Institutional Analysis of Uruu/ Village-Based Voting and Mobilisation Patterns in Post- Independence Kyrgyzstan ARZUU SHERANOVA

Traditional pre-tsarist institutions in Central Asia (CA) are viewed as being crucial in domestic politics, democratisation, transition and nation-building. Political sci- entists have focused on clan identities and clan politics, whereas anthropologists have proposed kinship and patronage as alternative analytical frameworks. Each side of the debate, however, has not adequately explained or portrayed tradition- al institutions that afect political voting and mobilisation simply because it is a combination of both proposed frameworks at the same time. This article suggests using Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis framework (IAD) to gain a more com- prehensive analysis of the issue. Ostrom’s IAD is particularly useful to frame and explain this phenomenon because it was designed as an instrument to under- stand complex situations for which individuals set rules. Due to dificulty in term- ing the phenomenon found in the literature, this article favours using the local terms “uruu/uruk” that denote patrilinear genealogy and “uruuchuluk” that broadly stands for patrilinear bonds identity to describe traditional pre-modern institutions that afect political voting and mobilisation. In addition, this article stresses that the uruu/uruk genealogy system is closely linked with its inhabited geographic area and generates a parallel regional identity which tends to be crucial in the political life of Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the paper treats uruu/uruk and region together as one phenomenon. The uruu/uruk genealogy system is explained via Ostrom’s IAD framework and is informed by the existing literature on contemporary elections in Kyrgyzstan along with the author’s observations of elections in Kyrgyzstan since 2009. Based on the IAD, I conclude that uruu/uruk-based voting and the develop- ment of regional identity in Kyrgyzstan are attractive practices for both individual voters and political candidates because they both benefit from the situation and are committed to maintaining the “structure” of the situation. Keywords: Institutional analysis, voting, uruu/uruk, uruuchuluk, genealogy, Kyrgyzstan

38 ISSUE 8 ------is proposed in this paper as as paper this in proposed is

institutional analysis below, the the below, analysis institutional

uruu/uruk village), despite the value of geographic geographic of value the despite village), / In paper this I theoretical apply an alternative In addition to kinship as an important feature of of feature important an as kinship to addition In article treats uruu and uruk as one. Recent studies studies Recent one. as uruk and uruu treats article nealogy system is closely linked with its inhabited inhabited its with linked closely is system nealogy generates a consequence, as and area, geographic 2012; (Jacquesson, Kyrgyzstan in mobilisation toral regionalism fact, In 2011). Sjöberg, 2005; Kartawich, in cleavage political a north-south to contributes identity regional The 2008). (Ryabkov, country the part of as being integral to understanding and studying Kyrgyzstan. in politics and kinship contemporary Inthe uruu/uruk of component a central as region considers study imaginationuruu/uruk and treats “region/village” stated (further complementary as “uruu/uruk” and as uruu in established well being not uruu/uruk in areas could instance, for Schatz, literature. existing the territory and kinship how explain adequately not in balancing clan of speaks still he yet related, are cor clan “umbrella that observes and Kazakhstan (2005, 241). p. territories” specific to […] responds Anal Institutional Ostrom’s approach, namely Elinor tradi of study the to (2005), (IAD) framework ysis electoral mobilisation Kyrgyz in institutions tional comprehen a more for allows IAD The voting. and especially is IAD Ostrom’s issue. the of analysis sive phenomenon this explaining and framing in useful also take this approach and prefer using the local local the using prefer and approach this take also 2018 Ismailbekova, (see uruuchuluk and uruu terms 2018). Light, and ge uruu/uruk the that notes paper the uruu/uruk, a parallel regional identity along with uruu/uruk. uruus Kyrgyz past, the of reality nomadic the Under a pre-agreed in another to pasture one from moved practice This uruus. neighboring with arrangement which land and uruu between a bond consolidated link The 1992). (Ibraimov, herding for essential was by cemented further was land the and uruu between A 2002). Luong (see policies sedentarisation Soviet genealogy uruu/uruk the part of as identity regional elec during especially be crucial, to tends system 39 ------” (in ” (in Uruun emne?” and “Urugun emne? he post-communist transition to democracy democracy to transition post-communist he process. on-going an still is Kyrgyzstan in democratic well-established formally Despite he same time, this paper suggests that instead, instead, that suggests paper this time, same he The terms used to denote traditional institutions institutions traditional denote to used terms The gue that the term “clan” is distorted from the local local the from distorted is “clan” term the that gue Kyrgyz: What is your lineage?). Considering this, the the this, Considering lineage?). your is What Kyrgyz: institutions and values, in practice, traditional institu traditional practice, in values, and institutions tions and values frequently succeed. On the central central On the succeed. frequently values and tions most in like Kyrgyzstan, in training democracy level, post-communist legitimated mainly Asia, Central of democracy simulated regimes the while regimes, on the However, 2014). (Murzakulova, performance net village and network family traditional level, local and challenged strong remained institutions work such as institutions and democratic modernisation Since parties. political and elections transparent sys e-voting the to shifted has Kyrgyzstan 2013, e-voting that believed government the because tem demo and transparent a more build to help would observa recent However, process. election cratic regional of a strengthening and bribery report tions 2016). (OSCE/ODIHR, loyalties and networks homegrown terms such as “uruu/uruk” that denote denote that “uruu/uruk” as such terms homegrown broadly that “uruuchuluk” and genealogy patrilinear be used should identity bonds patrilinear for stands group lineage a bigger is Uruu 2018). (Ismailbekova, in uruks or sub-groups smaller several of composed everyday common in though even genealogy, Kyrgyz common is It synonyms. essentially are they usage “ both: hear to and because traditional institutions that afect polit afect that institutions traditional because and saliev & Ploskih, 2000). In response, anthropologists anthropologists response, In 2000). Ploskih, & saliev ar adequately not has debate the of side each cause terminology, of best use the clarified or explained both of a combination is mobilisation and voting ical t at reality and propose instead referring to “kinship and and “kinship to referring instead propose and reality (Hardenberg, and “patronage” lineage” networks Be 2017). Ismailbekova, 2010; Jacquesson, 2009; as “clan” (Collins, 2004, 2006) and “tribalism” (Junu “tribalism” and 2006) 2004, (Collins, “clan” as

such as family networks and village networks are are networks and village networks such as family of side one On the scholarship. recent in disputed such terms suggest scientists political debate, the T ASIA IN FOCUS framework for understanding and analysing the Therefore, the IAD framework is the best-situated rules. situations of set individuals plexity which for instrument that can be used to understand the com and rules (Ostrom, 1990). The IAD framework is an lation through the development norms of common successfully self-governed without external regu in argued 1990 that common resources could be The IAD framework developed by Elinor Ostrom Kyrgyzstan in patterns voting mobilisation and village-based a theoretical frame to explain uruu Institutional analysis framework as gyzstan, and Ioutline the political implications. information on the genealogical uruu system of Kyr Analysis framework (2005), I give brief background questions, Ipresent Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional gyzstan to beelected? Before answering the posed do politicians rely on uruu/village networks in Kyr voters prefer voting along uruu/village lines? Why per addresses using IAD are the following: Why do solution for equilibrium. The key questions the pa the role of the uruu study why uruu/village loyalty matters and how afiliation matters. Furthermore, in this paper I also situation a as elections siders cal By using NGOs. IAD framework, the paper con missions and an as independent observer with lo interpreter an role as observation to election OSCE tions of elections in Kyrgyzstan since 2009 in my articles, and by analysing my own close observa ings from existing scholarly works as well as media patterns of post-communist elections using find I carried out the institutional analysis by studying tional analysis literature which uses IAD is lacking. ing Ostrom’s (1990, 2005) framework. The institu the perspective of their institutional structure us uruu/urukon regional and networks (village) from Kyrgyzstan. This paper contributes to the studies those which can be observed in post-independent particularlyderstand complex situations, as such because it was designed as an instrument to un / village remains an institutional where uruk/regional uruk/regional where / ------40 component” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 141). Ostrom (2005) original) (Ostrom, 2005, p. 18), and have an “OR ELSE re lems” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 14). The action situation is act, exchange goods and services, [and] solve prob where “participants with diverse preferences inter The point for the IAD analysis is the “action situation.” ernments at all scales” p. 3). (2005, The central those within families, neighborhoods […] and gov of repetitive and structured interactions including prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms vo uruu-based of institutional analysis in-depth viewed, on traditional institutions in Central Asia Ihave re in post-independent Kyrgyzstan. In the literature ing and uruu-based support mobilisation patterns complexity of the phenomenon of uruu-based vot are are scriptions what concerning actions (or outcomes) understandings by participants about instruction or principle. Rules are defined as “shared The concept of “rule” is elaborated as aregulation, individuals take and may result in diferent actions. three factors because together they afect actions p.15).(2005, Ostrom suggests taking into account all wo ing relationships, the attributes (2) of the biophysical three clusters of variables: (1) the rules for organis trom, 2005, p. 38). action situations result in diferent outcomes (Os impact of “exogenous variables,” participants and the action arena. In the process of interaction and action situationsand “holons” as (Ostrom, 2005, p. 38). education and gender age, as characteristics, such statuspants, (2) of participants and (3) individual utes of participants are the (1) number of partici al sition and capable of selecting actions from aset of fined as “decision-making entities assigned to apo ternatives” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 38). Relevant attrib gulated by norms and rules. Participants are de ting mobilisation electoral and lacking. is rld and (3) the structure of the general community Ostrom’s exogenous variables are made up of According to Elinor Ostrom, institutions are “the required

action situation represents the social space , prohibited Ostrom refers to participants , or permitted

and places them in ” (emphasis” in enforced pre ------ISSUE 8 - - - uruu

Kyrgyz Genealogy Sanzhyra according to , Kyrgyz Figure 1 Figure Temirkoulov (2004), after the independence, independence, the after (2004), Temirkoulov After the country had gained independence, gained had country the After at political parties in Kyrgyzstan are “restricted to to “restricted are Kyrgyzstan in parties political at diferent uruus competed against one another to to another one against competed uruus diferent under Soviet the sedentarisation, collectivisation (Kurmanov, 2003, p.4). Indeed, a high number of of number high a Indeed, 2003, p.4). (Kurmanov, oficially regis political parties in Kyrgyzstan—203 OSCE/ to according 2016 in parties political tered could 2016), OSCE/ODIHR, report ODIHR (see regional of prevalence the about extensively speak interest. national the over interests further reinforced its influence both in the socio-eco the in both influence its reinforced further of Hundreds country. the of life political and nomic of genealogies various on published were books noted As amateurs. and historians local by uruus by regional national, on resources state to access get (2010), Torogeldieva to According levels. local and creation, their during Kyrgyzstan, in parties political region on based were but ideology political no had notes Kartawich Similarly, ideology. tribal and alism th Kurmanov (2005, 7). p. area” geographical a specific as parliament the within factions existing to refers According (2003, 4). p. “amorphous” and “unstable” “his/her to attached more is MP elected an him, to party” “his/her than rather uruu]” or [region electors and “kolkhoz” (collective households) systems. systems. households) (collective and“kolkhoz” system uruu the reforms, Soviet despite However, 2006; (Collins, day present the to up survived has 1993). Suny, 2007; Roy, 41 ------/ / (right), the sol (left), and ich and (left), sol the (right),

Sanzhyra). Historically, tribal systems in Central Asia re Asia Central in systems tribal Historically, d political of society organisation which provided 92, p.66). Usually, tribesmen lost support from from support lost tribesmen Usually, 92,p.66). kilik (central). Thesekilik (central). uruu groupings are recorded Sanzhyra called tree genealogical the in kept and illus as sanjïra) or sanjyra as also (transliterated Genealogy 1, Kyrgyz Fig. below (see below trated to according placed functions of the modern state. In Turkmeni In state. modern the of functions placed economic social, of a form was system a tribal stan, an well-being of fellows in uruu (Ibraimov, 1992, p.66). 1992, p.66). (Ibraimov, uruu in fellows of well-being only nation a settled became Kyrgyz 1920–1940, In uruu if they betrayed, shamed or worsened the the worsened or shamed betrayed, they if uruu Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz people could not imagine their their imagine not could people Kyrgyz Kyrgyzstan, and protected it because uruu their outside lives such was This p.9). 2014, (Kenčiev, them supported did who Kyrgyz that identity part of essential an line their within ancestors seven their know not Vasil’eva, 1954, p. 176). Likewise, in pre-modern pre-modern in Likewise, 1954, 176). p. Vasil’eva, basic services, basic needs, and regulations (see (see regulations needs, and basic services, basic al groupings: the ong (Ibraimov, Kyrgyz ethnic not perceived were age 19 The Kyrgyz genealogical tree consists of three trib three of consists tree genealogical Kyrgyz The Kyrgyz traditional uruu/uruk system, system, uruu/uruk traditional Kyrgyz and implications regionalism political politics, kinship, patronage and tribalism. However, However, tribalism. and patronage kinship, politics, than complex more is study under phenomenon the approach, seemsit needs and comprehensive a more which I claim is IAD. provided by village-based voting and political mobilisation traditional this above, noted was As accordingly. clan informal as studied was institution pre-modern situations (Ostrom, 2005). The institutional analysis analysis institutional The 2005). (Ostrom, situations frame theoretical a well-suited is IAD by provided of study a deeper provide to be used could that uruu the of logic internal or machine internal the seven factors are some of the key variables among among variables key the of some are factors seven action analyse to help that variables exogenous uruu explain to and operation institution’s village participants have, (6) the information available to to available information the (6) have, participants These benefits. and (7) costs and the participants also points to (1) the set of participants, (2) the (2) the participants, of set the (1) to points also outcomes, potential the (3) participants, of positions that control the (5) actions, allowable of set the (4) ASIA IN FOCUS a candidate of ‘their own’” (2012, p. 3). Identically, ‘clan-tribal elections’ they at least were supporting had no choice but to vote for candidates, party in to the Soviet type of elections in which people p.12). As noted in Jacquesson’s paper, “[in] contrast alogy to gain political support (Sheranova, 2016, uruu uruu use members membership and gene the top-down relationship, both elite and non-elite their own kin, while at the elite-non-elite level or in non-elite relationship, to support seek non-elites members (elite-non-elite level or top-down). In the tical relationships between elite and non-elite uruu non-elite uruu (non-elite members level), and ver instance points to horizontal relationships between works in political support. Sheranova (2016) for studies horizontal along vertical kinship and net A similar “manipulation” was observed in earlier manipulation: the genealogy of Kyrgyz was asubject for permanent de connections “undesirable”sirable” and genealogical p.13). Based on this, she distinguishes between “de hand, they are “constructed” and “manipulated” (2017, the public perception are primordial, but on the other 20 “nation-building and course” (Ismailbekova, projects” ki vides asupport system, while on the political level, that the on privatewhich asserts level, kinship pro Ismailbekova proposes aconcept of “a native son,” on observation of parliamentary elections in 2007, people’s caretaker” (Ismailbekova, 2017, p. 35). Based and notes that “kinship replaced the state as the supports the existence of kinship in political life Recent literature the on subject also generally nship is strengthened with the help of “political dis pending on diferent contexts. She continues that 17, p. 22). For Ismailbekova, the genealogies from immediately (Ismailbekova decreases. 2017, p.15) powerful position, his circle of supportive kinsmen When an individual ... purposes. his loses wealth and mobilizecan alarge group of for people political the advantage of having many kinsmen is that he it strengthens the whole group. For the patron, as hisnumber; kinship network increases in size, and powerful his kinsmen begin to increase in The Kyrgyz say once an individual wealthy becomes ------42 nomic and social lives of Kyrgyz. If authors provide describes this phenomenon in the political, eco p.1). In brief, the literature Idiscussed here mostly lineage” has “little on social import” lives (2018, in social lives is not “central” and agreater “national practice in Kyrgyzstan, Light states that role of uruu 2017). In contrast, in her study of everyday uruu tions in 2017 for practicing regionalism (Orunbekov, of elites. The media too blamed the presidential elec events for as one of the support-seeking strategies community elders, aksakals, from villages to cities 133). Beyer (2016) rightly observes the invitation of to agitate for their own candidates (Sjöberg, 2011, p. campaigns, kin-fellows usually provide “free labor” (2011, p. 33). According to Sjöberg, during election campaigning”, respondents noted relatives and kin among the “most important groups of people in their Fredrik Sjöberg’s study on elections informs that ‘P mon imagined kinship ties and feelings of loyalty. ar tions of elections show that if both participants any attempt to conceptualise this phenomenon, sc ticipant B’, acandidate running for elections. The A’, ‘Participant are participants voter, a ‘Par and lines is action ‘the situation’. The two categories of mobilising political support based on uruu/village mobilisation electoral and ing context, Situating the IAD framework to Kyrgyzstan’s vot Kyrgyzstanin votingbased patterns mobilisation and Institutional analysis of uruu/village- of voting in Kyrgyzstan. analysis of the uruu/village institution in the context paper Iattempt to provide amore comprehensive the existing literature, in the remaining of part the ceptualising this complex institution. Building on they leave comprehensive a out approach in con tion situation: four possible guiding norms, if not rules, in the ac su pant A’, while ‘Participant A’, in response, relies on region to mobilise the political support of ‘Partici articipant B’ manipulates her/his manipulates and uruu own B’ articipant e from the same uruu/village, they share com holarly literature, media articles and observa pport frompport ‘Participant B’. In this paper Ipropose

vo ting and ------ISSUE 8 ------llage lines: (i) the benefit of getting elected elected getting of benefit the (i) lines: llage egion. ​vi ​r Similar to ‘Participant A’, there are several ben several are there A’, ‘Participant to Similar addition in framework, (2005) Ostrom’s Finally, In opposition to the benefits listed above, the the above, listed benefits the to opposition In 18). Finally, elected kins give rewards in exchange exchange in rewards give kins elected Finally, 18). eir own issues (Korganbaev, 2019). Usually, clients clients Usually, 2019). (Korganbaev, issues own eir exogenous variables’: (1) the set of participants, participants, of set the (1) variables’: exogenous potential the (3) participants, of (2) positions the the (5) actions, allowable of set the (4) outcomes, infor the (6) and have participants that control and voting the In participants. to available mation action set the mobilisation situation, of participants ment if kin or villager gets elected, (ii) lack of bene of lack (ii) elected, gets villager or kin if ment of lack (iii) and relationships, patron-client from fits elected from rewards material multiple or one-time loyalty. for exchange in kin own her/his uses (s)he B’ if ‘Participant for efits uruu/ ‘other these analyses also benefits, and costs the to da v Kyrgystan,” 2018). Patron-client relationships relationships Patron-client 2018). Kyrgystan,” v da Kyrgyzstan of reality political the in important are pa as act candidates Elected 2017). (Ismailbekova, bene a mutually In clients. as act voters while trons, resolve to ties kinship/village use they tandem, ficial th a job get employed, get problems, own their resolve or resources, economic to access get promotion, or “krysha” as protectors (trans patrons own have & Buzhor, (Zabyelina a roof) as Russian from lated 20 supporters, such as uruu/village giv from loyalty for (Ismail elections the winning after (toi) a feast ing p.179). 2017, bekova, uruu/village-based against voting of costs potential (i) as be formulated can A’ ‘Participant for voting improve social-infrastructure from benefits of lack ment and secure state funds or investments (“Kog investments or funds state secure and ment tron-client relationships and (iii) long-term political political long-term (iii) and relationships tron-client the rule, a As loyalty. for a uruu/region from support uruu/ using not B’ of ‘Participant for costs potential getting of benefits of lack (i) are support village (ii) support, uruu/village of help the with elected lack of benefits from patron-client relationships, from support political long-term of lack (iii) and uruu/ using uruu/village support, (ii) the benefits from pa from benefits the (ii) support, uruu/village using 43 ​ ------articipant B’ is expected to provide support for for support provide to B’expected is articipant articipant A’ is expected to listen to a common to listen to expected is A’ articipant llage political support. ‘Participant A’ is expected to provide support support provide to expected is A’ ‘Participant made decision OR ELSE uruu/village the within uruu/ from excluded become B’might ‘Participant vi ‘P OR ELSE ‘Participant uruu/village-fellows own other from support political receive not B’ might uruu/village-fellows. ‘P for her/his own uruu/village-fellows OR ELSE OR ELSE uruu/village-fellows own for her/his from support receive not might A’ ‘Participant other uruu/village-fellows. ly made decision OR ELSE uruu/village within some for excluded become might A’ ‘Participant instance, (for events social important from time feasts). to be invited not ‘Participant B’ is expected to listen to a commonly a commonly to listen to B’ expected is ‘Participant sume that somebody from their region who gets gets who region their from somebody that sume

this high expectation, elected deputies try to pro to try deputies elected expectation, high this parlia the in villages own their of needs the mote ties. As noted in 2005 by Radnitz, “one’s village of or of village “one’s Radnitz, by 2005 in noted As ties. this To 417). (p. interests” their represent will elected achieve To changed. not has expectation this date, connected to improvement of infrastructure: reha infrastructure: of improvement to connected schools, bridges, roads, of construction or bilitation facili recreation sportand or mosques policlinics, voters expect their elected “sons” or “daughters” “daughters” or “sons” elected their expect voters usually problems, and needs social their address to sented rules, a list of benefits and costs were devel were costs and benefits of a list rules, sented and articles media studies, previous on based oped patron-client from benefits (ii) elected, gets villager material multiple or one-time (iii) and relationships regions, the In loyalty. for kin elected from rewards readily people and life for a person with remains igin as of uruu/village-based voting are (i) benefits to res to benefits (i) are voting uruu/village-based of or kin if improvement social-infrastructure idence observations. benefits Potential for ‘Participant A’ Among the number of exogenous variables pro variables exogenous of number the Among to related ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ on elaborate can we uruu/village-based voting and electoral mobilisation pre above the to B. Similar A and Participants for 4. posed by Ostrom (2005), in the action situation, situation, action the in (2005), Ostrom by posed 1. 2. 3. ASIA IN FOCUS uruu/village using Ostrom’s IAD framework that framework IAD Ostrom’s using uruu/village of voting and mobilisation in Kyrgyzstan based on mobilise voters for their own benefit. The situation nipulate” or use uruu and regional connections to loyalty, and political candidates tending to “ma as voters preferring to vote per uruu and region tion in Kyrgyzstan through IAD can besummarised generalThus, a pattern during voting and mobilisa also act the way ‘Participant A’ did and vice versa. based on the assumption that ‘Participant will B’ er’s positions and preferences. ‘Participant A’ acts perfect because participants are aware of each oth during voting and mobilisation is “complete” and p. 41). ‘The information’ available to participants situationaction are: and outcomes, set ‘the of allowable actions’ in the not use uruu/region lines. Based on these variables region lines during elections, or (4) acandidate did along uruu/region lines, (3) a candidate used uruu/ along uruu/region avoter lines, (2) did not vote there are four potential ‘outcomes’: (1) avoter voted ing uruu/regional lines for political ends. Likewise, uruu/region lines, and acandidate is using/not us participants: a voter is voting/not voting based on same uruu/region. There are four ‘positions’ among is made of avoter and acandidate representing the choice” over them, as proposed by Ostrom (2005, exiting their positions is analysed as if they “have no ‘The control’ that participants have over entering or regional lines in voting and political mobilisation, (1) ‘Participant A’ and ‘Participant both B’ use uruu/ mobilisation. use uruu/regional lines in voting and political (4) neither ‘Participant A’ nor ‘Participant B’ with uruu/region or elected, but ‘Participant A’ does not vote in line (3) ‘Participant uses B’ uruu/regional lines to get to elected, get but ‘Participant does not B’ use uruu/regional lines ‘Participant(2) A’ votes in line with uruu/region, - - - - 44 v work to have amore comprehensive analysis of using Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis frame o pose kinship and patronage as significant. Instead and clan politics, whereas anthropologists pro political scientists tend to focus on clan identities pre-modern institutions in voting and mobilisation, When studying and conceptualising traditional Conclusion to maintaining structure’ ‘the of the situation. both benefit from the situation and are committed for both the voter and the candidate because they gional loyalty in Kyrgyzstan are attractive practices illustrated voting based on uruu/uruk loyalty and re As IAD of pre-modern uruu/village institution has comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon. I have analysed provides an alternative and more survived communism, post-Soviet transition and to as clans, kinships, patronages or tribes, had referred are they whether institutions, traditional theoretical framework suits well to explain why b taining the “structure” of the situation. The IAD, fit from the situation and are committed to main voter and the candidate because they both bene Kyrgyzstan are attractive practices for both the uruu/uruk on based loyalty regional and loyalty in tandem. In other words, Iconclude that voting and a candidate (Participant B) if they act in and outcomes between avoter (Participant A) interactions mutually beneficial productive and an The action situationspective the on phenomenon. alternatively IAD can provide amore holistic per fails to provide comprehensive a while approach, based on uruu or village loyalty. Existing literature th ence, something that past approaches to studying throughout the Soviet era and after independ to the durability of this pre-modern institution institution,village valuable explanation provides a o f e y l is topicis have failed to comprehensively. do This ting and political mobilisation in Kyrgyzstan alysis presented in the paper stated about a ooking closer at the internal logic of the uruu/ ntering into adebate, this article suggests ------ISSUE 8 is a PhD candidate in the the in candidate a PhD is Sheranova Arzuu the at Science Political of School Doctoral a junior and Budapest of University Corvinus Research. Asia Central for Center the at researcher [email protected] Email: 45 - e study of pre-modern institutions. pre-modern of e study ship on Central Asia, and suggests a new path in in path new a suggests and Asia, Central on ship th challenge on-going democratisation in the region. the in on-goingchallenge democratisation Examination of this traditional institution through scholar existing the to light brings model IAD the ASIA IN FOCUS Kartawich, (2005). L. Kyrgyzstan: Parliamentary elections. Retrieved from www. Kogda v Kyrgyzstan prikhodit krupnyi investor, na nem vse pytayutsya nazhit’sya December (2018, 19). Junushaliev, D., &Ploskih, V. (2000). Traibalizm iproblemy razvitiya Kyrgyzstana. and Asia Central Jacquesson, (2012). S. From clan narratives to clan politics. Central Asian Survey, 31 Kenčiev, J. (2014). “Sarybagysh” Sanzhyra plemeni kyrgyzskogo Jacquesson, (2010). S. Power play among the Kyrgyz: State versus descent. Charleux In I. (Ed.), Repre Ismailbekova, (2018). A. 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