Encyclopedia of

Volume 2

Lynn Nadel University of Arizona

Volume 1 Academic Achievement - Environmental Volume 2 Epilepsy - Mental Imagery, Philosophical Issues about Volume 3 Mental Models - Signal Detection Theory Volume 4 Similarity - Zombies

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Chomsky N (1961) Some methodological remarks on Levelt WJM (1974) Formal Grammars in and generative grammar. Word 17: 219-239. Psycholinguistics, 3 vols. The Hague, Netherlands: Fillmore CJ, Kempler D and Wang WS-Y (eds) (1979) Mouton. Individual Differences in Ability and Language McNair L, Singer K, Dobrin LM and AuCoin MM (eds) Behavior. New York, NY: Academic Press. (1996) CLS 32: Papersfrom the Parasession on Theoy and Gerken LA and Bever TG (1986) Linguistic intuitions Data in Linguistics. Chicago, IL: Chicago Linguistic are the result of interactions between perceptual Society. processes and linguistic universals. Cognitive Science 10: Newmeyer FJ (1983) Grammatical Theoy, its Limits and its 457-476. Possibilities. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Greenbaum S (1988) Good English and the Grammarian. Perry TA (ed.) (1979) Evidence and Argumentation in London, UK: Longman. Linguistics. Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter.

Linguistic Relativity Intermediate article Lera Boroditsky, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

CONTENTS Does language shape thought? Shapes and substances Space Objects Time Conclusion

Languages differ dramatically from one another in affect the way their speakers think terms of how they describe the world. Does having about the world? Do English, Mandarin, Russian, different ways of describing the world lead speakers and ~~~ki~hspeakers end up attending to, par- of different languages also to have different ways of titioning, and remembering their experiences thinking about the world? differently simply because they speak different languages? DOES LANGUAGE SHAPE 'THOUGHT? The idea that thought is shaped by language is most commonly associated with the writings of Humans communicate with one another using an (Whorf, 1956). Whorf, im- amazing array of languages, and each language pressed by linguistic diversity, proposed that the differs from the next in innumerable ways (from categories and distinctions of each language en- obvious differences in pronunciation and vocabu- shrine a way of perceiving, analyzing, and acting lary to more subtle differences in grammar). For in the world. In so far as languages differ, their example, to say that 'the elephant ate the peanuts' speakers too should differ in how they perceive in English, we must include tense - the fact that the and act in objectively similar situations. This strong event happened in the past. In Mandarin and Indo- Whorfian view - that thought and action are en- nesian, indicating when the event occurred would tirely determined by language - has long been be optional and couldn't be included in the verb. In abandoned in the field. However, definitively Russian, the verb would need to include tense and answering less deterministic versions of the 'does also whether the peanut-eater was male or female language shape thought' question has proven to be (though only in the past tense), and whether said a very difficult task. Some studies have claimed peanut-eater ate all of the peanuts or just a portion evidence to the affirmative (e.g. Boroditsky, 2001; of them. In Turkish, on the other hand, one would Bowerman, 1996; Davidoff et al., 1999; Gentner and specify (as a suffix on the verb) whether the eating Imai, 1997; Levinson, 1996; Lucy, 1992; Dehaene of the peanuts was witnessed or if it was hearsay. It et al., 1999), while others report evidence to the appears that speakers of different languages have contrary (e.g. Heider, 1972; Malt et al., 1999; Li to attend to and encode strikingly different aspects and Gleitrnan, 2002). of the world in order to use their language properly In recent years, research on (Sapir, 1921; Slobin, 1996). Do these quirks of has enjoyed a considerable resurgence, and much 918 Linguistic Relativity new evidence regarding the effects of language on Dramatic cross-linguistic differences have also thought has become available. This chapter reviews been noted in the way languages describe spatial several lines of evidence regarding the effects of locations (Levinson, 1996). Whereas most lan- language on people's representations of space, guages (e.g. English, Dutch) rely heavily on relative time, substances, and objects. spatial terms to describe the relative locations of objects (e.g. left/right, front/back), Tzeltal (a SPACE Mayan language) relies primarily on absolute ref- erence (a system similar to the English north/south Languages differ considerably in how they de- direction system). Spatial locations that are north scribe spatial relations. Many such differences are said to be downhill, and those south are said to have been noted among English, Dutch, Finnish, be uphill. This absolute uphill/downhill system is Korean, and Spanish, among others (Bowerman, the dominant way to describe spatial relations be- 1996). For example, English distinguishes between tween objects in Tzeltal; no relational equivalents to putting things into containers ('the apple in the the English terms front/back or left/right are avail- bowl', 'the letter in the envelope') and putting able (Levinson, 1996). things onto surfaces ('the apple on the table', 'the To test whether this difference between the two magnet on the refrigerator door'). Cross-cutting this languages has cognitive consequences, Levinson containment/support distinction, Korean distin- (1996) tested Dutch and Tzeltal speakers in a guishes between tight and loose fit or attachment. number of spatial tasks. In one study, participants For example, putting an apple in a bowl requires a were seated at a table and an arrow lay in front of different relational term (nehta) from putting a them pointing either to the right (north) or to the letter in an envelope (kitta), because the first is an left (south). They were then rotated 180 degrees to a example of loose containment and the second second table which had two arrows (one pointing an example of tight fit. Further, putting a letter to the left (north) and one to the right (south)), and in an envelope and putting a magnet on the re- were asked to identify the arrow 'like the one they frigerator are both described by kitta because both saw before'. Dutch speakers overwhelmingly chose involve close fit. the 'relative' solution. If the stimulus arrow pointed To test whether these cross-linguistic differences to the right (and north), Dutch speakers chose the are reflected in the way English and Korean arrow that still pointed to the right (though it now speakers represent spatial relations, McDonough pointed south instead of the original north). Tzeltal et al. (2000) showed scenes involving tight or loose speakers did exactly the opposite, overwhelmingly fit to Korean- and English-speaking adults. After choosing the 'absolute' solution. If the stimulus they had seen a few examples of either tight fit or arrow pointed to the right (and north), Tzeltal loose fit, the subjects were shown an example of speakers chose the arrow that still pointed north tight fit on one screen, and an example of loose fit (though it now pointed left instead of right). Thus, on another. While Korean-speaking adults looked Tzeltal speakers' heavy reliance on absolute refer- longer at the kind of spatial relation they had just ence in spatial description appears to have affected been familiarized with, English speakers did not their interpretation of (and performance on) a non- distinguish between the tight- and loose-fit scenes, linguistic orientation task. looking equally long at the familiar and novel Further studies of this task showed that English scenes. Further, when given several examples of speakers (English is the same as Dutch in this re- tight fit and one example of loose fit (or vice spect) do not always favor relative responses; cer- versa), Korean adults could easily pick out the odd tain contextual factors can be used to induce picture, but English speakers could not. Finally, English speakers to produce both absolute and McDonough et al. found that unlike adult English relative responses on these tasks (Li and Gleitman, speakers, prelinguistic infants (being raised in both 2002). This is not surprising since English speakers English-speaking and Korean-speaking house- use both absolute and relative forms in their lan- holds) distinguished between tight and loose fit in guage. It remains to be seen whether the same the looking-time test described above. This pattern contextual factors can induce Tzeltal speakers to of findings suggests that infants may come ready to produce relative responses despite an apparent attend to any number of spatial distinctions. How- lack of relative terms in Tzeltal. ever, as people learn and use language, the spatial In summary, the evidence available so far sug- distinctions reinforced by their particular language gests that reference frames and distinctions made are the ones that remain salient in their representa- available by one's language may indeed impose tional repertoire. important constraints on one's spatial thinking. Linguistic Relativity 919

'TIME time vertically as was observed with Mandarin speakers. Languages also differ from one another on their This last result suggests two things: (1) language descriptions of time. While all languages use is a powerful tool in shaping thought, and (2) one's spatial terms to talk about time ('looking forward native language plays a role in shaping habitual to a brighter tomorrow', 'proposing theories ahead thought (how we tend to think about time, for of our time', 'falling behind schedule'), different example) but does not completely determine languages use different spatial terms. For example, thought in the strong Whorfian sense (since one in English, we predominantly use front/back terms can always learn a new way of talking, and with to talk about time. We can talk about the good times it, a new way of thinking). ahead of us, or the hardships behind us. We can move meetings forward, push deadlines back, and eat dessert before we're finished with our vege- SHAPES AND SUBSTANCES tables. On the whole, the terms used to order events Languages also differ in the extent to which they are the same as those used to describe asymmetric make a grammatical distinction between objects horizontal spatial relations (e.g. 'he took three and substances. For example, in English, objects steps forward' or 'the path is behind the store'). In like candles and chairs have distinct singular and Mandarin, front/back spatial metaphors for time plural forms (e.g. one candle versus two candles), are also common (Scott, 1989). Mandarin speakers but substances like mud and wax do not. Further, use the spatial morphemes qian (front) and hbu objects and substances are distinguished in English (back) to talk about time. What makes Mandarin in counting. While one can say 'one candle, two interesting for present purposes is that Mandarin candles, three candles' and so on, counting sub- speakers also systematically use vertical metaphors stances is a bit trickier. Instead of saying 'one to talk about time (Scott, 1989). The spatial mor- mud, two muds', English speakers must specify phemes shling (up) and xili (down) are frequently the unit of measurement such as 'one mound of used to talk about the order of events, roughly mud' or 'one cup of mud' (words like 'mound' translated into English as last and next. Earlier and 'cup' here are called 'unitizers' because they events are said to be shling or 'up', and later events specify the unit of measurement). are said to be xi2 or 'down'. In summary, both Unlike English, some languages do not have Mandarin and English speakers use horizontal a grammatical boundary between objects and terms to talk about time. In addition, Mandarin substances. In Yucatec Mayan, for example, all speakers commonly use the vertical terms shling nouns act almost as if they refer to substances. All and xi;. nouns require a unitizer when counting (usually So, do the English and Mandarin ways of specifying shape or form, for example 'one long talking about time lead to differences in how thin unit'), and don't necessarily need to take dis- people think about time? Specifically, are Manda- tinct plural and singular forms (Lucy and Gaskins, rin speakers more likely to construct vertical time- 2001). This means that 'two candles' in English is lines to think about time, while English speakers more like 'two long thin units of wax' in Yucatec. are more likely to construct horizontal timelines? Does talking about objects as if they were sub- A collection of studies showed that Mandarin stances in their language lead Yucatec Mayans to speakers tend to think about time vertically even attend more to the materials and substances that when thinking for English (Boroditsky, 2001). For comprise the objects? Several studies suggest that example, Mandarin speakers were faster to con- this is indeed the case (e.g. Lucy and Gaskins, firm that March comes earlier than April if they 2001). English speakers and Yucatec Mayans were had just seen a vertical array of objects than if shown an example object (e.g. a plastic comb with a they had just seen a horizontal array. The reverse handle) and asked to choose which of two other was true for English speakers. Another study objects was more similar to this example. The two showed that the extent to which Mandarin-English choices varied from the example either in shape bilinguals think about time vertically is related (a plastic comb with no handle), or in material (a to how old they were when they first began wooden comb with a handle). English speakers to learn English. In another experiment native preferred the shape match, saying that the two English speakers were taught to talk about time combs with a handle were more similar (even using vertical spatial terms in a way similar to though they were made of different materials). Mandarin. On a subsequent test, this group of Eng- Yucatec Mayans, on the other hand, preferred the lish speakers showed the same bias to think about material match, saying that the two plastic combs 920 Linxuistic Relativity were more similar (even though they differed in Spanish), German speakers said 'beautiful, elegant, shape). These findings suggest that aspects of fragile, peaceful, pretty, and slender', while Span- grammar can in fact shape the way speakers of a ish speakers said 'big, dangerous, long, strong, language conceptualize the shapes and materials of sturdy, and towering'. These findings once again objects. indicate that people's thinking about objects is in- fluenced by the grammatical genders their native OBJECTS language assigns to the objects' names. It appears that even a small fluke of grammar (the seemingly Finally, languages also differ in how names of arbitrary assignment of a noun to be masculine or objects are grouped into grammatical categories. feminine) can have an effect on how people think One such common feature of languages is gram- about things in the world. matical gender. Unlike English, many languages have a system whereby all CONCLUSION nouns (e.g. penguins, pockets, and toasters) are assigned a gender. Many languages only have mas- Languages appear to influence many aspects of culine and feminine genders, but some also assign human : evidence regarding space, time, neuter, vegetative, and other more obscure genders. objects, and substances has been reviewed in this When speaking a language with grammatical article, but further studies have also found effects gender, speakers are required to mark objects as of language on people's understanding of numbers, gendered through definite articles and gendered colors, shapes, events, and other minds. Consider- pronouns, and often need to modify adjectives or ing the many ways in which languages differ, the even verbs to agree in gender with the nouns. Does findings reviewed here suggest that the private talking about inanimate objects as if they were mental lives of people who speak different lan- masculine or feminine actually lead people to guages may differ much more than previously think of inanimate objects as having a gender? thought. A recent set of studies suggests that the gram- Beyond showing that speakers of different lan- matical genders assigned to objects by a language guages think differently, these results suggest that do indeed influence people's mental representa- linguistic processes are pervasive in most funda- tions of objects (Boroditsky et al., in press). For mental domains of thought. That is, it appears that example, Spanish and German speakers were what we normally call 'thinking' is in fact a complex asked to rate similarities between pictures of set of collaborations between linguistic and nonlin- people (males or females) and pictures of objects guistic representations and processes. Further re- (the names of which had opposite genders in Span- search into linguistic relativity may help uncover ish and German). Both groups rated grammatically the exact nature of the interactions between these feminine objects to be more similar to females and many processes in the service of complex cognitive grammatically masculine objects more similar to function, as well as help us to establish what might males. This was true even though all objects had be core or universal in human cognition. opposite genders in Spanish and German, the test was completely nonlinguistic (conducted entirely References in pictures with instructions given in English), and Boroditsky L (2001) Does language shape thought? even when subjects performed the task during a Mandarin and English speakers' conceptions of time. verbal suppression manipulation (which would Cognitive Psychology 43(1): 1-22. interfere with their ability to subvocally name the Boroditsky L, Schmidt L, and Phillips W (in press). In: objects in any language). Other studies demon- Gentner D and Goldin-Meadow S (eds) Language in strated that Spanish and German speakers also Mind: Advances in the Study of Language and Cognition. ascribe more feminine or more masculine proper- Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ties to objects depending on their grammatical Bowerman M (1996) The origins of children's spatial gender. For example, asked to describe a 'key' (a semantic categories: cognitive versus linguistic word masculine in German and feminine in Span- determinants. In: Gumperz J and Levinson S (eds) Rethinking Linguistic Relativity, pp. 145-176. Cambridge, ish), German speakers were more likely to use MA: Cambridge University Press. words like 'hard, heavy, jagged, metal, serrated, Davidoff J, Davies I and Roberson D (1999) Colour and useful', while Spanish speakers were more categories of a stone-age tribe. Nature 398: 203-204. likely to say 'golden, intricate, little, lovely, shiny, Dehaene S, Spelke E, Pine1 P, Stanescu R and Tsivkin S and tiny'. To describe a 'bridge', on the other hand, (1999) Sources of mathematical thinking: behavioral (a word feminine in German and masculine in and brain-imaging evidence. Science 284: 970-974. Linguistic Relativitv 921

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