Marine Investigation Report M17a0004
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MARINE INVESTIGATION REPORT M17A0004 Grounding Bunkering tanker Arca 1 Little Pond, Nova Scotia 08 January 2017 Transportation Safety Board of Canada Place du Centre 200 Promenade du Portage, 4th floor Gatineau QC K1A 1K8 819-994-3741 1-800-387-3557 www.tsb.gc.ca [email protected] © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2018 Marine investigation report M17A0004 Cat. No. TU3-7/17-0004E-PDF ISBN 978-0-660-25740-2 This report is available on the website of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada at www.tsb.gc.ca Le présent rapport est également disponible en français. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. Marine Investigation Report M17A0004 Grounding Bunkering tanker Arca 1 Little Pond, Nova Scotia 08 January 2017 Summary On 08 January 2017, at 0820 Atlantic Standard Time, the bunkering tanker Arca 1 went aground while under reduced propulsion due to a failure of the port propulsion clutch. There were 6 people on board. The vessel sustained major damage to the hull and propulsion machinery. There were no injuries and there was no pollution. The vessel was refloated and towed to Sydney, Nova Scotia. Le présent rapport est également disponible en français. Marine Investigation Report M17A0004 | 1 Factual information Particulars of the vessel Table 1. Particulars of the vessel Name of vessel Arca 1 IMO* number 5411761 Port of registry Panama Flag Panama Type Bunkering tanker Gross tonnage 793 Length 51.25 m Draft Forward: 5.09 m Aft: 5.09 m Built 1963, Port Weller Dry Dock Ltd. St. Catharines, ON Propulsion Two V12 diesel engines each driving a fixed-pitch propeller, producing a total of 559.5 kW Crew 6 Registered owner Petroil Marine, Mexico Manager MLS & Associates, Panama * International Maritime Organization Description of the vessel The Arca 1 is a bunkering tanker with Figure 1. Arca 1 a capacity of 1527 m3, designed for the transportation of oil to vessels at a maximum speed of 8 knots (Figure 1). The vessel was built in St. Catharines, Ontario, in 1963 and had operated in the ports of both Montreal and Sorel, Quebec. The vessel was restricted to minor waters voyages, Class II.1 In 2004, a second hull was installed over the internal oil storage tanks, providing a double hull (Appendix A). The construction of the second hull provided a 750 1 A minor waters voyage, Class II, is defined as a voyage made in certain lakes or rivers that are specified in the inspection certificate, with the greatest width not exceeding two miles. (Source: Home-Trade, Inland and Minor Waters Voyages Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1430, section 6.) 2 | Transportation Safety Board of Canada mm space between the inner and outer hulls that incorporated 3 water ballast tanks. Two 12V92 diesel engines that power 2 Z-drives are mounted on the stern and provide thrust. The diesel engines power the Z-drives via a power take-off clutch arrangement. Each Z-drive (Figure 2) can rotate 360° and is fitted with a fixed-pitch propeller. The vessel is steered by modifying the orientation of the thrust units. Vessel certification Figure 2. Port Z-drive The vessel held a registry certificate as well as a Minimum Safe Manning Certificate and a Single Voyage for Delivery Authorization issued by Panama for delivery from Sorel, Quebec, Canada, to Mazatlán, Sinaloa, Mexico. The authorization specified that the vessel could carry out the voyage without statutory certificates. The vessel also held a radio station license. Personnel certification and experience The master held a credential document issued in the United States under the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 1978. 2 The document entitled the master to serve in the capacity of chief engineer on vessels of not more than 3000 gross tons (GT). This credential document also entitled the master, under the U.S. Code, Title 46 – Shipping, to serve only in the capacity of master on vessels of not more than 500 GT on U.S. domestic voyages. 3 2 The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (the STCW Convention) and its associated Seafarer’s Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code (the STCW Code) establish mandatory minimum standards for officers and watch personnel on merchant vessels. 3 A U.S. domestic voyage is defined as “movement of a vessel between places in, or subject to the jurisdiction of, the United States, except movement between (A) a place in a territory or possession of the United States or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and (B) a place outside that territory, possession, or Trust Territory.”(Source: U.S. Code, Title 46, section 5101.) Marine Investigation Report M17A0004 | 3 The master had sailed in various capacities on U.S. Coast Guard vessels for 6 years in the early 1970s. In the mid-1980s, he had sailed for 2 years as master on registered yachts in southern waters. Since 2008, he had sailed in various engineering positions on commercial vessels and had also seasonally operated vessels for a small-craft towing company. The second mate held a credential document issued in the U.S. under the provisions of the STCW Convention that entitled him to serve in the capacity of master on vessels of not more than 3000 GT. He had 40 years of experience in different capacities on various types of vessels, sailing mostly in the southern and western waters of the U.S. The chief mate held a Watchkeeping Mate certificate of competency issued in Canada under the provisions of the STCW Convention. The document entitled him to serve in the capacity of chief mate on vessels of not more than 3000 GT. The chief mate also held a Master 3000 Gross Tonnage, Domestic certificate issued in Canada. He had 32 years of experience in different capacities on various types of vessels, sailing mostly in Canadian waters. The motorman held an Engine Room Rating certificate issued in Canada. He had 6 years of experience sailing as an engine room rating on supply vessels, cargo ships, and seismic vessels. Two able seamen holding the required certifications were also on board. All crew member certificates were endorsed by the Panama Maritime Authority for a period of 3 months. Pre-voyage preparations The Arca 1 was laid up at the shipyard dock in Sorel for 2 years after being decommissioned in 2014. The vessel was sold to a Mexican company in 2016. In October 2016, 3 crew members joined the vessel. The owner attempted to register the vessel as a Canadian yacht for the purpose of ferrying it to Mexico, but the registration request was denied and the 3 crew members were sent back home. On 06 December 2016, the vessel obtained registration under the Panamanian flag. The 3 crew members were brought back on board and started to prepare the Arca 1 for its voyage to Mexico. On 08 December, having completed a condition survey of the vessel, a surveyor for the classification society Intermaritime Certification Services4 issued a statement of seaworthiness for the vessel’s voyage, as was required by Panama. On 09 December 2016, the Panama Maritime Authority issued a Minimum Safe Manning Certificate (Appendix B) as well as a Single Voyage for Delivery Authorization 4 Intermaritime Certification Services is a recognized organization authorized to offer statutory or class certification on behalf of flag states under the mandatory rules, regulations and requirements by national and International Maritime Organization legislation. 4 | Transportation Safety Board of Canada (Appendix C). The authorization imposed, among other things, the following requirements to mitigate risks to the vessel and its crew: Weather forecast are to be obtained 24/48 hours prior departure and on a daily basis throughout the entire voyage planned and agreed rout [sic]. The vessel is not to depart if seas waves excedding [sic] 4 meters are expected within 24 hours. Including to all intermediate stops made during the intended voyage. […] The vessel is not permitted to sail is [sic] seas of Beaufort 7[ 5] and/or above. In the event thatt [sic] the vessel is at sea in said Beaufort scale, master should proceed to a port of shelter. On 13 December 2016, Transport Canada (TC) conducted a Port State Control 6 inspection that identified 13 deficiencies related to radio equipment, life-saving equipment, the number of crew, the certification of crew members, and voyage planning. Given the deficiencies identified in the inspection, the Port State Control inspection was suspended under section 3.6 of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding protocol and the vessel was restricted from sailing. Following the inspection and to comply with the conditions of the Minimum Safe Manning Certificate, the capacity of the master was changed in the vessel’s Articles of Agreement7 from master to engineer, and the capacity of the second mate was changed from second mate to master. However, during the occurrence voyage, these 2 crew members carried out the same duties that were originally specified in the vessel’s Articles of Agreement. On 16 December, the crew was increased to 6 members to meet the requirements of the Minimum Safe Manning Certificate. On 21 December, the vessel’s authorized representative contacted TC Port State Control officers to ask TC to complete the inspection, clear previous findings, and remove the restricted-to-sail order. It was determined that a chief mate with the required certification was necessary to comply with the officer certification requirements of the Minimum Safe Manning Certificate.