ATtention Spanned: Comprehensive Vulnerability Analysis of AT Commands Within the Android Ecosystem Dave (Jing) Tian∗1, Grant Hernandez1, Joseph I. Choi1, Vanessa Frost1, Christie Ruales1, Patrick Traynor1, Hayawardh Vijayakumar2, Lee Harrison2, Amir Rahmati2,3, Michael Grace2, and Kevin R. B. Butler1 1Florida Institute for Cybersecurity (FICS) Research, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA fdaveti,grant.hernandez,choijoseph007,vfrost,cruales,traynor,butlerg@ufl.edu 2Samsung Research America, Mountain View, CA, USA fh.vijayakuma,lee.harrison,amir.rahmati,
[email protected] 3Department of Computer Science, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, USA Abstract have also been used by smartphone manufacturers and operating system designers to access and control device AT commands, originally designed in the early 80s for functionality in proprietary ways. For example, AT com- controlling modems, are still in use in most modern mands on Sony Ericsson smartphones can be used to ac- smartphones to support telephony functions. The role cess GPS accessories and the camera flash [18]. of AT commands in these devices has vastly expanded through vendor-specific customizations, yet the extent of While previous research (e.g., [20, 46, 47]) has demon- their functionality is unclear and poorly documented. In strated that these commands can expose actions poten- this paper, we systematically retrieve and extract 3,500 tially causing security vulnerabilities, these analyses have AT commands from over 2,000 Android smartphone been ad-hoc and narrowly focused on specific smartphone firmware images across 11 vendors. We methodically vendors. To date, there has been no systematic study of the test our corpus of AT commands against eight Android types of AT commands available on modern smartphone devices from four different vendors through their USB platforms, nor the functionality they enable.