The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-06-3

Editor in Chief Features LTC SHANE E. LEE 7 Armored Operations in Urban Environments: Managing Editor Anomaly or Natural Condition? by Dr. Robert Cameron CHRISTY BOURGEOIS 13 Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq Commandant by Major Jayson Altieri MG ROBERT M. WILLIAMS 16 Disrupting an Insurgent Bedroom Community: Decentralized Operations in a Terrorist Support Zone by Captain Gregory R. Mitchell ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- month ly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 20 More than a Campaign of Platitudes: Effective Information Operations ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th for the Battalion/Task Force and Company/Team Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. by Captain Greg Tomlin Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- MOR represents the professional opinions of 26 Algeria: Total War the authors and does not necessarily reflect by Eric Chevreuil the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information 33 Abrams and the Need for TUSK in the Age of Rapid Urbanization presented in other official Army publications. by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin M. Harris Official distribution is limited to one copy for 37 Introduction to the Stryker Mobile Gun System each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battal- by Major Jonathan B. Slater ion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- 41 Improving the Tank Loader’s Station quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com- for the Contemporary Operating Environment pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of by Sergeant First Class Vernon P. Prohaska and Captain Joshua M. Keena the United States Army. In addition, Army li- braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and 44 Contemporary Sniper and Observation Post Operations MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for by Sergeant First Class Mathew Donofrio armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel 49 Breaking the Paradigm of Crisis Maintenance for such organizations may request two copies by Brigadier General Mike Tucker by sending a request to the editor in chief. Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Departments Center has proponency. That proponency in- cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat 2 Contacts systems that do not serve primarily as infantry 3 Letters carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these 5 Commander’s Hatch systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 6 Driver’s Seat any miscellaneous items of equipment which 53 From the Boresight Line armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all 19-series officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logis- tics, history, and leadership of armor and ar- mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offi ces. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, where copyright is indicated. ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, ARMOR, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. May-June 2006, Vol. CXV, No. 3 USPS 467-970 “From My Position...”

“To make war without a thorough knowledge of the history of ation. Some of our readers will be quick to point out that one ex- war is on a par with the casualness of a doctor who prescribes ample or another is invalid for geographical, cultural, political, or medicine without taking the trouble to study the history of the military reasons, but to simply dismiss them without a deeper ex- case he is treating.” amination of the relevant issues would be a missed opportunity. Captain Basil Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, 1944 The uneven application of historical lessons learned, however, is not limited to counterinsurgency operations. In the current war, The cover of this edition of ARMOR might strike you as a bit odd. the Armor force has once again found itself heavily engaged in The top half of the picture may appear somewhat familiar, but hostile urban environments. The U.S. Army, and the Armor force then again, there is something not quite right. The vehicle shown in particular, has extensive experience fighting in built-up areas. might be American, but the soldiers certainly look foreign. The Unfortunately, in previous eras, we have demonstrated a tenden- scene could be somewhere in the Middle East, but at first glance, cy to de-emphasize the fundamentals of mounted operations in you may not be able to place the location. In fact, the scene de- urbanized terrain (MOUT) as the immediate threat diminished picted is from the Algerian conflict of the 1950s. In that war, the over time. Dr. Robert Cameron, the Armor branch historian, doc- French army, fresh from its experiences in Vietnam, found itself uments this cycle, which is not unique to our Army, and strongly once again fighting a very determined insurgency. This time, urges us to take this opportunity to ensure that the difficult les- however, it was not fighting in some far-flung colonial outpost. sons we are learning today are not forgotten tomorrow. Algeria, to most Frenchmen at the time, was not simply a colony Besides the articles discussed above, you will also find other ar- of France — it was France. ticles that are both interesting and useful. Every once in a while, For the French army fighting in Algeria, the stakes of this conflict soldiers have asked me why we don’t publish more articles writ- were very high indeed. They could not afford to fail. Many of the ten by NCOs and junior soldiers. The main reason is that we key leaders fighting this war had learned valuable lessons about rarely receive these kinds of articles. For those of you who have fighting insurgencies in the jungles of Vietnam and they suc- waited patiently for NCO-developed articles, we have two of cessfully applied those lessons in a completely different environ- them in this issue that are either authored or co-authored by ment. Ultimately, however, battlefield success did not lead to po- NCOs. We have a variety of other authors represented who have litical victory. written about both operational-level topics and very practical ar- ticles written about team-level topics. We even have an article As with any other worthwhile endeavor, we can learn equally on a subject we haven’t discussed much lately: maintenance. good lessons from both success and failure if we apply those Brigadier General Mike Tucker provides us with some very im- lessons in the proper context. In previous issues of this publica- portant insights taken from his years of experience maintaining tion, we discussed the British experience in Malaya and our own armored vehicles for combat. experience with irregular warfare on the Great Plains. In this is- sue, Eric Chevreuil introduces us to yet another historical exam- In short, this edition of ARMOR has something for everyone. ple of irregular warfare to generate informed discussion on coun- Since you will receive this issue during or just after the 2006 terinsurgency operations. Today’s war in Iraq, as implied by the Armor Warfighting Symposium, please keep us in mind as you cover art, shares many striking similarities with the nearly forgot- refine your ideas on warfighting and the future of the Armor ten conflict in Algeria. In none of the examples above, however, force. will you find a magic template that can be applied to any situ- S.E. LEE

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW PETER J. SCHOOMAKER Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff 0606703 DSN prefi x – 464- Points of Contact Commercial prefi x– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Offi ces U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor in Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) LTC Shane E. Lee 4087 MG Robert M. Williams 2121 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Christy Bourgeois 4582 BG Albert Bryant Jr. 7555 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Vivian Oertle 2610 COL Russell Gold 1101 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Art Director Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 CSM Otis Smith 4952 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editorial Assistant Command Sergeant Major to DCG (ATZK-DCG-CSM) Kathy A. Johnson 2249 CSM Joseph P. Zettlemoyer 7091 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Marlin Levendoski 1315 ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in edit- E-mail: [email protected] ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or print- ed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Word, Rich Text Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development Format, or ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or COL Richard G. Piscal (ATZK-TD) cover letter). Tape captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Ad- E-mail: [email protected] 8247 ditionally, we accept articles as e-mail or attachments at: TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) [email protected] COL John M. Shay 7955 When sending articles via e-mail, please include a complete mailing ad- E-mail: [email protected] dress and daytime phone number. Experimentation and Analysis Directorate (ATZK-UAE) COL Douglas L. Fletcher 7809 SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, E-mail: douglas.fl [email protected] we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your TRADOC Capability Manager, Platform Battle article to only one Army professional bulletin at a time. Command/Combat Identifi cation (ATZK-PBC-CID) COL Alan Mosher 4009 GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, but E-mail: [email protected] will accept electronic graphic and photo fi les in no less than 300 dpi format. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) Offi ce, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) If you use PowerPoint for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of ex- Aubrey Henley 5155 cessive color and shading. If you have any questions concerning elec- E-mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 tronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (ATZK-UA) Joe Hughes 5050 ADDRESS CHANGES, PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS, AND ST. GEORGE- E-mail: [email protected] ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription ser vice, address chang- Assistant TRADOC System Manager es, and delivery problems, or for awards in formation, contact Con- Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) nie Stiggers or Connie McMillen, United States Armor Association, MAJ Bryan Salyers 3519 P.O. Box 607, Fort Knox, KY 40121; E-mail: [email protected]; E-mail: [email protected] phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942-6219. You can also access the Association through their web site at www.usarmor-assn.org. UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery prob- U.S. Army Armor School lems or changes of unit address, e-mail us at [email protected]. mil; phone DSN 464-2249, com mercial (502) 624-2249; or FAX DSN Director of the Armor School (ATZK-DAS) 464-5039, commercial (502) 624-5039. Requests to be added to the of- COL Robert Valdivia 1050 fi cial distribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to the Ed- E-mail: [email protected] itor in Chief. 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) COL Peter D. Utley 8736 EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, E-mail: [email protected] Bldg 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATZK-SBZ) ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine web site COL Michael W. Alexander 7848 at www.knox.army.mil/armormag. E-mail: [email protected] ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24- NCO Academy (ATZK-NC) hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, CSM Samuel Wilson 5150 training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force. E-mail: [email protected]

2 — May-June 2006 Distinction Must Be Made between the the ground” posing the question: “What consti- ers who might otherwise be reluctant to break Nature and Purpose of ROE and RUF tutes imminent danger?” Rather than consti- the 20th-century formula for drafting ROE and tuting a “problem,” however, this is precisely rethink … all of the factors that embody such Dear ARMOR, the question that should be asked. The answer policy.” This comment, too, implies that com- The article, “21st-Century Rules of Engage- comes, of course, in the form of effective and manders and NCOs operating in challenging ment,” by Captain Louis V. Netherland, pub- realistic ROE training that prepares that man operational environments overseas have failed lished in the January-February 2006 edition of on the ground to recognize and appropriately to grasp the tactical situations they currently ARMOR, contains a number of observations respond to imminent danger. The Army has face — and the ROE they have in place reflect and criticisms pertaining to the current Army long understood this need and is consistently this failure. refining and providing such training. rules of engagement (ROE) drafting and train- Again, the available evidence does not sup- ing process that, while provocative in nature, do The author contends that the “difficulties” sur- port this critical generalization. Of particular not appear to be supported by any credible rounding ROE development have led com- note is a quote in an article appearing in a very body of demonstrable evidence. Such criticisms manders to impose certain “control” measures recent edition of The Washington Post, one are not new. The “law enforcement” approach that have contributed to confusion in the ranks dealing with the differences in the training pro- toward drafting ROE for use in “nontraditional and that have “…put Soldiers at risk and secu- vided to soldiers deploying to Iraq in 2003 and tactical environments” is one that has been rity in question.” He then cites, as evidence of now: “Of more than a dozen Soldiers asked to championed by a small group of individuals for this claim, a number of policies that, if placed compare their first and second tours of duty, all a number of years. However, while I believe it in the context of specific missions, appear to agreed that the rules of engagement that gov- counterproductive to disparage any effort to en- be both reasonable and prudent. Yet, despite ern the use of force have grown much tighter, hance ROE development and training, reading this fact, the author cites these examples as a and most said they thought the new restric- this particular article lead me to various obser- trend toward an “imbalance” between the risk- tions were for the good. ‘It’s a little bit harder. vations, which are outlined below. aversion and risk-inclined, driven by a “… la- You’re kind of tied down,’ said one soldier. Even There is a fundamental operational dichoto- tent fear of using force, paranoia of the ‘acci- so, he said, ‘we treat locals a lot better and have my between ROE and rules on the use of force dental’ discharge, and a dual misunderstand- a lot better relations with them.’” (RUF). ROE are directives that speak to the cir- ing of both the dynamics of a deadly force en- Army trainers are constantly reviewing the cumstances and limitations under which U.S. counter and the laws justifying such force.” I ROE development process and seeking more military forces will initiate and/or continue com- would submit that none of these charges lev- effective methods of providing ROE training. bat engagement with other forces encoun- ied against today’s commanders operating in There may well be certain aspects of the “law tered. RUF detail the manner in which force, to Afghanistan and Iraq are supported by any enforcement” approach that might be incorpo- include deadly force, might be employed by form of tangible evidence. rated into such training. It is important to re- military forces engaged in primarily domestic, The author, in recommending the way ahead member, however, that ROE and RUF serve noncombat operations. While ROE develop- on ROE development and training, states that fundamentally different purposes. The fact that ment and training might well draw on certain one of the key legal considerations in drafting ROE do not — and should not — fully embrace RUF approaches in formulating and implement- ROE is to be found in U.S. civilian law regard- the law enforcement aspects of RUF cannot ing ROE for specific types of military missions, ing the use of force. I disagree. Inherent in the be taken as proof that the current Army ROE a clear distinction between the nature and pur- “law enforcement” school’s approach toward development and training process is mired in pose of ROE and RUF must always be main- ROE development is the criticism that ROE the 20th century — or that commanders and tained. In brief, it is a misnomer to refer to — use of force provisions are often more restric- NCOs are currently systematically promulgat- and conduct — ROE/RUF tactical training. tive than use of force measures available to ing ROE that place both the mission and sol- The author notes, in essence, that the histor- U.S. law enforcement agents. I would think, diers at risk. ical record of the ability of the U.S. Armed however, that the distinction to be drawn be- Forces to understand and apply threat recog- tween FBI agents dealing with criminals within DAVID GRAHAM nition, rules of self-defense, and the use of ap- the U.S. and soldiers interacting with third coun- Executive Director, Judge Advocate propriate defensive postures in nontraditional try nationals while deployed on often political- General’s Legal Center and School tactical environments demonstrates both a ly sensitive operations overseas is an obvious clear need for “much” improvement, as well as one. The purpose of these soldiers is to facili- “Big 12” Leader Behaviors: a requirement to review and revise the manner tate mission accomplishment in often highly A Closer Look in which ROE are conceptualized, developed, stressful stability and reconstruction environ- published, and trained. In this regard, I would ments, not to arrest or take down known crim- Dear ARMOR, submit that the actual “historical record” rele- inals. Given this fact, the ROE in place may well This letter responds to LTC Philip Allum’s per- vant to this issue does, in fact, demonstrate an contain use of force provisions more restrictive tinent comments on my article, “Leader Behav- acute awareness on the part of the U.S Armed than those sanctioned by U.S. courts for U.S. ior: How to Identify Good Leaders,” in the Jan- Forces for the need to adapt ROE develop- law enforcement agents. And, yes, these same uary-February 2006 issue of ARMOR, about ment and training to changing operational en- soldiers may have to assume an element of the “Big 12” leader behaviors, which were de- vironments. While any form of training can and risk greater than that of law enforcement per- rived from a recent U.S. Army War College should be improved, a continuous effort on the sonnel. The assumption of such risk follows study of division commanders in OIF. Had I part of the Army to do so scarcely represents from each policy decision to place soldiers in done a better job of explaining the study, LTC historical evidence of prior program failure. nontraditional tactical environments. Allum’s concerns might not have arisen. The author observes that compounding the The author concludes by noting that it is fun- Nobody who has studied and practiced mili- challenge of crafting tactically sound ROE deal- damentally important that ROE policymakers tary leadership could disagree with LTC Al- ing with the use of deadly force, “…is the ver- understand the intricacies of the tactical situa- lum’s contention that “tactical competence … biage used at the start point of most ROE,” tion on the ground “…before drafting regula- intelligence, and courage” are essential char- language that reinforces the right to use dead- tions that decrease overall security and threat- acteristics of a combat leader. Then why were ly force when an individual reasonably believes en the safety of both soldiers and civilians.” Im- these characteristics not on the top list of be- himself, or others, to be in imminent danger. plicit in this comment is the assertion that this haviors selected by the 80 officers who partic- The “law enforcement” school of ROE devel- is now very often the case. Again, I have seen ipated in the study? (This question was also opment advocates an aggressive approach no demonstrable evidence that would support asked by some of the senior retired officers toward the use of deadly force in self-defense this claim. Finally, Captain Netherland submits who reviewed early data from the study.) situations. Thus, it is somewhat surprising that that the real value of the “law enforcement” ap- fault is found with the current regulatory lan- proach toward ROE development and training In developing a convenient, concise list of spe- guage reinforcing just this right. The problem, is that it encourages “… a positive change in cific behaviors that mattered (as opposed to a it is said, is this language leaves “the man on the cultural mindset of officers and NCOs, lead- general list of attributes, characteristics, or traits)

May-June 2006 — 3 we derived our 29 behaviors (plus a space for either competence or commitment. LTC Allum weeks of the course, officers move into a small write-in) from studies and interviews. “Tactical- mentioned Patton’s detailed instructions, and group where they learn specific training strate- ly and technically competent” was discussed at times, detailed instructions are sorely need- gies for the type of organization they are pro- as a potential listed behavior, but was omitted ed. But Patton was also a believer in giving jected to command. All of the organizations in for two reasons: it was less specific than we clear guidance and then trusting good subor- both phases are task organized to train com- wanted; and in early trials and discussions dinates to use their initiative. I believe many of bined arms warfare at all levels. For example, with current officers, it was not seen as a key the complaints from officers today about their in the mechanized team offense module, the discriminator within our current crop of senior being micromanaged are legitimate. Percep- student has to plan an operation as a com- officers. This is an important point, as well as a tions of micromanagement seemed particu- mander with a task organization of one tank significant difference from Army studies of the larly harmful in the complex OIF environment, platoon, two infantry platoons, engineers, and 1970s and early 1980s when there were com- from where participating officers had just re- air defense assets. This is the rule in ICCC, just mon complaints about the tactical ineptitude turned. as it is in ACCC. of “my boss.” While our sample may or may not The division commanders who gave guidance, I fully support CPT Kennedy’s decision and reflect the proficiency of division and brigade provided resources, kept channels open, and commanders Armywide, perceptions of tacti- commitment to become more knowledgeable let subordinates use their initiative were great- about mounted warfare. Career courses defi- cal competence within the four divisions stud- ly appreciated. Dr. Leonard Wong’s study of ju- ied were remarkably high. And expectations nitely benefit when students and instructors nior officer innovation in OIF again highlights come from other branches and those officers for personal and moral courage were also high, the positive results from clarity of mission ac- but not generally met. gain professionally as well. The Infantry School’s companied by a trusting and supportive com- recognition of this fact is evident on my teach- In confidential discussions with the 80 partic- mand climate. ing team. We have one armor officer, one Spe- ipants, items of courage and tactical compe- In reading LTC Allum’s good letter, I got the cial Forces officer, one British exchange offi- tence, while of course highly valued, were not impression that he saw too much of McClellan cer, one Marine officer, and infantry officers discriminators between the “good” and “not- (liked, but soft) and too little of Wellington (dis- with light, airborne, air assault, and mechanized so-good” officers. However, if I had to do it again liked, but a battle winner) in our Big 12 list, and command experience. In addition to those cre- (and could convince the other study team mem- being disliked as Wellington doesn’t matter dentials, one infantryman has commanded an bers to go along), I would add specific items much. Given that commanders must build units LRS detachment and one has served in the 2d on tactical competence and courage, just to be and develop leaders before the battle, and that Cavalry Regiment as a scout platoon leader. sure that our Army knows that we didn’t forget during peace or war, good soldiers function When referring to my small-group instructors, them. best when they are trusted and supported, I often joke that I have one of the few coalition One finding of the study revealed that some there is a strong argument that Wellington’s combined joint teams in the Army. leaders cannot exploit a high level of tactical contemporary Horatio Nelson represents a As CPT Kennedy closes his article, he implies and technical proficiency because they do not more productive command style than Welling- that ICCC focuses solely on infantry platoons have the necessary interpersonal skills or self- ton. Nelson exemplified professionalism that and companies; therefore, ACCC has led him control to motivate others and build teams. A rings true today. He was an aggressive warrior to a greater understanding of maneuver war- good example were stories — not just from the of unyielding courage, a skilled tactician, a ded- fare than he could have gained at ICCC. I sub- immediate OIF organization — of the bad-news icated teacher, and a demanding leader who mit that CPT Kennedy is arguing a point about messenger getting killed, with the upward flow built teams and earned respect and trust from an area in which he has limited knowledge and of essential information eventually drying up. his subordinates. At Trafalgar, for example, mi- should have chosen his position more careful- The most important behavior among the 29 in cromanagement was not needed. In any case, ly. Without examining the ICCC program of in- the respondent’s list was “keeps cool under if our study and its list of desirable behaviors struction, he simply should not make such state- pressure,” and “can handle bad news,” was not continue to stimulate discussion, it will have ments and inferences. He should instead rec- far behind. served a useful purpose. ognize that planners at the BCT and task force There are of course items in the “Big 12” list WALTER F. ULMER levels are graduates of both career courses relating directly to tactical and operational com- LTG, U.S. Army, Retired and have comparable skill sets. For BCT and mand, which include “clearly explains mission, task force commanders, the decision to select standards, and priorities;” “can make tough, ICCC and ACCC: Similar Courses a planner is not based on what career course sound decisions on time;” and “sees the big officers attend, but on many other factors. picture, provides context and perspective.” The Dear ARMOR, Since this article has gone to press, the BRAC list of 29 also includes other items, such as I am an armor officer and currently serving at that CPT Kennedy refers to has been approved “employs units in accordance with their capa- Fort Benning, Georgia, as team chief, Team 2, and the creation of a Maneuver Captain’s Ca- bilities;” and “will share the risks and hardships Infantry Captain’s Career Course (ICCC), so I reer Course will occur soon. In my dealings with of his soldiers.” feel it necessary to correct many of the dis- my peers at Fort Knox, I am continually amazed crepancies present in CPT Ed Kennedy’s arti- LTC Allum correctly raises the issue of high at the similarities between the two career cours- cle, “A Light Infantry Officer Training at the Home intelligence being critical for senior leaders. It es. While there are some minor differences in of Mounted Warfare” in the January-February is critical and is a commonly observed differ- methods, the overall instruction is remarkably 2006 issue of ARMOR. ence between senior executives and others in similar. Through our coordination, we are mak- organizations of all kinds. But assessing “intel- The first and most egregious logical flaw that ing both courses better and in the near future, ligence” is tough. We preferred to look at be- CPT Kennedy presents is that he compares the ACCC will include a light infantry company haviors that reflect the ability to perceive, ana- ICCC with IOBC and Ranger School, in that attack module and ICCC will improve its recon- lyze, and decide. “Big 12” behaviors, such as they focus training “mainly on light infantry naissance and security training in the battalion context, the big picture, decisionmaking, and units.” Nothing is further from the truth. ICCC phase. adaptability to new situations, addressed part instruction is nothing like IOBC and Ranger of that issue. Finding number 6 of the study re- School. ICCC is structured much like the Ar- I speak several times during the week with the vealed, “Adaptability, mental agility, the capac- mor Captain’s Career Course (ACCC) and fo- ACCC course manager, as well as with ACCC ity to improvise, and related conceptual skills cuses on producing combined arms company small-group instructors and we are on the same were seen increasingly necessary at senior commanders and staff officers. sheet of music for where the course needs to officer level, and these capacities were greatly go. That could only be possible if the courses In the company phase of ICCC, students con- were very similar to begin with and both cours- prized when exhibited by division command- duct practical exercises for light, mechanized, ers in OIF.” es are providing the Army with well-trained com- and Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) or- bined arms officers who are prepared to as- Micromanagement remains a hot issue. ganizations. They plan offensive and defensive sume their roles as company commanders and Sometimes for the boss, it is only taking care operations in desert, woodland, and urban en- staff officers. of the details and standards of business. For vironments. During the battalion phase, the ex- the subordinate that same behavior might be perience is the same and includes a recon- DOMINICK EDWARDS seen as dysfunctional meddling and distrust of naissance practical exercise. In the final two MAJ, U.S. Army

4 — May-June 2006 Major General Robert M. Williams Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

The Ever-Changing Role of Armor: Finding the Right Solution for the Future

If you looked over this edition’s table of The race to Baghdad in April 2003 also Eight Articles — Fundamentals of Com- contents, you noticed its focus on urban serves as an outstanding example of the pany-level Counterinsurgency” paper by operations. The U.S. Army and its mount- effectiveness of armored vehicles in ur- Dr. David Kilcullen. He argues that we ed force are currently involved in the full ban operations. Our Abrams and Bradleys cannot properly establish a rapport with spectrum of operations in urban areas provided our Army and Marine Corps a locals through the use of fast moving ar- both big and small. Although we once capability unprecedented in the history of mored convoys. Instead, he recommends viewed urban operations as the exception, warfare. The bold leaders of the 3d Infan- the predominant use of foot patrols. With- they are now the rule, and will remain so try Division’s “Spartan” Brigade defied out a doubt, his ideas have much merit, into the future. The world is in a period conventional wisdom and conducted the but armored vehicles still have an impor- of massive urbanization. People contin- now famous “Thunder Runs” into the tant role to play in the full-spectrum en- ue to migrate from rural to urban areas heart of Baghdad; thereby, hastening the vironment. Many of us who served in the throughout the globe, especially in devel- fall of Saddam’s regime. After the end of Balkans during the 1990s recall the sud- oping nations. As U.S. Army Field Man- high-intensity operations, we mistakenly den calming effect the presence of an ual 3-06, Urban Operations, states, “Giv- thought that armored vehicles no longer Abrams tank made on an unruly mob. As en the global population, Army forces had a role in Iraq. Clearly, the battles in leaders of the mounted force, we must de- will likely conduct operations in and Fallujah and other cities put that argument termine the proper role for armored vehi- around urban areas — not as a matter of to rest. We now know there are simply no cles in whatever environment we find our- fate but as a deliberate choice linked to other vehicles capable of providing the selves — just as we would for any other national objectives and strategy…” same combination of mobility, lethality, asset. and sur vivability as M1 tanks and their As recently as five years ago, many of us supporting Bradleys. Whether leading an As we approach the 2006 Armor War- could not imagine individual tanks regu- attack or escorting a relief convoy, these fighting Symposium, the topic of the role larly leading infantry squads in attacks vehicles are without equal. It may be true of armored vehicles should be foremost down streets of major cities. We were that no near-term adversary will challenge in our minds. They continue to be a great per haps victims of our own success. We us on an open field or desert, but that asset across the full spectrum of opera- rolled across Saudi Arabia and Iraq dur- reality does not lessen the value of the tions, albeit with some limitations. As ing Operation Desert Storm without fight- mounted force today or in the future. leaders, we clearly must determine how ing any large-scale urban battles. The dif- to best harness those capabilities in each ficult operations in Mogadishu of Black While we continue to wrestle with the particular environment. I am confident Hawk Down fame certainly taught us exact role of these armored vehicles in that the leaders and Soldiers of the mount- again the utility of armored vehicles in ur- stability and reconstruction operations, ed force will find the right solution to ban combat operations. Later operations they remain a valuable tool for the future these complex problems. Flexibility and in Bosnia and Kosovo further reinforced force. That said, we should re-examine adaptiveness have long been hallmarks of the importance of these vehicles in lower how we harness our capabilities. Many of the combat arm of decision. intensity operations. you may have read the recent “Twenty- FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT!

May-June 2006 — 5 CSM Otis Smith Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Leader Responsibility: Proper Use of Protective Equipment

Soldier safety is a key enabler to mis- to the bottom of the ear; the bottom of the investigation as to the fit and wear of the sion success in Iraq. Our Soldiers are the ACH should come to the top of the ear PASGT. front-line defense in an environment of canal opening. Soldiers may also find that over time the lawlessness and daily insurgent attacks, • while simultaneously supporting rebuild- Conduct front-look check to ensure PASGT will begin to fit more loosely. The ing efforts. hel mets are level from side to side. headband and suspension system may • need to be adjusted to compensate. If any The U.S. Army uses an abundance of Conduct side-look check to ensure the of the components are broken or worn resources to produce and test lifesaving PASGT front-to-back is slightly inclined out, they should be replaced. protective equipment to increase Soldier (look at helmet rim up to where the ear survivability. However, the proper use of begins); the ACH front-to-back should be Soldiers should be advised that the cor- any equipment depends on its user. Sur- level (look at part of helmet by the ear). rect size of the ACH might not be the veys from Operation Iraqi Freedom re- same size as their previously issued PAS- veal that a significant number of Soldiers A properly fitted PASGT helmet should GT helmet. Design features result in the are not properly wearing the personnel have a minimum of a one-half inch space front rim of the ACH resting about one- armor system, ground troops (PASGT) between the head and the helmet. The half inch higher than the PASGT. The helmet (also known as the “Kevlar”) or helmet should not be so big that it blocks ACH should be fitted by measuring head the advanced combat helmet (ACH). the wearer’s vision, or so small that ven- length, width, and circumference. Im- tilation, comfort, and safety suffer. A prop- proper wear may be caused by incorrect In cases where the PASGT or ACH hel- erly sized and fitted helmet will sit level helmet shell size, poor pad placement, mets are fitted or worn improperly, the on the Soldier’s head (side to side), with improper fit, incorrect crown pad size, or Soldier is exposed to increased risk of in- the lower edge of the front rim being set a combination thereof. jury due to ballistic threats (fragmenta- at the top of the eyebrow and level to the tion) or concussion. The majority of im- ground or slightly inclined with respect The ACH should fit so that the front rim properly sized/fitted helmets have been to the ground. When tightened, the chin is approximately one-half inch above the found to be too small. To ensure Soldier strap of the PASGT will be centered with eyebrows. A properly sized and fitted safety, leaders are required to inspect the equal distances on each side between the ACH will sit level on the Soldier’s head proper fit and wear of the PASGT and chin cup and mounting location on the (side to side), with the lower edge of the ACH helmets. To properly conduct hel- helmet. If the PASGT helmet sits too high front rim being level to the ground or met inspections, leaders should: slightly inclined with respect to the or low on the head, use the adjustable ground. While looking upward, with eye • drawstring tab on the suspension system Push down on top of helmet; the hel- to correct. A visual inspection can quick- movement only, the wearer can test for met should not move. ly determine if the bottom of the PASGT proper fit by observing that the edge of • Check proper ear canal coverage by comes to the bottom of the Soldier’s ear. ensuring the bottom of the PASGT comes Failure of this inspection justifies further Continued on Page 52

6 — May-June 2006 Armored Operations in Urban Environments: Anomaly or Natural Condition? by Dr. Robert Cameron

For much of the past century, mounted maneuver forces expe- nized capability equivalent to that demonstrated by the Ger- rienced urban combat as an unwelcome deviation from an oth- mans. Early armored force training and doctrine, however, fo- erwise comprehensive mission set. Too often, doctrine treated cused on basic skills. Urban combat received scant attention — military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) as special a condition that remained largely unchanged before the General cases. Thus, when circumstances forced mounted units to oper- Headquarters maneuvers of 1941. ate in cities, they did so without proper preparation, leaving sol- These training activities constituted the largest peacetime ma- diers to improvise tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) neuvers in U.S. history. They provided field experience for all while in combat. These trial-and-error measures resulted in ef- ranks and tested the readiness of America’s field forces, partic- fective MOUT capabilities, but at the cost of lives and materiel. ularly its new armored divisions. However, armored units dem- Moreover, once the need for these skills disappeared, the tem- onstrated a lack of street fighting savvy. Tanks tended to attack porary importance attached to urban combat faded, and later enemy forces in towns without waiting for artillery or infantry generations of mounted soldiers had to relearn the same lessons support. Instead, they simply drove into the streets, where they under fire. became disoriented, isolated, and easy targets for defending in- Today, armor organizations are conducting urban combat and fantry and antitank weapons.1 counterterrorism operations daily. After three years of conflict, Criticism of these practices did not trigger the development of they have become adept at such actions. This expertise must not effective MOUT doctrine. The armored force’s field manuals be allowed to wither. Global urbanization trends and national and training literature discouraged the use of tanks in built-up interests ensure the future employment of mounted troops in ur- areas. As late as January 1944, armored division doctrine ac- ban areas. The armor community needs to build on the lessons knowledged the possibility of combat in urban areas, but it of- learned to date and integrate these lessons into routine training. fered little guidance on how MOUT should be conducted, par- Until MOUT becomes a normal function for mounted forces, ticularly in large cities. Tanks were encouraged to operate out- the historical pattern of neglect and focus will continue. side city confines to minimize the risk of losses.2 Similarly, ar- World War II mored training included some instruction in urban combat, but it remained limited to individual soldier skills.3 The year 1940 found the U.S. Army in the midst of mobiliza- tion and modernization. Part of this preparation for war includ- The minimal MOUT training and doctrine available to armored ed creating the armored force, charged with forging a mecha- formations did not prepare them for fighting through the large “During World War II, armored units demonstrated a lack of street fighting savvy. Tanks tended to attack enemy forces in towns without waiting for artillery or infantry support. Instead, they simply drove into the streets, where they became disoriented, isolat- ed, and easy targets for defending infantry and antitank weapons.”

number of cities, towns, and villages that dotted Western Europe. In combat, teamwork suffered further from the inability of the Therefore, each armored division developed its own standard tanks and infantry to communicate via radio. Too often, battle- operating procedures. During the drive across France, and again field communication devolved into improvised means that often during the final push into Germany, rapid movement and massed failed. This problem was largely corrected by mounting field firepower characterized armored MOUT. Tanks seized key po- phones on tanks, permitting soldiers to talk directly to the vehi- sitions around small towns from where they fired into the de- cle commander.6 fenders. Tank-infantry teams then moved through the streets fir- From Korea to Vietnam ing at known or suspected targets to create terror and confusion.4 After the war, armor doctrine incorporated MOUT tactics and These tactics worked well against disorganized defenders in lessons learned in all theaters of operations. This emphasis was small urban enclaves, but not against prepared defenses in larg- not paralleled in training. Between 1945 and the onset of the er cities. In October 1944, American forces attacked the forti- Korean War in 1950, Army readiness declined and the ability to fied city of Aachen with considerable fire support but only a conduct combined arms, urban operations diminished.7 single infantry regiment, reinforced with tanks and tank de- stroyers. Careful planning and detailed reconnaissance preced- The Korean War, however, did not require sustained urban com- ed the attack, which progressed systematically through the city. bat. Fighting in built-up areas tended to occur in small villages, The brunt of the fighting was borne by combined arms teams with the important exception of Seoul. In September 1950, this built around an infantry company, supported by bazooka teams, city became the target of United Nations’ forces, following the flamethrowers, and tanks or tank destroyers. These teams ad- successful invasion at Inchon. Responsibility for taking the city vanced with the infantry leading and identified enemy posi- fell to a Marine Corps division, which faced a series of fortified tions. The vehicles then used their firepower to force the de- strong points throughout the city, each supported by snipers, fenders into streets or basements, where they were eliminated machine guns, antitank weapons, and often a self-propelled gun by massed firepower or flamethrowers and explosives. The city or tank. As at Aachen, close cooperation between infantry and surrendered after nine days.5 tanks systematically destroyed each strong point. Marine rifle- men guided tank movements and identified targets. The tanks Aachen became a model for combined arms MOUT opera- breached the strong points with firepower, overran them, and tions; however, the quality of tank-infantry cooperation demon- relied on supporting Marine infantry to eliminate survivors. In strated there was not universal. Infantry divisions did not rou- this manner, armor sustained the momentum of the Marine ad- tinely train with the separate tank battalions that supported them. vance and much of the city was cleared in four days.8

8 — May-June 2006 After the Korean War, the U.S. military focused its attention on ry owed much to the quality of the Marine Corps forces. Their Europe. There, the onset of the Cold War increased the danger training and unit cohesion permitted them to adapt to an unfa- of conflict with Warsaw Pact forces. However, in the 1950s, re- miliar environment under fire, forge appropriate tactics, and re- liance on atomic weapons, rather than conventional forces, to fine these tactics at the enemy’s expense. Although noteworthy deter Soviet aggression did little to encourage the development achievements, they exemplified the loss of MOUT expertise of combined arms MOUT doctrine. similarly obtained during World War II. The following decade, America became immersed in counter- Cold War insurgency operations in the Republic of South Vietnam. For After Vietnam, America’s military focus returned to the de- much of this conflict, fighting occurred outside population cen- fense of Central Europe from a possible Warsaw Pact invasion. ters. Until 1968, the cities remained safe havens, largely immune Combined arms operations and the application of firepower and from the sometimes bloody engagements fought elsewhere. maneuver received considerable doctrinal attention, but urban How ever, in that year, communist forces launched the Tet of- operations remained the infantry’s responsibility. Armor’s role fensive, targeting urban areas to discourage American popular lay in maneuvering outside built-up areas and providing fire support for the war. support as necessary. The 1979 publication of U.S. Army Field Tet opened with a series of simultaneous attacks throughout Manual (FM) 90-10, Military Operations on Urban Terrain South Vietnam. American and South Vietnamese forces reacted (MOUT), reinforced this impression. It provided detailed guid- with counterattacks that generally quickly repulsed the commu- ance for infantry to fight in cities, but relegated the role of ar- nist forces. However, the imperial city of Hue became the cen- mor to a short appendix. The latter warned readers of the dan- ter of protracted street fighting for nearly a month. There, North gers to armored vehicles in urban areas while simultaneously Vietnamese infantry overran much of the city and established noting that mounted units should expect to fight in them.11 strong points. U.S. Marine Corps quick reaction forces respond- The likelihood of employing armor in built-up areas increased ed shortly after the initial attacks, but they lacked MOUT expe- with urbanization in the Federal Republic of Germany. By the rience. One battalion commander sought to correct this defi- 1980s, each American brigade sector, on average, included 25 ciency by hurriedly reviewing urban combat manuals. General- villages and at least one mid-sized town.12 Nevertheless, one ly, however, company teams arrived piecemeal and simply drove 9 NATO analyst noted, “It is also questionable whether there is their truck columns into the city until ambushed. adequate training, whether adequate thought has been given to The survivors reorganized and began to attack North Vietnam- the adaptation of new weapons, equipment, and munitions to the ese strong points ensconced among buildings and walled com- requirements of MOUT and, perhaps most importantly, wheth- pounds. Tactics suited to jungle operations did not work in the er the career soldier has come to an acceptance of the impor- streets of Hue. The Marines suffered heavy losses, particularly tance of MOUT.”13 among junior leaders, while improvising new tactics suited to In the absence of published doctrinal guidance, military per- their environment. Finally organized into combined arms teams sonnel sought to generate their own doctrine. The pages of the of riflemen, mortars, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and tanks, service journals, including ARMOR, were filled with articles Marines began systematic block-clearing operations. Tanks pro- outlining concepts for the employment of mounted units in ur- vided direct fire support, moving with their dismounted escorts ban areas, ranging from generic principles to detailed tactical to engage targets identified by other team members.10 guidance at the platoon level.14 These articles stimulated discus- These tactics worked, but the city fell after 25 days of intense sion and raised the visibility of MOUT in the armor community, combat, which generated heavy casualties among the Marines but analysis of urban operations remained largely an intellectu- and the large civilian population that remained. The final victo- al exercise without parallel developments in training. With the

“The Korean War, however, did not require sustained urban combat. Fighting in built-up areas tended to occur in small villages, with the important exception of Seoul. In September 1950, this city became the target of United Nations’ forces, following the success- ful invasion at Inchon.”

May-June 2006 — 9 “After Vietnam, America’s military focus returned to the defense of Central Europe from a possible Warsaw Pact invasion. Combined arms operations and the application of firepower and maneuver received considerable doctrinal attention, but urban operations re- mained the infantry’s responsibility. Armor’s role lay in maneuvering outside built-up areas and providing fire support as necessary.”

exception of the Berlin Brigade, mounted units continued to fo- assembled force of inexperienced soldiers entered Grozny to cus training on maneuver and gunnery. end Chechen aspirations of independence. The Russians ex- pected a bloodless operation, relying on a show of force to deter Post-Cold War resistance. The Chechens, however, prepared a sophisticated, nonlinear defense designed to exploit Russian vulnerabilities. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened a new era no longer Employing small teams equipped with rocket propelled gre- dominated by superpower rivalry. Instead, regional crises re- nades (RPGs), snipers, and small arms, the Chechens quickly placed the threat of a third world war, and U.S. military forces destroyed a motorized brigade and decimated the combat effec- found themselves providing humanitarian assistance and stabil- tiveness of other Russian units during several weeks of urban ity operations to areas wracked by factional or ethnic violence. 16 The military’s posture also changed from forward deployment combat. to force projection, requiring access to ports and airfields abroad The failure to end Chechen resistance triggered Russia’s with- for all overseas movements. These developments thrust Ameri- drawal in 1996. Over the next three years, the Russians reinsti- can soldiers into cities wherever they deployed. tuted MOUT training and updated their urban combat doctrine. In particular, they analyzed the combined arms street-fighting Operations other than war triggered training and doctrine chang- tactics developed by the Red Army during World War II. In es intended to support peacekeeping rather than warfighting. 1999, the Russians applied similar tactics — modified to reflect Teamwork with psychological operations and civil affairs teams current weapons and technology — when they again attacked replaced analysis of Soviet tactics and the application of unre- Grozny. They fared much better and took the city without the strained firepower. Doctrinal publications included entire sec- 17 tions dedicated to stability and support operations, which were protracted fighting that characterized earlier operations. mirrored by related articles in the service journals. This litera- By the late 1990s, the Somalia and Chechnya experiences had ture tended to focus on two dimensions: command and organi- encouraged a long overdue update to American urban combat zational issues related to peacekeeping; and the techniques as- doctrine. However, training programs and guidance did not yet sociated with security, traffic, and crowd control. reflect the heightened interest in MOUT. Tank companies par- ticipating in Joint Readiness Training Center rotations contin- MOUT doctrine, however, remained rooted in World War II. It ued to plunge into the mock city without support or reconnais- reflected neither the changing nature of the American military 18 nor the newer weapons available. Therefore, in Haiti, Bosnia, sance — much like their 1941 forebears had done. Kosovo, Macedonia, and Somalia, U.S. forces entered volatile Fort Knox opened a MOUT training site in 1999 optimized for urban areas, where the possibility of combat was high, equipped heavy vehicles, but two years later, its principal customers re- with outmoded tactics. In Somalia, this possibility became real- mained infantry and Special Forces. For most armored soldiers, ity after American forces undertook military operations to elim- few opportunities existed to train the combined arms tactics that inate the threat to United Nations’ food deliveries. The climac- doctrine indicated were vital to success in urban environments. tic street battle in Mogadishu in October 1993 resulted and 91 MOUT awareness was high, but related training remained an American soldiers were killed or wounded when an attempt to elusive target. apprehend a hostile faction’s leadership went awry.15 Operation Iraqi Freedom The Russian experience in Chechnya further demonstrated the possible consequences of conducting urban operations without The greater doctrinal emphasis given to urban combat ensured appropriate training and doctrine. In December 1994, a hastily a degree of MOUT preparedness among mounted units operat-

10 — May-June 2006 ing in Iraq. However, the extent of preparation varied. Some tank teriel, and leadership strengths. In 2004, these new MOUT skills units obtained exhaust shields to permit infantry to operate in were employed successfully in destroying terrorist safe havens. close proximity to the Abrams tank, while others did not. At least During the final assault on Fallujah in November, Marine Corps one armor task force altered vehicle load plans, shortened battle tanks advanced through the streets while riflemen cleared the sight ranges, and trained to scan for targets among the upper adjacent buildings. Forward observers and snipers helped to stories of buildings. Some units actually practiced MOUT op- guide the tanks forward into positions where their firepower erations in the months before combat operations began.19 could be applied against enemy strong points.22 Conversely, scout HMMWVs were not hardened for urban com- Army operations paralleled this systematic application of team- bat, despite the negative experience of unarmored, wheeled ve- work and firepower. In Sadr City, combined teams of M1A2 hicles in Somalia. Army tanks lacked the field phone that had SEP tanks and M2A3 Bradley fighting vehicles formed armored been characteristic of fighting platforms since World War II. This boxes that moved at slow speed through the city’s grid-like street absence complicated tank-infantry communications.20 Overall, layout. Crews operated their vehicles buttoned up and used their however, most armor soldiers anticipated their role as one of onboard viewing devices to scan for targets, while mounted isolating cities, leaving their reduction to the infantry. infantry secured key buildings. These roving, armored boxes The drive to Baghdad exposed mounted forces to a series of moved steadily through the opposing militia with minimal loss. sharp, close-range encounters with Iraqi soldiers, tanks, and para- At An Najaf, the combination of a large cemetery, narrow streets, military forces that often fought from urban ambush positions. and confining terrain mandated different tactics. Here, com- American tank crews, trained for long-range, precision gunnery bined arms sections made up of a tank, Bradley, and up-armored engagements, found themselves the targets of RPG showers, HMMWVs predominated. The tank led to absorb the impact of while fending off enemy soldiers with side arms. any ambush with its armor. The Bradley provided flank and high- Battle drills and task organizations optimized for desert condi- angle security, and the HMMWV covered the rear. Infantry ad- tions simply did not work in urban areas. One of the few tank- vanced through buildings and alleyways on each side of the ve- versus-tank engagements of the war occurred in the streets of hicle section. Similar innovations occurred wherever mounted Mahmudiyah at point-blank range. Training did not address forces were present.23 such engagements and American gunners wondered in combat Current operations in Iraq are providing mounted maneuver if they could safely or effectively fire sabot rounds at distances 21 forces with a broad range of urban combat experiences that re- of less than 50 meters. flect tactical, cultural, and technological considerations. Similar Mounted forces soon adapted to their new operational environ- situations will be encountered again in the future. Therefore, ment. Much like their predecessors in prior wars, they developed the lessons learned to date need to be reflected in MOUT doc- under fire combat techniques that leveraged organizational, ma- trine development and in the training given to individual sol-

“Current operations in Iraq are providing mounted maneuver forces with a broad range of urban combat experiences that reflect tactical, cultural, and technological considerations. Similar situations will be encountered again in the future. Therefore, the lessons learned to date need to be reflected in MOUT doctrine development and in the training given to individual soldiers and units.” diers and units. The time for relegat- ing MOUT to field manual appen- dices is over. Global urbanization is a confirmed trend, even in less-de- veloped parts of the world where sta- bility and reconstruction operations are likely. Urban areas will be com- mon battlefield environments and their distinctive nature and charac- teristics need to be digested and un- derstood at the soldier level to avoid the pitfalls of the past. The simple application of generic doctrinal prin- ciples to urban areas does not meet soldier needs. Organizations fight the way they train — at least during the opening phases of a conflict. Combined arms tactics remain among the most ef- fective means of tackling defended “Mounted forces soon adapted to their new operational environment. Much like their predecessors cities, but team members need to in prior wars, they developed under fire combat techniques that leveraged organizational, materiel, train and work together to under- and leadership strengths. In 2004, these new MOUT skills were employed successfully in destroying stand how best to leverage strengths terrorist safe havens. During the final assault on Fallujah in November, Marine Corps tanks advanced and protect vulnerabilities. As a cen- through the streets while riflemen cleared the adjacent buildings.” tral member of the combined arms team, armor also needs to view ur- ban operations as standard activities and prepare in peace for what it will be required to execute in 10Ibid. war. If MOUT is not integral to unit readiness standards and 11U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), training schedules, future armor soldiers will find it difficult to U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 15 August 1979, Appendix F. dominate the battlefield while relearning the lessons of the past 12Monograph M-22-83, “Defense of Villages (A German Army “How to Fight” Guide from 1944) and present at a time, place, and tempo of the threat’s choosing. Applicable Today?” U.S. Army Armor Branch Archives, Fort Knox, KY, 7 December 1983, p. 1. 13John J. Mahan, “MOUT: The Quiet Imperative,” Military Review, July 1984, p. 43. 14See for example MAJ Adolf Carlson, “Tanks in Urban Combat,” ARMOR, March-April 1981, pp. 30-36; LTC Curtis V. Esposito, “Armor Operations in Built-Up Areas,” ARMOR, July-August 1982, pp. 26-30; LTC William R. Betson, “Tanks and Urban Combat,” ARMOR, July-August Notes 1992, pp. 22-25. 15 1See for example the report of Major F.T. Searcy concerning actions of 13th Armored Regiment See MAJ Timothy Karcher, “Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 3: Understanding the during first phase of Carolina maneuver, 21 November 1941, p. 2, NARA, Record Group 337, En- “Victory Disease,” From the Little Big Horn to Mogadishu and Beyond,” Combat Studies Institute try 57D, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, General Headquarters General Staff, G3 Section, Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004, pp. 23-37; Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Subject File 1940-March 9, 1942. For a comprehensive analysis of these maneuvers, see Christo- Modern War, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 1999. pher R. Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941, Center of Military History, Washington, 16Les Grau, “Russian MOUT Experience in Chechnya and Afghanistan: Lessons for American D.C., 1991. Armor,” briefing delivered to Armor Center, 1999; Timothy L. Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny: 2U.S. War Department, Armored Command Field Manual 17-100: The Armored Division, U.S. Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat,” Parameters, Summer 1999, pp. 87-102; Anatol Lieven, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 15 January 1944, pp. 91-96. “The World Turned Upside Down: Military Lessons of the Chechen War,” Armed Forces Journal 3Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, Study No. 27, “The Armored Force Command and International, August 1998, pp. 40-43. Center,” 1946, pp. 53, 66, 76-78. 17Timothy L. Thomas, “Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned,” Military Review, July- 4For example see 4th Armored Division training memorandum dated 23 September 1944 in- August 2000, pp. 50-58; Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, RAND Arroyo Center, cluded in U.S. Army Armor School, “Military History: Training/Tactics,” CS-1251-M-Army- Santa Monica, CA, 2001. Knox-Sep 86-2C; “XII Corps Operations Notes No. 2,” dated 7 September 1944, included in U.S. 18JRTC Observer/Controller, MOUT lessons learned briefing presented during “The Tank in the Army Armor School, “Military History: Training/Tactics,” CS-1251-M-Army-Knox-Sep 86-2C. MOUT Environment Symposium,” on 18 December 2001, U.S. Army Armor Branch Archives, 5Christopher R. Gabel, “ ‘Knock ’em All Down’: The Reduction of Aachen, October 1944,” Fort Knox, KY. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, pp. 6-7, U.S. Army Armor Branch Archives; Chris- 19 topher R. Gabel, “Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain: The 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, at Team C, 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, Task Force 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, “Opera- Aachen, October 1944,” pp. 1-2, U.S. Army Armor Branch Archives; Charles B. MacDonald, tion Iraqi Freedom After Action Review Comments,” 24 April 2003, posted on website http:// United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations: The Siegfried Line www.2ndbn5thmar.com/tisop/tireferences.htm, accessed 30 March 2006. Campaign, Department of Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1963, 20Note that Marine Corps tanks mounted field phone proved fragile in combat. pp. 251-306; Major William R. Campbell, “Tanks With Infantry,” Armored Cavalry Journal, Sep- tember-October 1947, pp. 50-51. 213d Battalion, 4th Marines, “3/4 OIF Lessons Learned,” 2003, website article accessed 31 March 2006 at http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/tisop/tireferences.htm; Jason Conroy with Ron 6General Board, “Study No. 50: Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment of Separate Martz, Heavy Metal: A Tank Company’s Battle to Baghdad, Potomac Books, Inc., Dulles, VA, Tank Battalions,” 1945, pp. 6, 12; Historical Section, “The Armored Force Command and Center,” 2005, pp. 1-15. pp. 59-60. 22 7For an understanding of the Army’s readiness problem in the Korean War, see T.R. Fehrenbach, CPT R.J. Bodisch, “Charlie Company, 2d Tank Battalion After Action Report, Operation Al This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness, Macmillan, New York, 1963. Fajr,” 8 January 2005, posted on website http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/tisop/tireferences.htm, ac- cessed 30 March 2006. 8Matthew H. Fath, “How Armor was Employed in the Urban Battle of Seoul,” ARMOR, Septem- ber-October 2001, pp. 25-29. 23MG Peter W. Chiarelli, MAJ Patrick R. Michaelis, and MAJ Geoffrey A. Norman, “Armor in 9 Urban Terrain: The Critical Enabler,” ARMOR, March-April 2005, pp. 7-12; LTC Pat White, See Keith William Noe, Battle for Hue: Tet 1968, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1983; Ron “Task Force Iron Dukes Campaign for Najaf,” ARMOR, November-December 2004, pp. 7-12; Christmas, “A Company Commander Remembers the Battle for Hue,” Marine Corps Gazette, CPT John C. Moore, “Sadr City: The Armor Pure Assault in Urban Terrain,” ARMOR, November- February 1977, pp. 19-26; Lieutenant Andrew J. Lawler, “The Battle for Hue City,” July 1999, December 2004, pp. 31-37. MOUT Homepage website accessed on 31 March 2006: http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/ 6453/hue3.html; LTG Ernest C. Cheatham and LTG George R. Christmas, “The Battle for Hue,” 23 January 1998, MOUT Homepage website accessed on 31 March 2006 at http://www.geocities. com/pentagon/6453/hue1.html. Robert S. Cameron is the armor branch historian.

12 — May-June 2006 Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq by Major Jayson Altieri

Two years ago, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) began con- aggressive information operations campaign and enabling eco- ducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations using both preci- nomic efforts, coalition forces are demonstrating that Sunni ex- sion strikes and maneuver enabled by human and electronic in- tremist attacks are only hurting the Iraqi population. telligence sources at the operational level of war to find, fix, The terrorists and foreign fighters are the least likely to partic- strike, and exploit insurgents operating across Iraq.1 These en- ipate in the Iraqi political process due to their extremism and un- ablers allow coalition forces (CF) to conduct rapid planning and willingness to negotiate with the government of Iraq; these strike at the enemy’s battle rhythm to disrupt their operations. groups include the Zarqawi network and Ansar al Islam. While Ultimately, the CF is setting conditions, which allow Iraqi Se- the Sunni are the current focus, there is a latent Shi’a constitu- curity Forces (ISF) to build combat power to assume the COIN ency that could enable resurgence of a Shi’a insurgency under fight, while simultaneously enabling the Iraqi transitional gov- certain post-election conditions or if Iranian agitation occurs. ernment to conclude an elections process that will seat a perma- The Shi’a, in particular, perceive coalition forces not as an nent Iraqi government. “army of liberation,” but rather a western occupying force in the The Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) Threat center of the Islamic culture. While not part of the insurgency, the Kurds likewise retain the potential to initiate violence to ad- To understand how coalition forces conduct the COIN fight, it vance their political aims. is important to examine how the threat, terrain, insurgent tac- The nature of the terrain in Iraq requires coalition forces to tics, and regional differences influence the Iraqi battlespace. To adopt a variety of tactics and enablers to disrupt insurgent forc- advance their goals and achieve freedom of action, the Sad- es. The most difficult and complex is the urban terrain found in damists (SDM) and Iraqi rejectionist groups (IZR), backed by a line of cities running west to east from Al Qaim to Baghdad terrorists and foreign fighters, focus on gaining passive support- along the Euphrates River, and a second line running north to ers from the disaffected segments of the Iraqi population by se- south from Mosul through Baghdad to Basra along the Tigris curing the acquiescence of other segments of the population River. This type of terrain requires large amounts of manpower through the use of terror and intimidation. and precision weapons systems and, at the same time, provides The insurgents recruit new members from a smaller, disaffect- insurgents with resources and sanctuary. The terrain also denies ed segment of the Sunni population, primarily poor, illiterate coalition forces the advantages offered by advanced technolo- young men. Without the passive and active support of a large gies and sensors. segment of the Sunni population, SDM, IZR, terrorists, and for- Targeting insurgents while minimizing collateral damage is dif- eign fighters would be denied freedom of action. By using an ficult. Using ISF and coalition forces’ human intelligence sourc-

May-June 2006 — 13 “To understand how coalition forc- es conduct the COIN fight, it is impor tant to examine how the threat, terrain, insurgent tactics, and region al differences influence the Iraqi battlespace. To advance their goals and achieve freedom of action, the Saddamists (SDM) and Iraqi rejectionist groups (IZR), backed by terrorists and foreign fighters, focus on gaining passive supporters from the disaffected segments of the Iraqi population by securing the acquiescence of other segments of the population through the use of terror and intimidation.”

consists of three major ethic groups: the Shi’a population locat- ed in southern and central Iraq; the Kurdish region located in northern Iraq; and the Sunnis located in a triangle running from northern Al Anbar to Baghdad and north to Mosul. As stated above, COIN op- es offset insurgent advantages in urban areas. Open terrain is erations must include the ability to find, fix, strike, and exploit found outside the cluster of cities and offers coalition forces the insurgents. ability to use mobility, speed, sensors, and stand-off to their ad- To accomplish this task, coalition forces use a variety of en- vantage. Open terrain provides few resources to insurgents. Some ablers to channel insurgents in a target area where precision disadvantages to coalition forces include long lines of commu- strikes and maneuver are employed to strike and disrupt their nications and moving logistics to remote areas, especially in the operations. This method is applied at both the macro and micro western located Al Anbar province. level of operations. The principles of COIN operations include Insurgents understand the limitations of coalition forces’ tech- planned operations, intelligence-based execution, and offensive nology in COIN operations and have adopted asymmetrical tac- operations. tics that are both simple in execution and complex in planning. Planned pattern of operations is a product of leadership, disci- Some examples of these tactics include improvised explosive de- pline, training, education, and experience. Commanders are re- vices/vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IED/VBIED), quired to quickly make necessary judgments — to objectively as- assassinations, and information operations. IED/VBIED are low- sess a wide range of situations — and almost intuitively use ap- tech weapons requiring simple delivery and targeting systems propriate kinetic and non-kinetic force as required. Intelligence that can be adapted for both mobile (convoys) and stationary drives operations using various intelligence, surveillance, and (buildings) targets with a high payoff in both casualties and in- reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and sources, to include human formation operations. Both types of attacks use a five-phase proc- intelligence. The ISF are a vital part of the ISR network by pro- ess that includes financing and information operations as criti- viding lightning-speed, actionable intelligence that allows coali- cal components of the attacks. Delivery systems vary from ex- tion forces to find, fix, and finish insurgents and their sources of plosives carried in vests to artillery shells buried along roads support. and highways. Cross-cueing from a variety of ISR platforms allows coalition As one of the oldest terrorist tactics, assassination has proven forces to conduct precision targeting and defense in depth in an successful during previous Arab insurgencies in Algeria and effort to economize forces conducting security operations (spe- Palestine. The 2004 withdrawal of Philippine forces and closure cial operations forces, border security, and infrastructure). Final- of the United Nations commissioner’s office are examples of ly, offensive operations, both kinetic (special operations forces, political effects resulting from assassinations with high infor- snap vehicle check points, counter-IED) and non-kinetic (infor- mation operations payoffs involving coalition members who had mation operations, military transition teams/battalion transition weak political support. Assassination can also have repercus- teams) are vital to COIN operations because they disrupt insur- sions if the wrong state is targeted, such as the 2005 Arab League gent operations. condemnation of the kidnapping and killing of Algerian diplo- mats. Additionally, this tactic is particularly useful in targeting MNC-I Mission local Iraqi nationals who cooperate with coalition forces. By demonstrating the inability of coalition forces and ISF to pro- MNC-I focused on the security lines of operation, such as seams tect and secure the population, IED/VBIED attacks and kidnap- and gaps, infrastructure, borders, and IED/VBIED, while simul- pings provide insurgents with immediate information operations taneously supporting the MNC-I forces, government, econom- success at little cost. ic, communications, and coalition transformation lines of oper- ation. COIN Operations Developing an ISF capable of the COIN fight is critical to the The diversity of religious and ethic communities requires dif- long-term success of the coalition efforts. To achieve this goal, ferent COIN approaches. The majority of the Iraqi population several essential tasks must be accomplished, which include neu-

14 — May-June 2006 tralizing AIF; developing an ISF capable of operations at battal- ploit insurgents using both precision strikes and maneuver. ion, brigade, and division levels; developing an ISF capable of These enablers allow coalition forces to conduct rapid planning controlling regional territories; developing an ISF capable of and strike at the enemy’s battle rhythm by effectively disrupting conducting independent operations; and developing a self-reli- their operations. Simultaneously, this sets conditions that will ant ISF. allow ISF to build combat power in the assumption of the COIN To achieve long-term effects over time and space, MNC-I must fight, and will permit the Iraqi transitional government to con- accomplish six key tasks to ensure successful transition from clude an elections process that will seat a permanent Iraqi gov- coalition forces to ISF, which include developing a capable ISF ernment. prepared to take the lead in counterinsurgency operations; con- tinuing the support and maintenance of joint coordination cen- ters and provincial joint coordination centers; transitioning the Notes battlespace to Iraqi control; implementing transition team pro- 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, U.S. Government Print- ing Office (GPO), Washington, DC., 21 September 2004, defines counterinsurgency as “those grams; assisting the government of Iraq and provincial govern- military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government ments in developing and securing infrastructure; and coordinat- to defeat insurgency;” and FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, GPO, Washington, ing with border security forces and developing their capabilities. DC., 20 January 2005, defines the operational level as “one that involves planning focused on de- veloping plans for campaigns and major operations that cover the broader dimensions of time and Current COIN Operations space than the tactical level.” Planners at the operational level focus on operational art — the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, or organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns and major operations. Operational-level plans link the The complexities of COIN operations lie in the nature of their tactical employment of forces to strategic objective. environment. Much like police officers working a city neighbor- hood beat, COIN operations must be conducted in urban and ru- ral areas to develop sources of intelligence, determine trends and Major Jayson A. Altieri is currently serving as corps planner, C3, Multi- irregularities, and establish relationships with community lead- national Corps-Iraq, Camp Victory, Iraq. He received a B.A. from Nor- ers and local citizens. Once coalition forces and ISF are estab- wich University, and an M.A. from the Air University, Alabama. His mili- lished in an area, COIN principles are applied in both rural and tary education includes the Aviation Officer Basic Course, the Armor Of- urban areas at different levels of operations. At the macro level, ficer Advanced Course, the Cavalry Leaders Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Air Command and Staff College, and School COIN operations can shape the strategic fight. The use of ISR as- of Advanced Air and Space Studies. He has served in various command sets, such as tactical- and national-level platforms, can find in- and staff positions, to include S3, 1st Battalion, 159th Aviation, LSA An- surgent cells and help commanders shape the battlespace. Once aconda, Iraq; XO, 1st Battalion (TS), 337th Aviation Regiment, Fort Knox, this information becomes available, commanders and staffs can KY; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battal- begin rapidly planning to shape the battlespace to effectively ion, 82d Aviation Regiment, Fort Bragg, NC; and commander, Aviation strike insurgents with precision fires or maneuver forces. Intel- Detachment, Task Force Safe Border, Patuca, Ecuador. ligence gathered from these strikes, through human sources or cap- tured materials, allows command- ers to exploit information, which will assist in finding the next in- surgent target. Finally, the find, fix, strike and exploit cycle can apply to micro- level operations. Using human and electronic intelligence sourc- es greatly enhances coalition forc- es and ISF operations in rural and urban areas where insurgent forc- es are difficult to locate. At the op- erational level of war, coalition forces and ISF in Iraq use both human and technical intelligence sources to find, fix, strike and ex-

“Commanders are required to quickly make necessary judg- ments — to objectively assess a wide range of situations — and almost intuitively use appropriate kinetic and non-kinetic force as required. Intelligence drives oper- ations using various intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and sources, to include human intelligence.” Disrupting an Insurgent Bedroom Community: Decentralized Operations in a Terrorist Support Zone by Captain Gregory R. Mitchell

The asymmetric battlefield of Iraq has tutional referendum and December elec- inated by Sunni Turkoman tribes that are forced armor and cavalry units to devel- tions; and disrupt anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) ethnically and linguistically distinct from op new methods outside the scope of tra- cells operating in the area of operation their Kurdish and Arab neighbors. The ditional roles on the high-intensity bat- (AO) to prepare for a future permanent Turkoman culture and its language share tlefield. What has evolved is a highly de- Iraqi army presence in Muhullabiya. Arab and Turkish influences, dating back centralized platoon and section fight for to the former Ottoman Empire’s domi- intelligence. H Company had a strong combined op- nance of Iraq. erational relationship with its Iraqi army Following Operation Restoring Rights counterpart 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3d In recent decades, the Sunni Turkoman in September 2005, a single tank platoon Iraqi Army Division, headquartered at benefited from Baathist rule, and like from H Company, 2d Squadron, 3d Ar- Fort Tal Afar. The Iraqi and American many other Sunni tribal groups, found fa- mored Cavalry Regiment, conducted se- units shared the same battlespace. How- voritism in Saddam’s military and secu- curity and reconnaissance operations in ever, the Iraqi battalion was spread thin, rity forces. Although pro-regime, the Tur- the vicinity of the Sunni Turkoman en- conducting security operations in the city koman displayed a high degree of cultur- claves of Muhullabiya and Sheikh Ibra- of Tal Afar and east of the city along route al resistance to Saddam’s program of Ar- heem, 20 kilometers (km) southeast of Santa Fe, preventing the battalion from abization in northern Iraq. Arabs, who the Tal Afar. The platoon managed its bat- dedicating a permanent presence in Mu- regime encouraged to resettle in Tal Afar, tlespace from Dixie House, an outpost hullabiya. The Iraqi army battalion surged assimilated to the distinct local culture, on the city limits of Muhullabiya, named to support election site security in Muhul- adopting the Turkoman language and in- for the strategic route, Alternate Supply labiya and Sheikh Ibraheem for a week termarrying with the local clans. The new Route (ASR) Dixie, that it overwatched. at a time during October and December. Iraqi government recently gave a nod to The site was more than a 50km road march For a four-month period, red platoon was the independent Turkoman identity when from its company headquarters, sister pla- forced to develop a unilateral strategy for the ministry of education sanctioned the toons, and Iraqi army partners at Fort Tal reconnaissance and security operations use of the Turkoman language in local Afar. The company’s 1st platoon was giv- that would successfully shape the AO for schools. en three tasks: conduct route security op- establishing a permanent Iraqi army pres- erations along a 30km stretch of an impor- ence in Muhullabiya by January 2006. Despite new political and cultural free- tant coalition and Iraqi supply route; con- doms, the economic and political chang- duct area reconnaissance and security op- The culture environment of Tal Afar and es resulting from Operation Iraqi Free- erations in support of the October consti- surrounding towns is unique in Iraq, dom- dom have fueled a Sunni Turkoman-based “On 15 October, during polling site security operations, H Company’s headquarters platoon discovered a large weapons cache, 5km west of Muhullabiya, hidden in one of the ar- ea’s large wells. The hidden cache included 125 155mm artillery rounds and more than 175 other pieces of ordnance, as well as rockets, fuses, trinitrotoluene (TNT), and several ready-made IED initiating devices, which were subsequently reduced; but the enemy’s local cache ar- rangements had been exposed.”

insurgency opposed to Shiah ascendancy in local and national politics, as well as the United States’ military presence. The Turkoman people are deeply divided along Shiah and Sunni lines, and as a result of tribal feuds, are a source of much of the violence in Tal Afar. vinced platoon and company leaders to Muhullabiya and Sheikh Ibraheem was maintain “Dixie House” after the elec- the mission of choice to focus the pla- While the insurgency in Tal Afar is large- tions and widen the scope of H Compa- toon’s offensive reconnaissance, as well ly homegrown, the city’s close proximity ny’s operations in the AO. Dixie House as nightly counter-IED patrols on route to Syria makes it an important transit overwatched key terrain at the intersec- Reno. On 15 October, during polling site point for foreign terrorist funding and in- tion of routes Reno and Dixie. The house security operations, H Company’s head- fluence. The nearby towns of Muhullabi- provided clear fields of fire and observa- quarters platoon discovered a large weap- ya and Sheikh Ibraheem are important tion along a 2km stretch of ASR Reno, ons cache, 5km west of Muhullabiya, hid- waypoints for Sunni Turkoman insurgents which had previously served as an ene- den in one of the area’s large wells. The operating between Tal Afar and the con- my improvised explosive device (IED) hidden cache included 125 155mm artil- tentious Turkoman enclaves of Mosul. kill zone. Earlier in the year, elements of lery rounds and more than 175 other piec- The ethnically homogenous composition H Company had engaged and destroyed es of ordnance, as well as rockets, fuses, of Muhullabiya and Sheikh Ibraheem pro- terrorists emplacing an IED on this stretch trinitrotoluene (TNT), and several ready- vides an important support zone for a of the route and the resulting high-speed made IED initiating devices, which were distinctly Turkoman front of the Iraqi in- chase led them to pass within 50 meters subsequently reduced; but the enemy’s surgency that does not easily find sup- of the future site of Dixie House. This local cache arrangements had been ex- port or safe haven among neighboring new platoon outpost was less than 1km posed. Arab tribes. The Sunni Turkoman towns from the Muhullabiya city limits and its of Muhullabiya and Sheikh Ibraheem are strategic proximity would facilitate co- Prior to, or immediately after, the fall of key terrain, which Iraqi security and co- alition support of a future permanent Ira- Baghdad, Baath party loyalists and local alition forces must dominate to defeat qi army presence within the town. landowners had conspired to move ord- terrorism in Tal Afar and Mosul. This nance from the nearby Badush Ammuni- endstate will allow political development Red platoon’s mission was to develop a tion Supply Point and stockpile it in the within the greater Turkoman communi- highly effective strategy to balance route enormous dirt berms surrounding the lo- ty, which could result in its pacification security of ASR Reno with aggressive re- cal wells. Red platoon’s subsequent re- and enfranchisement in the new Iraqi po- connaissance for cache sites and human connaissance revealed that six of the ar- litical and economic landscape. intelligence leads on terrorist activities in ea’s 36 wells contained weapons, explo- the insurgent support zone. Enemy tac- sives, and other materials of intelligence Combined coalition and Iraqi security tics, terrain, available combat power, and value. The enemy could not react imme- operations inside Tal Afar have placed isolation from adjacent units drove the diately to the platoon’s discoveries — the enormous pressure on the enemy to find platoon’s strategy for area security and re- caches were destroyed. freedom of maneuver and conduct oper- connaissance operations. Command and ations in outlying support zones. In the control and force protection at Dixie Despite its tribal ties and close proxim- weeks following Operation Restoring House required a full tank section, leav- ity to Tal Afar, Muhullabiya is part of the Rights, Muhullabiya and Sheikh Ibraheem ing the remaining eight-man section for greater Mosul municipality. Muhullabi- remained an enemy safe haven for plan- offensive operations outside the wire. ya had been without a city manager or ning, reconsolidation, weapons storage, Troops available for mounted offensive police force since the terrorist offensive and transit. Two important insurgent lead- in November 2004, which toppled Mo- operations presented a serious challenge. sul’s city government and security forc- ers in the Surai district, brothers who Both Muhullabiya and Sheikh Ibraheem hailed from Muhullabiya, had reportedly are densely populated and their medieval es. On 19 September 2005, within days withdrawn to their tribal support zone in streets are extremely restrictive for both of the conclusion of Operation Restoring Muhullabiya and Sheikh Ibraheem to re- tracked and wheeled vehicles. Regular pa- Rights in Tal Afar, the mayor of Mosul consolidate and plan future terrorist op- trols of the inner reaches of the city were appointed a new city manager for the erations. town of Muhullabiya. Red platoon’s se- impractical. nior noncommissioned officer (NCO) Valuable human intelligence and recon- Aggressive counter-cache reconnais- cautiously proceeded to develop a work- naissance of enemy weapons caches con- sance in agricultural areas surrounding ing relationship with this new city man-

May-June 2006 — 17 “The December national election was greeted with enthusiasm in Mu- hullabiya and Sheikh Ibraheem. Near- ly 4,000 citizens voted at two polling sites. The city manager and his newly reconstituted 47-man po lice force fully cooperated with H Company and the Iraqi army to secure the polling sites and patrol the town.”

that one of the five men that the senior NCO met on the 26th was one of the in- famous local terrorist brothers who grad- uated from Saddam’s Military Officer Academy in Baghdad and served as a first lieutenant in the former army’s spe- cial forces. The infamous terrorist was not one of the two men detained and lo- cals would later indicate that he fled the ager, who was a prominent figure in the A search of the small farmhouse revealed area following the discovery of his weap- local Sunni Turkoman Hamdany clan. Re- nothing unusual; however, the experi- ons lab. fined, articulate, and politically savvy, the enced NCO noted that the men wore short- new city manager made an excellent part- length dish dasha-style clothing, typical- A more detailed search of both farm- ner for the local election site security mis- ly worn by men from the contentious Su- houses revealed drums containing chem- sion. rai district of Tal Afar. There were no ical benzene, ammonium nitrate, natrium- women or children present and no sat- fluoride, arsentrioxide, insecticides, and The city manager’s personal story was ellite dish. The senior NCO was suspi- other unidentified compounds. Combat similar to that of many local political fig- cious of the house and a second search engineers conducted controlled detona- ures in new Iraq: he carried a card that conducted the following day in the resi- tions on both sites, destroying both struc- identified him as a former prisoner of con- dents’ absence, turned up an insurgent tures and sending an effective public mes- science; his father had been executed by explosives manual detailing chemical sage that severely disrupted local terror- the former regime; and he claimed to recipes for manufacturing bombs from ist operations. Sources in Muhullabiya have worked with a human-rights orga- agricultural chemicals. They confiscated and Sheikh Ibraheem revealed that land- nization in Baghdad with close ties to the the manual and quickly exfiltrated the owners were concerned enough to hire Americans and the former coalition pro- site, hoping their second reconnaissance guards to deter insurgents from using their visional authority. Despite his relatively of the home would go unnoticed. The properties. The locals now feared losing young age and sharp western dress, he platoon returned the following day and their livelihood for their involvement with was widely recognized as the local se- found the site abandoned. terrorism. The famous brothers were ru- nior sheikh of the Hamdany tribe, a clan mored to have left the area to conduct op- known to widely support the insurgency. On 28 November, the platoon continued erations elsewhere in Iraq. Through multiple meetings and endless its reconnaissance 3kms south of the aban- cups of sweet tea, red platoon’s senior The December national election was doned farm. They approached a similar greeted with enthusiasm in Muhullabiya NCO learned that all politics in Muhul- farmhouse and witnessed two men at- labiya were family politics. The new city and Sheikh Ibraheem. Nearly 4,000 citi- tempting to flee the site in a pickup truck. zens voted at two polling sites. The city manager and the tribal elder, or mokhtar, The vehicle was intercepted and the se- of Sheikh Ibraheem were cousins and manager and his newly reconstituted 47- nior NCO recognized the man who made man police force fully cooperated with competitors for local authority. It also be- him tea two days earlier. The Turkoman came apparent in coming weeks that both H Company and the Iraqi army to secure nervously and emphatically denied that the polling sites and patrol the town. Fol- men were close relatives of the area’s they had ever met, but the senior NCO most notorious insurgent brothers. lowing the election, H Company imple- recognized the man’s unmistakable light- mented a work program to employ local Red platoon approached its area recon- blue eyes. Both suspects were detained men to clean streets and repair local roads. naissance with tactics comparable to com- and a search of the house revealed an ex- The platoon secured ground until ele- munity-based policing. They regularly pa- tensive explosives laboratory and weap- ments of the 1st Brigade, 3d Iraqi Army trolled the local farms, stopping to speak ons cache. The lab contained a library of Division arrived in January 2006 to es- with locals, learning their names, occu- bound books and notebooks in English tablish a permanent security presence. pations, and family ties in the area. The and Arabic, detailing the manufacture of Local intelligence sources consistently citizens grew more comfortable with the improvised explosives and poisons. Sev- delivered complaints about the coalition platoon’s reconnaissance and security eral caches were discovered within 200 and Iraqi presence being too small and patrols. The city manager claimed that meters of the lab, containing chemistry intermittent to protect citizens from crim- locals derived a sense of security from the reference books, Pyrex-style chemical lab inals who threatened their families and unobtrusive American presence. wear, industrial and military chemical property. protective gear, military explosives, and On 26 November, red platoon’s patrol IED-making materials. Both men were The desired endstate for operations in approached five men at a farmhouse who detained and eventually sent to Abu Ghu- Muhullabiya and Sheikh Ibraheem was greeted them with tea and conversation. rayb. Local sources would later claim to put in place a permanent Iraqi army

18 — May-June 2006 presence to conduct area reconnaissance Despite the prevalence of AK47s, the abil ity to appear impartial or noncom- and security operations. This endstate was Iraq war is presently an asymmetric fight plicit with the new army’s presence. The achieved when 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade, due to the coalition’s superior firepower commander’s approach to combine po- 3d Iraqi Army Division descended on and protection. The enemy in the Tal Afar lice and army patrolling was effective in Muhullabiya in mid-January 2006. A ma- area of operations is elusive and engages forging a working partnership, despite the jor cordon and search operation was ex- U.S. forces with effective standoff. As language barrier and traditional ethnic ri- ecuted by four Iraqi infantry companies, the coalition transfers authority to Iraqi valry between the predominately Kurd- while H Company’s 1st and 3d platoons security forces, the fight will become in- ish soldiers and the Sunni Turkoman po- provided support by fire. Enablers pro- creasingly symmetric. Criminal elements’ lice. vided by U.S. forces, which included a weapons capabilities will approach pari- tactical psychological operations team, ty with those of the Iraqi army and the Establishing effective Iraqi security forc- rotary wing aerial reconnaissance, and a police. Iraqi security forces are lightly es is the decisive operation of this war. fixed wing show of force, enhanced the armed and most units are not equipped Recent operations in Muhullabiya dem- Iraqi battalion’s ability to establish its au- with armored vehicles. onstrate the effectiveness a convention- thority in the town during the operation. al maneuver unit can achieve when em- The plan for dismounted maneuver was In the absence of U.S. tanks, armored ployed in highly decentralized reconnais- entirely Iraqi and H Company’s mounted personnel carriers, and aerial reconnais- sance and security operations. These shap- support was tailored to meet the Iraqi ar- sance, direct fire ambushes will increase, ing operations have forged a modest lev- my commander’s concept. presenting a serious challenge to the se- el of cooperation between the Iraqi army, curity forces’ ability to maintain security police, and local governments that will Coalition units had previously conduct- and stability. The Iraqi army in Muhul- continue to disrupt terrorist activity, and ed large-scale cordon and search opera- labiya is expanding an effective strategy as it strengthens, defeat the enemy in this tions but had failed to confiscate AK47 of AK47 confiscation and weapons li- important terrorist support zone. assault rifles that could be found in near- censing initiated in Tal Afar during Op- ly every home. The Iraqi army battalion eration Restoring Rights, which should commander considered the weapons a se- be emulated throughout Iraq. rious threat to future operations in the Captain Gregory Mitchell is currently serving town. The vast majority of weapons were The Iraqi army commander was chal- as commander, H Company, 2d Squadron, 3d issued to the population by the Baath lenged by the questionable reliability and Armored Cavalry Regiment (2/3 ACR), Tal party prior to the fall of Baghdad as part loyalties of the Muhullabiya police. All Afar, Iraq. He received a B.A. from Washington of Saddam’s strategy for resistance to oc- the force’s officers and patrolmen were University in St. Louis. His military education cupation. Each rifle in Muhullabiya bore from the local area and many were re- includes Officer Candidate School, Armor Offi- portedly tied to criminal and terrorist ac- cer Basic Course, Captains Career Course, Saddam-era arms room markings on the and Cavalry Leaders Course. He has served in buttstock and receiver. H Company and tivities. The Iraqi army commander met various command and staff positions, to in- 1st Battalion, Iraqi army, had established this challenge by effectively and imme- clude assistant S3, 2/3 ACR, Fort Carson, CO; an extremely effective policy of confis- diately incorporating the police into his squadron adjutant, 2/3 ACR, Fort Carson; tank cation in their combined areas of opera- daily patrols. He established the army’s platoon leader, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regi- tions. During Operation Restoring Rights, supremacy by assigning two policemen ment, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort the mayor of Tal Afar ordered Iraqi secu- to each eight-man squad for combined Hood, TX; and tank platoon leader, C Compa- rity forces to confiscate all weapons and foot patrols. This denied the police the ny, 2d Battalion, 72d Armor, Korea. disband the Sunni and Shiah tribal mili- tias. The Iraqi army’s 2d Battalion would follow the same strategy in Muhullabiya, confiscating all automatic weapons and licensing them to a select few coopera- tive residents. This greatly enhanced the Iraqi army’s freedom of maneuver and operation in the contentious town.

“Coalition units had previously con- ducted large-scale cordon and search operations but had failed to confiscate AK47 assault rifles that could be found in nearly every home. The Iraqi army battalion commander considered the weapons a serious threat to future operations in the town. The vast majority of weapons were issued to the population by the Baath party prior to the fall of Bagh- dad as part of Saddam’s strategy for resistance to occupation.”

May-June 2006 — 19 More than a Campaign of Platitudes: Effective Information Operations for the Battalion/Task Force and Company/Team

by Captain Greg Tomlin

“The most important concept to remem- pitted against a far more ambiguous en- Commander’s Commitment — ber about information is that it is not a emy. It is also an enemy that easily morphs the First Critical Component weapon per se; it is a process, a way of into a local populace, which may be am- thinking about relationships. It is about bivalent to, or resentful of, the presence Despite the earnest efforts of many doc- perception, because information is an en- of U.S. forces in its community. trine writers and thoughtful officers pen- ning articles from the Balkans and Af- abler.”1 For the U.S. Army, information opera- ghanistan, few sources exist that provide There is a certain degree of comfort tions (IO) serves as the primary method coherent instruction on the application of shared by combat arms officers in read- for shaping verbal and symbolic messag- IO for units that carryout the most basic ing the operations order for conventional es used to influence the enemy and host- and immediately influential forms of IO. combat. It is reassuring to know what the nation populations. This article outlines If a battalion does not have an innovative enemy looks like, generally where the a methodology for incorporating IO, ma- IO officer, the commander may discount threat is located, and how conventional neuver and collection efforts, into a well- using IO, if he is unaware of its value. He assets, guided by doctrine, can provide de- synchronized operational plan that any may also misuse general support (GS) as- sired effects on a target. Unfortunately, task force can use as a starting point for sets, such as a psychological operations armor and infantry commanders, who de- providing company/teams with a realis- (PSYOPS) team, because of a lack in un- ploy their units to locations to support the tic approach for engaging a local popu- derstanding the element’s ability to serve Global War on Terror, find themselves lace. as a combat (or peacekeeping) multipli-

20 — May-June 2006 er. Such ignorance in stability and recon- mander ensures that IO becomes an inte- OPS team leader may meet with a radio struction operations does not do the mis- grated factor during all steps of the mili- station owner weekly to deliver a CD of sion or the people of a war-torn region tary decisionmaking process and mis- commercials and jingles about the impor- justice. The tendency of commanders to sion execution. To stand alone as a sepa- tance of participating in upcoming elec- rely on combat power is logical, consid- rate annex to every order is insufficient. tions. ering that it is a doctrinal tool that they Further, company commanders under- understand far better than the amorphous stand that face-to-face engagements and In each of these examples, the U.S. sol- and immature doctrine of IO. However, talking points cannot be summarily ig- dier builds a positive rapport with his SOI discounting the importance of comple- nored. by meeting regularly with him. Failing menting combat power with relevant in- to meet at an arranged time or sending formation will only make the war harder Spheres of Influence — a Means to random alternates to meet with the SOI Prevent Information Fratricide is inconsiderate and causes the soldier to to win decisively. lose credibility. According to Field Manual 3-0, Opera- Face-to-face engagements provide the tions most basic method for influencing peo- During every informal and scheduled , the Army defines IO as, “actions ple, eliciting information, and negotiat- encounter, the soldier should take notes. taken to affect adversaries’ and influence ing settlements. A fundamental for en- Sharing relevant notes with the S2 and others’ decisionmaking processes, infor- suring the effectiveness of face-to-face en- IO officer helps the staff build intelli- mation, and information systems, while gagements is establishing spheres of in- gence. Recorded information can also be protecting one’s own information and in- fluence (SOI) within the area of opera- used in the future against the SOI if he formation systems.”2 A dozen elements contribute to creating IO, but the most per- tion (AO). SOIs are individuals within forgets about previous agreements made tinent to battalion-level operations are communities who are deemed as leaders or compliments given. civil affairs (CA), PSYOPS, public af- by the local populace, such as politicians, By fostering trust in the relationship and fairs, military deception, operations se- clerics, tribal sheiks, businessmen, and subtly incorporating virtues prized by the curity, and at times, physical destruction. members of the press. They have the ca- host society, you can influence the SOI Other components, such as electronic war- pability of informing and influencing wid- to make a public statement. For instance, fare and computer network attacks, only er audiences within an AO than a task an influential sheik denounces the reli- come into consideration at higher com- force could as a lone entity. ability of Iraqi police in his village dur- mand levels. Most of the elements of IO SOIs should be tracked on a master sheet ing the weekly sheik’s council. While the are not new to the Army, but for combat by name, title, ethnicity, and the U.S. sol- claim is entirely unsubstantiated, the sheik arms officers working from company to dier who will meet with him a specified intends to use this council as a forum to brigade levels, IO elements could easily number of times per month. The task force improve his social stature by directly con- seem intimidating. Many IO components commander may meet with the police fronting the task force commander and do not fit within the conventional selec- chief daily to discuss the security situa- local political leaders. As a counteraction, tion of weaponry used to destroy, neu- tion. For example, a company command- the company commander assigned as the tralize, and suppress enemy forces. er or CA officer may meet with a village sheik’s SOI travels to the village the fol- Even more daunting for combat arms of- mayor once a month to discuss funding lowing day to meet with the sheik pri- ficers is how to design an effective IO infrastructure improvements; or a PSY- vately. The commander mentions that his campaign to persuade a foreign populace to accept certain beliefs. Often armor and infantry task forces turn to their fire sup- port officers (FSO) to create a plan. How- ever, defining a task and purpose for a CA team to placate Kosovar-Albanians opposed to the return of Kosovar-Serb refugees is not as simple as requesting an artillery smoke mission to screen friend- ly troop movement. To be successful in IO, staff officers have to grasp a new as- sortment of tasks. Deceive, influence, in- form, and preserve are just a few. Only by a task force commander’s direct guid- ance to his staff and subordinate leaders will a task force seriously study IO con- cepts and adapt those principles most per- tinent to their planning and operational endeavors. One of the first opportunities a task force commander has to shape his unit’s col- lective mindset prior to a deployment is during the unit’s mission readiness exer- cise. On arriving at the training center, “A fundamental for ensuring the effectiveness of face-to-face engagements is establishing the commander should assemble his staff spheres of influence (SOI) within the area of operation (AO). SOIs are individuals within com- and company commanders to deliver his munities who are deemed as leaders by the local populace, such as politicians, clerics, tribal commander’s intent. By establishing IO sheiks, businessmen, and members of the press. They have the capability of informing and influ- as a key task for mission success, the com- encing wider audiences within an AO than a task force could as a lone entity.”

May-June 2006 — 21 “While on patrol, a squad leader telling a mother of seven to “respect the rule of law” would most likely receive a blank stare. In contrast, the squad leader could encourage the woman to ensure her children do not skip school so they would gain a good education. By cor- relating academics with the opportunity to enjoy a brighter future, the mother might be more inclined to care about whether her children attend classes and how they spend their time after school.”

going personnel. By providing the new unit with as much historical information as possible, local SOIs are less likely to deceive the new task force and soldiers are spared the onerous task of conduct- ing detailed background interviews with their SOIs. The Talking Point — a Point from task force recently received $30,000 in he has gained stature in the community Which to Engage a Target funds tabbed for dilapidated waterworks. by having the task force commander lis- For the staff to fully incorporate IO into The commander wants to recommend the ten to his grievances. Considering that a maneuver and intelligence operations re- sheik’s village as a priority location for task force sector often includes dozens quires the IO officer to maintain a con- new pipes. However, the task force com- of city districts or villages, it is not feasi- stant dialogue with the battalion’s plan- mander would not support the recom- ble for the task force commander to meet ner, intelligence officer, and company- mendation due to the sheik’s negative re- regularly with every local leader. level leaders. Messages, or talking points, marks concerning the police force. The need to be scripted for targeting specific company commander reminds the sheik Having the U.S. Army deployed to the audiences. A generic message parroted of specific examples of Iraqi police ac- same locations aides planners in build- to everyone — Sunnis and Kurds, farm- complishments by citing the sheik’s own ing continuity folders and intelligence ers and lawyers — will not be as persua- words from previous conversations. Per- databases that expand on the influence, sive as separate messages constructed to haps if the sheik makes another public attitude, and threat of each SOI. Take pic- directly appeal to personal interests. IO statement at the next sheik’s council ac- tures with each SOI and write down full becomes a campaign of platitudes when knowledging improved police profession- names and addresses. If a unit’s relief in soldiers recite messages verbatim without alism, then his village would be guaran- place is curtailed for some reason, incom- asking follow-up questions or attempting teed funding. By the end of the meeting, ing soldiers may not have the opportuni- to qualify the effectiveness of the mes- the sheik agrees because he realizes that ty to be introduced to their SOIs by out- sages. his prestige will swell considerably more As an example, a common theme if his tribe enjoys fresh water than spoken throughout the Kosovo if his peerage at the council thinks Force (KFOR) deployment en- he is headstrong. couraged citizens to respect the Besides being a basic courtesy rule of law, which many ignored to attend all scheduled meetings, after the Serbian army withdrew acting as the primary counterpart and towns were rife with looting, to a local SOI reduces informa- arson, and ethnic intimidation. tion fratricide, “actions, per cep- While on patrol, a squad lead er tions, and information from friend- telling a mother of seven to “re- ly forces that create improper im- spect the rule of law” would most pressions [that] can adversely af- likely receive a blank stare. In con- fect IO in sensitive situations.”3 trast, the squad leader could en- For example, the PSYOPS team courage the woman to ensure her should not independently visit the children do not skip school so they Iraqi army battalion commander would gain a good education. By in the task force sector to offer cor relating academics with the op- handheld Motorola radios if the portunity to enjoy a brighter fu- primary SOI is the task force S3. ture, the mother might be more in- Likewise, the task force command- clined to care about whether her er should not normally visit with children attend classes and how a village sheik if a company com- they spend their time after school. mander is the primary SOI. If the “During every informal and scheduled encounter, the soldier colonel arrives at his home once should take notes. Sharing relevant notes with the S2 and IO Task force officers involved in or twice, the sheik may refuse to officer helps the staff build intelligence. Recorded information other activities in the AO should talk with the captain in the future can also be used in the future against the SOI if he forgets receive different talking points because the sheik would feel that about previous agreements made or compliments given.” about the rule of law to frame

22 — May-June 2006 their discussions. For example, between guidance from brigade. GS assets should does not seem to intimidate soldiers, from country and pop songs, a company com- be invited by the task force to be viable the squad to task force level. By constant- mander attending an Albanian-language participants in weekly targeting meetings ly seeking the opinions of company lead- radio show explains that international where they can regularly lend input on ers and frequent discussions with CA and businesses have little desire to invest or refining nonlethal targets and assessing PSYOPS soldiers, the IO officer can con- build factories in Kosovo until the secu- effects on the same. tinuously update and revise products. By rity situation improves. This will only oc- Commanders and staffs must do their tailoring talking points for each sphere cur after the youth take responsibility for homework to understand the capabilities of locals, soldiers will use the words writ- their actions. The task force commander and limitations of GS assets. Technical- ten specifically for them to engage the delivers a prepared statement during his ly, these assets work directly for the bri- populace. participation in the weekly press confer- gade headquarters. Most GS units are also The foundation for nonlethal targeting ence with the municipal president. His re- reservists and possess unique talents and is the Army’s effects-based operations tar- marks encourage Kosovar-Serbs to un- capabilities. Members of a CA team of- geting system and the use of decide, de- derstand that there are no Albanian or Ser- ten arrive on active duty from profes- tect, deliver, and assess (D3A). Howev- bian problems in the municipality, but sions in civilian business, teaching, and er, there are several striking differences only community issues that required the city planning. Tactical PSYOPS teams between indirect fire targets and IO tar- entire citizenry to resolve. have the ability to mass produce hand- gets. An enemy tank observed in open Major themes should not be strictly re- bills and fliers, and one of their HMMWVs terrain is a clear target and the observer served for specific SOIs or focus groups. normally has a mounted speaker with the can quickly determine if a 155mm bar- The S2 and IO officer can prepare a card ability to amplify voice messages by more rage will destroy it. It is much more dif- every two weeks with messages and ques- than a kilometer. ficult to ascertain the effects on all 16- to tions to aid soldiers on patrol in villages Through an open dialogue and willing- 24-year-old males in a town where the that are devoid of specific nonlethal tar- ness to understand each other’s missions, task is to deter, and the purpose is to pre- gets to engage. Over the course of an ex- it is possible for these special teams to act vent local youth from intimidating return- tended deployment, it is easy for leaders as enablers of the task force’s IO cam- ing refugees. to fall into a malaise and run through the paign. CA officers can knowledgably en- The delivery process for nonlethal tar- motions of a patrol without accomplish- gage local businessmen and government gets incorporates the variety of GS as- ing anything productive. With message/ employees to develop projects. Task force sets, SOIs, and talking points described question cards distributed throughout the messages can easily be incorporated into in this article. Synchronizing these assets task force, each platoon and squad leader their discussions and negotiations. A PSY- with maneuver operations during target- will be armed with talking points to de- OPS team that regularly visits the AO’s ing meetings is just as vital as a fire sup- liver, and information requirements to most popular market can disseminate col- port rehearsal conducted prior to an op- resolve prior to departing the base camp. orful newsletters to shoppers that also re- eration to mass the effects of multiple This simple product is important in any late to the task force’s IO focus of the forms of contact near-simultaneously on situation where leaders are otherwise un- month or week. the target. With the help of the S3 or as- sure of what issues to address while pro- sistant S3, the IO officer verifies that no viding a security presence with soldiers. Synchronization Process and Linkage single company is overburdened with IO to Collection and Maneuver Efforts targets. Considering the variety of addi- General Support Integration — An IO campaign will be successful when tional tasks that a company must achieve a Combat Multiplier leaders make a deliberate effort to adapt in a week, it is important that the compa- Constructing a well-synchronized IO the Army’s doctrine into a fashion that ny commander receives a listing of only plan requires constant assessments, re- fining and rewriting messages to provide soldiers with a realistic approach for en- gaging the local populace on a daily ba- sis. The CA and PSYOPS teams operat- ing within a task force sector have the ability to share a common IO message, but only if they are directly involved in the task force IO and targeting meetings. A task force should not be complacent with allowing these teams to operate free- ly throughout the task force AO solely on

“Through an open dialogue and willingness to understand each other’s missions, it is possible for these special teams to act as enablers of the task force’s IO campaign. CA officers can knowledgably engage local businessmen and government employees to develop projects.”

May-June 2006 — 23 count anything that does not fit into the description of their cookie-cutter molds. Numerical assessments fail to wholly as- sess the effects in the unconventional en- vironment. Investing the time in articu- lating qualitative assessments as part of the targeting process helps the staff re- fine intermediate effects on preexisting tar- gets and in selecting new, lucrative tar- gets.

Company/Team Level IO — Consider- ations for Soldiers on the Ground If company commanders do not express an interest in incorporating IO in their company operations, then soldiers will not deliver a common message. With the tremendous firepower carried by soldiers on patrol in Iraq, symbolic IO of ten ri- “...one morning in Baqubah, my platoon escorted the PSYOPS team to the education ministry. vals verbal messages as the most persua- One of their HMMWVs towed a trailer teeming with soccer balls and jerseys. While my platoon pro- sive method for influencing the populace vided perimeter security, the PSYOPS team leader met with the director of athletics to donate the concerning the intentions of multina tion- hundreds of shirts and balls that would allow dozens of youth soccer teams to begin playing in a al forces. IO not only affects the local in- matter of months. As soccer is an extremely popular sport in Iraq, the goodwill gesture was quite appropriate.” habitants in the task force AO, but poten- tially people around the world, thanks to modern media. International perceptions about the Global War on Terror could be the most essential targets to engage with sure their successes in relation to the fi- swayed quickly by anonymous observers his relatively limited resources. nal goal more precisely. whose digital photos become im mediate- During the targeting meeting, the S2 iden- Assessing the effects of nonlethal tar- ly available to millions via the internet. tifies IO targets that are identical to his geting requires a qualitative analysis of The actions and words of a HMMWV intelligence targets so that talking points engagements. The lethal targeting process gunner may rival the delicately scripted and priority intelligence requirements can relies on quantitative battle damage as- press statement of a head of state in shap- be paired together in the next published sessments to determine if an enemy is de- ing public opinion about the war. task force order. The last thing a patrol stroyed, neutralized, or suppressed. Of- When a company commander wants to leader wants to do after returning from a ten, IO officers want to create measures coordinate for indirect fires during an op- mission is to discover that he must return of effectiveness (MOE) that account for eration, he coordinates with his FSO into sector to locate an intelligence target purely statistical data. Such an assessment who, in turn, coordinates with the task for questioning that happens to be the is inappropriate for the nonlethal target- force FSO. During stability operations, same target he just engaged to accomplish ing process. Perhaps your unit’s goal is each company should have an officer re- an IO task. to reduce ethnic intimidation in a village. sponsible for coordinating IO. The obvi- Often the desired effects on a target may Quantitative MOE would include: num- ous choice is the company FSO, but if he take an entire deployment or longer to ful- ber of physical assaults against minori- is unavailable during a deployment, the ly achieve. During Operation Iraqi Free- ties; number of direct fire attacks against company commander should assign sec- dom (OIF) II, one of the key endstates minorities; and number of explosives det- ondary duties as the company IO officer was to transition security operations to onated in a minority community. to his executive officer or a senior platoon the Iraqi government. At the time of this During Task Force 2d Battalion, 63d Ar- leader. writing, units deployed to OIF III contin- mor’s deployment to Kosovo, a fight broke The availability of company-level IO of- ued to strive to meet this endstate. out between two families in one of the ficers provides the task force IO officer A task force staff should identify key towns in our sector. First, a teenager start- with people he can regularly talk to con- tasks that will support reaching the de- ed a fistfight with a man in the other fam- cerning nonlethal targeting. The senior sired endstate. Commanders and staff of- ily. The quid-pro-quo restitution escalat- IO officer can meet with company IO of- ficers must demonstrate the tactical pa- ed with a grenade being lobbed into the ficers prior to every targeting meeting to tience to regularly engage a target for home of one family, and finally a drive- review changes to existing targets, con- months at a time, or even for an entire by shooting on the tavern owned by the sider nominations for new targets, and year-long deployment. To verify that the other family. Based on the MOE, we had schedule combined missions with GS as- staff is on the correct path to gain the de- three alarming indicators that signified a sets. Following the targeting meeting, the sired effects, intermediate nonlethal ef- spike in ethnic intimidation in our AO. IO officer should review the updated tar- fects should be articulated during target- However, the two families were longtime get list worksheet and talking points with ing meetings. Establishing intermediate neighbors, and the dispute had nothing to each company IO officer to verify that effects that can be achieved during the do with the rights of minorities. they understand the tasks and purposes. mission rather than focusing exclusively Quantitative MOE are too inflexible, With greater visibility on activities with- on the final endstate allows units to mea- may cause unnecessary alarm, and dis- in his company sector, the company IO

24 — May-June 2006 officer offers the task force IO officer a realistic appreciation for progress and frustrations within his assigned sector of the task force AO. This is similar to a company FSO refining the grid locations to lethal targets, or a company command- er requesting ground-burst illumination to mark a target reference point. To enhance IO efforts at the company level, commanders should empower pla- toon and squad leaders to establish their own SOIs within the company AO. If the company commander is the primary SOI for an Iraqi city mayor and the leading sheiks, then platoon leaders should iden- tify muqtars (informal mayors of smaller villages or city districts) and shop own- “Patrol leaders could also influence the locals with whom they spoke to report all suspicious activ- ers who are influential in the areas they ity to U.S. and Iraqi security patrols, or make an anonymous call to the police station. If the people patrol. By assuming ownership of the want to believe that locals are not shooting at Americans, then the residents need to at least noti- company AO, subordinates will exponen- fy multinational forces or local police regarding any stranger who enters their community. Any town tially improve the task force’s collection or district that refuses to tolerate insurgent and criminal activity deserves infrastructure improve- capabilities as they deliver messages to ments ahead of those communities that harbor terrorists and pretend their districts are entirely key communicators who are respected by peaceful.” the local populace. A database of photos, names, and addresses can be maintained in the company command post. All of this ment opportunities, or attending Muja- By delivering these words of encourage- information should be handed over to the hadeen meetings? Without talking points ment, the commander implied that it was replacement unit just as SOI information from the IO officer and linked questions my responsibility as a platoon leader to is transferred at the task force level. from the S2, few lieutenants will take the continue to inform and influence the peo- initiative to share similar good news sto- ple of Baqubah. However, there was also Company commanders need to prepare ries that make the elicitation of credible a deeper meaning to his words. The situ- platoon leaders to cooperate with the CA information more natural. ation in Iraq, particularly accentuated in and PSYOPS elements working in their the spring of 2004, often flipped between AO, and see them as additional enablers An OIF Vignette — A Coffer combat operations and stability opera- sharing the same mission. Understanding of Millions, a Coffer of Ideas tions. An officer could not allow his men the task and purpose for a mission in- to take a myopic view of their mission, volving a platoon and GS asset will en- In mid-May 2004, my platoon received seeing patrols as entirely combat patrols sure that the platoon does more than pro- the tasking to establish security for a or face-to-face engagement patrols. Mem- vide the team with security. For instance, groundbreaking ceremony in a district of bers of a platoon had to be capable of one morning in Baqubah, my platoon es- Baqubah. Participants in the ceremony in- switching quickly between warfighting corted the PSYOPS team to the educa- cluded the Diyala governor, the Coalition and peacemaking, even though most were tion ministry. One of their HMMWVs Provisional Authority (CPA) representa- more comfortable being warriors all the towed a trailer teeming with soccer balls tive for the province, the brigade com- time. and jerseys. While my platoon provided mander, and the mayor of Baqubah. Var- perimeter security, the PSYOPS team ious news agencies and tribes were also Using the brigade commander’s impor- leader met with the director of athletics represented at the groundbreaking. While tant information, patrol leaders through- to donate the hundreds of shirts and balls I knew that the groundbreaking would out the city could discuss Diyala’s avail- that would allow dozens of youth soccer begin the resurfacing of a major road able funds while talking to locals during teams to begin playing in a matter of network in the lower Baqubah district, I dismounted patrols through Baqubah. In- months. As soccer is an extremely popu- learned nothing else about the activity variably, shopkeepers and homeowners lar sport in Iraq, the goodwill gesture was when I received the tasking a couple days complained about unreliable electricity, quite appropriate. prior to the event. impure water, and nonexistent sewage systems. The patrol leader could explain However, the next step in advancing the Following the ceremony, the brigade that their provincial government main- IO campaign would be for every platoon commander informed me that the CPA tained a $500 million engineering bud- leader to tout his excitement about up- recently presented half-a-billion dollars to get, and encourage people to speak with coming soccer games while conversing the Diyala province for infrastructure im- their muqtars and sheiks about petition- with local parents during patrols. Ques- provements. This road project marked the ing the provincial council for a portion tions about whether a son plans to play first of many endeavors, which the pro- of the funds for their dilapidated com- on a school soccer team begs questions vincial government would autonomous- munity. After all, a representative govern- regarding whether parents know what ly identify, prioritize, and initiate. Prior ment requires a citizenry willing to pub- their children — to include older chil- to returning to his HMMWV, the brigade licly advocate its convictions. dren — are doing in the afternoons and commander also told me, “If Kosovo was at night. Are they practicing soccer, la- college for you, this [Iraq] is your gradu- menting on the scarceness of employ- ate work.” Continued on Page 52

May-June 2006 — 25 Algeria: Total War by Eric Chevreuil

Retired U.S. Army Colonel Andrew J. Bacevich was quoted in that would eventually play an important role in the war by ac- the Los Angeles Times as saying: “What is happening in Bagh- tively supporting the liberation movement. dad is similar to the battle of Algiers. Despite using many inno- Lesson — international support vative tactics in counterinsurgency and getting the upper hand . France failed to get any kind over the FLN, the French ended up alienating the local popula- of international support for this war. Even America and Russia tion and losing the war politically. This is what America has to united to condemn the “Suez adventure.” (Egypt threatened the canal but was also a major contributor to the FLN [Front de expect.”1 Libération Nationale] cause). Tunisia and Morocco were sup- From the partisan debate that he initiated, and to avoid the same porting the “insurgents” and provided bases, weapons, and funds. mistakes and results in Iraq, came the idea for this article, which The United Nations also sided with Algeria. presents the Algerian conflict through the tactics used by French forces and by insurgents, as well as the positive and negative The Root of the Conflict: lessons learned from their applications. The notion of asymmet- At the end of World War II, Algeria attempted to seize the eu- ric warfare will also be developed to underline the similarities phoria of VE Day to make public its first nationalist aspirations. between that colonial war and the war in Iraq. It was 8 May 1945, in Setif, and the repression by the French Background of the Conflict colonial authorities was brutal, sending the message to the na- tionalists that an armed revolution was the only possible option. Geography: From 1945 onward, France had to deal with its war in Indochi- Algeria is a 900,000 square-mile arid and hot country (almost na and armed unrest in Tunisia and Morocco. twice the size of Iraq), mostly covered by the Sahara, and has Eventually, on 1 November 1954, the nationalists “declared a heavy urban concentration on its hilly Mediterranean coast- war,” initiating 70 quasi-simultaneous attacks, murders, or bomb- line. ings in 30 different locations within three hours. “La Toussaint Rouge In 1954, the country counted a booming population of 8.4 mil- ,” as that day was called in France, was considered an in- lion Muslims, plagued by 25 percent unemployment, and about surrection by the French government. 990,000 European colons who accounted for most of the local Lesson — “labels.” Denial was fashionable in Paris from 1954 wealth. Algeria was neither a colony nor a protectorate; it was a to 1962, and what happened in Algeria was always referred as grouping of three French departments under the same metro- “the events.” Furthermore, for France, Algeria was the grouping politan laws as other departments, seen as a full part of the re- of three of its many departments, a critical extension of its met- public. Also bordering Algeria were three Muslim countries ropolitan territory in Africa, a full part of France. Overview of the Conflict sionals, who were used to fighting political guerrilla fighters, changed the direction France and its armies were taking in Al- Traditional Guerrilla Warfare: geria and applied proven counter-guerrilla tactics. From 1954 to 1956, traditional mechanized units and tactics Lesson — experience. Only veteran units led by charismatic were used in the djebels, the Algerian rocky countryside. But leaders achieved critical tactical victories over enemy forces. that warfare, mostly conducted by conscript-based convention- al units, was far from being successful against small bands of Military Victory: highly mobile rebels, who used Mao’s guerrilla doctrine to ter- In 1957, 415,000 soldiers, including forces fresh from Indo- rorize small “douars” (towns, villages) located far from cities china, fanned out in Algeria and successfully applied new coun- or military strongholds. terinsurgency tactics against the enemy. The French also had a Lesson — conscripts. Groups opposed to the war targeted the Maoist goal in mind — cut the fish from the water and isolate “citizen soldiers” and promoted desertion, disobedience, sabo- the rebels! tage, or collaboration with the FLN. In 1958, the war in the djebels went from static to mobile. In the meantime, the famed and dirty “Battle of Algiers” started on Lesson — Cold War doctrine. The use of “heavy” units was 7 January 1957 and ended with a total French victory ten months fruitless against the high mobility of the insurgents. The forces later. needed to be tailored to the new enemy and battlefield. Lesson — military and law enforcement. Civil law enforce- Lesson — static bases. The initial French military deployment ment tasks should never be given to the military whose missions of big bases for big traditional units left remote areas under the are and should remain totally different. full and permanent control of the insurgents. “Quagmire:” Lesson — unguarded border. Relying on human detection or intelligence to prevent insurgents from crossing the borders of Terrorism, counterterrorism, treason, civil war, sedition, and FLN friendly countries was inefficient by itself. the rebellious behavior of parts of the army and colons are some of the events that highlighted the end of a conflict that tore apart If the 1954 fall of Dien Bien Phu, Indochina, likely triggered the a country, destroyed the Fourth French Republic, and seriously Algerian November insurrection, then the end of the Asian con- threatened the Fifth Republic. The 1960s brought back diplo- flict freed seasoned troops and military leaders for the new macy and talks of independence. Eventually, a cease-fire took North African front. Quickly, these counterinsurgency profes- effect in March 1962 and Algeria became independent in July rian “moujahidins” (combatants of the faith), initially in the hundreds and ill equipped, quickly reached the tens of thousands by 1957, and were directly aid- ed by Tunisia and Morocco, who provid- ed safe havens; Libya and Egypt with mainly international political or financial support; and by anti-war “liberal” move- ments in France. The soldiers of the ALN were trained in Maoist guerrilla tactics. Their tactics were both military and psychological, aimed at demoralizing the French troops and deterring any collaboration from lo- cals, and were highly reminiscent of what the Vietminh successfully used in Indo- china. Lesson — pragmatism. The guerrilla lead ers were more pragmatic than today’s ringleaders. Lesson — information operations. The fighters of the ALN demonstrated some Algiers, 19 March 1962. Follow ing the Evian agreements, the Bab El Oued district is basic understanding of “information op- secured by French military in support of the cease fire. erations.” (All photos courtesy ECPAD FRANCE) Total War — the FLN: In the mountains and the countryside, of the same year, after eight years of a war that killed between the FLN would target isolated patrols, small convoys, isolated 500,000 to 1.5 million (depending on sources) people. outposts police stations, communications facilities, and road in- frastructure. They would extend the attacks to European colons Lesson — “for or by the people.” The insurgency/counter- and destroy farms and production plants. They also resorted to insurgency war fed on the people that the opponents claimed to kidnapping and executing their own nationals if they were con- defend. Eventually, the people paid the highest price. The pro- sidered to be friendly toward the French. On many occasions French boarded ships and left Algeria forever, while the re- they mutilated the bodies of their victims to reinforce the mes- maining lived through years of purges under an FLN dictator- sage that the executions conveyed — you are with us or against ship. us! More than 6,000 Muslims and 1,000 Europeans, of all gen- ders and age, were allegedly slaughtered by the FLN during A Dirty War: The Tactics of the Insurgents the two first years of war. The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN): Lesson — terror. The Algerian nationals were the best target; The editorial of the first issue of El Moudjahid, the official the FLN strongly believed that executing an Algerian low-level newsletter of the FLN, published in June 1956, well summariz- civil servant was better than murdering a French colonist be- es the insurgency’s organization, drive, and goals. In the news- cause the brutal loss of a local figure effected the whole com- letter, the FLN explains the meaning of the word “jihad” (holy munity. The same tactics are used in Iraq today. war) and defines it as seeking total destruction of the existing In the cities, the FLN used walk-by/drive-by shooting tactics system (final victory) through unity, total sacrifice, and martyr- on individuals (soldiers, colonists, Algerians) or customers at dom, but without any religious or racial hatred, as “the climax bars or restaurants. They also bombed public places and painted of an open and liberal patriotism.” It also states that the jihad their slogans on walls while terrorizing the population into obe- encompasses “the soldier of the National Liberation Army (ALN), dience or “inaction.” During the battle of Algiers, the FLN the political activist, the liaison agent, the young shepherd boy claimed that it successfully conducted hundreds of shootings or that provides intelligence, the housewife that comments on the bombings a month! events in the “Kasbah,” the young Algerian pupil that goes on strike, the worker and his actions of economic sabotage, the stu- Lesson— roadside bombs. The simple and efficient concepts dent who joins the underground networks, the “fellah” and his of suicide and roadside bombings did not seem fashionable for family that suffer and hope.”2 the jihadists of this war! Roadside bombs only appeared during the 1980s in the Middle East against Israeli forces in Lebanon, Lesson — tolerance. The guerrilla leaders seemed to be far thanks to the Palestinian Liberation Organization.3 more tolerant than today’s radicals such as Bin Laden. The Armee de Libération Nationale (ALN): Like “a Fish in Water:” Mao and Sun Tzu met communism and Islam with a conve- The local people were terrorized by ruthless insurgents into nient unifying religious ideology that would fuel the drive of submission or active participation such as providing food, shel- the armed rebellion until the independence of 1962. The Alge- ter, money, intelligence, and manpower to the rebels. The rebels

28 — May-June 2006 were basically living off the same people they were claiming to defend and were getting taxes and food from the peasants. Even in France, undercover FLN agents terrorized the Algerian community into paying war taxes, and also staged antiwar demonstrations. Lesson — dissent, treason, and free speech. The FLN enlisted in its ranks high- profile French intellectuals and show busi- ness personalities who they used as carri- ers back and forth from Paris to Algiers. These carriers were commonly referred to as, “les porteurs de valises du FLN” (the FLN suitcase handlers). Freedom at Last: It took eight years for Algeria to “win” its independence. This was partly because the insurgents’ ferocity toward their own people prevented the ignition of the “uni- Algiers, 23 March 1962. French paratroopers are deployed around the district of Bab versal” and “spontaneous” popular move- El Oued in support of the implementation of the cease-fire. ment against the powers of France. Most- ly, however, since France was in such po- litical and military turmoil in the early 1960s, it had to let go of legal constraints — thanks to the extreme powers provided to Algeria for its own sake. the military by Paris. On 13 March 1962, a cease-fire went into effect. However, it Tailoring the Tactics: was not enough for the jihadists who attempted to strengthen the foundations of their future military-socialist dictatorship of the To enforce the French presence in rural areas and weaken the FLN with swift executions of between 50,000 to 100,000 for- influence of the insurgents, several changes were implemented, mer rallied Algerian soldiers in the months preceding the decla- which included the system of quadrillage (dividing the country ration of independence. into permanently garrisoned and aggressively patrolled geograph- ical zones); the displacement of vulnerable populations; the for- Lesson — total warfare. The cease-fire was not respected by mation of Algerian-based auto-defense units; the control of Al- the FLN. From 50 to 100,000 harkis (Algerians who fought gerian provincial and local administration through the Section alongside French) and families, Europeans, French soldiers, Administratives Specialisees (SAS); and the creation of Algeri- and Algerians were massacred, or just vanished, without reac- an units (Harkas) manned by 150,000 Algerian soldiers (harkis) tion from Paris or the military. who had volunteered to serve France. Lesson — SAS. SAS took over every single administrative and A Dirty War: Tactics of the French Troops medical support at local and provincial levels, to include mail Tailoring the Forces: delivery, city management, elections, finances, and Muslim wom- en’s issues. In November 1954, the French contingent in Algeria seemed strong on paper, but, in actuality, only about 10,000 soldiers Lesson — control of the battlefield. The garrisoned quadril- were operational. Metropolitan police and paratrooper units were lage system, coupled with the SAS, denied the FLN control of sent to assist French troops in “raking” operations of the coun- the country, even in its most remote areas. tryside until more seasoned units from Indochina could take over Lesson — native units. Using Algerian nationals in “native doctrine and operations. units” was an asset to the French military, and the harkis were In 1957, the focus was set on intelligence gathering, exploita- very effective against the insurgents. The one Algerian unit that tion, and new tactics. France had committed more than 400,000 stayed in 1962 was slaughtered by the FLN; the one that moved troops the prior year, after realizing that what Paris perceived as to France was relocated across the country. a simple “pacification operation,” was actually a major colonial Active Battlefield Control: war. In 1958, two active border “barrages” were set up to prevent Lesson — intelligence gathering. The only high-tech intelli- the free passage of combatants; however to facilitate weapons gence-gathering equipment was ground radars used along the and logistics support to and from friendly Tunisia and Morocco border fences. The remainder was human intelligence (HUM- (Morice lines), mobile units and task forces were created (“La INT), provided by pro-French supporters, military patrols, air reserve generale”) and supported with the extensive use of he- surveillance, informants, spies, interrogation of prisoners, and licopters to facilitate massive search-and-destroy operations police-style work. Furthermore, the chain of command was ex- against detected rebel bands. Furthermore, on occasion, the air tremely streamlined to respond immediately, and intelligence force even tracked the FLN across the border to bomb its bases was usually exploited at the first processing level without usual within Tunisian villages.

May-June 2006 — 29 Lesson — terror. The use of terror to “win the hearts and soul” of the population was counterproductive. Lesson — burned ground policy. Forcibly displacing and re- locating certain populations and destroying their villages and crops alienated more locals. A similar tactic called the “Strate- gic Hamlet Program,” was used by U.S. forces in Vietnam, with the same negative results.

Intelligence: Intelligence gathering, exploitation, and quick dissemination were critical to the efficiency of the quadrillage concept and to the success of the quick reaction motorized or heliborne forces. Intelligence was provided by the colons, the pro-French Algeri- ans, the rallied FLN soldiers, prisoners, ground or air patrols, and electronic equipment (radars). Intelligence was quickly ex- ploited at the garrisoned zone level. Prisoners were rapidly dis- patched to the interrogation center of the zone for what would be defined as cruel, inhumane, or degrading (CID) treatment. Oran, 1 Nov 1961. Security operations during demonstrations Lesson — HUMINT. HUMINT accounted for most of the in- in favor of independence. telligence the rapid reaction forces acted on. Lesson — intelligence and quick reaction forces. The exten- Lesson — quick reaction forces. The use of extremely rapid sive focus on intelligence gathering, exploitation, and quick dis- reaction elite forces, such as legionnaires, paratroopers, and com- semination to small and highly mobile units (heliborne, airborne, mandos, tailored to the detected threat, finally denied the FLN and motorized) was definitely the main lesson to be drawn from the mobility that allowed its units to freely roam the djebel. this conflict. French forces quickly responded to information and deployed adapted task forces to the enemy. Whether detect- Lesson — helicopters. The war in Algeria saw for the first time ed by reconnaissance units, seen by spotting planes, exposed by the extensive successful use of helicopters to quickly transport devices of the Morice lines, or provided by any other intelli- quick reaction forces. French helicopters were armed with ma- gence source, rebels ended up running for their lives in the chine guns, rockets, and guns, and carried troops and mortar bat- rocky desert. teries. The French heliborne tactics were later adopted by most of the armies in the world. Lesson — creating a “free hunting zone.” Displacing the po- tentially FLN-friendly population from the borders with Tuni- Lesson — ground radars. Ground radars were successfully used sia and Morocco and creating a so-called “free hunting zone” in combination with electric sensors to monitor the border “bar- (zones de chasse libres: free firing zones) dedicated to the “hunt- rages” and detect any penetration by rebel units. In Vietnam, ing commandos” (commandos de chasse), finally denied the ground radars and intrusion detection systems were also exten- night to the insurgents. sively used to detect enemy covert movement. Lesson — unilateral aggression of foreign countries. Track- La Bleuite: ing down the FLN in neighboring countries and bombing for- The rallied FLN soldiers wore highly visible blue coveralls for eign bases alienated other North African countries, as well as psychological reasons. The effect of their direct contribution to the United Nations. intelligence operations was called la bleuite (the blue illness) because of the color of the coverall. Some of these rallied FLN Total War — the French: also infiltrated their former organizations like efficient moles. la bleuite Between 1954 and 1962, French authorities also used ques- In one well-known example of , disinformation from tionable counterinsurgency methods to balance the effect of the a French intelligence operative accounted for the “purge” of guerrillas and terrorist activities. They displaced populations 2,000 enemies. from “sensitive border areas” (sometimes quite forcefully), re- Lesson — rallied forces. Only locals dedicated to the cause located “douars,” set up internment camps for FLN militants, can infiltrate enemy cells without detection and provide high- burned villages and crops, and quickly executed suspected agents. value intelligence. More that 4,000 officially (arrested with a paper trail) “assigned” prisoners disappeared. Lesson — disinformation. Intelligence operatives often infil- trated enemy units to exploit the existing paranoia of the many Lesson — legitimacy. Inhumane and illegal actions undercut leaders of the many factions that made the FLN. the legitimacy of counterinsurgency operations when conduct- ed by a democratic state. Leadership: Lesson — abuses. Obviously, torture and other abuses brought From 1954 to 1962, a total of 1.7 million officers, noncommis- a short-term military victory but alienated the Algerian and sioned officers, and soldiers served with honor and pride in Al- French populations, eventually bringing a political disaster that geria. Most of these units were elite and seasoned, forged in the led to political defeat. jungles of Asia and commanded by charismatic field command-

30 — May-June 2006 ers. Paris supported the war and successive governments gave diately detained and interrogated. Some of the military com- the priority to a military victory while implementing local po- manders and units resorted to torture or summarily executed litical reforms. Eventually, out of desperation, Paris wrote “a their prisoners. blank check” for the army to win quickly. The battle of Algiers in 1957 and the riot of the pro-French Algeria colons in May Lesson — police database. The French police compiled a huge 1958, eventually contributed to the final collapse of a weakened database of suspects, including their relatives and friends. Ex- fourth republic and the return of De Gaulle to power in the fifth tensive use of this continuously updated database allowed law republic. enforcement officials to quickly arrest a suspect or track him down through his entourage. Lesson — leadership. Some of the famous field commanders may have chosen to lead, order, and allow indiscipline, lawless- Purging the Algerians ness, and use of excessive force; however, most of them actual- ly ran tight and highly cohesive units that stayed faithful to the The defeat in Algiers deeply shook the FLN from within, split- republic. ting its coalition of various armed and political factions. From August to December 1957, a weak FLN was shaken by internal The Battle of Algiers purges both inside and outside of Algeria. The entire popula- tions of villages were slaughtered for supporting one faction A Political Goal: or the other. These gory and merciless scenes resurfaced some In 1957, Algiers became the focal point of the war when the three decades later when the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front FLN set up a 1,500-person terrorist network spread out among (FIS) used similar tactics to terrorize douars into Islam. The the 70,000 inhabitants of the city’s older Muslim neighborhood, rebels often used axes, shovels, and picks for their execution. the “Kasbah.” Terror was a weapon of choice for both sides and Lesson — “Divide to conquer.” History has shown that most again, faithful to their doctrine, insurgents terrorized other Al- insurgency movements were often made of temporary coali- gerians into obedience or inaction. There was no neutrality pos- tions of rival factions weakly united by convenience. sible during this war and when the paratroopers of Massu en- tered Algiers on 8 January 1957, they had been granted full pow- ers to “re-establish order” at any cost and put an end to the wave A Dirty War: Rebellion, Military Coup, and the End of bombings and executions that had shaken the capital for Last Hope: months. In 1958, General De Gaulle was recalled to power after the col- Lesson — psychological warfare. To win over the population, lapse of the government of the fourth republic. By June 1958, French forces also used meetings, tracts, propaganda, and dis- he carried the hopes of the military, the colons, and the pro- tribution of food and sweets. The FLN relied mostly on terror as French Algerian, as he shouted, “Je vous ai compris” (I got the a tool to obtain collaboration. message). Victory … and Dishonor: In 1959, the “plan Challes” and operation “Courvoie” were the last major pacification offensives launched throughout Algeria. The military used the tactics that served them well in the djeb- By the end of that year, a pragmatic De Gaulle clarified his of- els, which included intelligence gathering, quadrillage, raking, ficial stance on Algeria, disclosing his views of an Algerian self- combing, and surprise raids, against the Kas- bah. Furthermore, because of the govern- ment’s failure to cope with the size of the re- bellion and impose the rule of law, the mili- tary used its new powers to conduct searches and seizures, detentions, physical violence, torture, and executions. The cycle of violence and torture became the routine in Algiers as the two protago- nists resorted to terror to win the city. A cou- ple of months later, the FLN was totally de- feated in Algiers, while the terror expanded to a metropolitan France that sentenced 58 terrorists to the guillotine and opened four major detention camps. Lesson — legitimacy. Illegal actions total- ly destroy the legitimacy of operations when conducted by a democratic state. Lesson — judicial powers. The exception- al powers granted to the military by Paris al- lowed the army to avoid many time-con- suming legal procedures (checks and bal- Algiers, 19 March 1962. Following the Evian agreements and the implementation ances). Searches without warrants were con- of the cease-fire, armed forces are deployed in Algiers to avoid confrontation be- ducted at any time and suspects were imme- tween FLN and OAS (Secret Army Organization).

May-June 2006 — 31 determination, which infuriated everyone who had wrongly be- requirements demanded from one of the parties, while granting lieved in his commitment to keep Algeria French. the other an indifferent and accomplice silence for its violation of the same requirements.” (Olavo de Carvalho) Purging the French: Selective Memory: 1960 and 1961 saw the French purges and rebellions. Generals Challes and Massu were recalled to France while desperate co- The majority of the 1.7 million servicemen who fought and lons set up barricades and fought police forces. died served admirably and honorably for eight years for a cause the democratically elected government of France ordered them In 1961, once again abandoned, after suffering heavy losses to defend. Innovative and traditional military and psychological for a cause they were made to believe in by their successive gov- tactics were extensively used to counter ferocious insurgents. ernment, some military units followed their commanders in an The only aspects that history remembers from this conflict are uprising (the putsch of the generals) that would force De Gaulle the tortures and executions performed by some on the French to constitutionally assume full powers in Paris. side; an example of asymmetric warfare at its best; selective In the meantime, a new player in Algeria, the Secret Army Or- memory for those who conveniently forgot the bloody tactics ganization (OAS), launched a terrorist offensive against forces used by the FLN to gain power and to keep it. loyal to France. The organization wanted to keep their “word of The war in Algeria was total war, an early asymmetric conflict honor,” which was given to all Algerians who sided with the re- that killed hundreds of thousands of people, mostly civilians — public. The situation got so serious in Algiers that tanks and sol- the very hearts and minds the French troops and FLN were fight- diers seized the airport around Paris where a military coup was ing for. The conflict spilled into neighboring countries all the way feared. On 8 September 1961, an attempt on De Gaulle’s life, to Egypt and as far north as France and Paris. organized by the OAS, failed. It was a dirty war by all standards; one closer to a civil war than A Sour Ending: a colonial war, with absurdities, horror, treasons, cowardice, and The path was being paved to Algeria’s independence and 1962 extreme self-righteousness from both parties. put an end to the drama. The Evian agreements were signed, For history’s sake, always conveniently rewritten by the win- supported by 90 percent of the French population. General Sa- ners, it was a colonial war won by the oppressed Algerian peo- lan, the leader of the military coup, was arrested and a ceasefire ple, a conflict that almost destroyed the mean French republic; was implemented with the FLN. In June, the OAS made a truce one that brought victory and dishonor to its Nazi-like armies. and the colons and harkis began a massive exile to France. On 3 July, the Algerian Republic Provisionary Government (GPRA) For historians, it was a dirty conflict in which one camp was took control of the country, thus ending the last major colonial held to higher standards by the international community than conflict of the century. was its ruthless and ferocious enemy. The chapter of these dark times is not yet closed and the de- Iraq: The U.S. Military’s Algeria bate about confessing the institutionalized use of torture in Al- Asymmetric Warfare: geria rages in France; brought back to the fore by “the carriers of the FLN.” Certainly, a joint recognition of guilt and apology The war in Algeria inspired the basis of a new “anti-occident” would finally put an end to this drama, which continues to cause strategy, largely rooted in the writings of Mao and Sun Tzu, and pain to French and Algerian generations. later labeled “asymmetric warfare.” As shown in this article, the FLN, in the name of its legitimate revolution, resorted to terror As far as the current war in Iraq goes, even in its consequenc- against the enemy and its own population, bloody purges es, it is not likely to become another Vietnam. Iraq is going more within its ranks, torture, executions, mutilation, kidnapping, in the direction of a U.S. military Algeria — something that will terrorist tactics, bombings, extortion, disinformation, and sabo- deeply affect the U.S. Army, its leadership, doctrine, training, tage, both in Algeria and France. and the way it will be perceived far beyond the lifetimes of cur- rent decisionmakers in Washington, D.C. At the same time, the slightest morally reprehensive or illegal act from French forces was fully exploited to its fullest extent by the Parisian FLN disinformation apparatus. Eventually, the media would end up echoing the alleged or documented atroci- Notes ties committed by the army of the republic, soon followed by 1Retired U.S. Army Colonel Andrew J. Bacevich, “We Aren’t Fighting to Win Anymore U.S. the rest of the world and international organizations. Finally, Troops in Iraq Are Only Trying to Buy Time,” The Los Angeles Times, 20 February 2005. 2El Moudjahid, editorial of the first issue, Algeria, June 1956. that sort of moral blackmail would end up paralyzing the gov- 3 ernment and scaring politicians and military leaders into inac- Eric Chevreuil, “Peace in Galilee: Long Forgotten lessons,” ARMOR, July-August 2005. 4Jacque Baud, Asymmetric Warfare or the Defeat of the Victor, Editions du Rocher, France, 20 tion for fear of scandal. March 2003. Role of the Media: In his book, Asymmetric Warfare or the Defeat of the Victor, Eric Chevreuil retired from the French army after 18 years of service as an armor and cavalry officer and is currently employed by Hansen Tech- Jacque Baud claims that the media is the major weapon of ter- nologies. He is pursuing a bachelor’s degree from the University of Nan- 4 rorists. Brazilian author and philosopher, Olavo de Carvalho, cy, France. He received his military education from several French acad- echoed this theory when he said that disinformation as a weap- emies, to include St. Maixent NCO Academy; Saumur Armor Acade- on has recently become the most pervasive action of the media. my; St. Cyr-Coetquidan Officer Academy; Language and Intelligence School, Strasbourg; and Staff College, Compiegne. He served in various The war in Algeria is very similar to the current conflict in Iraq, command and staff positions, to include tank platoon commander, tank in terms of both the military battlefield and the media battle- company commander, long-range reconnaissance patrol commander, in- ground. Asymmetric warfare at its best is still applied today. To telligence officer, military English teacher, multimedia course developer, function, asymmetric warfare needs to influence society so “it and head of the British and North American Language Studies Depart- won’t even detect the inborn immorality of the so-called moral ment, Strasbourg.

32 — May-June 2006 Abrams and the Need for TUSK in the Age of Rapid Urbanization by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin M. Harris

Urban operations are difficult and cost- degree of tactical mobility and protected M1A2 systems enhancement program ly in terms of personnel and equipment, firepower. (SEP) paid the biggest dividends, par - and require a full suite of military capa- The Abrams main battle tank (MBT) has ticularly the commander’s independent bilities. Demographic studies indicate a thermal viewer (CITV) and the second- vast increase in the number and size of ur- successfully demonstrated tactical mobil- ity during numerous joint combined op- generation forward-looking infrared (2- ban areas throughout the world. Urban GEN FLIR). The modernization path be- areas may be strategic centers of gravity erations in Iraq. These operations, how- ever, revealed that some improvements gins with the baseline difference between and will probably contain a number of the M1A1 and the M1A2 SEP. For the operational centers of gravity and deci- should be made to preserve tank combat power. Today, both the U.S. Army and Ma- Army, the ongoing research in support of sive points.1 rine Corps are experimenting and testing this effort is the tank urban survival kit technology that will improve Abrams pro- (TUSK), but it is only limited research. The operational concept for Abrams, tection, lethality, and mobility in the ur- The Army has not yet funded the TUSK written and approved in 1980, describes ban environment. program for fielding. The Marines have the role of the tank as the principal ele- funded the program and are adding en- ment in the combined arms team that pos- Some of the new technologies being con- hancements to the M1A1 Abrams as part sesses, in a single system, the essential sidered are not that new. In fact, many of of their firepower enhancement program requisites for mounted combat: a high the most recent upgrades to the Abrams (FEP). At left, the M240 gun mount; above, the common remotely operated weapons sta- tion (CROWS); below left, the tank infantry phone (TIP); and below right, the load- er’s armored gun shield (LAGS) with light weapon thermal sight (LWTS).

The Marines are integrating three tech- which will be common with the U.S. Ar- .50-caliber machine gun, TSM Abrams nologies for the M1A1, which are univer- my. Egypt is also adding 2-GEN FLIR to agrees that the M1A2 SEP requires the sally required to enhance the MBT’s mo- their M1A1 production. common remotely operated weapons sys- bility and protection in urban operations. As the second initiative of the FEP, the tem (CROWS), which is currently being The first initiative is to upgrade first-gen- Marines are integrating an un-cooled in- fielded to military police on M1114s in eration FLIR with second-generation tech- frared (IR) sight for the commander’s .50- Iraq. CROWS will provide the M1A2 SEP nology as part of the FEP. With the intro- caliber machine gun. This improved sight- tank commander the ability to fire the .50- duction of the M1A2 SEP, the Army be- ing system will replace the current tele- caliber during movement due to its fully gan adding 2-GEN FLIR to the Abrams scope with a thermal day TV and an un- stabilized full-fire control system. Dur- in 1999. The capability of 2-GEN FLIR cooled IR sight. As part of the TUSK, ing operations in Iraq, “movement” in ur- to prevent fratricide, recently recognized TSM Abrams requested that PM Abrams ban operations has greatly added to our by the Joint Anti-Fratricide Task Force, integrate a thermal sight for the tank com- mounted systems’ survivability. Station- prompted the Army to reprogram money mander’s machine gun, as well as return ary tanks are easy targets; a moving tank from the combat identification program the original M1A1 tank commander’s ca- often surprises the enemy, causes less dis- to fund 2-GEN FLIR integration for the pability to fire his machine gun while pro- ruption to the friendly population, and is remaining M1A1s in the Active and Na- tected. TSM Abrams requested that PM in the spirit of “offensive” operations. tional Guard heavy brigade combat team Abrams maintain M1A1 commonality (HBCTs), down to platoon sergeant lev- with the Marine Corps’ M1A1 solution for The “Baghdad box” formation requires el.2 For the Army, the U.S. Army Train- all systems, including the Abrams, Brad- the tank commander’s .50-caliber ma- ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) chine gun. However, the M1A2 SEP re- ley, and M1114, to move slowly through Systems Manager-Abrams (TSM Abrams) quires a different solution to improve the the urban landscape, resulting in frequent, and Program Manager (PM) Abrams but short, engagements.3 The ability to agreed that the Army’s M1A1 hardware tank commander’s ability to fight in lim- quickly react and accurately return fire solution should be common with the Ar- ited visibility conditions while protected. while maneuvering will greatly add to the my’s M1A2 SEP upgrade, rather than the To fully meet the original requirement to lethality of this formation, while improved Marine Corps’ design. Australia is adding provide mobile protected firepower to accuracy and target acquisition will help 2-GEN FLIR to all of their new M1A1s, the tank commander when operating the reduce collateral damage.

34 — May-June 2006 Finally, the Marine Corps’ third FEP To improve the Abrams protection, le- the added elevation when the weapon is initiative will add a tank infantry phone thality, and mobility, TSM Abrams has resting on the rear-securing pin. Key to (TIP). Every tank in the Army since World requested the addition of other technolo- Abrams operations is its ability to provide War II has had a connection for the dis- gies. These remaining components make protected firepower. The loader, howev- mounted infantry (normally required in up what PM Abrams has coined, “TUSK,” er, is fully exposed. Most gunners in Iraq urban operations) to connect a phone for which includes a modern driver’s vision have learned the same lessons learned in communications and integration of tank enhancement. The Bradley, Stryker, and Vietnam and other wars — some added fires in support of joint urban operations. Marine Corps light armored vehicle (LAV) protection is better than none. This changed when the Abrams began already have a newer driver’s thermal fielding in 1982. view er than the Abrams. The Army and Marine Corps combat de- velopers have not yet agreed on a com- As part of TUSK, TSM Abrams has re- Other TUSK improvements are being mon design for mounting the M240. The quested that the TIP be integrated into outfitted for user evaluation during 2d Army has already fielded some transpar- both the M1A1 and M1A2 SEP systems, quarter fiscal year (FY) 2006. Both TSM ent armored gun shields (TAGS) to many using the Marine Corps’ design. Austra- Abrams and the Marine Corps realize the combat vehicles in Iraq. This includes a lia is already integrating the TIP into their loader’s machine gun requires improve- variant for Abrams, which was developed new production of M1A1s. The TIP will ments to better support urban operations. by United Defense (BAE), in cooperation enable supporting infantry to communi- Many soldiers in Iraq have converted the with TSM Abrams and PM Abrams. Cur- cate with the Abrams crew and provide M240 butt stock and trigger assembly to rently TSM Abrams, PM Abrams, and dismounted soldiers access to the Abrams make it similar to the M240B used by the General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) full suite of tactical radios for emergency Abrams loader. The problem is that the are developing an improved protection use. Currently, dismounted infantry-to- tank’s mounting system is not designed system, the loader’s armored gun shield tank coordination is conducted by shout- to hold the M240B. Crewmen have to rest (LAGS), which will provide added sur- ing over the noise of the AGT1500 gas the machine gun on the rear pin to have vivability to the loader. Unfortunately, no turbine engine, and requires the tank com- full access to the trigger assembly. new design for mounting the M240 has mander to be fully exposed to enemy fire. been introduced as of yet. Eventually, this system could host a wire- Using the M240B allows the loader to less communications system, which would engage targets with less of his torso ex- TSM Abrams manager has also request- increase safety and protection for dis- posed to enemy fire, which is considered ed that a thermal sight be added to the mounted infantrymen. Even with com- by many to be a more accurate firing tech- loader’s M240 in support of combat op- plete fielding of the multi-band inter/in- nique. Unfortunately, the Abrams M240 erations during periods of limited visi- tra team radio (MBITR), this system will does not have the front iron sight, and the bility. The infantry branch is currently provide a good backup during the ‘fog of ammunition can often become misfed due fielding a medium thermal weapons sight battle.’ to improper alignment, which is based on for their inventory of M240Bs; the Abrams

“The Abrams main battle tank (MBT) has successfully demonstrated tactical mobility during numerous joint combined operations in Iraq. These operations, however, revealed that some improvements should be made to preserve tank combat power. Today, both the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are experimenting and testing technology that will improve Abrams protection, lethality, and mobility in the urban environment.” Photo by Doug McDonough was not included in the basis of issue since Marine Corps combat developers will con- should submit an operational needs state- the tank gunner already has a thermal tinue to share information gained during ment today. sight for the coaxially mounted M240. testing. The enemy has attempted to conduct TUSK includes many other technolo- simultaneous complex attacks from mul- gies, which will greatly enhance and pre- Notes tiple directions, requiring all three crew- serve tank combat power. U.S. Central men to conduct simultaneous engage- 1Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Oper- Command (CENTCOM) has submitted ations, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 18 ments, which necessitate improvements a requirement (operational needs state- September 2002, pp. vii and viii. for the loader. Due to the distance from ment) for TUSK; however, no funding 2Reprograming is when the Army changes the purpose of the loader’s head to the recommended for production has been received to date. money authorized for use from one item to another. loader’s thermal weapons sight eyepiece, Money is promised in June 2006 as part 3The “Baghdad box” formation is a small-unit formation a heads up or embedded goggle display 4 with vehicles at all four corners to maintain 360-degree situa- of the FY06 supplemental for OIF. tional awareness; it makes it less likely for a rear attack on any will be required. These goggles will be of the vehicles. Each vehicle is responsible for a specific sec- the standard Army issue sand, dust, and Most leaders would agree that loaders tor. wind ballistic goggles with an embedded and tank commanders should have pro- 4Supplemental funding is emergency funding requested to tection and having night sights for ma- support the current war effort and is outside of the normal bud- display. The goggle could also be con- get process. nected to the driver’s new thermal sight chine guns makes sense; the problem is 5TSM Abrams was scheduled to close in FY04, but has been since it has the same RS170 video output trying to compete with all the other Ar- reinstated. No more changes for Abrams requirements were connection. my and Department of Defense require- expected since production was to stop in 2008. ments. Today, TUSK is not fielded. If The Marine Corps is also investigating money is made available, limited quanti- ways to improve the loader’s station by ties of LAGS, CROWS, TIP, and driv- Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Harris is current- using a different technological solution. er’s vision enhancer (DVE) could be pro- ly the assistant Training and Doctrine Com- They are testing a new fixed/swing mount duced and begin fielding in early 2007. mand System Manager for Abrams, Fort Knox, that is capable of securing the M240B. KY. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military This mount would be common with the The mission of armor is to close with Academy and an M.S. from Central Michigan University. His military education includes Air- system used on Stryker, but could not sup- and destroy the enemy using firepower, borne School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Ar- port the weight of any added ballistic pro- maneuver, and shock effect. TUSK will mor Officer Advanced Course, and U.S. Army tection, such as TAGS or LAGS, for the enhance this capability and the mission Command and General Staff College. He has loader. The Marine Corps mount would of armor. Unfortunately, TUSK is not cur- served in various command and staff positions, enable the loader to fire the weapon with- rently funded. Originally identified by to include assistant product manager for large out exposing any part of his body when TSM Abrams in the late summer of 2003, caliber (Abrams) ammunition, Picatinny Arse- engaging enemy at higher elevations com- there is only a glimmer of hope for funds nal, NJ; administrative contracting officer, Lima monly found in urban terrain. However, in the summer of 2006.5 As of February Army Tank Plant, Lima, OH; combined arms during normal tank-to-ground engage- 2006, the Army Requirements Resourc- team armor advisor, 42d Army National Guard, Fort Dix, NJ; commander, Headquarters and ments, this system would fully expose the ing Board approved 76 TUSK kits for Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 70th loader, but is also more responsive since 1st Armored Division, but funding can- Armor, 194th Separate Infantry Brigade, Fort there are no bearings or skate ring, which not be made available in time to meet Knox, KY; and commander, E Company, 2d has recently been reported as an issue for their deployment. For units to receive Battalion, 46th Infantry, 1st Armor Training Bri- tanks equipped with the TAGS. Army and TUSK once it is funded, commanders gade, Fort Knox.

“To improve the Abrams protection, lethality, and mobility, TSM Abrams has requested the addition of other technologies. These remaining components make up what PM Abrams has coined, “TUSK,” which includes a modern driver’s vision enhancement. The Bradley, Stryker, and Marine Corps light armored vehicle (LAV) already have a newer driver’s thermal viewer than the Abrams.”

36 — May-June 2006 Introduction to the Stryker Mobile Gun System

by Major Jonathan B. Slater

(Published in Infantry, March-April 2006)

The Stryker mobile gun system’s (MGS) high-explosive plastic tracer (HEP-T), sa- against 14.5mm armor-piercing rounds mission is to provide direct supporting bot, and canister. Each round provides the and travels at speeds up to 60 mph. fires to infantry squads during the assault. commander a unique capability. The MGS Its primary function is to destroy or sup- carries 18 rounds and uses an automatic Planning Considerations press hardened enemy bunkers and ma- loader. The mission equipment package chine gun and sniper positions, and create has eight rounds in a ready configuration The MGS has several unique character- infantry breach points in urban, restrict- in its carousel and an additional 10 rounds istics, including safety, security, and com- ed, and open rolling terrain. Additional- in a replenisher for reloading the carou- mand and control considerations while in- ly, in the self-defense mode, the MGS sel. The MGS is controlled through a fire tegrated with mounted and dismounted provides limited antiarmor capabilities. control system computer, which tracks elements, which must be considered when round locations in the carousel and re- employing it tactically. Overview plenisher and has ballistic solutions for Safety. MGS safety considerations sig- The MGS is a direct fire supporting each type of round. The MGS also has a nificantly exceed the general consider- weapons system that has a 105mm can- coaxial-mounted M240C 7.62mm ma- ations of vehicle movement with troops. non turret mounted on a Stryker chassis. chine gun and a pedestal-mounted M2 Dismounted soldiers working in proxim- It has a crew of three, which includes the .50-caliber for the vehicle commander. ity to the MGS must be aware of its gun driver, gunner, and vehicle commander. The weapons platform is stabilized and barrel blast area, critical hearing damage The MGS provides the infantry command- can fire 360 degrees while moving. The area, and back-blast area from target im- er the rapid-fire precision capability of a MGS platoon consists of three mobile pact. Firing the MGS in an urban envi- high-caliber round — a personal sledge- gun systems with crew and can be fought ronment has the implications of overpres- hammer. as an organic platoon, such as one MGS sure from its firing blast, as well as its in support of an infantry platoon, or some Each infantry company has one MGS back blast, which will effect windows, platoon, which is made up of three MGS variation thereof. exposed personnel, and loose debris. The vehicles and crews. This equates to nine following protective measures must be The MGS meets all the requirements of considered when firing the MGS: MGS per Stryker battalion and 27 in the the Stryker fleet for mobility, survivabil- Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). ity, and commonality of chassis repair • The immediate areas behind the gun The MGS has the capability of firing parts. However, the MGS cannot perform muzzle, for a distance of 25 meters, four different types of service ammuni- vehicle self-recovery since it carries no require hearing protection to avoid ear- tion: the high-explosive, anti-tank (HEAT), internal winch system. It is survivable drum rupture.

May-June 2006 — 37 • As hearing protective measures, all ing, an effort is underway to provide that must be considered during the planning soldiers within the 25-meter range data to field units in the future. phase: must be forewarned prior to firing the The MGS also has a significant range • When mounted, the MGS driver can weapons system. safety danger zone associated with its ar- observe a standing person to the driv- • Any vehicle within close proximity to senal of rounds. Leaders must take those er’s side at 32 inches and beyond, but MGS during firing must be complete- ranges into account prior to employment. he cannot see the ground immediately ly buttoned-up to protect the hearing For example, a gunner may chose to en- in front of the vehicle. of its occupants. gage a sniper location in a building with • On his side of the vehicle, the vehicle • The back blast from point of impact a sabot round. However, after that round commander has a blind spot of sever- throws incapacitating projectiles out impacts the sniper’s location, it has the al meters. potential to continue down range for up • to 100 meters. to 9km. This impact requires leaders to Rear security must always be consid- • The cartridge from the fired round is assess the down-range impact, which ered for the MGS; as with all vehicles, ejected in an area of five meters be- could be a town or friendly forces in that the rear is its most vulnerable area. hind the gun tube and causes injury general direction. These security issues also apply to the on contact. personal safety issues of the infantryman SBCT leaders need to ensure that when- operating in close proximity to the MGS. Risk factors associated with each of these ever possible, they integrate full graphic areas can be reduced through training and control measures in to their operational Command and Control. The MGS’s education. The most beneficial training plans, to include no-fire areas (NFA), fire primary role is to support assaulting in- method is to mark off the safety distanc- coordination lines (FCL), and no-maneu- fantry; as such, the MGS will frequently es from the MGS to point of impact. Sol- ver areas between the MGS’ planned fir- be attached in support of an infantry pla- diers should observe and understand what ing positions and their targets, keeping toon. It operates on the FM frequency of the distances look like on the ground. Lead- all friendly forces well clear of the MGS’ its supported unit and takes fire com- ers should specify identifiable locations muzzle-to-target line. mands from the maneuver commander, on the ground for limits of advance prior the company commander, and on down to using the main gun. Security. Local security capabilities for to the fire team leader, if the vehicle is the MGS are limited. Its three-man crew assigned to support. The maneuver lead- To further complicate safety consider- has limited capability to observe areas of ations, building structures must be care- er will ensure his forces are prepared pri- immediate proximity to the vehicle while or to ordering the MGS to fire. The ma- fully considered to avoid overmatching mounted, and the crew cannot operate ef- your target, which could completely de- neuver force will also coordinate move- fectively with a crewmember dismount- ment in formations and coordination of molish a building’s structure, penetrate ed. The SBCT infantry company com- buildings behind the target, and damage fires. A vehicle intercom system handset, mander must plan for providing security located on the rear of the hull, allows dis- the structural integrity of a building, there- for these valuable assets. by denying or limiting friendly soldier mounted leaders to directly communicate access to the target building. Although When operating in an urban environ- with the crew to enhance coordination be- the effects of each type of round has not ment, the deadspace must be observed by tween dismounted infantry and the sup- been characterized on every type of build- dismounted soldiers. These specific points porting MGS. Research and Developments During August 2005, a tactics, tech- niques, and procedures (TTP) develop- ment exercise was conducted at Fort Ben- ning, Georgia. Observations from the ex- ercise resulted in the development of sev- eral new operating methods, which are outlined below. Breach operations sequence of events: • MGS moves into an overwatch posi- tion (200 to 500 meters). • Assault element moves into position (mounted or dismounted) and provides flank security. • Assault element provides observation on breach site. If dismounted, no closer than 100 meters. • MGS notifies assault element “gun ready,” when it is oriented on the target and HEP-T round is loaded. • Prior to assault leader giving fire com- mand, leaders must ensure all soldiers Figure 1. MGS Back Blast Area Overlay are in covered positions with some level

38 — May-June 2006 of hearing protection at time of firing. • Assault element observes impact and determines if ad- ditional rounds are required to form breach. The current re- quirement for the MGS is to make a breach site in a double reinforced concrete wall with- in 3 to 5 rounds. The amount of debris and dust caused by the round exploding will take approximately 10 seconds to dissipate. • Assault leader orders MGS crew to shift fires prior to con- ducting the assault. If mount- ed, the infantry carrier vehi- cle (ICV) quickly reaches the breach site; the crew dismounts and enters breach. The ICV then moves beyond the objec- tive to provide far-side secu- “The MGS has several unique characteristics, including safety, security, and command and control rity. If it is a dismounted as- considerations while integrated with mounted and dismounted elements, which must be considered sault, the ICV provides sup- when employing it tactically.” pressing fires as needed and, at the assault leader’s com- mand, moves to the far side for security. • The MGS should have an additional element will order the MGS forward to tions is primary, the driver can monitor sector of fire for the coaxial machine gun destroy the bunker based on initial con- the movement as well as the hand and because main gun rounds should not be tact and spot reports. The MGS will de- arm signals of the dismounted elements fired when soldiers are in the gun line. stroy the bunker per procedure and pro- ahead. There is also a telephone box • Prior to the assault, a planning con- vide overwatch while an infantry squad mounted on the MGS for direct intercom sideration is to conduct breaches sequen- clears what remains of the bunker. communications with the crew. An expe- tially or simultaneously with more than Military operations on urbanized ter- rienced leader should stay with the MGS rain (MOUT) operations: in a trail position to maintain maximum one MGS in support, if a secondary breach control of the dismounted infantry and site is required for another building. The MGS can operate in a MOUT envi- MGS team. A rear security element is also • Leaders should develop blast-area ronment as a complement to dismounted necessary. over lays, as shown in Figure 1, for oper- infantry by providing precision fires with ations planning to ensure unit safety. its coax machine gun while the infantry Because coordination between mount- provide local security and clear road in- ed and dismounted forces is difficult, the Destroying a bunker: dismounted infantry, without any means tersections to protect the MGS flank. Per of communicating with the MGS crew, In this scenario, the plan calls for the doctrine, HEP-T rounds are battle carried should stay clear of the MGS due to its MGS to fire two rounds to destroy a stan- in a MOUT environment. A single HEP- limited field of view. Planning for MOUT dard NATO-constructed bunker. The first T round will subdue any enemy person- movement requires evaluating routes due round, a high-explosive anti-tank tracer nel in a building should the infantry come to the vehicle turning radius and main gun (HEAT-T) round, is aimed at the base of across an overwhelming position. rotation. the bunker. It will destroy the major for- The MGS also brings the capability to General observations and planning tifications and its jet stream will incapac- address snipers in multi-story buildings. factors: itate enemy personnel. The second round, The coax machine gun has the capability HEP-T, is fired into the hole created by to place precision fires; the main gun can • FM communications should always the initial round to destroy the bunker. fire a HEP-T round into a window or be the primary form of communications through an opening below the floor, de- with the MGS. Bunker engagements can be deliberate- • ly planned or occur hastily. In a deliber- stroying the enemy position from be- Firing the MGS main gun/coax around ate attack, the MGS should maximize the neath. This same procedure can be em- a corner exposes 50 percent of the vehi- use of its sights and prepare to engage ployed to clear a roof top. An MGS can cle. Given a choice, the driver should pull the bunker from 300 to 500 meters. Fol- engage third- and fourth-floor windows forward to fire, exposing the most sur- lowing the engagement, it will provide from an impressive distance. vivable section of the vehicle. overwatch for maneuver elements based There are multiple ways to communi- • Firing the vehicle commander’s .50- on mission requirements. If the engage- cate with an MGS crew in a MOUT en- caliber exposes approximately 60 percent ment is hasty, the leader of the maneuver vironment. Although FM communica- of the vehicle.

May-June 2006 — 39 sights to scan the targeted breaching wall to identify weak points in the structure, adjoining interior walls, and load-bear- ing walls, which will help the gunner place his round to create the effect that the ma- neuver commander intended. Coordination between gunner, driv- er, and vehicle commander. While ma- neuvering in a MOUT environment, gun- ners and drivers need to efficiently work together. A critical skill is the rapid en- gagement of a target after moving from a cover and concealed position. An MGS will be 50 percent exposed while firing in a flank direction. The gunner must po- sition the gun tube in the direction of the enemy while the driver pulls the vehicle Figure 2 forward. Additionally, the driver should try to turn slightly in the direction of the enemy for increased survivability. Fol- lowing gun firing, retrograde to the cov- • Street width can greatly effect the op- wire obstacles along the missile’s flight ered position must be practiced as the two eration of the MGS main gun. To tra- path. events will happen very quickly; hopeful- verse the turret 360 degrees, the MGS re- ly, without damaging the vehicle’s gun quires a minimum of eight meters street Training Suggestions tube by ramming it against any covering structures. width. Breach point aiming. The current TTP MGS ammunition: for creating a breach point in a building Movement with infantry. Habitual sup- requires the MGS to fire three to five port relationships between MGS crews The commander designates the ammu- rounds in pattern based on distances and and specific SBCT rifle platoons should nition mixture for the MGS based on mis- offsets between rounds. For developing be formed to develop coordination and sion, enemy, terrain, troops, time avail- this skill, the crew should practice mov- teamwork. During collective training at able, and civilians (METT-TC) consider- ing the aim point. The crew will need the infantry platoon level, it is important ations. The preferred main gun rounds in three or more circle-shaped cardboard cut- that the MGS be incorporated into the urban operations are HEAT-T, HEP-T, outs or other durable material 30 inches training plan, specifically for breach op- and canister. The HEAT-T round is used in diameter with a cross-hair drawn cen- erations, MOUT training, and movement primarily against lightly armored vehi- techniques. cles (secondary armor), field fortifications, ter circle, as shown in Figure 2. and personnel. The HEP-T round is used This exercise requires the gunner and an MGS Way Ahead against field fortifications, bunkers, build- assistant at the building’s location. The The MGS will be fielded this summer ings, and crew-served weapons emplace- gunner will take aim on the building and to the 2d Cavalry Regiment (SBCT), Fort ments, as well as troops where blast, con- direct the assistant to place one of the cir- Lewis, Washington. The unit will also par- cussion, and fragmentation are desired cles on the wall centered on the gun sight ticipate in the initial operational test and with secondary armor-defeating capabil- reticle. The gunner will then move the evaluation (IOTE) scheduled for Febru- ities. It is the primary round for creating aim point based on the offset and the as- ary/March 2007. This weapons system infantry breach points. The canister round sistant will again position a circle cen- will also be fielded to the 2d Brigade, is primarily used in an antipersonnel role tered on the reticle. After three aim points 25th Infantry (SBCT), Hawaii. The full- against troops in the open with the effec- have been attached to the building, prop- rate production decision is scheduled to tiveness to defeat an enemy squad from er positioning of the shot group should be made in late July 2007, following the 100 to 300 meters. be evaluated. The intent is to practice mak- IOTE. ing breach points from various distances The sabot round is used as the primary and validate proper aiming offsets. Off- Additional information on the MGS can armor-defeating round against tanks and sets will differ based on gun distances be attained through the SBCT Transfor- tank-like targets. The sabot petals endan- mation Portal at www.sbct.army.mil/. ger accompanying infantry elements. They from the breach site, see Figure 3. create a hazard area 70 meters on each Gun crews should develop their own side of the gun target line. The round can matrices for breach offset points for var- destroy an armored threat that wire-guid- ious distances to improve engagement Major Jonathan B. Slater is the assistant Train- ing and Doctrine (TRADOC) System Manager- ed missiles cannot reach due to guidance speed. MGS crews should use thermal Stryker/Bradley, Fort Benning, Georgia. He re- ceived a B.A. from Johnson and Wales Univer- sity and an M.B.A. from Long Island University. MGS Breach Aiming Point He has served in various command and staff positions including S3, 54th Troop Command, Distance 1st Hole 2d Hole 3d Hole New Hampshire (NH) Army National Guard; 200 Meters 2 mils from edge of wall .5 mil from top of first hole 2 mils left or right from deputy G1, NH National Guard; commander, center line of first hole Company C, 3-172 Infantry (Mountain); and ri- fle and anti-armor platoon leader, and HHC ex- Figure 3 ecutive officer, 3-27 Infantry, 7th ID.

40 — May-June 2006 Improving the Tank Loader’s Station for the Contemporary Operating Environment by Sergeant First Class Vernon P. Prohaska and Captain Joshua M. Keena

“Putting aside all the fancy words and program (CEEP) include vast improve- formation for the Army’s doctrinal evo- academic doubletalk, the basic reason for ments in the design and capability of the lution loop. having a military is to do two jobs — to loader’s station, to include an improved kill people and to destroy the works of M240 mount. “Hope is not a method,” Background man.”1 and you may not want to wait for the force Since the first “thunder run,” tankers — General Thomas S. Power modernization package to reach your unit have been inventing ways to increase the before you deploy to Iraq.2 effectiveness of the loader’s M240 dur- Operations in Iraq highlight the need ing actions on contact. As the ground war for the armor force to make deliberate im- The equipment and training devices dis- progressed, more armor leaders saw pre- provements in the tank loader’s machine cussed in this article are non-doctrinal cision requirements for employing the gun mount and M240 variant. While the and not included in the current inventory M240 not being met with the current con- tank platoon’s table of organization and of equipment signed for by armor com- figuration. equipment (TOE) equips each tank with pany commanders and tank platoon lead- a loader’s M240 machine gun and a mount • September 2004: The tank gunnery ers; they are, however, available in the branch of Directorate of Training, Doc- designed for area suppression of limited Army materiel system. Understand that targetry, current operations reveal that trine and Combat Development (DTDCD) the requirements learned from combat directs the revision of the Abrams gun- loaders require equipment and training and inevitable experimentation with doc- to ensure they are as effective as their 11B nery tables, to include loader’s M240 en- trine and equipment drive the fielding and gagements during tank tables V-XII. M240 gunner counterparts in combat. doctrine cycle.3 As long as you include The tank urban survival kit (TUSK) and risk analysis and mitigation with these • 2004-2005: Armor units adopt dis- M1A2 continued electronic enhancement initiatives, you are providing valuable in- mount training, equipment, and employ- ment tactics, techniques, and procedures Cavalry Regiment (2/3 ACR), strived for capabilities of the weapons. The avail- (TTP) for the loader’s M240 in response excellence in all weapons training and ability of PVS-7 and PVS-14 night vi- to combat operations in Iraqi. qualification, which enabled platoon ser- sion devices (NVDs) enhanced the unit’s • geants and tank/Bradley commanders the warfighting ability, and the devices were May 2005: 1st Cavalry Division after- ability to train younger, less experienced put to immediate use during limited-vis- action reviews (AARs) highlight statis- soldiers on proper weapons maintenance ibility operations. tical data regarding the loader’s M240 and employment techniques. The avail- employment requirements, to include the ability of M240B conversion kits and The M240 also possesses the range re- propensity for limited-visibility engage- night sights greatly enhanced the effec- quired to address threats at the maximum ments. tiveness of this weapon, as well as sol- standoff, short of employing the main gun • 2004-2005: 2d Battalion, 81st Armor, dier training. As with any new equipment, or M2 .50-caliber. When a tank was need- the 19K one-station unit training (OSUT) soldiers need to have hands-on training, ed for a mission and the loader’s M240 battalion, 1st Armor Training Brigade, as well as tough and realistic training con- mount was in use on a HMMWV, the Fort Knox, incorporates TTP into the con- ditions. Familiarization is not enough — M240B came to the rescue and was a suit- duct of tank live fire training to ensure tankers need to be trained to properly able replacement. The loader always kept that the loader’s M240 engagements in- mount and zero night-vision devices, day- his M4 nearby for fast response. The com- tegrate scenarios and equipment similar light optics, and machine gun mount sys- bination of the two undoubtedly proved to those seen during operations in Iraq. tems. a deterrent to anti-coalition forces. Tankers on HMMWVs would have been Combat Operations Eagle Troop, 2/3 ACR established a base camp in Ramadi, Iraq, in April 2003. By a strange sight four years ago, but the Ar- “The officers and men who permit them- the end of the month, tankers, as well as mor force is changing. The soldiers of selves to be surprised deserve to die, and scouts, were conducting dismounted op- Eagle Troop, 2/3 ACR adapted and main- the commanding general will spare no ef- erations. The M240, with dismount kit, tained momentum throughout the entire forts to secure them their desserts.”4 became the standard configuration for the deployment. The M240 and its variants — D.H. Hill, 1863 M240. The M1A2 tank would have the proved invaluable to the success of the loader’s weapon configured for quick and mission and should be incorporated into During deployment in support of Oper- easy adaptation to either dismounted or all applications. ation Iraqi Freedom, the M240 machine mounted operations. Equipment and Training gun, particularly the tank loader’s variant, In June 2003, tank maintenance, fuel re- proved invaluable during combat oper- quirements, and the availability of repair To address the immediate threats facing ations. This machine gun was used in parts played a factor in Eagle Troop tank- soldiers and to equip the armor platoon mount ed, as well as dismounted, config- ers transitioning from M1A2 tanks to soft- for maximum capabilities, the following urations. As tank platoons traded panzers top HMMWVs. The scouts trained the changes to the TOE represent a starting for light wheeled vehicles, many leaders tankers on the cross-over; it was at this point for transformation: took the initiative and fabricated mounts point, the M240 loader’s station mounts At the individual level, each soldier atop high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled were “liberated” from the turrets of the should have either a PVS-7 or PVS-14. vehicle (HMMWV) platforms. tanks. Fabrication and a little ingenuity A fifty-fifty mix for the tank platoon While conducting pre-deployment train- had these mounts atop HMMWVs. The (eight PVS-7s and eight PVS-14s) gives ing at Fort Carson, Colorado, the soldiers tankers conducted gunnery training and platoon leaders and platoon sergeants the of Eagle Troop, 2d Squadron, 3d Armored learned a great deal about the strength and tools required for limited visibility op-

“The M240 also possesses the range required to address threats at the maximum standoff, short of employing the main gun or M2 .50-caliber. When a tank was needed for a mission and the loader’s M240 mount was in use on a HMMWV, the M240B came to the rescue and was a suitable replacement.”

42 — May-June 2006 erations with the flexibility of tailoring NVDs for the mission and individual. At the crew level, the loader’s M240 should include an M240B feed tray cov- er (with Picatinny rail) in addition to the ground mount kit. The M240B feed tray cover will not interfere with the coax mount and allows various machine gun optics (MGOs), to include the M145 ma- chine gun scope, PAS-13 thermal weap- ons sight (TWS), and PVS-4 passive weap ons sight, to be mounted. Each crew should have an M145, which allows for precision aiming and employment of the M240. Because the M240 lacks the iron sight on the end of the barrel, it does not have the initial aiming accuracy of the M240B. Using an M145 solves this prob- lem. For limited visibility engagements, a fifty-fifty mix for the platoon of PEQ- 2A aiming lights and PAS-13 TWS (two PEQ-2As and two PAS-13s) would en- “Combat operations in Iraq have simultaneously reinforced the firepower and effectiveness of able the platoon to employ both passive the loader’s M240 while highlighting shortcomings in the present configuration. The resourceful- ness, ingenuity, and teamwork of soldiers in theater have yielded TTP and field expedient mate- and active image intensifying devices. riel fixes for improved employment of the M240.” The AN/PAS-13 is a silent, lightweight, compact, and durable battery-powered in- frared imaging sensor that operates with Future in Armor,” ARMOR, January-Feb- Gunnery,” ARMOR, September-October 2004, pp. 20-25; Staff Sergeant James L. Gibson, “Task Force 1-77 Armor — Back in low-battery consumption. The thermal 5 ruary 2005. the Saddle,” ARMOR, November-December 2004, pp. 23-25; weapons sight is capable of target acqui- and Captain Francis J.H. Park, “Advanced Infantry Optics and sition under conditions of limited visi- Combat operations in Iraq have simul- Their Future in Armor,” ARMOR, January-February 2005, pp. bility such as darkness, smoke, fog, dust, taneously reinforced the firepower and 18-21. and haze. Iraqi veterans often report be- effectiveness of the loader’s M240 while ing forced to borrow this equipment to highlighting shortcomings in the present Sergeant First Class Vernon P. Prohaska is complete combat patrols, cordon and configuration. The resourcefulness, inge- currently assigned as NCOIC, Stryker Training search missions, and security operations. nuity, and teamwork of soldiers in the- R4, Headquarters and Headquarters Compa- While this shows good initiative and team- ater have yielded TTP and field expedi- ny (HHC), 2d Battalion, 81st (2-81) Armor, 1st work, it also highlights the need to equip ent materiel fixes for improved employ- Armor Training Brigade (ATB), Fort Knox, KY. the armor platoon for success. ment of the M240. While it is true that His military education includes Advanced Non- The AN/PVS-4 individual weapons night “you go to war with the equipment you commissioned Officers School, Basic Non- have,” there is a requirement for incorpo- commissioned Officers School, Primary Lead- sight provides passive night vision for ma- ership Development Course, M1A2 SEP Tank chine gun operators. It uses natural star- rating feedback into fielding and doc- trine evolution. The recommended train- Commander Certification Course, Stryker Re- light or moonlight. It provides magnifi- connaissance Vehicle Course, and Recruiting cation of x3.6 and can be used to detect ing and equipment solutions mentioned School. He has served in various armor and targets out to 500 meters. A 2.7-volt mer- in this article are critical to ensure the cavalry positions, to include platoon sergeant, cury battery powers the unit for about a Abrams loader remains an effective, vital tank commander, instructor, and writer, HHC, 24-hour continuous use period. An auto- component to the tank crew in the con- 2-81 Armor, 1st ATB, Fort Knox, KY; tank pla- matic brightness control caters for sud- temporary operating environment. toon sergeant, E Troop, 2d Squadron, 3d Ar- mor Cavalry Regiment, Iraq and Fort Carson, den flashes of light, such as a rifle muz- CO; tank commander, C troop, 4th Squadron, zle flash. 7th Cavalry, Korea; and tank commander, B The M145, manufactured by Elcan, dif- Notes Company, 1st Battalion, 13th Armor, Fort Riley, fers from the standard 3.4x sight, in that KS. 1Thomas S. Power, Design for Survival, American Securities ballistic compensation is in the reticle, Council Press, 1968. Captain Joshua M. Keena is currently pursuing rather than in the mount. Reticle illumi- a Ph.D. as a uniformed Army scientist and en- 2Gordon R. Sullivan, Hope Is Not a Method, Broadway Pub- nation is by a battery-powered LED with lishing, 2 September 1997. gineer in the Army Acquisition Corps. He re- ceived a B.S. from the United States Military 11 intensity settings. 3Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Les- sons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Academy. His military education includes Ar- There are several references available Knife, Praeger Publishers, 2002. In Chapter 2 of his book, LTC mor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Ca- that provide the framework for employ- Nagl explains the cyclical nature of doctrinal evolution, with reer Course, Combined Arms and Services feedback from the force, feeding the loop and driving transfor- ing the M240 effectively in the tank pla- mational changes in equipment, training, and doctrine. Staff School, and the Acquisition Corps Basic Course. He has served in various command toon, which include U.S. Army Field 4D.H. Hill, 1863, as quoted in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-90, Manual (FM) 3-22.68, Crew Served Ma- Tactics, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 4 and staff positions, to include commander, chine Guns; FM 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery July 2001, Chapter 12. HHC, 2-81 Armor, Fort Knox, KY; commander, (Abrams); “The Future of Tank Gunnery,” 5U.S. Army Field Manual 3-22.68, Crew Served Machine Company F, 2-81 Armor, Fort Knox; support Guns, 5.56-mm and 7.62-mm; M249, 5.56-mm Machine Gun; platoon leader, Aviation Brigade, 25th Infantry ARMOR, September-October 2004; “Task M60, 7.62-mm Machine Gun; M240B, 7.62-mm Machine Gun, Division (ID), Schofield Barracks, HI; XO, HHC, Force 1-77 Armor — Back in the Saddle,” U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 31 January 2003; FM 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery (Abrams), GPO, Aviation Brigade, 25th ID, Schofield Barracks; ARMOR, November-December 2004; Washington, D.C., 15 August 2005; Major Herbert Skinner and scout platoon leader, 3d Squadron, 4th and “Advanced Infantry Optics and Their and Sergeant First Class Michael Dunfee, “The Future of Tank Cavalry, Schofield Barracks.

May-June 2006 — 43 Contemporary Sniper and Observation Post Operations by Sergeant First Class Mathew Donofrio

On 5 July 2004, the 1st Squadron, 11th take a disciplined and versatile platoon to information if they stayed to develop Armored Cavalry Regiment re-stitched Iraq. the situation. Even abandoned buildings their opposing force (OPFOR) desert com- tend ed to get frequented, and “non-hos- bat uniforms with standard Army regu- Three months into theater, the platoon tile compromise” was usually inevitable. lation insignia and began preparing for had conducted various missions, includ- We had some engagements during those war. ing combat patrols, reconnaissance, es- early days, which resulted in both con- corts, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) em- firmed and unconfirmed enemy killed The Ironhorse Squadron’s task organi- ployment, raids, and route clearance. How- in action (KIA) and the elimination of zation mirrored that of an armored task ever, it quickly became clear our main an IED cell operating in the Al Muthana force with a 10-HMMWV scout platoon. role would be sniper and observation post Bridge area. We took these lessons and With many of the usual uncertainties, (OP) operations in the counter-improvised such as a deployment date, area of opera- further refined our techniques in western explosive devise (IED), counter-rocket, Abu Ghraib, a sector in which the squad- tions, and platoon mission, we simply fo- and counter-mortar fight. cused on the basics. As a scout platoon ron reduced IED activity by more then sergeant, I focused our training on physi- During the first two months in north 50 percent in six months (see Figure 1). cal fitness, advanced rifle marksmanship Baghdad, east of the Tigris River, we rap- Thankfully, the squadron commander (ARM), room clearing, and vehicle and idly learned the techniques of reconnais- did not divide up the scout platoon. His personal searches. Training culminated sance in an urban environment. The first guidance was to retain OP, sniper, com- with a National Training Center rotation few times our OPs were compromised, mand and control (C2), QRF, and sustain- in November 2004. With the limited time, the quick reaction force (QRF) rushed in ment operations all within the same self- I knew I was not going to take the most to extract them. It soon became apparent contained unit — the scout platoon. We prepared platoon to war; my goal was to that the dismounts could gain valuable mitigated the risk of using two- and three-

May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Discovered 19 28 19 19 23 10 Detonated 22 12 15 13 12 13 these negotiations was to present a pro- Total 57 41 40 34 32 35 23 fessional appearance and encourage the Figure 1 locals to come and go as they please while remaining silent about our pres- man teams by using a dedicated, internal rel. The team’s normal operating time was ence for the sake of making the country a QRF. The scout platoon served as the 24 to 48 hours. safe place to live. squadron’s primary shaping element. We The OPs mirrored the sniper teams, with Whenever possible, we sent the same conducted weekly platoon-level after- the exception of the sniper; they normal- team to a specific area, which helped es- action reviews (AARs) prior to our op- ly operated with just two men for 18 to tablish relationships and gain trust among erations orders so that all new informa- 24 hours. When they did take three men, the local population. The same team pos- tion and procedures, along with all signi- the third also carried an M4 carbine. As sessed familiar faces and had an intangi- ficant events of the previous week, could shown in Figure 2, the major difference ble knowledge of the area that cannot sim- be discussed by everyone. The scout pla- between the two was the organization and ply be briefed to another team. The teams toon remained under squadron control engagement strategy. would have candy, coloring books, and throughout the deployment and signifi- other items for the children. Some of the cantly shaped the battlespace for the main families who lived near IED hotspots had ground force. Insertion actually lost members of their families to During insertion operations, the object shrapnel from the bombs. Out of respect The Quick Reaction Force was to find the quietest way into the house and professionalism, and to prevent anti- We experimented with multiple QRF pos- and verify sectors of observation. In some Iraqi forces (AIF) from compromising tures: initially four vehicles, then three, cases, using the front door was the only home owners, we paid strict attention to finally establishing two for the remain- way into the house, which sometimes pre- policing up all trash. sented problems. In a country of much der of the deployment. Ultimately, it was “Non-hostile Compromise” the two-truck QRF that enabled contin- lawlessness, a team could find itself in uous operations. The QRF had to stay contact with someone simply trying to The teams, particularly the snipers, be- within communications range, usually defend his home. Once the team verified gan learning both verbal and nonverbal within 2 to 3 minutes of the snipers and observation from its position, it was time communications techniques and began ef- OPs, but not close enough to deny the kill for a little gambling. If the team leader fectively interacting with civilians to de- zone established by the dismounts. The thought there was no way to avoid com- velop the situation. For the most part, the QRF would recon future positions, not- promise, he would wake the man of the Iraqis seemed happy with our efforts; ing times and frequencies that civilians house, explain the situation and his in- they did not necessarily feel great about used buildings. tentions, and complete the search of the us operating in their homes or places of house accompanied by its owner. If the work. No doubt, there were times when As secondary tasks, the QRF inspected team leader thought compromise could local nationals simply sent the message suspicious activity reported by the OPs be avoided, he would quietly search the throughout the neighborhood that Amer- that did not warrant engagement; kept the house on his own. From what we found, ican forces were in their homes so they sniper team supplied with enough water Iraqis are generally heavy sleepers. If the would not be held liable by AIF. How- to sustain it for up to 48-hours on a roof- team did not coordinate on arrival and ever, even compromise produced denial, top; and verified team concealment, in- was subsequently compromised, nego- which prevented AIF from emplacing formed them of necessary adjustments, tiations would then begin. The goal of IEDs in that area. and coordinated with other elements in sector.

Sniper and Observation Post Teams Doctrinal “3-Team” Task Organization Our two sniper teams consisted of three men each: the team leader, the sniper, A TEAM B TEAM C TEAM and the security man. The team leader (a PL (1) 2 5 (PSG) 4 junior noncommissioned officer) carried an M4 carbine with an M203 grenade 369 launcher. The sniper used either the bolt- 780 action M24 sniper weapon system (SWS) with PVS-10 day/night sight or the M14 Platoon Final Task Organization rifle. Although the M107 Barrett sniper rifles were available, the teams preferred A TEAM B TEAM C TEAM the more manageable M24 rifles to facil- Q PL (1) 5 PSG (4) SNIPERS itate movement into and out of positions. The team leader and sniper were either R 7 (6) SHADOW school trained or attended a modified F 2 OR 3 9 OR 0 (8) REAPER course conducted by the San Bernardino Police Department, focusing specifically on the mechanics of long-range marks- OP 2 OR 3 9 OR 0 manship. The security man carried an M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) Figure 2 with collapsible buttstock and short bar-

May-June 2006 — 45 Many of the local people were or visits with the family to keep willing to support our efforts; anyone from leaving, without however, in many cases, expla- using force. On other occasions, nations and negotiations were we simply told them they had to necessary. For example, one of stay. Both of these techniques the teams was using a particu- proved unsuccessful; however, lar house that had missing once the teams became profi- bricks on its balcony, which cient at explaining and persuad- provided great observation cov- ing, the family would usually er. However, one day the team come and go as they pleased, returned to use the house again and on many occasions, even and found the owner had made fed our soldiers. Only once was repairs to the balcony. The team an OP or sniper team engaged leader asked the man why he by the enemy over the entire had repaired the bricks. When year, which proved to be an un- the local national realized the pleasant defeat for the AIF. missing bricks provided obser- vation, he carved out a couple Engagement Strategy of bricks for us. We caught an in- surgent that very night! When Initially, we anticipated one or the engagement was over and two enemy over a two- or three- the dust had settled, the man phase emplacement operation, came up to the rooftop and based on intelligence prepa- shook the soldiers’ hands. Lat- ration of the battlefield (IPB) from OIF I and II veterans. er on, during another operation “During the first two months in north Baghdad, east of the Tigris River, on that rooftop, we paid him for While we did see this tactic, we we rapidly learned the techniques of reconnaissance in an urban en- also witnessed several different his assistance. vironment. The first few times our OPs were compromised, the quick reaction force (QRF) rushed in to extract them. It soon became appar- IED emplacement techniques: The non-hostile compromise ent that the dismounts could gain valuable information if they stayed single person on a bicycle; ve- was unfamiliar to most of the to develop the situation.” hicle with multiple persons; team. The importance of how multiple vehicles and persons; the team negotiates with an and even the drop-and-pop Iraqi national during a non-hos- technique where the car never tile compromise cannot be overstated. times, we tried to intentionally and “un- comes to a complete stop. AIF emplaced As stated earlier, in the beginning of our intentionally” detain local nationals in a IEDs using covert operations during tour, we would simply rush in the QRF house or building. Unintentional deten- hours of darkness and high-traffic situa- to handle these situations. A couple of tion means the security man plays cards tions during daylight hours. We had to rethink and adjust our engagement strat- egy after our first engagement with a two-vehicle AIF team. The engagement strategy or battle drill was executed as follows: • Sniper prepared to fire while secu- rity man prepared automatic weapon. • Team leader alerted the QRF by radio and QRF began movement (time per- mitting; otherwise, they called at first op- portunity). • Sniper fired, the M249 fired immedi- ately after (team leader followed with M203, if target was a vehicle/hand gre- nade or was dismounted within range). The OP teams engaged with the most ca- sualty-producing weapon first, the M203 if within range; otherwise, the M249. In- structions were shoot to kill, if an AIF member was wounded and could be of intelligence value, even better. The team executed two separate tasks during em- placement operations by AIF: “Our two sniper teams consisted of three men each: the team leader, the sniper, and the security man. The team leader (a junior noncommissioned officer) carried an M4 carbine with an M203 gre- • Task 1 — kill the emplacer, the most nade launcher. The sniper used either the bolt-action M24 sniper weapon system (SWS) with technically competent person on the AIF PVS-10 day/night sight or the M14 rifle.” team, which generally had a 1 to 2 week

46 — May-June 2006 DTG N FROM 100600OCT05 OOL TO 110600OCT05 SCH 2 impact on the cell’s operational capabil- OLD IED ity. HOLE 1 LOC XX 12345678 • Task 2 — kill, wound, or capture the 3 OLD IED CALL SIGN REAPER AIF security element for a real, lasting ef- HOLE SUPPORTING SET CALL SIGN fect. Nothing gets around town faster than, AKINCI 2 “Mohammed just got killed by a sniper EAST LIMIT XX 1234 while putting a bomb in the road!” In our WEST LIMIT XX1234 experience, AIF did not stay and fight, nor did they attempt to help wounded # VEHICLE TYPE / COLOR / PAC / TIME / REMARKS # VEHICLE TYPE / COLOR / PAC / TIME / REMARKS comrades. 1 DAEWOO PRINCE/BLACK/2/1010/CHANGE TIRE 30 MIN 12 2 BONGO TRUCK/BLUE/4/PARKED/1320/10 MIN 13 The 3d Infantry Division distributed vi- 3 SEDAN TAXI/WHITE/1/1445/BOUGHT GAS/5 MIN 14 gnettes to train sniper teams on rules of 4 15 engagement (ROE) once we arrived in 5 16 theater. The vignettes helped further il- 6 17 lustrate ROE down to the lowest individ- 7 18 ual level, instilling confidence and en- 8 19 abling soldiers to make competent deci- 9 20 sions instantaneously. Companies and 10 21 bat talions using snip er and OP teams 11 22 should seek out this guidance if it is not already available. Figure 3 Equipment and Aids tionary, surefire IR flashlight, collaps- in Arabic, was used by the team leader at Properly equipping the OP and sniper ible ladder (if needed), grappling hook/ first contact, which greatly enhanced the teams is a vital element to mission suc- large “D” ring with 30-foot cord/rope, probability of establishing relationships. cess. and black plastic NOD mount (personal The list below supplements the equip- preference). The platoon also developed a modified ment any dismounted team should have A questionnaire (flowchart type) writ- range card, shown in Figure 3, which re- on hand (personal weapons, night obser- ten in Arabic and English that allowed corded any vehicle that stopped to change vation devices (NODs), class I, and for “yes” and “no” answers was a very a tire or had car trouble within the OP’s medical equipment): sector. The card was developed after an helpful item. The list of questions in- incident involving a sniper team: • General equipment includes tactical cluded “do you have any weapons;” “if standard operating procedures (SOP), so, show them;” and “do you know where The team was observing a local nation- Iraqi smart card, and zip strips. AIF live?” A letter of explanation, based al boy who was selling fuel from cans by on current unit talking points and written the roadside all morning. Periodically, he • Commo equipment includes ASIP ra- dio, headset, hand-held microphone, long whip and base, short whip and base, bat- teries, frequency cutsheet, ICOM x 1, field expedient commo equipment, and per- sonal communications system (optional, but recommended). • Sniper equipment includes rifle, sand sock, tools as needed (personal prefer- ence), bullets (20 to 40 rounds, personal preference), and Otis cleaning kit. • Observation equipment includes bi- nos, civilian laser rangefinder, night vi- sions goggles (NVG) with magnifier (3x), PAS 13B, and batteries. • Navigation equipment includes civil- ian plugger, and large-scale area maps, acetate coated. • Near/far recognition equipment in- cludes VS17 panel, flare, smoke, large infared (IR) strobe, IR chem lights, bug lights, and thermal tape.

• Nonstandard equipment includes des- “During insertion operations, the object was to find the quietest way into the house and verify sec- ert shaded ponchos, bolt cutters, dark col- tors of observation. In some cases, using the front door was the only way into the house, which ored sneakers (personal preference), hi- sometimes presented problems. In a country of much lawlessness, a team could find itself in jab/burqa, bug juice, English/Arabic dic- contact with someone simply trying to defend his home.”

May-June 2006 — 47 would leave his fuel cans and then re- “T” series tanks. There are about a dozen Teams are observing through windows turn. On one occasion when the boy was very common vehicles in Iraq and with and holes in brick walls where there is gone, the team observed an approaching the confusion of urban warfare, vehicle deadspace. The sector may not begin for vehicle, which stopped at the location identification is very important. Platoons 200 meters out, but can end 700 meters where the boy was selling fuel. An un- should spend at least one-half day per beyond. An IED could be emplaced with- known man got out of the vehicle and week focusing on language and NCOs in those 200 meters in front of the posi- placed two cans of fuel among the boy’s should drill the entire platoon on lan- tion that the OP team cannot observe. other fuel cans. The team clearly saw all guage skills daily — OP teams do not of the man’s movements and concluded have interpreters or translators! Discipline cannot be overstated! Noise, that he was the boy’s fuel distributor. It light, complacency, and fighting the sleep turned out that there were explosives in Every 19D has pulled his fair share of monster are all the basics we emphasize the cans. Thankfully, no one was injured. OP duty; however, there are vast differ- from day one in the Army. A lot of time ences between our duties in Iraq and tra- and effort goes into what becomes a 5- The modified range card helped track ditional scout duties. First and foremost, to-10 second engagement; there are a lot suspicious vehicle movement and on one the old saying of “if a scout shoots, he’s more days of boredom than excitement. occasion, helped prevent injury and or wrong,” is not applicable in this environ- However, the effects of destroying ene- death from a vehicle-concealed IED that ment. Today, the enemy has the capabil- my IED teams in front of an entire neigh- parked within a team’s sector of observa- ity of emplacing IEDs in seconds — not borhood overwhelmingly shaped support tion. The modified range cards were ana- minutes. When you secure a target, elim- and confidence in coalition forces and lyzed weekly and monthly and assisted inate it immediately. The QRF can finish instilled fear in AIF. in illustrating exactly what could be seen the engagement, should the vehicle flee, from each position, which enabled the or go find wounded AIF that escape the platoon leader to better plan for future scene. positions. All soldiers, especially snipers, should Sergeant First Class Mathew Donofrio is cur- be comfortable shooting from an elevat- rently serving as scout platoon sergeant, 1st Training ed platform, off a knee, and from a seat- Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, The Joint IED Defeat Task Force (JIEDD- ed position. Soldiers should be instruct- Fort Irwin, CA. He is in his 4th year of degree completion at University of Louisville. His mili- TF) spent considerable time with our pla- ed on how to hit and immobilize vehicles tary education includes Advanced Noncom- toon in Iraq to endorse the tactics of what and should be competent at hitting mov- missioned Officers Course, Basic Noncommis- is referred to as the “small kill team” ing targets after just a day or two of train- sioned Officers Course, Primary Leadership (SKT). JIEDD-TF advocates proposed ing. Mocking up range towers with high Development Course, Drill Sergeant School, changes to the curriculum of the U.S. and low windows on modern range facil- and Scout Leader Course. He has served in Army Infantry School, which would in- ities would be a good place to create prac- various command and staff positions, to in- corporate SKT tactics and employment tical training scenarios for units. clude drill sergeant, D Troop and A Troop, 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY; section training. While these plans are still in the Leaders, especially in the planning fo- works, leaders can overcome this short- sergeant, 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, Baum- rum, need to be cognizant of the fact that holder, Germany; and squad leader, 2d Battal- fall by focusing some time on a few very these are not traditional OP operations. ion, 72d Armor, Camp Casey, Korea. important tasks, which will generate a tremendous effect through the lethality of snipers and OPs. Everyone has been developing ARM/close-quarter marks- manship (CQM) programs, which is great; however, snipers and OP teams need a tailored program. They also need train- ing to plan for the non-hostile compro- mise, which should be done prior to de- ployment. I would also suggest focusing on vehicle identification, language skills, and sniper/OP team engagement drills. Back in the “old days” we used to do vehicle identification religiously with the

“The teams, particularly the snipers, began learning both verbal and nonverbal communications techniques and began effectively interacting with civilians to develop the situation. For the most part, the Iraqis seemed happy with our efforts; they did not necessarily feel great about us operating in their homes or places of work.”

48 — May-June 2006 Breaking the Paradigm of Crisis Maintenance

by Brigadier General Mike Tucker

The U.S. Army’s equipment is built for cent chance of not experiencing a mean- schedules to allow for quality services. durability and to accomplish the mission time failure between services. In simple Like mandatory training, services are also for which it is designed, even in the harsh- terms, you won’t breakdown unexpect- required; unfortunately, the latter often est of conditions. However, this “mil- edly. However, units are consistently chal- pays for the former. spec” endurance is often short lived due lenged with conducting scheduled ser- to an all-too-often “don’t fix it until it vices for one primary reason — time. One Size Does Not Fit All breaks” attitude. One could term this as This problem normally stems from a fail- Each vehicle in the Army’s inventory crisis maintenance versus preventive main- ure to allocate time on unit training sched- has a prescribed amount of time required tenance. ules for services. Successful units include for a given service. This is provided to The bedrock of any maintenance pro- the conduct of services in their quarterly commanders and maintenance manag- gram lies in a unit’s ability to conduct qual- training guidance and note scheduled ser- ers on the Maintenance Allocation Chart ity services. Truth is: our military equip- vices on the battalion’s long-range train- (MAC) of the respective vehicle’s tech- ment can only perform as well as the ser- ing calendar. Such visibility allows com- nical manual.1 Maintenance standard op- vices we conduct. manders to see likely points of friction erating procedures (SOPs) often direct between scheduled training and sched- a specified amount of time for the con- Why Some Vehicles Breakdown uled services. Having visibility of this ear- duct of services. This is usually broken If services are done to standard, our ly in the planning process allows com- down by tracks and wheels (one week for equipment will have a better than 95 per- manders to mitigate and adjust training tracks and three days for wheels). For in-

May-June 2006 — 49 stance, the MAC allocates 120 man hours command information, march to the mo- pool; and perform an after-operations for an M1A1 annual service and 36 man tor pool, and so on. Finally, we are back maintenance check. Real efficiencies are hours for the annual service on an M998 on the line at work about 1330 hours. achieved when a unit conducts commo HMMWV.2 It is evident that a “cookie- Again, most units break for motor pool checks from distant locations in conjunc- cutter” approach in our SOPs will not pro- cleanup at 1630 hours and the day is com- tion with the during-operations checks. vide the amount of time required to con- plete. Adding all this up, my math comes These checks are recorded on the vehi- duct quality services. to five hours in what we would consider cle’s Form 5988 and become the actual to be an eight-hour day. document from which the service is con- Motor Pool Math Further, taking into account that ser- ducted, in conjunction with the service Let’s take a closer look at what we geant’s time training is conducted one day checklist from the applicable technical would normally consider a 40-hour work a week, we average 23 hours a week of manual. week in the motor pool. Are we getting actual maintenance time. This, of course, Failing to begin a service with a before- the number of hours we think we are each fails to account for the often Monday or operations check could cause maintenance week in the motor pool? Is it enough to Friday training holiday, which brings us personnel to overlook potential mechan- get the job done? to an 18-hour week; a far cry from 40. If ical problems, such as the vehicle’s steer- the commander has allocated even two ing pulling to one side, the vehicle shift- Most Army units conduct physical train- weeks for a tank platoon service, he may ing improperly, the brakes or linkages ing from 0630 to 0730 hours daily, fol- lowed by first formation at 0900 hours. fall short, unless steps are taken to fur- binding, the hubs overheat ing, or any of Usually, this formation is conducted in ther mitigate. the fluid lines leaking. More important- the company area and often command ly, this same process is repeated during information is disseminated along with Always Begin with Before the after-operations check to determine occasional promotions and award pre- and End with After if any of the replaced hoses or filters are sentations. We then march to the motor In accordance with the applicable tech- leaking and if the vehicle is operating pool, draw our tool boxes, don our cov- nical manual, completing vehicle servic- properly. eralls, secure the keys to our vehicles, and es to standard requires the following be move to the vehicle line or maintenance conducted: begin with a before-opera- Ways to Mitigate bays to begin work. By this time, it is at tions check; dispatch the vehicle; drive Commanders should have an apprecia- least 0930 hours, if not later. Most units the vehicle a minimum of five miles; con- tion for the amount of time it takes to break for lunch at 1130 hours and return duct a during-operations check on level conduct services on assigned equipment. for formation at 1300 hours. Again, more ground; return vehicle to the unit motor Completely understanding time require-

“Each vehicle in the Army’s inventory has a prescribed amount of time required for a given service. This is provided to commanders and mainte- nance managers on the Maintenance Allocation Chart (MAC) of the respective vehicle’s technical manual. Maintenance standard operating proce- dures (SOPs) often direct a specified amount of time for the conduct of services.”

50 — May-June 2006 ments for the MAC, coupled with an understanding of “mo- tor pool math,” commanders can ensure that enough time is allocated to conduct ser- vices to standard. Conducting the pre- and post- service road march is also im- portant, and in some circum- stances, will require appro- priate convoy and road-march clearances. Again, incorpo- rating vehicle services into the training guidance early in the planning process is very important to help facilitate co- ordination efforts.

Present and Accounted For During services, the vehicle operator/crew must be pres- “Without question, soldiers will know what commanders deem important by observing where they spend the ent, as well as the mechanics. majority of their time. If services are done to standard, we will stop senseless breakdowns and equipment fail- Services should never be con- ure. This sends a bad message to our soldiers — they must not only have confidence in their leaders and train- ducted without this marriage ing, but in their equipment as well.” of skill sets. Commanders must make adjustments to the duty roster to ensure essential personnel are present for duty in the mo- manders do not give maintenance pro- (LSA), which are then validated by TRADOC combat devel- opers. The combat developers conduct these logistics demon- tor pool for the duration of the service grams the proper attention and empha- strations in a controlled environment using soldiers from vari- — not to mention the availability of sis. A unit with routine breakdowns and ous TRADOC installations. These soldiers perform selected tasks from the OEM task list. Once time and standards are val- maintenance personnel. unscheduled maintenance requirements idated, the OEM task list is published as the MAC in the appli- is a unit with a poor service program and cable technical manual. Setting Condition a commander who does not deem main- 2According to TMs 9-2350-264-20-1-1 and 1-2, the semi-an- tenance readiness important to the unit’s nual service for the M1A1 is 58.8 hours for the hull service and In addition to the factors mentioned 61.2 hours for the turret service. TM 9-2350-264-2-1-1, Unit warfighting readiness. Maintenance Manual, Vol 1 of 5 for Tank, Combat, Full- above, commanders should address cer- tracked: 120mm Gun, M1A1 and TM 2-2350-264-2-1-2, Unit tain concerns to determine if the sched- Finally, commanders must spend qual- Maintenance Manual, Vol 2 of 5, for tank, Combat, Full- Tacked: 120mm Gun, M1A1, Headquarters, Department of the uled service is set up for success. For ex- ity time in the motor pool observing and Army, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 3 ample, commanders should ensure the assessing the maintenance efforts of their May 2003. correct number of service kits have been unit. Cameo appearances and “drive-bys” 3GEN Bruce C. Clarke, From Leadership to Commander- ordered; that adequate petroleum, oil, and are inadequate. World War II veteran, ship, online at www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clarkebimage3. lubricant products are on hand to con- GEN Bruce C. Clarke said, “An organi- htm. duct the service in accordance with the zation does well only those things the boss applicable lubrication order; that ade- checks.”3 Brigadier General Michael S. Tucker is current- ly serving as assistant division command er quate dry nitrogen is on hand to properly (support), 1st Armored Division, Baumholder, purge optics and turret components when Without question, soldiers will know what commanders deem important by Germany. He received a B.S. from University of conducting services on fire control sys- Maryland, an M.M.A.S. from the School of Ad- tems; that the unit-level logistics sys tem- observing where they spend the majority vanced Military Studies, and an M.P.A. from ground (ULLS-G)-produced “parts re- of their time. If services are done to stan- Shippensburg University, PA. His military ed- ceived-not installed” list has been purged dard, we will stop senseless breakdowns ucation includes Officer Candidate School, Air- and a plan has been developed to install and equipment failure. This sends a bad borne School, German Ranger School, Cana- them; and that adequate numbers of op- message to our soldiers — they must not dian Command and Staff College, U.S. Army erational steam cleaners or pressure wash- only have confidence in their leaders and Command and General Staff College, and the training, but in their equipment as well. U.S. Army War College. He has served in vari- ers are on hand. ous command and staff positions, to include This article validates the fact that servic- XO, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, Heidel- es do not just happen but must be planned berg, Germany; commander, 1st Brigade, 1st and appropriately resourced if they are Notes Armored Division, Friedberg, Germany; G3, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; command- expected to be completed to standard. 1The complete Maintenance Allocation Chart (MAC) can be found in Technical Manual (TM) 9-2350-264-20-1-5, Unit er, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 3d Infantry Divi- We owe this to our soldiers, who must Maintenance Manual, Vol 5 of 5 for Tank, Combat, Full- sion, Fort Stewart; and commander, Combat man and operate our vehicles to accom- tracked: 120mm Gun, M1A1, Appendix B, pp. B-4 through B- Support Company, Company C, and Head- plish their assigned missions. Services, 16. MACs originate early in the production cycle as a joint venture between the TRADOC combat developers and the quarters and Headquarters Company, and S1 as well as routine maintenance, are top- original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The process starts and S3, 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, 1st Armored down operations that will fail if unit com- with OEM engineering estimates and logistic support analyses Division, Erlangen, Germany.

May-June 2006 — 51 DRIVER’S SEAT from Page 6 the rim should just be in view. All fit in a medium-sized ACH shell with field of vision, stability, and hearing, ACH helmets should be fitted with size 6 pads are best accommodated which significantly enhances Soldier the thinner size 6 crown pad in the in a medium-sized ACH with size 8 survivability. However, if Soldiers are top of the helmet. The crown pad pads or a correct fitting PASGT hel- un aware of the proper fit and wear of should touch the top of the wearer’s met. It should also be noted that when these helmets, they are exposed to in- head. Fit can be adjusted by adjust- other items, such as headsets, NBC creased risk of injury due to ballistic ing the pad positions inside the hel- mask, and cold weather caps, are worn threats — knowledge is power. Lead- met, tightening the retention straps, with either helmet, the headband and ers must ensure correct fit and wear or exchanging the helmet shell for a suspension on the PASGT and the standards are enforced. This is only larger size. By inspecting, leaders pads in the ACH will need to be ad- one of the many safety key enablers can quickly determine if the bottom justed to allow for the additional that increase Soldier survivability. of the ACH comes to the top of the equipment. Failure to make adjust- Leaders must ensure that every safe- Soldier’s ear canal opening. If it ments may make the helmet ride too ty procedure on every piece of equip- does not, leaders are required to ex- high on the head, putting the Soldier ment is enforced. amine other possibilities for the im- at greater risk. proper fit and take corrective mea- Technical references, fitting guides sures, to include suspension pads Soldier safety remains priority one (with visual examples), and requisi- and retention straps for serviceabili- and Armor leaders are dedicated to tioning instructions for both helmets ty. If any of the components are bro- en suring the safety of their Soldiers. are available online, courtesy of PEO ken or worn out, they should be re- The PASGT and the ACH were de- Soldier, at www.peosoldier.army.mil/ veloped to provide ballistic protec- achsoum.asp. placed. tion to the head, temple, ear, and neck Since there is currently no small- areas against fragmenting munitions “Teach our young Soldiers and lead- sized ACH, Soldiers who have a loose without degradation to the Soldier’s ers how to think; not what to think.”

Information Operations continued from Page 25 Patrol leaders could also influence the an interview about how the provincial ments since 11 September. Military lead- locals with whom they spoke to report all government continues to mature as a com- ers at all levels, most specifically at the suspicious activity to U.S. and Iraqi se- petent administration, and deliver a CD tactical level, must accept that in the ab- curity patrols, or make an anonymous call containing Multinational Corps-Iraq in- sence of a conventional threat, IO is a crit- to the police station. If the people want fomercials. ical force enabler. Ensuring that we train to believe that locals are not shooting at soldiers to convey the right messages to Americans, then the residents need to at Another platoon could escort the CA a civilian on the battlefield today may be least notify multinational forces or local team to the city power plant to discuss just as vital as ensuring they know how police regarding any stranger who enters the effective use of funds with the plant to close with and kill the enemy. their community. Any town or district manager. Advance coordination with the that refuses to tolerate insurgent and crim- provincial television station and newspa- inal activity deserves infrastructure im- per would ensure media coverage of the provements ahead of those communities power plant tour to show the populace Notes that the U.S. is interested in improving 1 that harbor terrorists and pretend their Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of the quality of life for Iraqis. Soft Power, ed. Leigh Armistead, Brasseys, Inc., Dulles, 2004, districts are entirely peaceful. The Diya- p. 1. la government delineated between vio- Another effective IO measure would be 2U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, U.S. Gov- lent areas and those with a populace sup- using PSYOPS channels to design fliers ernment Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 14 June 2001, pp. 11-16. porting the rule of law. for patrols to distribute. The verbiage 3FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Tech- To further develop effective IO, the task might read: “Petition your city council niques, and Procedures, GPO, Washington, DC, 28 November to improve your community’s roads and 2003, pp. 1-5. force IO officer could use the theme, electricity — a representative govern- “funding is tied to security” in a variety ment only works when the community of efforts over a period of about a month. gets involved.” Captain Greg Tomlin is currently serving as Preparing talking points for patrol lead- the assistant fire support officer, 1st Heavy ers to carry similar messages would be IO Integration — an Essential Task Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, the beginning. The IO officer could also in Postmodern Warfare Camp Hovey, Korea. He received a B.A. from recommend that company commanders the College of William and Mary. His military inform SOIs about their government’s The Global War on Terror continues to education includes Field Artillery Officer Basic be a battle of ideals. Whoever achieves Course and the Armor Captains Career Course. coffers during visits, particularly with victory will be the opponent who most He has served in various command and staff mayors and muqtars. The SOIs could pri- effectively conveys his perception of re- positions, to include assistant S3, 1st Battal- oritize projects for their communities and ality and aspirations for the future with a ion, 6th (1-6) Field Artillery, Bamberg, Germa- share this information with the command- host-nation populace and an internation- ny; joint coordination center officer in charge, ers, who, in turn, could pass the data to Baqubah, Iraq; rifle platoon leader, 1-6 Field the S5 for creating a master list. al audience. The U.S. Army can little af- Artillery, Baqubah; task force information oper- ford to forget the lessons gained through ations officer, 2d Battalion, 63d (2-63) Armor, A platoon could also escort the PSYOPS a decade of Balkan peacekeeping opera- Kosovo; and company fire support officer, 2-63 team to the local radio station to conduct tions and four years of proactive engage- Armor, Vilseck, Germany.

52 — May-June 2006 From the Boresight Line: The Value of a Master Gunner: Priceless by First Sergeant Robert Hay

Many of my past articles have discussed the duties of the master gunner, the train- ing he receives, and how he is selected to attend the master gunner’s course. Once a student has successfully completed the course, he is a master of gunnery. This ar- ticle illustrates how a master gunner uses his knowledge in real-life scenarios. When a master gunner is presented with a problem, he is required to go through a series of steps to determine a solution: • Is it a tank equipment problem? Can I correct it? What maintenance trouble- ommended a solution, and installed the months, which will later be transformed shooting procedure do I use or in- replacement PCU by using knowledge he into a combined arms gunnery validation, struct the turret mechanic to perform? gained from the Master Gunner Course. including mortars, AT4s, and Apaches, as • Is there a crew procedural problem? Without the knowledge from the school, well as convoy live fire. A daunting task What information does the crew need he would not have known the relation- to most, it is more so during combat op- to correct the problem? ships between the various line replace- erations with limited resources. The mas- • Do I have both an equipment and crew able units (LRU) and the TIS system and ter gunner selected an old range that be- procedural problem? How much time quickly determined the solution. longed to the Iraqi army’s III Corps as will it take to correct the problem? Do 7 April 2003, Baghdad. The tanks of the the training area. Without materials to we move the crew to another tank due lead task force into Baghdad had con- make targets or access to target lifters, to our limited range training time? ducted the Thunder Run two days prior he had disabled Iraqi vehicles towed in • During combat, can the crew fight de- and had several maintenance issues and as hard targets and used plywood to make graded? What part(s) are needed to fix degraded systems. Positioned downtown troop targets. The first validation gun- the tank? Do we move it to the collec- Baghdad in front of the conference cen- nery was executed ahead of schedule, just tion point for repairs or do we need a ter, White 1’s hydraulics go down. The two and a half months later. replacement? crew is forced to fight in manual mode for The master gunner used various lessons The master gunner’s ability to apply his the next eight hours. The majority of the learned from the master gunner school technical skills and knowledge not only unit’s maintenance is back at the unit that enabled him to accomplish this mis- affects the 25 percent firepower of the pla- maintenance collection point (UMCP) sion. The training management he re- toon, but also the lives of four soldiers. working on other task force vehicles. With ceived during the course enabled him to 27 February 1991, Iraq. The task force limited maintenance forward with the task understand and execute the process of go- is moving North in Iraq on its way to ex- force and its lines of communications ing from no range to training execution ecuting the left hook into Kuwait. A65, still unsecured, there is no way to get the in less then three months for a combined the company XO’s tank is the only vehi- tank back to the UMCP; it’s left to the arms exercise. The surface danger area di- cle with the Loran system mounted and company master gunner to diagnose the agram and firing tables training enabled is guiding the company’s movement. The problem. He quickly determines that the him to safely set up the range and incor- thermal imaging system (TIS) goes blank, turret hydraulics distribution valve (TDV) porate various firing systems and safe fir- the crew can no longer use their thermal is broken. He radios his findings higher ing zones based on target and ammuni- system, and it’s a night operation! As the and later that evening, a TDV is pushed tion type to prevent potential safety haz- only vehicle with the navigational system, forward with the rearm and refuel (R2) ards. Properly organizing the range and its the tank is unable to pull back for repairs. package. The tank is back in the fight operation was a result of the training re- The turret mechanic is unavailable, so the FMC in less than two hours. ceived for advance conduct of fire and company master gunner jumps on to trou- The above is a scenario of how a master plan and conduct gunnery training. bleshoot. He quickly determines that the gunner uses his knowledge gained in the The examples above illustrate how a power control unit (PCU) is bad. The tool master gunner course to enhance his unit’s master gunner can assist his unit during truck has a spare PCU and brings it for- combat effectiveness. The master gunner peacetime, combat, or pre/post-deploy- ward. In about 30 minutes, the master gun- receives almost 30 hours of training and ment train ing. Sim ply stated, the master ner has replaced the PCU and the tank is troubleshooting on the turret hydraulics gunner is a combat multiplier. now fully mission capable (FMC) ready system; his in-depth and extensive under- Without a doubt, there are many more ex- to continue the fight. standing of the hydraulics system and its amples of how master gunners have ap- The above vignette is not that unusual to components allowed him to quickly diag- plied the skills and knowledge gained from most master gunners as far as the trouble- nose the problem and recommend a course the master gunner course to enhance unit shooting process is concerned. It is, how- of action. Having this knowledge prevent- combat effectiveness. If you have an ex- ever, significant because it was accom- ed a delay in the vehicle’s FMC status. ample of how your master gunner or you plished during combat, at night, on the June 2003, Ba'qubah. The battalion mas- as a master gunner have applied the train- move. This real life scenario showcases ter gunner is given guidance from the task ing received from the master gunner the capabilities of the tank master gunner. force commander to develop a gunnery course, please share it with us. Send your He quickly diagnosed the problem, rec- validation plan ready to execute in three story to [email protected].

May-June 2006 — 53 The Patton Museum Post-World War II Gallery Debuts

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