer to any ship with other act1v1t1es, valuable 1ntor1ation as well needing IU1ed1ate assistance or advice. as greater protection or the Force would have re sulted. It is recommended that HF and VHF d1rec 4. Ill th the recent increase and need for RC\! t1on tinders be installed immediately on all act1v1tles it is recommended that each carrier classes or ships in sufttctent quantity to task group Insure starr have a fully qualified RCM orct each Tas,k Group at least !our stations. cer "ho has attended It is one or the schools. He should real 1zed that the accuracy may be reduced on some have ~Ith him a unit of enlisted personnel to op types or ships but an accuracy w1th1n 30 degrees erate the equipment so that the maximum value can would be surrtc1ent 1n many cases - and at any be obtained. This unit should be add1t1onal to rate 1s better than no Indication or d1rect1on at the officer and aen assigned to and trained on all. board the ind1v1dual sh1ps. The units assigned to the flag would be for planning of operations 4. The r~cent 1nstallat1on o! YE/YG equipment and control or fleet units when use of RCM 1s con on rive destroyers has proved of inestimable value. templated. It afforded the Task Force greater protection 10 the kno~ledge that planes which did not rendezvous RADIO around these destroyers were likely to be enemies and therefore required inves Ligation. The s ta t1on- 1ng or these YG equipped destroyers as pickets at ranges or 50 miles trom the torce has permitted 1. Radio reception In the SJUTI' O!I~A SEA time ror 1nte rception. It has also helped save proved to be very unre Uab le at t111es. Whole mes lli3.ny planes lost and out or range or the Task Force sages on the NPM Juap Schedule, and even a few on homrng equipment. It 1s recommended that every Primary Schedule, were missed when NPM faded out destroyer division have at least two ships equipped on every frequency. For tuna tely, all opera t1onal Wlth houng sets, either tbe YG/YE or later models. traffic for 'llfIRD Fleet was routed via Primary The YE 1s considered the best because or 1ts gyro after 9 January; and Radio GUAM, which monitored feature which keeps the sector letters property the schedule, requested reruns fro1 Radio Hel'IOLULU oriented. when the latter faded out. S!fCURITY 2. Many messages on the NPM schedules are duu1es. It 1s belleved that the work or coding COllC~uDiv 13 (C~U 38.3.3) COl!l"lents and ~ec0111~ends: boards would be substantially reduced 1f such messages carr1ed dummy ind lea tors, as prov lded l n Ir a 11 users or T!l.S and VHF clrcu Its would the CSP 1465/68 series. as sume that the enemy Is hearing them, It 1s hard to believe that there would not be a radical change Cff 38 C.,....ents and 1'eCa."211dS: in the 1ater1al that goes out. The land areas now under invasion are hilly and tntercept1ng Sta I. As the Paci r Jc Pleet and its Task Forces tions on the h1 Us must be assumed to be picking Increases in size, more radio circuits are neces up our traffic at 100 miles or more dependent sary to handle couuntcat1ons upon erc1c1ently, l'htch atmospheric condtt10ns. lie kno" the Japanese requires an Increase in equipment have and 1n personnel, heard traffic on both these circuits 10 the past. both operators and techn1c1ans. Unless the com lie should assume that our traffic can be rnter plement of personnel and equipment 1s Increased cepted when we are close enough to land to make a the s1tuatlon will be cr1t1cal and endanger the s tnke. successful operation or the fleet. The following suggestions are ottered: 2. The trends or design or new construction have greatly reduced the err1ciency or the antennae (I) Strictly mon1lor the clrcu1ts, taking ap tor both rece 1 ving and trans11 tt ing. It 1s recoa propriate action when security 1s violated. aended that spreaders or special yardarms be placed (2) In the case of ships, write out messages at the highest possible point on the ships' super before transmittal. 'Ill1s ls required by structures to allow clear antennae leads. (The C10CPac order, except rn the case of ur design on Japanese warship~ seems exemplary). gent tactical signals. (3) Do not send by voice (use secondary coded 3. Lack or proper radio direction finders fre TBS or visual) any messages which do not quently has prevented the destruction or eneay require action w1th1n a spec1r1c time: snoopers and thus Jeopardized the security or the suggest three hours. 80- 25 SECR!ff CC>lt!UNICATIONS lCont.) commanders and task rorce commanders, but available ror a force common when needed. 'Ibis would allo• (4) Include in ihe shackle code common expres the TFC to put out Information to the TGC's and sions such as course and speed; distance; also allow the TGC to rurther disseminate the altitude; fuel and fueling; gasoline; black orders to thetr groups si~ultaneously, without any 011 and diesel oil; tYPes or planes; types interference between task groups. This sa1e sys or ships; etc. tem was introduced by CTF 38 on the MAN c1rcu1t (5) 'lbe present code names tor the Task Force, ror FIX> 1nror1at1on and has worked perfectly since. Groups, and Units and their Commanders have been In errect a Jong time and undoubtedly TRA!'f!C VOLUNE are known by the enemy. (6) It Is realized that some or the above sug CfG 38 . 2 C0011 All transmissions over TBS should be enunciated clearly and deliberately. Except Ln an emergency, COMPOSITION OF TASK GROUPS tactical transmissions should be repeated after a short 1nterva1 before the execute ls made. In case Crf 38 coaents and ,.-ec00t'lends: or an emergency transm1ss1on It should be repeated for lnfonatlon as hav 1ng been executed; for ex The maximua number or carriers that can be ample, "Quaker to Beaver am executing emergency operated tn each Task Group IS necessary so that Lum --- out•. a limited number of other ships aay be d1v1ded among as rew groups as possible. Eighteen de CTf 38 coaraents and 1'eca-ends: stroyers should be in a group screen. The compo sition of a night group should be s11llar to a I. 'lbe growth or the fleet has been responsible day group. 'Ibis group 1ust operate in the force for the failure or part or Its comaun1cat1on disposition during daylight and independently at system: 'IB.S. night. Recent Task Force experience is suama- r ized be low: 2. TI1P best range that can be depended on for TBS Is twelve to fifteen miles. \llhen task groups J. The prospective s tze or the Fast carr ler separate by more than twelve miles, linking ves Task Force in the Pac1r1c makes it desireable to sels are necessary. When messages are sent and consider the composition or task groups. With the linking vessel relays, this seriously slows any given number or carriers, battleships. cruis down the ctrcu1t because it Interferes with the ers and destroyers there must be a best method of task groups at the center or those within range distribution. 'lbe maximum protection !or the or the linking vessel. Similarly, when task carriers consistent with free space ror ur groups are In position, the ones farthest apart operations seems to be the best basis for distri cannot hear.each other while tbe center ones can bution or forces. hear both the outside groups. Wh en the vessels or the outside groups transmit simultaneously, 2. 'lbe larger the nuaber of carriers In a since they cannot hear each other, they block out group which •111 still permit the easy operation each other !or the center groups, which causes de or their aircraft the smaller the number of groups lay and confusion. which will be needed to be rormed. At one t11e three large carriers and two I !ght carriers oper 3. lt is recommended !1 rs tly, that TBS be re ated e!!1ciently 10 one group. From this experi placed by VHF equipment capable or transmitting ence It 1s felt that rour C'l's could easily oper over longer ranges; and secondly, that each task ate together and that four C'l's and l CVL could so group have a VHF rrequency diCferent Crom that or operate. It 11ght be well worth while to test the any other group. Each ship tn the !orce should practicability of operating rive C'l's in a group. have another set with a common rrequency which There is reason to believe that this Is feasible. would normally be used only between task group 80-26 SECl?Ki' COMPOSITION OF Tl.SK GROUPS 'Cant.) carriers equally spaced on circle 2.5, cruisers and battleships 3. In order to give maxau11 equally spaced on ctrcle 3.5, on anti-aircraft pro mid-bearings between carriers, tection to the carriers It ls believed that battle destroyers on circle 7; 5VB ships and cruisers 1n a group should be one more - as above, except that carriers moved 1n to circle 2, and than the nu•ber or carriers. 'Ibis •111 peraut cruisers and battle one ships to circle ship with heavy AA batteries to be 1n the center 2.5. or the formation wtth clear arc or r1re for high 2. These dispositions were destgned to give angled targets 1n any direction and, 1nc1dentally, maximum antt-a1rcrart protection ror carriers to act as a highly v1s1ble guide, The re~a1ning against surprise suicide dive-bomber tactics. Al heavy ships should be equally spaced between the though no opportunity was presented to test the carriers, either on tbe same circle or 500 yards effectiveness or these d1spos 1 ttons, 1 t is be lleved outside the carrier circle. In this position their that this type or close-in ftre support Will pro arcs or r1re have the •axtmum width. vide a partial answer to the difficult problem or defense against suicide attacks. 4. That there can neve'r be enough destroyers ls being constantly eaphas1zed. In a formation CONBatDi v 8 CO!!!~ ents and reco.,,.ends : based on !our or rive CV's and !Ive or six heavy supporting ships at least 18 DD's should be con l. Formation 5 Victor Baker was generally used stantly in the screen. The many demands !or de by TG 38.l with carriers on 2000 yard ctrcle stroyers ror picket and and Toi cat duties, for rrans- heavy escorts on the 2500 yard circle. This 111ss10n pro or urgent mail and for the rescue of vides a formation that gives each carrier downed two pilots creates a necessity for an excess powerful anti-aircraft batteries to augment over her the 18 considered essential at all times. To own against suicide planes and dive bombers; take at care or these extra act1v1t1es an add1t1onal the same time it gives heavy ships the opportunity destroyers are considered desirable. to maneuver Independently against attacking tor pedo planes or submarines. 5. The introduction or a group or carriers ror night operations only creates a new problem as to 2. Owing to the h1gh speed at which vessels •here 1 t should operate in the day tue. Obviously maneuver at night and the danger or collision that lt •ust be given the protection o! the daytime CAP 11.ay develop with extre•e rapidity in case a TBS and therefore must be within easy supporting dis maneuvering signal is missed by one or the heavy tance. Yet it must be clear or the day operating ships (as apparently occurred twice in TG 38.1), groups. Dur rng recent operations or the ENIBR It is deemed desirable to assu•e rormatton 5 Roger PRISE and INDEPDIDEl\CE they operated within the or 5 Victor Charlie during hours or darkness.) screen or a day group during the daytime and in dependently upwind or that group after dark, pro tected, or course, by a destroyer screen. This was not entirely satisfactory, however, due to EHEHY AIR ATTACK Of 21 JANUARY 19115 the many delays incident to pre-dawn heckling mis (Also see 'SUICIDE BOHBER•l sions and strikes. At tl•es the two groups did not aerge until nearly noon. ()} such occasions the AA protection which could be furnished by the destroyer screen was inadequate although CAP pro 1. It is believed that all enemy planes seen tection was always available. by ships or the formation were tracked in by the radars or at least one ship, and that surr1c1ent 6. As a result it is believed that a night data was avail~ble on voice channels ror all ships group should be formed Including all night car to follow the• In to about twelve 111les. At this riers and the sa11e surface protection that is pro point radar Indications or all planes became 1n vided ror other groups. 'Ibis group must operate d1stlngu1shable in the QVercrov.ded center portions tn the task force disposition during daylight and or the scopes. It is believed that all ot these as near thereto as practicable during darkness. planes ca1e tn two groups as rolio•s · (a) Group (A) or three planes attacked at 1207 and was co1pr1sed or a tighter who bo1bed the CRUISING DI SPOSITIOHS I.ANGLEY, a suicide plane which crashed the (See ftlso VICTOR FORMATIONS) TICONDfllOGA, and a scout plane which returned to base and reported results (•hose presence Coac~uD • ~ 10 cor.~ents : Is suspected beca.use the next day's ene1y propoganda broad:ast claimed a total or three 1. Co11ander '!'ask Group 38.1 extenstvely e•• carriers and one unidentified type damaged). ployed crulstng dtsposition 5VA, which placed the This group was tracked from 32 In to 13 miles. 80- 27 SKCRKf EHEMY AIR ATIACK OF 2l JANUARY l9~5 (Cont.} (b) Group (B) or at least seven planes. which interval no doubt noticed that the nearest included one shot down by ship's gunfire at large carrier was not turning with the rest 1250, one that crashed the TICCi'lDEROGA at but remained broadside to them. Both planes 1255, a plane that was tracked goJng out and re-entered the clouds, rrom which a moment which Look home its report, and others that later one eme rged and crashed the TICONDEROGA. were shot down by the CAP. Th is group was These attacks tend to indicate a doctrine or picked up at 75 miles and two elements v.·ere attacking from the rear, at least under the tracked in to 12 miles. cloud conditions that prevailed. 2. All enemy pla'l'les approached trow the same 5. The actual attacks were as follows: bearing and at the same time as groups or our re turning slrike planes. (a) The Cirst , at 1207, was a co-ordinated attack by a r1ghter· and a larger plane. Both 3. No unusual early approach tactics were emerged Crom the same cloud in the after pare noted, and possibly the enemy thought none were or the formation nearly over the FLI~T. the required because or the clouds. Group (Al came fighter followed in less than a minute by the 1n at high speed (250 knots) and without an larger g1ane. The righter dived from astern rnstant 's pause carried out lls attack. Group in a 30 glide on the LANGLEY, the nearest (B) was intercepted by the CAP at 42 miles, and carrier, pulled out at 400 feet and dropped its remnants made direct approaches at slower two small bombs. He may have intended to cli mb speeds. back in the clouds ahead while drawing all fire and attention. The second plane followed in a 4. The approach from twenty miles to the tip 15° glide and crashed the TICONDEROGA, who was over point 1s more noteworthy. ahead or the LANGLEY, also rrom astern. He re the performance or our Jacks (single planes or (a) Group (A) held a collision bearing from the combat air patrol, controlled visually by 25 ln to 18 miles or less, suggesting radar designated ships) was excellent. They had tracking. At about this point lt may have been alerted. Jack number 4, on the port bow sighted the formation and may have seen that it or the formation, must have seen the tighter was approaching on the formation's port bow,. break from the clouds. He was too far away to for it changed course and circled to the rear inter cept before the bombs were released, so or the formation, from which the attack was he dived !or a point of interception well made. ahead of the LANGLEY. 1be enemy righter must have seen him as he passed t he LANGLEY 's flight (b) One remnant or Group (B), the plane shot deck, for be thr ew himself into a sharp climb down at 1247, round itself twelve miles on the ing turn to the right, crossed ahead of the starboard bow of the formation and on a course WASH INGI'ON and made off on the starboard beam that would cross ahead. It is suggested that at high speed, the Jack on his tail JUSt out of it then turned to circle to the rear or the range. He flew full in the path of Jack number formation and dropped under the cloud base 2, who had swooped down from astern of the three minutes later to get 1ts bearings. Un formation and who shot him down with a s ingle !ortuna tely !or the enemy, the formation had short burst. at that instant completed an emergency turn nine, and the plane emerged directly ahead or (b) The second attack is believed to have the heavy ships on a course. to cross their been made by a single plane that became sepa bows and was promptly shot down. rated when the CAP descended upon Group (B) at about 40 miles, and who f inding himself alone, (c) The other remnant or Group (Bl. consist came on in to attempt a solitary attack. He ing or one suicide plane and a scout, lost blundered through the clouds directly over the about rive minutes evading our righters . They screen ahead of the NOR'Ill CAROLINA, and held a r1nally dropped below the clouds 4,000 yards straight course in substantially level flight ahead or the screen, while the formation was at 160 knots, JUSt long enough for the ships executing another emergency turn nine. It is in that vicinity to shoot him down. It appeared suggested that they also intended to attack from this flagship that the hi t was made by from the rear, but had first to wait for the 5"/38, Mark 18 ruses, and that the very short formation to steady on a course. The two run was rate-controlled on ln excellent !ashton, planes were seen to complete !our or rive or requiring only about three shots. bits just below the cloud base, and in this 80- 28 J SECRET EIH11Y AIR ATTACK OF 2t JANUARY t9ll5 Cont. } (c) Just beCore the thud attack two enemy (c) Attention was diverted from the second planes ~ere seen to orbit about 4,000 yards plane to crash the TICONDEROGA by a crippled friend outside the screen slightly on the starboard ly plane that was trying to make a water landing bo• or the formation as it steadied on the ne~ ahead or the TICc:tlDEROGA's screening destroyers. course. 1lle planes re-entered the clouds, and 1ll1s plane actually crossed the optics or the while above them one plane crossed to port to WASJHNGI'a'ol's director JUSt as the 5"/38 battery a position on the beam or the already damaged opened r1re; and the radar range operator TICONDEROGA. uncon From his orbit he may have thought sciously sh1!ted to it, spoiling the run. the smoke to have cose from her runnel, and may have singled her out because or her size and (d) The Tomcats (single destroyers position. statloned He could not attack rro11 astern about fl!ty 11les fro• the Task Force •lthout over which expos1ng h111se!C to the !ull broadsides returning strikes orbit prior to approaching or several heavy ships. own He came through the ships) apparently are not completely e!!ect1ve clouds over the screen in an eleven degree where th1s cype of cloud prevails . Il seems as glide which he corrected to fourteen degrees in though the strikes return below the clouds and the the last thousand yards. bog1es 1n or above them. 6. 1lle following points are noted: (e) Emergency turns have value in confusing the attack. (a) In both suicide attacks and in the •ast• head bo1b1ng attack ships' gunfire appears to (!)Both crash attacks were shallow glides at have been loerrective. Comparatively rew guns 100 - 150. were rued. Ad11ttedly, conditions 'lere d1r f1cult because or: (g) success or A.A. fire in these attacks was dependent upon visual lookouts and the rapid co (1) Eight-tenths broken cu•ulous clouds at ordination or the battery with them. 4,000-5,000 feet. (2) The presence or a hundred friendly planes above and about the rormat1on, VISUAL LOOKOUTS MUST BE ALERT AT ALL TIMES some damaged and short or ruel. (3) 1lle 5"/38 batteries or the two battle ships. the nearest heavy ships, could (h) Sufficient Mark 18 ruses must be !ired to not fire 1n the r1rst attack because designate to other ships and to automatic weapons fueling gear and destroyers alongside the poslt1on or the enemy planes. on each side blocked the mounts. (4) The very sbort elapsed time the planes (I) After the rust attack, the rnendly were or In sight; perhaps 20 seconds !or enemy identity or a plane was frequently the masthead determined bombing run, and a minute by the absence or presence or menacing tactics. for each or the crash planes. Friend and toe alike were taken under fire (5) The successful 1r they diversion employed by emerged !ro• the clouds over the formation the enemy in ·a in the rirst attack. glide or dive. Two enemy planes that orbited (6) Most auto•at1c weapons could only be peacefully outside the formation were not taken used !or the briefest or Intervals be under !ire. cause the ene1y planes all emerged rrom the clouds inside the formation and the Lessons Learned, Conclusions and Reco~11Endations: range •as fouled by ships. Most 2011 guns were outranged. The automatic (a) More errectlve radar coverage must be •eapons ob tn a position to be 1ost er tained farther rrom the force and 1n1t1al inter !ect1ve were those or the ships attacked. ceptions must be made sooner. (bl In the first attack the batteries did (b) Still greater restrictions must not receive a resounding be placed alert rro• the radar. on the moveients or friendly planes in the v1ctn1ty Apparently everyone thought this was a friendly or own forces and In the radar coverage area. plane with no I.F.F. The In word was received and order not to confuse radar operators and to keep In some cases put out to the guns that the bogie the air over the force as clear as possible for AA •as probably a damaged friendly plane returning fire. This 11111 help to prevent !iring on friendly wtih the strike. rt see1ed to be bnly a single planes. plane, one or \hose which have been the cause or •any false alarms that are perhaps necessarily (c) More errective means must be employed to sounded each strike day. detect bogles that come in with friendly planes. 80- 29 S&CREr ENEHY AIR ATTACK OF 21. JANUARY t9~5 (Cont.) or pilot study are irrevocably lost. The necessary equipment ls avallable. It re•atns for coHandrng (d) 5"/38 batteries must bring enemy planes o!flcers to enforce gun camera documentation or the under fire at aboul 12,000 yards, by radar or documentation or the most colorful part or the war otherwise. history w111 be gone forever. (e) All ships must doggedly track every bog1e 2. 'Ibe potential value or assessing by gun that appears on their screen; and also those bog1es .camera photography the damage 1n!licted on the reported by voice rad 10 by other shtps. Every bo enemy has to a great extent been neglected. Tile g le must be considered enemy until proven rr1end1y, gun camera program in the Fleet continues to oper and must be tracked and plotted by every ship the ate at a level distressingly below its expected er entire way ln, nulls, fades and Interference not- rec uveness. In an err on to de terune the causes " 1ths tanding. or, and remedy for, the ra11ure or th1s program, CTl'-38 on 2 December 1944 called a conference a (fl Returning strikes should be so covered by board the flagship or all carrier and air group friendly a1rcrafl that it would be impossible for photographic officers or cvs and CVLs then ln the enemy planes to trail these strikes home. port or ULI'Illl. It was generally agreed tba t the poor results in gun camera photography are the (g) IFF equipment must be provided for fire product or the following conditions: control radars at the earliest possible time. (a) Priority: Tile processing or gun camera f11• is last on the list or precedence in the ship's photolabs because few orr1cers have FLEET LOGISTIC SUPPORT ever seen Its possibilities demonstrated to advantage. Th1s attitude is generally shared COtlTHIRDPLeet c0ta11ents: by the photographic orr1cers, who erroneously consider gun camera film of little i~ A fleet ls only as strong as its logistic sup portance in relation to the •an-hours in port. ()Jrs bas been excellent; dHClcult problems, volved In 1alnta1ning the cameras and proc ar1s1ng unexpectedly, have been solved with re e~s1ng the fllm. Thus, with very few ex sourcefulness and dispatch. Repair and replacement ceptions, exposed gun ca1era !11• ls not rac111 ties must be kept as rar advanced in the developed for several days and somettaes theater or operations as possible; ULI'Il!I, in spite weeks. By then 1t is practically useless or its aany ll1itatlons, proved invaluable because for intelligence purposes, or ror tra.1n1ng or its advanced location. (slnce pilots have dtr!lculty remembering the exact conditions under which the !llm was exposed), and is proJec ted only for the FU ELI NG DESTROYERS personal sattsract1on or the pilots who shot down enemy planes. In the case or some CTG 38.2 rec0111~ends: ships, apathy toward this phase o! photo graphy has reached the peint where gun Jn order that all destroyers may be fueled as cameras are seldom loaded with film and near capacity as possible at all times,' it is rec- maintenance or the cameras has fallen to a 011ended t.hat "topping off" or destroyers having low ebb. soi or less on board be conducted as a routine operation during the long interval ro11ow1ng the (bl Co-ordination: Prior to the aforementioned first morning launch. In this manner l t should be conference, no apparent atte11pt had been possible to fuel one ha!! the task group screen on made to co-ordinate this program. Outside any day such operations are perforaed. the photoiabs, little knowledge exists or the capabilities and llattatlons or gun cameras, and no direct demand bad been 1ade GUN CAMERA PHOTOGRAPHY ror iaproved quality and service. OTP 38 c0tt11ents and recOt11,.ends: (c) Standardization: Letters on the subJect of gun cameras have been received Crom Co1Air 1. Gun camera photography continues to be the Pac. and 8.IAer, as well as ·representatives stepchlld or the Pleet photography activity, a from those commands and rroa Public Rela situation caused by lack .or recognition or Hs tions. Although each may envision a sep rundamen ta! importance. Gun camera photography ls arate purpose for gun ca1era fill, all are the only possible documentation or aerial colbat. agreed on the urgent n~ed for better re Each encounter unrecorded is Jost forever, or Jert sults. Procedures In photo labs vary for inadequate verbal descrlpllon. and the benefits depending upon the individual ideas or the 80-30 SICREr GUN CAMERA PllOTOGRAPllY (Cont.) with aerial reconnaissance photography. orr1cer 1n charge. Fila stock or several Add It tonal space can always be found aboard different types and eau1s1on speeds 1s ship when the need Ls urgent; 1n this being used; camera settings and shutter case 1t Is not even necessary that the speeds vary; each photolab has a different darkrooa be connected with the ship's photo aethod or processing. lab . Any s ma 11 space such as a single stateroo• which can be blacked out and flt (d) Suf>f)Ly: 1b1s problea 1s now being given ted with runntng water and power outlets full attention by a Co11A1rPac representa will serve the purpose. Two men, trained tive, who is atteapttng to proVlde all in 16 ma processing, ln add1t1on to the carriers •1th the same type or film. photolab complement, can comfortably handle the laboratory work. R8CO.' (b) It 1s reconended that a standard film type. The Ship Damage Report was devised as an answer camera speed and lens setting should be to the contused situation and duplication or directed to obtain opt1111u1 exposure results. claims which invariably (esulted when a convoy or The lenses should all be set for bright sb1pp1ng concentration was attacked by the air sunlight unless It 1s known to be overcast craft or more than one air group. The excellent at the target. This should be standard photographs and geographical plots wltlcb were in procedure instead or adjusting haphazardly cluded with these reports enabled CTF 38 to make along the entire range o! settings 1n the a detailed and caretul analysts or the enemy ship hop~ that soae or the caaeras •ill get ping situation whlc~ bad been Impossible 1n the ships have their good pictures. Also, aany past. It ls appreciated that these reports 1a caaeras set at 64 frames per second to de posed an add1t1ona1 burden upon ship and squa~ron e!!ects. 1be cameras are crease vibration ACI of!1cers and upon Photo Interpretation O!!t that speed !or long, and not built to stand cers, but 1t is felt that the results accomplished there 1s a resulting high percentage or warranted the time and etrort involved. The work- rua JUS In the magazines; this speed uses Reports, • up !11• too fast, and usually results 1n 9anshtp and accuracy or the Shtp Damage !or speed in thetr prep underexposure. The aanutacturers recoaaend 1n spite or the necessity excellent, with particu 32 rraaes per second. The reduction 1n aration, were uniformly be accoapllsbed by a larly !lne results shown ln those sub11tted by the vibration should YORK'IDWN, HORNET, and CABOT. design change ln location and aounting. TAFIGlf DATA ANALYSIS (c) One additional darkroo1 ls required to !il• concurrently handle aotion picture During November and December a representative 80-31 SECRET INTELLIGENCE ~en;.) HIGHT Fl GHTERS from the Target Analysis D1v1s1on of CINCPOA was CTG 38.2 co~nts and reC01lMnds: attached to the Staff of CTF-38. This officer was aboard the USS HANO:>O< during operations a I. Events or recent months tend to establish gainst LUZON 1n support or the MINDORO landings two things as regards employment of night fighters: froc 14 December through 16 December 1944. By observations made during the strikes, and by In (a) Their potential1t1es as an o!tens1ve weap terviews with ship and task group Air Combat on are JUst beginning to be realized and lntell1gence and Operations Ot!1cers after the made use or. force had returned to UL11lfl, he was able to eval uate and analyze the mass of intelligence ma (b) Their use as a defensive weapon has been terial which Is d1str1buted to the fleet from and 1s being overemphasized, which has and Pearl Barbor. His critlctsms and suggestions are is resulting tn their misuse in that capac included 1n a spec Jal report which was forwarded ity. under separate cover to CINCPOA via CTF-38. It ls felt that attempts to more closely coordinate 2. The first point is Illustrated by the suc intelligence material being prepared 1n rear cess or night righters as hecklers, intruders, and areas with the needs of combat units will result to a lesser extent bombers during the whole 1n rurther Improvement to the excellent data now PHILIPPI~E campaign, principally in LUZ.oN and being provided for the Fleet. FORMOSA. Probably one or their biggest contri butions has been one which cannot be measured, namely the loss or sleep surrered by the defend JAPAN ESE DEFENSE ers. A tired enemy 1s not an effective enemy, 3. Probably the basic reason for the second point 1s the 1llus1on entertained by many that 'Ille Japanese have based their defense or small because there are night righters 1n the alr the islands on a perimeter (beach) defense ,plan; this force IS well protected, and the companion fal same type or planning has colored and influenced lacy that the more night righters there are air the entire defense or the JAPANESE EMPIRE. Once borne, the greater the protection. the outer shell is smashed, only 1ndec1sion and fatal weaknesses are round - LEYTE and the CHINA 4. That this conception is a mistake 1s eastly COAST are pointed examples. Boldness in planning seen ~hen 11m1tat1ons or present radar equ1p•ent and 1n execution are the weapons to destroy the are seriously considered. At the present time JAPANESE EMPIRE expeditiously. there 1s no shipboard equipment available whlch will allow the et!ectlve control of any large number or night righters. Even in the case or controlling single planes the SM is often In HINES adequate because it cannot give the fine altitude readings sometimes necessary nor can it give the1 C1'G 38.2 co=ents: at the long range which often results because or a long chase. Finally, 1t is seriously doubted 1. Dur,tng recent operations orr the East coast that any determined night attack or any size could or FORMOSA and while passing through BALINTANG be broken up by night righters, principally be CllANNEI.. many mines were reported by ships of this cause or the ll1ltat1ons given above. Task Group. A number were exploded by rifle !1re rro• destroyers. One of these described the mine 5. This 1s not to say that the defensive as as small and spherical, weighing about 275 lbs. pect or night fighters should be disregarded. These are evidently floating mines released by the Rather lt 1s to say that their defensive 1111ta enemy In waters which he does not plan to use and t1ons should be recognized •hen assigntng them which he believes will be used by our forces. their role 1n force protection. 2. Due to the constant maneuvering or this 6. At the.present time gunnery ls the best Task Force during air operations there is an ex weapon against night attacks or any more than cellent chance that these mines will be detonated single planes. For that reason, principal re by one of the ships 1! they have been released liance should be placed on it and conditions made near the operating area. The use o! mines by the as favorable as possible !or Its use. enemy will probably increase ln the future and provisions tor sweeping any area ln which opera tions are lo be conducted may be necessary. 80- 32 SilCl?Ef NI GUT fl GllTERS : Cor. r.) 7. To achieve tne 1axl11wn advantages or both plane caught !ire and crashed approximately 8000 n lght fighters and gunnery, 1 t is reco11ended yards on the port quarter. that the follonng 1od1ficat1ons be made in tile use or nlgllt righters for defensive purposes: 2. Fire d1sc1pline was excellent. Firing was checked tn the middle or the run until the target (a) Eliminate the Dusk Jacks. cleared the bearing or a screen destroyer. (b) Launch the night CAP earlier and to act as a regular CAP until dark, staying Joined up 01111 PLAN E.S SHOT 00~ over base at a low altitude. After dark take station at least 30 11les rro• the CT{; 38,] C01''1~"ts: task rorce as is no• done. During the enemy air attack on Task Group 38.3, (c) LUH tile night CAP to a max1mu1 of !our two rescue Kingr1shers launched by the BALTIMOR::' planes for the rorce. insisted on !lytng directly into that Task Group despite repeated warning !rom their fighter es 8. The 1od1f1cat1ons would afford the ro11ow- cort to stay clear. AS a result, the two King 1ng advantages ror defense or the task force: f1sllers were fired on by ships or Task Group 38.3 and were attacked and tired on by one or the CAP (a) The gunnery of!lcers or the ships would planes wnich intercepted the flight. Both King have a clearer concept or the sl tuatlon fishers made emergency forced landings and the lflth regard to friend or roe. personnel were recovered uninJured by the USS COLAHAN. (b) CIC's would have only a maximum or four planes at any tlae to keep track or, thus enabl10g •ore effective use or radars for defense and clearing the c1rcu1ts or the PHOTOGRAPH unending trans11ss1ons associated with I C COVERAGE keeping track or many night righters. Cf'G 38. J CO•n•ents and rec°"'!llBnds: (c) '!be righters would be in a good pos1t1on for Interceptions - control would be com 1. ~blle pbotographi~ coverage for the opera plete which is not true or Dusk Jacks as tion, considering the weather, was 1n general good. the they are rorced to move in to keep screen need for stressing photographic flight d1sci Jn sight as it gets darker and thus are pltne and the importance o! obtaining good photo lost in the sea return. graphic coverage aust continue. Inadequate cover age or areas required for tactical study frequent (d) A landing whtch comes at a critical period ly resulted from failure to fly assigned !light or the day !or night attacks would be lines and fro• !lying too lo•. The latter rau'lt e11111nated. also resulted tn inadequate overlap for stereo pairs. 9. AS equ1p1ent, tra1n1ng, and technique 1m prove1a greater role In task force defense will 2. It 1s believed that a •ore thorough in undoubtedly be assigned to the night fighter. At doctr1nat1on of photographic pilots In the rela the present time, however, lt ls or secondary tionship between altitude, focal length, inter Importance in 1eet1ng night attacks and must there volo1eter setting, overlap, and the area covered fore no- be allowed to interfere with the weapon by given exposure would result in better photo or prlaary 11portance, gunnery. graphic coverage. In this connection It ls recom- 1ended that photographic planes have an inter ORDHAMCE HHERI AL - PERFORMANCE Of volometer tor each vertical camera so proper setting could be maintained, and also that the ConCrul!iv 10 CO!!ne"ts: pilot be given some visual indication when a camera's !11• Is used up. The use or stereo 1. On the night or 21 January 1945 the BOSTCN pal rs In br le ting by all pilots and a !ul l real 1za alone t 1red on a low-!iy 1ng eneay twln-engtned tlon of the value or photographs to forces other plane comtng In rro1 as tern. 111 rounds or 5" /38 than those that are airborne should result in more AA Co11on and 78 rounds 40111 were expended. The Interest and better photographs by carrier pilots. 80- 33 SKCR~T PllOTOGRAPllY 6. Phot ographs on 21 January checked shi pping CTG 38. 2 C0111711P-11ts and reCOJllMnds: Jn the TAKAD - 10SHEN area and covered 15 airfields in Southern mle.lOSA. l. Photographs or 3-4 January were valuable in establlshlng HE!l'O as the main operational 7. Mapping coverage and dicing obliques were !teld or Southern rORMOSA, and Jn cstabllsh1ng also secured, completing assignment except !or TAINAN and Jts satellites as training flelds. part of second priority vertical coverage. Low rJ!teen or twenty-three known air!ieJds on South nanging clouds prevented taking all tbe secondary ern mHMOSA were photographed and two new strips vertical coverage, while camera failur e balked the were discovered. completion o! part or the oblique photography. 2. Photographs 5-6 January o! LU2DN covered 8. Photographic pilots contribute greatly fifteen or nineteen airfields assigned to the Task toward an exact understanding of targets and Group .incl udlng au In the 0.AhK HELD area and all damage and are to be commended for their work and but !our Jn northeast LUZON. Coverage showed the risks they take to sec"ure this very necessary little movement o! planes Jn 0.AhK HELi' Area and information. confirmed only 83 operational aircraft on CLARK fIU.D ilself. 9. Experience shows t hat photographic pilots do not turn In work of the standard which their 3. Photographs 9 January con!.irmed a total of equipment allows until they have had several LL6 ships in TAKAD and 10&-IIEN Harbors 1 nc luding months experience. A Jong er training period with 28 large and medium merchant ships and oilers, 5 more practice with all camera 1nstal lat ions might destroyers and 17 small escort vessels. K-18-24' ellmin~te many useless photographs and at the and K-17-24• obllque photographs proved their same time insure the taking of pictures when they worth Jn determining the total number or ships are needed most. and Jn Jdentlfying them, (both ln this Instance and in that or the southern-most convoy o!! the LO. Mapping coverage by carrier-based planes INOO-O!!NA Coast). In addition, 9 rormosan air is hampered by the small !Um capacity of the fields were covered to check aircraft present. present K-18 magazines available. Vertical photography was hampered by cloudy weather. 11. Standard instructions are needed for changl ng the San Diego mod1!1cati on camera mount 4. Excellent photographic coverage o! shipping to support a vertical K-17-24' camera in addition attacked off the coast o! INOO-OJINA confirmed to the split vertical mount. This suggested the sinking of 5 to 8 ships .In one convoy at modification would permit mapping coverage for ILO - LO' North and damage to 6 or 20 ships in which slightly tilted, spilt-vert ical photographs convoys in the vicinity or L40 - 20' North. Ex are not acceptable. cel lent photographs or the sinking o! a Katori class a, were obtained with K-20 cameras 1n 12. The K- 18-24• camer a mounted in the oblique bombers and f1Xed cameras Jn fighters. -position is useful for panoramas of harbors and shipping as well as to count and identify ships present in any harbor or convoy. 5. Photography o! FO~iOSA and PESCAIX>kES on 15 January was hampered by poor weather, but sink 13. The difticul ty or seeing t argets, pa rtic ing or a DD (Wakatake Class) and an s:: in the ularly aircraft, f r om the air because of pr esent PESCAOOHES was con!irmed. Photographs taken by Jap methods of dispersal and camouf lage indicates the YORK10V.N of OONG KONG Harbor on the VF sweep the necessity of securing pr e- strike photographs over the area were forwarded to other ships and i! at all possible so that pUot s may have a were o! great assistance in evaluating targets for definite target In mind before taking of!. assignment in the strikes that followed on 16 January. Excellent vertical and obllque photo graphs of the HONG KONG-KO\ILOON Area were obtained PffOTO INTERPRETATION by all carriers or Task Group 38. 2 on L6 January AA. in spite o! Jn tense This was the !lrst cover C1'f 38 COllllllents and rec°"'..ends: age or this a rea by carrier-based photographic planes. The photographs confirmed damage t o 7 l. Throughout TF 38 operat ions , t he quality ships and to ground installations. Coverage o! and quantity or photography has been excellent. four air!Jelds showed only KAI TAK at HONG KONG This has been especially true or t he photography operational. of tar get s, shipping a nd airfie l ds, and the one mapping mission attempted 1n t he NN' 80-34 SECRET PllOTO IN TERP RETA Tl ON (Cont. ) was 1ade or the six-pilot photo team assigned to also highly successful. As a •easure or the magni CTF 38. ~·our pllots !lying In line abreast in one tude o! present day carrier photography. approx pass photographed the YO!'ifAN Airfield area •h1ch lntel y 350 so rues were !lo•n !ro1 3 November 1944 would have been extre1ely hazardous to cover in to 25 January 1945 by t6f-P photo planes. Thousands any other way. As 1t possessed the greatest con or additional photos were taken with hand-held centration or AA ever seen 1n the Pac1!1c, the K- ~ • s and t-56 's by aircrenen tn bombers and usual method by which one plane makes four passes torpedo planes. probably would not have been possible. 2. Photo coverage or shipping at TAAAD. KEELUN..;, 6. It is recommended that 10'1: of al I F6f' s on l()NU KONG and INUO-OilNA, was o! such high quality each CV or CvL should carry trimetr1gon mounts and that al1ost every ship could be classified by the so be prepared to carry cameras 1r any photo JMST systea. An accurate estimate or tonnage planes are lost or 1! any special photo missions, present and tonnage sunk resulted. lly comparing such as that In the NANSEI SHOTO, are scheduled. the excellent coverages or T/¥.,IO taken on 9 January It ls also recommended that at least 10~ o! all and 2 l January It was possible to de ter111 ne that !tght~r pilots be given a two-week course In photo 1ost o! the shlps present were sunken hulks. Pic graphy similar to that at NAS, Barbers Point, be tures or 130 .000 m or undaaaged shipping taken at fore asslgn•ent t·o carriers. They would !Jy as KEil.UNG on 21 January revealed that lt had super photo pilots only •hen the regularly assigned photo ceded TAKAO as the most important port 1n FOh!.IOSA. pilots are insu!!ictent to accomplish the 11ss1on. or the 33 1erchant ships present and subsequently sunk or daaaged in the !our main convoys discovered 7. The present photo lab !aclllttes on CV's and on 12 January at CAPE PADARAN, QHNHON BAY, CAPE CVL's are ~enerally satisfactory except in three SC. JA~ES. and SAI 80-35 SKCRET REPO'?TING ENEJ.tY LOSSES ANO OA/1AGE personnel !ell overboard while this force was under night attack. At such a time It ls hazardous era 38 .J com111ents and recom"lends: !or a destroyer to stop and search !or the man in 1. Postponement of submission o C the daily op the water. It is also very di!!icult to !ind bl•. erational su111mary untU 1600 or the rtay ro11owinb It ls suggested that a standard type aviation two man ra!t be fitted with a battery and light with a the action reported did not altoeether per~it the desired basing or damage estlmates on photographs. device set to turn the light on on impact. SJch a Only Jn a very few instances did carrier summaries raft could be dropped over the side with a sea clte photographs as authority for damage reported. anchor near tbe position at which the survivor was Task uroup damage estimates were based to a some reported and could be recovered later in the night what greater degree upon photographic evidence due or during the next day. The survivor could swim to the receipt of airfield status and, more par- to the raft guided by the light. Some such device t 1cu larly, ship damage reports. Full bene! it was would be of assistance to destroyers in making not realized from the latter during the last opera night rescues. tion, because the reports were by no means as good as they were meant to be or should have been. 2. Pilot evidence of damace, as reported by some carriers, was entire!} too eeneral and vacue, SEPARATION OF TASK GROUPS IN TASK FORCE FORMATION •soo pound hit• or •strafing• appearing mono tonously, and a description o! what happened to era 38 .1 com111ents: the ship being notable, generally, because or its absence. Some or the plots of ship locations were Greater separation or task groups in the task absolutely useless, a chart of the whole island o{ force formation has certain advantages. However, tOllMOSA being used in one instance to show the i! the separation distance between task groups is location or shipping Jn TAKAD Harbor. Nonetheless, 25 miles, the task groups should operate independ while some or the reports should have been much ently as the distance is too great !or any mutual better than they were, there undoubtedly was in support during air attack. adequate time for making these reports. 3. To make full use of this most valuable source o! information, it ls suggested that submission SU I Cl OE BOMBER o! the enemy loss part of .the daily operational (Also see •ENEMY AIR ATTACK OF 21 JANUARY 19115•) suamary be postponed to eight o'clock or the second morn! ng a!ter the photographs are taken. 'fhis Com!BIRDfleet recom111ends: should not interfere with tactical planning, which is based largely on the !lash reports, and would The newest Japanese weapon, tbe suicide bomber, permit the daily operational sU11mary to be accu can be licked; increased alertness, better gunnery, rately based on photographs. strike pickets, channelizing of own air 1oveaents, and a smothering fighter CM' (fighter blanket) over 4. Also, it is suggested that the task groups enemy air!lelds are proper and proven answers to might, on the basis of these ship da1age reports, the chal 1enge. make a report complete with marked photographs to be submitted In duplicate or triplicate to take IN ADDITION TO INFORMATION CONTAINED the place or all detailed Squadron ACT and ship IN COM I NCH SECRET BUL LETI H HO. 22, Action Reports on ship damage. PAGES 78-109 THROUGH 78-121, REGARDING DE FENS I VE MEASURES AGAI HST SU IC I DE AT TACKS, THE TWO REPORTS BELDW MAY PROVE HELPFUL: RESCUE era 38 , 2 com10en ts and 1"eCClllllllends: CinCPac secret letter serial 00837 dated 2 March t. Due to relays via VHF channels, communica 1945 states that 1t 1s believed that the Japanese tions between Task Group Commander and rescue suicide planes are being •convoyed• to a take-off submarine have not been satisfactory. point by another plane •b1cb 1s radar-equ1pped. Several intercepts o! the Type 3 Air Mark VI Model 2. There have been a number or occasions during 4 have been received preceding suicide attacks. the past rtve months when pilots waterlanded or The suicide bombers and the radar-equipped plane 80- 36 SKCRKT SUICIDE BOMBER (Cont.) by weather conditions. In clear weather, an ap at about 20 ,000-26 .DOD feet ls recommended. endeavor to approach close to land (and may possibly proach Crom that altitude ls be~un about 10 miles be taking advantage ot nulls in radar patterns) to Attack evade detection. rrom the target in a gentle glide to about 5000- 6500 feet, with the eng10e throttled to about L7 of mercury - apparently to avoid overshooting. The radar Intercept receiver appears to be one inches If the pilot discovers that he will overshoot, he sure •ethod or gaining early warning i! the above is Instructed to dive steeply to a point slightly tactics are to110111ed. It 1S recoHended that short ot the target, recover to horizontal flight cons Jde rat lon be g I ven to J aa•l ng any Japanese then resume bis gentle glide. airborne radar signal intercepted under these and conditions as soon as 1t is p1cked uo. Any danger Apparently the approach is to be as lengthy as the presence or ou.r ships is not a or disclosing possible to insure accuracy. It the target ls constderatlon since the Japanese are not !lying suddenly discovered from a gap between clouds It suicide planes untll our forces have been definitely is stated that, 'the attack wUl be pressed from as located. Al I avail all le Ja11•ers should be used to a distance as ts consistent wJth keeping the prevent the radar-equipped guide plane from obtain great within the tield o! v iston •. Medium and low indication on any partic enemy ing even a rough bearing dictated by cloud ular group of ships. altitude approaches are apparently formations. II there are scattered clouds, a medlu11 altitude approach may be expected immediately under II or between them (for better observation) with no glide preceding tbe dive. I! there ls a low cloud CoHander U.S. PACIFIC Heet and Pacl!lc Ocean cover, the plane •111 approach Just above the water, Areas in °ieekly Intelligence• dated 19 March rising to the base of the clouds Just before diving. 1945 reports on lloctrine !or ~ectal Attack Units•; Two docu1ents captured on Negros Island afford The importance attached to cloud cover ts ap insight on doctrine ot the newly organized • ~ectal parent both troa the accompanying drawings and the Attack Unit•. This ls the phrase associated with text: 'In cases where there are scattered clouds the word "Kulkaze • la propaganda broadcasts con or where thick clouds cover the skies, it would be cerning suicide groups. One docU1ent contains well to skirt under the clouds. However, it the training and the other tactical instructions tor approach is •ade ln the breaks between scattered lookout or the sky above 1ust be the ~eclal Attack Units and diagrams in the clouds, sharp second docu1ent illustrate attacks which 1ay be tor maintained . . . . It the as.;ault 1 s 1ade !ro1 a suicide crashes. •ed1u1 altitude, every possible advantage presented by the existing weather condition will be exploited The Jap has realized that there is a somewhat and the attack will be 1ade without pre111inary standard lull" between the successlYe deck-load movement •. strikes or a carrier raid, and has planned to take advantage or this break to make aggressive attacks The documents contain instructions only for a at least one or them was is on our task force: ·~eclal at tack units are otten particular unlt, but sent out between air raids by ene•y carrier borne sued by the First Alr fleet Headquarters and they planes. Therefore, it ls essential that flying aay give CM's so1e clue to where an approach 1ay suits and other equip1ent be always held in readi be expected under dif!erent weather conditions. be 1Hediately a!ter ness •1th the intention or taking o!! i11ed1ately Also, an approach 1ay expected a.tter the air raid ter1lnates ...... The interval the strike bas le!t the target. between ene1y air raids ts, at the longest, two hours. tllendly airplanes are brought out from The approach instructions are not tor separate their· concealment and sent out during this time•. planes but for several in close !ormat1on with suitable•, says IC this tactic ls carried out, a "J'CN' or snooper !igh ter cover. •rt is considered consist or two flight ti1ed to r111 the lull between strikes the docU1ent, •to have a !light should be able to destroy previously camouflaged fighter-bo•bers and two direct escort planes. In and each !light planes and also protect the task !orce fro• pos such a !or1at!on, each airplane sible attack. are strictly cautioned not to be too tar separated from one another.• The documents (reported 1n A11S llllletln No. Transports were assigned priority as targets 1798) turther disclose that tbe altitude of ap next to carriers. proach o! tbe ~ecial Attack Units, •hlch has ap peared to be deter•1ned at rando•. may be controlled 80-37 SKCllET SUICIDE BOMBEP (Cont.) If th1S unJt Is a suicide group, these documents possible that they are training such groups - as provide the !lrst con!lrmat1on or evidence or its these documents were Issued in December 1944. doctrine. Other lnforaation has indicated that "Kamikaze units• mentioned by kadlo Tokyo did not fhe state o! the Jap pilot pr<.5ra11 Js empha exist as such, but that Individual pilots were sized by the fact that the training syllabus !or desl~nated !or these missions. However, It Ls this highly special unit Is devoted largely to elementary formation !lying, the rudiments or navigation and single - not formation - diving. Attack Xade From a Low Altitude 20-30° "200nt" (=17"h g?) Cloud 20,000 - 2 ,000 ft. ft. 150-350 ~ - about 10 miles ~ 3,300 ft. = ------ Point at which the enemy was spotted 80-38 SKCRK! SJRPRI SE IN ATTACK (cl Per•it unrestricted air operation by the earners. C001Cn.Div 13 (CfQ 38.3.3) c°"sents: (d) Be easily 1aneuverable under emergency conditions. The great val~e o! surprise 1n attack was amply (e) Provide concentrated unrestricted !ire diSpl ayed Jn thl s act I on. It was ev Iden t that support or the carriers by the supporting this strike, deep in an area not previously sub ships against all forms or enemy air at jected to heavy attack, was e!!ect1ve. tack and particularly against enemy suicide plane at tacks. (!) Provide reasonable protection against TARGET CAP enemy subaarine attacks. CortCruDiv 13 (CfQ 38.3.3) cO!ll'lents: 2. Curing this operation ronatlon five Victor Able was used when cloud cover •as broken, The 1aintenance or an etrective target CAP scattered, and a!!orded concealment tor the ene1y over ene•y airfields continued to have telling aircraft during approach !or attack. rormation et!ect. The Japanese new alrcralt into the Hve Victor Baker was used when the cloud cover SAllDN area on this day, presumably !or attack was lo• solid overcast and enemy aircraft were on the force. but they were destroyed by our restricted to low attack and also when the ·pilots be!ore they could re-gas !or the attack. visibility was clear and the celling unlimited. Fro1 recent experience, it would appear that the f'oraation Five Victor Able is composed or !our value or the aaintenance or a tight dusk CN' over carriers and rive battleships/cruisers positioned eneay air!telds tar outweighs the disadvantage or as !otlo•s: CA-0000, CVL-2.5000, CA-3.5045, having to reaaln within striking range of eneay CV-2. 5090, llb-3.5135, CVL-2.5180, CA-3. 5225, planes during this critical period. CV-2. 5270, llb-3. 5315. The screen is composed of one CLAA at position 7000 and •tth destroyers equally spaced•through 3600 on circle seven. For•at1on tive Victor !laker has the saae composi VICTOR FO!t!ATIOMS tion as ttve Victor Able with the center units (See alao CRUISING OISPOSITIONS) positioned on the same bearings but with the CV CVL units on circle two instead or circle 2.5 Cr U. S. GOVt:RNti1EHT PRINTlNG OfTIQ. 0-.. 1945 80- 39