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Conseil De L'atlantique Nord North Atlantic Council CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL EXEMPLAIRE 343 N" COPY ORIGINAL; ENGLISH/FRENCH NATO SECRET 18th September, 19671 t MR SUMMARY RECORD G~AITE7lW~~ Summary record of a meeting ox tiio Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, TZoTT or Wednesday, 6th September, 1967 at 10.15 a.id. PRESENT Chairmans Mr. Manlio Brosio BELGIUM ; CPREECE NORWAY Baron J, Papeians de ! Mr. Christian X. j Mr. R. Busch Morchoven Palamar I 1 PORTUGAL GAN ADA ICELAND I j Mr, P.P.B. de Sousa Mr. J.E.G. Hardy ; Mr. H. Sv. BjBrnsson I I'crr.r j : DENMARK ! ITALY j Mr. H. Hjorth-Nielsen | Mr. A. Alcscandrini | Mr. Nuri Birgi FRANCE j LUXEMBOURG I UNITED KINGDOM ! Mr. J. Schricke ! Mr. P. Mort2 ! Sir Bernard Burrows 1 i GERMANY I N B T HERLANDS 1 UNITED STATES Mr. D. Oncken * Mr. H.N. Boon ! Mr. Harlan Cleveland INTERNAT I ONAL__ STAFF Assistant Secretary General foi Political Affairs: Mr. J. Jaenicke Executive Secretaryn The Lord Coleridge Chairman, Committee of Economic Advisers; Mr. A. Vincent ALSO PRESENT Military Committee Representatives Major G-eneral W.W. Stromberg NATO SECRET NATO SECRET 0-Pl( 67 ) P& ^ CONTENT D Item Subject Paragraph Nos. I. Death of General Reijnierse 1 - 3 II. Statements on political subject! non-proliferation 4 - 8 III. Malta 9-30 IV. Question of institutionalising relations between the North Atlantic Oouncil and the North Atlantic Assembly 31 - 55 V. Economic review of individual Eastern European countries and the Soviet Zone of Germany : Soviet Zone of Germany 5 6 - 6 4 VI. NATO countries’ trade with Communist countries 6 5 - 6 7 VII. NATO SIDEWINDER Production and Logistics Organisation - final report of the Board of Directors )0 72 VIII. Twenty-second session of United Nations General Assembly 73 - 76 IX. Departure of Mr. Palaiaas 77 - 79 X. Dato of the next meeting 80 DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE & NATO SECRET M -3 - N A T O S E CRET -> g-hO/tB 6 I NATO UNCLASSIFIED J 1• DEATH OP GENERAL REIJNIERSE to 01 1. The CHAIRMAN ma.de the following statements w hi to "You all know that General Reijnierse, the General q Manager of the NATO HAWK Management Office, died on Sunday m after a long illness. Services are being held this morning 1 . in Paris; I have asked Mr. de Vries to represent me at them. w M "General Reijnierse held the post of General w Manager of the HAWK Management Office ever since the g* establishment of that office in 1959. The HAWK programme was ^ one of the largest of its kind, involving, after completion w of the original task, a great number of developments. w o General Reijnierse brought outstanding leadership to it and J worked earnestly and unceasingly to promote fruitful w co-operation among the participating countries and to achieve p the maximum results of such co-operation. As the guiding ^ figure behind the programme for eight years, he deserves a h major share of the credit for its undeniably great success, pq We may say that he leaves us after having substantially J? concluded inis task with NATO. Pi 1 "I am sure that, in paying tribute to his many m qualities, I speak for the Council as a whole and that in h lamenting his loss, I speak for his many friends at NATO." h W 2. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he had C had the privilege of honouring General Eeijnierse about a q year ago with a United States award in recognition of his g work for the HAWK programme. The programme was in fact \ General Reijnierse, and would not have been possible without § him. His absence would be keenly felt. Up to the end, until £ prevented by illness, his personal and professional contribution had been, so to speak, a monument, and well- w ui deserving of such a highly intelligent and popular person. C u* 3. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that he was p profoundly grateful to the Chairman and the United States Representative for their words of sympathy and admiration for G-eneral Reijnierse's work, which he would convey to Mrs. Reijnierse and to the Netherlands Authorities. It was very difficult for him to say something about General Reijnierse, who had been both an able compatriot and for the Netherlands Delegation, a weui-:ia:.'tod friend. He personally felt his loss deeply. NATO SECRET -4- NATO SECRET 0- R d o 7 ) P 6 NATO SECRET 11• STATEMENTS ON POLITICAL SUBJECTS : NON-PROLIFERATION 4. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE commented on a folder containing five papers which had been circulated to the Council. He then made the following statement:- "Mr. Chairman: I am instructed today to resume our continuing consultations on the non-proliferation treaty. As you know from our reports in the interim, there have been a series of developments in Geneva since the Council discussed and saw no objection to our seeking Soviet agreement on the difficult Article III and tabling a draft with that article blank if we could not bring the Soviets around to accept the views of our Allies as worked out around this table and in bilateral consultations in our capitals. We did of course table an agreed draft in late August, as we reported in advance to other Delegations here. At that time the Soviets were still standing pat on their own draft Article III and rejecting the draft that represented, as best we could, the views of the NATO Allies. None the less,, as we previously had agreed among ourselves, the co-chairmen announced that bilateral negotiations would continue - the hope being that this would help forestall the non-aligned at the ENDC from tabling their own drafts which we expected would b§~rJhhelpful, especially from the viewpoint of members of EURATOM. Bilateral negotiations did continue., We have reported to you on the formal meetings between the co-chairmen and these were supplemented by frequent and sometimes exhausting debates at the staff level and informal talks in the corridors. Because these were repetitious and frequently very technical, I shall not detain you with a detailed rehearsal of them. But because the details of a slow evolution in Soviet positions may be interesting to you and to experts in your capitals, we have prepared a statement;, as a supplement to our previous reports on individual meetings which, may help all of you study the course of tho negotiations over the whole period since we last consulted formally on this subject. From our side this has been a process of patient explanation of the rationale behind the various contested points in our draft, especially those which bore upon the rôle of EURATOM in an acceptable safeguards system. Prom the Soviet side, it apparently has been a process of slow education. - 4 - NATO SECRET NATO SECRET C-RT67T56 In the end Mr. Roshchin told Mr. Poster last .Friday that his Delegation had gained a greater insight into the safeguards problem through the explanations made by the Unites States. He thereupon presented a new draft Article III which he said was an effort by tho Soviet Delegation to take into account the problems stressed by the United States and the special interest of EURATOM. Ambassador Poster replied only that he would seek instructions and in the meantime the United States would want to consult with its Allies. This is the reason why my Government wants to pick up promptly the threads of our continuing consultation on this subject today. I should add that Ambassador Roshchin urgently requested that the Soviet draft be held in the strictest confidence and claimed, that his Delegation had not tried it out on Moscow. Regardless of how far their internal clearance process may have gone* premature publicity on this Soviet draft could serve no Allied interest. I therefore must ask my colleagues to impress upon their respective governments the need for unusual precautions against leaks on this subject at this time. Mr. Chairman, my Government is still studying the Soviet proposal. All of our governments will, of course, want to examine it closely, as we shall he doing in the coming days. Before reaching our own mature conclusions, we shall want to consult fully with our Allies on this latest chapter in the long and complicated story of this treaty. But as a basis for consideration by your governments during the next few days, we want to share with, you at once our tentative appraisal. One thing is very clear: the Soviet proposal represents a very large departure from the positions and formulations in the previous Soviet draft which we and our Allies found objectionable. DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Several of the points on which the Soviets have now accepted our version have to do with details and technicalities, and these again are covered in the memorandum which vie have distributed. I thought it would be m.ost useful in this political forum to focus today on-the essentially political problems, especially the questions posed for the members of EURATOM. NATO SECRET -6- NATO SECRET ÜLU67736 One of the interesting and hopeful indications that emerged gradually in tho course of the co-chairman negotiations in Geneva was that the sticking point for the Russians was an explicit recognition in treaty language of safeguards systems other than IAEA, i.e., EURATOM. They probably felt that a Soviet signature to language of that kind would constitute a form of political blessing on EURATOM which they are not prepared to bestow. We believe the Soviet Delegation is now persuaded that, whether they like it or not in principle, a EURATOM rôle is a necessity in practice.
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