WellBeing International WBI Studies Repository

1982

Unnecessary Suffering: Definition and videnceE

Frank Hurnik University of Guelph

Hugh Lehman University of Guelph

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Recommended Citation Hurnik, F., & Lehman, H. (1982). Unnecessary suffering: Definition and vidence.e International Journal for the Study of Animal Problems, 3(2), 131-137.

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opinion concerning matters which came experimentation can be achieved if gov­ under the Act. ernment, scientists and the reform groups continue to work together as they have Who Should Be Responsible for for the last 2 years. But if these attempts Unnecessary Suffering: justifying Experiments? fail, the militants can be expected to be­ The Current Advisory Committee, come more vociferous, polarization will Definition and Evidence in framing its suggestions to the govern­ deepen, the productive dialogue of the "middle ground" will die, and the goal ment for new legislation, also felt that Frank Hurnik experiments need to be justified, although of workable new legislation will be lost it did not recommend that the Advisory as the controversy becomes increasingly and Committee should be granted executive heated. Hugh Lehman powers, since this move might be prohib­ References ited by expense. The Committee did, how­ Although it is possible to formulate stronger moral principles than "animals should ever, draw heavily on the approach al­ An Act to Amend the Law Relating to not be unnecessarily," there are significant grounds for doubting these ready offered by the Lords Select Com­ Cruelty, Viet. C. 77 1876. stronger principles. But the principle that underlies the dictum regarding unnecessary mittee and concluded- consider­ Advisory Committee on Animal Experi­ suffering is generally recognized as valid, since denial of it implies that we can do what­ able debate on the matter- that the ments (1981) Report to the Secretary ever we want with animals, conclusion that is usually considered unacceptable. A public would not be satisfied with any of State on the Framework of Legis­ determination of whether any particular instance of suffering is necessary or unneces­ new law that did not put the onus of jus­ lation to Replace the Cruelty to Ani­ sary must be based on an analysis of both the seriousness of the purpose of the act tification firmly on the shoulders of those mals Act 1876. that involves pain in animals, and its relative avoidability, as well as more concrete administering the new Act- ultimately, Animal Welfare Parliamentary Group, concerns like costs and availability of resources for a given community. the Secretary (Advisory Committee Animal Experimentation Advisory We can conclude, with reasonable certainty, that animals are suffering, by mak­ on Animal Experiments, 1981 ). Of course, Committee of the RSPCA, and the ing observations of changes in physiological and behavioral factors that are similar to the Home Office will probably be reluc­ Chairman of Animal Welfare Year, the changes that tell other humans are in pain. Further, the conclusion that any ani­ ant to accept this kind of responsibility 1976 (1976) Experiments on Living mal is suffering is sound, according to scientific methodology, because this hypothe­ readily, and the scientific community Animals: Cruelty to Animals Act sis is usually the best available explanation for the observed alterations in physiology will certainly oppose this measure on 1876. or behavior. the grounds that it will hamper scientific Departmental Committee on Experi­ Zusammenfassung freedom. ments in Animals (1965). Report. It is a great pity that the more ex­ HMSO cmnd. 2641, London. Dieser Artikel behandelt die verschiedenen Auslegungen des Prinzips, dass treme animal activists, in criticizing both Dawkins, M.S. (1981) Animal Suffering. man Tiere nicht unnotig leiden lassen darf. Das Prinzip von "unnotigem Leiden" Committees for not going far enough, House of Lords. Report of the Select wird vornehmlich im Zusammenhang mit der landwirtschaftlichen Praxis behandelt, have failed to recognize the significance Committee on the Laboratory Ani­ ist aber auch fUr viele andere Sachgebiete, die in diesem Artikel nicht zur Sprache of this new approach, since it does at mals Protection Bill EHL. Vol. 1, kommen, von grosser Bedeutung. last provide a mechanism for attaining para. 55. Tiere nicht unnotig leiden zu lassen ist ein weithin anerkanntes und gultiges what the Royal Commission of 1875 Hollands, C. (1981) Compassion is the Prinzip. Die Verleugnung dieses Grundsatzes brachte unannehmbare Folgen mit sought to achieve in drafting its legisla­ Bugler. Edinburgh, MacDonald, 1981. sich, so konnte z.B. jedermann mit Tieren machen was er will. Als allgemein aner­ tion, namely, that "the progress of medi­ Labour Party (1978) Living Without kanntes Prinzip wurde es auch zur ethischen Grundlage fUr viele Gesetze, welche cal knowledge [be] compatible with the Cruelty: Labour's Charter for Animal das Wohl der Tierwelt sicherstellen (Jackson, 1978; Leavitt, 1968). Ein weiter Person­ just claims of humanity" (Departmental Protection. The Labour Party, Lon­ enkreis hat strengere ethische Prinzipien befurwortet, z.B. dass Tiere ein Recht auf Committee on Experiments in Animals, don. Freiheit haben oder dass lnteressen der Tiere denen des Menschen nicht nachstehen 1965). Royal Commission on the Practice of und somit gleichermassen berucksichtigt werden mussen (Rachels, 1976; Singer, CRAE has recognized that this goal Subjecting Live Animals to Experi­ 1975). Es gibt jedoch bedeutende Grunde, solche Stellungnahmen, die sich uber die can only be attained through administra­ ments (1876) Report. Parliamentary in diesem Artikel besprochenen Prinzipien hinwegsetzen, anzugreifen. Da jedoch tive means and that, at the same time, Papers, 1978 C1397, vol. xli. das Prinzip, so wie es hier vertreten wird, auf keinen ernsthaften Wiederstand stosst any new law must be flexible enough to Ryder, R.D. (1976) Victims of Science. und die Verleugnung desselben weitherum zu Konflikten mit dem Gesetz fuhrt, permit progressive strengthening of its Davis, Poynter. provisions as the need arises. This objec­ Vines, R.S. (1976) Letter to New Scientist, Dr. Hurnik is Professor in the Department of Animal Science at the University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario. tive of a balanced view toward animal vol. 588, p. 588. Dr. Lehman is Professor of Philosophy at University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario.

/NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 130 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 131 II' I i

F. Hurnik and H. Lehman- Unnecessary Suffering Original Article F. Hurnik and H. Lehman- Unnecessary Suffering Original Article

bekennen sich die Autoren zum Prinzip, dass man Tiere nicht unnotig leiden lassen necessary and unnecessary suffering? A determination of whether suffer­ darf. Kl.. d 2. How do we know when an animal ing can be considered necessary or justi­ In der Meinung der Autoren muss dieses Bekenntnis auf weiterer arung ~r is suffering? fied is clearly related to an examination Behandlung selbst begrundet sein, denn die verschiedenen Auswirkungen/Folgen fur of the purpose for which the suffering in das Tier konnen allein aufgrund des Prinzips nicht festgelegt werd~n. Ob':ohl das Necessary Versus Unnecessary question is caused. Suffering that is Prinzip bereits als Crundlage fur viele Cesetze verwendet wurde, 1st v:en1~ ge:an Suffering brought about merely to gratify the sa­ d wor en, de n Begriff des "unnotigen Leidens" klarzustellen. Erforderl1ch.d b 1st d eme· distic pleasures of some human being is What is unnecessary suffering? To klare Unterscheidung zwischen notwendigem und unnotigem Le1 en. _A er ~ 1s_t unjustified. Suffering that is unlikely to answer this question, let us consider the noch ein zweites Problem: diese Klarstellung kann nich jene Komplikat1o~en ell~l­ add significantly to the well-being of the possible connotations of the term "un­ nieren die sich auch dann ergeben, wenn man unnotiges Leiden verme1den will. human community or to that of animals necessary." An event might be said to be Denn :'unnotiges Leiden" kann nur mit grundlicher Kenntnis uber das Le1den ~er is, for the most part, unjustified. Further­ necessary if it is the result of causal fac­ Tiere und wann Tiere leiden verhindert werden. In diesem Artikel werden be1de more, whether suffering is justified is tors over which people have no control. diese Probleme behandelt: clearly related to the avoidability of the Thus, one possible definition of "unnec­ suffering. In this respect, one of the def­ 1. Wie unterscheiden wir notiges und unnotiges Leiden? essary suffering" is: 2. Wie wissen wir, wann ein Tier leidet? initions of unnecessary suffering that we rejected above is, in part, on the right • Suffering is unnecessary if it is track. We should not say that suffering avoidable. Another connotation of the Moral Principles and Animals pie under consideration in this paper. was necessary suffering if the purpose term "unnecessary" relates to purpose: However, since the denial of the princi­ for which the suffering was brought In this paper, we discuss the various an event is unnecessary if it is done ple under consideration here is clearly about was not sufficiently worthwhile, ramifications of the principle that ani­ invalid and since this principle is not purposefully. Thus, another p~ss'i'b_le or even if the purpose for which the suf­ mals ought not to be made to suffer un­ open to serious objections, such as those definition of "unnecessary suffermg 1s: necessarily. While we are primarily con­ fering was brought about was sufficient­ that beset the stronger moral principles, • Suffering is unnecessary if it is cerned here with the implications of this ly worthwhile, if it could have been we believe that this principle is true. brought about purposefully. principle for agricultural practices, what achieved without causing suffering to While it is, we believe, reasonable the same extent. Of course, questions we have to say concerning "unnecessary Is either of these two definitions of to affirm the principle that we ought not can be raised concerning the formula­ suffering" has relevance to many other "unnecessary suffering" acceptable? The to cause animals to suffer unnecessarily, tion of methods for the determination contexts that are not taken up in this answer to this question is, we believe, such affirmation should be conditional and measurement of the importance of paper. negative. Neither of these definitions of upon further elaboration, since the vari­ human purposes. These questions raise That animals should not be made to "unnecessary suffering" is fully satisfac­ ous implications of this principle for ac­ deep issues in regard to theories of ~al­ suffer unnecessarily is widely recogniz­ tory. When we say that we ought not to tual treatment of animals are not self­ ues- issues that cannot be pursued In a ed as a valid moral principle. That this cause unnecessary suffering, we mean evident. Although the principle has al­ brief paper. It is our view that certain principle is valid may be demonstrated neither that we ought not to cause suf­ ready been used as the basis for much purposes, such as the provision of ad­ by the fact that denial of it carries with it fering on purpose nor that we ought not legislation, little has been done to ex­ equate nourishing food and sa:e. and _ef­ unacceptable implications: to wit, that a to cause avoidable suffering. A great plicate the concept of "unnecessary suf­ fective medicines, are of suff1c1ent Im­ person can do whatever he or she pleases deal of suffering that is both avoidable fering." What is needed is some clarifi­ portance. Other purposes, such as those with animals. Because of the evident va­ and purposefully caused is suffering cation on the distinction between neces­ relating to personal appearance, are lidity of this principle, it has been used that is necessary suffering. A scientist sary and unnecessary suffering. But there more dubious as to their importance, as the ethical basis for many laws that doing research on the effectiveness of is also a second problem: clarification of while other purposes such as, for ex­ are intended to protect the welfare of some treatment for a disease may pur­ this distinction will not eliminate all of ample, the alleviation of a slight in­ animals (Jackson, 1978; Leavitt, 1968). posefully bring about avoidable suffer­ the complications involved in the appli­ convenience concerned with animal care, Some people have advocated stronger ing in some experimental animals, but cation of the principle that we ought not are of no importance. moral principles, for example, that ani­ such suffering is necessary suffering. We to cause unnecessary suffering, because mals have a right to liberty or that ani­ do not agree that the scientist ought not In the last paragraph we argued application of the principle requires a mals are entitled to equal consideration to cause such suffering, unless he can that the necessity of some suffering is knowledge about when animals are suf­ of interests (Rachels, 1976; Singer, 1975). achieve the same research goals in some relative to both the purpose and the fering. In this paper we shall discuss But there are significant grounds for alternative manner, that is, in some man­ avoidability of the suffering. It is also both of these problems briefly: doubting these sorts of principles­ ner that causes less suffering or no suf­ relative to human knowledge, at any grounds that do not extend to the princi- 1. How do we distinguish between fering at all. particular time. This point can be infer- 132 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 133 II' I i

F. Hurnik and H. Lehman- Unnecessary Suffering Original Article F. Hurnik and H. Lehman- Unnecessary Suffering Original Article

bekennen sich die Autoren zum Prinzip, dass man Tiere nicht unnotig leiden lassen necessary and unnecessary suffering? A determination of whether suffer­ darf. Kl.. d 2. How do we know when an animal ing can be considered necessary or justi­ In der Meinung der Autoren muss dieses Bekenntnis auf weiterer arung ~r is suffering? fied is clearly related to an examination Behandlung selbst begrundet sein, denn die verschiedenen Auswirkungen/Folgen fur of the purpose for which the suffering in das Tier konnen allein aufgrund des Prinzips nicht festgelegt werd~n. Ob':ohl das Necessary Versus Unnecessary question is caused. Suffering that is Prinzip bereits als Crundlage fur viele Cesetze verwendet wurde, 1st v:en1~ ge:an Suffering brought about merely to gratify the sa­ d wor en, de n Begriff des "unnotigen Leidens" klarzustellen. Erforderl1ch.d b 1st d eme· distic pleasures of some human being is What is unnecessary suffering? To klare Unterscheidung zwischen notwendigem und unnotigem Le1 en. _A er ~ 1s_t unjustified. Suffering that is unlikely to answer this question, let us consider the noch ein zweites Problem: diese Klarstellung kann nich jene Komplikat1o~en ell~l­ add significantly to the well-being of the possible connotations of the term "un­ nieren die sich auch dann ergeben, wenn man unnotiges Leiden verme1den will. human community or to that of animals necessary." An event might be said to be Denn :'unnotiges Leiden" kann nur mit grundlicher Kenntnis uber das Le1den ~er is, for the most part, unjustified. Further­ necessary if it is the result of causal fac­ Tiere und wann Tiere leiden verhindert werden. In diesem Artikel werden be1de more, whether suffering is justified is tors over which people have no control. diese Probleme behandelt: clearly related to the avoidability of the Thus, one possible definition of "unnec­ suffering. In this respect, one of the def­ 1. Wie unterscheiden wir notiges und unnotiges Leiden? essary suffering" is: 2. Wie wissen wir, wann ein Tier leidet? initions of unnecessary suffering that we rejected above is, in part, on the right • Suffering is unnecessary if it is track. We should not say that suffering avoidable. Another connotation of the Moral Principles and Animals pie under consideration in this paper. was necessary suffering if the purpose term "unnecessary" relates to purpose: However, since the denial of the princi­ for which the suffering was brought In this paper, we discuss the various an event is unnecessary if it is done ple under consideration here is clearly about was not sufficiently worthwhile, ramifications of the principle that ani­ invalid and since this principle is not purposefully. Thus, another p~ss'i'b_le or even if the purpose for which the suf­ mals ought not to be made to suffer un­ open to serious objections, such as those definition of "unnecessary suffermg 1s: necessarily. While we are primarily con­ fering was brought about was sufficient­ that beset the stronger moral principles, • Suffering is unnecessary if it is cerned here with the implications of this ly worthwhile, if it could have been we believe that this principle is true. brought about purposefully. principle for agricultural practices, what achieved without causing suffering to While it is, we believe, reasonable the same extent. Of course, questions we have to say concerning "unnecessary Is either of these two definitions of to affirm the principle that we ought not can be raised concerning the formula­ suffering" has relevance to many other "unnecessary suffering" acceptable? The to cause animals to suffer unnecessarily, tion of methods for the determination contexts that are not taken up in this answer to this question is, we believe, such affirmation should be conditional and measurement of the importance of paper. negative. Neither of these definitions of upon further elaboration, since the vari­ human purposes. These questions raise That animals should not be made to "unnecessary suffering" is fully satisfac­ ous implications of this principle for ac­ deep issues in regard to theories of ~al­ suffer unnecessarily is widely recogniz­ tory. When we say that we ought not to tual treatment of animals are not self­ ues- issues that cannot be pursued In a ed as a valid moral principle. That this cause unnecessary suffering, we mean evident. Although the principle has al­ brief paper. It is our view that certain principle is valid may be demonstrated neither that we ought not to cause suf­ ready been used as the basis for much purposes, such as the provision of ad­ by the fact that denial of it carries with it fering on purpose nor that we ought not legislation, little has been done to ex­ equate nourishing food and sa:e. and _ef­ unacceptable implications: to wit, that a to cause avoidable suffering. A great plicate the concept of "unnecessary suf­ fective medicines, are of suff1c1ent Im­ person can do whatever he or she pleases deal of suffering that is both avoidable fering." What is needed is some clarifi­ portance. Other purposes, such as those with animals. Because of the evident va­ and purposefully caused is suffering cation on the distinction between neces­ relating to personal appearance, are lidity of this principle, it has been used that is necessary suffering. A scientist sary and unnecessary suffering. But there more dubious as to their importance, as the ethical basis for many laws that doing research on the effectiveness of is also a second problem: clarification of while still other purposes such as, for ex­ are intended to protect the welfare of some treatment for a disease may pur­ this distinction will not eliminate all of ample, the alleviation of a slight in­ animals (Jackson, 1978; Leavitt, 1968). posefully bring about avoidable suffer­ the complications involved in the appli­ convenience concerned with animal care, Some people have advocated stronger ing in some experimental animals, but cation of the principle that we ought not are of no importance. moral principles, for example, that ani­ such suffering is necessary suffering. We to cause unnecessary suffering, because mals have a right to liberty or that ani­ do not agree that the scientist ought not In the last paragraph we argued application of the principle requires a mals are entitled to equal consideration to cause such suffering, unless he can that the necessity of some suffering is knowledge about when animals are suf­ of interests (Rachels, 1976; Singer, 1975). achieve the same research goals in some relative to both the purpose and the fering. In this paper we shall discuss But there are significant grounds for alternative manner, that is, in some man­ avoidability of the suffering. It is also both of these problems briefly: doubting these sorts of principles­ ner that causes less suffering or no suf­ relative to human knowledge, at any grounds that do not extend to the princi- 1. How do we distinguish between fering at all. particular time. This point can be infer- 132 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 133 F. Hurnik and H. Lehman-Unnecessary Suffering Original Article F. Hurnik and H. Lehman-Unnecessary Suffering Original Article

red from the points made in the last par­ fering should not be accepted. Such ask such a person to tell us how he plained by the hypothesis that the ani­ agraph. Some suffering may be avoid­ practices include improper handling and knows that human beings suffer; that is, mal in question is suffering from some able only if human beings know how to care of animals, inadequate nutrition, we might ask him to describe the evi­ unpleasant stimulus or painful state. take steps to avoid it. Thus, advances in reduction in space to unreasonably dence available to him which supports We have argued above that we ar­ knowledge or technology may have im­ small amounts, and failure to allow for his contention that human beings suffer. rive at a determination that animals are plications concerning what kinds and the expression of genetically condition­ Since we are discussing the ways by suffering pain because this hypothesis is degrees of suffering are necessary. Even ed behavioral propensities. which he comes to know that humans essential for formulating the best avail­ though suffering of farm animals from We might summarize this part of other than himself do sometimes suffer, able explanation for observable animal certain diseases was unavoidable in ear­ our discussion in the following way: he cannot say that he has this knowl­ behavior. We have essentially the same lier times, such suffering is, in many edge because he himself can feel the ac­ type of evidence for the existence of Suffering of animals is unnecessary cases, avoidable today. Some people tual pain of others. other psychological states in animals. suffering if it is not essential for pur­ may to justify the suffering of farm At this point there are several For example, observations of escape re­ poses of sufficient importance or if animals in modern times under certain courses of argument that he might adopt, actions are evidence of fear. , it is it could be avoided by adopting al­ conditions by asserting that such ani­ and a full discussion of this issue would most important to note that our evi­ ternative practices that would achieve mals have always suffered under those require a lengthy treatise and is there­ dence for such psychological states as the same important purposes, but conditions. But this proffered justifica­ fore inappropriate in this context. In our fear, boredom, or pain is not fallacious would result in less suffering, pro­ tion is often unacceptable. view, the consequence of such a discus­ anthropomorphic reasoning. The evi­ viding that such alternative prac­ sion would be that we know that human dence that we have that an animal is Suffering and the Cost of tices were not too expensive for the beings are sometimes in pain, because afraid or in pain does not consist of dub­ Alleviating It community in question to bear. the hypothesis that they are in pain is ious analogies to human behavior. For It is, perhaps, less apparent that Identifying Suffering in Animals the best explanation that we can offer example, what grounds are available to whether or not suffering is necessary, it for certain kinds of behavior that we ob­ support the contention that a sheep is related to costs and available re­ Let us now turn to the other prob­ serve. For example, in most cases, the which sees or smells a wolf feels afraid? sources. Nonetheless, this is in fact the lem that arises if we try to apply the best explanation that we have of limping We do not say that we know that the case. Even in instances in which the moral principle under consideration. If behavior in a human being is that the sheep is afraid because when human be­ knowledge required to alleviate animal we are to avoid unnecessary suffering, person who is limping has a pain in his ings are in contact with wolves they feel suffering is available to a community, it we must know what conditions lead to leg or foot. afraid. Such reasoning would be fallaci­ may be too expensive for the people in animal suffering. How do we know when Furthermore, we can make the same ous and might lead to absurd conclu­ that community to apply such knowl­ animals are suffering? Some people may types of observations on other animals sions. Rather, the evidence that the edge and thereby reduce animal suffer­ maintain that we don't know that farm in pain as we do in the case of other sheep feels fear in the vicinity of the ing. In a poor society, where the people animals ever suffer. While this is an ex­ human beings. For example, if we see an wolf includes observations of physiolog­ have barely enough resources to pro­ treme position to which few people ac­ animal standing on three legs, the best ical and behavioral factors, as well as duce what is necessary for food, cloth­ tually subscribe, it may be instructive to explanation we may have of this behav­ the consideration that fear appears to ing, and shelter, any expense to reduce consider what steps one might take in ior is that the animal is doing this to make a significant contribution to the suffering of farm animals that is not ful­ the attempt to persuade such a person avoid the pain that it feels when it puts animal's chance of survival. While it ly compensated by increases in produc­ that his position is mistaken. With this in some weight on its fourth limb. Our might be suggested that we don't need tivity of food would be too costly to mind, one might start by asking such a theory that there is pain in the animal's the hypothesis that the animal feels fear bear. By contrast, for a community that person whether he believes that human limb rests essentially on the same type in order to explain the animal's behavior produces surplus food relatively inex­ beings other than himself can suffer? If of evidence as our knowledge of the in the presence of the wolf- that such pensively, certain increases in cost pro­ he answers this question in the negative, pain in another person's leg. According an explanation can be given without ref­ duction can be accepted, even though then we can dismiss his view as absurd. to circumstances and the type of animal erence to the animal's mental state, we such increases do not yield increased Possibly there is nothing that we can do in question, observations of such behav­ believe that this suggestion is superfici­ productivity, providing that such in­ to convince him that his view is mistak­ iors as rigid posture, limited use of a part al. To see that this is so, we ask the read­ creases really do reflect a reduction in en, but there is I ittle danger that very of the body, changed level of alertness, er to try to describe and explain the suffering in animals. In modern in­ many other people will ever agree with alteration of such factors as respiratory sheep's behavior in a useful way without dustrialized societies, where the cost of him. Let us assume, then, that we are rate, heart rate or body temperature, dis­ using terminology that carries some im­ food represents a relatively small frac­ conversing with a person who agrees organized behavior, vocalization, in­ plications concerning the sheep's men­ tion of the income of the community, that other human beings suffer, but tense homotopic investigation, etc., are tal state. We believe that reference to certain practices that cause animal suf- doubts that animals suffer. We might observable behaviors that are best ex- the animal's fear is warranted because

134 /NT I STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 INT j STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 135 F. Hurnik and H. Lehman-Unnecessary Suffering Original Article F. Hurnik and H. Lehman-Unnecessary Suffering Original Article

red from the points made in the last par­ fering should not be accepted. Such ask such a person to tell us how he plained by the hypothesis that the ani­ agraph. Some suffering may be avoid­ practices include improper handling and knows that human beings suffer; that is, mal in question is suffering from some able only if human beings know how to care of animals, inadequate nutrition, we might ask him to describe the evi­ unpleasant stimulus or painful state. take steps to avoid it. Thus, advances in reduction in space to unreasonably dence available to him which supports We have argued above that we ar­ knowledge or technology may have im­ small amounts, and failure to allow for his contention that human beings suffer. rive at a determination that animals are plications concerning what kinds and the expression of genetically condition­ Since we are discussing the ways by suffering pain because this hypothesis is degrees of suffering are necessary. Even ed behavioral propensities. which he comes to know that humans essential for formulating the best avail­ though suffering of farm animals from We might summarize this part of other than himself do sometimes suffer, able explanation for observable animal certain diseases was unavoidable in ear­ our discussion in the following way: he cannot say that he has this knowl­ behavior. We have essentially the same lier times, such suffering is, in many edge because he himself can feel the ac­ type of evidence for the existence of Suffering of animals is unnecessary cases, avoidable today. Some people tual pain of others. other psychological states in animals. suffering if it is not essential for pur­ may try to justify the suffering of farm At this point there are several For example, observations of escape re­ poses of sufficient importance or if animals in modern times under certain courses of argument that he might adopt, actions are evidence of fear. Now, it is it could be avoided by adopting al­ conditions by asserting that such ani­ and a full discussion of this issue would most important to note that our evi­ ternative practices that would achieve mals have always suffered under those require a lengthy treatise and is there­ dence for such psychological states as the same important purposes, but conditions. But this proffered justifica­ fore inappropriate in this context. In our fear, boredom, or pain is not fallacious would result in less suffering, pro­ tion is often unacceptable. view, the consequence of such a discus­ anthropomorphic reasoning. The evi­ viding that such alternative prac­ sion would be that we know that human dence that we have that an animal is Suffering and the Cost of tices were not too expensive for the beings are sometimes in pain, because afraid or in pain does not consist of dub­ Alleviating It community in question to bear. the hypothesis that they are in pain is ious analogies to human behavior. For It is, perhaps, less apparent that Identifying Suffering in Animals the best explanation that we can offer example, what grounds are available to whether or not suffering is necessary, it for certain kinds of behavior that we ob­ support the contention that a sheep is related to costs and available re­ Let us now turn to the other prob­ serve. For example, in most cases, the which sees or smells a wolf feels afraid? sources. Nonetheless, this is in fact the lem that arises if we try to apply the best explanation that we have of limping We do not say that we know that the case. Even in instances in which the moral principle under consideration. If behavior in a human being is that the sheep is afraid because when human be­ knowledge required to alleviate animal we are to avoid unnecessary suffering, person who is limping has a pain in his ings are in contact with wolves they feel suffering is available to a community, it we must know what conditions lead to leg or foot. afraid. Such reasoning would be fallaci­ may be too expensive for the people in animal suffering. How do we know when Furthermore, we can make the same ous and might lead to absurd conclu­ that community to apply such knowl­ animals are suffering? Some people may types of observations on other animals sions. Rather, the evidence that the edge and thereby reduce animal suffer­ maintain that we don't know that farm in pain as we do in the case of other sheep feels fear in the vicinity of the ing. In a poor society, where the people animals ever suffer. While this is an ex­ human beings. For example, if we see an wolf includes observations of physiolog­ have barely enough resources to pro­ treme position to which few people ac­ animal standing on three legs, the best ical and behavioral factors, as well as duce what is necessary for food, cloth­ tually subscribe, it may be instructive to explanation we may have of this behav­ the consideration that fear appears to ing, and shelter, any expense to reduce consider what steps one might take in ior is that the animal is doing this to make a significant contribution to the suffering of farm animals that is not ful­ the attempt to persuade such a person avoid the pain that it feels when it puts animal's chance of survival. While it ly compensated by increases in produc­ that his position is mistaken. With this in some weight on its fourth limb. Our might be suggested that we don't need tivity of food would be too costly to mind, one might start by asking such a theory that there is pain in the animal's the hypothesis that the animal feels fear bear. By contrast, for a community that person whether he believes that human limb rests essentially on the same type in order to explain the animal's behavior produces surplus food relatively inex­ beings other than himself can suffer? If of evidence as our knowledge of the in the presence of the wolf- that such pensively, certain increases in cost pro­ he answers this question in the negative, pain in another person's leg. According an explanation can be given without ref­ duction can be accepted, even though then we can dismiss his view as absurd. to circumstances and the type of animal erence to the animal's mental state, we such increases do not yield increased Possibly there is nothing that we can do in question, observations of such behav­ believe that this suggestion is superfici­ productivity, providing that such in­ to convince him that his view is mistak­ iors as rigid posture, limited use of a part al. To see that this is so, we ask the read­ creases really do reflect a reduction in en, but there is I ittle danger that very of the body, changed level of alertness, er to try to describe and explain the suffering in animals. In modern in­ many other people will ever agree with alteration of such factors as respiratory sheep's behavior in a useful way without dustrialized societies, where the cost of him. Let us assume, then, that we are rate, heart rate or body temperature, dis­ using terminology that carries some im­ food represents a relatively small frac­ conversing with a person who agrees organized behavior, vocalization, in­ plications concerning the sheep's men­ tion of the income of the community, that other human beings suffer, but tense homotopic investigation, etc., are tal state. We believe that reference to certain practices that cause animal suf- doubts that animals suffer. We might observable behaviors that are best ex- the animal's fear is warranted because

134 /NT I STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 INT j STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 135 F. Hurnik and H. Lehman- Unnecessary Suffering Original Article F. Hurnik and H. Lehman- Unnecessary Suffering Original Article

the best available descriptions and ex­ We have good scientific evidence that producer is an insensitive person. Some References planations of the sheep's observable be­ injured or diseased animals suffer pain animal welfarists have made such criti­ Jackson, W.T. (1978) Laws and other meas­ havior make reference to its fear. Rea­ and, similarly, we have, in some cases, cisms, but we do not believe such char­ ures for protection and humane soning in this way is in accord with good scientific evidence that animals acter assassination of those engaged in treatment of livestock. In Proceed­ sound canons of scientific method; it is suffer fear or boredom. Such evidence animal agriculture is justified. However, ings of the World Congress on Etholo­ not anthropomorphic. may not amount to absolute certainty, agriculturists are incorrect if they be­ gy Applied to Zootechnics, Madrid. We have argued that we have me­ but that sort of certainty is rarely, if lieve that there can be no legitimate crit­ Leavitt, E. (1968) Animals and Their Legal thodologically sound scientific evidence ever, attained in scientific studies. icisms of agricultural practices from a Rights. Animal Welfare Institute. for the existence of mental states in ani­ moral point of view, or that the critics of The Issue of Intensive Agriculture Rachels, J. (1976) Do animals have a mals. This point may be illustrated fur­ agricultural practices are doing nothing ther with another example. Let us ask, Prior to concluding this paper, we more than making unfounded vicious at­ right to liberty? In Animal Rights What grounds support the contention wish to raise two further points. First, it tacks against the character of those who and Human Obligations. Edited by Tom Regan and Peter Singer. Pren­ that a pregnant sow that is denied the is fashionable these days to direct criti­ are engaged in production of food. opportunity to make some sort of nest cism toward intensive methods of ani­ tice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. with straw or some other material suf­ mal agriculture. But the type of question Singer, P. (1975) Animal Liberation: A fers to some degree from the frustration we have been considering, namely, wheth­ New Ethics for Our Treatment of An­ of what is, for pigs, a natural instinct. er some agricultural practices cause un­ imals. Jonathan Cape, London. Again, no support for this contention is necessary suffering, is of much broader derived from alleged similarities with relevance, because criticisms based on human behavior. Rather, we observe the the principle of avoiding such suffering sow's behavior. Such observation will are also applicable to non-intensive Striving for Common Ground: support the above contention: Many sows methods of animal agriculture. For ex­ that are close to parturition and lack ample, one might consider chickens raised Humane and Scientific nest-building material will investigate in "free-range" conditions. In such con­ the floor and engage in what may be de­ ditions, the birds might regularly suffer Considerations in Contemporary scribed as "vacuum" nest building with from harsh weather, predators, high inci­ their heads, that is to say, they engage in dence of parasites, infections transfer­ Wildlife Management a sort of pantomime of nest building. red from wild animals, etc. Also, in free­ Some pigs in that condition also show in­ range conditions, disease prevention and creased stereotypy and bar-biting. Such precise medication are difficult to at­ Stephen R. Kellert behavior may be a consequence of labor tain. Given our capability to reduce or pain, but may also be indicative of a eliminate such forms of suffering, we Although there is a diversity of opinion about how to view the relationship be­ state of frustration associated with the may well ask whether animals raised in tween humans and wildlife, recent political pressures from the current administration absence of nesting material. free-range conditions are suffering un­ make it mandatory that these diverse groups coalesce to use their combined leverage Someone may criticize the remarks necessarily. It is not at all that the to halt the planned incursions into the remaining habitats of wildlife. It is also impor­ that we have made here by claiming that extent or intensity of suffering of birds tant to begin to see nature as a complex and interrelated whole, and to respect the in­ the evidence that we have concerning the raised on a "free range" is less than any tegrity of that whole, rather than simply select individual species for affection and suffering of the sow, etc., does not con­ discomfort that the birds suffer when protection. stitute proof that the animals in question raised in cages. Zusammenfassung are suffering. This objection reflects a Second, in raising the issue of wheth­ type of skepticism that is legitimate in er some agricultural practices cause un­ Obwohl verschiedene Meinungen Uber die Beziehung zwischen Mensch und many cases. We must be ready to admit, necessary suffering, we are not impugn­ wilder Fauna bestehen, wird es durch den jUngsten, von der gegenwartigen US Re­ with respect to many claims such as ing the motives of the producer who has gierung ausgehenden politischen Druck unumganglich, dass sich aile noch so ver­ those illustrated above, that we may be employed such practices- he or she is schiedenen Gruppen zusammenschliessen, um gemeinsam den Hebel anzusetzen, mistaken; to be rigidly dogmatic about not deliberately cruel. In saying that a our contention would be unscientific. particular practice causes unnecessary Dr. Kellert is Associate Professor in The School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, Yale University, New But, to deny or doubt conclusions that suffering, we are not saying that the Haven, CT. The following are the opening remarks at a symposium on "Wildlife Management in the United are supported by good scientific reason­ practice was introduced merely to cause States: Scientific and Humane Issues in Conservation Programs," The Institute for the Study of Animal Prob­ ing is also faulty scientific methodology. suffering and we are not saying that the lems, St. Louis, MO, October 14, 1981.

136 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 137 F. Hurnik and H. Lehman- Unnecessary Suffering Original Article F. Hurnik and H. Lehman- Unnecessary Suffering Original Article

the best available descriptions and ex­ We have good scientific evidence that producer is an insensitive person. Some References planations of the sheep's observable be­ injured or diseased animals suffer pain animal welfarists have made such criti­ Jackson, W.T. (1978) Laws and other meas­ havior make reference to its fear. Rea­ and, similarly, we have, in some cases, cisms, but we do not believe such char­ ures for protection and humane soning in this way is in accord with good scientific evidence that animals acter assassination of those engaged in treatment of livestock. In Proceed­ sound canons of scientific method; it is suffer fear or boredom. Such evidence animal agriculture is justified. However, ings of the World Congress on Etholo­ not anthropomorphic. may not amount to absolute certainty, agriculturists are incorrect if they be­ gy Applied to Zootechnics, Madrid. We have argued that we have me­ but that sort of certainty is rarely, if lieve that there can be no legitimate crit­ Leavitt, E. (1968) Animals and Their Legal thodologically sound scientific evidence ever, attained in scientific studies. icisms of agricultural practices from a Rights. Animal Welfare Institute. for the existence of mental states in ani­ moral point of view, or that the critics of The Issue of Intensive Agriculture Rachels, J. (1976) Do animals have a mals. This point may be illustrated fur­ agricultural practices are doing nothing ther with another example. Let us ask, Prior to concluding this paper, we more than making unfounded vicious at­ right to liberty? In Animal Rights What grounds support the contention wish to raise two further points. First, it tacks against the character of those who and Human Obligations. Edited by Tom Regan and Peter Singer. Pren­ that a pregnant sow that is denied the is fashionable these days to direct criti­ are engaged in production of food. opportunity to make some sort of nest cism toward intensive methods of ani­ tice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. with straw or some other material suf­ mal agriculture. But the type of question Singer, P. (1975) Animal Liberation: A fers to some degree from the frustration we have been considering, namely, wheth­ New Ethics for Our Treatment of An­ of what is, for pigs, a natural instinct. er some agricultural practices cause un­ imals. Jonathan Cape, London. Again, no support for this contention is necessary suffering, is of much broader derived from alleged similarities with relevance, because criticisms based on human behavior. Rather, we observe the the principle of avoiding such suffering sow's behavior. Such observation will are also applicable to non-intensive Striving for Common Ground: support the above contention: Many sows methods of animal agriculture. For ex­ that are close to parturition and lack ample, one might consider chickens raised Humane and Scientific nest-building material will investigate in "free-range" conditions. In such con­ the floor and engage in what may be de­ ditions, the birds might regularly suffer Considerations in Contemporary scribed as "vacuum" nest building with from harsh weather, predators, high inci­ their heads, that is to say, they engage in dence of parasites, infections transfer­ Wildlife Management a sort of pantomime of nest building. red from wild animals, etc. Also, in free­ Some pigs in that condition also show in­ range conditions, disease prevention and creased stereotypy and bar-biting. Such precise medication are difficult to at­ Stephen R. Kellert behavior may be a consequence of labor tain. Given our capability to reduce or pain, but may also be indicative of a eliminate such forms of suffering, we Although there is a diversity of opinion about how to view the relationship be­ state of frustration associated with the may well ask whether animals raised in tween humans and wildlife, recent political pressures from the current administration absence of nesting material. free-range conditions are suffering un­ make it mandatory that these diverse groups coalesce to use their combined leverage Someone may criticize the remarks necessarily. It is not at all clear that the to halt the planned incursions into the remaining habitats of wildlife. It is also impor­ that we have made here by claiming that extent or intensity of suffering of birds tant to begin to see nature as a complex and interrelated whole, and to respect the in­ the evidence that we have concerning the raised on a "free range" is less than any tegrity of that whole, rather than simply select individual species for affection and suffering of the sow, etc., does not con­ discomfort that the birds suffer when protection. stitute proof that the animals in question raised in cages. Zusammenfassung are suffering. This objection reflects a Second, in raising the issue of wheth­ type of skepticism that is legitimate in er some agricultural practices cause un­ Obwohl verschiedene Meinungen Uber die Beziehung zwischen Mensch und many cases. We must be ready to admit, necessary suffering, we are not impugn­ wilder Fauna bestehen, wird es durch den jUngsten, von der gegenwartigen US Re­ with respect to many claims such as ing the motives of the producer who has gierung ausgehenden politischen Druck unumganglich, dass sich aile noch so ver­ those illustrated above, that we may be employed such practices- he or she is schiedenen Gruppen zusammenschliessen, um gemeinsam den Hebel anzusetzen, mistaken; to be rigidly dogmatic about not deliberately cruel. In saying that a our contention would be unscientific. particular practice causes unnecessary Dr. Kellert is Associate Professor in The School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, Yale University, New But, to deny or doubt conclusions that suffering, we are not saying that the Haven, CT. The following are the opening remarks at a symposium on "Wildlife Management in the United are supported by good scientific reason­ practice was introduced merely to cause States: Scientific and Humane Issues in Conservation Programs," The Institute for the Study of Animal Prob­ ing is also faulty scientific methodology. suffering and we are not saying that the lems, St. Louis, MO, October 14, 1981.

136 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982 137