Resources, Representation, and Authority in Jharkhand, India
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Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 49, No. 1, April 2008 ISSN 1360-7456, pp83–97 Resources, representation, and authority in Jharkhand, India David Stuligross Peter Hjorts Vej 14, 3-TH, 2500 Valby, Denmark. Email: [email protected] Abstract: Jharkhand is at the centre of India’s struggles to define ‘the environment’ and ‘economi- cally relevant natural resources’.Although cultural labels are applied by leaders who seek influence in these struggles as well as by many of those people who listen, an ethnonational analytic frame does not help answer the questions: How, why and when has the political idea of environment changed in India? When and why has the Jharkhand movement chosen violent tactics? When and why has the Jharkhand statehood movement realised electoral success? Or, why was Jharkhand state formed? To address such questions, a long range historical-institutional approach is much more fruitful. Keywords: electoral politics, environment, ethnonationalism, Jharkhand, natural resources, tribal politics. At first glance, the Jharkhand statehood move- alded it as ‘India’s newest tribal state’. Chief- ment had all the characteristics of a resource- Minister-in-Waiting Shibu Soren predicted that based ethnic movement: a local population that the new state would ‘surely enable the govern- had lived in a region since time immemorial ment to respond to tribal interests’. Whatever was forced out of its traditional economic and they might have been. Would that it were so. social relationship with that land and was Jharkhand deserves a second glance. The largely excluded from newly emerging eco- Jharkhand statehood demands demonstrate in nomic opportunities. The forcers and excluders an extreme form something that I suspect is a were ethnically distinct from the local popula- much more general truth: ethno-nationalism tion. The locals sought government support and, can describe almost every moment in the state- failing this, turned to violence. After several hood movement as well as the motives and rounds of government appeals and violent epi- actions of Jharkhandi, Bihari and national sodes, the local population successfully con- Indian leaders. However, ethno-nationalism vinced government that everyone’s interests can explain virtually none of them: why did would be best served if their region were forestry issues resonate in some campaigns, and granted autonomy. Hence, Jharkhand state was industrial issues resonate in others? Why did born. violence sometimes – but only sometimes – The ethno-national temptation is hard to accompany demands for statehood? More stan- resist: a community is not as ‘successful’ as it dard political analyses can more usefully ‘should be’, and its leaders ask, ‘Why?’ Failing address these questions. to find a compelling alternative explanation, I will address these questions using a they offer ‘discrimination’. Their offer is century-long, institutionalist approach, focus- accepted, and a social movement is begun. ing first on how grassroots grievances trans- Such an ethno-national frame has been formed themselves into movements and then employed almost continuously during the on how those movements were markedly century-long Jharkhand statehood movement. shaped (including both opportunity and con- Indeed, when the state was created in Novem- straint) by existing national and state-level ber 2000, then Home Minister L.K. Advani her- political institutions. © 2008 The Author doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8373.2008.00362.x Journal compilation © 2008 Victoria University of Wellington D. Stuligross Starting from ‘the people’ and looking up tions each proved to be socially neutral when it towards government institutions, a broad his- came to discriminating against Jharkhandis. torical view reveals ‘the’ Jharkhand movement The top-down surprise might be that, when as a series of political moments that each latch observed carefully, it becomes increasingly onto the idea of institutional change – excluding clear that Jharkhand state was created in the mass of northern Bihari farmers from politi- response to national centre/state politics. The cal decisions that affect Jharkhand – as a solu- Jharkhand movement created a political oppor- tion to the social or economic problem of the tunity, but that opportunity existed for nearly a day. Precious little beyond a demand for state- century! One must place that opportunity in hood unites the series of political entrepreneurs, the context of national political pressures – in each of whom appealed to somewhat differently particular, the changing relationship between bounded communities in support of sometimes national parties (Congress and the Bharatiya markedly different substantive goals. Janata Party (BJP)) and those parties that suc- This ought not to be a surprise. State creation cessfully gained influence each in a single – that is, separating Jharkhand from northern state. Bihar – would do nothing more than change the No matter which level of analysis one rules of the game. By itself, statehood would not chooses, the Jharkhand movement has been guarantee any individual or group redress for fragmented: competing developmental visions, their substantive concerns, and the 30 million competition over distribution of benefits, com- Jharkhandis that would remain were a rather petition over mobilisational frame (ethnic, heterogeneous lot! Nonetheless, no matter how which excludes some people directly affected a Jharkhandi defined (or redefined) himself, and by ‘the problem’ however defined, or substan- whatever his interests were, the statehood tive, which undermines the ability to harness movement in each iteration claimed that inter- ‘ethnic passion’), competition over appropriate ests would be at least more likely to resonate institutional focus (central government, state productively in a Jharkhand legislature than in a government), competition over appropriate Bihari one. movement repertoire (electoral, mass move- The surprise might be that, when observed ment, violent vanguard) led Jharkhandis of carefully, the reality of the grievances did not every stripe to have limited influence on gov- match the political rhetoric of those seeking to ernment policies that affected them. Jharkhan- raise ethno-national rancour. Virtually every dis of every stripe realised limited rewards from issue, at virtually every historical moment, cut the multiple developmental paths that devel- across ethnicity. People asked, to what extent oped simultaneously during the twentieth will our support of the statehood movement century. enhance the creation of a Jharkhand state? To Ethno-nationalism is the expected vehicle of what extent will creation of a Jharkhand state people who fit uncomfortably in a political improve our lives? And, of course, who are we? system – people with identifiable, measurable The political ‘we’ and the traditional-tribal- grievances, a plausible explanation and a plau- linguistic-ethnic ‘we’ frequently diverged in the sible way out. But it takes routine electoral face of questions like these. analysis to unveil the structural sources of that Starting from government institutions and discomfort and careful empirical legwork to looking down towards ‘the people’, one would give the lie to the ethno-nationalist claim. These observe a century of policy preferences, driven are the goals of this paper. After an introductory by electoral logic, in favour of the Ganges delta aside on ‘tribe’, I will first demonstrate that each and against the Jharkhand area. One would not of the grievances that drove the Jharkhand state- find policies that substantially favoured one or hood movement cut through the ostensible another social, religious or linguistic group tribe–sadan-migrant divide. Then, I will demon- within the Ganges delta, nor would one find strate that political institutions on the state level social, religious or linguistic preferences among created pressure to ignore Jharkhand as a those most ignored in Jharkhand. During the region, and that political institutions on the course of a century, the British, the Congress national level created incentives to accommo- Party and the Janata Dal in its various incarna- date the region, in a variety of ways. 84 © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Victoria University of Wellington Resources, representation and authority An introductory aside: Which ‘ethnic groups’ listed as 44% of the region’s population in are we talking about, anyway? 1891; as a result of emigration, immigration and re-enumeration, their proportion by 2001 Jharkhand’s ‘sons of the soil’ were either was recorded as 28%.2 Of the four major ‘sadans’ or ‘tribespeople’. Sadans were those tribes – Munda, Santal, Oraon and Ho – the people, typically lower-caste Hindus, who Munda arrived first. Large tribal states were migrated to the region during the centuries well established at least by the thirteenth before the twentieth century and were gradually century (Sinha, 1962: 5–79; Saha, 1996: 824– incorporated – both socially and economically 834).3 Tribal states occasionally came into – into the fabric of Jharkhandi village life. ‘Tribes- conflict with one another and pushed the people’ belong to one of 32 tribes in the region earlier communities away, thus generating that are officially recognised on the National intra-Jharkhand rivalries and broadening the Schedule of Tribes. geographic area that comprises the idea of ‘Tribe’ is a politically important category Jharkhand. These conflicts are recorded in the because the Indian government determined that legends of both ‘winning’